SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES BACKGROUNDER: TERRORISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS 13 July 2004 ICG Asia Report N°80 Singapore/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND TO THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES CONFLICT..................... 3 III. TERROR AND THE PEACE PROCESS .................................................................... 5 IV. TERROR AND FACTIONALISM IN THE MILF..................................................... 9 V. CAMP HUDAIBIYAH AND THE ISLAMIC MILITARY ACADEMY ............... 13 A. ORIGINS OF JI-MILF COOPERATION ...................................................................................13 B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAMP HUDAIBIYAH........................................................................15 VI. AL-GHOZI AND THE JAKARTA AND RIZAL DAY BOMBINGS, 2000....... 18 VII. ZULKIFLI, THE FITMART DEPARTMENT STORE BOMBINGS, AND THE ABU SAYYAF CONNECTION................................................................................. 19 A. THE GENERAL SANTOS CITY SAFEHOUSES .........................................................................21 B. REBUILDING THE ABU SAYYAF CONNECTION .....................................................................22 VIII. THE DAVAO BOMBS................................................................................................. 23 IX. ONGOING MILF COOPERATION WITH JIHADIST GROUPS........................ 25 X. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES ....................................................................................................27 B. CHRONOLOGY OF BOMBINGS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES .............28 C. GRP-MILF PEACE PROCESS...............................................................................................30 D. JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT ....................................................................34 E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................35 F. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................36 G. ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES, INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD AND SENIOR MEMBERS.....38 ICG Asia Report N°80 13 July 2004 SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES BACKGROUNDER: TERRORISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Persistent reports of links between the separatist full-time, permanent Philippine government peace Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the panel, adequately resourced to build consensus Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror network overshadow among key stakeholders on the shape of enhanced and put at risk the peace process between the MILF autonomy. and the Philippine government. While the MILF leadership continues to deny any ties, all evidence JI, now notorious for its activities especially in points to ongoing operational and training links. Indonesia, established a foothold in the southern What is uncertain is whether top leaders are aware of Philippines in 1994, building on ties formed with the the activity and unwilling to admit it, or whether secessionist MILF in Afghanistan in the 1980s. members of JI and other like-minded jihadist groups Personal relationships between founding MILF have established their own personal ties to individual chairman Salamat Hashim and JI leaders like MILF commanders without the knowledge of the Abdullah Sungkar and Zulkarnaen allowed it to set MILF leadership. up training camps under MILF protection, replicating the Afghan camp system in which the This background report, which continues a series on organisation first took shape, and transferring deadly terrorism in South East Asia, examines the history skills to a new generation of operatives. of the JI-MILF alliance, the depth of its past cooperation and the state of the present relationship. As well as replenishing JI ranks in Indonesia A central paradox of the southern Philippines peace depleted by post-Bali arrests, some of these process is that it presents both the main short-term graduates have carried out terror attacks in the obstacle to rooting out the terrorist network and an Philippines in concert with local elements from the indispensable element in any long-term remedy to MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group. ICG information terror. Attempts to move directly against terrorists suggests that the architect of many of these recent embedded in MILF-controlled territory risk an attacks was a Javanese graduate of the Mindanao escalation of violence and a breakdown of talks. camps, named Zulkifli. He was captured in Malaysia Yet without a successful peace agreement, the in late 2003, but not before overseeing the Davao region will continue to be marked by a climate of bombings of March and April 2003, which killed 38 lawlessness in which terrorism can thrive. and remain a major obstacle to the peace talks. The short-term imperative is to prevent a re-eruption The JI-MILF relationship is clearly continuing, but of the war. One possible measure would be to in a much more decentralised fashion. Since the immediately bring into force a mechanism agreed to Philippine army overran major MILF camps in 2000, by both sides in 2002 but never implemented for joint MILF forces have been dispersed into smaller, more Philippine government-MILF cooperation against autonomous units, sometimes disavowed by the criminals taking refuge in MILF areas. This should be MILF leadership as "lost commands". The MILF has strengthened to address foreign terrorists explicitly. always been loose-knit, but its units became more independent following the offensive of 2000 and Improving MILF accountability to the peace process after Salamat Hashim's death in July 2003. in this way could be reciprocated by appointing a Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process ICG Asia Report N°80, 13 July 2004 Page ii It is unclear at this stage how the new MILF leadership around Hashim's successor, Al-Haj Murad, regards the ties to JI. The MILF officially disavows terrorism. Given what is now known about JI-MILF ties, therefore, there are three possible interpretations of this official stance, all of which bode ill for the peace process. If top MILF leaders engaged in peace negotiations are unaware of local level cooperation with JI or if they follow a "don't ask, don't tell" policy that leaves local commanders to their own devices, the lack of central control suggests it might not be possible to implement an agreement. If at least some top MILF officials are not only aware of JI ties, but see them as a crucial element of a "fight and talk" strategy, the good faith necessary for successful negotiations would be called into question. All three possibilities may be related to factional divisions within the MILF that appear to have deepened since Salamat Hashim's death. Singapore/Brussels, 13 July 2004 ICG Asia Report N°80 13 July 2004 SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES BACKGROUNDER: TERRORISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS I. INTRODUCTION to limit state capacity in much of the South, yet so decentralised that what ensues is not a shadow government, but pockets of anarchy. These enclaves The spectre of terrorism is haunting the southern are dominated by local rebel "commanders" owing Philippines peace process. Persistent reports of links varying degrees of allegiance to umbrella coalitions between the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation like the MILF or ASG, but whose power is rooted in Front (MILF), the regional Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) pyramids of particularistic clan and tribal loyalties. It network, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is unclear how much control the central MILF overshadow the negotiations between the MILF and leadership exercises over its commanders. Philippine government in Kuala Lumpur and underscore the growing entanglement of deeply- Negotiations with the MILF, underway since 1996, rooted domestic insurgencies with the global "war have repeatedly broken down over the issue of "lost on terrorism". Mindanao is increasingly viewed as a commands" and "lawless elements" taking refuge in frontline in this struggle.1 MILF territory that are disowned by the MILF leadership. This report examines the relationship The MILF is widely regarded as a revolutionary between the MILF and regional and local terrorist organisation fighting for the self-determination of organisations, focusing most closely on JI. It Philippine Muslims (Moros). It proclaims itself as highlights the special difficulties the Philippines such, and publicly renounces terror. It has not been faces in uprooting terrorist networks embedded in a listed as a terrorist organisation by the U.S., unlike domestic insurgency with its own complex the ASG, Pentagon Gang, and New People's Army dynamics. Countering these networks effectively (NPA), which also challenge Philippine security will involve a unique combination of police, forces.2 Yet Manila and Washington believe the military and diplomatic measures. MILF has working relationships with all these groups, and most significantly with JI, which is The Philippines has been described as the weakest said to train in MILF-controlled camps and whose link in the effort to contain the threat of further