DESIGNING HEAVEN'S WILL: THE JOB ASSIGNMENT IN THE CHINESE IMPERIAL CIVIL SERVICE INACIO´ BO´ AND LI CHEN Abstract. We provide an original analysis of historical documents to describe the as- signment procedures used to allocate entry-level civil service jobs in China from the tenth to the early twentieth century. The procedures tried to take different objectives into account through trial and error. By constructing a formal model that combines these procedures into a common framework, we compare their effectiveness in minimizing un- filled jobs and prioritizing high-level posts. We show that the problem was inherently complex such that changes made to improve the outcome could have the opposite effect. Based on a small modification of the last procedure used, we provide a new mechanism for producing maximum matchings under constraints in a transparent and public way. Keywords: Civil service assignment; Matching; Market design; History of civil service JEL: D73; J45; C78; D47; N15 arXiv:2105.02457v2 [econ.TH] 6 Sep 2021 B´o: China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China; email:
[email protected]. Chen: Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden; email:
[email protected]. Date: August, 2021. We thank Andrea Br´eard,Rustamdjan Hakimov, Philipp Heller, Yuan Ju, Dongwoo Lee, Herv´eMoulin, Luigi Pascali, Marek Pycia, Nadja Stroh-Maraun, and Utku Unver¨ for helpful comments. Special thanks to Rui Magone for assistance in our historical research of the Chinese civil service system. Financial support from the Anniversary Foundation of the School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, is gratefully acknowledged.