The East Asian War, 1592–1598

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The East Asian War, 1592–1598

As East Asia regains its historical position as a world centre, information on the history of regional relations becomes ever more critical. Astonishingly, Northeast Asia enjoyed fi ve centuries of international peace from 1400 to 1894, broken only by one major international war – the invasion of Korea in the 1590s by Japan’s ruler Hideyoshi. This war involved Koreans, Japanese, Chinese, Southeast Asians, and Europeans; it saw the largest overseas landing in world history up to that time and devastated Korea. It also highlighted the nature of the strategic balance in the region, presenting China’s Ming dynasty with a serious threat that perhaps foreshadowed the dynasty’s subsequent overthrow by the Manchus, played a major part in the establishment of the Tokugawa regime with its policy of peace and controlled access to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Japan, and demonstrated the importance for regional stability of the subtle relationship of Korea to both China and Japan. This book presents a comprehensive analysis of the war and its aftermath in all its aspects – military, political, social, economic, and cultural. As such it deepens understanding of East Asian international relations and provides important insights into the strategic concerns that continue to operate in the region at present.

James B. Lewis is the University Lecturer in Korean History at the University of Oxford, UK. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Asian States and Empires Edited by Peter Lorge , Vanderbilt University

The importance of Asia will continue to grow in the twenty-fi rst century, but remarkably little is available in English on the history of the polities that constitute this critical area. Most current work on Asia is hindered by the extremely limited state of knowledge of the Asian past in general and the history of Asian states and empires in particular. Asian States and Empires is a book series that will provide detailed accounts of the history of states and empires across Asia from earliest times to the present. It aims to explain and describe the formation, maintenance and collapse of Asian states and empires, and the means by which this was accomplished, making available the history of more than half the world’s population at a level of detail comparable to the history of Western polities. In so doing, it will demonstrate that Asian peoples and civilizations had their own histories apart from the West and provide the basis for understanding contemporary Asia in terms of its actual histories, rather than broad generalizations informed by Western categories of knowledge.

1. The Third Chinese Revolutionary 6. Rethinking the Decline of Civil War, 1945–49 China’s Qing Dynasty An analysis of Communist Imperial activism and strategy and leadership borderland management at the Christopher R. Lew turn of the nineteenth century Daniel McMahon 2. China’s Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976 7. Civil–Military Relations in Johannes L. Kurz Chinese History From Ancient China to the 3. War, Culture and Society in Early Communist takeover Modern South Asia, 1740–1849 Edited by Kai Filipiak

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kaushik Roy 8. Chinese and Indian Warfare – 4. The Military Collapse of China’s From the Classical Age to 1870 Ming Dynasty, 1618–44 Edited by Kaushik Roy and Kenneth M. Swope Peter Lorge

5. China’s Second Capital – Nanjing 9. The East Asian War, 1592–1598 under the Ming, 1368–1644 International relations, violence, Jun Fang and memory Edited by James B. Lewis The East Asian War, 1592–1598 International relations, violence, and memory

Edited by James B. Lewis Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 selection and editorial material, James B. Lewis; individual chapters, the contributors The right of James B. Lewis to be identifi ed as author of the editorial material, and of the individual authors as authors of their contributions, has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifi cation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data A catalog record for this book has been requested.

ISBN: 978-1-138-78663-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-76720-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 by Out of House Publishing Contents

List of illustrations viii List of contributors ix Acknowledgments xi Maps xii

Introduction 1

P A R T I International and domestic background 9

1 Japanese–Korean and Japanese–Chinese relations in the sixteenth century 11 SAEKI K Ō JI

2 Korea’s pre-war domestic situation and relations with Japan 22 HAN MOON JONG

3 Violence, trade, and impostors in Korean–Japanese relations, 1510–1609 42 KENNETH R. ROBINSON

PART II War 71 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 4 The Imjin Waeran: contrasting the fi rst and the second invasions of Korea 73 KITAJIMA MANJI

5 Hideyoshi’s view of Chos ŏ n Korea and Japan–Ming negotiations 93 SAJIMA AKIKO vi Contents 6 Post-war domain source material on Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea: the wartime memoirs of Shimazu soldiers 108 MURAI SH Ō SUKE

7 The role of the Chos ŏ n navy and major naval battles during the Imjin Waeran 120 YI MIN’UNG

8 Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 141 NUKII MASAYUKI

9 Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 163 KENNETH M. SWOPE

10 Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan: rethinking China’s involvement in the Imjin Waeran 197 HARRIET T. ZURNDORFER

11 The celestial warriors: Ming military aid and abuse during the Korean War, 1592–8 236 NAM-LIN HUR

12 International relations and the Imjin War 256 JAMES B. LEWIS

PART III Impact and memory 275

13 “The inestimable benevolence of saving a country on the brink of ruin”: Chos ŏ n–Ming and Chos ŏ n–Later Jin relations in the seventeenth century 277 HAN MYUNG-GI

14 Chos ŏ n Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran: state rituals in the Later Chos ŏ n period 294 KUWANO EIJI

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 15 War and cultural exchange 323 HA WOO BONG

16 The Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 340 CHOI GWAN Contents vii 17 Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue: the virtuous woman in post-war literary discourse 357 MICHAEL J. PETTID

Conclusion 378

Glossary and index 380 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Illustrations

Maps 1 East Asia c .1592 xii 2 First invasion xiii 3 Naval war xiv 4 Guerrilla war xv 5 Second invasion xvi

Tables 2.1 Korean and Japanese embassies 27 2.2 Embassies from the king of Japan to Chosŏ n (1510–92) 29 4.1 Province, production level, and daikan assignments 77 7.1 Sea battles of 1592 124

Figures 17.1 Maiden Ch’oe 362 17.2 Two wives 363 17.3 K ŭ nshim 364 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Contributors

Choi Gwan ( 崔官 ), Professor of Japanese Studies, Korea University, South Korea. Ha Woo Bong ( 河宇鳳), Professor of History, Chŏ nbuk National University South Korea. Han Moon Jong ( 韓文鍾), Associate Professor of History, Chŏ nbuk National University South Korea. Han Myung-gi ( 䞲ⳛ₆), Professor of History, Department of History, Myongji University, South Korea. Nam-lin Hur , Professor of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Canada. Kitajima Manji ( 北島万次), Professor of International Studies, Faculty of International Studies, Ky ō ritsu Women’s University, Japan. Kuwano Eiji ( 桑野栄治), Professor of History, Department of Intercultural Studies, Kurume University, Japan. James B. Lewis , University Lecturer in Korean History, University of Oxford. Murai Shō suke ( 村井章介), Professor of Japanese History, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, Faculty of Letters, University of Tō ky ō , Japan. Nukii Masayuki ( 貫井正之), Lecturer, Nagoya University of Foreign Studies Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 and Nihon Fukushi University, Japan. Michael J. Pettid , Professor of Premodern Korean Studies, Binghamton University (SUNY), USA. Kenneth R. Robinson , Research Fellow, Institute of Asian Cultural Studies, International Christian University, Japan. Saeki Kō ji ( 佐伯弘次), Professor of Japanese History, Department of History, Kyū sh ū University, Japan. x List of contributors

Sajima Akiko ( 佐島顕子), Associate Professor of History, Fukuoka Jo Gakuin University, Japan. Kenneth M. Swope , Professor of History, University of Southern Mississippi, USA. Yi Min’ung ( 蝗敏雄), Professor of History, Republic of Korea Naval Academy, South Korea. Harriet T. Zurndorfer , Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, The Netherlands. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Acknowledgments

The origin of the present volume goes back to an international conference held in Oxford in 2001. Those fi rst papers were translated, revised, and re-translated. Some papers came later from participants and additional papers were solicited to fi ll out the original scheme. Commentary at the 2001 conference was provided by invited discussants from Europe and the United States. Those who did not contribute papers but who came all the way to England to offer their wise counsel include: Willem J. Boot from the University of Leiden, Ronald P. Toby from the University of Urbana-Champaign, Hugh Kang from the University of Hawai’i, and JaHyun Kim Haboush from Columbia University. Thomas Nelson, then of Wadham College, drove in from the outer reaches of Oxfordshire. Translations were initially done by Nakajima Sanae and Rachel Payne of Pembroke College, Oxford; Grace Koh of Wadham College, Oxford, and Chi Young-hae of St Antony’s College, Oxford. Any remaining translation errors must be laid at my feet and not theirs. Nakajima Sanae and Grace Koh also supplied interpretation at the conference. Financial support was provided by The Korea Foundation, The Oriental Institute of the University of Oxford, The Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation, The Japan Foundation, The Northeast Area Council of the Association for Asian Studies (USA), The British Academy, The Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, The International Institute for Asian Studies (the Netherlands), and Wolfson College (Oxford). The conference was organized under the auspices of the British Association for Korean Studies and held at Wolfson College. Final production of the volume was possible only because of sabbatical support from the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies and the dedicated perseverance and constructive criticism offered by three doctoral students all working on aspects of the Imjin War: Mr Thomas Quartermain (Wolfson College) prepared the maps; Ms Eunjin Jeong-Spencer

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 (Wolfson College) edited the bibliography; and Mr Marshall Craig (Pembroke College) edited the glossary and index. Ms Wei Xin, another doctoral student, offered assistance with the fi nal compilation of the index at a critical moment. I would like to thank Peter Sowden of Routledge who took an interest in a volume of papers on an obscure East Asian war, and Helena Hurd of Routledge and David Campbell of Out of House Publishing who have shepherded the volume through production. Finally, I would like to thank Kenneth R. Robinson for his tireless patience and sound advice at all stages of the project. James B. Lewis Wolfson College, Oxford Maps

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Map 1 East Asia c . 1592 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Map 2 First invasion Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Map 3 Naval war Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Map 4 Guerrilla war Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Map 5 Second invasion Introduction

James B. Lewis

The Imjin War 1 has received little attention in Western scholarship, despite its scale, impact, and reverberating signifi cance. The Japanese invading forces completed the largest overseas landing in world history to that time, and the number of combatants may have reached 500,000.2 The war involved Koreans, Japanese, Chinese, Southeast Asians, and Europeans, giving it the dubious distinction of being an extensive, international war. It played a major part in the establishment of the Japanese pax Tokugawa in the early seventeenth century. It was a serious concern for Ming China, and it severely tested relations between China and Korea, the most important tributary relationship in East Asia. Although the war devastated Korea, it changed, but did not shatter, Korean society, governance, and economy. The war was one of the most important international events for East Asia over the period from the establishment of the Ming in 1368 to the arrival of Euro-American gunboat diplomacy in the nineteenth century. Memories of the invasion are continuously nurtured and kept fresh on the Korean peninsula, while the strategic concerns highlighted by the invasion for both Japan and China reappeared in the Korean War of the 1950s and are still relevant today. Until 2002, the only published monograph in English that surveyed the war was produced in 1907 by William George Aston and was based on his articles in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (“Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea”) from the 1870s and 1880s. From 1907 to 2001, we received only a few articles. 3 Since 2001 we have seen a slight expansion of interest and the appearance of a few detailed studies,4 as well as the appearance of translations of primary sources. 5

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The fi rst monograph on the war since Aston was Stephen Turnbull’s Samurai Invasion, which appeared in 2002. 6 Turnbull surveys the entire war and focuses on Japanese military history. The book relies on primary and secondary Japanese-language sources. Just three years later, in 2005, Samuel Hawley published The Imjin War. 7 Hawley’s book is a survey of the entire war as well, and uses secondary Korean literature. In 2009, Kenneth M. Swope published A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail , which works from primary Chinese records and secondary Japanese research.8 Because of their sources, the three books are written from the perspectives of the three main 2 Introduction belligerents. They offer broad and useful narratives on the war, but the scale of the confl ict can be overwhelming for any single author. We should move on to more specifi c and analytical research, which is the driving vision behind this collection. We still lack a body of monographs that exhaust primary materials to examine individual questions. We lack discussions of the international East Asian situation over the century preceding the war. We do not know much about why the Japanese initiated the war; why the Korean defense collapsed so spectacularly; why the Chinese came to the rescue; what strategic necessities dominated the war; how the Japanese thought they would govern Korea; how the Koreans resisted; what the Koreans thought about their Chinese saviors; the extent of the war’s impact on Japanese cultural development; how the war affected Korea’s environmental, economic, or demographic and social history; how Japanese and Koreans remembered the war in ritual and literature; or how the war might enlighten contemporary international relations theory. This collection attempts to open windows onto these questions. To address the major gap in English-language scholarship, leading scholars in South Korea, Japan, and the West were invited to prepare papers on the Imjin War. In the following pages, they address the background, the pros- ecution, and the lasting signifi cance of the war. The chapters look to material, ideological, cultural, and institutional factors. Some authors show how diplomacy and trade fi nally failed to maintain the peace and may have contributed to the outbreak of war. Some authors dwell on the various motives and objectives of the belligerents and discuss strategic, tactical, and personal perspectives. Others explain naval operations, guerrilla activities, Korean support for the Chinese, and Japanese attempts at governance. With its deep well of heroism, cowardice, and titanic clashes, the war lent itself easily to the construction of memory through literature, drama, and didactic publications. Memories produced ritual activity and nuanced foreign policy, and the following two centuries saw a long international peace, a phenomenal record among major powers in world history. The chapters are organized along three themes. The fi rst theme examines the international relations among Japan, Korea, and China over the sixteenth century before 1592. Japanese relations with Korea and China become attenuated as the century progressed, and Saeki Kō ji argues that the sixteenth century was a “piratical time” in the region. Japanese internal disunity spilled

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 onto the streets of Ningbo in 1523 and eventually the Japanese lost their tally trade or their access to China. Even earlier, a serious problem was developing within Korean–Japanese relations. Over the fi fteenth century, Tsushima established its primacy in the Korea trade and “Japan towns” appeared in the Korean open ports. Chosŏ n state attempts to impose controls on the “Japan towns” triggered violent outbursts in 1510. When relations were re-established in 1512, controls were accepted but because trade had been curtailed, the Japanese traders turned to manufacturing impostor envoys as a way to re-acquire more access. Han Moon Jong Introduction 3 outlines the general position of the impostor envoys within the full range of Japanese–Korean diplomatic relations, and Kenneth R. Robinson uncovers three dynamic cycles in Korean–Japanese relations: Japanese violence, followed by Korean termination of trade, followed by negotiations, and fi nally the re-establishment of trade. These cyclical patterns resulted in an expansion of the numbers of Japanese impostor envoys. The signifi cance of the fraud perpetrated by agents in Tsushima, Hakata, and western Japan became clear when Korean envoys in 1590 were startled to learn that some of the Chos ŏn state’s supposed Japanese contacts had long ago disappeared from the Japanese political scene and that Korean intelligence on Japan was nearly worthless. The fi rst theme also looks to the domestic situations of Japan and Korea. Han surveys socio-economic changes in Chosŏ n Korea over the sixteenth century and explains the breakdown of Chosŏ n military institutions and the resultant lack of Korean military preparedness. He concludes with a discussion of the various reasons that have been proffered for Korean military defeat. Robinson argues that the Korean state saw tolerance of Japanese impostors as less demanding than addressing real military needs, and he points out that the proliferation of impostor envoys meant that the centralizing Japanese powers in the Kinai region were just as removed from good intelligence on continental and peninsular affairs as the Koreans were becoming about Japan. These chapters set the stage for the war, but they do not explain why war broke out. The second theme turns to the war itself – why it was launched, how it was conducted, how it was resisted, what were the reasons for and the results of Chinese involvement, and what are some questions for international relations raised by the war. Kitajima Manji examines Hideyoshi’s self-image and his objectives in setting out to conquer China, and offers specifi cs on how the Japanese intended to rule the conquered territories. Kitajima explains that, as the war did not go smoothly, Hideyoshi became frustrated and reduced his goals to the permanent seizure of Korean land. The second invasion discarded all pretence of being benign to the Korean people and descended to atrocities. Kitajima argues that, without Korean lands to dispense, the feudal lords had to fall back on war tales of their derring-do to maintain the facade of their social status and to claim the slimmest shred of “victory.” Sajima Akiko goes further into Hideyoshi’s worldview and analyzes Japanese–Chinese negoti-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ations to reveal Hideyoshi’s views on Korea as he coped with a collapse of his original vision. She explains Hideyoshi’s motivations and why atrocities became commonplace by arguing that, even before the invasion, Hideyoshi already viewed Korea as Japanese territory in “revolt.” To maintain legitimacy, Hideyoshi could not hesitate to punish the “rebels,” and that punishment led to the invasions and the massacres symbolized by the “Mound of Ears” still preserved in Kyoto. Murai Shō suke picks up the question of Japanese war tales, and argues that these provided the chief source of Japanese memory on the war in succeeding centuries. He brings us the earliest instance of the 4 Introduction great tiger hunt (toragari no ki ), which became the leading icon of samurai “heroism” in Korea, and he relates Japanese reports on the administration of conquered territory. From Japanese motivations for war, we turn to Korean responses. Yi Min’ung analyzes the naval strategies of the combatants and tracks the progress of the naval war from its beginning to end, focusing on the Korean navy. He discusses the strategic victory in stopping the Japanese at sea and credits this to superior ship design and superior logistical and tactical talents embodied in Admiral Yi Sunshin. By detailing the obstacles that the navy faced, Yi strips away the romantic imagery that clouds our view of the famous admiral and better reveals his real accomplishments. Nukii Masayuki turns to Korean resistance on land and examines Korean guerrilla forces, particularly in their heyday during the fi rst year of the war. While comparing and contrasting regional responses across Korea, he addresses questions of submission and resistance to the Japanese, the organization and composition of the guerrillas, their motivations, and their relations with the court, the regular army, and the general populace. Such extra-governmental forces eventually posed an existential threat to the Korean government, making the co-opta- tion of the guerrillas and the resuscitation of regular forces a paramount concern to the state. The next four chapters discuss Chinese motivations and actions and the war as useful to study international relations in East Asia. Kenneth M. Swope makes a case for Ming China having an over-arching strategic vision, identifi es the key security problems, emphasizes the importance of violence within Ming foreign and domestic affairs, and proposes a periodization that discusses the application of grand strategy over the life of the dynasty. In short, Ming policy was designed to “manifest awe,” and we can see this pre- rogative in action in Korea in the 1590s. Harriet Zurndorfer draws a sharper focus on Ming involvement in Korea. She dispels the image of a weak Wanli emperor and puts into perspective the position of the war in China’s overall military concerns and examines the impact of the war on imperial fi nances. She concludes that the war did not cause the collapse of Ming China, and that the Korea campaign did not bankrupt the treasury. Nam-lin Hur brings us back to the reality of Chinese troops entering Korea. He looks at Korea within Chinese realpolitik and points to the heavy burdens of hosting Chinese forces. He argues that there was no altruism in the Chinese response, and that

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Chinese expectations of logistical support could not possibly be satisfi ed by the Koreans. The result was that Koreans often could not distinguish between the depredations of Ming and Japanese soldiers. Carrying on the theme of grand strategy across the region, James B. Lewis reaches out to the fi eld of international relations with a historian’s view on what sort of lessons the war offers for international relations scholars. He argues that the history of East Asian relations is still largely unknown and that is why scholars are not using this history to augment and correct European-derived theories; he promotes a constructivist or cultural approach; and he suggests a few questions that Introduction 5 might be profi tably explored: just war, the nature of hierarchy, and the geopolitics of war in Korea. The third and fi nal theme focuses on the impact and memory of the war exhibited in policies, institutions, material culture, and literature. Han Myung-gi points out that the war and the Chinese response transformed Korea–China relations. Although the gratitude felt by the Korean ruling elite towards Ming China had to be balanced against the deprivations visited on the Korean populace in supporting the Chinese troops, elite sentiments heavily infl uenced Chosŏ n policies towards the changing Chinese situation in the decades following the war. Pro-Ming versus Qing-accommodationist struggles at the Korean court see-sawed Chos ŏ n politics in the decades following the invasion and reached even to the dethronement of one king and to two Manchu invasions (1627 and 1636). Eventually a modus vivendi was established between Chosŏ n Korea and the rising Manchu power, but that was tempered by the memory of Ming aid. Kuwano Eiji questions the strength of Korean sentiment surrounding Ming China by detailing the establishment of Chos ŏn state rituals celebrating a Chinese god of war, living Chinese generals, and deceased Ming soldiers. Using state rituals as a proxy for attitudes towards Ming and Qing in the post-invasion context, Kuwano traces attitudes in Korea towards China over much of the seventeenth century. He argues that by the 1660s the revival of rites for dead Ming soldiers had more to do with mitigating a famine than with any resuscitation of admiration for the Ming. Ha Woo Bong takes a broad view of cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan during and after the war. He outlines far-reaching impacts on intellectual and material cultures in both Japan and Korea. Japanese soldiers brought back Neo-Confucian cognoscenti to instruct Japanese warlords in the fi neries of Confucian statecraft. Looted metal type helped launch a publishing revolution in Tokugawa-era Japan. Stolen books formed the core of many major Japanese libraries, and kidnapped potters transmitted technical knowledge and founded many of the major Japanese kilns. To Korea went arquebuses, Catholicism, tobacco, and chili peppers, which changed Korean society, economy, food, and its intellectual world. The last two chapters introduce us to the specifi cs of memory as preserved in post-war writings of various kinds. Choi Gwan surveys Korean non- fi ction, fi ctional dream novels, novels related to captives, verse, and that popular, agglutinative omnibus of tales on the war, the Imjinnok . Choi also traces the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 inscription of the Imjin Waeran in Japanese war tales and fi ctional accounts, some of which were transposed to the kabuki and ningy ō j ō ruri stages, even acquiring fantastic aspects. He argues that the Korean accounts depict horror and devastation while the Japanese accounts created long-lived chauvinist attitudes in Japan that carried into the Meiji era. Michael Pettid takes us back to a little-known aspect of the war’s impact on Korean society. He analyzes post-war Korean didactic texts to explain the construction of early-modern Korean female virtue. Through vignettes of women caught in war the state and a male-dominated ruling class molded a hegemonic discourse that largely 6 Introduction defi ned womanhood in post-war Korean society. While Kitajima and Murai explain that the Japanese ruling elite used war tales to salvage some measure of respect following the abject failure of the invasion, Pettid argues that the Chos ŏn ruling elite promoted stories of virtuous female resistance to suppress the fact that many women of the upper classes had been raped. The tainting of illustrious lineages had to be denied to resurrect social status and solicit the lower-class deference that allowed rule. Our collection is a sustained argument that the Imjin War was very signifi - cant to Northeast Asia and offers comparisons with the great international wars of Europe and continental Asia. Scholars in Korea and Japan continue to examine the war for its lessons regarding early-modern Chinese, Korean, and Japanese relations. The signboards of nearly every palace and temple in South Korea detail the destruction of the war, and every Japanese schoolchild is familiar with Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The Chinese cannot help considering the war and similar wars when they think about Korea and the northeast in general. If we in the West wish to understand East Asian international relations, the Imjin War is an excellent starting point. All East Asian names are rendered as surname and given name. Korean is romanized according to the McCune-Reischauer system; Japanese according to Hepburn; and Chinese according to Pinyin. Each chapter retains its own notes and bibliography to better aid the reader in consulting references. All individual glossaries have been unifi ed at the end and are combined with the index.

Notes 1 This Introduction and the chapters in the volume will refer to the Japanese invasion of Korea from 1592 to 1598 in various ways. The appellations have no particular intent behind them, and some may use the reign names or the sexagenary terms or simply refer to the war as “Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea.” For example, the common designator in modern Japan is the “War of Bunroku-Keich ō” (Bunroku-Keich ō no eki) for the Bunroku period (1592–5) and the Keichō period (1596–1614). The common designator in modern South Korea is the “Japanese disturbance of the Imjin year” ( Imjin Waeran ), which refers to the sexagenary term imjin (year 1592). 2 Absolute numbers are diffi cult to determine. Japanese combatants ranged from 200,000 to 300,000, depending on whether reserves are included; Koreans are unknown but could be estimated at tens of thousands, even up to 100,000, if we consider all irregular troop activity; the Chinese fi elded about 120,000. Swope, 2009,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 p. 186. 3 William George Aston, “Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea,” 1881 and 1883. These essays were brought together into W.G. Aston, Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea , 1907. Broader studies have mentioned the invasion. For example, there is a general treatment of Yi Sunshin and the naval war in G.A. Ballard’s The Infl uence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan, 1921, and an overview in Yoshi S. Kuno’s Japan’s Expansion on the Asiatic Continent , 1940, as well as Mary Elizabeth Berry’s Hideyoshi, 1982. There are book chapters and articles: Gari Ledyard, “Confucianism and War,” 1988–9, examines the Chinese debate at the end of the invasion in 1598 over the conduct of the Korean king and court and highlights the rhetoric deployed as an aspect of Confucian state ideology; Jurgis Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” Introduction 7 1991, outlines the event as an aspect of Japan’s engagement with East Asia in the late sixteenth century; Donald Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 1998, considers the invasion within Korean tributary relations with the Ming Empire. 4 JaHyun Kim Haboush introduced literary views on the war: “Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea,” 2003. Michael Finch introduced an important diary from the war: “Civilian life in Chosŏ n during the Japanese Invasion of 1592,” 2009. Multinational projects also exist, although results have not been published in English. In 2007, a collection of conference papers from Korean, Japanese, European, and American scholars was published in Korean and Japanese: Ch ŏ ng Tu-h ŭi and Yi Ky ŏng-sun, eds., Imjin Waeran tong Asia samguk chŏ njaeng (A Transnational history of the Imjin Waeran 1592–1598, in Korean), 2007, and Ch ŏ ng Tu-h ŭi and Yi Ky ŏng-sun, eds., Kim Mun-ja and Obata Michihiro, trans., Jinshin sensō , 2008. Military historians have not ignored the war. Peter Lorge has discussed the war in the context of the development of the use of gunpowder in East Asia in The Asian Military Revolution , 2008. 5 As early as 1977, we were given the Nanjung ilgi: War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin , translated by Ha Tae-hung and edited by Sohn Pow-key, 1977. Ha Tae-hung translated Yi Sunshin’s memorials and published them as the Imjin Changch’o in 1981. In 2001, Jurgis S.A. Elisonas included a translation of Hideyoshi’s letter to King S ŏ njo (1590) and a few translated passages from Keinen’s Ch ō sen Hinikki ( 朝鮮日日記 ) in the second edition of the Sources of Japanese Tradition . A translation by Choi Byonghyon of Yu Sŏ ngnyong’s Chingbinok appeared in 2002 as The Book of Corrections . A translation of one of the more popular versions of the Imjinnok ( 壬辰錄) appeared in 2000 from Peter H. Lee as The Record of the Black Dragon Year . In 2013, JaHyun Kim Haboush and Kenneth R. Robinson gave us a translation of Kang Hang’s Kanyangnok as A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1597–1600: The Writings of Kang Hang . 6 Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 2002. Earlier monographs appeared in the 1970s in the Park Chunghee era but these focused almost entirely on Yi Sunshin and extolled his martial valor, brilliant tactics, and self-sacrifi ce: Jho Sung-do, Yi Sun-shin: A national hero of Korea, 1970, and Yune-Hee Park, Admiral Yi Sun-Shin and His Turtleboat Armada , 1978. 7 Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War , 2005. 8 Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail , 2009.

References Aston , W.G. “ Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea ,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan 6 ( 1878 ): 227–45 ; 9 ( 1881 ): 87–93 , 213–22 ; 11 ( 1883 ): 117–25 . Aston , W.G. Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea, With Japanese Translation by T. Masuda . Tokyo : Ryubun-kwan , 1907 . Ballard , G.A. The Infl uence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan . London : John

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Murray , 1921 . Berry , Mary Elizabeth . Hideyoshi . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1982 . C h ŏ ng Tuh ŭ i (㩫⚦䧂、鄭杜熙 ) and Yi Ky ŏ ngsun ( 㧊ἓ㑲 , 蝗璟珣 ), eds. Imjin Waeran tong Asia samguk chŏ njaeng ( G㧚㰚㢲⧖ ☯㞚㔲㞚㌒ῃ㩚㨗, A Transnational History of the Imjin Waeran 1592–1598: The East Asian Dimension). Seoul : Hyum ŏ nis ŭ t’ ŭ , 2007 . (Korean) C h ŏ ng Tu-h ŭ i ( 㩫⚦䧂、鄭杜熙 ) and Yi Ky ŏ ngsun ( 㧊ἓ㑲 , 蝗璟珣 ), eds., Kim Munja ( ₖⶎ㧦 , 金文子 ) and Obata Michihiro ( 小幡倫裕), trans. Jinshin sens ō: 16 seiki Nit- Ch ō -Ch ū no Kokusai sensō ( 壬辰戦争 : 16 世紀日 ዘ朝 ዘ中の国際戦争 ). Tokyo : Akashi shoten , 2008 . (Japanese) 8 Introduction Clark , Donald . “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” in Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote , eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644 , Part II. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1998 , pp. 272–300 . Elisonas , Jurgis . “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” in John Whitney Hall , ed. Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1991 , pp. 235–300 . Elisonas , Jurgis S.A. , trans. Excerpts from from Keinen’s Chō sen Hinikki ( 朝鮮日日記 ), in W. Theodore de Bary et al ., compilers, Sources of Japanese Tradition from Earliest Times to 1600, Vol. 1, 2nd edn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001 , pp. 465–9 . Finch , Michael . “ Civilian Life in Chos ŏ n during the Japanese Invasion of 1592: The ‘Namhaeng illok’ and ‘Imjin illok’ in Swaemirok by O Hŭ imun ,” Acta Koreana 12 :2 (December 2009 ): 55–77 . Ha Tae-hung , trans., Sohn Pow-key , ed. Nanjung ilgi: War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun- sin . Seoul : Yonsei University Press , 1977 . Ha Tae-hung , trans., Lee Chong-young , ed. Imjin Changch’o: Admiral Yi Sun-sin’s Memorials to Court . Seoul : Yonsei University Press , 1981 . Haboush , JaHyun Kim . “ Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea: Subversion and Literary Production in the Private Sector ,” The Journal of Asian Studies 62 :2 (May 2003 ): 415–42 . Hawley , Samuel . The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China . Seoul : Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch; Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California , 2005 . Jho Sung-do , Yi Sun-shin: A National Hero of Korea . Chinhae : Choongmoo-kong Society, Naval Academy , 1970 . Kang Hang ( 姜沆 ), JaHyun Kim Haboush and Kenneth R. Robinson , trans. A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1597–1600: The Writings of Kang Hang [ Kanyangnok ( 看羊錄 )]. New York : Columbia University Press , 2013 . Kuno , Yoshi S. Japan’s Expansion on the Asiatic Continent . Berkeley : University of California Press , 1940 . Ledyard , Gari . “ Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598 ,” Journal of Korean Studies 6 ( 1988–9 ): 81–119 . Lee , Peter H. The Record of the Black Dragon Year [ Imjinnok (壬辰錄 )]. Seoul : Institute of Korean Culture, Korea University , 2000 . Lorge , Peter A. The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2008 . Park , Yune-Hee . Admiral Yi Sun-Shin and His Turtleboat Armada , rev. edn. Seoul : Hanjin Publishing Company , 1978 . Swope , Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 East Asian War, 1592–1598. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009 . Turnbull , Stephen . Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War, 1592–98 . London : Cassell & Co. , 2002 . Y u S ŏ ngnyong ( 柳成龍 ), Choi Byonghyon , trans. The Book of Corrections: Refl ections on the National Crisis during the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592–1598 [ Chingbinok ( 懲毖錄 )]. Berkeley, CA : Institute of East Asian Studies , 2002 .

Part I International and domestic background Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 1 Japanese–Korean and Japanese– Chinese relations in the sixteenth century

Saeki K ō ji ( 佐伯弘次 )

Introduction This chapter surveys the diplomatic relations among Japan, Chosŏ n Korea, and Ming China in the sixteenth century; it probes the characteristics of that interaction and provides a context for the sixteenth century that lay behind the Imjin Waeran. The sixteenth-century East Asian maritime region saw a number of phenomena and changes: Tsushima’s monopolistic control of trade with Korea in Japan–Chosŏ n relations; confl ict and severance of relations in Japan–China relations; the revival of activities by Japanese pirates; and the arrival of the Europeans. The developments held a certain degree of commonality to the extent that the period can be called a “Wakō - like or piratical time.” The fi rst part below begins with the incident of 1510, the main watershed in Japanese–Korean relations of the sixteenth century. It then examines the way in which Tsushima came to monopolize trade with Chos ŏ n by initiating a system of impostor envoys following the establishment of the 1512 agreement (K. Imshin yakcho, J. Jinshin yakuj ō). The second part considers the Ningbo disturbance of 1523 and its impact on Japan–Ming relations, as well as the after-effects across East Asia as a whole. The chapter concludes with a survey of the booming maritime trade.

The riot of the three ports and Japan–Chos ŏ n relations Since the early fi fteenth century, the three ports of Che-p’o, Pusan-p’o, and Y ŏm-p’o off the southern coast of the Korean peninsula had been designated as ports where Japanese ships could moor, and many Japanese arrived in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ports. Among the Japanese who came to Chosŏ n in this way, some, particularly those who came from Tsushima, stayed on to live in the three coastal areas. In Chosŏ n, the Japanese living in Korea were called “resident Japanese” (K. hangg ŏ Waein). The population of resident Japanese increased as the years progressed, totaling more than 3,000 people at its peak. More than ten Japanese Buddhist temples were constructed for their religious needs. The three coastal towns inhabited by resident Japanese took on the appearance of “Japan towns.” Most of the resident Japanese made their living as merchants 12 Saeki Kōji or fi shermen, but there were some who engaged in smuggling and illegal fi shing. These, together with occasional bouts of aggression towards Koreans, became a source of worry for the Chos ŏ n government.1 During the reign of King Chungjong (r. 1506–44), the effects of political reform reached as far as the three ports and the offi cials in these coastal towns extended stricter controls over the Japanese living there. Despite the control efforts, some Japanese continued to behave belligerently. Reacting against suppressive measures by the Korean government, the Japanese residents of the three ports allied with the Sō family of Tsushima and staged an uprising that began on the fourth day of the fourth month of 1510. The uprising is known as the Riot of the Three Ports (K. Samp’o Waeran, J. Sanpo no ran ). 2 The allied army consisting of resident Japanese and Tsushima soldiers attacked the Pusan garrison and the Che-p’o garrison, either killing port offi cials or taking them hostage. The Korean government, however, easily suppressed this rebellion, and the resident Japanese escaped to Tsushima. At the end of the sixth month, the reunited allied army of resident Japanese and Tsushima soldiers mounted another attack on the Koreans at the port of Angol-p’o, east of Che-p’o, but this attack also ended in failure. The defeat at Angol- p’o marked the end of the disturbance, and with it ended relations between Tsushima and Chos ŏ n. The problem was that the survival of Tsushima and the S ō family depended on relations with Chos ŏn. The governor (J. shugo , t ō shu) of Tsushima, for example, had enormous interests tied up with Chosŏ n, because he had been allowed to dispatch fi fty trade ships to Chosŏ n each year as “annual ships” (K. segy ŏ ns ŏ n , J. saikensen), and to receive an annual subsidy from Chos ŏ n of 200 Korean s ŏ k worth of rice and soybeans. Aside from the annual ships, the governor could also send “Specially dispatched ships” (K. t ŭ ksongs ŏ n , J. tokus ō sen) in extraordinary circumstances. Deprived of all the access that they had enjoyed in the past as a result of the riot, the S ō became desperate to restore their connection with Chos ŏ n. S ō Saemon daibu oboegaki describes this state of affairs.3 The record shows how the Sō tried to make amends with Chos ŏ n through negotiations. Tsushima’s attempt to restore relations with Chosŏ n began around the third month of 1511, a year after the disturbance in the three ports. On the eighth day of the fourth month of 1511, the Goshomaru , the embassy ship for the “King of Japan,” took on board an envoy from the “King of Japan”

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 and three Koreans and departed Tsushima. The envoy was an impostor created by the S ō for the purpose of restoring relations. The three Koreans being repatriated had been captured by Japanese pirates, probably at the instigation of the S ō , but they were to be used as tokens of goodwill. In 1512, ships from the Shō ni in northern Kyū sh ū , the “King of Japan” (Ashikaga shō gun), and the Ō uchi in western Honshū and Hakata, as well as “specially dispatched” ships from the Sō , sailed one after the other for Chos ŏn. The envoys from the Sh ōni, the “King of Japan,” and the Ōuchi were impostors created by the S ō Japanese–Korean and Japanese–Chinese relations 13 for the purpose of restoring relations. Watching this parade of arrivals, the Chos ŏn government decided to make peace with Tsushima. Having no relations with Tsushima was a disadvantage to the Koreans, for they had come to rely on Tsushima to supply necessities such as pepper and sappanwood (red dye). The 1512 agreement (K. Imshin yakcho ) resulted from a mutual rapprochement between Chosŏ n and Tsushima. Although the Korean government drew up the 1512 agreement in the eighth month of that year, it was not brought to Tsushima for verifi cation until the end of the year. The governor of Tsushima, Sō Yoshimori (1476–1520), did not receive the details of the agreement from his special envoy until the fi rst month of 1513. Yoshimori, however, cared most about reviving the 1443 agreement (K. Kyehae yakcho ) with its fi fty ships, subsidy, and special envoys, and it was not until the seventh month of 1514 that he fi nally sent an annual trade ship to Chosŏ n in accordance with the 1512 agreement, thereby accepting the Korean terms. The 1512 agreement consisted of nine articles. 4 The following is a brief summary of the main points.

1 Japanese residence in the three ports to be banned; 2 the number of annual trade ships dispatched by the governor of Tsushima to Chos ŏ n to be halved to twenty-fi ve; 3 the annual subsidies of rice and soybeans to the governor of Tsushima to be halved to 100 s ŏ k ; 4 the abolition of specially dispatched ships from the governor of Tsushima; 5 the cessation of annual rice and soybean subsidies to and annual ships from the son of the governor of Tsushima, the governor’s deputy (J. daikan), nominal Korean military post appointees (J. jushokunin ), and personal seal recipients (J. jutoshonin ); 6 the reduction in the number of nominal Korean military post appointees and personal seal recipients based outside Tsushima (J. shinshowa ) according to an investigation of the length of their contact with Chosŏ n and their meritorious services; 7 Japanese ships to be permitted anchorage only at Che-p’o.

The conditions set in this agreement were a harsh blow to the S ō whose trading privileges were reduced to one-half of what had been granted in the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 1443 agreement. Not only that, but Japanese residence would no longer be permitted in the three ports and landings would be limited to only Che-p’o. For these reasons, negotiations by the Sō to recover lost privileges continued constantly throughout the sixteenth century. In order to recover lost privileges, the Sō continually sent envoys to Chosŏ n. For example, the S ō retainer Uchiyama Saemonsa, sent in the ninth month of 1514, stated that pirate activity had been terminated and that the Sō had repatriated Korean castaways. He requested, in return, that Chosŏ n restore 14 Saeki Kōji the annual trade ships to the original number (50) and provide the rice and soybean subsidies for the past two or three years. The Koreans refused these requests.5 In the eleventh month of 1515, the Chosŏ n government acknowledged the merits of the governor of Tsushima, who saw to the return of Korean castaways and offered incense for the dead, and permitted three annual trade ships from the governor’s son, Sō Morihide, and one annual trade ship from the district chief of Toyozaki-gun, S ō Moritoshi, who gave aid to Korean castaways. 6 These grants for both Morihide and Moritoshi appear to have been made in response to requests made by the governor. However, the fact that Moritoshi had died in 1503 shows that this clearly was an impostor envoy. The creation of impostor envoys immediately after the conclusion of the 1512 agreement indicates from the outset what would become the basis of negotiations with Chos ŏ n. From that time onwards, the Sō composed envoys from the “King of Japan” and dispatched them to Chos ŏ n frequently. Impostor envoys from this period included the monks Nanko (1514), Daiin (1517), Ekishū (1521), Daigen (1522), Ichigaku (1523), and Keirin (1525), to name but a few. 7 Among these envoys, Daigen and Ichigaku requested that the Korean government also receive the governor of Tsushima. Because these envoys are presumed to have been impostors, many others from the “King of Japan” can be considered fraudulent as well. At the same time, the Sō were providing reports to the Chosŏ n government on the activities of pirates. For example, in the fourth month of 1516, the S ō informed the Koreans that a large band of pirates had attacked Ryū ky ū and Ming China, and that they were about to encroach on Chos ŏ n territory.8 The Korean offi cials, however, did not yet trust this information. On the twenty-third day of the twelfth month of 1513, Governor Sō Yoshimori handed the following document to his retainer, Sō Daizen-no- suke: 9

The benefi ce held by [your father] Izu-no-kami of Sago-gun, Tsushima- kuni, was noted in a document issued by Sō Sadakuni and is confi rmed. In addition, as benefi ce, you will receive annually a letter [of introduction to Chos ŏn] for one trade ship under [the name of the governor of Tsushima], a letter [of introduction to Chosŏ n] under the name of Chiba of Hizen with [his] travel permit fee, and a letter [of introduction to Chosŏ n] under

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 your own name, and there shall be no deviations from this. 1513.12.23 S ō Yoshimori (seal) S ō Daizen-no-suke

The Daizen-no-suke document demonstrates well the relationship between the S ō and Chosŏ n, as well as the relationship with retainers immediately after the Riot of the Three Ports and the 1512 agreement re-opening relations with Chosŏ n. The Izu-no-kami who appears in this document is S ō Daizen- no-suke’s father, S ō Izu-no-kami Kuniyuki, who originally went by the name Japanese–Korean and Japanese–Chinese relations 15 S ō Daizen-no-suke Kuniyuki, and who sometimes traveled to Chos ŏn as the governor’s special envoy, and sometimes of his own accord. He is also known to have been dispatched as a special envoy during the period when Tsushima and Chosŏ n were re-establishing relations following the Riot of the Three Ports. He died in Che-p’o in Korea. As a direct retainer of the Sō family in Fuch ū (the provincial capital of Tsushima, today called Izuhara), S ō Daizen- no-suke combined the dual roles of diplomat and trader during his lifetime. What draws our attention to this document is the fact that the following three privileges were recognized for Sō Daizen-no-suke: (1) an annual letter of introduction to Chosŏ n for one ship from among the governor of Tsushima’s annual trade ships; (2) an annual letter of introduction for Chiba with his travel permit fee; and (3) a letter of introduction in his own name. Let us look at each of these in turn. In point (1), the Japanese text mentions kuninami (sometimes written as kunitsugu), which refers to the annual trade ships of the governor of Tsushima. The phrase, “annually a letter [of introduction to Chos ŏn] for one trade ship under [the name of the governor of Tsushima]” therefore indicates the privilege to maintain and manage one annual trade ship allowed to the governor. Here, we can see that Sō Yoshimori was granting one of his annual trade ships to his vassal as a feudatory stipend (J. chigy ō ). From other sources we know that between 1504 and 1520, Sō Daizen-no- suke (whose family name later changed to Yoshiga) received privileges to an annual trade ship only in alternate years.10 In contrast to the privilege apparently granted by Yoshimori in 1513, actual access to trade ships decreased by one-half from 1513 to 1581. The second point – “one letter [of introduction to Chos ŏ n] under the name of Chiba of Hizen with [his] travel permit fee” – meant that the governor gave S ō Daizen-no-suke contact privileges with Chos ŏn in the name of Chiba of Hizen. According to Haedong chegukki , 11 the Chos ŏ n government extended permission to Chiba Mototane of Hizen Province to send one trade ship every year. The fi rst ship was dispatched in 1459, but it is conceivable that this privilege to travel to Chosŏ n was passed on to the S ō at some point, or that he held this privilege from the beginning. The envoys dispatched by Chiba Mototane, either from the beginning or from some later time, would have been impostor envoys from Tsushima. S ō Daizen Kuniyuki travelled to Chos ŏ n on two occasions with Chiba Mototane in 1484 and 1492, 12 and so we can presume that in 1484, at the least, the contact privilege was exercised by So

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Daizen Kuniyuki. “[T]ravel permit fee” is the governor of Tsushima’s fee for issuing a travel permit (K. mun’in ) to Chiba. The governor, therefore, waived this administrative cost when S ō Daizen-no-suke dispatched an annual ship in the name of Chiba. After the Riot of the Three Ports, the Chiba annual trade ship was suspended by the 1512 agreement. The fact that no trade missions were sent in the name of Chiba in Ch ō sen s ōshi kunitsugu no shokei oboe suggests that contact never resumed. This confi rms that in 1513, despite receiving S ō Yoshimori’s approval and confi rmation, the contact privilege had become null and void. 16 Saeki Kōji Point (3), “a letter [of introduction to Chosŏ n] under your own name,” refers to landing permission based on the contact privilege held by the house of S ō Daizen-no-suke. From 1478, S ō Kuniyuki sent envoys to Chos ŏ n almost every year, and from 1484 he often sent two missions per year. We may sur- mise from this that Chos ŏn granted Kuniyuki one annual trade ship before 1478, and the number increased to a maximum of two after 1484. Because there is no evidence that Kuniyuki’s personal seal (K. tos ŏ ) was renewed for his son Daizen-no-suke, the “your” in the document refers to his father, S ō Kuniyuki. However, according to the 1512 agreement, contact with Chosŏ n by Tsushima islanders, with the exception of the governor, was completely annulled, which would have included Kuniyuki’s privileges. In other words, “a letter [of introduction to Chosŏ n] under your own name” was the Sō Daizen- no-suke house privilege, which, in reality, had lost its validity. In this manner, the governor of Tsushima conferred upon his retainers various privileges to conduct diplomatic relations with Chos ŏ n, but the majority of these grants had become invalid under the 1512 agreement. Perhaps documents like this could be interpreted as Yoshimori making promises to negotiate for the restoration of the old privileges. On the other hand, the conferral of one ship out of the Tsushima governor’s reduced fl eet of annual trade ships was probably because the S ō Daizen-no-suke house had lost all other contact privileges with Chosŏ n. In short, the Riot of the Three Ports brought devastating consequences to Tsushima. To escape from this wretched plight, there were only two things that could be done – enter into negotiations with Chos ŏn over the restoration of the former privileges and manufacture vast numbers of impostor envoys. Following the 1512 agreement, the governors of Tsushima concentrated their efforts on negotiating with Chos ŏn to restore the trading privileges that Tsushima islanders, beginning with the Sō , enjoyed before the outbreak of the Riot of the Three Ports.13 To achieve this aim, the Sō frequently dispatched their impostor envoys, in the guise of the Shō gun’s envoys (“King of Japan”), to negotiate with Chosŏ n. The result was that in 1525, the number of the governor’s annual trade ships was increased by fi ve, to thirty ships. In 1544, however, Chosŏ n was raided by Tsushima islanders in “the Saryang incident,” and the relationship between Tsushima and Chosŏ n was once again severed. Negotiations were fi nally settled in 1547 with a new agreement. The outcome of the 1547 agreement was that the number of annual trade ships for the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 governor was again reduced to twenty-fi ve. When Japanese raiders struck Tallyang in 1555 (also known in Korea as the Ŭ lmyo Waeby ŏ n or Tallyang Waeby ŏ n ), Chos ŏ n started to take the governor of Tsushima’s warnings of pirates more seriously.14 In 1557 yet another new agreement came into force, and the court added fi ve more ships for the governor, bringing the total again to thirty. There was a long way to go before the fi fty ships permitted by the 1443 agreement could be reached again, and Japanese residency in the three ports was still forbidden. It was obvious that negotiations alone to restore the Japanese–Korean and Japanese–Chinese relations 17 governor’s privileges had limits. The S ō thus turned their attention to Japanese contacts living outside Tsushima and negotiated vigorously through impostor sh ō gunal envoys for the restoration of contact privileges. As a result, Chos ŏ n admitted contact for ten Japanese in 1563, and twelve in 1567. 15 The contact privileges attained in this manner often resulted in being handed over as benefi ce privileges to the Sō ’s retainers. In appearance, the situation was no different from the fi fteenth century when contact with Chosŏ n was made by the “King of Japan” (Ashikaga sh ō gun), offi cials of the Muromachi bakufu , and provincial elites, but, in reality, only the governor of Tsushima and his retainers dispatched envoys to Chos ŏn. This tendency towards a Tsushima monopoly that used impostors started appearing in the mid fi fteenth century, becoming more common after the 1512 agreement, and even more pronounced by the mid sixteenth century.

The Ningbo disturbance and East Asia In the history of Japan–Ming China relations in the sixteenth century, two incidents stand out as having had the same impact as the Riot of the Three Ports in Japan–Chos ŏn relations. These were the Ningbo disturbance of 1523 and the breakdown of the tally trade in the mid sixteenth century. The Ningbo disturbance was a riot by Japanese who took part in the seventeenth tribute mission to Ming China, and it was so called because the riot broke out in the trade port of Ningbo. The cause of the riot is usually attributed to a struggle between the Hosokawa and the Ō uchi over leadership of the tally trade with Ming China.16 In the sixteenth tribute mission, ships number one and three were the Ō uchi’s, and ship number two was the Hosokawa’s. Each ship carried a Hongzhi tally, and the fl eet left Japan in 1506, reaching China in 1511. Unhappy with this arrangement, the Hosokawa prepared a different ship to be captained by the Ming-born Song Suqing and dispatched it to China. This ship arrived before the offi cial tribute ships and returned to Japan in 1510. The offi cial tribute ships returned to Japan in 1512 with the new Zhengde tallies, but the Ō uchi decided to hold these and never presented them to the Muromachi bakufu . Such subterfuges laid the foundation for the eventual outbreak of the Ningbo rebellion.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Shortly thereafter, the Hosokawa and the Ō uchi went about planning independent diplomatic missions to Ming China. Three Ō uchi ships reached China in the fourth month of 1523, carrying the Zhengde tallies that they had secured on their last mission. The Hosokawa, on the other hand, managed to obtain the older Hongzhi tallies from the bakufu, and their ships entered China a little later than the Ō uchi fl eet. Despite their later arrival, Song Suqing, who had sailed with the Hosokawa, bribed the Ningbo offi cials so that the goods on his ship could be unloaded and checked fi rst. He also made arrangements for the head envoy of the Hosokawa tribute mission to be placed at the primary 18 Saeki Kōji seat for the welcome dinner in the reception hall. The Ō uchi envoys became enraged, killed the Hosokawa’s head envoy, burned their ships, and generally caused havoc in and around Ningbo. They also captured Ming offi cials, stole ships, and returned home. This was the Ningbo disturbance. Following the incident, Ming China tightened its controls on Japanese tribute missions. In the sixth month of 1523, shortly after the outbreak of the Ningbo disturbance, Chosŏ n received news of the incident through the S ō . 17 In the eighth month, Chosŏ n returned the Chinese prisoners captured by the Japanese in Ningbo, and presented to Ming China the Japanese in their possession, including a certain Nakabayashi and others. In the fourth month of 1525, the shō gun Ashikaga Yoshiharu’s (1511–50) envoy arrived in Chosŏ n and requested Chosŏ n to inform Ming China that the Chinese prisoners captured in the Ningbo disturbance would be repatriated in the following year aboard a Japanese tribute ship. In the sixth month of the same year, Ming China ordered the King of Ry ū ky ū to send a message to the “King of Japan,” tell- ing him to hand over the Ō uchi’s head envoy, Sō setsu, and return the Chinese prisoners taken to Japan. An envoy from Ry ū ky ū arrived in Japan with this command in 1527 bringing a state letter from the emperor of Ming China. Yoshiharu wrote a reply to the emperor and entrusted it to the Ry ū ky ū envoy. Regarding these developments, the Ō uchi, as the interested party, informed Ry ū ky ū that the Ōuchi should be the ones to deliver the emperor’s state letter to the “King of Japan.” Furthermore, in 1528, the Ō uchi sent a monk-envoy to Chos ŏn, requesting Chosŏ n to forward Ming captives on to China, but Chos ŏ n refused to comply with this request. As we can see, the aftermath of the Ningbo disturbance was different from the aftermath of the Riot of the Three Ports. In addition to Japan and Ming China, the concerned parties, the incident also came to involve Ry ū ky ū and Chos ŏn. The different countries of East Asia, each taking on different roles, participated in the resolution of the affair. Ming China was at the center of the civilized–barbarian order, but this event is an important illustration of how the individual countries interacted closely during the aftermath of the Ningbo incident. Although the Ōuchi took complete control of the eighteenth and nineteenth tribute missions to Ming China, with the death of Ō uchi Yoshitaka in 1551 (b. 1507), the tally trade with Ming China came to a halt. Almost simultaneously, the activities of the Chinese “maritime traders,” or the so-called latter-period

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Japanese pirates (J. k ō ki wak ō), increased. Arano Yasunori uses the expression “piratical circumstances” (J. wak ō -teki j ōky ō ) to describe the various phenomena that sprang up along the network of sea routes from East Asia down into Southeast Asia from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century. 18 He raises three points as main factors that contributed to the development of this situation: (1) the boom in trade from the meeting of smugglers and Chinese mainland merchants; (2) the sudden increase in silver production in Japan after the 1530s; and (3) the arrival of Europeans (particularly the Portuguese). Another feature of the “piratical circumstances” Japanese–Korean and Japanese–Chinese relations 19 was the coexistence of people of different ethnicities. The phrases “piratical circumstances” and “multi-ethnic mixed residence” (J. shominzoku zakkyo ) have become commonly accepted descriptors for the social situation of the late sixteenth century, but we await their further clarifi cation. Just as Wang Zhi was deeply involved in the introduction of fi rearms to Japan through Tanegashima,19 Chinese maritime traders operated extensively throughout the area. Their activity in Japan appears to have intensifi ed from around 1542 onwards. In 1548, when the Ming Chinese army destroyed Shuangyu Harbor, which had been used as the Chinese maritime traders’ headquarters, Wang Zhi escaped to Japan. Using the islands and harbors around Gotō and Hirado as a base, he and others engaged in smuggling and piracy. Their activity was not restricted to Kyū sh ū ; they operated along the coasts of the Sea of Japan and even reached the Kant ō region. This was probably a period during which domestic circulation was closely linked to larger Asian trading systems as had never been seen before. For example, the vast amount of Chinese pottery, dating from the second half of the sixteenth century, which has been found all over Japan, speaks volumes about the vigor of trade activities. In the fi rst half of the sixteenth century, silver was mined in vast quantities following the development of the Iwami silver mines by a merchant from Hakata. As a result, silver coins circulated as currency within Japan and were carried to Korea and China by Japanese merchants and Chinese maritime traders.20 Even on Tsushima, silver was widely circulated. For example, in 1567, the governor of Tsushima collected silver from his own vassals when conducting the negotiations with Chosŏ n over restoring privileges for non- Tsushima Japanese contacts, and from 1572 onwards, the S ō collected silver as payment for measuring the length of envoy ships heading for Chosŏ n from Waniura, a harbor in northern Tsushima.21 In addition to the boom in the circulation of goods brought about by the Japanese merchants and Chinese maritime traders, we can add another, vital, new component: the arrival of the Europeans. The maritime world stretching from East Asia to Southeast Asia entered an age of extremely close economic relations as various elements became enmeshed in complicated ways.

Conclusion

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This chapter will conclude by suggesting the preconditions of the Imjin Waeran. Economically, East Asia of the second half of the sixteenth century was extremely tightly bound. It is conceivable that, during this period, some regular form of interaction at the non-elite or mass level was maintained and mutual understanding developed. However, the deepening of that understanding was rarely recorded in written texts and disseminated more broadly. If we look at the relations between countries, the severance of offi cial connections is striking. These included the breakdown of relations between 20 Saeki Kōji Japan and Ming China, the ruination of relations between Japan and Chosŏ n because of the systemic creation of impostor envoys, and the attenuation of relations between Japan and Ryū ky ū. These failures brought about a decline in mutual understanding between countries. It is true that, following the intensifi cation of activities by the latter-period Japanese pirates, an interest in Japan increased and Chinese publications about Japan increased, but the contents of these documents lack variety and display great uniformity. 22 Leaving aside the debates over the immediate causes of the Imjin Waeran, for the countries of East Asia there is no denying that the breakdown in the exchange of knowledge among the ruling classes brought about by the severance and attenuation of relations posed a likely contribution to the outbreak of war.

Notes Translated by Nakajima Sanae and Rachel Payne with James B. Lewis. 1 Murai Sh ō suke, Ch ū sei Wajin den , 1993, pp. 79–126. 2 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Sanpo,” Vol. 1, 1965, pp. 627–728. 3 Tanaka Takeo, Taigai kankei , 1982, pp. 550–9. 4 Nakamura Hidetaka, Nissen , Vol. 1, 1965, pp. 194–5. 5 Chungjong shillok , 20:60a (1514.9.27). 6 Chungjong shillok , 23:34b (1515.11.18). 7 Nakamura Hidetaka, Nihon to Ch ō sen , 1966, pp. 98–9. 8 Chungjong shillok , 24:41b–43a (1516.4.17). 9 Goumamawari onhanmotsu hikae , 5. 10 Tanaka Takeo, Taigai kankei , 1982, pp. 560–623 (“Chō sen s ō shi kunitsugi shokei oboe”). 11 Tanaka Takeo (trans.), Kaitō shokokuki , 1991, p. 180. 1 2 Sŏ ngjong shillok , 163:7a (1484.2.9); S ŏ ngjong shillok , 263:21b (1492.3.21). 13 Nakamura Hidetaka, Nihon to Chō sen , 1966, pp. 166–72. 14 Saeki K ō ji, “J ū roku seiki,” 1997, pp. 34–7. 15 Yonetani Hitoshi, “J ū roku,” 1997, pp. 2–3. 16 Kashiwara Sh ō z ō , “Nichi-Min kangō ,” 1914 (25): 9–11; 1915 (26:2–3): 2–3; Kobata Atsushi, Ch ū sei , 1969, pp. 129–58. See Map 1 . 17 Taigai kankeishi, 1999, p. 490. 18 Arano Yasunori, “Nihon-gata,” 1987, pp. 183–226. 19 Murai Sh ō suke, Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon , 1997. 20 Murai Sh ō suke, Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon , 1997. 21 Osa Masanori, “ Chō sen s ō shi ,” 1964, pp. 104–16. 22 Translator’s note: Chinese offi cial and popular depictions of the Japanese were fi lled with stories of the horrors visited on Chinese by the Japanese pirates: pillage,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 rape, death, and destruction at the hands of “lawless rouges,” “cunning barbarians,” “sharks,” and “water demons.” See Wang, “Realistic and fantastic images of ‘Dwarf Pirates,’” 2002.

References Arano Yasunori ( 荒野泰典). “Nihon-gata kai chitsujo no keisei ( 日本型華夷秩序の形成 ),” in Asao , Naohiro ( 朝尾直弘 ) et al ., eds., Nihon no shakaishi 1: Rett ō naigai no k ō ts ū to kokka ( 日本の社会史１列島内外の交通と国家 ). T ō ky ō : Iwanami Shoten, 1987 , pp. 183–226 . Japanese–Korean and Japanese–Chinese relations 21 Chungjong shillok ( 中宗実録 ). Goumamawari onhanmotsu hikae ( 御馬廻御判物控), private collection of Yoshiga Heiuemon ( 吉賀兵右衛門所持 ). Kashiwara Sh ō z ō ( 栢原昌三 ). “Nichi-Min kangō b ō eki ni okeru Hosokawa – Ō uchi nishi no kō s ō (日明勘合貿易に於ける細川 ዘ大内二氏の抗争 ) ,” Shigaku zasshi ( 史学雑誌 ) 25 :9 ( 1914 ): 1128–72 ; 25 :10 ( 1914 ): 1237–65 ; 25 :11 ( 1914 ): 1414–47 ; 26 :2 ( 1915 ): 172–201 ; 16 :3 ( 1915 ): 301–37 . Kobata Atsushi ( 小葉田淳 ). Ch ū sei Nis-Shi tsū k ō b ō ekishi no kenkyū ( 中世日支通交貿易史の研究 ). T ō ky ō : Toko Shoin , 1969 . Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 ). Chū sei Wajin den ( 中世倭人伝 ). T ō ky ō : Iwanami Shoten , 1993 . Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 ). Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon (海から見た戦国日本 ). T ō ky ō : Chikuma Shob ō , 1997 . Nakamura Hidetaka ( 中村栄孝 ). “Sanpo ni okeru Wajin no s ō ran ( 三浦における倭人の争乱 ),” in Nakamura , Hidetaka ( 中村栄孝 ), Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū (日鮮関係史の研究上 ), Vol. 1. T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa K ō bunkan , 1965 . Nakamura Hidetaka ( 中村栄孝 ). Nihon to Chō sen ( 日本と朝鮮 ). T ō ky ō : Chibund ō , 1966 . Osa Masanori ( 長正統 ). “ Ch ō sen s ōshi kunitsugu no shokei oboe no shiry ō -teki seikaku ( 「朝鮮送使国次之書契覚」の史料的性格 ),” Ch ō sen gakuh ō ( 朝鮮学報 ) 33 ( 1964 ): 104–16 . Saeki K ō ji ( 佐伯弘次 ). “J ūroku seiki ni okeru kō ki wak ō no katsudō to Tsushima S ō -shi” ( 一六世紀における後期倭寇の活動と対馬宗氏 ),” in Nakamura , Tadashi ( 中村質編 ), ed., Sakoku to kokusai kankei ( 鎖国と国際関係 ). T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa K ō bunkan , 1997 , pp. 34–7 . S ŏ ngjong shillok ( 成宗実録 ). Taigai kankeishi s ō g ō nenpy ō hensh ū iinkai , ed. ( 対外関係史総合年表編集委員会編 ). Taigai kankeishi sō g ō nenpy ō ( 対外関係史総合年表 ). T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa K ō bunkan , 1999 . Tanaka Takeo (translator and annotator) ( 田中健夫訳注 ). Kaitō shokokuki: Chō senjin no mita chū sei no Nihon to Ry ūky ū ( 海東諸国紀 : 朝鮮人のみた中世の日本と琉球 ). T ō ky ō : Iwanami Shoten , 1991 . Tanaka Takeo ( 田中健夫 ). “Ch ō sen s ōshi kunitsugi shokei oboe (朝鮮送使国次書契覚 ),” in Tanaka , Takeo ( 田中健夫 ), Taigai kankei to bunka kō ry ū ( 対外関係と文化交流 ). Ky ō to : Shibunkaku , 1982 , pp. 560–623 . Tanaka Takeo ( 田中健夫 ). Taigai kankei to bunka kō ry ū ( 対外関係と文化交流 ). Ky ō to : Shibunkaku , 1982 . Wang , Yong . “Realistic and Fantastic Images of ‘Dwarf Pirates’: The Evolution of Ming Dynasty Perceptions of the Japanese,” in Joshua A. Fogel , ed., Sagacious

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors: Chinese Views of Japan in the Ming–Qing Period . Norwalk, CT : EastBridge , 2002 , pp. 17–41 . Yonetani Hitoshi ( 米谷均 ). “ J ūroku seiki Nit-Chō kankei ni okeru gishi haken no kō z ō to jittai (16世紀日朝関係における偽使派遣の構造と実態 ) ,” Rekishigaku kenky ū ( 歴史学研究 ) 697 (1997 ): 1–18 , 62 .

2 Korea’s pre-war domestic situation and relations with Japan

Han Moon Jong ( 韓文鍾 )

Introduction The Imjin Waeran, as a planned invasion of Chosŏ n by Japan, was not just a war between Chosŏ n and Japan. It took on the character of an East Asian war that expanded to involve Ming China. The result of the war saw the collapse of the Toyotomi regime in Japan and the appearance of the Edo bakufu . It was also a war that led to Ming’s slow decline on the Chinese continent, with its disbursement of heavy war expenditures, and to the opportunity for the displacement of the Ming by the Qing as Manchurian Jurchens expanded. As the war continued over seven years on the Korean peninsula, the land was devastated, lives were lost, and the country suffered severe damage politically, economically, socially, and culturally with the theft and loss of the products of civilization. In these ways, the Imjin Waeran brought enormous changes to the domestic and foreign circumstances of Korea, Japan, and China. In particular, this event visited such repercussions on Chosǒ n society as to divide the Chosǒ n period into the period before the war (early Chosŏ n) and the period after the war (late Chos ŏ n). Studies of the Imjin Waeran have mainly focused on the causes of the war and the activities of the “righteous soldiers” or guerrillas (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng ) and the navy, including Yi Sunshin. On the other hand, studies of the relations between Korea and Japan prior to the war and the causes for the initial defeat are few. Therefore, to acquire a composite understanding, it is necessary to examine the domestic situation in Chosŏ n and the process of change in relations between Korea and Japan from the time of the Riot of the Three Ports (K. Samp’o Waeran) in 1510, when relations began to decline, to the eve of Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the war. The following will fi rst look at the Korean domestic situation before the outbreak of the Imjin Waeran for relevant political, social, and economic changes. Next, I will turn to the background factors in the sudden rise after the Riot of the Three Ports in the number of impostors who falsely presented themselves as envoys of the Japanese king and consider the true identities of these fraudulent envoys. Finally, I will discuss the Chos ǒ n government’s defensive measures against a Japanese invasion on the eve of the outbreak of Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 23 the war and examine the causes of the government army’s crushing defeat by the Japanese army in the early stages of the war.

The domestic situation prior to the Imjin Waeran In late-fi fteenth-century Chosǒ n, contradictions within the yangban bureaucratic order began to cause problems. Socio-economic changes appeared with the collapse of the Rank Land Law (K. Kwaj ŏ nb ŏ p ), the expansion of private landholding, the intensifi cation of contradictions within the circulation of commodities and the tax system (K. kongnapche ), the collapse of the military service system (K. kuny ŏ k chedo), and the development of foreign trade and discord with foreigners. As commoner farmers sank deeper and deeper into ruin and the political order fragmented into factional dispute, none of these problems saw solution. Economically, the Rank Land Law collapsed, and land management that had operated through assigned rent collection rights based on social class (K. sujo’gw ŏ n ) began to change into land management based on ownership (K. soyu’gw ŏ n ). Yangban offi cials enlarged their private holdings by acquiring agricultural estates through various means. Especially after the abolish- ment in the mid sixteenth century of the Offi ce Land Law (K. chikch ŏ nb ŏ p ) that had granted offi ce-holders tax collection rights, the growth of land ownership by yangban offi cials became considerable and expanded throughout the entire country beginning with the provinces of Chŏ lla, Ky ŏ ngsang, and Ch’ungch’ŏ ng. The yangban offi cials cultivated their land by farming themselves, or by managing farmland through unfree labor (K. nobi ) and tenant farmers (K. chŏ nho). The result of the expansion of private holdings was that social divergence appeared in the sixteenth century when self-suffi cient, freeborn, commoner farmers increasingly faced ruin, and either abandoned their farmlands or sold their land and were degraded to the status of tenant farmers. In addition, abuses in the tribute tax system and disorder in the military service further hastened the disintegration of the small-scale, freeborn, farming class.1 The expansion of plantations and the collapse of the farming class brought about changes in the tribute tax and military service systems. The tribute tax system, which imposed levies on special regional products from the provinces, was a heavy burden on the farming class. Moreover, with the practice

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of “indirect payment” (K. pangnap), where intermediary merchants delivered tribute goods to the state and then collected the cost from the farmers, the farmers’ burden became all the more onerous. The practice of indirect payment, which began in the mid fi fteenth century, became especially prevalent with the growth and development of the distribution economy in the sixteenth century. Abuse of the tribute tax system reached an extreme when powerful central offi cials and merchants conspired with local magistrates to commit fraud. In order to redress this abuse, a scheme to collect rice in lieu 24 Han Moon Jong of tribute levies was discussed, the Uniform Land Tax Law (K. Taedongb ŏ p ), but the reform was not established until the seventeenth century, after the Imjin Waeran. 2 In commerce, agricultural production increased with improvements in agricultural technology, including fertilization methods and irrigation. As product distribution became more active, markets expanded in the provinces, and by the mid-sixteenth century a national distribution network took shape. Together with these developments, the transition to a monetized economy began. At the time, bolts of cotton cloth were the most general means of exchange. However, with a surge in the demand for cotton, the quality fell, and rice began to be used as a means of exchange.3 These economic changes not only promoted the development and growth of domestic commerce and industry, but also provided the setting for active foreign trade with China and Japan. Moreover, with the expansion of markets and the growth of a distribution economy, the number of farmers who left farmlands and became merchants increased. With these socio-economic changes, extreme unrest within the military service system also emerged in the sixteenth century. In the military service system of the early Chosǒ n period, only freeborn commoners served, in accordance with social status. Because of the recognition of soldier-farmers (K. py ŏ ngnong ilch’ije ) and the system whereby a taxpayer supported a duty soldier (K. pongjokche), soldiers received tax support while farming in various regions and serving as duty soldiers or guards. This military service system, however, became increasingly disorganized with the Paired Provisioner System (K. pob ŏ p ) introduced at the time of King Sejo (r. 1455–68) that organized mutual support among two or three able-bodied men who supported each other as they were called up in turn. The result was that farmers ran away to avoid the burden of compulsory military service and passed the burden on to their families or neighbors to fi ll the quotas for duty, and these people, in turn, ran away. The disorganization in the military service system was exacerbated by the growing practice of assigning guardsmen, conscript duty soldiers, and sailors to other compulsory corv é e labor, such as engineer- ing work and construction, which differed from their original duties. Thus, from the end of the fi fteenth century, military service became merely another form of compulsory corv ée labor. Consequently, the sup’o taeripche, a system in which conscripted soldiers hired others for a fi xed sum of cloth to stand

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 corv ée service in their place, became a common practice. However, the price for corvé e labor substitution skyrocketed in the sixteenth century and bad cloth of poor quality was being used, which led to the further ruin of those responsible for military service. At this point, an adjustment was made that established the panggun sup’oje , a system in which the government collected cloth directly for central duty conscripts, and exempted the payers from their corv ée duties. This system eventually became widespread among the land garrison forces and naval forces in the provinces. However, in the process of enforcing collection, many abuses took place, including provincial army Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 25 and navy offi cials coercing payments to fi ll their own purses.4 As a result, the number of soldiers decreased, military capacity declined, and the provincial armies became lax. The garrison-command structure that had focused on fortifi ed points (K. chin’gwan ch’eje) – the basis of the early Chos ŏ n national defense structure – became merely a paper institution.5 The political world developed a confrontational style. The sarim , or Neo- Confucian literati, who emerged as a new political force within the fl ow of these social and economic changes, tried to promote various reform measures to resolve confl ict and construct an ideal Confucian society. In the process of establishing themselves, the sarim clashed with the Merit Subjects (K. hun’gu ), and four literati purges (K. sahwa ) took place over the late fi f- teenth and early sixteenth centuries. Among them, the Literati Purge of 1519 (K. kimyo sahwa ) was a political event in which the Merit Subjects who had backed the coup d’é tat that placed King Chungjong on the throne in 1506 were driven into a corner by a critical censorate and retaliated by expelling Cho Kwangjo and the sarim from central governing circles. Despite this apparent setback, the sarim ’s power was not on the wane. They retreated to regions outside the capital and worked at diffusing village codes (K. hyangyak ) and constructing private academies (K. s ŏ w ŏ n ). They laid a foundation for power by spreading their infl uence. After the Literati Purge of 1545 (K. ŭ lsa sahwa), the sarim began to reappear in central political circles, and by the time of King Sŏ njo’s reign (r. 1567–1608) they succeeded in seizing political leadership. In 1575, the sarim divided into two factions of Easterners and Westerners, and intense factional struggle blossomed. With the eruption of the K ŏ nj ŏ Affair (K. k ŏ nj ŏŭ i sag ŏ n , Ch ŏ ng Ch’ ŏ l’s proposal in 1591 for designating an heir for the heirless King Sŏ njo), the Easterner faction divided into sub-factions of Southerners and Northerners, thereby further atomizing the political scene. Factional politics may have contained aspects of governance that refl ected diversity of views, something akin to public consensus, and mutual checks on each party, but it also enabled exclusive and self-righteous political behavior. The sixteenth century thus saw a number of socio-economic changes and political developments that militated against accruing state revenues, strengthening the military, and centralizing power, three steps that might have helped the Chos ŏn state organize an effective defense against the Japanese. Although markets in the provinces developed and trade with foreign countries became

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 active with the increase in agricultural production and the elaboration of distribution networks, the expansion of agricultural estates ruined the peasantry, and the lives of farmers became increasingly destitute with increasing abuses visited on them from the tribute tax and military service systems. Moreover, with continuous droughts and fl oods and outbursts of epidemic diseases, farmers lost their homes, wandered aimlessly, or became thieves on a large scale like Im Kk ŏ kch ŏ ng, who was active in King Myŏ ngjong’s time (r. 1545–67). Agricultural communities, which had formed the base of the country’s fi nances, became increasingly desolate as time went on. As a result, 26 Han Moon Jong the store of rice in the Three Granaries (K. samch’ang ) or the total government stores, which had amounted to 2,300,000 s ŏ k under King Chungjong (r. 1506–44), was depleted to only a little over 500,000 s ǒ k just before the Imjin Waeran.6 Adding to the general travail, public confi dence declined as insecurity spread and fear was aroused among the people from wild rumors about the increasing number of raids by Japanese pirates after the Riot of the Three Ports in 1510.

The degeneration of envoys from the king of Japan and impostors In the early Chosǒ n period, the Chosǒ n king and the Muromachi shō gun entered into exemplary “good neighbor” relations (K. kyorin kwan’gye ); envoys were exchanged on a regular basis and friendly relations were maintained. Chos ǒn sent envoys carrying the titles of Hoeryesa , Pobingsa, and T’ongshinsa to the bakufu on eighteen occasions, most of which took place in the beginning of the Chos ǒ n dynasty, during the reigns of King T’aejong (r. 1400–18) and King Sejong (r. 1418–50). Table 2.1 lists the embassies exchanged between the two central governments from the end of the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth century. Among the eighteen offi cial trips, only thirteen were successful journeys to the capital of Ky ōto, while fi ve had to be suspended en route to the capital due to typhoons, envoys’ illness, unstable Japanese domestic conditions, or danger on the journey route. Before the outbreak of the Imjin Waeran, the last offi - cial trip made by a Chos ǒn royal envoy to Ky ōto, excluding Hwang Yun’gil’s journey in 1590–1, was Pyǒ n Hyomun’s visit in 1443, nearly a century-and-a- half earlier. On the other hand, the bakufu sent Japanese envoys (from the king of Japan) to the king of Chosǒ n seventy times. These occasions were concentrated during the reigns of Kings T’aejong, Sejong, and after Sǒ ngjong (r. 1469–94). The aim of the Japanese envoys’ visits most often consisted of maintaining friendly relations, requesting the Tripitaka , and seeking support for Buddhist temples. However, the objectives changed after the Riot of the Three Ports in 1510. The new objectives involved appeals for pardon so as to restore relations with Chosǒ n and requests for the reinstatement of annual trading ships (K. segy ŏ ns ŏ n ) and the ships granted to offi ce-holders (K. sujik ) and seal-holders (K. sudos ŏ s ŏ n ).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Degeneration of envoys from the king of Japan began around the eighth month of 1470 when Hosokawa and Ise falsely used the title “king” and sent envoys to Chosǒ n to request war funds. The fact that these had been impostor envoys who misrepresented themselves as royal envoys was revealed when an actual envoy from the sh ō gun was sent to Chos ǒ n in 1474.7 The reasons behind the appearance of impostors who posed as envoys of the Japanese king from around 1470 were related to a variety of factors. As a result of rising levels of violence in Japanese domestic politics, there was disorder on the Japanese side and no possibility of control. The Chosǒ n government increasingly lacked information on Japan that would have identifi ed Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Table 2.1 Korean and Japanese embassies

Reigns of T’aejo Ch ŏ ngjong T’aejong Sejong Munjong Tanjong Sejo Yejong S ŏ ngjong Y ŏ n- Chung- Injong My ŏ ngjong S ŏ njo Total Korean 1392–8 1398–1400 1400–18 1418–50 1450–2 1452–5 1455–68 1468–9 1469–94 san’gun jong 1544–5 1545–67 1567–1608 kings 1494–1506 1506–44

From the 0 1 12 10 1 0 7 0 9 4 12 1 8 5 70 king of Japan From the 1 1 (1) 5 (1) 7 0 0 1 (1) 0 2 (2) 0 0 0 0 1 18 (5) king of Korea

Sources: Chosŏ n wangjo shillok , Zenrin kokuh ō ki . Note: Numbers inside parentheses indicate aborted embassies. 28 Han Moon Jong fraud. In particular, as Chosǒ n no longer successfully sent envoys to Kyōto after Py ǒn Hyomun’s offi cial trip in 1443, the Chosǒ n court was unable to procure accurate information on the domestic situation of Japan. It is probable that this lack of intelligence opened opportunities for the dispatch of impostor envoys to Chosǒ n. Finally, of course, there was the attraction of the special treatment given to envoys from the king of Japan. After the 1470 incident, the impersonation of Japanese royal envoys emerged again around the time of the Riot of the Three Ports. While it had been usually the attendants of the shō gun or powerful clans in mainland Japan who sent impostor envoys before the riot, it was the governor of Tsushima who often dispatched impostors after the riot. After the riot, with the severing and restoration of relations, contact between the two countries declined and multiple restrictions were placed on Tsushima’s contacts with Chos ŏn. As a way to escape these restrictions, Tsushima sent impostors posing as envoys from the king of Japan, because royal envoys were free of controls and allowed to travel without restriction in Chosǒ n, and they received lavish receptions. There are twenty-six cases of envoys from the king of Japan over the eighty years between 1511 and 1591 that can be identifi ed through documents ( Table 2.2 ). In 1512, 1522, 1545, and 1546, the Japanese royal envoys were accompanied by special envoys from the governor of Tsushima (K. t ŭ ksong , J. tokus ō ) or by envoys (K. sasong , J. shis ō) from powerful lords in northern Kyū sh ū and western Japan, the Shō ni and the Ōuchi (Table 2.2: Nos. 2, 6, 13, and 14). There were many instances of a Tsushima person being the envoy or vice-envoy. The envoy in fi ve cases from 1542 to 1552 was Anshin, who was a monk from Seizanji temple in Fuchū (Izuhara) on Tsushima. From 1556 to 1591, on seven occasions, Keitetsu Genso, from the Iteian temple in Izuhara was the envoy or vice-envoy, again a Tsushima person. Aside from these, we see the names Yanagawa Shigenobu, Tachibana Yashuhiro, and Tachibana Yasutoshi, all Tsushima people. From these cases, we can see that Tsushima was deeply involved. Because of their facility with Chinese and non-threatening demeanor, Buddhist monks were often emissaries. Kyō shi Bank ō , who was the envoy in 1463, supervised foreign diplomacy with Chosŏ n at the request of the Tsushima lords S ō Shigemoto and S ō Sadakuni. The result was that, following Bank ō, monks of the Mus ō sect and the Kaz ōmon sect often operated

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 as impostor envoys, posing as envoys from the king of Japan.8 Later on, we should take note of two monks of the Rinzai Genjū Zen sect. Genso appeared in Chosŏ n as a Japanese royal envoy on seven occasions between 1556 and 1591. Genpō , from the Iteian temple in Izuhara, managed foreign relations with Chos ǒn for Tsushima until the outbreak of the Yanagawa Forgery Affair in 1635 (J. Yanagawa ikken ). 9 From these facts, it is evident that the people who acted as Japanese royal envoys were Zen monks of the Rinzai Zen sect and monks from Tsushima. As the Zen monks of the Rinzai sect were working as diplomat monks for the Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Table 2.2 Embassies from the king of Japan to Chosŏ n (1510–92)

No. Year. month Authority of Envoy Vice-Envoy Ship captain and Purpose Notes embassy other available information

1 1511. 4–10 Japan ( 日本國 ) Ch ū seid ō Gekk ō (月江 ) 16 people Request peace, repatriate ( 中西堂 ) captives, mediation for tribute to Ming 2 1512. 4–9 Japan ( 日本國 ) Ch ū seid ō Peace negotiations, offer Accompanied the ( 中西堂 ) the heads of 18 Japanese Specially Dispatched pirates Ships of the Island Lord; concluded the Imshin Agreement in the eighth month 3 1514. King of Japan Nanko seid ō Keisetsu S ō Shigenobu Request additional Annual Permitted aid and trade in 11–1515. ( 日本國王 ) ( 南湖西堂 ) Shuza ( 宗茂信 ) Ships, aid, S ō Shigenobu copper and iron 3? ( 景雪首座 ) ( 宗茂信 ) reinstated to offi ce, and permission for copper and iron in the private trade 4 1517. 5–8 Japan ( 日本國 ) Taiin ( 太蔭 ) 20 people Request Koreana Tripitaka , Bestowed one set of the aid, and repatriate Koreana Tripitaka ; castaways repatriated castaways; bestowed 200 bolts [of cloth] 5 1521. 4–7? King of Japan Ish ū Seid ō Request re-opening of ports Re-opening of Pusan ( 日本國王 ) ( 易宗西堂 ) harbor in the eighth month 6 1522. 2–6 King of Japan Daigen T ō d ō Taishuku Enter into friendly Accompany Sh ō ni and ( 日本國王 ) ( 大原東堂 ) ( 台叔 ) relations with Tsushima, Tsushima envoys extradition of two leaders of the 1510 Riot of the Three Ports, request for cotton Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Table 2.2 (cont.)

No. Year. month Authority of Envoy Vice-Envoy Ship captain and Purpose Notes embassy other available information

7 1523. 5–9? King of Japan, Ichigaku Gy ō fu Seid ō Request aid, additional Five ships established Minamoto T ō d ō ( 一鶚 ( 堯甫西堂 ) Annual Ships for Yoshiharu (日東堂 ) T ō un Tsushima 本國王源義 ( 東雲 ) 晴 ) 8 1525. 4–9? King of Japan, Keirin T ō d ō 22 people Request aid (rebuild Offi cial Trade cotton Minamoto ( 景林東堂 ) Bansh ū zen temple ( 萬壽 1700 tong [85,000 bolts Yoshiharu (日禪寺 ) in Bungo); 10,000 cotton] 本國王源義 bolts of cotton; repatriate 晴 ) castaways; increase the number of Annual Ships 9 1528. King of Japan Ichigaku Collect Japanese castaway Traded for 1750 tong 10–1529. ( 日本國王 ) T ō d ō ( 一鶚 Nakahashi ( 中林 ); [87,500 bolts cotton] 5 東堂 ) T ō un request books for Lord ( 東雲 ) Ō tomo 10 1537. King of Japan T ō y ō T ō d ō R equest T’ongshinsa and Bestowed one set of the 1–1537. 4 ( 日本國王 ) ( 東陽東堂 ) Koreana Tripitaka ; Koreana Tripitaka protest sending Japanese castaway Nakahashi to Ming 11 1542. 4–9 King of Japan Anshin T ō d ō Tachibana Repatriate Ming castaways; ( 日本國王 ) ( 安心東堂 ) Narihiro ( 橘 request silver trade, and 成廣 ) increase in Annual Ships 12 1543. King of Japan, Jujiku T ō d ō Keien ( ) Request mediation to offer Refused 3–1544. 1 Minamoto ( 受竺東堂 ) tribute to Ming Yoshiharu ( 日本國王源義晴 ) Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

13 1545. 3–11 King of Japan Anshin T ō d ō Request peace after Accompany Sh ō ni and ( 日本國王 ) ( 安心東堂 ) Japanese disturbance in Tsushima envoys Saryang ( 蛇梁 ), increase Annual Ships 14 1546. King of Japan, Anshin T ō d ō Kikushin Negotiations after Saryang Accompany Sh ō ni envoy 10–1547. Minamoto ( 安心東堂 ) Seid ō ( 菊心 disturbance, offer prayers and concluded the 4 Yoshiharu (日西堂 ) for King Injong Ch ŏ ngmi Agreement in 本國王源義 the second month 晴 ) 15 1547. 9–? Japan ( 日本國 ) Offer condolences Two ships for the envoy and the vice-envoy, and one ship for Keikin Sh ū za ( 慶忻首座 ) 16 1548. 9–10 King of Japan ( 日本國王 ) 17 1552. King of Japan Anshin T ō d ō Teny ū Seid ō Tachibana Traded silver and Accompany an envoy from 6–1553. 3 ( 日本國王 ) ( 安心東堂 ) ( 天友西堂 ) Narihiro sappanwood Lord Hatakeyama ( 橘成廣 ) ( 畠山 ) and Lord Ubuei ( 右武衛 ). Teny ū ( 天友 ) died on the mission. 18 1556. King of Japan Tenf ū T ō d ō Keitetsu Request peace negotiations, Bestowed Koreana 10–1557. ( 日本國王 ) ( 天富東堂 ) Seid ō , grant Annual Ship, again Tripitaka 2 Genso ( 景 grant seals, trade items, 轍西堂 , copy of the Koreana 玄蘇 ) Tripitaka , and other requests 19 1563. 4–9 King of Japan Keitetsu T ō d ō 20 people Request to open Che-p’o Seals again granted to 10 ( 日本國王 ) (Genso) ( 景 harbor, again grant seals 轍東堂 , revoked in wake of 1510 玄蘇 ) Riot of the Three Ports, and abolition of ivory seals 20 1565. 3–? King of Japan Keitetsu T ō d ō ( 日本國王 ) (Genso) ( 景轍東堂 , 玄蘇 ) Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Table 2.2 (cont.)

No. Year. month Authority of Envoy Vice-Envoy Ship captain and Purpose Notes embassy other available information

21 1567. 5–? Japan ( 日本國 ) Request to open Che-p’o harbor, increase Annual Ships, and reception for T ō kiky ū ( 藤熙久 ) and fi ve others 22 1571. 11–? King of Japan ( 日本國王 ) 23 1580. Japan ( 日本國 ) Keitetsu Tō d ō Taira Taira Hideyoshi took Refused 12–1581. (Genso) ( 景 [Yanagawa] power (the assassination 3 轍東堂 , 玄 Shigenobu of Oda Nobunaga or 蘇 ) ( 平調信 ) the Honn ō ji incident occurred on 1582.6.2), request for hawks, request for mediation to send tribute to the Ming 24 1587. Taira Hideyoshi Tachibana ( 橘 Tachibana Request dispatch of a Refused 10–1588. of Japan ( 日康廣 ) ( 橘康年 ) T’ongshinsa 4 本平秀吉 ) 25 1589. Taira Hideyoshi Genso T ō d ō S ō Yoshitoshi Shibu Suishun Request “borrow a road to Accompanying 6–1590. 3 of Japan ( 日 ( 玄蘇東堂 ) ( 宗義智 ) ( 侍奉瑞俊 ) 25 enter Ming” T’ongshinsa (Hwang 本平秀吉 ) people Yun’gil) 26 1591. 1–6 Taira Hideyoshi Genso T ō d ō Taira Request “borrow a road to Return the courtesy and of Japan ( 日 ( 玄蘇東堂 ) [Yanagawa] enter Ming” escort T’ongshinsa 本國平秀吉 ) Shigenobu (Hwang Yun’gil) ( 平調信 )

Sources: Chos ŏ n wangjo shillok , Zenrin kokuhō ki , Murai Sh ō suke, Ch ū sei Wajinden , 1993, pp. 156–7. NB: Names and titles of envoys appear as they do in the sources. Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 33 Muromachi bakufu , the two groups had close connections. Hence, it is likely that the bakufu was aware of Tsushima’s dispatch of impostors disguised as royal envoys through the Zen connection. If so, the bakufu failed to put a stop to the fraud, and the possibility that they consented to or even abetted the activity cannot be eliminated. Moreover, Chosǒ n knew that the “royal envoys” sent after the Riot of the Three Ports were impostors. The presence of impostors was again publicly recognized in 1525, when Keirin Tō d ō , an envoy from the king of Japan, arrived and the Chief State Councilor Nam Kon pointed out that this envoy was obviously a Tsushima fabrication.10 Because the Chosŏ n government did not take fi rm action to resolve the matter of impostors, but dealt with them indifferently, the number of impostors leapt upwards. It is probable that the Yanagawa Incident, which revealed Tsushima’s forgery of state letters in the later Chos ŏn period, also occurred as a result of such indifference. In the pre-war period, a distinguishing aspect of the impostor envoys was the swift increase in the number of cases from 1523 onwards where envoys emphasized trade rather than foreign relations. For example, an envoy in the fi fth month of 1523 solicited an astounding quantity of cotton that amounted to more than 2,000 tong (100,000 bolts), which included 1,900 tong for offi cial trade and the rest as gifts. 11 Around 1542, a noticeable aspect of change in the trade between the two countries was the appearance of silver. The reason was the sharp increase in the Japanese production of silver beginning in Iwami, as a result of importing from Chos ŏn the cupellation silver refi ning technique (K. hoech’wib ǒ p , J. haifuki ). 12 Anshin, who came in the fourth month of 1542, brought 80,000 yang of silver, which amounted to the price of 9,000 tong (450,000 bolts) of cotton cloth, and requested trade.13 As Tsushima did not have the economic capacity to handle such volumes, there was no other option than to join forces with powerful Kyū sh ū lords, such as the Ō uchi and the Ō tomo, or with merchants from Hakata,14 and this shows that the impostor envoys had close connections with infl uential Kyū sh ū elites and Hakata merchants. After the political situation in Japan became more stabilized under Hideyoshi, the Japanese king’s envoys (K. Kukwangsa ) of 1589 and 1591 transfi gured into envoys charged with the political goal to “borrow a road to enter Ming” rather than to promote Tsushima’s interests and pursue economic gains through trade. The senior envoy at the time, Genso, participated in the Imjin Waeran and acted as a prime mover in the invasions. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Defense measures against a Japanese invasion As attacks by Japanese pirates became frequent after the Riot of the Three Ports and the Jurchen tribes to the north grew in strength and emerged as yet another threat to Chosŏ n, the court established the Border Defense Council (K. Piby ŏ nsa) and strengthened Chos ŏn’s frontiers against Japanese pirates and the Jurchen. After the pirate attack in 1555 (K. Ŭ lmyo Waebyŏ n or Tallyang Waeby ŏ n ), the regional defense structures were reorganized so 34 Han Moon Jong that the garrison-command structure was replaced by a “local self-defense system” (K. ches ŭ ng pangnyak ). Under the new system, in the event of an attack, local troops would gather at designated points and command would be handled through the dispatch of offi cers from the center. Furthermore, at the time of the pirate attack in 1555, when the Japanese pirates made an incursion using large ships and improved weaponry,15 it became clear that the standard maengs ŏ n or the lightweight kyŏ ngk’waes ŏ n ships could not stop the pirates and efforts were put into developing a new style of large warship that could dominate the Japanese pirate ships. The result was the advent of the p’anoksŏ n , or vessels with wooden planks covering the top deck,16 which became the mainstay battleship during the Imjin Waeran and led the Korean navy to numerous victories at sea.17 In this manner, Chosǒ n made efforts to devise suitable countermeasures for its defense. The establishment of the Border Defense Council, the reorgan- ization of the military system into a local self-defense structure, and the construction of warships with covered decks were designed to counter pirate raids, though, and they were unable to function as an effective defense against a large-scale Japanese invasion. As national defense and the military service system largely collapsed towards the end of the sixteenth century, Yi I and others recognized and emphasized the importance of national defense by insisting on a policy to create an army 100,000 strong.18 However, the Neo- Confucian literati in power at the time were exceedingly indifferent towards national defense. Out of the vague concern that Japan might attack, the Border Defense Council did prepare against a Japanese invasion by mending fortress walls in every province, inspecting weapons, and singling out talented soldiers without regard to rank, among whom were individuals such as Yi Sunshin and Kwǒ n Yul.19 Other measures included replacing incompetent land and naval offi cers in the Y ǒngnam, Honam, and Ch’ungch’ ǒng regions and dispatching capable commanders (K. Pang ŏ sa) and assistant defense commanders (K. Chobangjang ) for the tasks of building fortresses and digging trenches in areas of strategic importance along the coast.20 Meanwhile in Japan, Hideyoshi, who seized power after the death of Oda Nobunaga in 1582, subjugated Ky ū sh ū in 1587. After unifying Japan, he began preparing for an invasion of the continent. He fi rst ordered the gover- nor of Tsushima, who was conversant with the Korean situation, to negotiate

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 with the Chosŏ n king to “loan a road for [the Japanese] to enter Ming” and to come to the Japanese capital for an audience with Hideyoshi. From the early years of the Chos ŏn dynasty, Tsushima had been incorporated into a Chos ŏ n-centric international order and had been invested with special economic rights: the right to issue writs authorizing landing rights in Korea (K. mun’in palhaenggwŏ n ), a specifi ed number of annual trading ships, and an annual disbursement of rice and beans. 21 Because more than 95 percent of the island is not arable and Chos ŏ n was much closer than Ky ū sh ū or Honsh ū , Tsushima was in the position of obtaining food and other necessities from Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 35 trade with Chosŏ n. Therefore, if at all possible, Tsushima worked to avoid war with Chosŏ n. At this point, in the ninth month of 1587, in contradiction to Hideyoshi’s command, the governor of Tsushima sent an envoy to Chosŏ n to inform them of the political change in Japan and to request the dispatch of a Communication Embassy (K. T’ongshinsa ) to congratulate Hideyoshi.22 While much debate took place at the Chosŏ n court, Chosǒ n eventually declined the request for the dispatch of envoys on the grounds that the water- ways were dangerous and that it did not know the route very well. At the same time, Chosŏ n demanded of the lord of Tsushima that he repatriate Korean peasants who had fl ed to Japan and that he capture and send the Japanese pirates who had been preying on the southern coast. Hideyoshi ordered the governor of Tsushima, Sō Yoshitoshi, to go to Chos ǒn in person and negotiate with the court. At this point, Yoshitoshi accompanied Genso, acting as envoy for the king of Japan, to Chosǒ n in the seventh month of 1589. While returning 116 Koreans and offering three captives as the Japanese pirates who had raided Chos ŏn, he again requested a Korean Communication Embassy (K. T’ongshinsa ). 23 At this turn, the Chosŏ n court decided to send a T’ongshinsa to reply to the king of Japan and to assess the situation. The embassy, led by Envoy Hwang Yun’gil, Vice-Envoy Kim Sǒ ng’il, and Document Offi cer Hŏ S ŏng, left the Chosǒ n capital in the third month of 1590 and arrived in Ky ō to in the seventh month. Because Hideyoshi was then on campaign against the Hō j ō in Odawara, the state letter from the king of Chos ŏn was not delivered until the eleventh month. Hideyoshi’s reply included the assertion that his army would subjugate Ming and he requested that Chos ŏn guide him in this endeavor. The envoys requested that the letter be revised, but because Genso offered many excuses and pretexts to avoid alter- ing the letter, in the end, the envoys failed to have their argument accepted and returned to Korea in the third month of the following year. The reports by Hwang Yun’gil and Kim S ǒ ng’il contradicted each other. About Japanese intentions to invade and Hideyoshi, Hwang reported: “As Japan is in the process of preparing many warships, war is likely. Toyotomi Hideyoshi has sharp eyes, and he appears to be fearless.” Kim reported: “I did not detect the slightest intention of invasion. Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s eyes are like those of a rat, and there is nothing to fear.”24 Traditionally, the different opinions of Hwang Yun’gil and Kim Sǒ ng’il have been understood as resulting from different positions taken in the confrontation between the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Westerner (K. S ŏ in ) and the Easterner (K. Tong’in ) factions, but this is a mis- understanding. Among the three envoys, the Document Offi cer (H ŏ S ŏng) was a member of Kim S ŏ ng’il’s Easterner faction and a personal friend, but he agreed with the Westerner Hwang Yun’gil’s assessment. Considering this point, it is doubtful that the difference between Hwang and Kim arose from a factional confrontation, and it is now thought that the differences arose over their impressions of Japan.25 In short, Kim based his impressions on a framework of relative rankings derived from the contest between civilization and barbarism, and in that framework he viewed Japan and the Japanese as 36 Han Moon Jong barbarous. Kim was particularly obsessed with the relative superiority or inferiority between civilized and barbarous and this brought on a lack of clarity regarding Japanese circumstances at the time. The result was that he dismissed the Japanese as barbarians incapable of mounting an invasion. 26 On the other hand, Hwang Chin, who accompanied Kim S ŏ ng’il to Japan, foresaw the coming war, and every day, after completing his work, would practice horseback riding and archery. 27 Among the ministers at court there was fi erce debate regarding the contrary reports from Hwang Yun’gil and Kim Sŏ ng’il, and those in power feared unrest among the populace if the rumor of war circulated. Accepting Kim’s opinion, orders were issued to all the provinces, and the hasty defensive preparations, including the building of fortresses, were suspended. The Embassy returned together with Genso and Yanagawa Shigenobu, who brought the reply from Hideyoshi. The content of Hideyoshi’s letter was not only insolent and rude, but it also included the request for Chosǒ n to guide the way during Japan’s conquest of Ming. Enraged at the content of the letter, Cho H ŏn memorialized seven proposals, including decapitating the Japanese envoys, informing China and Ry ū ky ū of Japan’s threats to invade, and fortifying defenses in the Y ǒngnam (southeast) and Honam (southwest) regions in preparation against Japanese raids. Most of these were rejected. 28 However, Han Ŭ ng’in was dispatched to Ming China where he reported that the Japanese were intending to attack China. After he defended Chos ŏ n against suspicion that it was participating in preparations for invasion, the Ming government decided to dispatch a relief force.29 In this succession of diplomatic activity, Chosŏ n could not accurately grasp Japan’s intentions to invade. In the midst of a vague worry that Japan might actually invade, from one year before the eruption of the Imjin Waeran, the Chos ŏn court intended to set up measures in preparation for unexpected incidents. While the abuses within the local self-defense system were pointed out in the Border Defense Council, arguments were put forward to restore the garrison-command structure, but these measures never materialized. 30 Under the judgment that Japan was stronger on sea than on land, the Chosǒ n court ordered the extension of fortifi cations and trenches at the Left and Right Military Commands in Kyǒ ngsang, Ch ǒlla, and other, nearby provinces. 31 However, construction took place perfunctorily, yielding low fortress walls built on plains. Moreover, some yangban concluded that the Japanese army

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 would not invade and opposed these measures. The commoners who were mobilized to extend fortresses and participate in military training harbored grudges against the local magistrates and military offi cials. As a result, orders to mend defensive works along the southern coast and to repair weapons were used by local magistrates and military commanders merely as a means to mobilize the peasants and extract some profi t. Very few orders were ever actually enforced.32 Accordingly, these efforts did not amount to preparations that could repulse the Japanese army but merely heightened popular animosity. On the other hand, from the eleventh month of 1591, Hideyoshi, at his Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 37 base in Nagoya Castle in northwestern Kyū sh ū , was, among other preparations, accelerating the construction of warships for the invasion of Chosŏ n. In these ways, although the Chosǒ n court could anticipate war, it did not suffi ciently prepare the country. The immediate reason for the failure was the court’s miscalculated expectation that the war would only consist of Japanese pirates plundering on a grand scale. The larger reason was the collapse of order within the Neo-Confucian literati regime.

Reasons for the defeats at the beginning of the Imjin Waeran The discussion above has examined the domestic situation in Chosŏ n, the relations between Chosŏ n and Japan, and countermeasures taken by the Chos ŏn government against invasion leading up to the outbreak of the Imjin Waeran. In light of this and in lieu of a conclusion, I would like to consider the causes for the defeats of the Chosŏ n military in the early months of the Imjin Waeran. First, the discipline of the Neo-Confucian literati regime became lax in the sixteenth century and two factors emerged to prevent the establishment of an effective defense. In Chosŏ n prior to the outbreak of the Imjin Waeran, popular sentiment became chaotic and national discipline became attenuated with changes occurring in politics, society, and the economy. As disturbances appeared in the military order, the basis of national defense in the garrison- command structure became little more than a nominal entity. Following the Riot of the Three Ports, the Border Defense Council was established to provide preparation against Japanese incursions and efforts were made to reform the military structure into a local self-defense system and to construct p’anoksŏ n warships. On the eve of the Imjin Waeran incompetent magistrates were replaced and fortresses in Ky ǒ ngsang and Chǒ lla provinces were mended, but these measures were enforced perfunctorily and merely earned popular resentment. Although the coming war was clearly foretold, defensive preparations were unable to address this possibility adequately and the lack of preparation became the main reason for the defeat of the Chos ŏ n military at the hands of the Japanese. Second, the Chosŏ n government had inadequate intelligence information on the internal Japanese situation. In the early Chos ŏ n period (1392–1592), Chos ŏn envoys went as far as Kyō to and were able to see and hear fi rst-hand

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 about Japanese internal matters. With this information as a foundation, the early Chos ŏn government was able to unfold an effective foreign policy regarding Japan. However, because envoys were unable to travel to Ky ōto after 1443, it became impossible to obtain accurate intelligence on the Japanese domestic scene. The result was that impostor envoys sporting the title of king of Japan multiplied and the Chosŏ n government was unable to grasp and cope with a Japanese plan of invasion in advance. On the other hand, envoys from the king of Japan, unlike Korean envoys, were able to visit the Korean capital until the eve of the invasion. Using these opportunities, they were able to 38 Han Moon Jong obtain intelligence information on Chos ŏn’s military structure and the state of its national defense. Consequently, when the invasion arrived, the routes that the Japanese envoys had taken to the Korean capital were the very routes that the invading Japanese armies mainly used. Moreover, the Chos ŏn government worked from the assessment that because Japan was an island country, its naval capacity would be better than its land capacity, thus small-scale fortifi cation extensions and ditches were prepared for the Left and Right Army Commands in Ky ŏ ngsang and Chŏ lla provinces and elsewhere as a defense against the Japanese army. As became clear later and in contrast to this assessment, Korean forces received crushing defeats on land, but at sea they gathered in victories. 33 Again, this miscalculation was attributable to the inadequacy of accurate intelligence on the Japanese. Third, Korean tactics were wholly inadequate in comparison to the Japanese. After the Riot of the Three Ports, Chosŏ n had established the Border Defense Council to cope with incursions from Japanese pirates in the south and from the Jurchens in the north. After the pirate attack of 1555, regional defenses were reorganized from a garrison-command structure into a local, self- defense system. The local self-defense system was effective against Japanese pirates in limited, single incursions, but in a large-scale invasion such as the Imjin Waeran, it was useless in actual battle.34 This also became a factor in the crushing defeats of the Chos ŏ n forces at the opening of the invasion. Chos ŏn weaponry at the opening of the Imjin Waeran was also inadequate and consisted of conventional weapons such as bows, arrows, and swords, and gunpowder weapons such as the victory mark cannon (K. s ŭ ngja ch’ongt’ong ), the heaven’s mark cannon (K. ch’ ŏ nja ch’ongt’ong), the earth mark cannon (K. chija ch’ongt’ong ), the black mark cannon (K. hy ŏ nja ch’ongt’ong ), and rocketry such as the single rocket arrow (K. shin’gij ŏ n ), a multiple arrow- launcher akin to a modern, multiple-launch rocket system (K. hwacha ), and something akin to modern bombs (K. pigy ŏ k chinch’ ŏ lloe ). 35 By contrast, the main weapon used by the Japanese army was the arquebus, whose performance far exceeded Korean weapons. The Japanese army used their pikes and fi rearms effi ciently to allow their arquebuses to be put to best use. In short, when meeting the enemy, fi rst the rifl emen would fi re, and while they were re-loading, the archers would launch arrows. After that, the rifl emen would fi re again. While the enemy’s line was in disarray, the pikemen and the cavalry would advance and with the initiation of hand-to-hand combat, victory or

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 defeat would be decided. Even though the Japanese army was in command of a strategy that systematically used rifl emen, the Korean army had nearly no information on Japanese weapons or tactics and so could not avoid complete defeat. An exemplary instance is Shin Ip’s defeat at the Battle of T’an’gŭ mdae near Ch’ungju. 36 In short, behind the Japanese army’s entrance into Hans ŏ ng just a little over twenty days after landing at Pusan was the Chos ŏ n army’s inability to grasp and respond to the Japanese army’s performance and tactics. This was the reason why the army was unable to delay the advance of the enemy and create confusion behind his lines.37 Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 39 For the reasons stated above, in the opening days of the invasion, the Chosŏ n army met total defeat by the Japanese forces. However, as time passed, the activities of the ŭ iby ŏ ng guerrillas, who arose in the provinces, and the naval victories centered on Yi Sunshin, as well as the development of new weapons and tactics, overcame failure and delivered defeat to the Japanese army.

Notes Translated by Grace Koh with James B. Lewis. 1 Kim T’aey ŏ ng, “Kwaj ŏ nb ŏ p,” 1996, pp. 32–65. 2 Ko Sokkyu, “Sangp’um,” 1996, pp. 84–9. 3 Ko Sokkyu, “Sangp’um,” 1996, pp. 71–6. 4 Chungjong shillok , 103:29a–31a (1544.5.27). 5 Kim Chongsu, “Kuny ŏ k chedo,” 1996, pp. 89–113. 6 Sŏ njo shillok , 140:8a–10b (1601.8.13). 7 S ŏ ngjong shillok , 50:7b–8b (1474.12.15). 8 I t ō K ō ji, “J ū go-j ū roku seiki,” 1999, pp. 88–9. 9 I t ō K ō ji, “Ch ū sei kō ki,” 1994. 1 0 Chungjong shillok , 54:16a–16b (1525.4.28). 1 1 Chungjong shillok , 48:63a (1523.7.28). 12 Murai Sh ō suke, Ch ū sei Wajinden , 1993, pp. 163–4. 1 3 Chungjong shillok , 98:13a–14a (1558.4.20). 14 Because Tsushima sourced their goods and fi nances in Hakata, when they dispatched their impostor envoys, it was necessary to keep good relations with the Ō uchi and Ō tomo lords who controlled Hakata. Takahashi Kimiaki, “Jū roku seiki,” 1989, pp. 166–7. 1 5 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 18:34b–37a (1555.5.16). 1 6 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 32:34b–35a (1566.3.13). 17 Kim Chaeg ŭ n, Uri ŭ i pae , 1996, pp. 135–55. 18 There is much debate over Yi I’s proposal for 100,000 troops ( shimman yangpy ŏ ng s ŏ l ). Yi Chaeho points out that the main source for Yi’s proposal is the personal obituary for Yi I by Kim Changsaeng in the S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , which underwent no selective editing and incorporated a number of fi ctions. Yi Chaeho, “S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok ,” 1985. 1 9 Sŏ njo shillok , 23:1b (1589.1.21). 2 0 Sŏ njo shillok , 23:7a (1587.7.28). 21 Han Munjong, “Chos ŏ n ch ŏ ngi tae-Il,” 1996. 2 2 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 23:27a–27b (1587.9.1). 2 3 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 23:8a–8b (1589.7.1). 2 4 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:2a–3a (1591.3.1). 25 Ha Ubong, “Imjin Waeran,” 1999. 26 Ha Ubong, “Imjin Waeran,” 1999, pp. 198–200. Kim Sŏ ng’il’s view that Japan Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 would not invade carried the day and Kim repeated his assessment on later occasions. In 1591, when there were proposals to repair fortifi cations, dig ditches, and select servicemen in preparation against a Japanese disturbance, Kim Sŏ ng’il criticized these proposals as mistaken stratagems (S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:20b, 1591.11.1). Even just before the Imjin Waeran broke out, while stating that the “Japs” (K. Waeno ) will not invade, and even if they do, there is nothing to worry about, he argued that the castle construction and military drilling in Kyŏ ngsang Province were harmful ( S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 26:1b, 1592.3.1). 2 7 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:20b–21a (1591.12.1). 2 8 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:4a–11a (1591.3.1). 40 Han Moon Jong 29 Ch’oe Y ŏ ngh ŭ i, “Waeran,” 1995, p. 25. 3 0 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:19a–19b (1591.10.1). 3 1 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:18b (1591.7.1). 32 O Chongnok, “Y ŏ r ŏ ŏ lgul,” 2000, p. 87. 33 The ability of the navy to achieve successive victories at sea was probably due to the confl uence of fundamental differences in the performance of the battleships and cannon and Yi Sunshin’s outstanding ability to command. Pak Chaegwang, “Ch ŏ ngjaeng ŭ i togu,” 1999, pp. 116–22. 3 4 Y i K y ŏ mju, “Imjin Waeran,” 1992, pp. 46–7. 35 Translator’s note: See Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 74–5, for more details. 36 Translator’s note: See Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 95–6. 37 Pak Chaegwang, “Ch ŏ ngjaeng ŭ i togu,” 1999, pp. 89–109.

References Ch’oe Y ŏ ngh ŭ i (崔永禧 ). “ Waeran ch ŏ n ŭ i ch ŏ ngse (㢲⧖G 㩚㦮G 㩫㎎ ) ,” Han’guksa ( 䞲ῃ㌂ ) 29 , Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 1995 ): 13–26 . Chungjong shillok ( 中宗実録 ). Ha Ubong ( 䞮㤆⽟). “Imjin Waeran ch ŏnhu Han’guk’in ŭi Ilbon kwan ( 㧚㰚㢲⧖G 㩚䤚G䞲ῃ㧎㦮G㧒⽎ὖ ),” in Saeropge tasi pon ŭ n Imjin Waeran ( ㌞⫃ỢG┺㔲G⽊⓪G 㧚㰚㢲⧖ ). Chinju : Kungnip Chinju Pangmulgwan , 1999 , pp. 198–203 . Han Munjong ( 䞲ⶎ㫛 ). “Chos ŏ n ch ŏ ngi tae-Il oegyo ch ŏ ngch’aek y ŏ n’gu: Taemado wa ŭi kwangye r ŭl chungsim ŭro (朝鮮前期對日外交政策硏究 - 對馬島㢖㦮G ὖἚ⯒ 㭧㕂㦒⪲ ),” Ph.D. dissertation, Ch ŏ nbuk taehakkyo, 1996 . I t ō K ō ji ( 伊藤幸司 ). “Ch ū sei k ōki no Rinzai-sh ū Genj ū-ha to taigai k ō ry ū ( 中世後期の螡濟宗幻住派と對外交流 ) ,” Shig aku zasshi (史學雜誌 ) 108 :4 ( 1999 ): 465–500 , 621–2 . I t ō K ō ji ( 伊藤幸司 ). “ J ū go-j ūroku seiki no Nichi-Min, Nit-Chō k ō sh ō to Mus ō -ha Kaz ō mon-ha ( 十五 · 十蜄世紀の日明 · 日朝交涉と夢窓派華藏門派 ) ,” Ch ō sen gakuh ō ( 朝鮮學報 ) 71 ( 1999 ): 65–101 . Kim Chaeg ŭ n ( ₖ㨂⁒ ). Uri ŭ i pae: Kujo wa y ŏ ksa ( 㤆Ⰲ㦮G⺆ -ῂ㫆㢖G㡃㌂ -). Seoul : Seoul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu , 1996 . Kim Chongsu ( 金鍾洙 ). “ Kuny ŏk chedo ŭ i pungkoe ( 軍役制度㦮G⿫ᾊ ) ,” Han’guksa ( 䞲ῃ㌂ ) 28 , Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 1996 ): 89–113 . Kim T’aey ŏ ng ( 金泰永 ). “ Kwaj ŏ nb ŏ b ŭ i pong’g ŭi wa chijuje ŭ i paldal ( 科田法㦮G ⿫ᾊ㢖地主制㦮G ⹲╂ ) ,” Han’guksa ( 䞲ῃ㌂ ) 28 , Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 1996 ): 32–65 . Ko Sokkyu ( 高錫珪 ). “ Sangp’um ŭ i yut’ong kwa kongnapche ŭ i mosun (㌗䛞㦮G 㥶䐋ὒ 貢納制㦮G ⳾㑲 ) ,” Han’guksa ( 䞲ῃ㌂ ) 28 , Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 1996 ): 65–89 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 ). Chū sei Wajinden ( 中世倭人傳 ). Tokyo : Iwanami shoten , 1993 . My ŏ ngjong shillok ( 明宗實錄 ). O Chongnok ( 㡺㫛⪳ ). “Y ŏ rŏ ŏ lgul ŭ i chŏ njaeng, Imjin Waeran (㡂⩂G㠒Ὴ㦮G㩚㨗G , 㧚㰚㢲⧖ ),” in Ch ŏ ng Py ŏ ngjun ( 㩫⼧㭖 ), ed., Chinboj ŏk minju ju ŭ ija, Y ŏ Unhy ŏ ng: Naeil ŭ l y ŏ n ŭ n y ŏ ksa ch’angganho (㰚⽊㩗G⹒㭒㭒㦮㧦G , 㡂㤊䡫 : ⌊㧒㦚G㡂⓪G㡃㌂G ⽚䢎 [ 㺓Ṛ䢎 ]). Seoul : Sins ŏ w ŏ n , 2000 , pp. 79–90 . Pak Chaegwang ( ⹫㨂ὧ ). “Chŏ ngjaeng ŭ i togu (㩫㨗㦮G ☚ῂ ),” in Saeropge tasi pon ŭ n Imjin Waeran (㌞⫃ỢG ┺㔲G ⽊⓪G 㧚㰚㢲⧖ ). Chinju : Kungnip Chinju Pangmulgwan , 1999 , pp. 116–22 . Korea’s pre-war domestic situation 41 S ŏ ngjong shillok (成宗實錄 ). S ŏ njo shillok (宣祖實錄 ). S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok ( 宣祖修正實錄 ). Swope , Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 . Norman : University of Oklahoma Press , 2009 . Takahashi Kimiaki (高橋公明 ). “J ūroku seiki no Chō sen-Tsushima-Higashi Ajia kai- iki ( 十蜄世紀の朝鮮 · 對馬 · 東アジア海域 ),” in Kat ō Eiichi ( 加藤榮一 ) et al ., eds., Bakuhansei kokka to iiki ikoku (幕藩制國家と異域異國 ). Tokyo : Azekura shob ō , 1989 , pp. 143–77 . Yi Chaeho ( 蝗載浩 ). “ S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok kisa ŭ i ŭ ij ŏm e tae han py ŏ ns ŏ k: t’ ŭ khi Yi Yulgok ŭ i Simman yangpyŏ ngnon e tae hay ŏ ( 宣祖修正實錄記事㦮疑點㠦對䞲辨析 - 䔏䧞G蝗蜚谷㦮十萬養兵論ὒ 蛢西厓㦮養兵臺可論㠦G╖䞮㡂G) ,” Taedong munhwa y ŏ n’gu (大東文化硏究 ) 19 ( 1985 ): 189–232 . Y i K y ŏ mju ( 蝗謙周 ). “Imjin Waeran chŏ n Chos ŏ n ŭ i kukpang silt’ae ( 壬辰倭亂前朝鮮㦮國防實態 ) ,” Han’guk saron ( 韓國史論 ) 22 , Kuksa p’yŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 1992 ): 27–47 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 3 Violence, trade, and impostors in Korean–Japanese relations, 1510–1609

Kenneth R. Robinson

Introduction Japanese traded with the Chosŏ n government from the 1390s, but from the mid-fi fteenth century elites in western Japan, especially Tsushima, frequently achieved sanctioned trade through impostor identities, too. The strategies behind impostor contacts varied, but all aimed at gaining regular, annual opportunities for exchange. Korean kings bestowed contact privileges that enabled trade to many fraudulent identities, but denied those privileges to numerous others. Concern at court about the long careers of several Japanese contacts sharpened in the fi rst years of King Chungjong’s reign (r. 1506–44). This issue of interaction through impostor identities informed negotiations over expanding trade between the Chosŏ n court and Japanese elites for most of the sixteenth century. Korean offi cials complained in the third lunar month of 1509 that Japanese were trading through the Chosŏ n government-issued personal seals (K. tos ŏ ) of Japanese who must have already died. King Chungjong and his ministers soon revised four regulations governing maritime access to Chos ŏ n for trade and dispatched an offi cial to inform the governor of Tsushima of these new rules. For those in Japan who were involved in such tribute trade missions, the most distressing reform probably was the review and possible voiding of personal seals issued more than “fi fty years” earlier. 1 That is, sanctioned trade in Chosŏ n by or through these seal recipients could not continue without royal approval. However, the governor of Tsushima passed away before King Chungjong’s representative reached Ky ŏ ngsang Province. With condolences now appropriate, the king of Chosŏ n could not introduce the new Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 regulations.2 Those reforms might have discouraged the next mission from Minamoto Gi, of Hirado, in northwest Ky ū sh ū, who had received a personal seal in 1456. In the seventh lunar month of 1509 court offi cials asked about this contact’s health. The envoy replied that following Gi’s death some thirty years ago Gi’s younger brother had succeeded as family head. In the fi fteenth century, the Chos ŏn court recognized a contact successor when the successor returned his father’s personal seal and requested to receive a personal seal for himself. The successor to Minamoto Gi had not requested this recognition and that Violence, trade, and impostors 43 fueled Chungjong’s anger. Learning of the transfer of this seal to another person, Chungjong ordered offi cials at the open ports to question each envoy who presented a letter (K. s ŏ gye, J. shokei) that had been stamped by a personal seal issued decades earlier.3 Minamoto Gi was one of the impostor identities through which Japanese interacted fraudulently with the Chosŏ n government. Most of the men involved in impostor tribute trade were based in Tsushima and Hakata, and, for some, their connections extended to elites in the Sakai area. 4 King Chungjong dispatched another offi cial to Tsushima in the second lunar month of 1510. In addition to condolences, this representative was to deliver the monarch’s confi rmation of the new governor of Tsushima in the tributary relationship and in his role as the issuer of the mun’in travel permits. The Chos ŏn court required this Korean document of all Japanese ships sailing from Tsushima to one of the three open ports in Ky ŏngsang Province. (If an envoy led more than one ship, then a travel permit was necessary for each ship.) The Korean offi cial carried a letter expressing concern, among other issues, about the durability of personal seal-holders. The letter read, in part, “There must be many among them that have died.”5 This offi cial did not reach Tsushima, either. Before he could sail, Japanese residing in the Japan House (K. Waegwan ) at the ports of Che-p’o and Pusan- p’o attacked Korean military and civil administration offi ces in the fourth lunar month of 1510. The Riot of the Three Ports (K. Samp’o Waeran ) ended in the eighth lunar month after having spread inland, to nearby ports, and to nearby islands, and after Japanese reinforcements had arrived from Tsushima. 6 King Chungjong severed relations with the Muromachi bakufu , thus barring access to the peninsula and trade to all Japanese. Negotiations restored diplomatic relations in 1511 and trade in 1512. The Riot of the Three Ports was the fi rst of three cycles of Japanese violence, Korean termination of state-to-state diplomatic relations and trade, negotiation, resumption of state-to-state diplomatic relations, negotiation, and resumption of interaction and sanctioned trade with other Japanese between 1510 and 1609. Individuals responsible for the violence – the disturbance at the ports in 1510, the 1544 pirate raid on Saryang, in Kyŏ ngsang Province, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion from 1592 to 1598 – did not participate in the management of Japanese trade in Chos ŏn. Those Japanese who negotiated with the Chos ŏn court in 1511–12, 1545–7, and from soon

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 after the invasion’s end until 1609 were based in Tsushima and Hakata or they had connections with Hakata’s political, religious, and merchant elites. In other words, the Japanese engaged in managing the Korean trade did not use violence to further their objectives. Rather, those Japanese had to repair diplomatic and trade relations with the Chosŏ n government after others had disrupted them. Three dynamics shaped negotiations to establish and maintain trade over the sixteenth century. The fi rst was the desire among Japanese in Tsushima and Hakata, but especially in Tsushima, to expand trade volume from 1512. 44 K.R. Robinson Second were the Chos ŏ n government’s efforts to prevent further manipulation of access and trade regulations. The third was the Chosŏ n government’s need to protect against maritime piracy from the mid-1540s. However, measures taken against piracy, which included permitting trade through impostor identities and encouraging Japanese to raise alerts of nearby pirate ships, failed when violence reached the level of an invasion. Such violence was far beyond what these men in western Japan could control, although they tried. The Chosŏ n government’s policies, though, left it unprepared for an unexpected war.

Impostor identities, Hakata elites, and Southeast Asian goods The problems that King Chungjong and his offi cials sought to eliminate in 1509 may be traced back to the 1450s, when the Chosŏ n court began regularly issuing personal seals and annual ship quotas to Japanese contacts based in western provinces. Among the recipients over the succeeding decades were living Japanese and contacts fraudulently created in Japan, almost certainly in Tsushima and Hakata. Other contacts, such as Minamoto Gi, continued to be active after their deaths, suggesting that another family member or someone outside the family held the personal seal and traded illicitly through that identity. In 1509 and 1510 the Chos ŏn court intended to halt trade by impostor identities. In particular, King Chungjong and his offi cials sought to eliminate fraudulent trade through personal seals not held by the individuals in whose names they had been issued. The riot in 1510 enabled King Chungjong to fi nally impose reforms. His offi cials negotiated in 1511 and 1512 with the king of Japan (K. Ilbon kugwang, J. Nihon koku ō) as represented by the monk H ō ch ū D ōtoku. Whether D ōtoku traveled to Chos ŏn on behalf of the sh ō gun Ashikaga Yoshitane, who had lived in exile with the Ō uchi family from 1493 to 1508, or on behalf of an impostor shō gun that had been designed and was being managed in western Japan is not clear.7 D ō toku returned to Japan in 1511 with state-level diplomatic relations re-established, and again in 1512 with new regulations for access, trade, and residence, or the Agreement of 1512 (K. Imshin yakcho). In 1513, Yoshitane appointed him to Shō fukuji, a Rinzai Zen temple in Hakata. 8 This assignment may indicate that he had traveled on behalf of Yoshitane.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The Chosŏ n government’s punishment in 1512 for the riot targeted Tsushima islanders and impostor identities. The Chosŏ n court reopened only Che-p’o among the three ports where Japanese previously had resided and traded, but the king no longer permitted residence. Of immediate and long-term damage to Tsushima’s economy, the court eliminated contact privileges for all Tsushima islanders except the governor. It revoked the personal seals and the offi ce warrants (K. koshin) for nominal military posts bestowed upon Tsushima men, invalidated the annual ship quota for the island’s seal recipients, and halved the number of annual trade ships allowed to the governor since 1443. The Violence, trade, and impostors 45 Korean government reduced Tsushima elites from some seventy-four trade ships each year to the twenty-fi ve ships allowed to the governor. To halt the misuse of personal seals issued for contacts based elsewhere, the court stated its intention to review all personal seals with the exception of those bestowed for merit.9 To the extent that the personal seals of impostor identities such as Chiba Mototane were managed in Tsushima,10 the revocation of privileges reduced further the number of Tsushima ships that could visit Chosŏ n each year and sharpened the islanders’ economic pain.11 After several requests, the court allowed three ships each year for the governor’s son in 1515 and added fi ve ships to the governor of Tsushima’s annual quota in 1523. 12 Nevertheless, discomfort from severed trading opportunities must not have stopped at Tsushima. It must have extended into the islanders’ trading relationships in Hakata, elsewhere in Japan, and even to Ry ū ky ū and Southeast Asia. Moreover, the slump to the north coincided with the appearance of Portuguese in Southeast Asia, their entry into local and regional networks from Malacca from 1511, and their competition with the Ry ū ky ū government and its traders. The Ryū ky ūan government had to absorb reductions in volume north and south that proved to be permanent. Infl ated and unreliable though his accounts may at times be, Fern ã o Mendes Pinto wrote that Ry ū ky ū continued to be a destination for ships sailing from Southeast Asia, and that Ryū ky ū an ships sailed to Japan in the 1540s and 1550s. 13 Kang Hang, a Korean captive of war in Japan from the tenth lunar month of 1597 until the fourth lunar month of 1600, commented that Ry ū ky ūan, Portuguese, Chinese, and Luzon trade ships came without cease to Karatsu and Nagoya, in northwest Ky ū sh ū .14 And from the mid-sixteenth century Portuguese also carried pepper to Japan.15 Pepper, cinnabar, and sappanwood, all Southeast Asian goods that Japanese carried to the peninsula from the early fi fteenth century, continued to enter Chosŏ n as late as 1590.16 Cinnabar and pepper also arrived because of two changes in the patterns of Japanese trade. In the fi rst pattern, certain Japanese revived trade under the names of impostor Muromachi bakufu offi cials in 1548, or the year after the king of Chos ŏn had restored tribute trade following the second closure of the country to Japanese in 1544. An earlier generation of impostor Muromachi bakufu offi - cials had proven effective between 1455 and 1474, especially during the Ō nin War of 1467–77. This was largely due to their status within the Korean tribute system and to inadequate information in Chos ŏn about the Japanese government. In

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the fi fteenth century and now again in the sixteenth century, the Chosŏ n court received bakufu offi cials at the second reception grade, which was below only that for kings of foreign countries in the ordering of maritime contacts, and permitted these contacts to outfi t as many as two ships each trade mission. But in 1551 the court complained that the trade missions of bakufu offi cials, ones that Korean offi cials do not seem to have realized were fraudulent, carried large amounts of cinnabar and pepper.17 In the second pattern, in 1552, King My ŏngjong’s court permitted Japanese contacts based in Ky ū sh ū to resume interaction. Active personal seals totaled 46 K.R. Robinson fi fteen in 1555.18 More trade ships, including those of impostor bakufu offi - cials, now sailed for Chos ŏn as compared to prior to 1544, and greater volumes of cinnabar and pepper entered Chos ŏ n. In 1557 the Chos ŏn court grew tired of Japanese seeking to exchange cinnabar and pepper in quantities four and fi ve times greater than in earlier years. King Myŏ ngjong limited cinnabar to thirty catties (K. k ŭ n , J. kin ), or 18,000 grams, and pepper to fi fty catties, or 30,000 grams, per trade mission, and required the governor of Tsushima to record the quantity on the travel permit. The court also allowed each mission to carry as many as three inkstones (J. suzuribako ).19 The ceilings imposed in 1557 governed exchange into the mid-1580s, and almost certainly until the invasion. Data for trade volumes are rich for the years 1580 to 1586. Before reviewing that information, a brief introduction to the Chosŏ n court’s hierarchical ordering of Japanese contacts after 1512 will be instructive. The court divided Japanese contacts into four reception grades and into fi ner diplomatic statuses within two of those grades. The diplomatic equal of the king of Chosŏ n was the king of Japan, as the Chinese and Korean governments called the representative of Japan in state-to-state relations. Interaction at this highest reception grade enabled those concocting fraudulent, impostor sh ōgunal embassies to outfi t up to three ships per embassy. Below the king of Japan were bakufu offi cials, the Ō uchi family, and the Shō ni family at the second reception grade, the Kyū sh ū Deputy (J. Ky ū sh ū tandai), who was a regional offi cial, at the third grade, and all other Japanese contacts at the fourth grade. Between 1580 and 1586 the quantities of cinnabar and pepper sent by contacts of the fourth reception grade did not exceed the 1557 regulations. Of 527 missions recorded as carrying cinnabar, pepper, inkstone cases, or horns, 517 missions held cinnabar, nine held pepper, and one held horns. In addition, inkstone cases appeared in two missions, and swords, silk thread, and other goods also were listed. Calculating from these Tsushima records, Japanese carried 12,251 catties, or 7,350,600 grams, of cinnabar and 105 catties, or 63,000 grams, of pepper from 1580 into 1586, or annual averages of 1,750.14 catties, or 1,050,084 grams, of cinnabar and 16.43 catties, or 9,858 grams, of pepper. These fi gures probably do not represent the total amounts of the goods, though. This is because the records do not identify goods prepared for impostor shō gunal embassies, which sailed from the 1520s at the latest, or for

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 contacts of the second reception grade. As for inkstone cases, the number of items carried in 1580 and in 1584 exceeded the 1557 limit.20 Tsushima islanders almost certainly acquired these Southeast Asian goods in Hakata. The port city’s proximity was one reason. Another was the Sō family’s relationships with the city’s political and economic elites over the previous 150 years and more. Baigan, who probably was a monk and based in Tsushima, demonstrates the involvement of Tsushima men in networks that coursed through Hakata society in the late sixteenth century. In 1580 and 1585 his trade ships to Chosŏ n each bore twenty catties, or 12,000 grams, of Violence, trade, and impostors 47 cinnabar, and his ships sent in 1581, 1582, 1583, and 1586 each carried thirty catties, or 18,000 grams. Moreover, his 1584 mission handled one of the few confi rmed cargoes of pepper by a contact of the fourth reception grade other than the governor of Tsushima.21 An anecdote illustrates the network of traders and monks. One afternoon in 1579, Baigan joined a Hakata monk and prominent Hakata merchants for fl ower viewing and poetry.22 The Hakata monk who attended that afternoon gathering was Keitetsu Genso, the abbot of Shō fukuji temple in the port city.23 Sh ōfukuji had long maintained ties with the Ōuchi, who administered Hakata in the mid-fi fteenth century and again from 1479 until their demise in 1551, and the temple remained visible and valuable in the second half of the sixteenth century, too.24 In earlier years, Genso had communicated with the abbot of Seizanji, a Rinzai Zen temple in Tsushima. Seizanji also contributed to Japanese relations with the Korean government. An abbot of Seizanji at one point in his career, the monk Anshin Tō d ō served three times in the 1540s and 1550s as the envoy for impostor shō guns. 25 And the temple traded in Chos ŏn every year from 1580 to 1586.26 In 1580–1, Genso himself had served as envoy for an impostor embassy whose documentation was prepared in Tsushima.27 Also present at the gathering in Hakata that afternoon was the merchant Shimai S ōshitsu, who was an associate of Ō tomo S ōrin, himself the gover- nor of Bungo Province and the most powerful man in northern Kyū sh ū in the 1570s. S ō rin (or perhaps someone using Sō rin’s name?) traded with the Chos ŏn court through Tsushima islanders in 1572, 1573, and 1574. 28 Shimai’s activities stretched to Tsushima and Chosŏ n, and to Sakai, which he frequently visited for trade and where he joined in tea gatherings. The merchant was working with the Sō by 1568, when he turned a handsome profi t in Sakai from goods acquired in the peninsula.29 And he visited Tsushima about one month before the outing with Baigan and Genso.30 Trade in Chos ŏ n was probably the strongest common denominator that connected the men viewing fl owers that afternoon. In sum, throughout the sixteenth century Tsushima elites and their associates in western Japan were managing an elaborate system of seals that gained them access to Chos ŏn and to trade there. Some of these seals were fraudulent in that they had been obtained under false pretenses. Real and impostor contacts moved Southeast Asian goods that had been acquired through

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Ryukyuan contacts. Changes in Chosŏ n government policy to regulate the use of seals had repercussions through Tsushima to Hakata to Ryū ky ū and even further. Into this network in the 1530s entered silver.

The early silver trade and China From the 1530s into the mid-1550s, silver eclipsed Southeast Asian goods in the cargo of a few select Japanese ships. The global silver trade linked economies in Asia, the Americas, and Western Europe, and expanded to 48 K.R. Robinson northeast China when Koreans started to acquire goods there in the late fi fteenth century or the fi rst years of the sixteenth century with silver mined in Chosŏ n. The Chosŏ -period silver trade in China fi rst relied on metal mined in Tanch’ ŏn and elsewhere in the peninsular northeast. By the late 1530s Koreans also were carrying Japanese silver into China. Silver mining came to the attention of the Korean ruler Prince Yŏ nsan by 1503 at the latest. 31 In the northeast, Koreans were utilizing a cupellation technique (K. y ŏ ny ŏ n ch’ ŏl wi ŭ n ) learned from Chinese that separated silver more readily from the iron ore in which it was found. 32 By early in 1508, the Chos ŏn court knew that interpreters assigned to royal embassies were carrying Korean silver into China. 33 For the next several decades the court struggled to prevent unsupervised extraction and to stop Korean merchants and government offi cials from trading silver or using it as currency in northeast China and Beijing. The circulation of silver touched upon the Korean government’s management of the domestic economy, relations with the Ming court, and relations with Japanese in western provinces. A profl igate son, Prince Yŏ nsan secured revenue from the mining. In 1504 he constricted mining to state-supervised digs during lulls in the spring and autumn farming seasons. King Chungjong abolished the seasonal mining almost immediately after taking the throne in the ninth lunar month of 1506.34 The government’s need for silver could not be neglected, however. In early 1510 King Chungjong ordered the Board of Taxation (K. Hojo) to cal- culate the amount of silver necessary for state use and to collect that amount in Hamgy ŏ ng Province.35 People in Hamgy ŏng and Kangw ŏn provinces engaged in private extraction over the next several decades despite this king’s opposition to mining beyond state oversight. (King Chungjong had approved private mining in 1515, but halted it in 1516.) In 1517 the court decided to confi scate goods acquired in Ming China by embassy participants, save for books, medicine, and other approved items. The law was intended to stop the fl ow of silver to China by denying participants its proceeds and thereby discouraging private mining and export. The court resumed spring and autumn state mining in 1521, and this continued until 1542. Another ban on private mining, announced in 1528, indicates that the government could not police extraction, nor could it adequately monitor the comings and goings of merchants, interpreters, military men, and others assigned to embassies bound for Beijing. Silver left Hamgy ŏ ng

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Province by various means. For example, miners exchanged their haul with visiting merchants, including licensed merchants, who then traveled to Hansŏ ng, to P’yŏ ng’an Province, or into China. In Hansŏ ng, they delivered the silver to Chinese-language interpreters or military offi cials who were to serve in an upcoming embassy. (The Ming court permitted the king of Chosŏ n to send up to four tribute embassies each year.) Or, merchants carried their load to Ŭiju, the city in P’yŏ ng’an Province through which embassies departed and entered Chosŏ n, and stored the metal at a private home for transfer to an embassy participant. Violence, trade, and impostors 49 Concern about the transport of silver to China did not begin in the early sixteenth century. Rather, this trade rekindled worries assuaged in 1429 when the Chinese and Korean governments agreed to the falsehood that silver was not to be found in Chosŏ n and therefore would not be demanded as tribute. Maintaining this fi ction and avoiding Chinese demands for silver tribute had inhibited the use of silver as currency in Chosŏ n during the fi fteenth century. King Chungjong on more than one occasion expressed fears that the current fl ow of Korean silver from the early 1500s would become known to the Chinese government and the emperor would renew the demand for silver as tribute.36 The Korean government would have found it diffi cult to ignore such a demand. In Ming China, silver was a trusted medium of exchange. When the government lifted the 1375 ban on payment in silver in 1435, it accepted the metal for the remittance of taxes.37 A silver economy formed in Ming China from the mid-fi fteenth century, as “silver quickly displaced all other currencies.” 38 The government did not convert this metal into coin. Silver circulated instead as weight. Participants in a transaction measured the quality of the ingot, which could be of varying sizes, and removed the amount necessary for the sale from the ingot. However, the Ming government’s monetary policies failed in the fi fteenth century. While Chinese continued to use silver for large-scale transactions, such as land purchases, they relied upon other cash, typically copper-based coins, for smaller transactions. In addition to copper coins minted by the state in 1435, debased and counterfeit coinage also circulated, and the latter even displaced the state currency. Silver, though, retained its value. For example, in the mid-sixteenth century in Wujiang County, in Suzhou Prefecture, where silver and copper coins had been used for loans in the fi fteenth century, the “lower interest rates levied on loans in silver attested to the market’s confi - dence in the long-term worth of silver.” 39 Chinese economic historians have long noted the insuffi cient volume of circulating silver in the late Ming economy prior to its import from Japan and elsewhere.40 Regardless of whether silver’s presence or absence is emphasized, Chinese merchants and others welcomed the availability of the Korean precious metal. How Korean silver moved through the Chinese economy requires further research, but Sukawa Hidenori suggests that Korean silver served as compensation (J. taika ) in smuggling. 41 Meanwhile, in Chos ŏ n, veins opened in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Tanch’ ŏn were reported in 1540 to be thinning and in the mid-1560s to be all but exhausted.42 By 1538, and possibly from a decade earlier, though, a second source of silver for the Chos ŏ n government, for Korean markets, and for Korean trade in China had opened. Koreans taught Japanese the cupellation technique that had revolutionized mining in Hamgy ŏ ng Province, and silver extraction fl ourished in the islands by the mid-1520s. The Hakata merchant Kamiya Jutei, who was already involved in copper mining and in trading copper in Chos ŏ n, began mining silver in Iwami Province, on the western coast of Honsh ū, from 1526.43 Silver 50 K.R. Robinson mines opened elsewhere in Japan, too, especially in other provinces along that western coast. Japanese added silver to cargoes bound for Chos ŏn possibly as early as 1528.44 The introduction of an external source of silver further complicated the Korean government’s efforts at preventing the fl ow of silver within and beyond Chosŏ n. Japanese traded the metal through (at least) two contacts, the Shō ni family and impostor kings of Japan. The earliest specifi c mention of silver in offi cial trade is in 1538, when a Shō ni mission brought 6,000 yang (375 catties, or 225,000 grams). The silver arrived as part of the trade to be conducted with the Korean government. In the court debate over the exchange rate, the Board of Rites (K. Yejo ) described silver as not of use to the state and argued that it should not be included in offi cial trade. Board offi - cials worried that even if the monarch were to approve only one-third of the amount for offi cial trade, Japanese would bring more of the metal for the private trade and Korean merchants would profi t greatly by paying for goods in China with silver acquired from the Japanese. 45 It is generally believed that the court accepted 125 catties, or 75,000 grams, for offi cial exchange and allowed the remainder to be traded privately at the open port where the mission had landed. While accepting Japanese silver, the court paid close attention to the Korean goods that the Japanese obtained for their silver. In particular, Japanese carried away great amounts of cotton cloth, and this had an impact on supplies in state warehouses and thus on state coffers. Interest in importing cotton from Chos ŏn and Ming China emerged in the mid-fi fteenth century and informed the construction of some impostor Muromachi bakufu offi cials in the 1460s and early 1470s. Participants in these trade missions may have sought to circulate the goods in the capital area and elsewhere.46 The next recorded import of silver occurred in 1542. In this fi rst known attempt to trade silver through an impostor shō gun, Japanese sent approximately 80,000 yang (5,000 catties, or 30,000,000 grams). The Chosŏ n court wanted to keep the silver–cloth exchange rate low, and offered two bolts (K. p’il) of cloth for three yang of silver. The impostor sh ōgun’s envoy, Anshin T ō d ō, demanded the 1538 rate of 15,000 yang of silver for 60,000 p’il of cloth that the Shō ni mission had enjoyed (twelve bolts for three yang ).47 The exchange rate is believed to eventually have been set at that previous rate of 15,000 yang of silver for 60,000 p’il of cloth. 48 Yu S ŭ ngju suggests that the Chosŏ n government’s acquisition of Japanese

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 silver in the late 1530s and the early 1540s increased the displeasure of Tanch’ ŏn residents who were forced to mine for the state but not permitted to mine for themselves. Whether people in Tanch’ŏ n did or did not know of trade for Japanese silver, available fi gures show declining output around 1540 in Chos ŏ n compared to earlier years.49 Thanks to Japanese, as King Chungjong himself noted, the Korean government no longer suffered from a shortage of silver. 50 Another impostor embassy led by Anshin Tō d ō brought silver in 1552–3, and another impostor embassy in 1556–7 carried 30,000 yang (1,875 catties, Violence, trade, and impostors 51 or 1,125,000 grams). Judging from the amount of cotton cloth received in exchange by the later embassy, the court seems to have accepted a ceiling of 3,000 yang (187.5 catties, or 112,500 grams) of silver for offi cial trade.51 Rather than accept one-third of the silver, or 10,000 yang , for offi cial trade as in the past, the court allowed only one-tenth for offi cial trade, or 3,000yang . Generally, Koreans moved silver from Kyŏ ngsang Province to Hans ŏ ng, where central government offi cials channeled the metal to interpreters, merchants, or others for exchange in China. But, as the king of Chosŏ n’s embassies to Ming China offered opportunities for Koreans to engage in the private exchange of silver there, the Chosŏ n court’s relations with Japanese invited what the court considered to be smuggling trade in Japanese silver. Japanese and Koreans met near Che-p’o and Pusan-p’o, the latter port having been reopened in 1521. Hansŏ ng merchants posing as central government offi cials acquired silver in 1539, and Japanese rendezvoused late at night with military offi cials in 1541. Also in 1541, government slaves disappeared with silver without fulfi lling their promise to provide the Japanese with goods in return. In a similar case, Koreans did not compensate Japanese for silver that had been obtained from the Japanese in advance of payment, which prompted the swindled Japanese smugglers to complain to the Board of Rites.52 And in 1539, the court revised the guard system at the Hall of Eastern Peace (K. Tongp’y ŏ nggwan), where Japanese stayed while in Hans ŏng, so as to prevent trade in forbidden goods.53 The smuggling provoked consternation. 54 Frustrated by the secret trade in the south and the transfer of Japanese silver among Koreans, the court began introducing new laws to thwart smuggling in the late 1530s. For example, offi - cials would be dismissed if they did not arrest local interpreters (K. hyang t’ongsa ) and merchants who secretly traded at night with Japanese on offshore islands. 55 That is, the court would punish offi cials who participated directly or indirectly in illicit transactions, or who knew of such transgressions but did not act. Several other laws introduced prior to the compilation in 1545 of the Taej ŏ n hu songnok , a volume of addenda to the Ky ŏ ngguk taej ŏ n , the state law code, imposed penalties on individuals who traded improperly in China and on individuals who traded in silver and Chinese goods. 56 Legal restrictions and political problems make it diffi cult to track the silver trade after this time. The closure of Chosŏ n to Japanese trade from 1544 to 1547 due to the pirate raid at Saryang contributed to the gap in (recorded) silver deliveries between

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 1542 and 1552. The silence of the veritable records regarding Japanese silver cargo after the impostor shō gunal embassy of 1556–7 makes it diffi cult to confi rm the frequency or volume of trade in Japanese silver from that time until 1592. The success of the court’s anti-smuggling measures similarly cannot be judged from the 1540s onwards. Japanese silver found other routes to China. To the south, Chinese merchants were sailing for northern Kyū sh ū by late 1541. 57 With the silver trade through Chosŏ n stifl ed by volume, exchange rates, and the court’s ban of thirty-four months on sanctioned exchange from 1544 to 1547, Japanese may 52 K.R. Robinson have turned directly towards China. According to Fernã o Mendes Pinto, in 1542 pirates attacked three Japanese ships bearing large quantities of silver that had departed Hirado bound for “Chincheo,” in China. 58 The Ō tomo and other families in western Japan endeavored to send embassies in 1544, 1545, and 1546, but these seem not to have sailed. In 1556, 1557, and 1558, families in western Japan again sent tribute embassies to Ming China. However, with one Japanese embassy sent by the Ō uchi having returned to Japan in 1541 and another in 1549, the Chinese government denied reception because each of these three later embassies did not meet the schedule of one embassy every ten years.59 Tribute trade and supplementary trade in the capital were obvious goals. The embassies, and their persistent dispatch, were perhaps inspired in part by the new demand for Japanese silver in China.

Piracy and impostor identities An issue more problematic than the smuggling of silver confronted the Chos ŏn government from the mid-1540s until the Japanese invasion. As noted already, pirates reached Chosŏ n in the fourth lunar month of 1544. Some 200 men aboard some twenty ships plundered Saryang that month. King Chungjong closed Chos ŏ n to Japanese for the second time, and only permitted trade from 1547. 60 Meanwhile, “Chinese ships” (K. hwang tangs ŏ n ) struck more than ten times from 1544 to 1547. Piracy, as in the second half of the fourteenth century, was a menace that civil war in Japan compounded, and a menace that infl uenced Korean court policy thereafter. Korean–Japanese relations from 1547 until the invasion in 1592 differed signifi cantly from interaction between 1512 and 1544. King Chungjong’s administration had prevented further interaction through impostor identities and other questionable contacts that had been active prior to 1510. With piracy now a threat, though, King Myŏ ngjong’s administration used trade through impostor identities to help discourage further raids. As had happened in 1510, Japanese men who were not involved in planning and managing much of the Japanese trade in the peninsula, this time, pirates, impelled changes in Korean policy towards maritime trade. Neither the severing of relations nor the resumption of trade halted marauding, however. Another wave of eight pirate attacks from 1552 to 1554 also troubled the court and residents of southern coastal areas. Pirates intruded intermittently for several more dec-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ades, though apparently not again in such fl urries.61 The Chos ŏ n court concluded the Agreement of 1547 (K. Ch ŏ ngmi yakcho ) with an impostor king of Japan. The new king of Chosŏ n, My ŏ ngjong, then in his second year on the throne, was just fourteen years old. The Korean government reiterated the prohibition of further interaction through personal seals and military posts issued more than “fi fty years” earlier. Prior to the Saryang raid in 1544, elites in Tsushima could send at least sixty-six ships each year. In 1547, the court reduced the governor from thirty annual ships back to twenty-fi ve annual ships. Further, it did not restore or add other contact Violence, trade, and impostors 53 privileges.62 Before considering how Japanese traders subverted these restrictions, how control of the south affected the Chosŏ n government’s defense posture should be discussed. Korean kings and offi cials had feared piracy since 1350, and they frequently referred to raids when debating policy and action. In the mid-sixteenth century, however, numerous problems connected with military preparedness complicated their response. For example, the Korean government had lowered troop levels in the early 1470s, reducing the number of soldiers and sailors by 25 percent between 1469 and 1475. In 1472, 19,015 soldiers and sailors served in Kyŏ ngsang Province and 102,736 soldiers and sailors countrywide. In 1475 the court fi xed the number of troops required of individual villages and of each province. From that time, according to the new regulation, the Chosŏ n government would stand 15,022 soldiers and sailors in Kyŏ ngsang Province, 72,097 soldiers and sailors countrywide. 63 These reductions probably expressed a belief that the threat of piracy had faded. And several years earlier, in the late 1460s, the court had converted naval vessels into ships for conveying taxes. This, too, likely expressed lessened worries about the southern coast.64 Larger, structural problems came to play a role in debilitating the Korean military in the late sixteenth century. These included the “under-registration of the adult male population for service, the exemption of slaves and yangban from military duty, the lack of training, and the failure to adopt fi rearms.” Avoidance of duty through laws and evasion denied the military of soldiers such that in 1582 Yi I recommended an army of 100,000 troops, with 10,000 men to be based in each province and 20,000 men in the capital.65 However, Yi I’s proposed distribution of soldiers equally across the provinces suggests an unsure grasp of the geography of targets and the geography of defense. Why, for example, did Kangw ŏn Province, which was distant from Kyū sh ū and not a key agricultural area, require the same number of troops as Kyŏ ngsang Province and Chŏ lla Province? After all, coastal defense in Ky ŏ ngsang and Chŏ lla provinces had failed often since 1544. Or, perhaps Yi hoped to prompt discussion at court of the country’s current and future defense system. Whether or not Yi I’s implicit warning resonated at court, a Jurchen attack in northeast Hamgyŏ ng Province in early 1583 almost certainly sharpened thinking about military readiness.66 The court selected 101 men from the fi rst military examination (K. mukwa) conducted in 1583, 500 men from the second military examination conducted in 1583, and 202 men from the mili-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tary examination conducted in 1584. 67 By contrast, in 1580, the court had accepted forty-four passers from the military examination.68 Meanwhile, maritime piracy troubled leaders in Tsushima as well as the Chos ŏn government. Following the resumption of trade in 1547, the island’s governors alerted Korean offi cials when marauders approached. They sent seven messages between 1553 and 1559; three of those alerts arrived in 1555, or before and after seventy ships descended upon Tallyang, in Chŏ lla Province, in the fi fth lunar month. By bartering information for access, the governors hoped to increase the quality and the quantity of exchange in Chosŏ n.69 54 K.R. Robinson The preservation of peaceful waters became an important aspect of the governor of Tsushima’s trade policy. This objective also benefi ted people in Iki, Hakata, Akamagaseki (in westernmost Honshū ), and Matsuura (in northwest Kyū sh ū ) who, probably bothered by the dangers from piracy of passage between China and Kyū sh ū and between Kyū sh ū and Ry ū ky ū , provided Tsushima elites with information. In Hansŏ ng, Korean offi cials came to trust the governors’ reports.70 Japanese pressed other strategies for improving trade, too. Governors of Tsushima, as noted, managed to restore a total of eight ships in 1515 and 1523, though the Chosŏ n court limited these vessels to the Sō family. By 1544, the court allowed Japanese to send some sixty-six or more ships, 71 but piracy and the reduction to twenty-fi ve ships from 1547 brought continued focus on impostor sh ō gunal embassies for exchange and negotiation with the Chos ŏ n court.72 After 1547, these impostor kings of Japan, composed and outfi tted almost certainly in Tsushima, and possibly with assistance from men in Hakata or western Honshu, increasingly requested contact privileges for other Japanese. The requests in 1552, 1563, and 1567 to be discussed below are the most important examples. Another tactic revived in 1548 a gambit that had succeeded in the mid- fi fteenth century, namely, sending impostor Muromachi bakufu offi cials or impostor contacts that likewise would be received at the second reception grade. These identities could conduct more trade at one visit than could contacts, including the governor of Tsushima, of the fourth reception grade. Two approaches can be identifi ed.73 In the fi rst approach, Japanese reintroduced the families of impostor Muromachi bakufu offi cials utilized between 1455 and 1474. Envoys presented the appropriate patents of identifi cation, which required access to an ivory tally that the king of Chosŏ n had issued in 1504. In the twelfth lunar month of 1474, King S ŏngjong had entrusted the king of Japan (and retired shō gun) Ashikaga Yoshimasa with a set of ten ivory tallies in order to halt the dispatch of tribute trade missions under the names of impostor bakufu offi cials. The Chos ŏn court expected the king of Japan to distribute the patent to his envoys and to the envoys of bakufu offi cials. The set of ivory tallies issued in 1504 replaced the fi rst set.74 Several of the new tallies reached the Ōtomo and the Ōuchi in western Japan. These families administered Hakata and were deeply involved in the Chos ŏn trade. Looking towards Ky ōto, the Ōtomo and the Ōuchi had sup-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ported different shō guns in a power struggle that continued from 1493 to 1508. Each family presumably received one or more tallies from the sh ō gun that they had backed. 75 Multiple holders of 1504 tallies posed the possibility that different groups could organize impostor shō gunal embassies and impostor bakufu offi cial missions. Or perhaps the two families also cooperated in ventures sent through their respective tallies. Whatever the background of the embassy or of the mission, the participation of the Sō was necessary because the governor of Tsushima issued the travel permit required for reception and Violence, trade, and impostors 55 trade. From 1548, envoys of impostor bakufu offi cials presenting an ivory tally again appeared in Chos ŏ n. In the second approach, Japanese sought to free contacts from the ivory tally. The number of ivory tallies was limited, and none were held in Tsushima. The Ōtomo family in northern Ky ū sh ū or the Ōuchi family, and perhaps then the M ōri family, which controlled the former Ōuchi lands in western Honsh ū from the mid-1550s, presumably rented an ivory tally to the governor of Tsushima or a trader for trade in Chosŏ n. But elites in Tsushima seem to have used the tally for additional purposes related to enhancing trade through new impostor identities. Gaining a personal seal from the king of Chosŏ n in the name of an impostor identity received at the second grade would presumably free the user of the ivory tally from paying a percentage to that tally’s holder. Some impostor bakufu offi cials, that is, the sponsor(s) of the trade mission behind the fraudulent identity, asked Korean kings to bestow personal seals upon them presumably so as to escape the ivory tally regulations and paying a percentage to someone else. By removing an impostor bakufu offi cial from the oversight of an impostor king of Japan, that is, by trading through a personal seal rather than an ivory tally, the Japanese sponsor(s) of these fraudulent identities could send ships under this name at their convenience. The key was to receive a personal seal from the Chos ŏ n government. To offer one example, King Myŏ ngjong’s court refused the request of the impostor, Hatakeyama Yoshiaki, for a copper seal in 1560, but in 1563 the fake Yoshiaki gained a seal through the good offi ces of an impostor shō gun.76 The planners of this fraud placed the Yoshiaki identity in an impostor branch of the Hatakeyama family that had traded in Chosŏ n in the mid-fi fteenth century. Yoshiaki was claimed to be a descendant of (the impostor) Hatakeyama Yoshinari, who began trading in 1460 as Deputy Sh ōgun (J. Kanrei ), which was then the most powerful position below the sh ōgun. Not surprisingly, the planners of the Yoshiaki identity also designed male relatives for future interaction. Yoshiaki’s younger brother received a personal seal and Yoshiaki introduced a son to the court. Japanese also traded through fake identities placed in the Hosokawa, Shiba, Ky ō goku, and Kai families. All were families that Korean offi cials could confi rm in records from the second half of the f- fi teenth century. With the personal seal for Yoshiaki’s younger brother and (at the least) a wooden seal for Yoshiaki held in Tsushima, it would seem that the S ō managed these two identities.77

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Japanese aimed the largest number of impostor identities at the fourth reception grade. In seeking to increase trade, this strategy was the most signifi cant because it could potentially result in more trade annually than through impostor bakufu offi cials. Represented by impostor kings of Japan in 1552, 1563, and 1567, Japanese succeeded in opening interaction through two new types of contacts: identities that had traded in the late fi fteenth century and the early sixteenth century, and impostor successors to contacts that had been active from the mid-fi fteenth century until after 1512. More specifi cally, 56 K.R. Robinson the Chos ŏn court reissued personal seals for the fi rst type of contacts, and renewed a family’s privileges through contact succession and the issuance of a personal seal for the second type.78 The Chos ŏn government found it expedient to use impostor trade to protect against piracy. Reversing the policy of King Chungjong’s court, King My ŏ ngjong’s court accepted trade through impostor identities. The government permitted impostor trade by Tsushima islanders as another means to discourage as well as to defend against piracy, because the managers of impostor identities would profi t from continued trade and could contribute to reducing the threat of piracy to the Chosŏ n government’s interests and to their own interests. That is, this was not fraudulent trade. Among fi fty-seven personal seals known to have been used in the early 1570s and the early 1580s, the Chosŏ n court produced at least forty-four patents for contacts claimed to be based in places other than Tsushima. In eleven known cases of reissued personal seals, the court reinstated contacts that had been recognized after King S ŏ ngjong’s coronation in 1469. The cut- off at “fi fty years” proposed in 1509, implicit in the Agreement of 1512 and reiterated in the Agreement of 1547, came to mean a break between personal seals bestowed by King Sŏ ngjong’s predecessors and personal seals bestowed by King S ŏ ngjong. 79 These impostor contacts thus traded through personal seals in two distinct periods, from the original bestowal until the court terminated contact privileges for that identity at some date after the restoration of interaction in 1512 and again from the second bestowal until the invasion in 1592. King My ŏngjong enabled tribute trade through contact succession in 1563 and 1567. That is, if they had not already done so in late 1552, he and his offi cials accepted the fi ction of family succession and allowed ten contact successions in 1563 and twelve more in 1567. Of those twenty-two new impostor identities, three names have been confi rmed as 1563 grantees and nine names confi rmed as 1567 grantees. 80 In contrast to the reissuance of personal seals, in these twenty-two contact successions all of the earlier generation of contacts had entered into tributary relationships with the Korean monarch before King Sŏ ngjong assumed the throne in the eleventh lunar month of 1469. Further, all of these impostor identities were based in places other than Tsushima. King Myŏ ngjong’s court focused not on the recent trade as had King Chungjong and his offi cials, but

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 on the early interaction. However, the court maintained the practice of not bestowing privileges upon a contact that had been active prior to Sŏ ngjong’s enthronement. This stance may have helped to justify the bestowal of contact privileges upon later generations in contact families. King Myŏ ngjong’s court restored a form of interaction that Japanese had abused in the second half of the fi fteenth century and the fi rst decade of the sixteenth century, and that had prompted revisions in 1509, 1510, and 1512. However, the strict stance against sanctioned trade by Tsushima elites other than the S ō family continued. In short, King Myŏ ngjong’s court institutionalized impostor identities Violence, trade, and impostors 57 and impostor trade, and entrusted management of that trade to the governor of Tsushima. The king of Chos ŏn approved personal seals for impostor identities instead of issuing personal seals to Tsushima men and permitting interaction under their names and place of residence. Many personal seals for impostor identities reached the governor of Tsushima, who then assigned the patents to island elites for tribute trade missions. The Chosŏ n court surely understood that these personal seals would be stored and utilized in Tsushima. If this view is accurate, the Korean monarch and his offi cials converted impostor identities and impostor trade into a means of subsidizing the Tsushima economy. By supporting the Tsushima economy the Korean government almost certainly sought to guide islanders away from piracy. This strategy had worked in the early fi fteenth century. Regardless of the degree of their knowledge of these Japanese contacts, King My ŏngjong, King Sŏ njo (r. 1567–1608), and their offi cials restored trade to Tsushima islanders indirectly. Greater numbers of trade missions did not end piracy, yet raids and warnings did not compel the Chosŏ n court to focus sustained attention on the military system and on reform of recruitment practices or other problems. The courts of kings My ŏngjong and Sŏ njo, as had the Chos ŏn government in its fi rst decades, chose trade over military readiness.81 Of course, throughout King Myŏ ngjong’s reign and the fi rst two decades of King Sŏ njo’s rule there was no reason to fear an invasion from across the sea.

From trade to invasion By the late 1560s, then, a new form of mutually benefi cial interaction had emerged. The Korean government accepted impostor trade and encouraged continued cooperation against pirate attacks; Tsushima islanders and perhaps other Japanese increased the frequency and quantity of their trade in Chos ŏn, enhanced the quality of trade through impostor bakufu offi cials, and contributed to the Korean government’s defense against pirate attacks. However, Hideyoshi’s desire to receive the king of Chos ŏ n’s subjugation and to conquer Ming China worried Japanese who knew Chosŏ n, who knew the Korean government’s relationship with the Chinese government, and who knew Japanese–Korean relations best. From 1587, men in Tsushima and Hakata who would suffer economically from war labored to avert catastrophe.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In the sixth lunar month of 1587 Hideyoshi ordered the governor of Tsushima Sō Yoshishige to have the king of Chos ŏn come to Japan and submit before him. Outfi tted as an embassy sent by the king of Japan, a Tsushima offi cial traveled to Hans ŏng and in the ninth lunar month of 1587 informed the Korean government of Hideyoshi’s unifi cation of Japan. Rather than deliver Hideyoshi’s demand that the king submit before Japan’s ruler, Yoshishige instead asked that King Sŏ njo send an embassy to congratulate the new ruler. 82 In the third lunar month of 1589, Hideyoshi commanded the governor of Tsushima to demand that the king of Chos ŏn submit in 58 K.R. Robinson person and to deliver a warning that should the king not assist in his attack on Ming China, he, Hideyoshi, would invade Chosŏ n. The governor, now S ō Yoshitoshi, prepared another impostor embassy. That group departed Tsushima with Keitetsu Genso standing as envoy. Yoshitoshi, his retainer Yanagawa Shigenobu, who had sailed with Genso in 1580–1, and Shimai S ō shitsu accompanied the envoy. Underscoring this mission’s importance, Yoshitoshi was the fi rst governor of Tsushima to visit Chos ŏn. They reached Pusan in the sixth lunar month of 1589. In the capital, the mission suggested again that the king of Chosŏ n send an embassy to Japan. King S ŏ njo and his offi cials did not realize that these guests, like the guests in 1587, were endangering themselves by misrepresenting their ruler’s message to the advantage of the Korean government. However, King Sŏ njo needed a reason other than a request presented by an (impostor) envoy of the king of Japan to send an embassy to Japan.83 The Chos ŏ n court demanded that a Korean who had assisted in a Japanese raid on an island in Chŏ lla Province in 1587 be handed over for punishment. Upon the delivery in the second lunar month of 1590 of several men, including the wanted Korean, King Sŏ njo now had a pretext for contacting the ruler of Japan. He could now thank Hideyoshi, and dispatched an embassy. Led by the Envoy Hwang Yun’gil and the Vice-Envoy Kim Sŏ ng’il, the embassy departed Hansŏ ng in the third lunar month of 1590. Genso, Yoshitoshi, and Shimai accompanied the Koreans to the Japanese capital. There are extant in Japan two letters under King Sŏ njo’s name dated the third lunar month of 1590 and addressed to the “King of Japan.” One letter is preserved in Tō ky ō at the Shoryō bu, an archive managed by the Imperial Household Agency (J. Kunaich ō); the other letter is at My ō h ōin, a temple in Kyō to. The text of both letters is the same, though the former is more skillfully prepared. For example, the fi fth column is straight where the fthfi column in the latter document veers to the reader’s right. Both letters bear two imprints that identify the king of Chos ŏ n in state letters addressed to the king of Japan. 84 The text of that seal reads “ Ŭ i ch ŏ ng i t ŏ k .” 85 The document preserved at the Shory ōbu, which is thought to be the letter presented to Hideyoshi, is not what it appears to be. Testing of the seal ink on that letter and the seal ink on a wooden seal inscribed with the text Ŭ i ch ŏng i t ŏ k that formerly was preserved in Tsushima and is now held by

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the Ky ū sh ū National Museum (J. Kyū sh ū Kokuritsu Hakubutsukan ) indicates that the same seal ink is on both objects.86 In other words, the Shory ō bu letter was prepared with the assistance of Japanese, presumably Tsushima islanders and presumably in Tsushima or elsewhere in Japan, as the Korean embassy traveled to meet Hideyoshi. It is a forgery. 87 That the Shory ō bu letter does not mention the return of the Korean pirate may suggest that the forger(s) did not want Hideyoshi to learn of that action and Tsushima’s role in it.88 Tsushima elites went so far as to use a counterfeit royal seal, one that likely had been used for earlier impostor shō gunal embassies to Chos ŏ n, and Violence, trade, and impostors 59 rewrite a Korean state letter, activities that required the cooperation of one or more Korean embassy offi cials. Such efforts bespeak desperate efforts by some elites in western Japan to avert war. S ŏnjo ordered the envoys to observe military preparations for a possible invasion while in Japan. However, it would seem unlikely that the two men saw much while sailing through the Inland Sea or while on land that could have offered valuable hints of readiness. First, Hideyoshi had not yet ordered daimy ō throughout the country to begin preparations for an invasion of Chos ŏ n, including the construction of large numbers of vessels. Second, he had not ordered a headquarters for the invasion to be constructed. Third, the Korean delegation stopped at Tsushima, Iki, Hakata, Nagato Province, Nagoya (that is, the birthplace of Hideyoshi in central Honsh ū), and Sakai, a thriving port town from which one could travel to Ō saka and Ky ō to.89 These places relate a maritime journey to the Japanese capital; Hwang and Kim’s predecessors too had reached the Kyō to area by sea in the second half of the fourteenth century and the fi rst half of the fi fteenth century. What concrete information the two envoys could have based their respective evaluations upon when reporting to King S ŏ njo in the third lunar month of 1591 is unclear. However, the Korean offi cials gained more than impressions about military readiness in Japan. As was common in the fi fteenth century, the monarch entrusted his representatives with gifts for Japanese contacts. The families that King S ŏnjo’s envoys were to meet included the Hosokawa and the Kyō goku, who had served in the Muromachi bakufu but under whose surnames impostor trade had resumed by the 1570s. They also carried gifts for the Shō ni and the Ō uchi. Despite being in Japan for so long, though, the envoys had not yet met anyone from these four families. Soon after learning that the Shō ni and the Ō uchi had been removed from political signifi cance many years earlier, the Ō uchi in 1551 and the Shō ni in 1559, the embassy received letters from the family heads of the Sh ōni and the Ōuchi. Korean offi cials noticed, however, that the same hand had written both letters. Vice-Envoy Kim S ŏ ng’il sensed that the Ky ōgoku and the Hosokawa, too, no longer exercised infl uence.90 The Chosŏ n court had not realized that the Ō uchi, the Sh ō ni, the Kyō goku, and the Hosokawa had become vehicles for impostor trade. Stated differently, the impostor trade that Tsushima and Hakata elites were desperately trying to preserve had been exposed as broader than the court had known. This

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 discovery showed how dangerously uninformed Korean offi cials were about the changes in Japan over the past century and more. And this lack of knowledge demonstrated how effectively Tsushima elites had deterred the Chosŏ n court from meeting with other Japanese who were not involved in the trade in Chos ŏn until this embassy. Conversely, the possibility that Korean embassy members would uncover hidden features of the trade underscores the danger that Hideyoshi’s intentions posed for the governor of Tsushima and his associates in Hakata. In effect, though without doubt unintentionally, the governor of Tsushima lost the impostor trade in the effort to avoid war. 60 K.R. Robinson Genso and Shigenobu traveled with the Korean embassy back to Hans ŏ ng in 1591 and again sought to postpone or avoid war. They tried to recast Hideyoshi’s demand that the king of Chos ŏn guide the Japanese army to Ming China as a request that the Korean monarch permit the Japanese army to pass through Chos ŏ n to Ming China.91 They could not but fail. The further Hideyoshi’s plans advanced and the more bellicose his demands of the king of Chosŏ n became, the further into a corner the Japanese involved in the Korean trade were pushed. 92 The dispatch of the Korean embassy in 1590 focuses attention not only on elites in Tsushima, but also on their associates in Hakata. For example, Tsushima islanders needed Hakata’s merchants for cinnabar, pepper, and other goods that they traded in Chosŏ n, and the Rinzai Zen community contributed to selecting monks such as Genso to serve as the envoys of the impostor kings of Japan. They also benefi ted from assistance in distributing goods acquired in Chosŏ n, such as cloth and pottery. Relationships may also be traced eastward to Sakai. Tanaka Takeo believed that Konishi Yukinaga supported the Sō and Shimai in seeking a solution to the crisis. Born into a family of Sakai merchants, Konishi had included Shimai, whose ties to the merchant community in Sakai extended back many years, in the visit to Chosŏ n in 1589–90. 93 Yoshitoshi, who, like Konishi, had been baptized, was married to Konishi’s daughter. In Hideyoshi’s invasion army, Konishi commanded the First Division, which spearheaded the invasion. Yoshitoshi’s forces served in the First Division, and Genso guided Konishi and the soldiers serving under him to Hans ŏ ng. After the war, Yoshitoshi approached the Korean government hoping to initiate discussion of the restoration of state-to-state diplomatic relations and of Tsushima’s trade in Chos ŏ n. Over several years of communication, Japanese sailed from Tsushima, Koreans sailed to Tsushima, and Tsushima islanders forged state letters between the king of Chos ŏ n and the shō gun of Japan. With diplomatic relations established in 1607, Genso and the son of Shigenobu negotiated new regulations for departure, access, trade, and residence. 94 The Agreement of 1609 (K. Kiyu yakcho ), like those in 1512 and 1547, covered several aspects of interaction. Perhaps the most important change also punished Japanese broadly for the impostor deceptions that Kim Sŏ ng’il had discovered in Japan. That is, the Chosŏ n court banned trade by Japanese based outside of Tsushima other than the king of Japan. This halted both the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 approved, institutionalized impostor tribute trade and the covert impostor tribute trade. Thus ended the careers of these impostor identities, still more victims of Hideyoshi’s folly.

Conclusion Hideyoshi’s invasion fractured diplomatic and trade practices that the Chos ŏn court and Japanese elites in western provinces had constructed through overlapping interests, regulations, and deception from the 1390s, Violence, trade, and impostors 61 more immediately from 1511 and 1512, and especially from 1547. The Agreement of 1609, however, limited trade to Tsushima islanders, who continued to work with Hakata elites, and the Japanese ruler in Edo. Trade in Southeast Asian goods and Japanese silver resumed in Pusan, the only port now open for residence and exchange. And Tsushima elites continued forging state letters, now to restore and to enhance diplomatic relations between the Chosŏ n court and the Edo government, until exposed in 1635 by Yanagawa Shigeoki, an ambitious Tsushima offi cial who was the grandson of Shigenobu. From 1547, King Myŏ ngjong’s court chose trade with impostor identities over confronting piracy with an improved military. Proposals for strengthening the army and the navy in the late sixteenth century might have met a more positive response had history and experience not suggested that trade could be effective and less disruptive to Korean society. Reforming the military would have necessitated addressing, among other problems, the evasion of military duty and perhaps even the diffi cult issue of privileges enjoyed byyangban families. The court debate in the third lunar month of 1591 over Hideyoshi’s ability to make war was sadly irrelevant when observed in a longer timeframe. By then the timetable for assembling a military that would repel a Japanese onslaught, that is, for enlisting and training men to be offi cers, soldiers, and sailors, for constructing warships, for manufacturing weapons, for strengthening forts and other defenses, and for storing food and weapons, among other preparations, could not have countered Hideyoshi’s timetable for invasion once he had decided upon war. The direct preparation was launched from spring 1591, when Hideyoshi ordered troops to Nagoya in northwest Ky ū sh ū . Further, Hideyoshi’s shallow comprehension of the practices of diplomatic relations and interaction in northeast Asia should not be underestimated as a cause of the war.95 One reason for Hideyoshi’s ignorance was the dislocation of state-to-state relations from the government in Ky ōto and its relocation to elites in western provinces, particularly in Tsushima and in Hakata, in the early sixteenth century. Enterprising men had appropriated the shō gun for, among other purposes, recovering trade ships and trade volume lost in and after 1512. Interaction with these fake shō guns similarly distanced the Korean government from its counterpart in Japan, and contributed to the court’s confusion when Hideyoshi introduced himself in 1587 as the new paramount in Japan.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In the second half of the sixteenth century, and from earlier, the Chosŏ n court was dependent upon people involved in impostor trade for current information about Japan. Lacking direct communication with Japanese governments, and lacking the interest or the urgency to send offi cials beyond Tsushima to Hakata or Kyō to, Korean kings and their offi cials could not follow the politics and warfare in Japan on their own terms. For such reasons, as well as the audacity of Hideyoshi’s demands even when muted by Tsushima elites, King S ŏ njo and his offi cials were unable to skillfully interpret signals from the Tsushima and Hakata men representing Hideyoshi. The winter of 62 K.R. Robinson 1590 was too late for the Chos ŏ n court to begin gathering information in Japan beyond Tsushima.

Notes 1 Chungjong shillok , 8:15a–b (1509.3.26); Chungjong shillok , 8:23a–24a (1509.4.12). 2 Nakamura, Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū , Vol. 1, 1965, pp. 674–5. 3 Chungjong shillok, 8:60a (1509.7.6); Chungjong shillok, 8:61a (1509.7.7); Shin, Haedong chegukki , 1933, 83b. 4 Here I have adapted Mary Elizabeth Berry’s discussion of corporations in Muromachi-period Japan. See Berry, The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto , 1994, pp. xxix–xxx. For connections between Hakata and Sakai, see Izumi, Sakai to Hakata , 1976. 5 Chungjong shillok , 10:43b–44a (1510.2.3). 6 Nakamura, Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū , Vol. 1, 1965, pp. 703–28. 7 For impostor kings of Japan, see Murai, Ch ū sei Wajin den , 1993, pp. 154–63. 8 Osa, “Keitetsu Genso ni tsuite,” 1963, p. 145. 9 Chungjong shillok , 16:55a–b (1512.8.20); Chungjong shillok , 16:55b (1512.8.21). 10 Please refer to Chapter 1 , by Saeki K ō ji. 11 The fi rst Chiba Mototane mission arrived in 1458. Perhaps two more missions sailed before his death in 1464 and at least fourteen more from 1465 until 1504. The governor of Tsushima tried in 1513–14 to continue trade through the Mototane personal seal, which was kept on the island. The court’s rejection is strongly suggested by the absence of further reference to Mototane in extant sources. See Shin, Haedong chegukki , 1938, 81a; “Yoshimori kakikudashi,” dated 1513.12.23, in Umamawari gohanmotsu chō , in Nagasaki-ken shi, shiryō -hen, dai- 1, 1963, pp. 724–5; Takeuchi “Tsushima no komonjo,” 1951, p. 111. 1 2 Chungjong shillok , 49:21a (1523.9.6); Chungjong shillok , 23:45b (1515.12.4). The 1585 edition of the Kosa ch’waryo reports that relatives of the governor of Tsushima could send four ships each year. See Ǒ , Kosa ch’waryo , 1974, 1:40b. 13 Mendes Pinto, The Travels of Mendes Pinto , 1989, pp. 73, 104, 420, and 518. 14 Kang, Kanyangnok , 1658, 42b, 73b. 15 Schurhammer, Francis Xavier , 1982, p. 9 n. 44; p. 138 n. 24. 16 Osa, Chū sei Nitch ō kankei to Tsushima , 1987, p. 285. 1 7 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 12:29b–30b (1551.10.24). 1 8 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 13:77a–b (1552.11.26); Ǒ , Kosa ch’waryo 1:37a (1585 edition); Nakamura, Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū , Vol. 3, 1969, pp. 193–6. 1 9 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 23:71a–b (1557.12.30). 2 0 K y ū sh ū shiry ō kank ōkai, ed., Ch ōsen sosa kuninami no shokei oboe, 1955, 38, 69. Japanese inkstones circulated in Chosŏ n in the mid-sixteenth century. See Yi, Mukche ilgi , Vol. 2, 1998, p. 336 (1558.10.9). 2 1 K y ū sh ū shiry ō kankō kai, ed. Ch ōsen sosa kuninami no shokei oboe, 1955, pp. 36,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 45, 53, 62, 68, 75, and 82. 22 Osa, “Keitetsu Genso ni tsuite,” 1963, pp. 139–41; Keitetsu Genso, Sens ō k ō , 1:24b–26a, 2:23b, 2:27b–29b. 23 In 1513, the sh ō gun appointed Hō ch ū D ō toku as Abbot of Sh ō fukuji. 24 It ō , “ Ō uchi-shi no taigai k ō ry ū to Chikuzen Hakata Sh ō fukuji,” 1996, pp. 31–53. 2 5 Ieyasu-k ō , 13a. 2 6 K y ū sh ū shiry ō kank ō kai, ed., Ch ō sen sosa kuninami no shokei oboe , 1955, pp. 34, 44, 50, 60, 67, 74, and 82. 27 Keitetsu Genso, Sens ō k ō, 1:26b, 1:41b; Kyū sh ū shiry ō kank ō kai, ed., Ch ō sen sosa kuninami no shokei oboe, 1955, p. 38; S ŏ njo shillok, 15:3b (1581.1.26); S ŏ njo shillok , 15:10b (1581.3.26). Violence, trade, and impostors 63 2 8 K y ū sh ū shiry ō kank ō kai, ed., Ch ō sen sosa kuninami no shokei oboe , 1955, pp. 18, 23, and 27. 29 “Shimai-shi nenroku,” item dated 1568.2 and item dated 1568.6.5, p. 171; Izumi, Sakai to Hakata , 1976, pp. 127–39. 30 “Shimai-shi nenroku,” item dated 1579.8, p. 174. 3 1 Yŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 49:29b (1503.5.23); Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 52:3b (1504.1.16); Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi, 53:21a (1504.Intercalary 4.29). Also, in 1502.1 and 1503.4 Japanese requested silver as an exchange good, suggesting the possibility that the Korean government and people in Chos ŏn with whom Japanese dealt knew of the mining prior to 1502. See Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 42:10a (1502.1.19); and Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 49:22b (1503.4.27). 3 2 Yŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 52:3b (1504.1.16); Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 53:21a (1504.Intercalary 4.29). 3 3 Chungjong shillok , 7:14a–15a (1508.11.6). Also see Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 37:7a–b (1500.3.22) for the transport of silver into Ming China. 34 This brief discussion of silver production in Chos ŏn is based on Han, “16 segi tae-Chungguk samuyŏ k ŭ i ch ŏ ngae,” 1983, pp. 449–85, and Yu, Chos ŏ n shidae kwang ŏ psa y ŏ ngu , 1993, pp. 130–74. 3 5 Chungjong shillok , 7:58a–b (1510.1.28). 3 6 Chungjong shillok , 7:14a–15a (1509.11.6); Chungjong shillok , 21:50a–b (1515.2.8). Also see Chungjong shillok , 9:15a–16a (1509.8.28). 37 The discussion of silver in Ming China is from von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , 1996, pp. 70–112, and Mote, Imperial China, 900–1800 , 1999, pp. 766–9. 38 von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , 1996, p. 79. 39 von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , 1996, p. 103. 40 Li, “A Study on the Song, Yuan and Ming Monetary Policies,” 2007, pp. 123–6. 41 Sukawa, “Ch ō sen jidai no kahei,” 1999, p. 81. 4 2 Chungjong shillok , 93:67a–b (1540.9.10); My ŏ ngjong shillok , 32:64b (1566.4.25). 43 Murai, Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon , 1997, p. 153. 44 Murai, Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon, 1997, pp. 153–4; Chungjong shillok , 60:43a (1528.2.10). 4 5 Chungjong shillok , 88:64b–65a (1538.10.29). 46 For cotton in the capital area of Japan in the 1460s and 1470s, see Nagahara, Shin – Momen izen no koto , 1990, pp. 68–70. 4 7 Chungjong shillok, 98:52a (1542.6.10); Chungjong shillok, 98:55b (1542.6.18). For a summary of the court debate regarding the silver carried by this embassy, see Ch’oe Yŏng-ho, trans. “Precious Metals,” in Lee, ed., Sourcebook of Korean Civilization , Vol. 1, 1993, pp. 597–600. 48 Kobata, “Ch ū sei k ōhanki ni okeru Nissen kin-gin b ōeki no kenky ū (2),” 1932, p. 104; Shin Sekk ō , “Ch ō sen Ch ū sō jidai no kin-gin mondai,” 1938, p. 428. 49 Yu, Chosŏ n shidae kwangŏ psa y ŏ ngu, 1993, p. 154; Chungjong shillok, 64:12b (1528. Intercalary 10.20); Chungjong shillok , 93:67a–b (1540.9.10). 5 0 Chungjong shillok , 98:51b (1542.6.9). 5 1 My ŏ ngjong shillok, 13:43b (1552.6.12); My ŏ ngjong shillok, 22:25a–26a (1557.2.12);

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kobata, “Chū sei k ōhanki ni okeru Nissen kin-gin b ōeki no kenky ū (2),” 1932, p. 106. 52 Shin Sekk ō , “Ch ō sen Ch ū sō jidai no kin-gin mondai,” 1938, pp. 424–5. 5 3 Chungjong shillok , 91:7a–8a (1539.6.5). 54 Yi, Hoeje sŏ nsaeng py ŏ lchip , 1973, 1:20a–21a; Murai, Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon , 1997, pp. 160–75. 5 5 Taej ŏ n hu songnok , 1983, 5:5a. 5 6 Taej ŏ n hu songnok , 1983, 5:3b–6a. 5 7 Chungjong shillok , 96:64b (1541.11.24). 58 Mendes Pinto, The Travels of Mendes Pinto , 1989, p. 126. Also see Lidin, Tanegashima , 2002, p. 208, note 101. 64 K.R. Robinson 59 Hashimoto, “Muromachi – Sengokuki no sh ōgun kenryoku to gaik ō ken,” 1998, pp. 13–14. 6 0 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 5:19b–20b (1547.2.13). 61 Takahashi, “16 seiki ch ū ki no k ō t ō sen to Chō sen no tai ō ,” 1995, pp. 95–104; Saeki, “16 seiki ni okeru k ō ki Wak ō no katsud ō to Tsushima S ō -shi,” 1997, p. 36. 6 2 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 5:19b–20b (1547.2.13); Chungjong shillok , 49:21a (1523.9.6). 63 Yi, “Chos ŏ n ch’ogi,” 2003, pp. 65–72. 64 For the naval vessels see Rokutanda, “Ch ō sen shoki,” 1997, pp. 73–97. 65 For the Korean military in the sixteenth century, see Palais, Confucian Statecraft , 1996, pp. 76–82, and pp. 402–5. The quotation and Yi I’s memorial are from p. 76. 66 For the connection between the Jurchen attack and military examinations see Park, “Military Examination Graduates,” 2001, pp. 24–6. 67 Shim, “Chos ŏ n Sŏ njo-dae mukwa kŭ pcheja ŭ i shinbun,” 1994, pp. 48–9. 6 8 Mally ŏ k p’ally ŏ n ky ŏ ngjin samwŏ l shib’o-il py ŏ lshi pangmok , 10a–19b. 69 Saeki, “16 seiki ni okeru k ō ki Wak ō no katsudō to Tsushima S ō -shi,” 1997, pp. 36, 47. 70 Tashiro and Yonetani, “S ō -ke ky ū z ō ‘tosho’ to mokuin,” 1995, p. 94; Takahashi, “16 seiki chū ki no kō t ōsen to Chō sen tai ō,” 1995, pp. 95–112; Saeki, “16 seiki ni okeru k ō ki Wak ō no katsud ō to Tsushima S ō -shi,” 1997, pp. 34–7 and pp. 42–6. 7 1 Chungjong shillok , 102:75b–78b (1544.4.24). 72 Murai, Ch ū sei Wajin den , 1993, p. 160. 7 3 My ŏ ngjong shillok, 7:41b (1548.3.18); My ŏ ngjong shillok , 7:41b–43b (1548.3.18). 74 “Nihon koku ō Minamoto Yoshizumi hō sho,” dated 1503.3.(unspecifi ed), 1901, pp. 24–5; Kyō to sh ō gun kefu , 1978, p. 382; Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 49:3a (1503.3.6); Hashimoto, “Muromachi – Sengokuki no shō gun kenryoku to gaik ō ken,” 1998, pp. 10–11. 75 See Hashimoto, “Muromachi – Sengokuki no sh ō gun kenryoku to gaik ō ken,” 1998, pp. 5–6, for confi rmation that both theŌ tomo and the Ō uchi held 1504 tallies. 7 6 My ŏ ngjong shillok, 26:9b–10a (1560.2.21); My ŏ ngjong shillok, 26:28a–b (1560.5.12); Tashiro and Yonetani, “S ō -ke ky ū z ō ‘tosho’ to mokuin,” 1995, pp. 50–2. 77 Robinson, “The Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama Family,” 1999, pp. 67–88. 78 Yonetani, “16 seiki Nitch ō kankei ni okeru gishi haken no kō z ō to jittai,” 1997, pp. 3–7. 7 9 Chungjong shillok , 8:15a–b (1509.3.26); Chungjong shillok , 16:55a–b (1512.8.20); My ŏ ngjong shillok , 5:19b–20b (1547.2.13). 8 0 My ŏ ngjong shillok , 29:71b–72a (1563.9.28); My ŏ ngjong shillok , 34:32b–34a (1567.5.16); My ŏ ngjong shillok , 34:34a–b (1567.5.17); Yonetani, “16 seiki Nitchō kankei ni okeru gishi haken no kō z ō to jittai,” 1997, p. 6. 81 For the earlier preference see Nakamura, Nihon to Chō sen , 1966, p. 102. 82 This discussion of the roles of Tsushima and Hakata elites in negotiations is drawn from Tanaka Takeo’s biography of Shimai Sō shitsu, from Kitajima Manji’s

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 research on the invasion and its prelude, and from Yonetani Hitoshi’s study of Japanese communication with King Sŏ njo’s court in 1589–90. See Tanaka, Shimai S ō shitsu , 1961, p. 145; Kitajima, Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Ch ō sen shinryaku , 1995, pp. 14–28, and Yonetani, “Hideyoshi seiken-ki ni okeru kaizoku no hikiwatashi to Nitch ō kankei,” 2002, pp. 1–17. 83 Yonetani, “Hideyoshi seiken-ki ni okeru kaizoku no hikiwatashi to Nitchō kankei,” 2002, pp. 5–6. 84 “Ch ō sen koku ō Ri En (Senso) kokusho,” 2002, viii, plate 5.1; “Chō sen ō Ri En shinsho – dō beppuku,” in Ky ōto Kokuritsu Hakubutsukan, ed., My ō h ō in to Violence, trade, and impostors 65 Sanj ū sangend ō, 1999, pp. 190–1, plate 73. The two extant texts each show the Ŭ i chŏ ng . i tŏ k seal face text in two places on the letter and in one place on the appended list of gifts. For a photographic enlargement of the fi rst imprint, which was affi xed over the king of Chosŏ n’s adult name written in the column for the address from the king of Chos ŏ n, that is, the fi rst column, in the Shoryō bu letter, see plate 5 on page xxii in the issue of Ky ū sh ū shigaku containing “Ch ō sen koku ō Ri En (Senso) kokusho.” 85 For Chos ŏ n period reproductions of the Ŭ i ch ŏ ng i t ŏ k royal seal, see Poin pushin ch’ongsu, 1994, p. 46, and Han’guk Chŏ ngshin Munhwa Y ŏ n’guw ŏ n Changs ŏ gak, ed., Poinso ŭ igye , 2004, pp. 51–6. 86 Wada, “Ch ō sen koku ō kokusho ni osareta shuin no kagaku-teki bunseki,” 2006, p. 26. 87 Tashiro and Yonetani, “S ō -ke ky ū z ō ‘tosho’ to mokuin,” 1995, pp. 86–8. 88 Yonetani, “Hideyoshi seiken-ki ni okeru kaizoku no hikiwatashi to Nitchō kankei,” 2002, pp. 12–13. 8 9 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:2a–3a (1591.3.1). 90 Kim, Haesarok , 1967, pp. 42–3. 91 Tanaka, Shimai Sō shitsu, 1961, pp. 154–5; Kitajima, Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Chō sen shinryaku , 1995, p. 26; Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, pp. 265–6. 92 Tanaka, Shimai Sō shitsu, 1961, p. 144; Turnbull, Samurai Invasion , 2002, pp. 33–4. 93 Tanaka, Shimai Sō shitsu, 1961, pp. 149, 152–4, and 156–8. Also see Yonetani, “Hideyoshi seiken-ki ni okeru kaizoku no hikiwatashi to Nitchō kankei,” 2002, pp. 7–10, and 13. 94 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan , 1984, pp. 23–43. 95 Hideyoshi believed that the king of Chosŏ n was a tributary of the governor of Tsushima. See Kitajima, Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Chō sen shinryaku, 1995, p. 16.

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Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 ). Umi kara mita sengoku Nihon: Rett ō shi kara sekaishi e ( 海からみた戦国日本－列島史から世界史へ ). T ō ky ō : Chikuma shob ō , 1997 . My ŏ ngjong shillok ( 明宗實録 ). Nagahara Keiji ( 永原慶二 ). Shin – Momen izen no koto: Choma kara momen e ( 新 ዘ木綿以前のことー苧麻から木綿へ ). T ō ky ō : Ch ūō k ō ronsha , 1990 . Nakamura Hidetaka ( 中村栄孝 ). Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū ( 日鮮関係史の研究 ), vols. 1–3. T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1965–1969 . Nakamura Hidetaka ( 中村栄孝 ). Nihon to Chō sen ( 日本と朝鮮 ). T ō ky ō : Shibund ō , 1966 . “Nihon koku ō Minamoto Yoshizumi hō sho ( 日本国王源義純奉書),” in Zoku zenrinkoku hō ki ( 續善隣國寳記 ), in K aitei shiseki shū ran, dai-21 satsu ( 改定史籍集覧 ). T ō ky ō : Kond ō shuppanbu , 1901 , pp. 24–5 . Ǒ Sukkw ŏ n ( 魚叔權 ). Kosa ch’waryo (1585 edn.) (攷事撮要 ). Seoul : Nammun’gak , 1974 . Osa Masanori ( 長政統 ). “ Keitetsu Genso ni tsuite: Ichi gaikō z ō no shutsuji to hō kei ( 景轍玄蘇について:一外交僧の出自と法系 ) ,” Ch ō sen gakuh ō ( 朝鮮学報 ) 29 :10 ( 1963 ): 135–47 . Osa Setsuko ( 長節子 ). Ch ū sei Nitch ō kankei to Tsushima ( 中世日朝関係と対馬 ). T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1987 . Palais, James B. Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hy ŏ ngw ŏ n and the Late Chos ŏ n Dynasty . Seattle : University of Washington Press , 1996 . Park , Eugene Y. “ Military Examination Graduates in Sixteenth-Century Korea: Political Upheaval, Social Change, and Security Crisis,” Journal of Asian History 35 :1 ( 2001 ): 1–57 . Poin pushin ch’ongsu ( 寳印符信總數 ). Seoul : Sŏ ul taehakkyo Kyujanggak , 1994 . Robinson , Kenneth R. “ The Imposter Branch of the Hatakeyama Family and Japanese–Chosŏ n Korea Court Relations, 1455–1580s,” Kokusai Kirisutoky ō Daigaku Ajia Bunka Kenky ūjo Ajia bunka kenky ū ( 国際基督教大学アジア文化研究所アジア文化研究 ) 25 :3 ( 1999 ): 67–88 . Rokutanda Yutaka ( 六反田豊 ). “ Ch ōsen shoki s ōunsei ni okeru sensotsu – senpaku no d ōin taisei ( 朝鮮初期漕運制における船卒 ዘ船舶の動員体制 ) ,” T ōky ō daigaku bungakubu Chō sen bunka kenkyū shitsu kiy ō ( 東京大学文学部朝鮮文化研究室紀要 ) 4 ( 1997 ): 73–97 . Saeki K ō ji ( 佐伯弘次). “16 seiki ni okeru kō ki Wak ō no katsud ō to Tsushima S ō -shi ( 十六世紀における後期倭寇の活動と対馬宗氏 ),” in Nakamura , Tadashi ( 中村質), ed., Sakoku to kokusai kankei ( 鎖国と国際関係 ). Tō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1997 , pp. 31–50 . Schurhammer , Georg . Francis Xavier, His Life and Times, Vol. 4: Japan and China, 1549– 1552 . Costelloe , M. Joseph , trans. Rome : The Jesuit Historical Institute , 1982 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Shim S ŭ nggu ( 葘勝求 ). “ Chos ŏ n S ŏnjo-dae mugwa kŭ pcheja ŭi shinbun: 1583–1584 nyŏ n ŭi taeryang shich’wi pangmok ŭl chungshim ŭro (朝鮮宣祖代武科及第者㦮身分 ; 1583―1584 ⎚㦮大量試取榜目㦚G 㭧㕂㦒⪲ ) ,” Y ŏ ksa hakpo (歷史學報 ) 144 :12 ( 1994 ): 47–87 . “Shimai-shi nenroku ( 島井氏年録 ),” in Shimai monjo oyobi kiroku ( 島井文書および記録 ), in Oshir ō , It ō ( 伊東尾四郎 ), ed., Fukuoka-ken shi shiryō , dai-6 kan ( 福岡県史資料 ). Fukuoka : Fukuoka-ken , 1936 . Shin Sekk ō (Shin, S ŏ kho) ( 申奭鎬 ). “Ch ō sen Ch ū s ō jidai no kin-gin mondai ( 朝鮮中宗時代の金銀問題 ),” in Inaba hakushi kanreki kinenkai ( 稲葉博士還暦記念会 ), 68 K.R. Robinson

ed., Inaba hakushi kanreki kinen Mansenshi ronsō ( 稲葉博士還暦記念満鮮史論叢 ). Keij ō : Inaba hakushi kanreki kinenkai , 1938 , pp. 401–52 . Shin Sukchu ( 申叔舟), comp. Haedong chegukki ( 海東諸國紀 ). Keij ō : Ch ō sen s ō tokufu , 1933 . S ŏ njo shillok ( 宣祖實録 ). S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok ( 宣祖修正實録 ). Sukawa Hidenori ( 須川 ). “Ch ōsen jidai no kahei: ‘Riken zaij ō‘ o meguru katt ō ( 朝鮮時代の貨幣 ― 「利権在上」をめぐる葛藤 ),” in Rekishigaku kenky ū kai ( 歴史学研究会 ), ed., Ekky ō suru kahei ( 越境する貨幣 ). T ō ky ō : Aoki shoten , 1999 , pp. 75–108 . Taej ŏn hu songnok ( 大典後續錄), in Taej ŏn songnok – hu songnok ( 大典續錄 , 後續錄 ). Seoul : Asea munhwasa , 1983 . Takahashi Kimiaki ( 高橋公明 ). “16 seiki chū ki no kō t ō sen to Chō sen no taiō (十六世紀中期の荒唐船と朝鮮の対応 ),” in Tanaka , Takeo ( 田中健夫), ed., Zenkindai no Nihon to Higashi Ajia ( 前近代の日本と東アジア ). T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1995 , pp. 342–70 . Takeuchi Riz ō ( 竹内理三). “Tsushima no komonjo: Keich ō izen no onhanmotsu ( 対馬の古文書 ― 慶長以前の御判物 ) ,” Kyū sh ū bunkashi kenkyū jo kiy ō ( 九州文化史研究所紀要 ) 1 ( 1951 ): 65–118 . Tanaka Takeo ( 田中健夫 ). Shimai S ō shitsu (島井宗室 ). T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1961 . Tashiro Kazui ( 田代和生 ) and Yonetani , Hitoshi ( 米谷均 ). “ S ō -ke ky ū z ō ‘tosho’ to mokuin ( 宗家旧蔵「図書」と木印 ) ,” Ch ō sen gakuh ō ( 朝鮮学報 ) 156 :7 ( 1995 ): 13–96 . Toby , Ronald P. State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia and the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu . Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press , 1984 (reprinted 1991 ). Turnbull , Stephen . Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War, 1592–1598 . London : Cassell & Co. , 2002 . Umamawari gohanmotsu ch ō ( 馬周御判物控 ), in Nagasaki-ken shi hensan iinkai ( 長崎縣史編纂委員會), ed., Nagasaki-ken shi, shiry ō -hen, dai-1 ( 長崎県史資料編 ). T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1963 . von Glahn , Richard . Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000– 1700 . Berkeley : University of California Press , 1996 . Wada Hiroshi ( 和田浩 ). “ Chō sen koku ō kokusho ni osareta shuin no kagaku-teki bunseki (朝鮮国王国書に捺された朱印の科学的分析 ) ,” Museum 603 :8 ( 2006 ): 23–38 . Y i H y ŏ nsu ( 㧊䡚㑮 ). “ Chosŏ n ch’ogi kunj ŏ ng ŭ i ch ŏ ng’aekhwa kwaj ŏ ng kwa kun’aek ch’ui (㫆㍶㽞₆ 軍丁㦮定額化 ὒ㩫ὒ 軍額推移 ) ,” Chos ŏ n shidaesa yŏ n’gu ( 朝

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 鮮時代史研究 ) 26 :9 ( 2003 ): 39–73 . Yi Mung ŏ n (蝗文楗 ). Mukche ilgi ( 默齋日記), Vol. 2. Kwach’ ŏ n : Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe , 1998 . Y i Ŏ nj ŏ k ( 蝗彦迪 ). Hoeje sŏ nsaeng py ŏ lchip ( 晦齋先生別集 ), in Yi Ŏ nj ŏ k ( 蝗彦迪 ), Hoeje ch ŏ ns ŏ ( 晦齋全書 ). Seoul : S ŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo taedong munhwa y ŏ n’guso , 1973 . Yonetani Hitoshi ( 米谷均 ). “ 16 seiki Nitchō kankei ni okeru gishi haken no k ō z ō to jittai (16 世紀日朝関係における偽使派遣の構造と実態 ) ,” Rekishigaku kenky ū ( 歴史学研究 ) 697 :5 ( 1997 ): 1–18 , 62. Violence, trade, and impostors 69

Yonetani Hitoshi ( 米谷均 ). “ Hideyoshi seiken-ki ni okeru kaizoku no hikiwatashi to Nitch ō kankei ( 秀吉政権期における海賊の引き渡しと日朝関係 ) ,” Nihon rekishi ( 日本歴史 ) 650 :1 ( 2002 ), 1–17 . Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi (燕山君日記 ). Y u S ŭ ngju ( 蛢承宙 ). Chos ŏn shidae kwang ŏ psa y ŏ n’gu ( 朝鮮時代鑛業史硏究 ). Seoul : Kory ŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu , 1993 . Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Part II W a r Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 4 The Imjin Waeran Contrasting the fi rst and the second invasions of Korea

Kitajima Manji ( 北島万次 )

Introduction In the course of his unifi cation of Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi advocated the conquest of Ming China, embracing the ambition of foreign subjugation. The fi rst step towards achieving this ambition was his initial invasion of Chosŏ n Korea in 1592. The people of Korea, however, successfully defended their own land with the help of the Chinese army, and the war, which stretched over seven years and included the mounting of two major invasion campaigns, ended in Hideyoshi’s defeat. The focus below is on contrasting features of the two Japanese invasions.

The fi rst Korean invasion Hideyoshi’s ultimate aim when he invaded Korea for the fi rst time was the conquest of Ming China. His plan was to send the Koreans into China as a vanguard, followed by the military forces of various Japanese daimy ō . In order to achieve this, he ordered the Sō daimy ō of Tsushima to go to Korea and demand Chos ŏn submit to Hideyoshi. Far from taking the vanguard in an assault on Ming China, the Koreans mounted a country-wide resistance. What had begun as Japan’s military invasion of China turned into a war in Korea. When Hideyoshi set out to unify the warring states of Japan, he awarded his vassals lands as a result of military success, or he confi rmed lands held by the lords at the time of their submission to him. Some were obliged to move to another territory. Action taken in the hope of increasing territory, there- Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 fore, became the pursuit of land outside one’s own territory. From the very beginning of the establishment of the Toyotomi regime in 1582, territorial aggrandizement and even foreign conquest was an inherent part of its nature. In other words, foreign conquest was an extension of national unifi cation. In 1587, Hideyoshi secured Kyū sh ū. Believing that the king of Ry ū ky ū was already under the control of the Shimazu daimy ō of Satsuma, he instructed Shimazu to make the king of Ryū ky ū submit to become his vassal. Similarly, he 74 Kitajima Manji commanded the S ō daimyō of Tsushima to force the king of Korea into submission, believing that Chosŏ n was under Sō ’s authority. 1 Considering Tsushima’s long-standing economic relations with Chosŏ n, S ō could not relay Hideyoshi’s message directly for fear of offending the Chosŏ n king. Instead he negotiated for Chosŏ n to send an embassy carrying messages of congratulations to Hideyoshi on his recent successful unifi cation of Japan. The Koreans dispatched just such a Communication Embassy (K. T’ongshinsa, J. Ts ū shinshi). For Sō , this was a convenient way of papering over a delicate situation, since the Korean embassy could be presented to Hideyoshi as an envoy of submission. In the eleventh month of 1590, Hideyoshi greeted the embassy from Chosŏ n at his Jurakudai residence in Kyoto, believing that they were there to convey the Korean king’s subordination. After the meeting, he wrote a letter of reply to the Korean king and sent it to the embassy waiting in Sakai. It contained orders to the Korean king to guide the conquest of Ming China and depicted Hideyoshi as the “Sun Child” (J. nichirin no ko). The content of the letter can be summarized as follows:

1 Hideyoshi considered himself the “Sun Child,” and therefore it was his fate that he should engage in the task of unifying the world. 2 Hideyoshi appreciated the tribute sent to him by the Korean king, and he ordered Chosŏ n to become the vanguard in the Ming invasion. 3 Hideyoshi desired notoriety in his homeland, in China, and in India.2

Hideyoshi used the term “Sun Child” for the following reasons. He came from humble parentage, but when his mother was pregnant with Hideyoshi, she saw a dream in which the sun (J. nichirin) entered her womb. A fortune- teller told her that the child would grow up to be “a person known in distant places; his benevolence and grand character would be renowned; his fame universal.” With such propitious omens at his back, the boy’s future was secure. He will be undefeated in battle and come to rule the world. He will treat the peasantry well and the people will prosper. Revenue will increase and the Japanese court will be secure. The capital will fl ourish as never seen before. Similar conception myths are fairly widespread in Eastern Eurasia. Stories of pregnant mothers feeling sunlight, a sun spirit, or thunder and lightning and then giving birth are referred to as the sensory birth theory (J. kansei teisetsu ). 3 Similar nativity stories feature conspicuously in myths

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 surrounding the births of China’s dynastic founders. The mother of the fi rst ruler of the Han Dynasty gave birth to her son Liu Bang after being exposed to thunder and lightning. He is said to have been born with the face of a dragon.4 Yang Jian, the Wendi emperor and fi rst ruler of the Sui Dynasty, was born when the courtyard of his house was shrouded in violet vapor. The adult Yang Jian developed a dragon visage. 5 Even among the conquest dynasties, there is the story of Bodonč ar, the tenth-generation ancestor of the founder of the Mongol dynasty. Bodonč ar’s mother, Alan, dreamed of white light The Imjin Waeran 75 fl ooding from above into her bedchamber. The light became a golden demi- god and later she gave birth to Bodon č ar.6 These stories were used to justify the supremacy of their courts. Hideyoshi, who planned to conquer East Asia and establish a new conquest dynasty in China, needed a similar myth, and that was the purpose of the “Sun Child” myth. He would tell the Korean court of the miraculous circumstances of his birth, and then order the Koreans into the forefront of the Ming conquest (J. seimin kyō d ō ). Hideyoshi’s hope was to illuminate India (J. Tenjiku), China (J. Kara), and Japan (J. Honch ō) with his illustrious name. Afterwards, the phrase “Sun Child” appeared in diplomatic letters to Luzon, Ming, and Taiwan. Myths do not create governments, and Hideyoshi laid plans for continental conquest and administration. Hans ŏ ng fell on the third day of the fi fth month of 1592. On receiving the news, Hideyoshi addressed an oboegaki , or memorandum, consisting of twenty-fi ve articles to the Regent (J.Kanpaku ) Hidetsugu.7 Hideyoshi outlined three main concerns. The fi rst was the management of the emperor. He expressed his wish to have Emperor Go-Yō zei moved to Beijing to administer ten “countries” (J. kuni , or provinces) in the vicinity of the Chinese capital. Courtiers accompanying the emperor would also be awarded with land ten times larger than that which they previously owned (article 18). He also stated that he would elevate either Crown Prince Yoshihito or Prince Tomohito to the reigning emperor of Japan (article 20). The second concern was what should be done with the position of Kanpaku , the de facto ruler of Japan at the time. Article 20 proposed that Hideyoshi intended to appoint either Toyotomi Hideyasu, the adopted son of Toyotomi Hidenaga, or Ukita Hideie as Kanpaku in Japan, and the current Kanpaku , Hidetsugu, would be posted to China as the China Regent and awarded with 100 provinces in the vicinity of Beijing. Finally, the third concern was a consideration of administrative posts in Ky ū sh ū and Chos ŏn Korea. Hideyoshi’s choice for the Korean post was between Oda Hidenobu, who was second in line to succeed Oda Nobunaga by virtue of being Oda Nobutada’s son, or Ukita Hideie. For Nagoya in northwestern Ky ū sh ū , Hideyoshi’s chief staging point for the Korean campaigns, he appointed Hashiba Toshihide, later known by the name Kobayakawa Hideaki (article 21). From other documents we can glimpse Hideyoshi’s long-term thinking. Letters by Hideyoshi state that he intended to stay in Beijing for a while before moving on to Ningbo. 8 His plan to control the East Asian transportation system is made clear by the fact that

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 he had plans to settle in Ningbo, formerly the gateway to Japan–Ming trade. Hideyoshi took an ambitious perspective on his foreign domination project: he was intending to extend his control from Kinai to Kyū sh ū to Chos ŏ n to China, and then penetrate further into all parts of Asia. The Korean invasion was only the fi rst step in the grand scheme. Still, appointments to top posts are not suffi cient to rule the newly acquired territories, and Hideyoshi outlined an occupation strategy based on his troop deployments across the eight Korean provinces. On the sixteenth day of the 76 Kitajima Manji fi fth month of 1592, or two days before Hideyoshi announced his intent to conquer “the three lands,” he instructed Katō Kiyomasa on nine issues, four of which shall be mentioned here:

1 The townspeople of Korea will be forced back to [urban centers] and a seat of government will be established for Hideyoshi in Hansŏ ng.

Hideyoshi had intentions of settling himself in Hans ŏng, envisaging the city as a fully equipped center of administration, with a castle around which would be a castle town. Outside of the city the daimy ō would set up their camps in the same manner as at Nagoya in Ky ū sh ū, the military base from which Japan’s Korean invasion was set in motion.

2 The peasants scattered around the country will be directed back to their villages and prohibition laws (J. hatto ) will be enforced.

Hideyoshi intended to treat the Korean peasant population in the same manner as in Japan by tying them to agriculture and taxing them on their produce.

3 On inspection and reserves of food supplies for the army. 4 On the construction of Hideyoshi’s lodgings and road works between Pusan and Hans ŏ ng.9

Furthermore, in the sixth month, Hideyoshi sent Ishida Mitsunari to Chosŏ n as Administrator of Chosŏ n ( Ch ō sen bugy ō ), who took with him the following instructions:

1 The eight provinces of Chos ŏn will come under Hideyoshi’s direct jurisdiction and a bailiff or intendant (J. daikan) will be stationed in each of them. The selected daimy ō for these posts will be shown the extent of their jurisdiction on a map, and the allotments will be according to status. 2 Fugitive peasants must be called back to the villages to farm and pay taxes. 3 Build new lodgings for Hideyoshi along the route to China and station

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 bailiffs there. 10

The above terms demonstrate that Hideyoshi would rule Chosŏ n as a means to prepare the ground for the conquest of China, the underlying ideas being the same as when he proceeded to establish military camps wherever his troops were stationed during the national unifi cation campaign. Following Hideyoshi’s instructions, the daimy ō designated as bailiffs, their territory, and the land tax value of the eight districts were apportioned as shown in Table 4.1 .11 Under this policy, the Japanese daimy ō encroached on Korean territory. The Imjin Waeran 77 Table 4.1 Province, production level, and daikan assignments

Name of province Taxation level in koku Name of daikan

Ky ŏ ngsang 2,287,790 M ō ri Terumoto Ch ŏ lla 2,269,379 Kobayakawa Takakage Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng 987,514 Fukushima Masanori Kangw ŏ n 402,289 M ō ri Yoshinari Ky ŏ nggi 775,113 Ukita Hideie Hwanghae 728,867 Kuroda Nagamasa Hamgy ŏ ng 2,071,028 Kat ō Kiyomasa P’y ŏ ng’an 1,794,186 Konishi Yukinaga Total koku 11,316,166

If we look closer at the occupation policies, we can begin to detect the character of the rule planned for Chosŏ n. The cases of Kat ō Kiyomasa and Nabeshima Naoshige are illustrative. In the sixth month of 1592, troops led by Kiyomasa and Naoshige entered Hamgy ŏ ng Province in the northeast of Korea. Kiyomasa issued the following ordinances addressed to the peasants of the district:12

1 Hideyoshi’s military intervention is aimed at the political reform of Chos ŏ n. 2 The King of Chos ŏn has fl ed Hansŏ ng, but we are not here to penalize him. 3 We promise to provide protection to those who submit to us. Peasants must therefore return to their homes and devote themselves to farming. 4 Japanese commanders have been assigned to govern each of Chos ŏ n’s eight provinces. The administrator of Hamgy ŏng Province is Kat ō Kiyomasa. This is as it should be.

Kiyomasa established his military base at Anbyŏ n and Naoshige encamped at Hamhŭ ng, both in southern Hamgyŏ ng Province. Garrisons were built throughout the region, guarded by Kiyomasa’s vassals in the magistracies of Kilju, S ŏ ngjin, Tanch’ ŏ n, Iw ŏn, and Pukch’ŏ ng and Naoshige’s in T ŏ g’w ŏ n, Munch’ ŏ n, Y ŏ ngh ŭ ng, Ch ŏ ngp’y ŏ ng, Hamh ŭ ng, and Hongwŏ n.13 Kiyomasa and Naoshige built fortifi cations in these areas and appraised

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 agricultural productivity. An extant document on Korean revenue (J. Ch ō sen kokuso zeichō ) for the magistracies controlled by Naoshige shows that the total revenue from the cereal harvest was 244,360 s ŏ k .14 Out of this total fi gure, 86.28 percent (210,839 s ŏ k ) was constituted of miscellaneous cereal grains and the remaining 13.72 percent (33,521 s ŏ k ) was some sort of rice. Of that, unpolished rice was no more than 1.5 percent, indicating that unpolished rice was a priceless commodity in a region devoted to other grains. It was the unpolished rice that interested Naoshige the most, and he devised a method of collection. This was to “take hostages and imprison them. The 78 Kitajima Manji hostages were released, one by one, in exchange for the delivery of military provisions.”15 A Chos ŏ n document describes the Japanese rule as follows:

The exercise of authority by the bandit forces [Kiyomasa] is more intense here [Hamgyŏ ng Province] than in any other province. They have appointed a Japanese [K. Wae ] general in each of the six towns surrounding Anbyŏ n, who each have three to four hundred soldiers under their command. They levy taxes from the people and daily rob the peasantry for provisions. They deploy troops at strategic points to ambush passersby, making travel impossible. Everywhere, massacre and plunder are rife. 16

This sort of rule was practiced everywhere by the Japanese occupying forces, albeit to varying degrees. The Korean people responded by organizing “righteous soldiers” (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng) and initiating a war of resistance. In Hamgy ŏng Province, Ch ŏng Munbu and Yu Ŭ ngsu led a campaign in the tenth month of 1592. Among the problems that the occupation faced was the mobilization of the Ming army and the shock handed the Japanese military by its deployment. In the seventh month of 1592, the Ming Liaodong regiment sent to Chos ŏn’s aid attacked Konishi Yukinaga and his forces in P’y ŏngyang and suffered a defeat. Although Konishi and his forces repelled the assault on this occasion, the deployment of Ming aid itself became a serious problem for the Japanese. In the eighth month, the majority of commanders who were posted in Chos ŏn gathered at a military conference held in Hansŏ ng. The central issue was how to deal with an anticipated renewed attack by the Ming army. A suggestion was made to give priority to the defense of Hans ŏ ng but this proposal was met with opposition from Konishi Yukinaga, whose forces had already advanced as far northwards as P’y ŏ ngyang. 17 A t the same time, the Ming Minister of War Shi Xing was under fi nancial pressure, for the Ming government was suppressing a mutiny in Ningxia. 18 F o r that reason, Shi Xing wanted to pursue negotiations to resolve the Korean confl ict. He decided to appoint the Japan specialist Shen Weijing as a Mobile Corps Commander (Ch. Youji jiangjun) and sent him to the Japanese military headquarters. 19

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 With the initiation of negotiations, Japanese objectives shifted from the conquest of Ming to the cession of Korean territory. On the fi rst day of the ninth month of 1592 (8.30 by the Japanese lunar calendar) Konishi Yukinaga met Shen Weijing at the foot of Mount Kangbok in the suburbs of P’y ŏngyang. In reviewing the particulars to Shen as to how Japan came to send troops to Chos ŏn, Yukinaga explained that the Japanese had deployed their army because they wanted enfeoffment and a tribute route to the Ming. Shen replied that Chosŏ n was within China’s dominion (“Ming’s boundary” – jing – or the gateway to China) and urged a Japanese military withdrawal. The Imjin Waeran 79 In response, Yukinaga asserted that he would leave P’yŏ ngyang, but that the Japanese would keep the area south of the Taedong River.20 In the background to Yukinaga’s statements – the Japanese military was in Chosŏ n because Japan wished to obtain enfeoffment and tribute access to China – lurk the following elements. In the eleventh month of 1590, Hideyoshi gave a letter to the Korean Communication Embassy addressed to the Korean king that ordered Chosŏ n to “lead the way to conquer China [J. seimin ky ō d ō].” This, however, unnerved Sō Yoshitoshi of Tsushima to the extent that he responded to Hideyoshi’s order to present a subjugated Chos ŏ n with creative diplomacy. As already mentioned, Sō requested the Koreans to send a congratulatory mission to Hideyoshi for unifying Japan and then pretended to Hideyoshi that the envoys dispatched by the Korean king were messengers confi rming Chosŏ n’s submission. S ō Yoshitoshi’s second temporary expedient was to substitute “borrow a road to China” (J. kato ny ū min ) for “lead the way to conquer China.” In the intercalary third month of 1591 (third month by the Japanese lunar calendar), the monk Keitetsu Genso of Sh ō fukuji temple in Hakata, acting as Sō Yoshitoshi’s representative, traveled to Hans ŏng to enter negotiations with the Koreans over the matter of access to China. He told the Koreans that Hideyoshi was deeply ashamed of the lapse of the tributary relations between Japan and China, and he sincerely hoped for its resumption. Japan was only asking Chosŏ n to “borrow a road” to enter Ming to offer tribute and requesting the kind offi ces of Chosŏ n in this matter. If this wish was not granted, he feared hostilities would break out. 21 Genso’s argument – that a war will break out if Chos ŏn refused to yield a tribute route to Ming – was the point put to Shen Weijing by Konishi Yukinaga. Later, it became established fact that Hideyoshi deployed his army in Chos ŏn because he failed to receive a response from the king of Chos ŏ n promising to assist him to present tribute to the Ming emperor.22 Originally, however, Hideyoshi himself never held such an intention. Returning to the issue of Japanese annexation of Korean territory from the Taedong River southwards, we should note that the matter of the cession of Korean territory fi rst surfaced during these initial discussions between Konishi Yukinaga and Shen Weijing. Hideyoshi’s plan to conquer Ming was never mentioned on this occasion. Thus it was that at the fi rst Japan–Ming negotiations the goal of conquering Ming had completely disappeared and the focus had shifted to the cession of Korean territory. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

The Japan–Ming peace negotiations As negotiations proceeded, fi ghting still went on. On the fi rst day of the fth fi month of 1593, Hideyoshi confi ded his thoughts on the conditions for the peace negotiations to Asano Nagamasa, Kuroda Yoshitaka, Mashita Nagamori, Ishida Mitsunari, and Ō tani Yoshitsugu. At the same time, Hideyoshi ordered the capture of Chinju and the subjugation of Chŏ lla Province, saying that even if Ming proposed peace, they must remain vigilant.23 In the sixth month, 80 Kitajima Manji Hideyoshi ordered all his troops to join forces for the assault on Chinju in southern Kyŏ ngsang Province. In this way, Hideyoshi proceeded to negotiate peace with the Ming, advising Asano and the others of the advantage of maintaining both a fi ghting spirit and a wish for a peaceful resolution. These actions suggest that Hideyoshi proposed to create a fait accompli in acquiring the four southern provinces of Chosŏ n, which he would present to Ming China as a condition of peace. In the fi fth month of 1593, the Ming envoys Xie Yongzi and Xu Yiguan reached Nagoya in Kyū sh ū . Hideyoshi appointed the monks Genpo Reisan of Kyoto’s Nanzenji temple and Keitetsu Genso, who were experienced in handling foreign affairs, to carry out peace negotiations with the ambassadors from Ming China. Their meetings resulted in a Japanese peace proposal consisting of the following seven articles, which was presented to the Ming envoys at the end of the sixth month of 1593:

1 Provide the emperor of Ming China’s daughter as a bride for the emperor of Japan; 2 Resume state trade between Japan and Ming China; 3 Establish friendly relations between the high-ranking offi cials of both countries; 4 Cede the southern four provinces of Chos ŏ n [to Japan]; 5 Provide a Chos ŏ n prince as a hostage in Japan; 6 Return the two Chos ŏ n princes captured by Kat ō Kiyomasa; 7 The ministers of the Korean court must provide written oaths stating their absolute obedience to Japan.24

In addition, Hideyoshi’s private d é marche Dai Min chokushi ni kokuhō subeki j ō moku (“What I Wish to Convey to the Imperial Envoy of the Great Ming”) was presented to the Ming ambassadors. The following is a summary:

1 Ming’s failure to show gratitude for Hideyoshi’s suppression of the widespread Japanese piracy problem against the Ming implies contempt for Japan. That is why we planned to conquer the Ming, and Chosŏ n expressed its willingness to cooperate with us in this endeavor. 2 Chos ŏn was initially in favor of mediating between Ming China and Japan, but later breached its promise. Japan sent in troops to redress this

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 error but was greeted with defi ance. 3 Ming lost sight of its advantage by providing emergency aid to Chosŏ n, but the responsibility lies with Chos ŏ n.25

The core of Hideyoshi’s peace proposal lies in articles 1, 2, and 4. The marriage between the two royals in article 1 was discussed by Genpo Reisan and the Ming envoys in Nagoya, but the Ming envoys refused to give consent to such an arrangement. Hideyoshi obviously had in mind a political marriage of convenience such as were arranged in Japan. The issue of the cession of southern Chos ŏn was put forward with the intention of giving The Imjin Waeran 81 China alternatives: if the royal marriage was unthinkable, then hand over half of Chosŏ n. The cession option, however, was an issue that had already been discussed by Konishi Yukinaga and Shen Weijing in their deliberations. At the time of that meeting, Yukinaga, who was based in P’y ŏ ngyang, had proposed the border at the Taedong River, which was his forward position. Meeting resistance from the allied Ming and Korean forces, however, Yukinaga’s men had to withdraw southwards to Hans ŏ ng. From that time onwards, the negotiating position had retreated to cession with the Han River as the border. 26 Furthermore, although the Japanese army had retreated from Hansŏ ng to the environs of Pusan harbor to facilitate the peace negotiations, they held their ground in newly constructed fortresses scattered along the southern coast of Ky ŏngsang Province, realizing that there was far greater chance of claiming ceded territory in Chos ŏ n than of conquering Ming. Let us elaborate further on article 2, which proposed a resumption of state trade between Japan and Ming China. The proposal actually reads: “In recent years, communications between Japan and Ming have degenerated and even our tally trade (J. kang ō )27 has ceased to operate. We must review this situation with the desire to revive both offi cial and private sea traffi c.” The question of trade had never been addressed in previous negotiations. As is well known, the key to the tally trade with Ming China was the offering of tribute to the Ming emperor. Tribute was treated as a sign of submission to the Ming, and this would have been unthinkable for Hideyoshi, who advocated conquering the Ming. A tally, however, was proof of identity for an offi cial trade ship, a license that distinguished offi cial vessels from pirate ships. For Hideyoshi, who was planning to set himself up in Ningbo, to encourage a revival of “offi - cial and private sea traffi c” using tallies, was, in short, a demand for offi cial trade between Ming China and Japan. Portions of Hideyoshi’s Dai Min chokushi ni kokuhō subeki j ō moku had already been revealed at a meeting in Nagoya between Keitetsu Genso and the Ming representatives. The point of interest is article 2. The necessity of Japan’s military deployment in Chosŏ n was expressed by S ō Yoshitoshi and Keitetsu Genso during their 1591 negotiations “to borrow a road into China,” and by Konishi Yukinaga in his 1592 talks with Shen Weijing. Namely, Chos ŏ n breached its promise to intercede with Ming to help Hideyoshi establish tribute relations, and when Japan deployed forces to redress the matter,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the Koreans resisted. This point was improvised during Japanese negotiations with Chosŏ n and the Ming. It was an extreme position and ultimately placed the blame for the invasion entirely on Chos ŏ n. Both Hideyoshi’s terms for peace and his private dé marche to the Ming peace envoys were the product of countermeasures that the Japanese were forced to devise in coping with the real situation, whether they were aiming to subjugate China in fi ghting Ming and Korean troops or engage in peace negotiations. The nonchalance that Hideyoshi showed when he declared his plan to divide the continent after the fall of Hans ŏ ng was gone. The contrast between that earlier time and 1593 and after is stark. 82 Kitajima Manji The second Korean invasion It is usually said that in the ninth month of 1596 Japan–Ming peace negotiations came to an end when the Ming envoy read an imperial edict to Hideyoshi that contained the phrase, “Herewith I bestow on you the title King of Japan.” These words supposedly enraged Hideyoshi, since they implied Chinese sovereignty, and are often cited as the cause of the collapse of the negotiations. The real reasons were not so straightforward. The instructions written by Hideyoshi on the seventh day of the same month to Shimazu Yoshihiro condemned the Korean king for failing to comply with article 5 of Hideyoshi’s peace proposal, which stated that the king must hand over one of his sons as a hostage to Japan in return for four of the eight provinces of Chos ŏ n. He ordered Yoshihiro to strengthen the military stronghold on Kad ŏ k Island in southern Ky ŏngsang Province, commanding him to strengthen the garrison guards and secure provisions.28 In the meantime, a letter from Kobayakawa Takakage to Shimazu Yoshihiro on the same day reports on this matter of the emperor’s edict causing the collapse of the peace parleys and states that Hideyoshi’s excuse for the deployment of new forces was the fact that the Chosŏ n government refused to send their prince to become a hostage, thereby not fulfi lling article 5 of Hideyoshi’s demands.29 Together with this evidence we should keep in mind that the Ming court had insisted strongly on the withdrawal of the Japanese army stationed in Japanese fortifi cations around Ky ŏngsang Province, something the Japanese were exceedingly dilatory in accomplishing. The Ming envoy sent to enfeof Hideyoshi had closely inspected the situation. 30 The Japanese positions were still held. In sum, Hideyoshi equated the total evacuation from Chosŏ n with the collapse of his regime. He realized that the only way to stay in power was to dispatch another military force to Chosŏ n. The only problem was what excuse to use. His consistent complaints about the lack of a Korean hostage indicate that the excuse focused on Chos ŏn. In the second month of 1597, Hideyoshi fi nalized the battle formation for the second invasion of Chosŏ n and Chŏ lla Province was to become its focus. Katō Kiyomasa and Konishi Yukinaga were to head regiments of 14,700 men each and a total of 141,500 soldiers would be marshaled for the campaign. He ordered them to subjugate Ch ŏ lla Province and then advance into Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng Province.31 From the very beginning of the peace Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 talks, Hideyoshi had been building fortresses around the southern coast of Ky ŏngsang Province, suggesting that his strategy was to seize the grain- rich region of Chŏ lla Province, secure the south, and then gain control of Ch’ungch’ ŏng Province before moving northwards. We can see from this that Hideyoshi intended to impose by force the cession of southern Chos ŏ n that he had proposed in the peace negotiations. In the seventh month of 1597, the Japanese destroyed a Korean navy led by W ŏn Kyun at a sea battle at Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang near K ŏje Island. From this The Imjin Waeran 83 point onwards, the Japanese military split into two units, the Left Army and the Right Army. Kobayakawa Hideaki was appointed commander-in-chief and encamped at Pusan Bay. Ukita Hideie was placed in charge of the Left Army, supervising Konishi Yukinaga, Shimazu Yoshihiro, Katō Yoshiaki, and Hachisuka Iemasa. The Right Army was under Mō ri Hidemoto, who directed Katō Kiyomasa, Asano Yoshinaga, and Kuroda Nagamasa. In the eighth month of 1597, the Left Army advanced northwards through Chŏ lla Province after fi ghting in Namwŏ n. On reaching Puyŏ in Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province, it doubled back south to Chŏ ng’ ŭp in northern Ch ŏlla Province. It was here that a military meeting was convened. 32 The following points were discussed:

1 Having invaded Ch ŏ lla Province by way of Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province, the Shimazu regiment should divide themselves across the province, advance further, and fortify positions from which they can exercise their authority over the occupied territory. 2 We expect reports, with maps, on the situation in the various counties of both Ch’ungch’ŏ ng and Chŏ lla provinces. 3 Final decisions have now been made on the locations of fortifi cations. Konishi Yukinaga’s fort should be constructed on the frontline in either Kyŏ ngsang Province or at Sunch’ ŏ n in Ch ŏ lla Province. 4 M ōri Yoshinari will be posted as defender of Pusan Bay, the communications and supply artery between Japan and all Chosŏ n-based Japanese daimy ō , and he must see that its defense capabilities are strengthened. 5 Tachibana Muneshige’s fortifi cation is to be built between the Shimazu regiment and the Nabeshima regiment. 33

Sites of fortifi cations also indicate territory to be occupied and administered. The Japanese army applied their rule to Chŏ lla Province shortly afterwards. Thirteen daimy ō , including Shimazu Yoshihiro, Hachisuka Iemasa, Ikoma Kazumasa, Konishi Yukinaga, M ōri Yoshinari, and Nabeshima Naoshige, signed a decree addressed to the Korean peasantry: Matters concerning the administration of Haenam, Chŏ lla Province:

1 Peasants who are originally from Haenam County will immediately return to their homes and farm there.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 2 Locate the homes of Chos ŏ n offi cials and execute their occupants, including the immediate and extended family members. Set fi re to offi cials’ homes. 3 Rewards will be given to those who inform us of the location of any secret refuge within Haenam County that shelters either peasants or offi cials. 4 Although we have so far spared the lives of the people of Haenam County, if we fi nd anyone refusing to return home, we will do as we did in the interior of Chŏ lla Province, which was to set fi re to all the houses and execute everyone. 84 Kitajima Manji 5 If a Japanese soldier is found to be behaving contrary to the intentions set out in this decree and kills a member of the Korean public or plunders the people of their possessions, Konishi Yukinaga must be notifi ed.34

Inducing the peasants into returning to their villages to farm and soliciting information on Chos ŏ n government offi cials or leaders of the anti-Japanese resistance were two aspects that had also characterized the fi rst invasion. The Japanese military would dazzle with rewards, behind which was the threat of death. This was military rule through carrots and sticks. In order to establish these policies, senior military supervisors (J. Ikusa metsuke) such as Kumagai Naomori issued the following additional orders:

1 Korean peasants will be taxed on their produce at either 20 percent or 25 percent of their total harvest. 2 Do not trust Korean peasants who have a guaranteed livelihood from farming when they express their gratitude only in words. They will receive the same treatment as Japanese peasants if they show their sin- cerity by either capturing offi cials or informing us of land and buildings hidden from the surveyors. We will reward them with a fi eld or a larger possession. Nabeshima Katsushige and Shimazu Tadatsune are also to be informed of these decisions. 35

By shifting control of the Korean peasantry from Korean offi cials to themselves, the occupying Japanese hoped to raise revenue through taxation. From the senior military supervisors down to the lower-ranking daimy ō , this method of control was adopted universally by the Japanese in Chos ŏ n. As a result of these policies, the Korean peasantry settled into their villages for a time. In response to the inducements to capitulate used by the Shimazu forces in Naju, Chō lla Province, markets opened and trading transpired. 36 The peasantry apparently pretended obeisance while harboring betrayal towards their Japanese masters, because when the allied Ming and Korean forces began their push southwards, the peasants ran away from the villages and scattered into the mountains, 37 displaying an opposition to Japanese rule when the circumstances of war shifted. Occupation policies and the response of the local populace were always

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 dependent on the progress of the war and the disposition of armies. By the time the Japan–Ming peace negotiations collapsed, most of the Chinese relief forces dispatched to Chosŏ n had been withdrawn to China. As a result, in the eighth month of 1597, at the battle for Hwangsŏ k mountain fortress (the passes of Hwangs ŏk mountain marked the border between Kyŏ ngsang Province’s K ŏch’ang County and Chŏ lla Province’s Ch ŏnju County), the Korean forces were alone and were repelled by Katō Kiyomasa’s troops. The Ming court, on hearing the news in the fi fth month of 1597 of Japan’s renewed invasion of Chos ŏ n, sent Deputy Commander (Ch. Fuzongbing ) Yang Yuan The Imjin Waeran 85 to Chosŏ n. Yang led 3,000 soldiers from Liaodong and reached Namwŏ n in Chŏ lla Province in the middle of the sixth month. Namw ŏn was the key strategic point for Chŏ lla and Kyŏ ngsang provinces. Yang reinforced his defense there, but in the middle of the eighth month Namwŏ n fell to the Japanese and Yang deserted the fi eld of battle. This was the Battle of Namwŏ n. In the ninth month of 1597, Kuroda Nagamasa’s troops clashed with an army led by the Ming Deputy Commander Xie Sheng at Chiksan, a border town between northern Ch’ungchŏ ng Province and Ky ŏ nggi Province. No resolution emerged in the battle and both sides retreated. This was the Battle of Chiksan. And, in the eleventh month, Ming’s Supreme Commander (Ch. Jinglue) Xing Jie led a large army into Chos ŏn. In preparation for a counterattack against the Japanese, he also reorganized the Korean troops38 and then laid siege to Kat ō Kiyomasa’s army at Ulsan in Ky ŏ ngsang Province. Fighting in the second invasion became hard and bitter and atrocities became commonplace. The Japanese committed a large-scale massacre following the Battle of Namwŏ n in the eighth month. One of Hideyoshi’s military supervisors, Bungo Usuki, had a castle keeper called Ō ta Kazuyoshi. Ō ta’s fi eld physician, the monk Keinen from Anyō ji temple, kept a diary in which he vividly described the indiscriminate massacre at Namwŏ n. 39 The ordinary people remained within the city walls of Namwŏ n, lending their support to the allied Ming–Chosŏ n army in the fi ght against the Japanese. From the time of the Battle of Namw ŏ n, hanagiri or cutting off noses was widely practiced by the Japanese. At the Battle of Namwŏ n, Shimazu Yoshihiro’s troops removed 421 noses, while Tō d ō Takatora’s soldiers sliced off 269. These severed noses were delivered to Hideyoshi, who sent the troop commanders a note congratulating their valor.40 The cutting off of noses was done at the direction of Hideyoshi. Kobayakawa Hideaki and others received orders from Hideyoshi: “Send in our army and kill all [J. minagoroshi ] Koreans. What do I care if Chos ŏn becomes a land empty of people [J. akichi ]? … Humans have two ears, but we only have one nose. Cut off noses instead of heads!”41 Hideyoshi also made it clear to “sever noses from the elderly, the young, men, women, priests, laymen, rich, or humble and send these to Japan.” 42 The idea of clearing the land by mass slaughter had already been practiced in Japan when the land survey had been applied in the Tō hoku region of northern Honsh ū. Then, Hideyoshi had instructed his army to cut down everyone (J. nadegiri ) in a village where anyone resisted

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the survey, even if this meant that the land would be deprived of tillers.43 Similarly, the idea of slicing off the enemy’s noses instead of removing heads was not new; it had already been practiced during the Sengoku period in Japan (1467–1573). 44 During the invasion of Chosŏ n, however, even ordinary people were pursued as targets, a practice that differed from what had been done in Japan. The various daimy ō and their vassals living in Chosŏ n found it compulsory to cut off noses under this policy. Kat ō Kiyomasa issued a quota to his subordinates to obtain three noses each.45 Once the daimy ō was in possession of his 86 Kitajima Manji vassal’s latest acquisition, he would make out a receipt. Kitsukawa Hiroie’s vassal Akana Kyū nai for example, was issued a receipt, dated second day, tenth month, 1597 for 365 noses.46 For Ky ūnai, this testifi ed to his distinguished war service and entitled him to a larger share of land. The daimy ō collected the noses secured by their vassals and forwarded them to Hideyoshi’s military supervisors who would, in return, write out receipts. The severed noses, therefore, became visible evidence of a daimy ō ’s distinguished service in war. Receipts for noses were not the only proof of distinguished service, but they were important as the Japanese tried to salvage something from the Korean campaign. Hideyoshi’s death in the eighth month of 1598 prompted the military withdrawal of the Japanese from Chosŏ n. It is from around this time that doubts arose regarding the utility for the daimy ō of the huge costs incurred from Japan’s invasion of Chos ŏ n. Written records such as Kiyomasa Kō rai [no] jin oboegaki about Katō Kiyomasa and Kuroda kafu Ch ō sen [no] jin ki about Kuroda Yoshitaka and Kuroda Nagamasa describe how these powerful clans displayed their military valor during the Korean campaign. In order to sustain their position as a lord within Japan’s feudal class, it became essential to prove their worth by making known the military exploits associated with themselves and their illustrious houses. These collections of war tales that starred particular lords may have had many reasons for composition, but we do have evidence that their production was linked to the creation and maintenance of status. For example, in the early stages of the second invasion, the Shimazu were victorious in two confl icts, once in the sea battle at K ŏ je Island’s Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang and once at the Battle of Namw ŏ n. On hearing about Shimazu Yoshihiro’s exploits in Chosŏ n, Shimazu Yoshihisa, who had remained in Japan, commended Yoshihiro on his admirable achievements and urged Yoshihiro to report these victories to Ishida Mitsunari immediately, warning him that any negligence in doing so might cause some to believe that the Shimazu were complacent, and that such rumors would tarnish the family name. 47 Clearly, the daimy ō clans were very conscious of making the right kind of impression upon their peers and superiors with evidence of distinguished war service. The most ostentatious displays of valor were connected with the battle at Sach’ ŏ n in the tenth month of 1598 and the sea battle at Noryang in the eleventh month. The fi rst victory is attributed to the Shimazu, who repelled the allied Ming–Chosŏ n assault on Sach’ ŏn Castle. Heads of enemy soldiers

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 were taken and their noses sent to Japan, although, as one might expect, there is some confusion over just how many heads and noses. According to the monument dedicated to the Japanese dead from the Korean war erected by the Shimazu family at K ō yasan temple, the number exceeded 80,000.48 The authenticity of this fi gure, however, remains unconfi rmed. A letter addressed to Shimazu Tadatsune by offi cers (gobugy ō 49) of the Toyotomi regime states that the number was 38,700. 50 Yet, the fi gure 30,814 is quoted in a letter sent home by a vassal of the Shimazu clan.51 Murai Sh ō suke considers the last fi g- ure to be the most likely one. 52 Be that as it may, we can be certain of the fact The Imjin Waeran 87 that, in the end, the number was grossly exaggerated as having been in excess of 80,000. While noses supported the Shimazu, the Seikanroku entry on the Noryang sea battle helped save the reputation of the major fi ve clans of the Konishi. In a self-congratulatory postscript, the author states “recently, our ancestor who took part in the mission to conquer Chosŏ n displayed his military power on foreign soil, doing great deeds for our people, and his reputation now spreads over the four seas.” Noses provided concrete evidence and war tales fi lled in the storyline, but nothing was more convincing than captives, particularly those with technical skills or cultural knowledge. At the Battle of Namwŏ n, Koreans were detained and taken to Japan. Among the prisoners of the Shimazu, some who were sent to Satsuma became potters. A Satsuma legend describes a Korean prisoner taken at Namwŏ n, a soldier attendant on Prince Yi Kŭ mgwang, who arrived at Naeshirogawa in Satsuma after journeying from Chŏ lla Province to Sach’ ŏn in Ky ŏngsang Province. He settled in as a potter. 53 In this manner, the western daimy ō, such as the Nabeshima, brought Korean potters from various regions back with them. The beginning of Arita porcelain is attributed to these potters, and their production enriched the fi nances of the western daimy ō. While pottery was useful, perhaps even beautiful, captive Confucian scholars provided prestige. The most representative of all the scholars taken to Japan was Kang Hang. He was captured by Tō d ō Takatora and sent to Ōzu in Iyo Province. After learning that he was a Confucian scholar, the Japanese treated him differently. Later, in Kyō to, Kang Hang and Fujiwara Seika developed a friendly relationship while discussing Neo-Confucianism (J. Shushigaku ). Kang left behind Kanyangnok as a record of the time he spent as a prisoner of war in Japan.54 Out of all the prisoners, peasants were the most numerous. According to the confession by Katō Kiyomasa’s vassal Fukuda Kansuke, who was captured by the Chos ŏn army in the ninth month of 1597, Korean peasants taken captive were taken to Japan and immediately put to work on the land to fi ll the labor shortage. Labor was in short supply because Japanese peasants had been taken abroad to perform miscellaneous duties in the military camps of the western Japanese daimy ō in Chos ŏ n. 55

Conclusion

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The fi rst Japanese invasion of Chos ŏn was instigated by Hideyoshi, whose ambition was to reign over Asia. His dream of domination did not stop at China, the country that he had planned as his initial conquest, but it extended to other countries and territories in Asia. Hideyoshi’s fi rst step was to send his troops into Chosŏ n. His plan, however, was frustrated by the resistance of the Korean people and the relief aid that Chosŏ n obtained from Ming China. By the time Konishi Yukinaga and Shen Weijing began their negotiations, Hideyoshi’s original objective was already shifting from the conquest of Ming to the cession of Chosŏ n. 88 Kitajima Manji The second invasion aimed at the forcible seizure of Korean territory as its objective. The various daimy ō who went into Chosŏ n tried to bring the peasantry under control using the same policies adopted at home. They massacred those who disobeyed. The occupation of Chosŏ n fi nally ended in failure. Eager to display their military valor, the daimy ō and their vassals used the war as a tool for self-aggrandizement. Cutting off the noses of ordinary people was typical of this approach. The oppression of a foreign people and their sacrifi ce became an essential means by which members of Japan’s feudal land-holding class sustained their position within the feudal order. That was a consequence of the invasions of Chos ŏ n.

Notes Translated by Nakajima Sanae and Rachel Payne with James B. Lewis. 1 Ō mura Y ū ko, Ky ū sh ū god ō za ki. 2 Tensh ō 18 (1590), mid-winter, “Ch ō sen koku ō ate, Kanpaku Hideyoshi shokan,” in Edaki Ungai, K ō un zuihitsu . 3 Nait ō Konan, “T ō hoku Ajia no kansei teisetsu,” 1914. 4 Hanshu , Vol. 1, Gaodiji, diyi shang. 5 Suishu , Vol. 1, diji, diyi, Gaozushang. 6 Yuanshi , Vol. 1, benji, diyi, Taizu. 7 “Kanpaku Hidetsugu ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi oboegaki,” 1592.5.18, in Seikan monjo . 8 “On higashi sama, On kyakushin sama ate, Yamanaka Kitsunai shoj ō ,” 1592.5.18, in Kumiya monjo . 9 “ K a t ō Kiyomasa ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō ,” 1592.5.16, in Kat ō monjo . 10 “S ō Yoshitoshi ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinjō ,” 1592.6.3, in S ō ke Ch ō senjin monjo . 1 1 Kō raikoku hassu no kokun ō oboe no koto. 12 “Kanky ō d ō [K. Hamgyŏ ng-do] hyakush ō ate, Kat ō Kiyomasa b ōbun,” 1592.6.?, in Taich ō in monjo . 13 “Kiyomasa K ōraijin no oboegaki,” 1592.9.25, in Tajiri Akitane, K ō rai nikki. See Map 2 . 14 In Korea, weights and measures at the time were as follows, according to Kyŏ ngguk taej ŏ n , 1971: 10 chak = 1 hop ; 10 hop = 1 toe or s ŭ ng ; 10 toe or s ŭ ng = 1 mal or tu ; 15 mal or tu = 1 s ŏ k . The Japanese koku (180 liters), composed of Japanese masu, was roughly 4.5 times the Korean s ŏ k , composed of 4 Korean s ŏ k and 5 mal . Translator’s note: Although the source is Japanese, it refers to a Korean harvest, so the measuring unit is rendered here as s ŏ k and not koku . 1 5 Nabeshima Naoshige fukōho , 1592.7.18, in Tajiri Akitane, K ō rai nikki. 1 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 30:12b–13a (1592.9.15). Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 1 7 Kuroda kafu, Ch ō sen jinki. 18 Translator’s note: See Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail , 2009, pp. 25–33. 1 9 Ry ōch ō Heij ō roku. 2 0 S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 26:34b–35a (1592.9.–); Ry ōch ō Heij ō roku; Mingshi , Vol. 320, liechuan 208, Chaoxian. 2 1 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:11a–11b (1591.intercalary 3.–). 22 “Dai Min chokushi ni kokuh ō subeki jō moku,” in Edaki Ungai, K ō un zuihitsu . 2 3 Kuroda kafu, Ch ō sen jinki. 2 4 Nanzen ky ū ki. Translator’s note: See Chapter 5, p. 96, for a more literal statement of Hideyoshi’s seven articles of peace. The Imjin Waeran 89 25 Edaki Ungai, Kō un zuihitsu . 2 6 Mingshi , Vol. 320, liechuan 208, Chaoxian. 27 See Toby, State and Diplomacy , 1984, p. 58, on the issue of kang ō . 28 “Shimazu Yoshihiro ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō ,” 1596.9.7, in Shimazu-ke monjo , document no. 424. 29 “Shimazu Yoshihiro ate, Kobayakawa Takakage shoj ō,” 1596.9.7, in Sappan ky ū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen , no. 37. 3 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 65:37a–37b (1595.7.24). 31 “Shimazu Yoshihiro ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō,” 1597.2.21, in Shimazu-ke monjo, document no. 402; “Toyotomi Hideyoshi K ōrai saido jinjindate sho,” 21/2 Keich ō 2 (1597), in Shimazu-ke monjo , document no. 403. 3 2 Omodaka rench ō b ō nikki , 16/9 Keich ō 2 (1597). See Map 5 . 33 “Maeda Geni ika 3 mei ate, Ukita Hideie hoka 14 mei rensho gonj ō j ō an,” 1597.9.16, in Shimazu-ke monjo , document no. 988. 34 “Shimazu Yoshihiro hoka 12 mei rensho Zenra-d ō [K. Chŏ lla-do] Kainan [K. Haenam] teib ō bunsha,” 1597.9.?, in Shimazuke monjo , document no. 971. 35 “Ikoma Sanuki no kami ate, Kumagaya Naomori hoka 2 mei shojō ,” 1597.9.23, in Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen , no. 40. 3 6 Nanjung chamnok, 1597.9. 37 “Ishida Mitsunari ate, Shimazu Yoshihiro shoj ō,” 1598.1.6, in Sappan ky ū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen , no. 41. 3 8 Ry ōch ō Heij ō roku. 39 Keinen, Chō sen hinikki , 16/8–18/8 Keich ō 2 (1597). 40 “Shimazu Yoshihiro ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō,” 1597.9.13, in Shimazu-ke monjo , document no. 438; “Tō d ō Takatora ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinjō ,” 13/9 Keich ō 2 (1597), in T ō d ō monjo . 4 1 Nanjung chamnok , 1597.7. 4 2 Ō k ō chi Hidemoto Ch ō sen nikki. 43 “Asano Nagamasa ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō,” 1586.9.14, in Asanoke monjo , document no. 59. 4 4 Zō hy ō monogatari . 45 Shimokawa Heiday ū , Kiyomasa Kō rai [no] jin oboegaki. 4 6 Hagi-han batsuetsuroku , no. 37 47 “Shimazu Yoshihiro, Tadatsune ate, Shimazu Yoshihisa shoj ō,” 1597.9.13, in Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen , no. 40. 4 8 Kagoshima kenshi , Vol. 1, p. 784. 49 The gobugyō or fi ve principal fi gures in the Toyotomi government were Asano Nagamasa, Ishida Mitsunari, Mashita Nagamori, Natsuka Masaie, and Maeda Gen’i. 50 “Shimazu Iehisa ate, Toyotomi gobugy ō rensho onchigy ō gata mokuroku,” 1599.1.9, in Sappan ky ū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen , no. 44. 51 “Yatomoto ate, Ōshima Tadayasu shojō ,” 1598.10.12, in Sappan ky ū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen , no. 29.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 52 Murai Sh ō suke, “Shimazu shiryō kara mita Shisen no tatakai,” 2000. 5 3 Shiseki henny ū no negai. 54 Translator’s note: Kang’s students later compiled his writings and titled the collection Kanyangnok. For an English translation, see Kang Hang, A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1599–1600 in the References for Chapter 1. 5 5 Sŏ njo shillok , 93:8a–9a (1597.10.3).

References Asanoke monjo (浅野家文書). Dai Nihon komonjo, iewake 2 ( 大日本古文書, 家わけ2). 90 Kitajima Manji

Asanoke monjo ( 浅野家文書 ). “Asano Nagamasa ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 浅野長政宛 , 豊臣秀吉朱印状 ).” Ch ōsen kokusozei chō ( 朝鮮国租税牒). Maeda Sonkeikaku Bunko (前田尊経閣文庫所蔵 ). Edaki Ungai ( 江岳雲崖), ed. K ō un zuihitsu ( 江雲随筆 ). T ō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shozō shahon ( 東京大学史料編纂所所蔵写本 ). Edaki Ungai . “Ch ō sen koku ō ate, Kanpaku Hideyoshi shokan (朝鮮國王宛 , 關白秀吉書翰 ).” Edaki Ungai . “Dai Min chokushi ni kokuh ō subeki jō moku ( 大明勅使に告報すべき条目 ).” Hagi-han batsuetsuroku ( 萩藩閥閲録 ). Yamaguchi-ken shokan shozō ( 山口県文書館所蔵 ). Hanshu ( 漢書 ). Kagoshima kenshi (鹿児島県史 ). Kagoshima ken ( 鹿児島県 ). Kang Hang ( 姜沆 ). Kanyangnok ( 看羊録 ). Included in Haehaeng ch’ongjae ( 海行摠載 ). Kat ō monjo ( 加藤文書 ). T ō kyō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shozō shahon (東京大学史料編纂所所蔵写本 ). Kat ō monjo (加藤文書 ). “Kat ō Kiyomasa ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinjō (加藤清正宛 , 豊臣秀吉朱印状 ).” Keinen ( 慶念 ). Ch ō sen hinikki ( 朝鮮日々記 ). Ō ita-ken Usuki-shi Any ō ji shoz ō ( 大分県臼杵市安養寺所蔵 ). K ō raikoku hassu no kokun ō oboe no koto ( 高麗国八州之石納覚之事 ). Included in the Tosa no kuni tokanshū ( 土佐国蠧簡集 ). Tō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shoz ō shahon ( 東京大学史料編纂所所蔵写本 ). Kumiya monjo ( 組屋文書). Included in Echizen nyakkyō kobun shosen ( 越前若狭古文書選 ). Kumiya monjo ( 組屋文書). “On higashi sama, On kyakushin sama ate, Yamanaka Kitsunai shoj ō ( 御ひかしさま , 御きやくしんさま宛 , 山中橘内書状 ).” Kuroda kafu, Ch ōsen [no] jinki ( 黒田家譜朝鮮陣記). Naikaku Bunko shozō ( 内閣文庫所蔵 ). Kyŏ ngguk taej ŏ n (J. Keikoku taiten, 経国大典 ). Gakush ūin Daigaku Tō y ō Bunka Kenky ū jo ( 学習院大学東洋文化研究所 ), 1971 . Mingshi ( 明史 ). Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 ). “ Shimazu shiry ō kara mita Shisen no tatakai (島津史料からみた泗川の戦い ) .” Rekishigaku kenky ū ( 歴史学研究 ) 736 ( 2000 ): 16–27 . Nabeshima Naoshige fukō ho ( 鍋島直茂譜考補 ). Naikaku Bunko shozō ( 内閣文庫所蔵 ). Nait ō Konan ( 内藤湖南 ). “ T ōhoku Ajia no kansei teisetsu (東北亜細亜の感生帝説 ) .”

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Minzoku to rekishi ( 民族と歴史 ) 1–4 (April 1914 ). Nanjung chamnok ( 亂中雜綠). Han’guk Kuksa P’y ŏ nch’an Wiwŏ nhoe ( 韓國國史編纂委員會 ). Nanzen ky ū ki ( 南禅旧記 ). Naikaku Bunko shozō ( 內閣文庫所蔵 ). Ō k ō chi Hidemoto Chō sen nikki ( 大河內秀元朝鮮日記 ), alternate title Ch ō senki ( 朝鮮記 ). Included in Zoku gunsho ruij ū ( 續群書類従 , 590), Vol. 590. Omodaka renchō b ō nikki ( 面高連長坊高麗日記). Included in Kaitei shiseki sh ū ran ( 改訂史籍集覧 ), Vol. 25. Ō m u r a Y ū k o ( 大村由己 ). Ky ū sh ū god ō za ki ( 九州御動座記 ). Maeda Sonkeikaku Bunko ( 前田尊経閣文庫 ). The Imjin Waeran 91

Ry ōch ō Heij ō roku ( 両朝平攘録 ). T ō ky ō Daigaku T ō y ō Bunka Kenkyū jo shoz ō ( 東京大学東洋文化研究所所蔵 ). Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku, kō hen ( 薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編 ). T ō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shoz ō ( 東京大学史料編纂所所蔵 ). Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen (薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編). “Shimazu Yoshihiro ate, Kobayakawa Takakage shojō ( 島津義弘宛 , 小早川隆景書状 ).” Sappan ky ūki zatsuroku, k ō hen ( 薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編). “Ikoma Sanuki no kami ate, Kumagaya Naomori hoka 2 mei shoj ō ( 生駒讃岐守宛 , 熊谷直盛外２名連署状 ).” Sappan ky ūki zatsuroku, kō hen ( 薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編). “Ishida Mitsunari ate, Shimazu Yoshihiro shojō ( 石田三成宛 , 島津義弘書状 ).” Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku, kō hen ( 薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編 ). “Shimazu Yoshihiro, Tadatsune ate, Shimazu Yoshihisa shoj ō ( 島津義弘 , 忠恒宛 , 島津義久書状 ).” Sappan ky ūki zatsuroku, kō hen ( 薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編). “Shimazu Iehisa ate, Toyotomi gobugy ō rensho onchigyō gata mokuroku (島津家久宛 , 豊臣五奉行連署御知行方目録 ).” Sappan ky ū ki zatsuroku, kō hen ( 薩藩旧記雑録 , 後編 ). “Yatomoto ate, Ō shima Tadayasu shojō ( やともと宛 , 大嶋忠泰書状 ).” Seikan monjo ( 征韓文書 ). Maeda Sonkeikaku Bunko ( 前田尊経閣文庫所蔵 ). Seikan monjo ( 征韓文書). “Kanpaku Hidetsugu ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi oboegaki ( 関白秀次宛 , 豊臣秀吉覚書 ).” Seikanroku (征韓録 ). T ō kyō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shozō shahon (東京大学史料編纂所所蔵写本 ). Shimazu-ke monjo ( 島津家文書 ). Included in Dai Nihon komonjo, iewake (大日本古文書 , 家わけ 16), Vol. 16. Shimazu-ke monjo ( 島津家文書). “Shimazu Yoshihiro ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinjō ( 島津義弘宛 , 豊臣秀吉朱印状 ).” Shimazu-ke monjo ( 島津家文書 ). “Toyotomi Hideyoshi Kō rai saido jinjindate sho (豊臣秀吉高麗再度陣陣立書 ).” Shimazu-ke monjo ( 島津家文書). “Maeda Geni ika 3 mei ate, Ukita Hideie hoka 14 mei rensho gonjō j ō an ( 前田玄以以下 3 名宛 , 宇喜多秀家外 14 名連署言上状案 ).” Shimazu-ke monjo (島津家文書). “Shimazu Yoshihiro hoka 12 mei rensho Zenra-dō [K. Ch ŏlla-do] Kainan [K. Haenam] teibō bunsha ( 島津義弘外 12 名連署全羅道海南定榜文写 ).” Shimokawa Heiday ū ( 下川兵大夫 ). Kiyomasa Kō rai [no] jin oboegaki (清正高麗陣覚書 ). Included in Zoku zoku gunsho ruij ū ( 続々群書類従 , 4), Vol. 4. Shiseki hennyū no negai ( 士籍編入之願 ). Chinjukan shi shoz ō monjo (沈寿官氏所蔵文書 ). S ō ke Ch ō senjin monjo ( 宗家朝鮮陣文書). Included in Ch ō sen shiry ō s ō kan ( 朝鮮史料叢刊第 19), Vol. 19.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 S ō ke Ch ō senjin monjo ( 宗家朝鮮陣文書 ). “S ō Yoshitoshi ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 宗義智宛 , 豊臣秀吉朱印状 ).” S ŏ njo shillok (宣祖實録 ). S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok ( 宣祖修正實録 ). Suishu ( 隋書 ). Swope , Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming Chin and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 . Norman : University of Oklahoma Press , 2009 . Taich ō in monjo ( 泰長院文書). Included in Saga-ken shiry ō sh ūsei komonjo hen ( 佐賀県史料集成古文書編), Vol. 5. T ō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shoz ō shahon ( 東京大学史料編纂所所蔵写本 ). 92 Kitajima Manji

Taich ō in monjo ( 泰長院文書 ). “Kankyō d ō [K. Hamgy ŏ ng-do] hyakush ō ate, Kat ō Kiyomasa b ō bun ( 咸鏡道百姓宛 , 加藤清正榜文 ).” Tajiri Akitane ( 田尻鑑種 ). K ō rai nikki ( 高麗日記 ). Saga Kenritsu Toshokan shoz ō ( 佐賀県立図書館所蔵 ). Tajiri Akitane ( 田尻鑑種 ). “Kiyomasa K ō raijin no oboegaki ( 清正高麗陣覚書 ).” Tajiri Akitane ( 田尻鑑種 ). “Nabeshima Naoshige fuk ō ho ( 鍋島直茂譜考補 ).” Toby , Ronald P. State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1984 . T ō d ō monjo ( 藤堂文書 ). Tō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo shoz ō ( 東京大学史料編纂所所蔵写本 ). T ō d ō monjo ( 藤堂文書 ). “T ō d ō Takatora ate, Toyotomi Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 藤堂高虎宛 , 豊臣秀吉朱印状 ).” Yuanshi ( 元史 ). Z ō hy ō monogatari ( 雑兵物語 ). In Nakamura Michio ( 中村通夫 ) and Yuzawa K ō kichir ō ( 湯沢幸吉郎), eds., Z ōhei monogatari: Oamu monogatari (雑兵物語 : おあむ物語 ). T ō ky ō : Iwanami Bunko , 1943 . Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 5 Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏ n Korea and Japan–Ming negotiations

Sajima Akiko ( 佐島顕子 )

Introduction In 1592, Japan and China commenced a series of negotiations to end the Imjin Waeran, and by the ninth month of 1596, the Japanese received envoys from both Ming China and Chosŏ n Korea. The peace was short-lived, terminated by a sudden explosion of anger from Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and in 1597, a renewed attack on Korea began. Previous research in Japan has focused on the reasons for the rupture after four years of peace negotiations.1 This chapter examines Hideyoshi’s view of Korea, the contradictions remaining by 1596 in the conditions for peace put forward from Hideyoshi and Ming China, and the process of negotiation. In addition, I will investigate the reasons why peace negotiations took place between the Japanese and the Chinese, despite the fact that Chinese territory was never invaded and Korea was the center of the fi ghting.

The Toyotomi regime’s awareness of Korea In the fourth month of 1592, troops led by Konishi Yukinaga landed at Pusan and committed their fi rst atrocity. The following, by one of Konishi’s men, describes the scene:

When we landed in the early morning on the thirteenth day of the fourth month, we immediately fell on the Pusan fortress, but they were expecting us. Arrows released from small bows fell upon us like rain … They hid between houses or under the fl ooring, and those who could Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 not fi nd anywhere to hide ran to the east gate to escape. They all put their hands together kneeling down, and uttered words we had never heard, meaningless words that sounded like “manō , man ō !” as if to plead for help. The Japanese offi cers and men ignored these words, slashed at them, and trampled them to death. Their victims were both men and women, and even dogs and cats were slain. Nearly 30,000 were massacred.2 94 Sajima Akiko Why was the Japanese attack so extreme? Normally, the Toyotomi regime employed “total massacre” (J. minagoroshi) as a means to suppress domestic revolts, but this was a foreign war. The reasons for the deployment of this domestic fi ghting style require explanation. Fujiki Hisashi’s studies reveal that in the process of unifying the Japanese archipelago Hideyoshi chose not to destroy the feudal lords, but used methods to incorporate them under his rule.3 After the Muromachi bakufu lost power from the fi fteenth century, regional lords, military men, and even villagers resorted to force to resolve problems such as border incidents. The Toyotomi regime that appeared in the late sixteenth century demanded a cessation of confl ict, obedience to itself, and the acceptance of boundaries arbitrated by itself. This marked the transition from a medieval world to an early-modern world in which public life would be subject to law and order. The feudal lords were promised control of their lands by the Toyotomi regime in exchange for hostages, which acted as proof of their allegiance to the regime. The Toyotomi regime considered local disturbances, whether an invasion by a neighboring domain or an uprising organized by retainers, not as a private matter, but as an act of defi ance against their authority; they would intervene by sending in allied troops, collected from various daimy ō . Hideyoshi sent messengers country-wide to persuade local lords to submit to him. For those who yielded to persuasion, he permitted them to continue controlling their land as before. Resistance and then capitulation were met with a reduction of the lord’s holdings, but even then, confi scation of the offender’s land was not complete. However, later on, if there was dissatisfaction with Hideyoshi’s decision in land allocations or a lack of submission and open rebellion against Hideyoshi, the Toyotomi regime called this resistance a “revolt” and mer- cilessly killed all of the perpetrators. Although the Toyotomi regime tolerated opposition from antagonists before they submitted, it never tolerated rebellion from those who had submitted and joined the regime. This was a particular characteristic of the regime’s control over the daimy ō. From 1587, when he opened diplomatic contact with Chosŏ n, Hideyoshi insisted on adhering to the same policy towards this neighboring country as he had adopted at home: if the king of Chosŏ n swore obedience to Hideyoshi, then his right to rule Korea would be recognized, but if the king refused, then a Toyotomi army made up of subordinate daimy ō would be sent to force him

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 into submission. The envoys responsible for communicating this policy, S ō Yoshitoshi and his father-in-law Konishi Yukinaga, failed to convey Hideyoshi’s intentions to the Chos ŏn court for fear of offending King Sŏ njo. Instead, they requested a congratulatory embassy be sent in honor of Japan’s recent unifi cation. When the embassy arrived from Chos ŏ n Korea in 1590, Yoshitoshi and Yukinaga presented them to Hideyoshi as an embassy communicating Chosŏ n’s submission. Hideyoshi mistakenly accepted this as a sign of the Chosŏ n king’s subjugation to his authority, and in 1592 launched a campaign to conquer Ming Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 95 China on the understanding that Chos ŏ n would cooperate in this venture. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that Chosŏ n ever submitted to the Toyotomi regime and therefore no reason for Chosŏ n to assist Hideyoshi. On learning of Chosŏ n’s non-compliance, Konishi began the invasion by attacking Pusan. On receiving the news of the disturbance at Pusan, Hideyoshi issued the following statement to his daimy ō :

Some time back, the Chosŏ n court submitted to Toyotomi governance, so I told them to make their roads into China available for our use to subjugate Ming China. However, today we learn that, instead of being welcomed at the castle at Pusan, our troops were attacked. We therefore initiated a counterattack and razed their castle.4

And three days later Hideyoshi added the following: “Do not kill the Chos ŏn king for I intend to award him with territory.” 5 We can infer from these statements that Hideyoshi considered Korea to be one of his territorial domains. The invasion, therefore, was not a foreign war, but a suppression of a local revolt. In the eleventh month of the same year (1592), Hideyoshi stated: “I will cross the channel to Chosŏ n in the third month of next year without fail, and I will subject the whole land to my authority after annihilating [J. minagoroshi ] these rebels [J. ikki ].” 6 In reality, the conditions of war were such that Hideyoshi was unable to cross to Korea: his troops were challenged by the bitter defi ance of the Chos ŏ n regular and irregular (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng , “righteous soldiers”) forces and suffered from food shortages. Although the fi ghting in Chinju, a southern Korean city, was in reality a confrontation between two armies, Hideyoshi called it a “revolt” (J. ikki), and in the sixth month of 1593, he delivered an all-out attack and after fi erce fi ghting, killed 60,000 people, including civilians. 7 Thus Hideyoshi treated the clash with Chosŏ n not as a foreign war but as the suppression of a revolt. This discrepancy in views was later to affect the nature of the peace negotiations.

The Japan–Ming negotiations that led to Hideyoshi’s recognition (J. sakuh ō ) In the autumn of 1592, for the fi rst time, Konishi Yukinaga’s troops in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 P’y ŏngyang fought with the Ming auxiliary army, which had been brought in at the request of Chosŏ n. Immediately after this initial clash, the Japanese appealed for peace with China. Chos ŏn, whose sovereignty had been violated by the Japanese army, was not Yukinaga’s interlocutor for peace, the Ming government was. The Toyotomi regime’s perception of Chosŏ n – that it was a rebellious part of the internal dominion – was responsible for this neglect of one of the main participants of the war. In 1593, Hideyoshi declared a truce with the Ming army and issued the following terms and conditions to his chief negotiator Yukinaga. 96 Sajima Akiko The terms of peace between the Great Ming and Japan:

1a There must not be any misunderstandings in our peace covenant. Peace must be protected even if heaven and earth vanish. We therefore invite a daughter of the Emperor of Great Ming to become Empress to the Emperor of Japan. 2a Attenuation of the relations between our two countries has resulted in the recent discontinuation of the tally trade (J. kang ō ). This situation will now be rectifi ed so that offi cial envoy ships and trade ships can travel freely. 3a Diplomatic relations between Great Ming and Japan must not be impaired. Ministers from both countries will write each other oaths. 4a We have already subdued Chos ŏn with our military power, but now is the time to stabilize the country and let the people live in peace. Japan may have been forced to deploy its army, but if agreement is reached over the acceptance of these conditions, then Chosŏ n will, in dread of defying Japan and before the Great Ming, divide its eight provinces. Four provinces and the capital city will be awarded to the king of Chosŏ n, because Japan had previously entered into peace with Chos ŏ n through the three Chos ŏn envoys dispatched to Japan. Precise details may be obtained ver- bally from Ishida [Mitsunari] and the four others. 5a Four provinces have already been handed back to Chos ŏn. The Koreans must respond to this by sending a prince and a high minister to Japan as hostages. 6a Two Chos ŏ n princes of admirable disposition were taken as hostages last year by the Japanese army. They will be treated as a separate case from the terms of the peace treaty and entrusted to Shen Weijing [a Chinese peace representative who had been dispatched to Japan by the Ming army] and returned to Chos ŏ n. 7a The chief ministers of the king of Chos ŏn will write oaths stating their obedience to Japan henceforth. The four bearers of this document will explain the particulars of the above to the envoys of the Emperor of Great Ming. 28th day, 6th month of Bunroku 2 [1593] Hideyoshi (sealed in vermilion) Ishida Mitsunari Mashita Nagamori

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Ō tani Yoshitsugu Konishi Yukinaga8

Popularly known as “Hideyoshi’s seven articles,” the contents can be categorized under three headings: (i) three demands on China; (ii) two demands on Chos ŏ n; and (iii) Japan’s two obligations:

i Demands on China: 1a Ming princess to wed Japanese emperor; 2a Resuscitation of Japan–Ming tally trade; Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 97 3a Exchange of vows between Ming China and Japan confi rming diplomatic relations.

ii Demands on Chos ŏ n: 5a A prince as hostage; 7a A vow of repentance.

iii Japan’s obligations: 4a Northern half of Chos ŏ n and the capital to be offered to the king of Chos ŏ n; 6 a K a t ō Kiyomasa’s captives, Prince Imhae and Prince Sunhwa, to be returned.

Hideyoshi sought diplomatic relations and trade with Ming China but not with Chos ŏn for which he claimed administrative responsibility. Declaring himself ruler of Chos ŏn, he offered the northern half to the king of Chosŏ n and kept the southern half for himself. He also demanded written oaths and hostages as proof of Chosŏ n’s submission. The Japanese were already in possession of two princes, but Hideyoshi felt that a clearer demonstration of Chos ŏn’s submission was needed. He would return the captive princes but demanded that Chos ŏn take the initiative by delivering hostages. From 1590 Hideyoshi was led to believe that the Chosŏ n congratulatory embassy came bearing the king’s submission, and he had been under the illusion that the whole of Chos ŏ n was subject to his authority. The Japanese forces immediately fulfi lled their part of the promise – the princes were returned and the Japanese army withdrew from all but the southern, coastal region. Using Hideyoshi’s seven articles of 1593 as a guide, Yukinaga entered into peace negotiations with Shen Weijing, the peace representative dispatched from the Ming military. Since Shen took the liberty of arbitrarily changing article 1a, substituting 300 horses for the Ming princess,9 Yukinaga focused on articles 2a and 3a, the tally trade and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Ming China. The tally trade was a trade arrangement between the emperor of Ming China and the kings of neighboring countries. Under this system only those recognized (J. sakuh ō ) as king by the Ming emperor could trade with China. There were signifi cant advantages for the kings in being part of this exclu-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 sive trade network centered on China. The tally was proof of permission to trade with Ming China and that permission was issued only to the kings of countries. As well as the economic profi t of being able to trade with China, other powers within a country were excluded, enabling the local king to take a superior position in internal politics. Hideyoshi was ignorant of the fact that trade with Ming China was condi- tional on him being recognized by the Ming court. It appears that Hideyoshi used the term “ kang ō” (tally trade) merely to indicate a resumption of trade between Japan and China. Yukinaga, on the other hand, knew that it was necessary to request recognition before entering into trade with Ming China. 98 Sajima Akiko Therefore, he forged a document that stated Hideyoshi’s capitulation, and had it delivered to the Ming court. Of course, condemnation of the Japanese invasion of Chosŏ n was rife within the Ming government, but offi cials decided to follow the example of 1402, when the title “King of Japan” had been conferred on the retired shō gun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. The court planned to bring the war to a swift conclusion by bestowing the title of “King of Japan” on Hideyoshi. A conclusion to the fi ghting would have meant that no further troops would be dispatched, a fi nancial concern, and recognition of a king would have meant that all diplomatic questions would be settled. Thus the Ming government viewed matters in a traditional framework.10 Ming China accused Chos ŏn of causing the outbreak of war, saying that it had refused to mediate Hideyoshi’s request for recognition, despite the fact that he was keen to receive the Ming court’s recognition. Admittedly, Ming China was fully aware of the falsity of such an accusation, but they now had Hideyoshi’s written capitulation. This prompted the Ming court to dispatch an envoy, who carried with him the authority to grant the title “King of Japan” to Hideyoshi as well as to confer a state letter and a gold seal. However, in the fi rst month of 1595, the Ming court set three conditions by which Hideyoshi should abide, if he were to accept recognition:

1b Trade will not be allowed. 2b Japan and Chos ŏ n will conclude a peace. 3b Troops must be withdrawn completely from Chos ŏ n.

Although Yukinaga could accept recognition of the “King of Japan” as a precondition for trade, he found it very diffi cult to accept only recognition and no trade and resisted these conditions. 11 In the end, Yukinaga’s envoy accepted the terms 1b and 2b in Beijing. It is likely that Yukinaga accepted the Ming government’s offer, however reluctantly, because he thought that Hideyoshi’s requests to China would more or less be honored. Horses would replace the princess; the gold seal would look as if it could be used as a tally; and the state letter could be construed as an oath. For the time being then, Yukinaga accepted the offer of recognition. It seems peculiar that Hideyoshi would accept Ming recognition when he had launched an invasion to conquer Ming China. Reviewing the circum-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 stances of the time, though, it appears that Hideyoshi himself had in fact accepted recognition by 1595. This hypothesis is supported by the following statement made by Yukinaga’s rival, Katō Kiyomasa, on hearing about the content of the peace negotiations. Kiyomasa appealed to Hideyoshi in the following terms:

It is lamentable that we are now about to become Ming’s subjects when the original plan was to make them our subjects. This year or next year – an immediate invasion may not be possible, but if we stay in Chosŏ n for Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 99 a decade or so and then attack Ming, that should enable us to carry out our original objective.12

Despite Kiyomasa’s entreaty, there is no evidence to suggest that Hideyoshi was shocked or that he made any attempt to suspend Yukinaga’s peace negotiations at the time. The Toyotomi regime no longer had the reserve forces with which to resume the war against China and Korea. It is plausible that there was no other option left for Hideyoshi but to agree to let Ming China confer on him the title of king and then enter into a peace treaty with China.

Withdrawal from Chosŏ n as a condition for recognition In the fi fth month of 1595, Yukinaga briefl y returned to Japan to make a progress report to Hideyoshi on the peace negotiations. 13 Hideyoshi issued the terms below to Yukinaga.

Hideyoshi’s Second Set of Terms for Peace between Great Ming, Chos ŏ n, and Japan (signed Hideyoshi) … 1c) I have received information that Shen Weijing appeared at Konishi Yukinaga’s camp at Ungch’ŏ n in southern Chos ŏn and relayed the Great Ming terms for peace. I have decided to obey the Ming Emperor’s orders and forgive Chosŏ n’s treachery provided the following conditions are met: i) Chosŏ n must send one prince to Japan as my servant; ii) of the eight provinces of Chos ŏn, four will be annexed to Japan, as prescribed previously; iii) when the prince comes to Japan, two ministers will accompany him and attend on the prince in alternate shifts. 2c) On the arrival of Shen Weijing and the Chosŏ n prince at the Ungch’ ŏ n camp, ten of the fi fteen fortresses built by the Japanese will be destroyed immediately. 3c) We are prepared to forgive Chosŏ n its rebellion and make peace, because the Ming Emperor has so strongly urged us to do so. The [Ming] state letter will be delivered to Japan by Ming’s Imperial Envoy. Henceforth, all diplomatic and trade ships between the two countries will be recognized by a tally stamped with a gold seal.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 22nd day, 5th month Bunroku 4 [1595] Hideyoshi (sealed in vermilion) Konishi Yukinaga Terazawa Hirotaka14

Of the seven terms originally proposed in 1593 (see above), articles 2a (tally trade) and 3a (establishment of relations) towards Ming China and 4a (cession of four provinces) and 5a (hostage prince) towards Chosŏ n have been preserved in this version from the fi fth month of 1595. Article 6a deserved no mention, because Japan had already returned the two Chosŏ n princes. Apart 100 Sajima Akiko from the omission of article 1a about the Ming princess, Hideyoshi’s original conditions remained unchanged, despite the unfavorable progress of the war. Non-compliance with the request for the Ming princess has often been cited as one of the reasons for the collapse of the peace negotiations. Shen Weijing, however, maintained that Ming China had approved the imperial wedding, but because the princess died en route, 300 horses were being sent as a substitute. 15 It is diffi cult to imagine that Hideyoshi would have believed such a story, but the fact that the demand disappears from his 1595 terms and the fact that the “princess” issue was never raised in 1597 at the time when the peace negotiations ruptured indicate that the matter had been long excised from Hideyoshi’s conditions. In the tally trade of the Muromachi period, Japanese ships travelled to China carrying a tally bestowed on the “King of Japan” by the Ming emperor. It is possible to conclude from article 3c, however, that Hideyoshi intended to control maritime trade in East Asian waters by having each vessel carry a certifi cate stamped with a gold seal by either Japan or Ming China.16 The Ming court never authorized offi cial trade with Japan, but in reality there was much private commerce between the two countries. It appears that Yukinaga explained to Hideyoshi that the gold seal would be given to him to be used to produce his vermilion-sealed documents, which controlled the sea traffi c. As regards diplomatic relations between China and Japan, there is a notable difference in Hideyoshi’s attitude between 1593, when he spoke of “the ministers’ written oaths,” and the revised conditions two years later, when he awaited the arrival of an imperial envoy to deliver the state letter. We may conclude from the above that at the time the terms were written in 1595, Hideyoshi had no real reason to halt the peace process. On the other hand, Japan had still not complied with one of the three terms presented to them by Ming China – the complete withdrawal from Chos ŏ n (3b). It is likely that Yukinaga did not make this demand clear to Hideyoshi. In this connection, Hideyoshi’s 1595 terms for peace (1c–3c above) eased his military deployment in the occupied southern territory by authorizing the demolition of ten out of the fi fteen Japanese fortresses and gave consent to the return to Japan of his generals in Korea. The news of Hideyoshi’s “evacuation” from Chos ŏn territory reached the Chos ŏn government via Yukinaga, who held back the vital truth that this was no more than a reduction of deployments.17 Ming China was equally mis-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 guided in the matter when they heard that Hideyoshi was “eliminating ten of his own fortresses and awaiting the arrival of an envoy from Ming,” and that this was “the beginning of a complete withdrawal.”18 The Ming government responded to this news by dispatching an envoy for recognition from Beijing and ordered him to wait in Hans ŏ ng until the withdrawal was completed. With the stories of Japanese fortresses being razed and a comprehensive military evacuation under way, Yukinaga intended to deceive China into believing that Japan was yielding to their demands of withdrawal. Just before the demolition of the fortress on Kŏ je Island, Yukinaga sent a directive to Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 101 the keeper of the fortress, Shimazu, saying, “I will send one of Shen Weijing’s associates, because we need a Chinese to witness this.”19 Although it was from Chos ŏn that Japan was making their military retreat, Yukinaga did not verify the demolition of Japanese fortresses with any Chosŏ n offi cial. This evidence suggests that Yukinaga and the Ming court both believed that a Japan–Ming peace could end the war, and neither considered the war-torn and occupied Chos ŏ n to be a participant in the peace. Hideyoshi’s intention, as made clear in the 1595 peace terms, was to demol- ish the fortresses after a prince was delivered as hostage, but Yukinaga and Shen predicted that Chosŏ n would refuse to part with a prince and requested that only an envoy be sent. By the ninth month of 1595, ten fortresses out of sixteen in the possession of the Japanese army had been razed. The Chosŏ n court judged that Japan’s withdrawal was real: the taxation on Japanese occupied land fell from 50 percent to 30 percent, rice was transported to Japan instead of being stored for later use, and there was a visible reduction in the number of Japanese ships in the ports.20

Putting recognition before withdrawal Before Hideyoshi’s evacuation project was discovered to be only a partial evacuation, Yukinaga and Shen Weijing urged the Ming army to send the recognition envoy to Japan. The Ming Minister of War, Shi Xing, was enthusiastic about the negotiations, because he desired the Ming army’s withdrawal from Chos ŏ n. He ordered the recognition envoy to leave Hansŏ ng without delay and proceed to the Japanese camp. 21 The chief Chinese envoy, Li Zongcheng, was alarmed to hear an order contradicting the directives he had been given in Beijing. He stopped at Namwŏ n and Miryang along the way and refused to enter the Japanese camps. He said that until all the Japanese fortresses were destroyed, he would not set foot in Yukinaga’s camp in Pusan. He asserted, “If Kat ō Kiyomasa can refuse to withdraw after a year, I need not move forward for a year.” 22 Li’s resistance ended when his messenger sent to Beijing to report on the withdrawal situation returned to Miryang with Shi Xing’s orders on the eighteenth day of the eleventh month, 1595: Li was to leave Miryang and enter the Japanese camp in Pusan. This order was issued because Shen Weijing com-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 plained to Shi that Kiyomasa and his army were holding their positions, and the reason was that the Ming recognition envoy was refusing to enter the Japanese camp. The desire to accelerate the peace process made both Shi and Shen act against Beijing’s policy. Both the chief envoy Li Zongcheng and the Chosŏ n court were of the opinion that the Japanese would probably break their promise of full evacuation if the recognition envoy should enter the Japanese camp before the Japanese withdrew. When King S ŏnjo heard that Li had entered the Japanese camp at Pusan on the twenty-second day of the eleventh month on Shi’s command, 23 102 Sajima Akiko he felt anxious about the realization of peace.24 Just as he feared, Japan’s withdrawal was discontinued. Despite this, Shen and others at Pusan began planning the travel arrangements to Japan for the recognition envoy. Li repeatedly reported to the Ming court that the withdrawal process was not progressing. He even wrote of resigning his post because it seemed incon- ceivable that Hideyoshi could ever be recognized. A debate arose within Ming government councils over the anomaly that an offi cial date for a visit by a recognition envoy should be discussed when Japan still held fi ve camps and Kiyomasa was still in Korea. Some said that even if recognition should come fi rst, the envoy must remain in Pusan until evacuation was completed. 25 Withholding from the government information on Li’s wish for resignation, and using the fact that Japan was willing to bear all expenses for the cost of travel for the Chinese envoy’s visit to Japan, Shi insisted that Japan’s desire to be recognized was unchanged and that problems did not exist. The Ming government eventually accepted Shi’s assertions and ordered the chief envoy to commit to his duty with dignity on behalf of his country. No reason was left for the Ming court to review their ideas about the peace process with Japan. Isolated, Li feared that he might be coerced into entering Japan to perform a recognition ceremony, despite the fact that Japan had not withdrawn. On the third day of the fi fth month, 1596, he donned a disguise and escaped from the Japanese camp at Pusan with the state letter from the emperor and the gold seal and returned to China under the auspices of the Chosŏ n government. This was Li’s last attempt to oppose developments; he had sent numerous reports to his government expecting responsible answers, but his hopes were dashed each time by the interference of Shi in the Ministry of War. Shen and Yukinaga handled Li’s defi ant escape as “fl ight resulting from intimidation by false rumors.” The state letter got lost along the way, later to be found in a meadow at Kimhae near Pusan,26 and as it was stained, a fresh copy was later reissued in Beijing. The gold seal, which he was believed to have taken, was found back in his quarters. On his return to China, Li was inter- rogated as a fugitive who had damaged Ming China’s reputation by running away alone and neglecting the state letter and the gold seal. Li’s abandonment of his post led to the promotion of Yang Fangheng, the deputy envoy and an adherent of Shi’s, to the position of chief envoy. Shen became deputy envoy. They then travelled to Japan without settling article 3b of the Ming terms for

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 peace – the complete withdrawal of Japan from Chosŏ n.

Collapse of the peace negotiations On the fi rst day of the ninth month, 1596, the recognition ceremony was completed without disruption in audience with Hideyoshi at Ō saka Castle. Hideyoshi was presented with the state letter and the gold seal, which together symbolized his recognition. He was also given a ceremonial robe with cap. The state letter, the gold seal, the written appointments (Ch. zhafu ) issued by Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 103 the Ming Ministry of War, which were distributed to the daimy ō appointing them as “subjects of the King of Japan,” all remained in Japan even after the breakdown of the peace negotiations. It is clear that Hideyoshi and his daimy ō happily accepted the Ming government’s offi cial appointments. For the recognition envoy, however, there was still the problem of article 3b or Japanese evacuation. Yang Fangheng and Shen Weijing had prioritized recognition over evacuation, but they would have disobeyed the emperor had the evacuation not been total. They must have expected that the Japanese troops would be out of Chosŏ n by the time they returned to Ming China to appear before the emperor. Another problem was that Hideyoshi refused to see the Chosŏ n envoys. In Hideyoshi’s terms of 1593 and 1595, he demanded that a Chos ŏ n prince come as hostage to Japan, and he was still anticipating a prince’s arrival in the intercalary seventh month of 1596.27 By the eighth month, Hideyoshi became irate because a Communication Embassy (K. T’ongshinsa ) had arrived from the Chos ŏ n government instead of a prince. Yukinaga and others concealed Hideyoshi’s desire to have a Chos ŏ n prince, instead pressing for the dispatch of a Chosŏ n embassy. The Chosŏ n court was opposed to a Ming–Japan peace in the fi rst place and had been refusing to send an embassy, arguing that “we cannot live in the same world with them.” In the absence of an offi cial directive from the Ming court, the Chosŏ n court felt that they could not respond to a personal appeal from Shen and refused to send a Communication Embassy.28 The Japanese negotiator, Yanagawa Shigenobu, offered himself as a hostage to the Koreans in exchange for an embassy,29 and in the fi fth month of 1596 he told an offi cial interpreter that anyone from the government would suffi ce, even a “fake” envoy.30 The per- sistence of the appeals, and the fear that their refusal to comply may well be reported by Shen to the Ming Ministry of War as an obstruction of the peace process, led the Chos ŏ n court to agree reluctantly to send an embassy bearing a state letter to Japan. Hideyoshi became furious when he learned that it was not a prince who had arrived from Chos ŏ n. He said to Yukinaga and others, “The fact that the Chos ŏn envoy arrived later than the recognition envoy from Ming, together with their failure to dispatch a prince, show that they are making a mockery of me.” This, however, did not result in the peace process being terminated. Instead, Hideyoshi planned fi rst of all to meet the Ming envoy, and consult

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 with the Ming Ministry of War about the situation. Afterwards, he would then fi nally meet the Chos ŏ n envoy.31 Just as he had talked about peace with Chos ŏ n – “I have decided to obey the Ming Emperor’s orders and forgive Chos ŏn’s treachery” (Hideyoshi’s 1595 terms for peace, 1c) – he thought that Ming China was responsible for Chosŏ n’s conduct. Thus, Hideyoshi sought to take control of Chosŏ n territory not by invasion or by negotiations with Chos ŏ n but by diplomatic talks with the Ming court: the northern four provinces to be given to the Chos ŏ n king while the southern four provinces were to be held by Japan. At the banquet for the Ming envoys on the second day 104 Sajima Akiko of the ninth month, Shen Weijing asked Hideyoshi to meet with the Chosŏ n envoys, but Hideyoshi refused.32 On the fourth day of the ninth month, Hideyoshi sent the deputy (J. bugy ō ) in charge of Ky ōto, Maeda Gen’i, and a priest in charge of foreign correspondence to Shen’s quarters for a discussion about a letter of reply to the Ming court. Yukinaga was also present. 33 It is said that, on this occasion, Hideyoshi sent an extremely cordial note to the recognition envoy, stating: “If you have any requests, feel free to make them heard.” 34 Finding courage in Hideyoshi’s amiable missive and gaining Gen’i’s understanding, Shen replied to Hideyoshi regarding both the problem of military withdrawal and a meeting with the Chosŏ n embassy. 35 The Chos ŏ n ambassador, Hwang Shin, despite being present in Shen’s quarters at this time, was not able to participate in the meeting. Clearly, the Chosŏ n court was completely excluded from the Japan–Ming peace negotiations. The joint effort by Shen and Yukinaga to convince Hideyoshi ended in total failure. The following day, Yanagawa Shigenobu told Hwang Shin the following:

Today, Yukinaga took Shen Weijing’s letter to Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi became furious and said, “I have been tolerant for a while, because the Ming envoy had accorded me recognition, but Chosŏ n’s behaviour is deplorable. Peace shall now cease and I will attack again. On top of everything, they ask me to consider military withdrawal, which is outra- geous. The Ming envoy might as well depart for home tomorrow and the same goes for the Koreans. I will prepare my troops, and after the winter has gone, they will attack Chos ŏ n.”

And thus, the negotiations ended in rupture. Luis Frois, a Jesuit resident in Japan at the time, left a similar record. According to Frois, Hideyoshi erupted with rage when he arrived at the section in Shen Weijing’s letter that covered the destruction of his fortresses.36 On the seventh day of the ninth month, Hideyoshi made a public announce- ment to his daimy ō declaring the termination of the peace negotiations and the initiation of a second invasion of Chosŏ n. He gave his reason: “because the Chosŏ n prince failed to arrive in Japan.” 37 According to one daimy ō , however,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The peace talks broke down because the Ming envoy did not address Hideyoshi properly. Hideyoshi got angry because Chosŏ n failed to deliver their prince on time. The prince should have paid his respects to Hideyoshi before the arrival of the Ming envoy.38

Hideyoshi had been dissatisfi ed with Chosŏ n’s refusal to submit to Toyotomi authority, but Shen’s request to have his entire army withdrawn proved to be the fi nal test of the Japanese ruler’s patience. Neither Ming China’s failure to deliver the princess nor the recognition matter were responsible for the collapse Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 105 of the peace or Japan’s renewed invasion of Korea. Chosŏ n, which did not send a prince as hostage, refused effectively to submit to the Toyotomi regime. Ming China, which asked for a complete withdrawal of Hideyoshi’s troops from Korea, refused to recognize his control of Chosŏ n. Confronting these two facts, Hideyoshi had to acknowledge the impossibility of attaining control over Chosŏ n Korea through diplomatic talks alone. For Hideyoshi, peace with Ming China was now pointless. By 1593, the invasion of China (J. Kara iri), which had begun with the intention to absorb Chosŏ n into the Toyotomi regime, had seen merciless combat only to end in failure. Hideyoshi looked for ways to end the war by continuing diplomatic relations with the Ming government. He eventually agreed to be part of the Chinese diplomatic structure, but he showed a different attitude towards Chos ŏn. His domestic strategy for unifi cation – “disobedience shall be forgiven as long as I can detect the intention of allegiance, which will guarantee you a position within the regime” – resulted in fettering Hideyoshi himself. In the end, he could never bring himself to treat Chosŏ n as a foreign country outside his domain of control.

Notes Translated by Nakajima Sanae and Rachel Payne with James B. Lewis. 1 Tokutomi Soh ō , Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, 1921; Nakamura Hidetaka, Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū , 1969; Ishihara Michihiro, Bunroku-Keich ō no eki , 1963; Kitajima Manji, Ch ō sen hinikki, Kō rai nikki , 1984; Miki Seiichirō , “Kanpaku gaik ō taisei no tokushitsu ni tsuite,” 1987; Kitajima Manji, Toyotomi seiken no taigai ninshiki to Ch ō sen shinryaku , 1990. 2 “Yoshino Jingozaemon oboegaki,” p. 379. 3 Fujiki Hisashi, Toyotomi heiwarei to sengoku shakai , 1985, pp. 1–76. 4 Hideyoshi shuinj ō (1592.4.22). 5 Hideyoshi shuinj ō utsushi (1592.4.25). 6 Hideyoshi shuinj ō (1592.11.10). 7 A very informative book on the Battle of Chinju, which became the focus of Korean “revolts,” is Sai Kan (Choi Kwan)’s Bunroku-Keich ō no eki , 1994. 8 Nanzen ky ū ki , last volume, pp. 1–7, numbering inserted by author. 9 Zhuge Yuansheng, Liangzhou pingranglu, riben , p. 81. 10 Okano Masako, “Hideyoshi no Ch ō sen shinryaku to Chū goku,” 1977. 1 1 Shenzong shilu , 282: 6a–6b (1595.2.12). 12 “Nanjung shillok,” Vol. 2, in Taedong yasŭ ng , Vol. 6, pp. 4–6. 1 3 S ŏ njo shillok , 63: 10a, p. 496 (1595.5.10); S ŏ njo shillok , 64: 28a–28b, p. 516 (1595.6.22); Hideyoshi shuinj ō (1595.4.16).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 1 4 Dai Min Chō sen to Nihon wahei no j ō moku, pp. 1–3; numbering inserted by author. 1 5 Sŏ njo shillok , 74: 19b–21a, pp. 677–8 (1596.4.10). 16 Tanaka Takeo, Taigai kankei to bunka kō ry ū , 1982, pp. 82–91; Fujiki Hisashi, Toyotomi heiwarei to sengoku shakai, 1985, p. 243; Miki Seiichir ō, “Kanpaku gaikō taisei no tokushitsu ni tsuite,” 1987; Kitajima Manji, Toyotomi seiken no taigai ninshiki to Ch ō sen shinryaku , 1990, p. 189. 1 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 64: 28a–28b (1595.6.22). 1 8 S ŏ njo shillok , 65: 20b (1595.7.14). 19 For “Konishi Yukinaga–Terazawa Masanari shoj ō ” (1595.8.28), see Ky ū ki zatsuroku: K ō hen , Vol. 2 (1587), 1986. 106 Sajima Akiko 2 0 Sŏ njo shillok , 67: 31b (1595.9.28); S ŏ njo shillok , 70: 21a–21b, p. 616 (1595.12.23). 2 1 S ŏ njo shillok , 69: 3b–4a (1595.11.3). 2 2 S ŏ njo shillok , 69: 30a–31a (1595.11.30). 2 3 S ŏ njo shillok , 70: 14a–14b (1595.12.12). 2 4 S ŏ njo shillok , 70: 1a (1595.12.1). 2 5 Shenzong shilu , 294: 9b–10b (1596.2.24). 2 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 74: 50b–54a (1596.4.23). 27 “Natsuka Masaie shoj ō ,” in Kijima monjo (1596 intercalary 7.11). 2 8 Sŏ njo shillok , 71: 1a–2b (1596.1.1). 2 9 Sŏ njo shillok , 74: 41b–44a (1596.4.17). 3 0 Sŏ njo shillok , 75: 4b–5a (1596.5.2). 31 Hwang Shin, Ilbon wanghwan ilgi , entry for ninth month sixth day, pp. 11–12. 3 2 Ruisu Furoisu nenp ō , hoi , 16~17 seiki Iezusu kai (1596.12.28), p. 320. 33 Hwang Shin, Ilbon wanghwan ilgi , entry for ninth month fi fth day, p. 11. 34 “Ruisu Furoisu nenpo, hoi,” in 16~17 seiki Iezusu kai , p. 321. 35 Hwang Shin, Ilbon wanghwan ilgi , entry for ninth month fi fth day, p. 11 36 “Ruisu Furoisu nenpo, hoi,” in 16~17 seiki Iezusu kai , p. 321. 3 7 Hideyoshi shuinj ō (1596.9.7), p. 375. 38 For “Kobayakawa Takakage shoj ō ” (1596.9.7), see Ky ū ki zatsuroku: Kō hen , Vol. 3, 107, 1986, pp. 41–2.

References Dai Min Chō sen to Nihon wahei no jō moku (Dai Min, Chō sen to Nihon no kō wa jō ken) ( 大明朝鮮与日本和平之条目 [ 大明 , 朝鮮と日本の講和条件 ]). Tō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo, t ō shabon ( 東京大学 , 史料編纂所 , 謄写本 ). Fujiki Hisashi ( 藤木久志 ). Toyotomi heiwarei to sengoku shakai ( 豊臣平和令と戦国社会 ). T ō ky ō : Tō ky ō daigaku shuppankai , 1985 . Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 秀吉朱印状 ) (1592.4.22), in Takeda Katsuz ō ( 武田勝蔵 ). “Hakushaku, Sō -ke shoz ō : H ō k ō (Toyotomi Hideyoshi) monjo to Chō senjin ( 伯爵宗家所蔵豊公 [ 豊臣秀吉 ] 文書と朝鮮陣 ),” Shigaku ( 史学 ) 8 ( 1925 ): 383–440 . Hideyoshi shuinj ō utsushi ( 秀吉朱印状写) (1592.4.25), in Kuroda monjo ( 黒田文書 ), Vol. 10. T ō ky ō : T ō ky ō Daigaku Shiry ō Hensanjo, t ō shabon ( 東京大学史料編纂所 , 謄写本 ). Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 秀吉朱印状 ) (1592.11.10), in Matsumoto Sumio ( 松本寿三郎 ), ed., “Kat ō monjo, 14(加藤文書, 14),” Kumamoto-ken shiry ō sh ū sei: Kumamoto-ken shiry ō chū seihen ( 熊本県史料集成 , 熊本県史料中世編 ), Vol. 5, Kumamoto-ken , 1966 , pp. 154–5 . Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 秀吉朱印状) (1595.4.16), in “Nabeshima-ke monjo, 80 (鍋島家文書, 80),” Saga-ken shiry ō sh ū sei: Komonjo-hen ( 佐賀県史料集成 , 古文書編), Vol. 3. Saga : Saga kenritsu toshokan , 1972 , pp. 359–60 . Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Hideyoshi shuinj ō ( 秀吉朱印状) (1596.9.7), in “Nabeshima-ke monjo, 104 (鍋島家文書 , 104),” Saga-ken shiryō sh ū sei: Komonjo-hen ( 佐賀県史料集成 , 古文書編 ), Vol. 3. Saga : Saga kenritsu toshokan , 1972 , p. 375 . Hwang Shin ( 黃愼 ). Ilbon wanghwan ilgi [J. Nihon ō kan nikki ] ( 日本往還日記 ). Seiky ū gakus ō ( 青丘学叢) 11 (1933 ). [Translator’s note: translated and republished as K ō Shin ( 黄慎 , 1560–1617), trans. by Wakamatsu Minoru ( 若松実 ). Nihon ōkan nikki: Jinshin Waran-Bunroku no eki ni okeru Minkoku sakuhō shi-Ch ō sen Tsū shinshi no washin k ō sh ō no nikki ( 日本往還日記 : 壬辰倭乱 ዘ文禄の役に於ける明国冊封使 ዘ朝鮮通信使の和親交渉の記録 ). Nagoya : Nitch ō kyō kai Aichi- ken reng ō kai ( 日朝協会愛知県連合会 ), 1989 .] Hideyoshi’s view of Chosŏn Korea 107

Ishihara Michihiro ( 石原道博 ). Bunroku-Keich ō no eki ( 文禄 -慶長の役 ). T ō ky ō : Hanawa Shob ō , 1963 . Kitajima Manji ( 北島万次 ). Chō sen hinikki, Kō rai nikki ( 朝鮮日々記 · 高麗日記 ). T ō ky ō : Soshiete , 1984 . Kitajima Manji ( 北島万次 ). Toyotomi seiken no taigai ninshiki to Chō sen shinryaku (豊臣政権の対外認識と朝鮮侵略 ). T ō ky ō : Azekura shob ō , 1990 . “Kobayakawa Takakage shojō (小早川隆景書状 )” (1596.9.7), in Kyū ki zatsuroku: K ō hen (旧記雑録 , 後編), Vol. 3, 107. Kagoshima : Kagoshima-ken Ishin Shiry ō Hensanjo , 1986 . “Konishi Yukinaga and Terazawa Masanari shojō ( 小西行長 ዘ 寺沢正成書状 )” (1595.8.28), in Ky ū ki zatsuroku: Kō hen ( 旧記雑録 , 後編), Vol. 2, 1587. Kagoshima : Kagoshima-ken Ishin Shiry ō Hensanjo , 1986 . Miki Seiichir ō ( 三鬼清一郎 ). “Kanpaku gaikō taisei no tokushitsu ni tsuite (関白外交体制の特質について ),” in Tanaka Takeo ( 田中健夫 ), ed., Nihon zenkindai no kokka to taigai kankei (日本前近代の国家と対外関係 ). Tō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1987 . Nakamura Hidetaka ( 中村栄孝 ). Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū ( 日鮮関係史の研究 , 中 ), Vol. 2. T ō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1969 . “Nanjung shillok ( 乱中実録 ),” in Taedong yasŭ ng ( 大東野乗 ), Vol. 2. Keijō : Ch ō sen kosho kankō kai , 1911 . Nanzen ky ū ki , ge ( 南禅旧記 , 下). Kokuritsu k ōbunshokan, Naikaku bunko, shoz ō ( 国立公文書館内閣文庫所蔵 ). “Natsuka Masaie shoj ō ( 長束正家書状 ),” in Kijima monjo (木島文書 ). Okano Masako (岡野昌子). “Hideyoshi no Ch ōsen shinryaku to Ch ū goku ( 秀吉の朝鮮侵略と中国 ),” in Minshinshi ronsh ū ( 明清史論集 ). Tō ky ō : R y ō gen shoten , 1977 . Ruisu Furoisu (Luis Frois) nenp ō , hoi ( ルイスٜフロイス年報 , 補遺 ), in 16~17 seiki Iezusu kai Nihon hō koku sh ū ( 十六~七世紀イエズス会日本報告集), dai 1 ki, dai 2 maki ( 第１期 , 第２巻 ), trans. by Matsuda Kiichi ( 松田毅一監 ) et al . Kyoto : D ō hō sha , 1998 . Sai Kan (Choi Kwan, 崔官 ). Bunroku-Keichō no eki, Imjin-Waeran: Bungaku ni kizamareta sensō ( 文禄 - 慶長の役 : 壬辰 - 丁酉倭乱 : 文学に刻まれた戦争 ). T ō ky ō : K ō dansha , 1994 . Shenzong shilu (神宗実録). Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, lishi yuyan yanjiusuo chuban (中央研究院 , 歴史語言研究所出版 ). S ŏ njo shillok (宣祖実録 ). Tanaka Takeo ( 田中健夫 ). Taigai kankei to bunka kō ry ū ( 対外関係と文化交流 ). T ō ky ō : Shibunkaku , 1982 . Tokutomi Soh ō ( 徳富蘇峰 ). Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi: Toyotomi jidai Ch ō sen eki, ge ( 近世日本国民史 : 豊臣時代朝鮮役 ,下 ). T ō kyō : Meiji shoin , 1921 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 “Yoshino Jingozaemon oboegaki (吉野甚五左衛門覚書 ),” in Zoku-Gunsho ruijū ( 続群書類従 ), Vol. 23. Zhuge Yuansheng ( 諸葛元声 ). Liangzhou pingranglu, riben ( 両朝平攘録 , 日本 ), in Beijing daxue Chaoxian wenhua yanjiusuo et al., eds. (北京大学朝鮮文化研究所等主編 ). Renchen zhiyi shiliao huiji, xia ( 壬辰之役史料匯集 , 下 ).

6 Post-war domain source material on Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea The wartime memoirs of Shimazu soldiers

Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 )

Introduction The Imjin Waeran was a war of aggression mounted by the Japanese army against Korea at the end of the sixteenth century. Devised by the Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, this confl ict had the conquest of China as its fi nal aim. Not only is this war considered pivotal to Japan’s transition from medieval to early-modern times and a milestone in the development of the early-modern state (J. bakuhansei kokka), it is also a major watershed in Korea’s history, dividing early Chosŏ n from later Chosŏ n, and an event remembered as visiting extreme devastation on the country. It also has a signifi cant place in Chinese history, being regarded as one of the key incidents that played a decisive role in the Ming–Qing dynastic changeover in 1644. The war became a concern not only for those directly involved but also for Europeans. East Asia had by this time experienced half a century of European presence in the region. European concern with the invasion is demonstrated by records left by Christian missionaries resident in Japan, such as Luis Frois, who made careful observations of ongoing events. Because the war assumed such global dimensions, information on the subject is both plentiful and varied. There are extant records in Japan, Korea, China, Ryū ky ū , Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Not only is a comprehensive collection of these records yet to be compiled, but we have not yet exhausted our search for information.1 More emphasis needs to be placed on the collection and analysis of primary sources preliminary to building a clearer picture of the war. This chapter will focus on a topic that has received little attention: the war Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 memoirs, or j ū gun oboegaki , written at the behest of their domains by Japanese soldiers more than a decade after their service. This survey will limit itself to Satsuma domain, which expended more energy than any other domain on collecting war memoirs. The following considers the special character of the memoirs as historical records, and looks briefl y at where they can be found. Furthermore, extracts from the most illuminating of all the Satsuma war memoirs, Oku Sekisuke oboegaki , is introduced. Post-war domain source material 109 The origin of the war memoirs: the j ū gun oboegaki The following six documents, as the diaries and records of combatants, are considered valuable as research materials and are frequently cited:

1 K ō rai nikki (Kory ŏ Diary) by Tajiri Akitane, vassal of Nabeshima Naoshige; 2 Ch ō sen hinikki (Korean Days) by the monk Keinen, Ō ta Kazuyoshi’s fi eld doctor; 3 Ch ō sen nikki (Chos ŏn Diary) by Ō k ōchi Hidemoto, another of Ō ta’s vassals; 4 Yoshino nikki (The Yoshino Diary) by Matsuura Shigenobu’s vassal, Yoshino Jingozaemon; 5 K ō rai nikki (Kory ŏ Diary) by Shimazu Yoshihiro’s fi eld priest, Omodaka Rench ō b ō ; 6 Seisei nikki (The Western Conquest Diary) by Konishi Yukinaga and S ō Yoshitoshi’s fi eld priest, Tenkei.

There is another set of war tales compiled years later that are frequently cited. These are:

1 Kiyomasa Kō raijin oboegaki (Kiyomasa’s Korean War Memoirs), about Kat ō Kiyomasa; 2 Tachibana Chō senki (Tachibana’s Korean Record), about Tachibana Muneshige; 3 Utsunomiya Kō rai kijin monogarari (The Story of Utsunomiya’s Return from the Korean War), about Utsunomiya Kunitsuna who accompanied Konishi Yukinaga.

These are examples of war tales that were clearly compiled to highlight the military achievements of individuals. They have a common descriptive style, are easy to read, and often quoted. There is yet another type of record simply called oboegaki , or memoirs, written retrospectively by ordinary soldiers some years after their service. The vast majority of surviving oboegaki that we know about apparently come almost solely from Satsuma domain. Their usage tends to be very limited because the events are often described without coherence and the style is stilted. Kitajima Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Manji makes a rare reference to these oboegaki in his work:

And even among the vassals of the daimy ō who participated in the invasion of Korea, oboegaki were written with a view to making their individual exploits known. In the case of the Shimazu clan, the vassals submitted their oboegaki as proof of their participation in the war. Izumi sh ūch ū It ō Gentaku K ō raijin oboegaki (It ō Gentaku’s Korean War Memoir), 110 Murai Shōsuke Ōshige Heiroku K ō rai oboegaki ( Ōshige Heiroku’s Korea Memoir), Ch ō sa Hikozaemon oboegaki (Ch ōsa Hikozaemon’s Memoir), Oshikawa Rokubee m ō shide (A Report by Oshikawa Rokubee), Hishikari Kyū bee Ch ō sen h ō k ō oboe (Hishikari Ky ūbee’s Memoirs of Service in Korea), and Eda T ō emon oboegaki (Eda Tō emon’s Memoir) are all of this type and are kept in the Kagoshima Prefectural Library. These memoirs formed the basis for the Shimazu clan’s Seikanroku (Records on the Korean Conquest).2

As some of the six oboegaki mentioned above are particularly brief, it can hardly be said that these are fully representative. It should also be noted that the copies held at Kagoshima Prefectural Library are only transcripts of the Tamazato Bunko editions held in the Kagoshima University Library. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, it is incorrect to say that self- glorifi cation was the reason for writing the oboegaki , such as was the case with Kiyomasa Kō raijin oboegaki and others mentioned above. In brief, due to the defi ciency of interest in these records, current research lacks a common understanding of elementary facts. This does not mean, however, that these records have little value as historical sources. Admittedly, as a resource to determine the chronology of wartime events, there are problems in both the writing style and the level of accuracy of the authors’ memories, and these two aspects pose enormous limitations on the user. That said, the vivid portrayal of the war through the eyes of the soldiers who were directly involved is absent from other sources, and in that respect, the oboegaki excel.3 There are various types of records left to us, with various motivations for their production. In the afterword to Oku Sekisuke oboegaki, which will be more extensively introduced below, the author explains his purpose in writing the memoir.

[I wrote] the preceding in response to a request by the Offi ce of Letters ( ofumidokoro ). 4 The events I described, however, happened over sixty years ago, so you may fi nd that some stories do not all appear in the correct chronological order. I am also eighty-two, so you will have to pardon me for [leaving some matters uncertain]. Year of the Boar (1659, Manji 2), Fifteenth day of the eighth month, Oku Sekisuke, retired monk Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Clearly, Oku Sekisuke was under considerable pressure from his domain to write his memoir, which he eagerly constructed by recalling events that had happened more than sixty years ago. As the author admitted himself, he attributed the lack of accuracy to faded memories. There seems to be no evidence, however, of Sekisuke intentionally distorting the truth. The afterword alone does not exclude the possibility that the memoirs may have been written to stress the author’s valor and exploits in the war. If such were the case, it would mean that the domain had its soldiers write their oboegaki to carry out Post-war domain source material 111 a survey of individual military accomplishments. This hypothesis fails in the face of the opening section of the Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki .5 The Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki opens by quoting a letter addressed to Fuchinobe Kazuemon, dated the seventeenth day of the eighth month of the Year of the Boar (1659, Manji 2). The letter reads: “You are summoned by the Records Offi ce [same as the Offi ce of Letters above] regarding the Korean invasion. Attend today at the residence of the records offi cer, Hirata Seiemon.” This is followed by a list of sixteen points that Hirata Seiemon made to Fuchinobe Kazuemon on the following day. The fourteenth request, which states that Kazuemon must provide a description of the day when Shimazu Yoshihiro withdrew his troops from Sach’ŏ n Castle, demonstrates that the domain was not necessarily asking for a list of Fuchinobe Kazuemon’s war-time activities or achievements. They wanted Kazuemon to give a detailed description of the actions taken by Shimazu Yoshihiro during the Keich ō campaign or the second Korean invasion of 1597. At the time Kazuemon received his summons, the Records Offi ce was headed by Shimazu Hisamichi (1604–74), a domain elder (J. kar ō ), who, in the autumn of his life, became editor-in-chief of Seikanroku (The Record of Korean Conquest). Oku Sekisuke and Fuchinobe Kazuemon received their instructions from the domain when the compilation of the Shimazu clan history was in progress under the guidance of Hisamichi. The central task in producing this chronicle was to collect pieces of information, particularly those that involved Shimazu Yoshihiro and Shimazu Tadatsune (the fi rst daimy ō of Satsuma domain, later renamed Iehisa, 1576–1638), which would be helpful to create a clear picture of the Keichō campaign. These pieces of evidence demonstrate that the oboegaki are records written by soldiers of all ages and ranks and are not a homogeneous collection. Diversity is a primary feature of the j ū gun oboegaki. Because there is a gap of about sixty years between the occurrence of the war and when these oboegaki were written, the authors were all old men who had served in the war when they were around 20 years of age. The greatest number of oboegaki were written by these old men who had been young soldiers serving closely under Yoshihiro and Tadatsune and witnessing them in action. Given their youth and the gap between events and recording, it was not uncommon for discrepancies to occur between different observers of the same events. To take an example, in 1598, It ō Gentaku crossed the channel to Korea to enter

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the services of Shimazu Tadatsune at the age of fourteen, engaging in such tasks as taking drinking water to his lord and carrying his lord’s spare sword. Some time before 1660, he was approached by Shimazu Hisamichi to describe the second Korean invasion in writing. The extant Izumi shū ch ū It ō Gentaku m ō shide was the outcome. 6 After reading Oku Sekisuke oboegaki in 1660, however, Gentaku realized that there were a number of discrepancies between his description of the war and Sekisuke’s description, and he produced a revised version, dated the seventh day of the eleventh month (in 1660). This revised work is longer than the fi rst work and is found in volume 43 of theSappan 112 Murai Shōsuke kyū ki zatsuroku k ō hen (The Sequel to the Miscellaneous Ancient Records of Satsuma domain) under a different title, It ō Iki ny ū d ō Gentaku oboegaki (The Memoir of a Lay Iki Priest, It ō Gentaku). In 1664, Itō Gentaku also wrote It ō Gentaku yuishogaki (It ō Gentaku’s Writings on Historic Matters). Since 1999, I have been engaged in the task of locating such historical documents as the Shimazu clan oboegaki. The majority of the documents are held in the following three libraries: the Kagoshima University Library, Tamazato Collection (the entire collection was bequeathed to the university by the Shimazu family who had kept the documents at their Tamazato residence); the Historiographical Institute at the University of T ō ky ō , where the most important documents related to the Shimazu clan are found; and the Kagoshima Prefectural Library, where archivists collect materials related to Kagoshima prefecture.

Introducing Oku Sekisuke oboegaki Many documents can be classifi ed under the heading oboegaki , but in reality very few are truly representative of the oboegaki form in terms of the length of the document. Of the seventy or so that I have located, I consider only about fi ve to qualify fully as oboegaki : the three written by Itō Gentaku – Izumi sh ūch ū It ō Gentaku m ō shide , It ō Iki ny ū d ō oboegaki, and It ō Gentaku yuishogaki ; Oku Sekisuke’s Oku Sekisuke oboegaki ; and Fuchinobe Kazuemon’s Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki . 7 Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki is contained in Zoku gunsho ruij ū under the title Shimazuke Kō raijin hiroku . Itō Iki ny ū d ō oboegaki , included in Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku k ō hen, was typeset and included in the Kagoshima-ken shiryō compilation. Izumi shū ch ū It ō Gentaku mō shide has been introduced in an earlier study. 8 Although it still awaits typesetting, it is plausible to think that Oku Sekisuke oboegaki, which has the highest number of extant manuscript copies, was widely read at the time. 9 Oku Sekisuke oboegaki and K ō rai nikki, listed sep- arately in Kokusho s ō mokuroku (The Comprehensive Catalogue of Japanese Publications), are, in fact, the same document under different titles. It appears that the story of the tiger hunt, which appears in the fi rst half of Oku’s memoir, aroused particular interest. This was excerpted and published as a separate book by Tamazato Bunko under the title, Toragari no ki. The Shimazu family at Miyakonojō owns a folding screen with a painting of scenes from

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the tiger hunt story. There is insuffi cient space to introduce Toragari no ki in its entirety, so I will restrict myself to presenting a section, not included elsewhere, that I feel best portrays the character of Oku’s writing.

Excerpts from Toragari no ki … Later on, orders came from Kyoto assigning certain daimy ō to take part in the tiger hunt. Lord Shimazu was one of those who were chosen. He immediately set sail from Karashima [Kŏ je Island] and participated in the Post-war domain source material 113 hunt at a place called Ch’angwŏ n in the Akaguni [“Red Country,” or Ch ŏ lla Province]. Two tigers were caught that day. The story goes that earlier in the morning, a tiger had appeared, out of the blue, at the hunting lodge where Yasuda Jirobee, an attendant of Shimazu Moriemon, was keeping a watch. Unable to escape, Jirobee placed his hand on his two-shaku , nine-sun -long [approx. 0.88 m] sword at his waist. Just at that moment, the tiger pounced on him and Jirobee plunged his sword into the tiger’s chest, missing the heart. The tiger collapsed on the ground with the sword half embedded in its torso. Just then, the two lords [Shimazu] Yoshihiro and Tadatsune happened to pass by on horseback. Lord Yoshihiro saw the tiger and barked out an order, “What’s happened here?” Lord Tadatsune, still on horseback, went nearer to observe the scene. Beppu Toneri and Oku Sekisuke were, once again, their footmen on that occasion. Lord Tadatsune asked Yasuda Jirobee directly to give him a detailed description of the ordeal. When he heard how Jirobee defended himself from the attacking tiger, Lord Tadatsune said, “If what you say is true, it is quite a deed!” and presented Jirobee with his own superb Bizen Kanemitsu sword, two shaku and fi ve sun long [approx. 0.75 m], a prized Shimazu family treasure. This is what happened on the plain. The two lords proceeded with their journey through a fi eld that seemed to stretch forever. Just then, a group of watchmen approached them with the news of a tiger lurking in the mountain ahead. The two lords asked, “Are you quite certain of that?” and the watchmen answered, “Yes, we are certain.” The two lords then asked, “Will the tiger emerge?” and one by one they said, “It has not yet come out.” The tiger was hiding somewhere among the three or four rocky summits that were visible from where they were. Letting the watchmen take the lead, men of both high and low status approached the mountains and scattered all over, encircling the area. The tiger was hiding in the tallest of the mountains. Staying on the plain, the two lords positioned themselves on horseback about twenty-three ken [approx. 42 m] from the foot of the mountain, and between twelve to thirteen ken [approx. 22–4 m] from where the watchmen were. The sky that day was shrouded in white clouds, and rain fell intermittently. The tall mountain was covered with withered pampas grass, dotted here and there with red pines. It was a mountain full of summer trees, with chestnut, cherry, and sumac. Lord Yoshihiro sent a swift courier with the message, “If you let the tiger escape because you were distracted by the deer, my two guards will slit your stomachs open.” The courier came run-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ning back saying, “I have communicated your wishes fi rmly to every single one of them.” Lord Yoshihiro then said sternly, “Knowing what people are like in Satsuma, I am almost certain that they will be too absorbed by the deer to keep an eye out for the tiger. That’s why I sent you. Now, go and tell the archers to leave their bows unstrung and the gunmen to leave their fuse cords unlit. Don’t come back until you have carried out this task thoroughly.” After two or three hours, the messenger returned. He said, breathless from running, “I have communicated your wishes to each and every one of them.” Then Lord Yoshihiro said, 114 Murai Shōsuke “The rain is probably keeping the tiger from emerging. It is approaching dusk now, so go and tell them to leave their positions and go into the mountain.” The two messengers who were dispatched came back after a while and said, “We have communicated your wishes to each and every one of them.” They waited for quite a long time but no one left their position and went into the mountain. This made Lord Yoshihiro very angry and he said, “In the old days, a samurai was prepared to die in the name of duty before his master’s very eyes!” Lord Tadatsune, equally irate, added, “We have so many men at our disposal, but no one dares to venture into the mountain. What accounts for this display of disobedience when both my father and I are here watching!” An attendant called Ueno Gon’emon was holding the right harness of Lord Tadatsune’s horse. Lord Tadatsune addressed Gon’emon directly, “Gon’emon, you go and fl ush out the tiger.” Gon’emon answered, “Your wish is my command,” and abandoned the harness. Walking away from the two lords to their right, he climbed the mountain behind a few watchmen. About two-thirds of the way up, he walked across a fi eld for twelve to thirteenken [approx. 22–4 m]. To those watching from below, Gon’emon’s fi gure disappeared into the fi eld. Gon’emon entered a vast withered fi eld of tall pampas grass. Everyone who waited down below, from lord to valet, saw the movement of the pampas grass as Gon’emon waded through it. When he had progressed about twelve to thirteen ken , the tiger, perched on top of a summit, spotted Gon’emon and howled. Everyone was completely dumbstruck as if the earth had moved. With one giant leap, the tiger pounced on Gon’emon and bit him to death. The tiger threw Gon’emon’s body about two to three hiro [approx. 3.6–5.4 m] up in the air, from where it fell to the ground. The tiger then sprang back up to the summit where it had originally stood. The tiger must have made a leap of at least a hundred ken [180 m] when he pounced on Gon’emon. The troops said to each other, “It couldn’t have been less than that.” Was the tiger injured by Gon’emon? A vertical cut about 3 sun long [approx. 9 cm] stretched above the center of the tiger’s right eye. Stealing the moment when the tiger was suffering from pain, fi rst Ch ō sa Rokushichi and then Fukunaga Sukejū r ō and Nagano Rokub ē pounced on the tiger and managed to hold it down and stab it to death. Chō sa Rokushichi was bitten on his thighs and acquired four teeth marks from which ran not Rokushichi’s own blood, but the tiger’s saliva. Rokushichi was carried down and presented to the two lords, while twelve or thirteen men carried in the dead tiger. The

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 men reported to the two lords, “An inspection of Gon’emon’s corpse confi rms that he was ravaged by the tiger.” Continuing, they said, “We found only an empty sheath on Gon’emon’s waist; there was no sword.” Ch ō sa Rokushichi died that evening on board ship. Both tigers were skinned and gutted, their insides packed with salt, and their skins stretched back on the bodies before they were shipped off to Kyō to. Not many mountains could rival in magnitude the north-facing mountains that the tigers had inhabited. The story of the two lords and their tiger hunt spread throughout the three countries [of China, Korea, and Japan]. Post-war domain source material 115 In the following year [1597], the two lords left their camp at Kad ŏk Island to advance to a camp on the mainland. They landed at the Hadong River in the Akaguni [Chŏ lla Province], thirty-odd ri [approx. 118 km 10 ] from Namw ŏ n. That day, they covered roughly eight to nine ri [31–5 km] before reaching a place called Hadong and both lords set up camp there that evening. Three days had elapsed when they received a messenger from Shimazu Nakatsukasa reporting, “Resistance has broken out at Namwŏ n city and daimy ō from near and far are all joining in the attack. Come quickly.” The two lords set off the following day, crossing treacherous mountains and advancing as much as fourteen to fi fteen ri [55–9 km] daily. This gave glory to the troops. Namw ŏ n fell on the fi fteenth day of the eighth month at the eighth hour, three days after the arrival of the two lords. Enemy soldiers plummeted from the castle walls down in front of the Japanese camp, and the soldiers of the Shimazu forces cut down every one of them. That evening, when they counted the number of heads they had amassed, it came to just over four hundred and thirty. After the fall of the city, each daimy ō followed the instructions given to them, and they either advanced to the front or returned to their previous positions. After two days, the two lords reached Ch ŏnju. They had been there for fi ve days when a directive was delivered from the Bizen Ch ū nagon [Lord Ukita Hideie] that said, “Thirty men of ranks high and low have gathered here all professing to be the best swordsman in the world. Please come and observe their skills.” They went to watch a runner being cut down. The swordsmen slashed away hoping to get a sword as a reward from the two [Shimazu] lords. They left camp the following day to advance inland. After four days, they reached the ruined city walls of Haenam. There they stayed for three days before they broke camp once again, this time to cross into the Aoguni [“Blue Country,” or Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng Province]. They reached an exceptionally wide river, which they crossed in a ferry to Hansan. Four or fi ve days later, they reached the city walls of Sŏ ch’ ŏn, which was on the south-facing coast. There they stayed for eight to nine days. S ŏ ch’ ŏn city walls encompassed one square ri [3.9 square km] in size. Life within its boundary seemed very secure, and many houses had their roofs covered with tiles. The two lords took up residence there and clan members high and low also garrisoned there. Within the complex, there were seven

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tile-roofed storehouses, all of which were twelve to thirteen ken [22–4 m] in size. The fi rst storehouse was packed tightly with woven straw sacks containing fl our, so much so that the eaves creaked and a person could not squeeze through its two doors. The second storehouse was equally full, but with casks and bottles containing sesame oil. The third and fourth storehouses were so packed with casks and bottles of bees’ honey that the eaves squeaked. The fi fth storehouse was packed with straw bags containing huge salted fi sh seven to eight shaku [2.1–2.4 m] long. The sixth storehouse was crammed with bags of salt. The seventh storehouse contained bags of superior, white rice, crammed 116 Murai Shōsuke in enough to split the eaves apart. Inside the city walls they also reared goats, sheep, pigs, and chickens. Because there were no prohibitions to stop them, men of all ranks helped themselves to what they liked. They retraced their route back to Haenam and set up camp in the ruined city. They stayed there for thirty to forty days. Seven to eight hundred wooden plaques, seven to eight bu [2.1–2.4 cm] in width by eight sun [24 cm] in length, were produced using cypress. Inscribed on the front was the name “Shimazu Sagami,” and on the back was the date. Seven to eight interpreters went to the foot of the mountain to hand out the wooden plaques to the local people. As a result, seven to eight hundred sarumi [Koreans] came down the mountain with their wives and children to show their support. They laid out paddy fi elds in Haenam and took in a harvest. Nine plaster-walled storehouses, seven to eight ken [12.7–14.5 m] in size, were built within the city walls and bags of rice were stored there. Time fl ew by. There was a settlement one ri [3.9 km] away from Haenam that had a population of one hundred and fi fty or sixty men and women. Despite possessing the aforementioned wooden plaques, they remained where they were in idle seclusion. Messengers were sent regularly suggesting that they erect a storehouse and store their harvest there, but the villagers never appeared before the two lords. The messengers were tenacious, going fi ve times, only to be lied to by the villagers who never came to pay their respects. On their fi fth visit they were told by the villagers, “We will defi nitely make an appearance before the lords tomorrow.” The lords waited but the villagers never came, showing their disrespect. Naturally, this made Lord Tadatsune very angry. He left alone for Lord Yoshihiro’s camp, leaving Toneri and Sekisuke trailing behind him. Lord Tadatsune told his father exactly what had happened. Lord Yoshihiro’s response was, “It is deplorable, as you say, but I suggest you send one more messenger and if that has no effect, then it would be absolutely right to punish them.” When Lord Tadatsune returned to his camp, he dispatched a messenger and an interpreter. The villagers fi rmly replied once again saying, “We will defi nitely present our humble selves before you tomorrow.” He waited till the following day, but they still had not appeared when the seventh hour came. Lord Tadatsune became even more furious at their lying. He went to Lord Yoshihiro’s camp once again and complained bitterly. When he heard his son’s story, Lord Yoshihiro said, “That is unforgivable behavior. Have them cut down immediately.” Lord Tadatsune returned to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 his camp and said, “I don’t need any horsemen, but I will take thirty or so soldiers with me.” They set off from camp at the seventh hour the following morning. Dawn broke when they were just three ch ō [approx. 327 m] away from the village. When they saw Tadatsune approaching their village with his soldiers, women and children scattered into the mountains behind the village, like white herons fl ying away. Lord Tadatsune observed this scene from horseback. Realizing that he and his army had already been spotted, he shouted an order, “If you attack them without my command, I will punish you.” When Tadatsune was Post-war domain source material 117 two chō or so [approx. 218 m] away from the village, ten men appeared to greet them. The one who looked like an offi cial dressed all in black prostrated himself at the front, groveling and twitching. The rest followed suit fi ve or six ken [9–11 m] behind him. As soon as Lord Tadatsune’s horse came abreast of the man, the Lord swiftly dismounted and in one motion unsheathed his sword and cut him in half, slashing aslant across the shoulder. When Lord Tadatsune saw the remaining eight or nine men fl eeing in all directions from this sight, we were given the order to “cut them down quickly!” All nine were put to death on the spot. Then Lord Tadatsune proceeded into the village on horseback where he issued an order to kill the entire male population; fi fty-three were executed. He did not, however, permit the killing of women or children. Strictly enforcing the law from that morning, he then departed for his lodgings.

Notes Translated by Nakajima Sanae and Rachel Payne with James B. Lewis. 1 A research team that includes Kitajima Manji and myself have produced an index to historical sources in Taigai kankeishi s ō g ō nenpy ō. References are indicated for all materials. 2 Kitajima, Chō sen hinikki , 1982, p. 356. 3 Murai, “Shimazu shiry ō ,” 2000, p. 25. 4 Ofumidokoro was Satsuma domain’s editorial bureau for historical matters. 5 This oboegaki, the only one to be typeset, is found in Zoku gunsho ruijū (in the section on battles) under the title Shimazuke K ō raigun hiroku. There are, however, errors in the text such as using the wrong Chinese characters for the author’s given name (Ch ūuemon instead of Ry ōuemon), but because the attached title does not refl ect the content accurately, regrettably, it has not been adequately exploited as a historical source. 6 Murai, “Shimazu shiry ō ,” 2000. 7 See Document List I for the locations of these oboegaki . 8 Murai, “Shimazu shiry ō ,” 2000. 9 Document List II shows the documents whose location has been confi rmed in the course of my research. Documents marked with * are noted in the Kokusho S ō mokuroku . 10 Translator’s note: Distances have been calculated according to a Japanese ri or 3.927 km per ri .

References Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kitajima Manji ( 北島万次 ). Chō sen hinikki, Kō rai nikki: Hideyoshi no Ch ō sen shinryaku to sono rekishiteki kokuhatsu (朝鮮日々記ٜ高麗日記 : 秀吉の朝鮮侵略とその歴史的告発 ). T ō ky ō : Soshiete-kan , 1982 . Murai Sh ō suke ( 村井章介 ). “ Shimazu shiry ō kara mita Sach’ ŏ n (J. Shisen) no tatakai ( 島津史料からみた泗川の戦い ) ,” Rekishigaku kenkyū ( 歴史学研究 ) 736 ( 2000 ): 25 . Taigai kankeishi s ō g ō nenpy ō hensh ū iinkai , ed. ( 対外関係史総合年表編集委員会編 ). Taigai kankeishi sō g ō nenpy ō ( 対外関係史総合年表 ). Tō ky ō : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan- kan , 1999 . 118 Murai Shōsuke Document list I A. Kagoshima Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan, Tamazato Bunko ( 鹿児島大学附属図書館玉里文庫 ). I. 『諸旧記S上』所収天－５仁 /92/1 ( Shokyū ki , j ō [catalogue: ten – 5in/92/1]). a. 淵辺量右衛門朝鮮陣覚書 ( 淵辺元真 , 万治２＝ 1659, 続群書類従本「島津家高麗軍秘録」 ) (Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki (Fuchinobe Motozane, Manji 2\1659, Zoku Gunsho Ruij ū bon, “Shimazu-ke Kō raigun Hiroku”)). b . 出水衆中伊東玄宅申出 ( 万治３＝ 1660 以前) (Izumi shū ch ū Itō Gentaku m ō shide [pre Manji 3\1660]). c. 伊東玄宅由緒書 ( 寛文４＝ 1664) (It ō Gentaku yuishogaki [Kanbun 4\1664]). II. 『有馬原城覚書他七部合本』所収天－５仁／ 85–91 ( Arima Haraj ō oboegaki hoka shichibu gappon [catalogue: ten – 5shin/85–91]). a. 虎狩之記 ( 「奥関助覚書」の抜粋) (Toragari no ki [extract from “Oku Sekisuke oboegaki”]). B . T ō ky ō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo ( 東京大学史料編纂所 ). I. 写本 ዘ謄写本 (Shahon/t ō shabon). a. 高麗日記 ( 「奥関助覚書」に同じ , 都城島津家本) 2040.5/48 (Kō rai nikki [same as “Oku Sekisuke oboegaki,” Miyakonoj ō Shimazuke-bon] 2040.5/48). b . 朝鮮軍覚書 ( 「淵辺量右衛門覚書」に同じ , 都城島津家本 ) 2040.5/53 (Ch ō sengun oboegaki [same as “Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki,” Miyakonoj ō Shimazuke- bon] 2040.5/53). II. 『群書合輯』第６冊所収島津家本さ I-12-33-323-(6) (Gunsho gassh ū, issue 6, Shimazu-ke hon sa I-12-33-323-(6)). a. 玄宅由緒書并高麗入覚書 ( 「伊東玄宅由緒書」に同じ) (Gentaku yuishogaki narabi ni K ō rai-iri oboegaki [same as “It ō Gentaku yuishogaki”]). III. 『旧典類聚』所収写本 4140.1/34 およびその転写本 2040.1/27 ( Kyū ten ruiju [shahon 4140.1/34; tenshabon 2040.1/27]). a. 奥関助覚書 ( 第５冊 ) Oku Sekisuke oboegaki (issue 5). IV. 『薩藩旧記雑録後編』所収 ( 『鹿児島県史料』旧記雑録後編 II ዘ III で活字化 ) ( Sappan ky ūki zatsuroku k ō hen [typeset as “Kagoshima-ken shiry ō ” ky ū ki zatsuroku k ō hen, vols. II and III]). a. 伊東壱岐入道覚書 III-639 (It ō Iki ny ū d ō oboegaki III-639). C. Kagoshima Kenritsu Toshokan (鹿児島県立図書館 ). I. 『古雑史』所収 ( 福島家旧蔵本) 9410043085 (Kozatsushi (Fukushimake kyū z ō bon) 9410043085). a. 奥関介高麗陣覚書之事 ( 「奥関助覚書」に同じ ) (Oku Sekisuke K ō raijin oboegaki no koto [same as “Oku Sekisuke oboegaki”]). b . 其 ( 玄 ) 宅由緒書并高麗入覚書 ( 「伊東玄宅由緒書」に同じ ) ([Gen]taku yuisho

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 narabi ni K ō rai iri oboegaki [same as “It ō Gentaku yuishogaki”]). II. 『高麗入并虎狩奥関助覚書』 (福島家旧蔵本, 「奥関助覚書」に同じ ) 9410022475 (K ō rai iri narabi ni toragari Oku Sekisuke oboegaki [Fukushimake ky ūz ō bon, same as “Oku Sekisuke oboegaki”] 9410022475). III. 『高麗軍覚』 (福島家旧蔵本, 「淵辺量右衛門覚書」に同じ ) 9410064152 (K ō raigun oboe [Fukushimake ky ūz ō bon, same as “Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki”] 9410064152). Post-war domain source material 119 Document list II Documents marked with * ̪ are noted in the Kokusho S ō mokuroku . (1) 都城島津家所蔵「高麗日記」 ( 東京大学史料編纂所 ̪ ዘ京都大学文学部図書室 ̪ に謄写本がある ). K ō rai Nikki in the possession of the Miyakonojō Shimazu family; copies held at Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* and Kyoto Daigaku Bungakubu Toshoshitsu.* (2) 鹿児島大学附属図書館玉里文庫所蔵「奥関助覚書」 (『諸旧記』上所収 ). Oku Sekisuke Oboegaki in the Shoky ū ki, preserved in Kagoshima Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan Tamazato Bunko. (3) 同所蔵「虎狩の記」 (『有馬原城覚書他七部合本』所収 . Toragari no ki , held at Kagoshima Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan Tamazato Bunko in Arima Haraj ō oboegaki hoka nanabu gappon , extract from item (2) of the passages extending from Tadatsune’s arrival in the capital to his tiger-hunting expedition in Korea. (4) 鹿児島県立図書館所蔵「高麗入并虎狩奥関助覚書」 ( 福島虎嘯旧蔵本 ) ̪ . K ō rai iri narabi ni toragari Oku Sekisuke oboegaki , held at Kagoshima Kenritsu Toshokan in the Fukushima Kosh ō Ky ū z ō bon .* (5) 同所蔵「高麗陣奥関助入道休安覚書之事」 ( 『古雑史』所収 ) ̪ . Kō raijin Oku Sekisuke ny ū d ō Ky ūan oboegaki no koto, held at Kagoshima Kenritsu Toshokan in the Kozasshi .* (6) 同所蔵「奥関助覚書」 (『朝鮮役及関ヶ原役ニ於ケル井上主膳覚書外二十六名申出聞書自記日記上申状』所収 . Oku Sekisuke oboegaki, held at Kagoshima Kenritsu Toshokan in the Ch ōsen Eki oyobi Sekigahara eki ni okeru Inoue Shuzen oboegaki no hoka 26 mei m ōshide kikigaki jiki nikki j ō shinj ō. This is a revised version of item (2) with the inclusion of katakana usage. (7) 東京大学史料編纂所所蔵「奥関助覚書」 (『旧典類聚』巻５所収 ) ̪ . Oku Sekisuke oboegaki , held at Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo in Ky ū ten ruij ū (Vol. 5).* (8) 「奥関輔入道差出書」 (『碩田叢史』巻 12 所収 ) ̪ . Oku Sekisuke ny ū d ō sashidashigaki, in Sekiden s ō shi (Vol. 12).* (9) 京都大学附属図書館所蔵「奥関助入道休安覚書」 ( 『橘園叢書』巻 56 所収 ) ̪ . Oku Sekisuke ny ū d ō Ky ū an oboegaki , at Kyoto Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan in Tachibanaen s ō sho (Vol. 56).* (10) 同所蔵「奥関輔入道差出書」『 ( 碩田叢史』巻 12 所収 )̪ . Oku Sekisuke ny ū d ō sashidashigaki , at Kyoto Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan in Sekiden s ō shi (Vol. 12).* (11) お茶の水図書館成簣堂文庫所蔵 ( 書名未確認 )̪ . Title unconfi rmed, held at Ochanomizu Toshokan Seikid ō Bunko.*

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 7 The role of the Chosŏ n navy and major naval battles during the Imjin Waeran

Yi Min’ung ( 蝗敏雄 )

Introduction Japan started the Imjin Waeran in the fourth month of 1592 by invading Chosŏ n with the ultimate motive of conquering Ming China and thereby launched an international war in Northeast Asia. The invasion posed the greatest national crisis for a country that had become accustomed to peace over the previous two centuries. Due to the lack of defensive preparations, Chosŏ n suffered successive defeats on land in the early phase of the war, including the fall of the capital city. However, in the wake of resistance by volunteer guerrilla armies across the country and the naval victories successfully orchestrated by Yi Sunshin, Chosŏ n managed to turn the situation around and eventually defeat the Japanese. Research on the Imjin Waeran in Korea, inaugurated by scholars such as Han Ugŭ n and Ch’oe Yŏ ngh ŭ i in the 1950s, has seen the publication of over 300 articles and over 150 books. As the volume steadily rose, Yi Changhŭ i and others surveyed the history of research on the Imjin Waeran conducted from the 1970s to 2000.1 Yet, among those works surveyed, histories of naval battles are relatively scarce and those that are included suffer methodological problems. The main problem is that they pay undue attention to the person of Yi Sunshin at the cost of ignoring the naval battles themselves. Undoubtedly a hero makes history, but history also makes a hero. It is my belief that a great man or woman is, after all, a creature of their historical circumstance. For this reason, research on Yi Sunshin cannot be done properly unless it is fi rst grounded on a thorough historical analysis of the period. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Korean scholars are not an exception to the oft-observed pattern that people have tended to look at victorious battles and ignore the failures. Or some naval battles, deserving attention for their scope and military signifi - cance alone, have however failed to attract careful analysis of the historical circumstances and their implications. For example, there has not even been a devoted study of the Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang battle in the early days of the 1597 invasion in which Japan infl icted a fatal blow on the Chosŏ n navy, nor has there been extensive research on the battles at My ŏ ngnyang or Noryang. The role of the Chosŏn navy 121 Refl ecting on such limitations, this chapter aims at surveying the background, the conduct, and the historical signifi cance of naval battles during the Imjin Waeran. For this purpose it looks into the entire period of the Imjin Waeran and examines each naval battle within the fl ow of the war. I will eschew the existing approaches marked by extolling individual heroism and patriotic martyrdom and instead try to throw light on the objective reality of the war. I will refer to existing studies on naval combat, where necessary, but I will also explore topics that have received little attention. For convenience, I divide the Imjin Waeran into three periods: the early phase (1592–1593.4); the peace negotiation phase (1593.5–1596); and the second invasion and end of the war (1597–8). Each of the following parts of the chapter corresponds to these periods. The second section examines the major naval engagements during the early phase of the invasion; the third examines the activities of both naval powers during the peace negotiations. The fourth section examines the background, the process, and the historical implications of major battles such as those at Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang, My ŏ ngnyang, and Noryang during the second invasion.

Naval battles in the early phase of the Imjin Waeran (1592) Continuous invasions of Chos ŏn’s southern regions by Japanese pirates from the end of Kory ŏ until the early Chosŏ n period provided momentum for the systematic development of a navy. During the fi rst century of Chosŏ n the navy secured special favor from the kings, who strengthened it as an aspect of national security. Such policies included the dispatch of a naval commander- in-chief (K. sugun chŏ ltosa ) to each province to prepare a unifi ed naval organization and take command of warships and sailors. At the same time, all battleships in Chosŏ n were unifi ed and categorized into small, medium, and large with specifi cations for the crew size and the kinds of weapons to be installed on each ship.2 There are two crucial aspects in an account of the Chosŏ n navy during the early period: the development of fi rearms and the appearance of thep’anoks ŏ n battleship. Recognition of the importance of fi rearms and their development began from the time of King T’aejong (r. 1400–18). The king laid the foundation for fi rearm development by appointing Ch’oe Haesan, one of Ch’oe Musŏ n’s sons, and establishing the Offi ce for the Manufacture and Control

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of Gunpowder (K. Hwayak kamjoch’ŏ ng). Inheriting King T’aejong’s policy of a strong defense, King Sejong also made signifi cant contributions to the development of fi rearms. Of particular importance under Sejong were the expansion of gunpowder production and the improvement of its performance. However, from the reign of King Sejo, progress and retreat alternated. A Japanese pirate raid of 1555 ( Ŭ lmyo Waeby ŏ n ), in the tenth year of King My ŏngjong’s reign, spurred the casting of large guns (K. ch’ongt’ong ) with the marks: heaven, earth, black, and yellow. Hŏ S ŏ ndo estimates that by 1563 122 Yi Min’ung more than 100,000 k ŭ n (about 60,000 kg) of copper had been consumed for this purpose.3 The 1555 pirate incident was a critical point for the development of the p’anoks ŏ n battleship. The existing battleship designs (K. maengs ŏ n ) were abandoned and the p’anoks ŏ n design adopted, because of the appearance of newly enlarged Japanese ships fortifi ed with added panels around the exter- ior. These panels drastically reduced the impact of cannon fi re from Chosŏ n battleships. P’anoks ŏ n were distinctive in that, while retaining the structure of existing fl atboat design (K.p’y ŏ ngj ŏ s ŏ n ), the ship itself was fortifi ed by the use of thick planks and was double-decked for the separation of combat soldiers from non-combatants. Turning from the Chosŏ n navy, we should consider the Japanese case on the eve of the invasion. This issue requires a survey of Japanese pirates, out of which the Japanese navy arose. The Waegu , who had infl icted great harm on Chos ŏn and Ming in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, are essential to the history of the Japanese navy at the end of the sixteenth century. The evolution of one from the other is hinted at in the constitution of the Japanese navy that fought during the Imjin Waeran. The pirate bands of the Sengoku period either had come under direct control of Toyotomi Hideyoshi or became the navies or direct vassals (J. kashin ) under the command of regional daimy ō .4 Because of this two-tier structure, Japan did not possess a national, systematic, naval organization at the time of the Imjin Waeran and could not advance beyond ad-hoc fl eets patched together as the need arose. Japan deployed two types of military ships during the Imjin Waeran, the atakebune and the sekibune . The differences in these two vessels were the size and whether or not they had a multi-storied command post on the deck. Both types possessed v-shaped hulls, used thin, cedar planking, and were struc- turally weaker than the p’anoks ŏ n . 5 Atakebune, the larger of the two, had a distinctive two- or three-story building, which became a primary target of the p’anoks ŏ n cannon in battles. The arquebus, fi rst introduced to Japan in 1543, spread rapidly and by the end of the 1570s was being used at sea as well. However, the shot was unable to penetrate the thick p’anoks ŏ n panels and thus posed no serious threat to seamen, unlike the land battles.6 From the start of the invasion on the thirteenth day of the fourth month of 1592, the Japanese navy concentrated on the transportation of armies

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 and supplies rather than seeking direct engagements with the Chosŏ n navy. Continuous victories on land and a withdrawal from naval combat may explain the avoidance of engagement, but a more likely reason is the absence of any overall plan geared to defeating Chosŏ n’s naval power and securing mastery of the seas. Japanese naval forces showed no particular interest in further campaigns after capturing the Left Naval Command of Kyŏ ngsang Province (K. Ky ŏ ngsang chwasuy ŏ ng) and adjacent military installations. For a period of more than two weeks, Wŏ n Kyun, the Right Naval Commander of Kyŏ ngsang Province (K. Ky ŏ ngsang ususa), was able to report the situation to The role of the Chosŏn navy 123 the court and request reinforcements. Yi Sunshin, the Left Naval Commander of Ch ŏlla Province (K. Ch ŏ lla chwasusa), was able to rally and put order into the ranks of the naval forces under his command.7 Chos ŏ n’s fi rst naval campaign was led by the forces of the Chŏ lla Left Naval Command under the direction of Yi Sunshin and began on the fourth day of the fi fth month, some twenty days after the start of the war. It consisted of three consecutive battles at Ok-p’o and Hap-p’o (Ok Harbor and Hap Harbor, both on the seventh day, fi fth month), and Chŏ kchin-p’o (eighth day). Yi’s fl eet, at Wŏ n’s repeated requests for urgent support, received permission from the court to engage the Japanese navy and set out to war with twenty-four battleships. In the very fi rst encounter on the waters off Ok-p’o he destroyed a small fl eet of twenty Japanese ships and thus started off with a victory. In the afternoon on the same day, he sank fi ve ships at Hap-p’o, and the next morning a further thirteen ships at Ch ŏ kchin-p’o.8 I wish to take this opportunity to correct a widely circulated error in the scholarship. The Hap-p’o battle and the Chŏ kchin-p’o battle were not fought off present-day Hap-p’o, Masan City, South Kyŏ ngsang Province or Chŏ kt ŏ k, Kwangdomyŏ n, T’ongy ŏng City, as has been traditionally believed, but near Hapkae Village, Wŏ np’o-dong, Chinhae City, and Kudang village, Kŏ ryu- my ŏn, in Kosŏ ng County. 9 After he defeated over forty ships in three battles, Yi Sunshin’s fl eet returned to the base of the Chŏ lla Left Naval Command on the ninth day of the fi fth month. Intelligence information that the Japanese were about to attack Ch ŏ lla Province in a joint land–sea maneuver led the Chos ŏn navy to open a second campaign that lasted continuously for eleven days between the twenty-ninth day of the fi fth month and the tenth day of the sixth month. Altogether the navy fought four battles at Sach’ ŏn (twenty-ninth day, fi fth month), Tang-p’o (fi rst day, sixth month), Tanghang-p’o (fi fth day, sixth month), and Yul-p’o (seventh day, sixth month). In these encounters, just as in the fi rst campaign, the Chos ŏn navy faced small numbers of Japanese ships. In the fi rst battle at Sach’ ŏn, Yi was shot in the shoulder, but he managed to sink thirteen Japanese ships. At Sach’ ŏn, the k ŏ buks ŏ n (turtle ship) was put into action for the fi rst time. On the next day at the Battle of Tang-p’o, in which Yi’s fl eet again took a decisive role, twenty Japanese ships were sunk. On the fourth day of the sixth month, the day before the third Tanghang- p’o battle, the fl eet led by Yi Ŏ kki, the Right Naval Commander of Chŏ lla

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Province (K. Ch ŏ lla ususa ), joined with Yi Sunshin’s fl eet, thereby doub- ling the latter’s military strength. The next day, the combined fl eet lured the Japanese ships anchored at Tanghang-p’o into a trap and destroyed twenty- six ships at sea. On the seventh day the combined fl eet pursued and sank seven ships in the sea near Yul-p’o. In the end the second campaign saw continuous success in destroying Japan’s small fl eets with the number of sunken ships totaling sixty-seven. 10 The second campaign has important implications from the perspective of military tactics: that is, for the fi rst time the Left and Right Naval Commands of Ch ŏ lla Province and the Right Naval Command Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Table 7.1 Sea battles of 1592

Campaign Name of Date Place Comparative force Japanese Chos ŏ n victory Notes Battle (1592) deployment commander’s results affi liation Chos ŏ n Japan Warships People, etc. 1 Battle of Ok 5. 7 K ŏ je Island Warships: 28 30 ships T ō d ō Takatora Large ships: 13, Many Complete Harbor and Ok Assisting and Medium ships: casualties victory at the Harbor bay ships: 17 Horinouchi 6 and others, beginning Ujiyoshi Total: 26 ships of the war, Kyŏ ngsang Province Right [Naval Command] destroyed 5 ships Battle of 5.7 Ungch ŏ n and Same 5 ships Unknown Large ships: 4, Many Japanese ships Hap Hap Harbor Small ships: casualties escaped, battle Harbor 1, Destroyed of pursuit and by fi re attack Battle of 5.8 Kos ŏ ng and Same 13 ships Unknown Large ships: 9, Grains Altogether 44 Ch ŏ kchin Tangdong Medium ships: captured ships destroyed Harbor Bay 2 and others, by fi re Total: 13 ships Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

2 Battle of 5.29 Sea off Sach’ ŏ n Warships: 26 13 ships Unknown Large ships: 12, Many k ŏ buks ŏ n Sach’ ŏ n Assisting Others: 1, casualties (turtle boat) ships: 20 Total: 13 ships participated (est.) in battle, Yi Sunshin wounded Battle of 6.1 Sea off Tang Same 21 ships Kamei Shigenori Large ships: 9, Many Tang Harbor Medium ships: casualties Harbor 12, Total: 21 ships Battle of 6.5 Harbor Warships: 51 26 ships Kato Kiyomasa’s Large ships: 9, 43 heads Lured the enemy Tanghang entrance to Assisting navy Medium ships: taken into battle, Harbor Tanghang ships: 50 4 and others, and many combined fl eet Harbor (est.) Total: 26 ships casualties took shape Battle of Yul 6.7 Near sea off Same 7 ships Kitajima Large ships: 5, Enemy Altogether 67 Harbor Yul Harbor T ō shiaki Medium ships: general ships destroyed 2 and others, killed by fi re Total: 7 ships and many casualties 3 Great victory 7.8 In the waters Warships: 59 73 ships Wakisaka Large ships: 35, More than Wakisaka of Hansan around Assisting Yasuharu Medium ships: 340 heads Yasuharu Island Hansan ships: 50 17 and others, taken and 14 ships Island (est.) Total: 59 ships and many escaped casualties Battle of 7.10 Harbor entrance Same 42 ships Kuki Yoshitaka More than 20 Many Altogether 79 Angol to Angol and Kat ō ships destroyed casualties ships destroyed Harbor Harbor Yoshiaki by fi re by fi re 4 Battle of 9.1 In the region Warships: 81 Mor e than Japanese Main More than 30 Many Altogether, more Pusan of Pusan Assisting 470 Squadron Ships, More casualties than 130 ships Harbor Harbor ships: large than 100 destroyed more than and destroyed by 92 small fi re ships

Sources: Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o ; Yi Hyŏ ngs ŏ k, Imjin ch ŏ llansa , 1967. 126 Yi Min’ung of Ky ŏngsang Province formed a combined fl eet that proved highly successful in the subsequent two battles. The fl eet chased the Japanese navy from Ch ŏlla’s seas as far as the waters off Kyŏ ngsang Province and sank their ships one by one. At the news of defeats in a row, Toyotomi Hideyoshi ordered his forces to attack the Chosŏ n navy. He directed the naval commanders Wakisaka Yasuharu (1554–1626), Kuki Yoshitaka (1542–1600), and Katō Yoshiaki (1563–1631), who had been fi ghting on land, to launch a naval campaign. The Chos ŏ n navy obtained this intelligence and moved to engage the enemy for a third campaign. The fi ght lasted for eight days between the sixth and the thirteenth day of the seventh month. The Battle of Hansan-do (Hansan island) that opened on the eighth day of the seventh month was, both in name and reality, a struggle between Chosŏ n’s largest combined fl eet and the elite of the Japanese navy. On this day, Yi avoided the narrow straights of Kyŏ nnaeryang and lured the Japanese into an open area of sea near Hansan island where he closed on Wakisaka Yasuharu’s large fl eet with the famous Crane Formation (K. hag’ikchin). Only ten or so Japanese ships managed to escape. More than sixty battleships perished in fl ame, and many thousands of sailors were killed.11 The Hansan-do success was followed by another victory on the tenth at Angol-p’o where a surprise attack by Yi’s combined fl eet destroyed twenty ships of the elite navy led by Kuki Yoshitaka and Kat ō Yoshiaki, the loss being roughly about half of their forces. No longer able to resist, the rest of the Japanese force fl ed before the dawn.12 The Battle of Hansan-do, one of the three great battles won by Chosŏ n during the Imjin Waeran, carried great import, because Chos ŏn’s forces now came to dominate the southern seas. After Hansan-do Hideyoshi ordered the Japanese navy to avoid direct engagement with the Chosŏ n navy and instead station itself in fortifi cations along the coast to defend important sea lanes. The fourth and the last sea campaign in the fi rst year of the war lasted for eight days between the twenty-fourth of the eighth month and the second of the ninth month. The most important encounter was the Battle of Pusan- p’o on the fi rst of the ninth month. It is important in the history of Chosŏ n naval warfare, since it was the only sea battle, out of the ten fought during the year, in which Chosŏ n attacked the Japanese naval base with relatively inferior fi repower.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In spite of the loss of Chŏ ng Un, one of Yi’s staff who was shot during the battle, Yi achieved an enormous victory in sinking over 100 ships in this one battle alone. As winter crept in, the two parties found naval operations impossible and rode at anchor for the duration of the season.13 The Chos ŏ n navy’s success in all ten battles during the Imjin year (1592) exercised a large infl uence over the course of the entire invasion. Sea victories compensated for land defeats. The Japanese army had advanced deep into the country, but Chosŏ n’s domination of the seas around the south coast frustrated Japan’s efforts to integrate naval and ground campaigns and The role of the Chosŏn navy 127 posed a serious threat to the sea-borne logistics that supported the Japanese land forces. Table 7.1 shows an outline of the sea battles in the fi rst year of the war.

The two navies during the period of peace negotiations (1593–6) With the dawn of a new year, the war situation saw drastic changes. It became even more international when Ming China joined the war. Chinese involvement triggered the start of a long and complicated peace process. The depletion of food in Chosŏ n forced the three parties to give up any further military engagement. The peace talks started in earnest from the fourth month of 1593. This was about the time when fi ghting went into a lull after the recovery of P’yŏ ngyang by the allied Chosŏ n–Ming forces and after the defeat of the Ming army at Py ŏ kchegwan. We need to look at the situation of the three countries briefl y. The war infl icted direct damage on Chos ŏn’s agriculture, which consequently led to a serious depletion of the grain stock. The crisis went beyond a food shortage for soldiers. It extended to under-nourishment and death from starvation for the civilian population together with the spread of infectious diseases. The predicament was aggravated by the need to feed the Ming army stationed in Chos ŏn prior to consumption by the people of Chosŏ n, which only reduced the already waning war capacity of the Chosŏ n forces. As for Japan, from the summer of 1592, the most urgent task was to maintain intact the long logistics lines that had been subject to threat by the rise of volunteer guerrilla armies and the victories of the Chosŏ n navy in the southern seas. Failure to supply food from the occupied areas also aggravated the situation, forcing its army to scale down consumption. Particularly, the defeat at P’y ŏngyang in the fi rst month of 1593 meant a considerable loss of troops, and the subsequent retreat from P’yŏ ngyang amidst the wintry cold and a food shortage infl icted more hardship. After that, the Japanese army assembled its forces in the capital at Hanyang and planned the next battle, but the failure to secure suffi cient provisions left the Japanese no option but to retreat further and engage in peace talks. The Ming army just managed to save its dignity by defeating Japan in P’y ŏ ngyang, but that achievement came at the expense of many elite soldiers among the casualties. Soon after the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang, the Ming forces

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 were defeated by the Japanese at the Battle of Pyŏ kchegwan at the end of the fi rst month. They lost their will to fi ght and retreated to P’yŏ ngyang. The army was also hounded by an epidemic that killed over 10,000 military horses. With its operational power seriously degraded, Ming had to be content with only having deterred the Japanese army outside the Chinese border. Peace talks appeared to be the only choice. 14 The talks that began in these circumstances thus augured a mismatch of peace conditions and a breakdown from the very beginning. The second Battle of Chinju, fought during the early phase of the talks, boosted the 128 Yi Min’ung positions of the anti-peace factions in the Chos ŏ n and Ming courts.15 However, the pro-peace factions in both countries kept the negotiations roll- ing by resorting to fabricating Hideyoshi’s capitulation. While conducting a unilateral evacuation, the Ming army demanded that the Japanese quit Chos ŏ n completely. The negotiations continued through many twists and turns until the second invasion in 1597. There was the Ming court’s coercion of Chosŏ n to permit Japan to offer tribute (fi fth to seventh month, 1594). There was the demand that Chosŏ n dispatch a Communication Embassy (T’ongshinsa ) to accompany the Ming investiture envoy (fourth month of 1595 to the sixth month of 1596). There was the fl ight of the Ming investiture envoy (fourth month of 1596). In the ninth month 1596, Hideyoshi noticed that the conditions for peace contradicted his own intentions and thus declared another invasion of Chos ŏ n for 1597.16 As it was noted earlier, shortages of food became so severe from spring 1593 that starvation began to spread in Chosŏ n with the collateral spread of diseases. 17 The collective nature of military camp life, particularly long-term residence in the small spaces of ships, made sailors more susceptible to contagious diseases than land armies. A report composed immediately after the operations at Ungch’ ŏ n in the second and third months of 1593 is the fi rst report we have on contagious diseases in the Chos ŏ n navy. Outbreaks of disease stemmed from the physical exhaustion of the sailors that followed a long military operation in combination with malnutrition attributable to the shortage of provisions. The military strength of the Left Naval Command of Chŏ lla Province was decimated with deaths of up to 10 percent of the 6,000 or so sailors.18 Disease became more intense from 1594. A report by Yi Sunshin in the fourth month of 1594 reveals that 10 percent of his force was already dead, and because infection had reached another 20 percent of the whole force, this meant that about one-third of his army was by then ill or dead. The epidemic lasted for more than a year after that. An important point to note is that the majority of the victims were the elite, combat-experienced sailors. By the second month of 1595, when a recovery of strength had begun, force levels were up to 4,190 and six months after that to 5,480, which accounted for about 20 to 30 percent of strength levels at their height. Death associated with food shortages and contagious diseases was the main cause of the loss of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 military strength. In addition, we can assume that a part of the loss was also due to the unavoidable release of ailing soldiers and to the willful abandonment of posts by those who were bold enough to risk the death penalty. In spite of such adverse conditions, the Chosŏ n navy continued to carry out operations over 1593–4 following orders from the court. During this period, Yi developed his tactical principles of a land–sea combined attack and the interdiction of sea routes. He pursued such tactics as a second-best choice, 19 because active assaults were out of the question in the circumstances. Thereafter he adhered to these tactics. The role of the Chosŏn navy 129 Yet, even in such adverse circumstances, Yi unceasingly worked to boost the combat strength of his forces. Let us briefl y consider these efforts in terms of ship-building, recruitment of soldiers, securing grains, training, and fi rearms manufacturing. While naval operations continued in 1592, the number of battleships in the combined fl eet kept growing. Particularly, from the winter of the same year, Yi planned to build a fl eet consisting of 250 ships, and he allocated a specifi c number of ships to be manufactured in each provincial base. The original plan did not come to full fruition, but the battleships constructed during this period constituted the backbone of a large fl eet, estimated to comprise over 180 ships, that fought the Japanese during the second invasion. Second, he endeavored to maximize recruitment. For this purpose, he expended great efforts on many fronts. He persuaded the court and other high offi cials to stop the transfer of soldiers from sea to ground forces. He strictly applied the penal code to deserters. He incorporated volunteer guerrillas and monk soldiers into the navy. He rewarded and punished regional recruitment offi cers according to their performance, and he collected refugees to augment his military strength. As a result, even in straightened circumstances, he was able to maintain his strength levels at 4,000 to 5,000 men. Third, securing provisions was as important a task as recruiting soldiers. He had some garrison rice fi elds (tunj ŏ n ) under his direct control for this purpose, and he requested that Chŏ ng Ky ŏ ngdal, the former Magistrate of Sŏ nsan, be made his assistant and from whom he received much help.20 Yi spared no opportunity to increase the stock of provisions. He traded in fi sh and salt and appointed clerks and stewards (kyew ŏ n yusa) throughout the territory under his control to collect provisions. Finally, Yi also developed fi rearms such as cannons and conducted intensive military training. Having witnessed the power of cannons during battles in 1592, he ordered his offi cers to manufacture gunpowder, and he made cannons (K. ch ŏ ngch’ ŏ l ch’ongt’ong) modeled on various sorts of large guns and arquebuses. Records on the military training are somewhat vague, but at least there is documentary support for the fact that he carried out military training. Yi himself practiced archery daily, because he believed that the bow was an essential individual weapon for both offi cers and soldiers. Such efforts produced some good results. By the time Wŏ n Kyun replaced him as commander-in-chief (K. T’ongjesa) at the end of the second month

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of 1597, the navy was prepared for future military contingencies with battleships, provisions, and weapons. The only thing it lacked was manpower. On the other hand, following a series of defeats at sea in 1592, Hideyoshi prohibited his forces from engaging with the Chosŏ n navy, and instead issued orders to build fortifi ed ground bases around the southern coast and on ŏK je Island to defend the coast from the land and secure important sea routes.21 In obedience to the decree, the Japanese navy avoided battles and instead concentrated on improving its war capacity while the peace talks were conducted. These efforts focused on improving its general strength by building 130 Yi Min’ung battleships, developing tactics and strategies to counter the Chos ŏ n navy, and conspiring to remove Yi from his command. Aware of the notable decline in his naval strength and in the number of crew members on his transport ships, Hideyoshi incorporated various daimy ō from around the coast, such as Chō sogabe Motochika, into the navy. Moreover he conscripted more soldiers from his personal jurisdictions to create a navy that would be directly responsible to him. At the same time, he expanded the number of sailors by assigning specifi c recruitment quotas to each daimy ō and implementing measures to strengthen conscription at the national level.22 As for the construction of battleships, in both Hideyoshi’s personal domains and those of the various daimy ō battleships were manufactured throughout the country with special emphasis on the atakebune designed by Kuki Yoshitaka. Of particular note is the direct order given to Toyotomi Hidetsugu, who had been appointed by Hideyoshi to the latter’s own position of Kanpaku . Hidetsugu was directed to supervise the construction of ships all over Japan. 23 The number of ships launched cannot be ascertained, but Japan is thought to have produced so many that the majority of the Japanese navies were in possession of atakebune .24 The Japanese navy refl ected on the causes of their crushing defeat in the fi rst year of the war and sought tactics and strategies that would enable them to overcome Chosŏ n’s navy. This is confi rmed in the report by Hwang Shin who traveled to Japan just before the second invasion of 1597. The important points mention night-time surprise attacks, encirclement and attack, boarding and fi ghting, and joint water–land operations.25 In addition, the Japanese side initiated a subterfuge from the fi rst year of the war to have Yi Sunshin removed from his command of the Chos ŏ n navy. Konishi Yukinaga and Sō Yoshitoshi used the interpreter Yoshira to leak false information on Kat ō Kiyomasa’s naval movements in an attempt to entrap Yi. The plot was surprisingly successful in that Yi was relieved of his command and arrested, while W ŏn Kyun took his place as commander- in-chief. 26 One problem that plagued the Chosŏ n navy was the rivalry between Yi and W ŏn. This was a serious issue, since the confl ict meant a schism within the command structure of the navy. The enmity began as early as the ninth month of 1592, when they worked together in a combined fl eet. Mistrust had already developed even before Yi was appointed naval commander-in-chief in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the tenth month of 1593.27 Japanese research of the colonial period and after generally holds the view that the two men were associated with rival factions at court, and that the rivalry resulted from the Easterner and Westerner factions competing to install their own man as commander-in-chief; in other words, the confl ict was interpreted as a result of factional rivalry. 28 A careful investigation of the period shows that this interpretation is untenable. The East–West factional confl ict did not involve these two men. This is demonstrated by the fact that, while Ch ŏng Tak of the Southerner faction supported W ŏn, the Westerner The role of the Chosŏn navy 131 Yun Tusu and his brother took the opposite position and recommended that Yi be appointed commander-in-chief in early 1597.29 If factional confl ict had little relation to the matter, why was there a change of naval commanders at that crucial moment? Due to worsening circumstances after Yi became commander-in-chief, he was not able to engage aggressively in naval battles. Because Yi was not on the attack, King Sŏ njo began to wonder aloud if Yi had become lazy, and the mistrust deepened as time progressed. In contrast, Wŏ n Kyun was regarded as a courageous and devoted soldier. It was against the background of such contrasting perceptions held by the king that successive incidents detrimental to Yi sprang up. These include the Japanese conspiracy to disparage Yi mentioned above and the arson attack on the Japanese camp in Pusan. It appears that these events led to an explosion of doubt in the king’s mind. S ŏ njo was now determined to arrest, inter- rogate, and punish Yi. At this time, the Border Defense Council (K. Piby ŏ nsa ) sought to defuse the crisis by beseeching the king not to be hasty and instead appoint both men as commander-in-chief. But the king’s will prevailed and he changed his commander-in-chief, a move that later was to become one of the main reasons for the Chos ŏ n defeat at the Battle of Ch’ilch’ ŏ llyang.30

The three great naval battles during the second invasion (1597–8)

The course and the signifi cance of the Battle of Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang W ŏn Kyun assumed the post of the naval commander-in-chief on the twenty-fi fth day of the second month of 1597, but he failed to consolidate his power as commander-in-chief and faced isolation, having not won the trust of people above and below him. He was at loggerheads with Governor (K. Ch’ech’alsa) Yi W ŏnik and Kw ŏn Yul, the Commanding General (K. Tow ŏ nsu ), over strategy and tactics.31 Whereas the latter two preferred the interdiction of sea lanes, Wŏ n followed Yi’s thinking that they should opt for a combined water–land operation and the army should fi rst attack the Japanese naval base at Angol-p’o.32 In addition, Wŏ n’s unbending character yielded a cruel command over his subordinates, and they lost all respect and trust for their commander. 33 The primary responsibility for what was to come lay with King S ŏnjo and the court, who had changed commanders, but W ŏ n

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 carries enormous responsibility because he failed to establish the authority required of a commander-in-chief. After lengthy discussions, interdiction was adopted in opposition to the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, and Wŏ n Kyun was ordered to intercept the Japanese fl eet in the seas off Pusan. Thus, the Battle of Ch’ilch’ ŏ llyang began. On the fourteenth day of the seventh month of 1597, W ŏ n’s combined fl eet sailed out in front of Pusan, but suffered diffi culties from the outset: the sailors suffered exhaustion from chronic disease and a part of the fl eet was scattered by strong winds.34 On the fi fteenth, bad weather 132 Yi Min’ung forced him to move his fl eet to Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang. That night the course of the fl eet was detected by the Japanese navy, which launched a surprise attack. The battle started from dawn of the sixteenth day and lasted until midday. The Japanese implemented encirclement and boarding tactics.35 In particular the Japanese strategy of combined water–land operation meant the appalling slaughter of many Chos ŏ n sailors who fl ed to the coast. The battle ended in the sinking of the majority of Chosŏ n warships and the death of the highest commanding offi cers.36 The reasons for the defeat at Ch’ilch’ ŏllyang probably lay in the inadequacy of W ŏn Kyun’s command, the adoption of fl awed tactics, and the collapse of the line because sailors fl ed. The defeat meant a loss of control over the southern seas and the inability to stop Japan’s advance on water and land. An inability to stop the advancing Japanese would result in the loss of Chŏ lla Province and pose the danger that the three southern provinces would collapse. On hearing the news, the court decided to reinstate Yi Sunshin and immediately inform Ming China of the defeat.37 Immediately after the defeat at Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang, Yi put a request to Kwŏ n Yul to allow him to visit the battlefi eld and devise a plan to rehabilitate the navy. Yi was given permission. 38 On the other hand, the victorious Japanese navy did not extend its campaign towards the west, but instead it ceased operations until the end of the seventh month to refresh its forces. Early in the eighth month, it landed at Tuch’ijin on the lower reaches of the Sŏ mjin River and participated in the attack on Namwŏ n. 39 Hence the Japanese navy had been inactive for more than a month after the Ch’ilch’ŏ llyang battle, during which time Yi was able to reassemble a fl eet and prepare for the next battle. During this period, the Japanese army imposed a brutal occupation policy of slaughter and pillage, driving most commoners to fl ee. Those with resources sailed to coastal islands to hide.40 These escapees wandered about at sea seeking safety from pursuit and pillage by the Japanese navy. When they heard about Yi’s reappointment as commander-in-chief, a good number of refugee vessels gathered around Yi’s base. By this time, the Ming court was predicting a second invasion and decided to dispatch its navy as a countermeasure. On hearing the news of the Ch’ilch’ ŏ llyang, Namw ŏ n, and Chŏ nju defeats and the Japanese intention to occupy Chŏlla Province, the Ming court attributed the worsening situation to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Chos ŏ n’s loss of control over the sea and moved to dispatch its own navy.

The My ŏ ngnyang battle and the reconstruction of the Chos ŏ n navy The My ŏ ngnyang battle, fought on the sixteenth day of the ninth month, 1597, was an important naval battle in which a Chosŏ n force destroyed the Japanese navy as it capitalized on its victories at the beginning of the second invasion and attempted to advance into the West Sea. We know from existing research that, having been planned and implemented by Yi, who The role of the Chosŏn navy 133 was reappointed commander-in-chief, the battle was fought against a fl eet ten times more powerful and the Chosŏ n navy took advantage of the narrow passage at My ŏ ngnyang and its tidal changes.41 Before the battle and after Yi was restored to his former command, he had been moving around the coast collecting forces. Under his command gathered not only those who were then serving offi cers but also forces that had formerly served under him, seasoned by volunteer guerilla soldiers from the adjacent regions. These elements all contributed to raising the battle capacity of the small fl eet, which then consisted of only thirteen ships.42 On the nineteenth day of the eighth month, Yi took transfer of command over the fl eet from Pae Sŏ l at Hoery ŏng-p’o. While continuing to move to the southwest, he encountered the Japanese navy for the fi rst time on the twenty- eighth day. From that day, the Japanese fl eet pursued Yi, while his forces navi- gated westward. In the end, Yi anchored at Pyŏ kp’ajin on Chindo island for a fortnight, chose the Strait of Myŏ ngnyang as a battle scene, and moved his camp to Usuyŏ ng a day before the My ŏ ngnyang battle. 43 The My ŏngnyang battle started from the morning on the sixteenth day of the ninth month. The enemy fl eet had over 300 battleships of which only 133 sekibune came into the straits for attack. Because the straits were too narrow and shallow, the atakebune stood by in the distance.44 At the start of the battle, the Chosŏ n navy was overwhelmed by the strength of the Japanese fl eet and did not engage. Only Yi’s ship struggled alone for some time surrounded and beleaguered by the enemy. After a while, answering Yi’s call, the remaining twelve ships began to engage with the enemy. Helped by the timely change in the direction of tide, the Chos ŏ n fl eet was able to destroy thirty or so ships in a short time. The Japanese fl eet withdrew to the opposite side of the straits and continued confronting the Korean ships until completely retreating on the evening tide. 45 In the end, Yi’s thirteen-strong fl eet defeated ten times that number of Japanese ships. The defeat not only frustrated Japan’s advance to the West Sea but also gave Chosŏ n a respite to rebuild the navy. Yi’s victory at My ŏ ngnyang can be credited to his combat tactics, the construction of a small and yet powerful fl eet, and the participation of refugee civilians and refugee ships in the battle. The participation of the k ŏ buks ŏ n warship and the installation of iron chains across the straits have been offered as additional explanations, but much of these arguments have arisen from later tales of heroes and myths and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 cannot be taken as refl ecting historical events.46 Quiet on the naval front after the My ŏ ngnyang battle was due to the onset of winter weather. After moving north as far as Kogunsan Island after the battle, Yi’s fl eet turned southward to winter at Koha Island off Mok-p’o. Yi’s efforts to reconstitute the navy saw some fruition in grain stocking and ship- building, owing to fi nancial help from the refugees living at sea and strenuous efforts from the military leaders in surrounding areas.47 On the seventeenth day of the second month in 1598, Yi moved his camp from Koha Island to Kog ŭm Island, which provided a better strategic position 134 Yi Min’ung and a more favorable socio-economic base for provisioning.48 In particular, the island was well positioned to counter the naval activities of Konishi Yukinaga’s fl eet that had been stationed at Yegyo fort in Sunch’ŏ n county. On Kog ŭm Island, Yi pursued a naval development program similar to the one he had conducted in his previous term as commander-in-chief. As a consequence, just before the Noryang battle, his fl eet was probably more powerful than it was in his days on Hansan Island. We can estimate that Yi managed to secure over eighty ships and 10,000 sailors during this period.

The formation of the Chos ŏ n–Ming combined fl eet and the Noryang battle The aforementioned decision by Ming to dispatch its navy to the war front began in the eleventh month of 1597 with the entry into Chos ŏn of 3,000 troops led by Ji Jin. However, rather than conducting naval operations, his army landed in Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng Province to prevent the rescue of Konishi Yukinaga’s army in Ulsan.49 Any massive dispatch of the navy did not start until the Ming court synchronized the dispatch of naval forces with an increase in land forces from the spring of 1598 to implement a strategy of advancing on four fronts (K. saro py ŏ ngjin, Ch. silu bingjin). Originally the strategy was to advance on three fronts (K. samno py ŏ ngjin, Ch. sanlu bingjin ), but concluding that the defeat at the Battle of Ulsan at the end of 1597 was due to the failure to prevent support of the Japanese army by sea, Ming devised plans to add in naval forces.50 Thereupon, the Ming navy, totaling 13,000 sailors, including 5,000 led by Chen Lin, and forces under the command of other generals arrived continuously before the start of the Battle of Noryang. Combined operations began properly on the sixteenth day of the seventh month in 1598 when Chen Lin’s main forces arrived at Kog ŭ m Island.51 However, Chen Lin and his sailors earned notoriety for their violent behavior from the time of their arrival, and in particular Chen Lin periodically asserted his military authority over the entire fl eet to deter independent operations by Yi Sunshin. 52 Meanwhile, Yi continued to improve the combat capacity of his navy, on the one hand, and on the other hand he credited to Chen Lin all the hard-won victories achieved in the several battles fought before the introduction of the four-front strategy as a way of winning his favor.53 In this way Yi won acknowledgment of his abilities from Chen Lin, and at the decisive moment Yi was able to induce

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Chen Lin to join battle. The Battle of Noryang was the fi nal battle of the war, and was also the only great success that we can attribute to the four-front strategy. Just prior to the battle, the joint Chosŏ n–Ming fl eet, which was the Naval Route Army (K. Surogun , Ch. Shuilujun ), began by launching a water–land dual attack on Konishi’s main base in Yegyo castle in coordination with the Western Route Army (K. S ŏ rogun , Ch. Xilujun ). 54 Let us briefl y outline the results of the four-front strategy. First, the Eastern Route Army (K. Tongnogun , Ch. Donglujun ), led by Ma Gui, charged Katō Kiyomasa at Ulsan, but he withdrew to Kyŏ ngju because its defense was The role of the Chosŏn navy 135 sound. Dong Yiyuan of the Middle Route Army (K. Chungnogun , Ch. Zhong lujun ) was bloated with self-confi dence after his initial victories and attacked Sach’ ŏn in great haste only to suffer great defeat and lose more than 10,000 soldiers. His defeat handed Liu Ting of the Western Route Army a good excuse to step back. After this, Liu Ting, for inexplicable reasons, threw away a good opportunity that had opened up as a result of the coordinated land– sea operations with the Naval Route Army. In the end, he had to withdraw with massive damage infl icted on his men and resources.55 After the early part of the tenth month, Chen Lin, who had focused on the battle for Yegyo castle with Liu Ting’s Western Route Army, and the Chosŏ n– Ming combined fl eet had to go their separate ways. Yi Sunshin subsequently developed a plan whereby he would isolate the Japanese army in Yegyo before destroying them through attacks from both land and sea. 56 When Hideyoshi died on the eighteenth day of the eighth month in 1598, the war took a completely different course. Japan’s Gotair ō (Five Great Elders) 57 decided to call off the war and ordered the Japanese army stationed in Korea to make peace and to return to Japan by the middle of the eleventh month. 58 Accordingly, Konishi Yukinaga made a peace with Liu Ting and tried to withdraw his army, but the Naval Route Army blocked the retreat. Subsequently he sued for peace with Chen Lin and Yi Sunshin; but Chen Lin rejected the proposed conditions for peace and Yi rejected the peace itself. In the end Yukinaga requested aid from the adjacent Japanese armies, and a battle took place at Noryang between a Japanese army led by Tō d ō Takatora and Shimazu Yoshihiro mobilized from Pusan and Namhae and the Chosŏ n– Ming combined fl eet. The Noryang battle, which opened from dawn on the nineteenth day of the eleventh month, was the last and largest battle fought during the Imjin Waeran. The fi rst encounter happened at the sea entrance to Noryang when the two fl eets faced each other, and the combined Chosŏ n–Ming fl eet was able to infl ict serious damage on the Japanese navy by fi re attack taking advantage of the northwesterly wind. Chased by the Chos ŏ n–Ming fl eet, the Japanese fl eet stumbled into a cul-de-sac by mistaking the mouth of Kwan’ŭ m-p’o port for an open sea route, only to realize at dawn that they were trapped in a port. There followed a fi erce battle between the Japanese desperately seeking to escape the port and the Chosŏ n–Ming fl eet on the attack. In the end the sea battle ended in a great victory for the combined Chos ŏ n–Ming fl eet with its

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 superior fi repower and weaponry, having destroyed more than 200 Japanese ships. 59 As is well known, Yi Sunshin was killed in this battle together with over ten other generals, which demonstrates how fi ercely the battle was fought. In short, the Battle of Noryang was the last battle in the Imjin Waeran and was a splendid achievement that blocked retreat and delivered a blow to the Japanese army during their withdrawal. Moreover, Noryang has ornamental historical signifi cance as a defeat of the Japanese forces that were trying to evacuate quickly because of sudden political changes at home. After having triggered an unjustifi ed war, the Japanese wanted to retreat, but the battle of Noryang stands as a victorious fi nale for the defenders. 136 Yi Min’ung Conclusion As has been shown above, the Chosŏ n navy played a very important role in overcoming the national crisis brought on by the Imjin Waeran. In short, at the beginning of the war there were successive victories over the Japanese navy in the sea war, unlike the land war. During both invasions, with decisive victories at sea over the Japanese, the Chosŏ n navy changed the war situation. That carried strategically important military and historical signifi cance. I would like to conclude this chapter by summarizing the factors that led to the victories by the Chos ŏ n navy. First, we should take note of the superior weaponry, of which the p’anoks ŏ n and the ch’ongt’ong are representative. As it is true even today, weapon systems are indeed the basic factor that decide victory or defeat in naval battles. The development of the P’anoks ŏ n and the production of the ch’ongt’ong , which had been prepared a century earlier, were important background factors to victory at sea during the Imjin Waeran. Second, we should point to the role of Yi Sunshin, who was both an outstanding strategist and manager of the Chosŏ n navy in bringing victory at sea. Not only did he achieve distinguished service through victory in all of the ten battles fought in the fi rst year, but he continued to enhance the war capacity of the navy even in diffi cult moments such as when disease spread through his ranks while the peace talks were ongoing. Even after he was relieved and then reinstated in 1597, he again won three major battles of the second invasion and thereby played an important role in overcoming the national crisis. Finally, there was support from a number of staff who stayed close to him, and the role of loyal anonymous sailors and civilians resident in the coastal region. The serious extent of damage to civilians was often seen in the many villages along the coast that were burnt to ash, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it was the sacrifi ce of those people that kept the Chosŏ n navy going. Due to such experience in the war, every time national defense was discussed in the post-war period, emphasis was given to the role of the navy, and prominence to the theory of naval defense that emphasizes stopping the enemy on the high seas. It was due to the infl uence of the naval victories of the Imjin Waeran that, together with the strength of this theory, the systemiza- tion of the regional naval defense for Kyŏ nggi and the lower three provinces was centralized in a unifi ed command (t’ongjey ŏ ng) with a single base camp ( t’ ŏ ng’ ŏ y ŏ ng ). Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Notes Translated by Chi Young-hae with James B. Lewis. 1 Yi Changh ŭi, “Imjin Waeran,” 1976; Ha Ubong, “Sadae kyorin kwangye wa yangnan,” 1995; O Chongnok, “Imjin Waeran Py ŏngja horan sigi kunsasa y ŏ n’gu ŭ i hy ŏ nhwang kwa kwaje,” 1999; Cho Wŏ llae, “Imjin Waeran-sa yŏ n’gu ŭ i ch’ui wa kwaje,” 2000. The role of the Chosŏn navy 137 2 Kyŏ ngguk taej ŏ n , “Py ŏ ngj ŏn,” Chedo py ŏ ngs ŏnjo; Pang Sanghy ŏ n, Chos ŏ n ch ŏ ngi sugun chedo , 1991. 3 H ŏ Sŏ ndo, Chosŏ n sidae hwayak py ŏ nggisa y ŏ n’gu, 1994; Ch’ae Y ŏ ns ŏ k, Chos ŏ n ch’ogi hwagi y ŏ n’gu , 1981. 4 Miki Seiichir ō , “Ch ōsen eki ni okeru suigun hensei ni tsuite,” 1968; Udagawa Takehisa, Nihon no kaizoku , 1983. 5 Kim Chaeg ŭn, “Imjin Waeran chung Cho-Il-My ŏ ng guns ŏ n ŭ i t ŭ ks ŏ ng,” 1991, pp. 271–6. 6 Udagawa Takehisa, Higashi Ajia heiki kō ry ū shi no kenky ū, 1993, pp. 208–12. According to Udagawa Takehisa, there was a large iron cannon (J. dai tepp ō ) that was able to penetrate outside planks and destroy oars, which appears to have been a greater threat than arquebuses. 7 The major naval battles described below are from Yi Min’ung, “Imjin Waeran haej ŏ nsa y ŏn’gu,” 2002, pp. 35–61. See also: Yi Min’ung, Imjin Waeran haej ŏ nsa , 2004. 8 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o , 1592.5.10. See Map 3 for a general picture. 9 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o, 1592.5.10; Kim Illyong, “Imjinnan Ch ŏ kjin-p’o haej ŏn, ” 1995, pp. 153–76. 10 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o , 1592.6.14; Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1592.5.29, 1592.6.10. 11 Ch ŏ ng Chinsul, “Hansando haejŏ n y ŏ n’gu,” 1993, pp. 159–94. 12 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o , 1592.7.15. 13 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o , 1592.9.17. 1 4 S ŏ njo shillok , 35 (1593.2.6); Shin Ky ŏ ng, Chaejo p ŏ nbang-chi , 2 (1593.1). 15 Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok, 2 (1593.6). Photolithographic reproduction by the Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1977, p. 87. 16 Yi Min’ung, “Imjin Waeran haej ŏ nsa y ŏ n’gu,” 2002, pp. 74–81. 17 Kim Pok, “ Tong’ŭ i pogam p’y ŏ nchan ŭ i y ŏ ksa-ch ŏ k paegy ŏng kwa ŭ ihangnon,” 2000, pp. 40–3. 18 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o , 1593.4.6. 19 Yi Sunshin, Imjin changch’o , 1593.2.17, changgye . 20 Ch ŏ ng Ky ŏ ngdal, Pansan sego, “Pan’gok Nanjung ilgi,” “Pan’gok nyŏ n’gi,” photo- lithographically reproduced by Asea Munhwasa, 1987. 21 Japan, Rikugun, Sanb ō honbu, Nihon senshi Ch ō sen eki , “Honhen,” 1924, p. 219. 22 Miki Seiichir ō , “Ch ō sen eki ni okeru sugun hensei ni tsuite,” 1968, pp. 280–4. 23 Watanabe Yosuke, “Ch ō sen eki to waga zō sen no hatatsu,” 1935, pp. 576–9. 24 Japan, Rikugun, Sanb ō honbu, Nihon senshi Chō sen eki, “Hoten,” no. 114, “Katō Yoshiaki no kigai,” 1924, p. 150. 2 5 Sŏ njo shillok, 83 (1596.12.21); Hwang Shin, Ch’ubo-chip, fascicle 2, “T’ongshin hoehwan-hu s ŏgye.” 2 6 Y u S ŏ ngnyong, Chingbirok, 1991; Cho Kyŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok , 3 (1597.2.11). 27 Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1593.8.7: “In the evening, Kyŏ ngsang Naval Commander

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Pak Ch’igong came and reported on the bandit ships’ withdrawal saying that, although Naval Commander W ŏ n and his offi cers are usually good, [their] self- serving reports cannot be trusted.” 28 Tokutomi Iichir ō , Chō sen no eki, Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, 1921–2, pp. 452–3; Kitajima Manji, Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Ch ō sen shinryaku , 1995, pp. 183–7. 29 Translator’s note: Yun Tusu was a member of the Westerner faction. 30 Yi T ŭ ky ŏ l, Yanghodang ilgi , 1597.2. 31 Translator’s note: In 1595, Yi W ŏ nik was made governor of four provinces. 3 2 S ŏ njo shillok , 87 (1597.4.19); 87 (1597.5.8); 87 (1597.6.11). 3 3 S ŏ njo shillok , 99 (1598.4.2). 138 Yi Min’ung 34 Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok, 3 (1597.7.16); Yu Sŏ ngnyong, Chingbirok , fascicle 2, 1991, p. 611. 35 Sat ō Kazuo, Umi to suigun no Nihonshi , 1995, p. 300. 3 6 Haeso shilgi , Vol. 1, 1987. 3 7 Sŏ njo shillok , 90 (1597.7.22); Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1597.8.3. 38 Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1597.7.19 and 25. 39 Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok , 3 (1597.8.6). 40 Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok, 3 (1597.8.8 and 9); Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1597.9.17 and 20. 41 Cho S ŏ ngdo, “My ŏ ngnyang taech’ ŏ p yŏ n’gu,” 1987. 42 Cho W ŏllae, “Imnan haejŏ n,” 1987, pp. 79–82; “Ch’ungmu Yi Kong Sunshin tongsun chegong sashil – Ch’amchwa chegong sashil”, 1990. 43 Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1597.9.15. 44 Japan, Rikugun, Sanb ō honbu, Nihon senshi Chō sen eki, “Honhen,” 1924, pp. 368– 9; S ŏ njo shillok , 126 (1600.6.15). 45 Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1597.9.16. 46 Yi Min’ung, “Imjin Waeran haej ŏ nsa y ŏ n’gu,” 2002. 47 Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi , 1597.12.5 and 10. 48 Yi Pun, “Haengnok.” 49 Shin H ŭ m, “Ch’ ŏ njo chosa changshin sŏ nhu k ŏ rae sŏ ngmy ŏ nggi”; Cho Kyŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok , 3 (1597.12.23). 5 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 95 (1597.12.30). 51 Yi Pun, “Haengnok.” 5 2 Sŏ njo shillok , 104 (1598.9.8). 5 3 Sŏ njo shillok , 103 (1598.8.4 and 13). 54 Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi ,1598.9.15 and 10.3. 55 Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok , 3 (1598.10.2 and 3). 56 An Pangjun, “Noryang kisa.” 57 Translator’s note: These were Tokugawa Ieyasu, Maeda Toshiie (later Toshinaga), Ukita Hideie, Uesugi Kagekatsu, and M ō ri Terumoto. 58 Yi Hy ŏ ngs ŏ k, Imjin ch ŏ llansa , 1967, pp. 1137–43. 59 An Pangjun, “Noryang kisa”; Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok, 3 (1598.11.19); “Kishil sang.”

References An Pangjun ( 安邦俊). “Noryang kisa (緦粱記事),” in Ŭ nbong ch ŏ ns ŏ ( 隱峰全書 ), fascicle 7. Ch’ae Y ŏ ns ŏ k ( 蔡蕙錫 ). Chos ŏ n ch’ogi hwagi yŏ n’gu ( 朝鮮初期火器硏究 ). Seoul : Iljisa , 1981 . Cho Ky ŏ ngnam ( 趙慶男 ). Nanjung chamnok ( 綧中雜錄 ). Photolithographic reproduction by Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe , 1977 .

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O Chongnok ( 吳宗錄). “Imjin Waeran ~ Pyŏ ngja horan shigi kunsasa yŏ n’gu ŭ i hy ŏnhwang kwa kwaje ( 壬辰倭亂 ~ 丙子胡亂時期軍事史硏究㦮現況ὒ 課題 ) ,” in Kukpang kunsa y ŏ n’guso ( 國防軍史硏究所 ), ed., Kunsa ( 軍史 ) 38 ( 1999 ): 135–60 . Pang Sanghy ŏ n ( 方相鉉 ). Chos ŏ n ch ŏ ngi sugun chedo ( 朝鮮初期水軍制度 ). Seoul : Minjok munhwasa , 1991 . S a t ō Kazuo ( 佐藤和夫 ). Umi to suigun no Nihonshi ( 海と水軍の日本史 ), Vol. 2. Tokyo : Hara Shobo , 1995 . Shin H ŭ m ( 申欽 ). “Ch’ ŏnjo chosa changshin sŏ nhu k ŏ rae s ŏ ngmy ŏ nggi (天朝詔使將臣先後去來姓名記), ” in “Sangch’onjip (象村集 ),” fascicle 57, in Sangch’on sŏ nsaeng chip (象村先生集 ). Seoul : Seoul National University, Kyujanggak . Shin Ky ŏ ng ( 申炅 ). Chaejo pŏ nbang-chi ( 再造藩邦志), fascicle 2 (1593, 癸巳 ), 1st month. S ŏ njo shillok ( 宣祖實錄 ). Tokutomi Iichir ō ( 德富猪一郞 ). Ch ōsen no eki, Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi ( 朝鮮役 - 近世日本國民史 -), Vol. 2. Tokyo : Miny ū sha , 1921 –2. Udagawa Takehisa ( 宇田川武久 ). Nihon no kaizoku ( 日本の海賊 ). Tokyo : Seibund ō shink ō sha , 1983 . Udagawa Takehisa ( 宇田川武久 ). Higashi Ajia heiki kō ry ū shi no kenkyū : j ū go~j ū shichi seiki ni okeru heiki no juy ō to denba ( 東アジア兵器交流史の研究 : 十五¥十七世紀における兵器の受容と伝播 ). Tokyo : Yoshikawa k ō bunkan , 1993 . Watanabe Yosuke ( 渡辺世祐 ). “ Ch ō sen eki to waga z ō sen no hatatsu (朝鮮役と我が造船の發達 ) ,” Shigaku zasshi ( 史學雜誌 ) 46 :5 ( 1935 ): 576–9 . Yi Changh ŭ i ( 㧊㧻䧂 , 蝗章熙 ). “Imjin Waeran (㧚㰚㢲⧖ ),” in Han’guksaron ( 䞲ῃ㌂⪶ ) 4. Kwach’ ŏ n : Kuksa p’y ŏ ch’an wiwŏ nhoe , 1976 , pp. 1–11 . Y i H y ŏ ngsŏ k ( 蝗炯錫 ). Imjin chŏ llansa ( 壬辰戰亂史 ), Vol. 2. Seoul : Seoul National University Press , 1967 . Yi Min’ung ( 蝗敏雄 ). “Imjin Waeran haejŏ nsa y ŏ n’gu ( 壬辰倭亂海戰史硏究 ),” Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University, 2002 . Yi Min’ung ( 㧊⹒㤛 ). Imjin Waeran haejŏ nsa: 7 nyŏ n ch ŏ njaeng, pada esŏ k ŏ dun s ŭ ngni ŭ i kirok (㧚㰚㢲⧖G䟊㩚㌂ : 7 ⎚G㩚㨗 , ⹪┺㠦㍲GỆ⚪G㔏Ⰲ㦮G₆⪳ ). Seoul : Ch’ ŏ ng ŏ ram midi ŏ , 2004 . Yi Pun ( 蝗芬 ). “Haengnok ( 行錄 ),” in Yi ch’ungmugong chŏ ns ŏ ( 蝗忠武公全書 ), Vol. 9, Appendix 1. Yi Sunshin ( 蝗舜臣 ). Imjin changch’o ( 壬辰蟳草 ). Yi Sunshin ( 蝗舜臣 ). Nanjung ilgi ( 綧中日記 ). Y i T ŭ ky ŏ l ( 蝗德悅 ). Yanghodang ilgi ( 養浩堂日記 ). Y u S ŏ ngnyong ( 蛢成龍 ). Chingbirok ( 懲毖錄), in S ŏ ae ch ŏ ns ŏ pyŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 西厓全書䘎㺂㥚㤦䣢 ), ed., S ŏ ae ch ŏ ns ŏ ( 西厓全書 ). Seoul : Sŏ ae s ŏ nsaeng ki’ny ŏ m sa ŏ phoe , 1991 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 8 Righteous army activity in the Imjin War

Nukii Masayuki ( 貫井正之 )

Introduction In the fourth month of 1592, the Toyotomi regime declared an expedition to subjugate Ming China and launched an invasion of neighboring Korea. The Korean army, which had grown accustomed to peace over the two centuries from the founding of the kingdom, collapsed in the face of more than 150,000 incomparably fearless Japanese troops. With the breakdown of the ruling structures, Korean society fell into extreme chaos. Members of the Korean social classes adopted various behaviors. There were those who rebelled against their overlords, those who surrendered and cooperated with the Japanese military (K. bu-Wae , J. fu-Wa ), offi cials and troops who abandoned their posts, and those who left their villages and fl ed deep into remote mountains. There were also those who faced the crisis to the kingdom, took up weapons, and turned to confront the Japanese invasion. In Korea, the armed groups that spontaneously arose from the populace are called “righteous armies” (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng). Their activities were such that, wherever the Japanese forces were, there also appeared guerrilla resistance. Even though they are all referred to as righteous armies, their circumstances are various and complex: where and when they appeared; how they resisted the Japanese; and their relations with the court, the regular army, and the populace. I have spent many years examining the Korean resistance to the 1592 invasion. In this chapter, I will consolidate individual regional studies, consider an overall picture of resistance activities from a national viewpoint, and recon- struct the historical signifi cance of the resistance. All references used in the chapter derive from my published works and will be noted at the end of the Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 chapter.

Righteous army activities in Ky ŏ ngsang Province Among the righteous armies in the country, the earliest and most diverse resistance was offered by guerrillas in Ky ŏ ngsang Province. The reasons are largely that Kyŏ ngsang Province was the closest Korean province to Japan 142 Nukii Masayuki and the site of the longest historical exchange with Japan: (1) it was the entry point of the invasion; (2) it was where the invasion reached its fullest scope; (3) it was where the Japanese troops were stationed the longest; (4) as a fertile grain-producing region centered on rice production, its population was large and it held an attraction for Japanese military control; (5) fi nally, it occupied the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, Kyŏ ngsang Province also possessed the special characteristic that the Naktong River interposed itself down the middle to create a “left” Ky ŏngsang Province to the east and a “right” Ky ŏngsang Province to the west with different forms of guerrilla resistance.1

Righteous armies in western Ky ŏ ngsang Province The sudden Japanese invasion wrenched the Chos ŏn kingdom’s ruling structure from its base and tossed society into extreme confusion. The inhabitants of Kyŏ ngsang Province were freed from the restraints of the existing ruling order and engaged in various activities. Court records speak of the collapsing order and that all people in the province followed the bandits. Although few at the beginning of the war, some appeared who led local people in resistance against the Japanese forces. They styled themselves as righteous armies to make clear that these private military forces were not rebels. Guerrilla leaders were local yangban . The majority of them were former offi cials or Confucian scholars (yusaeng or candidates for offi ce) and at the center of the local ruling order as local landlords. Kwak Chaeu (1552–1617) of Ŭ iry ŏng, the fi rst to organize a guerrilla band in Korea, was known to be from a local, eminent, and wealthy family. His father had risen to become a provincial governor (Jr. 2), and the clan was well known for producing many high-ranking offi cials. Kwak Chaeu himself had competed in the civil service examinations when young, but failed, and he had gone back to live the life of a country gentleman in Ŭ iry ŏng. When he undertook to raise an army, he invested his family’s wealth and provided provisions and weapons at his own expense. When Chŏ ng Inhong (1535–1623) of Hapch’ ŏn and Kim Myŏ n (1541–93) of K ŏch’ang raised troops, they also paid to arm their forces. The guerrilla leadership that arose in western Ky ŏ ngsang, including the three just mentioned, were students of Cho Shik (1501–72, pen name Nam My ŏ ng). The local people who were led by them had been infl uenced by Cho Shik’s

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 philosophy in their everyday life through the community compacts (hyangyak , hyang’an , hyanggyu , tongyak ) authored by yangban of the Nam Myŏ ng School. Cho Shik was a great Confucianist of the mid-Chosŏ n period, and with Yi Hwang (1501–70, pen name T’oegye) brought Korean Neo-Confucianism to completion. Simply put, Cho Shik’s educational doctrine was an ideology of kyŏ ng’ ŭ i (“respect for righteousness”) and sangmu (“esteem the military”). Cho Shik and Yi Hwang’s disciples were known as the Yŏ ngnam (Ky ŏ ngsang) school or the sarim , at that time performing brilliantly in capital politics. In the center, they had formed the Easterners’ faction (tong’in ). In the provinces, Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 143 they had fi rmly established themselves in a position of leadership. Later, the Easterners split into the Cho Shik group, known as the Northerners (pug’in ) and the Yi Hwang group, known as the Southerners (nam’in ). In short, the righteous army ( ŭ iby ŏ ng ) fi ghters in western Kyŏ ngsang were an armed local group united by Cho Shik’s philosophy. The Japanese vanguard saw the capital Hansŏ ng (modern Seoul) in Kyŏ nggi Province as their goal and quickly overran Kyŏ ngsang and Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng provinces. The Japanese generals, who occupied Hansŏ ng early in the fi fth month, planned to make all of Korea into Japanese territory and set about dividing the regional governance of Chos ŏ n’s eight provinces among the powerful daimy ō. Governance of Ky ŏngsang Province was turned over to the 30,000- man Eighth Army led by M ō ri Terumoto (1553–1625). As soon as Mō ri’s army landed at Pusan in the middle of the fourth month, he headed towards the capital on the west road through Yŏ ngsan, Ch’angny ŏ ng, Hy ŏ np’ung, and Mugye to reach the military stronghold (k ŏ jin ) 2 a t S ŏ ngju and established his headquarters at Kaery ŏ ng in north Ky ŏ ngsang Province. The location sat astride an important transport route and was an attractive site to construct a defensive fortifi cation. The righteous armies of Ky ŏngsang Province simultaneously opened guerrilla attacks on the Japanese forces stationed in strategic locales in the province as well as those forces coming and going between Pusan and Hans ŏ ng. When Kwak Chaeu in Ŭ iry ŏ ng heard of the Japanese invasion, on the twenty- fi rst day of the fourth month, he gathered about sixty local men and launched his righteous army. Kwak was a yangban , a Confucian scholar, and rural land- lord. He appealed to the local people to rise up, and together with appeals to come to the aid of king and country in the crisis, he also advocated a defense of local scholars from the ravages of the enemy. He included the defense of local scholars, because he would not have been able to mass together the people who directly suffered injury from the Japanese armies if it were only a matter of the relations between sovereign and subject. At the same time, he indicted Kim Su (1537–1615), the governor of Kyŏ ngsang Province, for not preventing the passage of Japanese forces within the province. Of course, that invited the animosity of Kim Su and Kwak’s righteous army was ordered to disband, but with mediation by Kim Sŏ ng’il (1538–93), the recruiting offi cer ( ch’oyusa ) for the guerrillas, Kwak’s righteous army was permitted to exist. Because the object of the Japanese vanguard was the occupation of Hansŏ ng

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 and Ŭ iry ŏng was slightly off the path of advancement, Ŭ iry ŏng sustained no attack from the Japanese vanguard. In this circumstance, Kwak’s force came down the Namgang River, appearing and disappearing along the shores of the Naktong River and staging guerrilla attacks on Japanese military ships attempting to navigate the river. Also, Kwak imposed harsh judgment on collaborators (bu-Wae ) as people plotting internal division. In a similar fashion, when Kim My ŏ n captured Chirye castle, he viewed the captured Korean women as collaborators and burned all of them at the stake. At the beginning of the war, as a means of preventing territories from surrendering to 144 Nukii Masayuki the Japanese, the court issued an edict of “[if] captured by the enemy, all die” ( Hamj ŏ k kaesalb ŏ p ). In the case of Kyŏ ngsang Province, because the injury caused by the Japanese forces was severe, the treatment of those who surrendered and cooperated was also severe. On the tenth day of the fi fth month, Chŏ ng Inhong, the former Third Inspector ( changny ŏ ng, Sr. 4) of Hapch’ ŏn, and Kim Myŏ n, the former Assistant Section Chief (chwarang , Sr. 6) of Koy ŏng, simultaneously raised armies. Both of them were disciples of Cho Shik and, after retiring from offi ce, they had returned to their birthplaces and engaged in the training of disciples. When news went out that they were raising a resistance, scholars loyal to Cho Shik’s teachings led local people into their camps. Chŏ ng Inhong’s troop numbers grew to 1,000. U Paesŏ n (1569–1621) of Hwawŏ n County, who had been recruited into Chŏ ng’s righteous army, brought in eighty-nine local militiamen. Various counties in Kyŏ ngsang and Ch ŏlla provinces had prepared for Waegu (J. Wak ō, C. Wokou) attacks that struck repeatedly in the past and had reserve defense units consisting of local militia; these came forward. The righteous armies consisted of family and clan members, students from Confucian academies, local people, scattered soldiers, regular army units, and nobi . They were tied together by locality or kinship in village associations, and their esprit de corps was strong. Of course, this was not the only reason they joined the righteous armies. To prevent surrender and cooperation with the Japanese forces, the court had promised an elevation in social status for those who presented the government with grain or the heads of the enemy. Yangban aspired to be appointed as government offi cials, commoners as yangban, and the sons of concubines and other low-born as commoners. Participation in a righteous army was a prime opportunity to break out of a fi xed social position. M ō ri Terumoto’s army established a string of fortifi ed bases in the various towns along the Naktong River, engaged in mopping-up operations of the surrounding regions, and began serious efforts to govern the province. The guerrillas in western Ky ŏ ngsang Province engaged in local defense, obstruct- ing the movements of the Japanese forces on the western road to the capital and along the Naktong River, raided the areas occupied by the Japanese within the province, and sought to recapture the fortifi cations at Sŏ ngju and Kaery ŏng, which were the Mō ri army bases. In the sixth month, a large force under Kobayakawa Takakage (1533–97), which had been given the task of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 governing Chŏ lla Province, moved southwards from Hansŏ ng into the northern borders of Kyŏ ngsang Province and entered the walled city of Kŭ msan on the border with Ky ŏngsang Province. To reinforce this army, Ankokuji Ekei (?–1600) moved his forces northwards from Pusan along the western road to the capital. To obstruct the Japanese entry into Chŏ lla Province, the righteous armies of Kyŏ ngsang, Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng, and Chŏ lla provinces, beginning with the Kyŏ ngsang forces, attacked the Kŭ msan fortress in waves. Guerrillas from the western part of the province – Kim My ŏn’s forces based in K ŏ ch’ang, various forces from the Chŏ nju area, the Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏng (1533–92) righteous Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 145 army from Chŏ lla, the Cho H ŏ n (1544–92) and Y ŏ nggyu (?–1592) forces from Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province – attacked in succession. The righteous armies took great losses with every attack, but in the end, Kobayakawa’s forces abandoned the invasion of Ch ŏ lla Province and withdrew to Hans ŏ ng from K ŭ msan. Entering the eighth month, offensive operations against the Japanese by the guerrillas in the western part of the province became increasingly frequent, and control of the province by the Mō ri forces became relatively more diffi cult. Kwak Chaeu’s militia in Ŭ iry ŏng grew to more than 1,000, and it left Ŭ iry ŏ ng to capture successively the Japanese fortifi cations along the Naktong River at Hy ŏ np’ung, Ch’angny ŏng, and Y ŏ ngsan. Ch ŏng Inhong’s force coordinated with Kim My ŏn and attacked M ōri’s base at S ŏngju. The offensive and defensive battles at S ŏ ngju were extremely violent, and the attacks by the Korean righteous armies were repulsed each time by powerful Japanese forces, ending in failure. However, the order of battle with the Japanese became reversed for the fi rst time in the war: the Korean forces were now attacking Japanese positions. Control of Kyŏ ngsang Province by Mō ri became a matter of barely maintaining a defense of a string of fortresses in a line along the middle route to the capital. In the same month, Ch ŏng Inhong was appointed Senior Quartermaster to the Royal Chambers (cheyonggam ch ŏ ng , Jr. 4);3 Kim My ŏ n was appointed Magistrate of Hapch’ŏ n ( kunsu , Jr. 4), and Kwak Chaeu was appointed Superintendent of Post Stations ( ch’albang, Jr. 6) for Yugok. In the tenth month, a Japanese force in excess of 20,000 opened operations against the Chinju fortress, because Hideyoshi’s hands had been burned by the activities of the righteous armies and he had concluded that Chinju was a righteous army base. In fact, the defensive force at Chinju was only 3,800, and the fortress walls sheltered a large number of refugees. In the battle, by request of the recruiting offi cer Kim S ŏng’il, the righteous armies from the west of Ky ŏngsang Province participated. The Korean forces inside and outside the city walls acted in concert and attacked the Japanese army, repelling it after a ten-day battle. The signifi cance of the victory was great, because this was the fi rst large-scale Korean victory on land with joint operations by regular and irregular forces. After the victory, the court advocated the unifi cation of regular and irregular forces, which had not cooperated before. The court appreciated the combat strength of the guerrillas and expanded military qualifi cations to the low-born. Since the founding of the state, mili-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tary service had been limited to commoners. The expansion was indicated by the newly established rosters recording the recruitment of local militiamen ( sog’ogun ). 4 By limiting the war front, the fi ghting strength of the righteous armies from the western part of Ky ŏ ngsang Province increased and even the regular army came under their command. Chŏ ng Inhong’s forces and Kim My ŏ n’s forces grew ever stronger. At this point, both Chŏ ng Inhong and Kim My ŏ n were given commissions as “Great Generals of the Righteous Army” ( ŭ iby ŏ ng taejang) and appointed Magistrates of S ŏ ngju ( moksa, Sr. 3) and Provincial 146 Nukii Masayuki Military Commanders of Western Ky ŏ ngsang Province (Ky ŏ ngsang-do u’py ŏ ngsa, Sr. 3). Kwak Chaeu was appointed Defending General (ch ŏ lch’ung changgun) and Assistant Defensive General ( chobangjang), both Sr. 3 rank. The righteous armies successively occupied fortifi cations along the western road to the capital and Mō ri was forced to gather his forces inside the fortifi - cations at S ŏngju and Kaery ŏng and concentrate on the defense of these two cities. The Ky ŏngsang Province righteous armies were augmented by regular troops and merged with the Ch ŏ lla Province righteous armies. The Korean forces focused their attacks on Sŏ ngju and Kaeryŏ ng and early in the second month of 1593 occupied both cities and secured the western road to the capital and the transport routes of the Naktong River, frustrating M ō ri’s attempts to control Kyŏ ngsang Province. In the fourth month of the same year, that frustration became the reason for the withdrawal of Japanese forces to Pusan from Hans ŏ ng. After the war, when Kwanghaegun, who was under the sway of the Kyŏ ngsang Province Northerner faction (the western righteous armies), came to the throne, Ch ŏ ng Inhong was made Chief State Councilor (y ŏ ng ŭ ij ŏ ng , Sr. 1), shouldering the heavy responsibility for post-war reconstruction.

East Ky ŏ ngsang Province In the sixth month, M ōri’s forces established their headquarters in Kaeryŏ ng and began mopping-up operations. Mō ri Motoyasu (1560–1601), a subordinate clansman, led a force of 3,000 and was given the job of governing the region. Motoyasu left Sŏ nsan and quickly captured various county seats in the east of the province, such as Sangju, Ŭ is ŏng, and Andong. Together with expanding his area of control, he took in vast amounts of grain for his military. At the same time, an 8,000-man M ō ri force under Kitsukawa Hiroie (1561–1625) that was billeted in Mun’gyŏ ng began operations towards Yech’ŏ n. Motoyasu, who delighted in an orderly progress in gaining control of the region, posted the following edicts on roadside placards for the Korean populace: (1) quickly return to your homes and work hard in the fi elds; (2) if Japanese soldiers take your wives or children, they will be punished; (3) those who obstruct the movements of Japanese soldiers will be punished. Nevertheless, in this region, as well, a sporadic anti-Japanese guerrilla war began. A full-scale righteous army effort did not begin until the middle of the sixth month with the appearance of resistance activities by the former Stewards

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ( pongsa , Jr. 8)5 K w ŏ n Ŭ ngsu (1546–1608) and Ch ŏ ng Taeim (1553–94) of Shilly ŏng. The Recruiting Offi cer Kim Sŏ ng’il immediately recognized these private forces as righteous armies and appointed Kwŏ n Ŭ ngsu as a commander. Following them appeared Han Hyosun (1543–1621) and Yu Chonggae (1558–92) of Y ŏ ngch’ ŏn, Kim Yunmy ŏng (1541–1604) of Andong, Kim Hae (1555–93) of Yean, and Kim Ho (?–1592) and Chu Chaho (?–?) of Ky ŏ ngju. At the end of the seventh month, Kwŏ n Ŭngsu and Chŏ ng Taeim’s forces attacked the Japanese garrison at Yŏ ngch’ ŏ n, and after three days of heavy fi ghting, the Japanese forces withdrew to Ky ŏngju. Riding on that victory, Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 147 the guerrillas recaptured Japanese garrisons at Ŭ is ŏng, Andong, Yech’ŏ , and P’ungsan. In the eighth month, a joint effort by regular and irregular forces aimed to recapture the Japanese stronghold at Kyŏ ngju, on the east road to the capital, but the attack failed. Nevertheless, in the middle of the eighth month, Motoyasu’s forces concluded that the maintenance of control in the interior of the eastern part of the province had fallen into diffi culty and withdrew to Sŏ nsan, along the middle road to the capital. Because of righteous army activity in the eastern part of Kyŏ ngsang Province, the eastern road to the capital became dangerous for the Japanese. In response to the guerrilla activity in the eastern part of the province, the court appointed Kwŏ n Ŭ ngsu as t’ongch ŏ ng taebu (a civil post, Sr. 3) and Ch ŏng Taeim as the Magistrate of Yech’ ŏ n.6

Righteous army activities in Ch ŏ lla Province Because Ch ŏ lla Province was geographically removed from the invasion route taken by the Japanese vanguard forces, it did not suffer direct damage at the opening of the war. For this reason, in contrast to Kyŏ ngsang Province, the existing ruling structure remained relatively preserved, and the living circumstances of the Korean populace and their morale remained relatively stable. However, the people heard a drumbeat of news about the steady advances of the Japanese military and the crushing defeats of the Korean regular forces. The governor (kwanch’alsa )7 of Ch ŏ lla Province, Yi Kwang (1541–1607), led a regular force of several tens of thousands with the intention of defending the capital but returned without once engaging the Japanese. At the beginning of the sixth month, with Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng of Kwangju and Kim Ch’ŏ n’il (1537–93) of Naju as advocates, a declaration inciting the creation of a Chŏ lla righteous army was circulated in the province. Both men were yangban . Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng had been the Magistrate of Tongnae (Jr. 3), and Kim Ch’ ŏ n’il had been the Magistrate of Tamyang (Jr. 3). Both men had retired from offi ce and were living secluded lives in their home villages. In proposing the creation of guerrilla forces, they clearly insisted that the irregular forces were to rescue king and country from the crisis. Moreover, Kim Ch’ŏ n’il denounced Governor Yi Kwang’s incompetence, and this statement supplied the force of the argument advocating attack, as suggested by Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng’s counsel. Powerful yangban throughout the province led their

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 recruits and gathered under Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏ ng’s and Kim Ch’ŏ n’il’s righteous army tents. After Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏng announced that he was putting together a force, he quickly attracted about 6,000 men. Kim Ch’ ŏ n’il’s personal force numbered 700. When they launched their efforts, they dispatched representatives to the king’s temporary refuge (kahaeng chaeso ) at Ŭ iju in P’yŏ ng’an Province and requested recognition of their righteous armies. 8 If they had not received recognition by the court, then they would have been no different from an army of rebellion. The court considered the raising of irregular troops in Ch ŏ lla Province and concluded that, without titles, the maintenance 148 Nukii Masayuki of the forces would become diffi cult. They appointed Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏng as a ch’ot’osa and Kim Ch’ŏ n’il as ch’ang ŭ isa .9 These titles contrast with the titles given to Kwak Chaeu in the west of the province. As illustrated by the saying that “young men and nobi [were led forward] to recruit,” yangban volunteers across the province led local men and gathered in the camps of powerful righteous army commanders who exercised great attractive power. In Chŏ lla Province as well as Ky ŏ ngsang Province, an anti-Waegu defensive force still functioned, and the righteous army recruits sought an elevation of their social status. The righteous army soldiers in Chŏ lla Province were from the entire social spectrum. The declaration of the Kŏ bu guerrillas details the target occupa- tions called on for recruits and lists: “high and low-born, old men, Confucian scholars, idle commoners, monks, post-station attendants, nobi , kuryu , 10 and miscellaneous.” Righteous army recruits were “men of will” and accepted unconditionally with no regard to social status. Their treatment within the military unit was decided on the basis of real strength and achievement. Those with merit in battle received higher social status and rewards. The object of the Ch ŏlla Province righteous army leaders was to march on the capital, recapture it from the Japanese, and restore the king. Kim Ch’ŏ n’il’s righteous army went ahead of Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏng’s force, moved north, entered Kanghwa Island in Kyŏ nggi Province, and confronted the Japanese military. Kim Ch’ ŏn’il’s appearance in Kanghwa Island awakened an anti-Japanese sentiment among the people of the Hans ŏ ng and Ky ŏ nggi Province region. In the middle of the sixth month, Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng’s forces left their Kwangju base and moved northwards. When they reached Yŏ san in Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province, news arrived that a large force under Kobayakawa Takakage had opened an invasion of Ch ŏlla Province by entering K ŭmsan, at the northern tip of Chŏ lla Province. Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏng himself wanted to move north, but his offi cers and men from Chŏ lla Province strongly desired to defend their home villages. Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏng was sympathetic to his soldiers’ wishes and turned his force to attack Kŭ msan. The leaders’ purpose in raising righteous armies in Chŏ lla was to rescue king and country, but the desire to defend their homes was strong among the rank and fi le. In the ŭK msan campaign, general Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏng and the greater part of his offi cers and men died, and the siege failed. Before that outcome, though, Kobayakawa’s main force left Kŭ msan fort-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ress and fought a fi erce battle with Korean regular and irregular forces at Ungji, very close to Chŏ nju, a capital of Ch ŏlla Province. In Kobayakawa’s absence, K ŭmsan came under attack from Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏng’s righteous army. A detached force from Kobayakawa’s army fought with and was detained by a regular force led by Kw ŏ n Yul (1537–99) at Ich’i on the way to Chŏ nju. Kobayakawa Takakage abandoned the capture of Chŏ nju and pulled back to the Kŭ msan fortress. In the middle of the seventh month, Takakage was called to a meeting of the Japanese generals in Hans ŏ ng, where he went and was caught up in providing a defense of Hansŏ ng against the Ming army, Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 149 never to return to Kŭ msan. Ankokuji Ekei was left in charge of the Kŭ msan fortress, but his forces were attacked in waves by guerrillas from Chŏ lla, Ch’ungch’ŏ ng, and Kyŏ ngsang provinces. Setting aside the question of governing Chŏ lla, even the defense of Kŭ msan was endangered, and he found that he had to withdraw to Ky ŏ ngsang Province. The heroic deaths of Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng’s righteous army troops stirred the sympathy of the people of Ch ŏ lla Province, and righteous armies appeared one after the other to carry on the dying wishes of Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng: Im Kyey ŏng (1528–97), a former Bailiff ( hyŏ n’gam , Jr. 6) of Posŏ ng; Ch’oe Kyŏ nghoe (1532–93), a former Magistrate (Jr. 3) of N ŭ ngs ŏng; and Kim T ŏ ngny ŏng (1567–96), a Confucian scholar from Tamyang. Im Kyeyŏ ng’s and Ch’oe Ky ŏnghoe’s guerrillas operated beyond Chŏ lla Province, merging with the west Kyŏ ngsang Province righteous army camp, which had seen the intensity of the damage wrought by the Japanese invasion. They came under the command of the west Kyŏ ngsang guerrilla leaders Chŏ ng Inhong and Kim Myŏ n and saw intense fi ghting. Chŏ lla supplied troops and army provisions to the frontline in Kyŏ ngsang Province and generally acted as a supply base. The supply arrangement illustrated the national strategic picture of “losing Yŏ ngnam (Ky ŏ ngsang) means the destruction of Honam (Chŏ lla).” The special characteristic of the Ch ŏlla guerrillas was that, from their initial mobilization, they rid themselves of their regionally exclusive character, which had been a defect of the righteous armies. The Ch ŏ lla righteous armies also prevented the Japanese army from entering Ch ŏ lla at all. 11

Righteous army activities in Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng Province Because the three roads to the capital cut across the center of Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province, it became an objective for the Japanese armies seeking to take Hans ŏng. At the beginning of the war, of the fi fty-eight counties in the province, eighteen along the roadside were attacked. In the middle of the fi fth month, guerrillas rose up in the counties that had suffered intense damage. Guerrillas appeared in so many places that the numbers are said to have reached from thirty to more than fi fty camps. There were more than twenty commanders, among whom were Cho Hŏ n, the monk Y ŏ nggyu, Shim Sugy ŏ ng (1516–99), Han Myŏ ng’yun (1542–93), and Hong Kyenam (?–?). Their motivation for resistance can be seen in their pleas for recruitment. As

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the region abuts Hansŏ ng, they spoke fi rst of the recovery of Hansŏ ng and the return of the king to his capital and then of local defense. The promoters of the righteous armies were yangban and other local powerful people. Their leaders were largely government offi cials. At the top of the list was Third State Councilor ( u ŭ ij ŏ ng, Sr. 1) Shim Sugyŏ ng, followed by County Magistrate (Jr. 4) Han Myŏ ng’yun (1542–93), tosa (Jr. 5) 12 Cho H ŏ n, and Superintendent of Post Stations (ch’albang , Jr. 6) Pak Ch’unmu (1568–1646). Others came from many different social classes: the military offi cials Cho Ung and Hong Ŏ nnam of the Ch’ungŭ iwi;13 the Confucian scholars awaiting bureaucratic 150 Nukii Masayuki appointment, Yi Pong (?–?), Han Hyŏ n (?–1596), and Yi Hae (?–?); monks under Y ŏnggyu; and a man who appears to have been Hong Kyenam’s second son ( s ŏ ja). There were guerrillas who became commanders based on results and not social status. Cho Hŏ n and Shim Sugy ŏng commanded more than 1,000 men; Hong Kyenam had more than 500. Japanese appointments of governance for the region deployed six daimy ō with 25,000 men, beginning with Fukushima Masanori’s (1561–1624) Fifth Army. The Japanese established a series of fortifi cations with the objective of governing Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province and protect the supply route from Pusan to Hans ŏ ng. The most impressive of the Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province righteous armies were the Cho Hŏ n and Yŏ nggyu contingents. Cho Hŏ n came from a yangban household of humble origin and in his youth received his education from the famous Confucianist S ŏng Hon (1535–98). He sought offi ce through the examinations, but rejected offi cial life and retreated to Okch’ŏ n in Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province to spend a life training disciples, working, and pursuing intellectual interests. He was known as a man of principle. He was troubled by the pre-war, national situation, and in front of the king’s palace called for a fi rm posture towards Japan in numerous memorials. Y ŏ nggyu was chief priest of a mountain temple in Ch’ungch’ ŏng Province near Kongju. Y ŏnggyu came into contact with a written appeal for resistance from his former teacher Sŏ san Taesa (1520–1604?) and responded. He gathered monks and created a righteous monk army ( ŭ is ŭ ngby ŏ ng). The monks took up sickles and joined with Cho H ŏ n’s force. Cho H ŏn, together with raising an army, severely criticized the governor of Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province, Yun Kukhy ŏng (1543–1611), as being responsible for the easy advancement of the Japanese army through Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province. In the eighth month, Cho Hŏ n and Y ŏ nggyu attacked the important Japanese stronghold at Ch’ŏ ngju, fought intensely, and captured the fortress. As the Japanese abandoned the fortifi cation and withdrew from the city, they were made to lament: “the guerrillas ( ŭ iby ŏ ng) cannot be compared to the regular army (commanded by Yun Kukhyŏ ng); they risk death and advance. There is no defense against that.” Cho Hŏ n and Yŏ nggyu’s aim was to reach the capital, but the staff offi cers and men asked to attack the Japanese fortifi cation at K ŭmsan on the provincial border. The guerrillas heard of the Ch ŏ lla leader Ko Ky ŏ ngmy ŏng’s death in battle at K ŭmsan, and Cho Hŏ n acceded to his soldiers’ request. From the beginning, within Cho Hŏ n’s force it was

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 said that “even without the whip, Cho Hŏ n’s soldiers obey orders well.” From this, we have a hint of the atmosphere inside Cho Hŏ n’s camp. In the regular army, it was habitual practice to lash troops into obeying orders. To encourage soldiers to fi ght, extreme measures were taken such as beheading deserters and detaining families. Morale was low. By contrast, it seemed that soldiers would desert the regular army, join the local militias, and become brave in battle. The righteous armies were not disorderly mobs and undisciplined bands. Rather, as a fi ghting corps, they possessed a stricter discipline than the regular troops. The following rules are an example of the military discipline Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 151 within the Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Provincial leader Yi Pong’s force: (1) those who fl ee from the battlefi eld will be beheaded; (2) those who pledge to fi ght and then desert will be beheaded; (3) those who disobey the commander’s order will be beheaded; (4) those who spread rumors with the intent to deceive will be punished. Compliance with this strict military order arose from acceptance and determination. Cho H ŏn and Y ŏnggyu’s forces produced a glorious military achievement in taking back the fortress at Ch’ ŏ ngju. That victory exacerbated the jealousy Governor Yun Kukhyŏ ng directed at Cho Hŏ n and provoked interference with the activities of the righteous army: “those who are registered with the regular army and conspire with Cho H ŏ n’s guerrillas will be punished” and “the parents, wives, and children of Cho Hŏ n’s guerrilla confederates will be arrested.” When Cho H ŏ n’s militia was launched, he had more than 1,000 men, but because of interference by the commanders of the regular army, the desertions multiplied and the number fell to around 700. At that time, Ankokuji Ekei, commanding offi cer of the Kobayakawa army, planned to establish a stronghold at K ŭmsan and govern the region. At the end of the eighth month, after the Battle of Ch’ŏ ngju, Cho Hŏ n and Yŏ nggyu’s righteous armies aimed to retake the capital and advanced to Onyang, but the staff offi cers pleaded to attack Kŭ msan for the defense of Ch ŏlla. Cho H ŏ n and Y ŏnggyu’s forces turned and decisively moved to attack Kŭ msan, but they were overwhelmed and most were killed in battle, including the two leaders. When people heard of their refusal to surrender and honorable deaths there was a general mourning. A stonemason, of his own initiative, erected a stele to leave a record of their heroic deeds to later generations. In the middle of the eighth month, the court praised Cho Hŏ n’s efforts and invested him as the Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province Righteous Army Commander, Fourth Secretary of the Offi ce of Sacrifi cial Rites pongsangshi( ch’ ŏ mj ŏ ng) (Jr. 4), but before he heard of his appointment he had died in battle. The late Yŏ nggyu was restored to secular life with the social status of commoner and given posthumously an appointment as t’ongch ŏ ng taebu (a civil post, Sr. 3). He was re- secularized because the conservative bureaucracy adhering to Confucianism within the court could not consent to conferring title on a man with the social status of a Buddhist monk. From 1594 to 1596, large popular revolts broke out one after another in Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province. The revolts were largely against bad governance and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 incompetent offi cials and sparked by unfair rewards to the “righteous armies,” severe exploitation, and the lack of measures to cope with famine and pesti- lence. Popular participation in the righteous armies had surely taught people the power of social outburst. The leaders and supporters of the rebels who created the largest revolts were people who had personal experience of the righteous armies. After the suppression of the revolts, the aforementioned leaders of the righteous armies, such as Kwak Chaeu, Kim Tŏ ngny ŏ ng, Hong Kyenam, and Ko Ŏ nbaek, came under suspicion and were arrested, but all were falsely charged as supporters of the revolts. Their treatment was an 152 Nukii Masayuki indication of the suppression being extended by powerful conservative interests facing the newly emergent power of the righteous armies. As one policy to quell the revolts, the court abolished the corvé e and tribute taxes in Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province and introduced a uniform grain tax. After the war, this policy brought about a unifi ed, national tax structure and developed into a system that greatly lightened the tax burden on the populace known as the Uniform Land Tax Law or the Taedongb ŏ p .14

Righteous army activities in Hamgy ŏ ng Province In the sixth month, the Japanese invasion of Hamgyŏ ng Province began. About 20,000 Japanese troops in the Second Army, led by Kat ō Kiyomasa (1562–1611) and Nabeshima Naoshige (1538–1618), were assigned control of Hamgy ŏ ng Province. Hamgyŏ ng differed from other provinces in that it was alienated from the Chos ŏn monarchy. Hamgy ŏ ng suffered from discriminatory measures: severe exploitation, local clans had their qualifi cations for the civil examinations revoked, and it was regarded as a destination for banishment and exile. When the Japanese invasion of Hamgyŏ ng began, many in the local populace had already fomented rebellion against the local government. Offi cial granaries were seized and local offi cials were punished and handed over to the Japanese military. A remarkable example was the arrest and deliverance to Katō Kiyomasa’s camp of two princes (Imhaegun, 1574–1609, and Sunhwa’gun, 1580–1607) and their entourage who had come to Hamgyŏ ng Province to raise a resistance. From this incident, we can see the deep resentment towards the court by the local populace. The court was forced to lament that “all the people of Hamgy ŏng have become rebels.” The Japanese army was welcomed as a liberator. Kiyomasa and his comrades were helped by the popular revolt and swept over the province quickly, even advancing across the country’s border into Jurchen territory.15 Benefi ting from cooperation from lower offi cials, local clans, and the populace, Japanese army rule of Hamgy ŏ ng Province proceeded favorably, even to the point of drawing up a cadastral survey that would form the foundation of governance. The survey recorded details of grain yields, fi eld sizes, and village population numbers for each county. At the end are the names of the local, lower government offi cials and clerks who managed the investigations.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In this way, the survey was accomplished with the practical and long-term cooperation of local government offi cials. The completion of a land survey was unique in the Japanese military control of Korea. Kat ō Kiyomasa established his headquarters in Anbyŏ n in south Hamgy ŏ ng Province and deployed his subordinates in a string of fortifi cations in the northern part of the province: Pukch’ŏ ng, Iw ŏ n, Tanch’ ŏ n, S ŏngjin, and Kilju. The fortifi cations north of these were entrusted to the leaders of the rebellions as Japanese military puppets. Kiyomasa’s colleague, Nabeshima Naoshige, made Hamh ŭng his base and aimed to control the region with a string of Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 153 forts at T ŏ g’w ŏ n (near Wŏnsan), Munch’ŏ n, Y ŏ ngh ŭ ng, Ch ŏ ngp’y ŏ ng, and Hongw ŏn. However, after months of rule by the Japanese military and their puppets, the Korean populace began to show tendencies towards rebellion against the coercive completion of the cadastral survey and the avaricious extraction that accompanied that process. Additionally, rumors of righteous army uprisings in other provinces began to arrive. The fi rst call for a righteous army uprising in Hamgy ŏng Province came from Chŏ ng Munbu (1565–1624). Chŏ ng was born in Haeju in Hwanghae Province. His father rose to become a high-ranking offi cial as a County Magistrate (Sr. 3). Chŏ ng passed the civil service examinations and was appointed to Kyŏ ngs ŏng in Hamgy ŏng Province as North Army Aide in the Provincial Military Administration ( pukp’y ŏ ngsa, Sr. 6). As a result of the popular uprisings that appeared when the Japanese military entered Hamgyŏ ng Province, danger came personally close to Chŏ ng as well, but his habitual good deeds were to prove fortunate. He was sheltered by his disciples and lived for some time hiding in a remote area. In the ninth month, Chŏ ng made a recommendation regarding leadership of a righteous army to two local men of powerful clans, Chi Talw ŏn (?–?) and Ch’oe Paech’ ŏn (?–?). The two gathered local men and joined Ch ŏng’s force. When Ch ŏng’s militia formed, they attacked Kyŏ ngs ŏ ng, where the puppet Kuk Se’p’il was installed, and recaptured the city. Ch ŏng, who had a victory at the opening of the confl ict, extended leniency towards all but the leading collaborators. With a strategy towards the populace of “no pursuit of past crimes,” Chŏ ng issued a broad appeal for recruitment to his righteous army. This was a necessary measure to turn the tide of large-scale opposition in Hamgyŏ ng Province to the Korean court towards support of the guerrillas. In the ninth month, the court abolished the edict “[if] captured by the enemy, all die” (Hamj ŏ k kaesalb ŏ p ), promulgated at the beginning of the confl ict, but Chŏ ng had already dealt realistically with the matter by his own judgment without the new law. Similarly, the court had enacted at the beginning of the confl ict the edict to “kill all Japanese who surrender” (Kangwae chinsalbŏ p ), but for the purpose of gathering information on the Japanese armies and strengthening the Korean army, the court now shifted its policy to “invite Japanese who surrender to guide and instruct” ( Kangwae yuinb ŏ p ). The court sought Japanese prisoners of war who were expert in the military arts to use them as instructors. New government posts were created for training and weapons manufacture called Superintendents

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 for Training ( hully ŏ n togam ). Ch ŏ ng Munbu’s call for the creation of a militia spread out to other counties in the province, and even in Hoeryŏ ng County, which was under the control of a rebel against the Korean government by the name of Kuk Kyŏ ng’in (?–1592), Shin Sejun (?–?), a member of a local clan, raised an army and attacked Hoeryŏ ng. In the beginning of the tenth month, all of the counties controlled by Japanese military puppets from Myŏngch’ŏn northwards fell into the hands of righteous armies. From the eleventh month to the fi rst month of the following year, during a particularly cold winter in the northern part of 154 Nukii Masayuki Korea, Ch ŏng Munbu’s militia attacked Japanese garrisons at Kilju, Sŏ ngjin, and Tanch’ ŏn. Kiyomasa’s and Naoshige’s main forces in the southern part of Hamgyŏ ng could not dispatch reinforcements because of the severe cold and tremendous snowfalls. They could do nothing more than issue an order to “fi ght to the last; await the spring thaw” and watch as their subordinates in the string of forts to the north died. In the second month of 1593, Katō Kiyomasa and Nabeshima Naoshige abandoned Hamgyŏ ng Province under orders from headquarters in Hansŏ ng and pulled back to the capital. This was because it was necessary to prepare for a massive Ming military attack and strengthen the defense of the Hansŏ ng garrison. Ch ŏng Munbu was recognized for his resistance to the enemy and awarded the post of t’ongch ŏ ng taebu (a civil appointment, Sr. 3).16

Righteous army activities in Hwanghae Province In the middle of the fi fth month, the Japanese campaign for Hwanghae and P’y ŏng’an provinces began. The First Army under Konishi Yukinaga (?–1600) and the Third Army under Kuroda Nagamasa (1568–1623) totaled some 30,000 troops. At that time, the Korean king had been driven from his capital by the Japanese forces, passed through Kaes ŏng and P’y ŏngyang, and was accommodated temporarily in Ŭ iju on the border with China. The Japanese army pursued the king, continuing their western advance and at the Battle of the Imjin River, in front of Kaes ŏ ng, defeated the Korean army. Thereafter, resistance by the regular army ceased to exist, and on the eighth day of the sixth month, Japanese forces arrived at the Taedong River in the suburbs of P’y ŏ ngyang, and the city was bloodlessly captured. In the latter part of the sixth month, 11,000 troops under Kuroda Nagamasa and Ōtomo Yoshimune left P’y ŏngyang and moved southwards with the intention of establishing control in Hwanghae Province. Otomo’s army established its headquarters at Pongsan in Hwanghae and was given the task of protecting the logistics line between Hansŏ ng and P’y ŏ ngyang. Kuroda’s army went farther south and positioned itself in a large fortress at Haeju, intending to rule Hwanghae Province. Nagamasa ordered roadside notice boards be put up with the following announcements:

1) The Japanese army are envoys of peace; 2) Corvee and taxation would

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 be light; 3) Public and private low-born (nobi ) would all become farmers ( hyakush ō ); 4) Those who do not return to their villages and those who conceal weapons will be beheaded.

The edicts were translated into ŏ nmun (vernacular Korean) with the intention of reaching all the populace. Moreover, Nagamasa distributed grain from government stores to the populace, strictly forbade the Japanese forces from plunder and arson, struck the pose of a liberating army, and asked for the submission of the populace. Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 155 In the middle of the seventh month, tendencies towards guerrilla resistance appeared in this region as well. Kim Chinsu (?–?), Kim Mansu (1553–1607), and Hwang Hasu (?–?) of Pongsan issued calls for revolt and to the populace they appealed for the gathering of guerrillas with the pledge that “if even those who have surrendered to the Japanese present themselves as recruits, we will not inquire into their crimes. For those who capture a bandit, we offer large rewards.” Kim T ŏ ks ŏng (?–?) of Paekch’ ŏn and Pak Ch’uny ŏng (?–?) of Y ŏn’an also invited volunteers from their vicinities and created militias. Cho Chongnam (?–?) of Paekch’ ŏn, with ten others, repeatedly conferred and called for volunteers from Haeju, P’yŏ ngsan, and Y ŏ n’an. However, as there was no one with the qualities of a commander, they recommended Third Minister of the Board of Personnel ( Yijo sam ŭ i , Sr. 3), Yi Ch ŏng’am (1541–1600), as the righteous army general. Yi did not reply immediately because of various worries: the location of his family, the resentment of the populace against high offi cials, and the diffi culty of gathering recruits. He was born in Kyŏ ngju in Kyŏ ngsang Province; he was a Y ŏ ngnam sarim; he had served in high posts in local government (Magistrate of P’y ŏngsan and Y ŏn’an in Hwanghae Province, Tongnae in Ky ŏ ngsang Province, all Sr. 3) and returned to the central political world as Third Minister of the Board of Personnel in close association with the king. However, he was unable to follow the king when he left the capital as a refugee. That was because it would have meant abandoning Hans ŏ ng, and Yi was clan patriarch with hundreds of dependants, beginning with his seventy-two-year-old mother. He came as far as Kaesŏ ng, but the king’s retinue had already left for P’yŏ ngyang. The Custodial Magistrate of Kaes ŏ ng (Kaes ŏ ng yusujik , Sr. 3) was Yi Chŏ nghy ŏng, his younger brother, and from him Yi Ch ŏng’am learned of his dismissal. At that point, he and his family abandoned following the king and fl ed to the mountains. Because the local yangban implored Yi Ch ŏng’am to comply with their request, and he felt pangs of conscience for not having been able to accompany the king, when he had sent his elderly mother to Kanghwa Island for refuge, he accepted the commission as commander of the Hwanghae Province righteous army. The rumor that he was raising an army immediately circulated in the neighboring counties and underneath him gathered local yangban volunteers, refugee government offi cials, and regular troops. The court feared that the populace of Hwanghae would collaborate with the Japanese, but they were delighted with Yi Ch ŏng’am’s call to arms and immediately appointed

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 him Commander of the Righteous Army of Hwanghae and Special Wartime Envoy ( Hwanghae-do ŭ iby ŏng chang ky ŏ m ch’ot’osa ).17 The appointment was because Yi Ch ŏng’am had once been at the side of the king and his loyalty was well known. Moreover, expectations for the call to arms were high, because Hwanghae Province was a grain-producing region, next to the region where the king had fl ed, a relay point for the transport of goods from Chŏ lla, and sat astride the main road connecting Hans ŏ ng with P’y ŏ ngyang. Together with his call to arms, Yi Ch ŏng’am stipulated two points. First, the righteous army base would avoid territory occupied by the Japanese army, 156 Nukii Masayuki and he chose the strong fortifi cation at Yŏ n’an with its moat. However, fearing a Japanese attack on Yŏ n’an, the magistrate, the regular army troops, and the people all fl ed. It sat empty, and its storehouses were all looted. Second, he set out a military code, after he received his court commission on the fourth day of the eighth month. It consisted of eight parts and reveals a lot about the character of Yi Ch ŏ ng’am’s righteous army:

1) Those who fl ee the battlefi eld will be beheaded; 2) Those who prey on the people will be beheaded; 3) Those who do not obey the orders of a commanding offi cer will be beheaded; 4) Those who disclose classifi ed information will be beheaded; 5) Those who renege on their oath to serve will be beheaded; 6) Bowmen come fi rst followed by swordsmen; 7) Those who obtain enemy property will not be rewarded; and 8) Those who take another’s achievements will not be rewarded.

In short, these principles suggest that the righteous army is a military force that supports the populace, and to counter the stronger Japanese force, a strict code of self-discipline is necessary. Towards the end of the eighth month, 3,000 troops under Kuroda Nagamasa’s direct command encircled the Yŏ n’an fortress. Yŏ n’an was located on the route from one of Hwanghae’s capitals, Haeju, to Paekch’ŏ n. To secure the military logistics route from Haeju to Hansŏ ng or P’yŏ ngyang it was essential to bring Yŏ n’an under control. The militia defenders numbered 200 with 2,000 occupants. Yi Chŏ ng’am’s staff offi cers who faced the Japanese force said that Y ŏn’an was “without an army, without provisions, and without weapons,” and in these circumstances, any defense of the city would be reckless. They strongly recommended withdrawal from the city. Nevertheless, Yi Chŏ ng’am decided that he had to cling to his public promise to the residents to return them to the city to protect their property and lives and laid out a way to meet the Japanese army. On top of this, he allowed his staff offi cers to decide individually whether they would stay to defend the city or fl ee. The battle raged for fi ve days. Despite the fact that Nagamasa took direct command of his troops, the fortress did not fall. The Kuroda army broke off the assault on Yŏ n’an and retired to Paekch’ŏ n. This was because an order had arrived from headquarters in Hansŏ ng that, given the tenacious resistance of Yŏ n’an, Kuroda should move to Paekch’ŏ n in order to protect

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the road between P’yŏ ngyang and Hansŏ ng. Kuroda Nagamasa’s control of Hwanghae Province ended with the failed capture of Yŏ n’an, and he never again reached Haeju. Yi Ch ŏng’am’s victory at Y ŏn’an carried great import. First, it made inse- cure the Japanese army’s logistics route between P’yŏ ngyang and Hans ŏ ng. Second, it encouraged anti-Japanese activities in the P’yŏ ng’an and Ky ŏ nggi regions. Third, it secured the grain-producing region of Hwanghae Province. Fourth, it opened a West Sea logistics and supply route that connected the king’s temporary capital with Chŏ lla, Province, Kanghwa Island, and Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 157 Hwanghae Province. The court praised the Yŏ n’an victory and rewarded the achievement by commissioning Yi Ch ŏng’am with the real offi ce of Fourth Minister-without-Portfolio ( Tongji Chungch’ubusa, Jr. 2) and giving offi ces to his offi cers and men. Afterwards, in considering the power relations of Hwanghae Province, the territory controlled by the Japanese military were only the forts that linked Hansŏ ng and P’yŏ ngyang. The greater part of the counties in Hwanghae Province were in the hands of the Hwanghae righteous army. After the Battle of Y ŏ n’an, Yi Chŏ ng’am possessed 6,000 men with fi ghters in every county putting pressure on the Japanese forces stationed in Hwanghae Province.18

Righteous army activities in P’y ŏ ng’an Province From the beginning of the sixth month, P’yŏ ng’an Province on the northwest part of the Korean Peninsula became the temporary refuge for the king ( kahaengjaeso) with the temporary capital ( ch’ ŏ ndo) in Ŭiju. In the middle of the fi fth month, the Japanese First Army under Konishi Yukinaga pursued the king as he decamped from Hansŏ ng and arrived in P’y ŏ ngyang. The king’s retinue was hurried and in the escape from P’yŏ ngyang, they left large amounts of rice provisions in the city. When Konishi’s army occupied P’y ŏ ngyang, they did not advance to the west but continued to garrison the city. From the beginning of the war, Konishi consistently sought an armistice and peace negotiations with the Koreans and the Chinese. During this period, in the seventh month, the Ming reinforcements attacked P’yŏ ngyang but were repelled by the Japanese. In the eighth month, the Ming diplomat Shen Weijing arrived in P’yŏ ngyang and concluded a fi fty-day truce with Yukinaga. The Japanese military paused in P’y ŏngyang and awaited a diplomatic response from the Chinese emperor in the peace negotiations. From Ŭiju, the court called for a righteous army uprising by all the people of the country. In P’yŏ ng’an Province, guerrilla resistance by Buddhist monks was lively. Here, I will focus on their activities. During the Chos ŏ n period, Confucianism was greatly respected as the state ideology, and Buddhism was thoroughly ostracized and suppressed. Moreover, monks had fallen to low-born social status. Nevertheless, with regard to religious policy, it was a time of intermittent religious persecution. The middle Chosŏ n period (King Chungjong, King Myŏ ngjong, and King Sŏ njo) saw relative leniency towards

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the Buddhist faith and suppressive policies were relaxed. During this time, the Sŏ n Buddhist civil service examination ( s ŏ n’gwa) was revived. Sitting a recognized examination enabled them to have something akin to an offi cial career (or “jump the dragon gate”), and there appeared a number of famous, accomplished monks. 19 In spite of the offi cial suppression of Buddhism by the court, respect for the Buddhist faith had put down deep roots among the populace. The court’s call to arms was also directed at Buddhist monks. At the time, the famous monk S ŏsan taesa Hyuj ŏng (1520–1604), in whose person was focused popular confi dence, was pursuing the propagation of the 158 Nukii Masayuki faith and training disciples in Myohyang mountain. When Hyujŏ ng received a royal command in the seventh month, he took up weapons in his own hands and propagated a general call to arms to all temples and monks in the country. The respondents were known as righteous monk soldiers ( ŭ is ŭ ngby ŏ ng ). Sa’my ŏng taesa Yujŏ ng (1544–1610) (also known as Song’un taesa) received a written appeal from his honored teacher, Hyujŏ ng. Yuj ŏ ng was born into a humble yangban household in Milyang in Ky ŏngsang Province. Losing his parents at a young age, he became a monk at fourteen, and at age eighteen, he was accepted into the Sŏ n sect. Thereafter, he toured all the mountain temples in the country, and for a time was a disciple of Hyujŏ ng. When war broke out, he was training at P’yohun Temple in the Kŭ mgang mountains in Kangwŏ n Province. Mori Yoshinari’s Fourth Army even entered the Kŭ mgang mountains, but Yuj ŏ ng argued that Korean mountain temples had no treasures and convinced them to withdraw. Yujŏ ng responded to his teacher’s written appeal to arms and led 150 monks out of the Kŭ mgang mountains towards the king’s temporary court in P’yŏ ng’an Province while recruiting righteous monk soldiers along the way. The monk soldiers came under the command of Yu S ŏngnyong, Temporary Envoy to the Provinces ( ch’ech’alsa) and commander-in-chief (tow ŏ nsu ). 20 Hyuj ŏ ng was appointed Supreme Commander and Righteous Monk for the Eight Provinces and Sixteen Sects ( p’aldo sipyuk chongdo ch’ongs ŏ p ŭ is ŭ ng), and Yuj ŏng was appointed Great General of the Righteous Monks ( ŭ is ŭ ng todaechang). Eventually, Yujŏ ng replaced Hyujŏ ng because of Hyujŏ ng’s advanced age, and Yuj ŏng became supreme commander of about 2,000 righteous monks. Yuj ŏng’s righteous monks did not proceed in the direction of the temporary capital but established their headquarters in Sun’an, a suburb of P’yŏ ngyang, and attacked the transport corps of the Japanese army operating between P’y ŏngyang and Hansŏ ng. As a result, grain shortages for the 18,000 Japanese troops in the P’yŏ ngyang garrison became serious. Moreover, the severe peninsular winter sapped the morale of the Japanese soldiers and produced consecutive outbreaks of illnesses. Despite these problems, Yukinaga adhered to the truce agreement with Shen Weijing and persevered in waiting for an imperial rescript from the Ming emperor. During this time, however, the Ming court pursued a reconstruction of forces to repel the Japanese. In the fi rst month of 1593, a joint Chinese–Korean force of 50,000 crack troops led by the Ming commander Li Rusong, together with the Korean regular army, uni-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 laterally abrogated the truce and attacked P’y ŏ ngyang. The righteous monks provided reconnaissance on the Japanese forces inside the walls, guided attacking troops in battle, and fought in the vanguard. The Chinese–Korean army that drove out the Japanese forces from P’yŏ ngyang headed south to lay siege to Hansŏ ng. The righteous monks followed, and at the Battle of Surak Mountain, an access point for Hansŏ ng, they drove out the Japanese forces putting up a defense of the capital. To reward Yujŏ ng, the Korean king conferred on him Great Master of the Meditation School and Palace Ascendable Offi cial (s ŏngyo chongp’ansa ky ŏm tangsang kwanjik , Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 159 Sr. 3). For the bureaucrats within the court to recognize this special appointment testifi es to the confi dence they placed in Yujŏ ng; they needed the fi ghting strength of the righteous monks. After that, the righteous monks fought in numerous battles in every region and sometimes as the transport corps, sometimes as the constructors of mountain forts. They were entrusted with the most rigorous rear duties in support of the Chinese and Korean forces. Let us consider the special qualities of the righteous monks. They had a strong esprit de corps because they shared the Buddhist faith, and the social status of both offi cers and men was low-born. Having been part of a national church organization, they were able to function in a united and systematic way. Having been trained in mountain temples, they were in robust health and acquainted with the mountainous topography of the entire country. Because their daily life was self-suffi cient, they excelled at being independently capable, and their skills were of assistance in producing provisions and material for the military. They were not married and could participate in battle without being anxious about dependants. In comparison with the righteous armies, however, the righteous monks were held in lower regard by the court. Conferring decorations on them for meritorious conduct in battle was not easily done, because of the opposition of the Confucian bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the monks wanted offi cial recognition of Buddhism and the continuation of the Sŏ n sect and fought tenaciously.21 The confi dence of the king and the people towards Yuj ŏ ng steadily deepened. Yujŏ ng’s activities were remarkable: conducting peace negotiations with Katō Kiyomasa on four occasions and crossing to Japan after the war for audience with Tokugawa Ieyasu about the post-war dispensation. Those meetings built the basis for the post-war normalization of relations, and both countries preserved the peace between them with “neighborly relations” for 260 years, thereby creating a stable international order in East Asia. 22

Conclusion This chapter has summarized the activities of the righteous armies in various provinces during the Imjin War. The following summarizes the similarities and differences among the provinces and pulls together the points of signifi cance. The similarities are multiple. (1) The righteous armies were armed groups that arose spontaneously from among the populace, but it took court approval

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 before they could be called righteous armies. The formation and conduct of the righteous armies differed from the regular army; they were self-reliant and original. (2) Leadership of the righteous armies came from local yangban (excepting the righteous monks) or local well-known and wealthy clans at the core of village rule. Although Ch ŏ ng Munbu in Hamgyŏ ng Province and Yi Chŏ ng’am in Hwanghae Province were not local yangban , their support structure lay with local yangban and local powerful clans. Yangban were the constituents of the ruling class with their summit in the king, and their calls to arms were strongly focused on aid to country and king. (3) The activities 160 Nukii Masayuki of the righteous armies were directed by the leadership, but the motivation to volunteer among the rank and fi le was local defense. That purpose was made manifest within the righteous army activities. (4) The righteous armies possessed a severe military code that they themselves created, and they strictly enforced it. Offi cers and men were highly valued within the ranks; social class was ignored; and real abilities and achievements were highly valued. That circumstance brought out the energy and fi ghting strength of each individual guerrilla. (5) The righteous armies were composed of different social levels, but the esprit de corps was strong because of the regional and kin groups based on village cooperative bodies. Moreover, the various social classes that were recruited into the righteous armies all carried strong aspirations to raise their social status. (6) When the righteous armies were established, there were many instances of competition with the regular army, but in the end, the righteous armies were subordinated to the direction of the court. The yangban leadership of the righteous armies presented no opposition to this development. (7) The fi ghting strength of the righteous armies was a greater threat to the Japanese forces than that of the regular army. Let us now consider the differences. (1) The timing of the creation of the righteous armies and their scale show differences depending on when the Japanese invaded their regions and how much damage the Japanese infl icted. (2) The shape of activities took many forms, dependent on the behavior of the Japanese armies and on regional peculiarities. In the various counties of Ky ŏngsang and Ch ŏlla provinces, existing local defense structures to counter Japanese piracy were brought to life. The righteous armies in western Kyŏ ngsang province formed a loose regional force based on intimate ideological connections. From the origin of the Chŏ lla righteous armies, they were a large military force, and the basis of their behavior sprang from a relatively strong regional exclusivity. (3) The righteous monk armies were special military forces that cannot be viewed the same as the other righteous armies; they made use of their special characteristics in their activities. Nevertheless, they were relatively undervalued in their military results. (4) The way the bu-Wae (those who surrendered to and cooperated with the Japanese) were handled differed by righteous army in each province. The differences sprang from their interaction with the Japanese military. The court also shifted from an extremely punitive approach at the opening of the confl ict to a mitigating posture. (5) The conduct of the populace was not uniform and varied in com-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 plicated ways by province. At least, it was not a simple matter to take up arms against the invading Japanese. (6) The basic conception behind the righteous army leadership in each province was a Confucian notion of loyalty to the prince and love of country, but the historical background and basis for resistance differed. The righteous armies that appeared in 1592 smashed the local rule distributed across Korea’s eight provinces by the Japanese military. The righteous army activities were one of the most important primary factors for the frustration of the Toyotomi regime’s ambition to subjugate Ming China and Righteous army activity in the Imjin War 161 extend dominion over Korea. We can understand Hideyoshi’s intent when he said, “the most frightening thing in Korea are the insurrectionists (ikki yakura ).” Moreover, the activities of the righteous armies brought about various reforms in social status, military structure, and taxation in the Chosŏ n kingdom and contributed to the development of Chosŏ n society.

Notes Translated by James B. Lewis. 1 Translator’s note: “Left” and “right” refer to the king’s perspective facing south from the capital. 2 Translator’s note: A mid-sized military camp within the Chos ŏ n-period military structure. See Map 4 . 3 Translator’s note: An offi cial in charge of food and clothing for the royal family. 4 Translator’s note: For a description of extant military rosters and an analysis of the information they can provide on Chosŏ n-period height, see James B. Lewis et al. , “Toward an Anthropometric History of Chos ŏ n Dynasty Korea,” 2013. 5 Translator’s note: An offi cial appointed to the Royal House Administration and its various temples, shrines, offi ces, halls, directorates, granaries, storehouses, and palaces. 6 Nukii Masayuki, Toyotomi seiken no kaigai shinryaku to Ch ō sen gihei kenkyū , 1996, Part II, sections 1 and 2. See also: Nukii Masayuki, “Nanmyō [Nam Myŏ ng or Cho Shik] gakuha no Jinshin gihei katsud ō ,” 2003. 7 Translator’s note: Provincial governors were usually Jr. 2 rank. 8 Translator’s note: Oh, Engraving Virtue, 2013, p. 230, translates kahaeng chaeso as “Travel Palace.” 9 Translator’s note: The ch’ot’osa was a special offi cial dispatched to provinces at a time of war. The ch’ang ŭ isa probably had a similar function. 10 Translator’s note: The kuryu refers to practitioners of the nine schools: Confucians, Daoists, Yin and Yang specialists, Legalists, Logicians, Mohists, Diplomats, Miscellaneous, and Agriculturalists. 11 Nukii Masayuki, Toyotomi seiken no kaigai shinryaku to Chō sen gihei kenkyū , 1996, Part II, section 3. 12 An offi cial in the Merit Awards Administration (Ch’unghunbu ), the Offi ce of the Princesses’ Consort ( Ŭ ibinbu), the Offi ce of Loyal Ministers (Ch’ung’ikbu ), the State Tribunal ( Ŭ ig ŭ mbu ), and the Kaesŏ ng Magistracy ( Kaes ŏ ngbu ). 13 Translator’s note: The Ch’ung ŭ iwi was a special branch of the army under the Division of the South (ch’ungchwawi ) among the Five Commands ( owi), and offi - cials were dispatched from the central military. 14 Nukii Masayuki, Toyotomi seiken no kaigai shinryaku to Chō sen gihei kenkyū , 1996, Part II, section 4. 15 Translators’ note: Kiyomasa crossed the Tumen River and raided Jurchen villages. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 See Map 2 . 16 Nukii Masayuki, Toyotomi seiken no kaigai shinryaku to Chō sen gihei kenky ū , 1996, Part II, section 1 and Part III, section 4. See also: Nukii Masayuki, Hideyoshi to tatakatta Ch ō sen bush ō , 1992, ch. 4. 17 A special offi cial dispatched temporarily to the provinces in the midst of war. 18 Nukii Masayuki, “Jinshin Waran to K ō kait ō gihei,” 1999. 19 Translators’ note: The sŏ n’gwa , or S ŏ n examination, was the general term for the s ŭ nggwa, or monk’s examination, that dated back to the tenth century. Temporarily discontinued under King Sŏ ngjong or King Y ŏnsan’gun (1469–1506), it was reinstated under King Myŏ ngjong (r. 1545–67). A euphemism in East Asia for passing 162 Nukii Masayuki the civil service examinations was “jumping the dragon gate” and referred to carp swimming upstream, leaping over the Yellow River waterfall at Dragon Gate, gaining admittance to a select group, and being transformed into dragons, which in this case became “monks jumping the dragon gate” (s ŭ ngnyo t ŭ ngyongmun ). 20 Translators’ note: Yu S ŏngnyong was prime minister during the confl ict and author of Chingbirok . 21 Translator’s note: The motivation of the monks is the subject of a Ph.D. dissertation by Samuel Dukhae Kim, “The Korean Monk-Soldiers in the Imjin Wars,” 1978. Kim concludes that patriotism may have been a motivation, but the stronger motivation was for recognition and improvement of the social status of monks. 22 Nukii Masayuki, “Jinshin Teiy ū Waran oyobi sengo no Nitchō k ō sh ō ni okeru Isei (Yuj ŏ ng) (Song’un taesa) no katsudō ni kansuru k ō satsu,” 2001.

References Kim , Samuel Dukhae. “The Korean Monk-Soldiers in the Imjin Wars: An analysis of Buddhist Resistance to the Hideyoshi Invasion 1592–1598,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1978 . Lewis , James B. , Seong Ho Jun , and Daniel Schwenkendiek . “ Toward an Anthropometric History of Chosŏ n Dynasty Korea, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century ,” Journal of the Historical Society 13 :3 ( 2013 ): 239–70 . Nukii , Masayuki ( 貫井正之 ). “ Jinshin Teiy ū Waran oyobi sengo no Nitchō k ō sh ō ni okeru Isei (Yujŏ ng) (Song’un taesa) no katsudō ni kansuru k ō satsu ( 壬辰丁酉倭乱および戦後の日朝交渉における惟政 ( 松雲大師 ) の活動に関する考察 ) ,” Ch ō sen gakuh ō ( 朝鮮学報 ) 178 ( 2001 ): 97–139 . Nukii Masayuki ( 貫井正之). “Jinshin Waran to Kō kait ō gihei: Ri Teian gihei wo ch ū shin ni shite ( 壬辰倭乱と黄海道義兵 – 李廷〔アン〕義兵を中心にして ) ,” Rekishi hy ō ron ( 歴史評論 ) 595 ( 1999 ): 2–16 . Nukii Masayuki ( 貫井正之 ). “Nanmy ō [Nam Myŏ ng or Cho Shik] gakuha no Jinshin gihei katsudō : toku ni Keishō ud ō ni okeru Jō Ninkō [Ch ŏ ng Inhong] gihei wo ch ū shin ni shite (南冥学派の壬辰義兵活動ーとくに慶尚右道における鄭仁弘義兵を中心にしてー ) ,” Rekishigaku kenky ū ( 歴史学研究 ) 778 ( 2003 ): 18–33 . Nukii Masayuki ( 貫井正之 ). Hideyoshi to tatakatta Chō sen bush ō ( 秀吉と戦った朝鮮武将 ). Tokyo : Rokk ō Shuppan , 1992 . Nukii Masayuki ( 貫井正之 ). Toyotomi seiken no kaigai shinryaku to Ch ō sen gihei kenky ū ( 豊臣政権の海外侵略と朝鮮義兵研究 ). Tokyo : Aoki shoten , 1996 . Oh , Young Kyun . Engraving Virtue: The Printing History of a Premodern Korea Moral Primer . Leiden : Brill , 2013 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 9 Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea

Kenneth M. Swope

Victory in War lies in establishing awe. – Wei Liaozi

The ruler cannot be without awesomeness, for if he lacks awesomeness, he will lose his authority. – Three Strategies of Huang Shigong1

While the period of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) is widely regarded as having been one of the high points of traditional Chinese art and culture, far less scholarly attention has focused upon the military dimensions of the empire.2 This is due both to the biases of traditional Chinese historians, who were wont to downplay the importance of the military and military offi cials in their records, and to the efforts of the Manchu conquerors of Ming China, who pointed to the military decline of the dynasty as one of the primary reasons for their own seizure of the Mandate of Heaven. As a result of such self-serving interpretations, modern historians have, for the most part, been content to accept standard interpretations of the decline and fall of the Ming dynasty and have neglected an examination of the military achievements of the empire. 3 One prominent historian has even characterized the Ming as “an introverted and noncompetitive state.”4 This obscures the historical reality of the Ming Empire that, even during its waning days, was one of the largest and most militarily powerful states in the world. Modern scholars are now starting to acknowledge this fact and examine some of its ramifi cations. For

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 example, the Ming has recently been accurately described as the world’s fi rst gunpowder empire, a fourteenth-century “military superpower.”5 Another historian has offered a fascinating re-examination of the great Ming naval missions of the early fi fteenth century, describing them as a form of “force projection.” 6 David Robinson has published a fascinating study of “martial spectacles” at the Ming court wherein he delineates various ways in which Ming emperors sought to embrace the military aspects of their rule, focusing on such things as ritual hunts, archery contests, military parades and reviews, and martial games such as polo, and situates these activities within a broader Eurasian context of universal rulership.7 164 K.M. Swope Moreover, the Ming empire was ethnically and geographically diverse and the Ming military was forced to deal with a range of strategic problems that far exceeded those of its contemporaries. That the Ming state was able to handle these problems successfully for nearly three centuries is a testament to the military might of the empire and warrants far greater attention from both students of Chinese history and students of comparative military history. This chapter will focus upon the larger strategic concerns of the Ming in order to determine whether or not the Ming in fact had a grand strategy for maintaining dynastic security and advancing the state’s interests. Below, I will also consider whether or not the Ming government can be said to have possessed a strategic culture. Because of the tremendous amount of primary materials extant, the Ming dynasty presents a very fertile area for the study of such matters in the early-modern world. Scholars can trace and evaluate the decision-making process at all stages to arrive at conclusions concerning the coherent articulation and application of grand strategy for the Imjin War, while also identifying potential strategic cultures that may have infl u- enced such strategies. Therefore, I will summarize recent literature pertaining to both grand strategy and strategic culture in Chinese history with an emphasis upon the Ming period, before advancing my conceptualizations of Ming grand strategy. In addition to examining the Ming context, I will offer grounds for comparison with other early-modern gunpowder empires. Before launching into a discussion of Ming grand strategy, working defi nitions of key concepts used in this chapter are in order. I accept Iain Johnston’s broad defi nition of strategic culture as the idea that different states have different predominant sets of strategic preferences that are rooted in the “early” or the “formative” military experiences of the state or its predecessor, and are infl uenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cogni- tive characteristics of the state and state elites as these develop through time. 8 Moreover, strategic culture

is an integrated system of symbols that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and effi cacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and effi cacious.9

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 As indicated above, imperial China provides an excellent test case for such theories because of the extent of its written tradition, not to mention the conscious repeated invocations of precedent and historical lessons by offi cials and policy makers. Chinese emperors all received extensive instruction in history and an extensive understanding of the reasons for past decisions, and the ramifi cations of such decisions informed the policy-making process.10 As for grand strategy, I will again follow the lead of Johnston, who employs the defi nition provided by the United States Department of Defense in 1987: grand strategy is the coordination of all elements of national power Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 165 (economic, political, and military) to accomplish “national” goals, primarily security against external threats.11 A grand strategy must therefore identify threats and propose remedies for those threats. Of course, both threats and solutions to threats will evolve over time and will be contingent upon a variety of personal and institutional factors. Nonetheless, if one accepts the notion that states have strategic cultures, the ways in which these affect the formulation of grand strategy can provide insight into the aims and actions of states when confronted by military threats. As noted above, the topic of Chinese strategic culture as it pertains to grand strategy has recently received a fair amount of attention from the international relations and policy analyst community. Since several of these authors reference historical antecedents, particularly the Ming dynasty, it is worth discussing three of their contributions herein. These are the works of Feng Huiyun, Iain Johnston, and Yuan-kang Wang, all of whom weave international relations and political science theories into their discussions of Chinese grand strategy. 12 I will begin with a discussion of Feng Huiyun’s research because her work most closely refl ects what might be termed a more “traditional” pacifi st interpretation of Chinese strategic culture. Indeed, at the outset of her chapter on China’s strategic culture she challenges Johnston’s assertion that Chinese strategic culture “exhibits an aggressive and expansionist preference.”13 Feng operates from the premise that Confucian thought as it emerged towards the end of the Warring States period ( c .403–221 BCE ) assumed predominance in the creation of China’s strategic culture. 14 She contends that Confucianism “refl ected the people’s general aspiration for peace” and was domestically focused. Therefore, “the Chinese way of expansion of the Chinese order was through cultural rather than military means and the fi nal goal was not territorial or political rule over other states.”15 She continues by contending that “the unique part of Chinese Confucian thought is that … it relies on virtue and self-cultivation of leaders/rulers to maintain peace and prestige rather than resorting to force for obedience in handling inter-state relations.”16 While acknowledging that many scholars have contested this idealized notion of Confucianism’s pervasive infl uence over state policy, Feng nonetheless asserts that the constraining infl uence of Confucianism, with its emphasis upon non-violence, defensiveness, and righteous war, has created a Chinese strategic culture that has been primarily defensive since the Warring

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 States era.17 She takes this one step further by contending that “in over 2000 years of feudal rule the feudal empires of China seldom displayed aggressive intentions towards other countries nor made any attempts at expansion despite the capability to do so.”18 Such a rosy interpretation would be surprising to the ancestors of many of China’s fi fty-six recognized “national minority” groups today, whose forced assimilation into the empire resembles that of their counterparts all over the globe.19 But Feng takes her argument even further and claims that “In China’s 5000 years of history, there were only two large-scale 166 K.M. Swope military expansionist movements carried out by the nomadic minorities of Mongolian and Manchurian people.”20 In making such statements Feng is not only seeing traditional Chinese military culture through an overwhelm- ingly positive lens, but is also evincing a remarkable degree of Han Chinese chauvinism. She further points to the Great Wall as the ultimate symbol of Chinese defensiveness and pacifi sm, a popular interpretation that has been problematized by Arthur Waldron in his classic study of the policy decisions that resulted in the huge expansion of the Wall during the Ming dynasty. 21 And even more interesting is the fact that while Feng decries Johnston for positing the dominance of an aggressive, realpolitik streak in Chinese strategic culture that extends throughout Chinese history, she does the same in arguing for her own virtuous, defensive-oriented, Confucian model.22 There are two major problems with Feng’s presentation of Chinese strategic culture. The fi rst is that she presumes the nearly absolute and total dominance of the Confucian philosophical school and its principles. In fact, as Feng admits, Confucianism was only one of the major philosophical schools, and the others were never completely subordinated. Indeed, Chinese emperors and many of their advisers tended to prefer the harsher prescriptions of the Legalist (Fajia ) school, despite its loss of legitimacy as a result of having been the offi cial orthodoxy of the short-lived Qin Empire (221–206BCE ).23 In fact, however, it is more appropriate to speak of the imperial Chinese state as a Confucian–Legalist state, as the government often favored and employed coercive Legalist methods of government as well as more aggressive approaches to foreign relations. The intermingling of philosophical schools, including Daoism, is also evident in the ancient Chinese military writings, grouped together in the Song dynasty as the Seven Military Classics ( Wujing qishu ).24 Feng, however, chooses to ignore elements of these texts that contra- dict her emphasis on pacifi sm. Interestingly enough, Johnston relies on the same texts to arrive at a diametrically opposed interpretation of traditional China’s strategic culture. The second major weakness of Feng’s argument is that she relies too much on rhetoric and pays little attention to actual battle accounts and memorials concerning warfare. Admittedly her primary focus is on the Maoist era, but even a cursory reading of such texts from the pre-modern era would suffi ce to raise serious doubts about her underlying premise of an eternal, pacifi st China. Moreover, even for the contemporary period she tends to accept the rhetoric of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the People’s Republic of China that China was, is, and always will be a purely defensive state at face value. As Yuan-kang Wang notes, however, most states contend that they are defensive, so we must look beyond the pronouncements of leaders and examine behaviors in response to multiple stimuli to get a more comprehensive sense of grand strategy and strategic preferences.25 In contrast to Feng’s interpretation, Johnston argues that over time the Chinese developed two major strategic cultures that helped shape their grand strategy. 26 The fi rst of these, which he calls the Confucian–Mencian paradigm, was based upon what might be considered accommodationist principles. This Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 167 is akin to Feng’s conceptualization of the Confucian-oriented state. In this framework Chinese policy makers generally attempted to defuse security threats by diplomatic maneuvering, moral government, bribes, and marriage alliances.27 As indicated above, traditionally scholars have tended to accept this view of Chinese strategic culture rather uncritically, largely because generations have been infl uenced by the Confucian rhetoric deployed in much of the historical literature. The second paradigm, which he terms the parabellum paradigm, posits a much darker view of the world and presumes that war is inevitable. States must be prepared to fi ght and should act aggressively whenever possible to keep their enemies on the defensive. This is a much more realpolitik view of Chinese strategic culture. Perhaps surprisingly, drawing upon his readings of the aforementioned Chinese military classics, which he deems to constitute the basic corpus of Ming decision making, in conjunction with his review of Ming policy memorials, Johnston concludes that the Ming favored the more aggressive approach to security problems. 28 As he puts it, the Seven Military Classics “share a preference for offensive strategies over defensive and accommodationist options” and emphasize fl exibility as key to strategic choice.29 Thus, in marked contrast to Feng, Johnston sees the underlying Confucian culture of imperial China as being primarily symbolic, whereas the parabellum culture was both operative and dynamic, and thus sheds greater light on Chinese strategic preferences.30 He fi nds that there is in fact “little evidence” that the Confucian–Mencian strategic culture had any general infl uence on policy choices, at least with respect to the Mongol threat, which is his focus. 31 Johnston terms his approach “cultural realism.” While Johnston’s overall argument is far more persuasive due to his extensive use of primary source materials such as policy memorials, his study still has weaknesses. First, he presumes that the Seven Military Classics were integral in the socialization of top military and civil offi cials and that they provided the “textual and intellectual basis for much of the extensive writing on military affairs in the Ming period.” 32 These presumptions are only partially correct. While all high-ranking civil offi cials and most military offi cials would have been conversant with these texts, that does not mean that they regularly looked to them for guidance or systematically applied their lessons. In fact, no less an authority than the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661–1722) famously declared the military classics to be worthless. Having read a large number of Ming military documents, reports, and memorials, I fi nd references to the military

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 classics rare enough to note them down whenever I fi nd them. And though Johnston states that the military classics are often referenced in late Ming military manuals and encyclopedias, such practice was standard procedure in Chinese writing, perhaps not much more unusual than references to the thought of Mao Zedong early in the communist era. Second, his description of what constitutes aggressive, offensive operations is often problematic as he portrays reactions to Mongol incursions as indicative of an aggressive foreign policy posture, though he concedes that offensive strategies were less likely to be pursued when the Ming was militarily weak.33 168 K.M. Swope More recently Yuan-kang Wang has attempted to modify Johnston’s conceptualization of Chinese strategic behavior. Adopting a much longer tem- poral framework, Wang argues that Chinese states from the Song dynasty (960–1279) onwards have operated in accordance with their relative power vis- à-vis their enemies. When powerful, Chinese states adopted an aggressive, expansionist grand strategy. When they were weak, Chinese states adopted defensive or accommodationist strategies. But in general he contends that states are in fact “primed for offense,” so we should expect offensive actions whenever the opportunity presents itself.34 Nevertheless, Wang cautions against rejecting the infl uence of Confucian acculturation and Confucian infl uence upon the creation of Chinese strategic culture and grand strategy.35 Indeed, there were times when Confucianism exerted an ameliorating infl u- ence upon strategic behavior, especially with respect to quelling domestic revolts. But in general, the anarchic nature of international systems pushed China towards aggressive realpolitik behavior in the interest of survival, at least according to Wang. 36 In other words, power considerations and capabilities trump variables such as culture or ideology. This brings us back to the question of whether or not the Ming had a grand strategy and if so, what was it? Johnston identifi es three ideal types of grand strategy, which he terms accommodationist, defensive, and offensive. The fi rst type relies upon diplomacy, alliance building, and low levels of coercion. In such a grand strategy the ends of policy exclude the physical and political elimination of an enemy and the annexation of territory. Defensive grand strategy, by contrast, is more coercive, but still focuses upon the static defense of fi xed boundaries. Security is achieved primarily through the mobilization of internal resources rather than alliance building. The annexation of territory and elimination of enemies is generally not pursued. Offensive grand strategies are characterized by aggressive, expansionist behavior with a high level of coercion. The strategic goal behind the use of force is total military victory and the annexation of at least some territory, though the political aims of this type of grand strategy are malleable beyond the desire to eliminate an enemy’s military capabilities.37 Johnston admits that these are ideal types and that realities strayed from these ideals. Moreover, there have been several notable efforts to identify grand strategies for traditional China, most of which encompass the aforementioned categories to varying degrees.38 So where does the Ming fi t? I contend that at various times the Ming dyn-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 asty embraced all three of Johnston’s types of grand strategy, but in fact Ming grand strategy can be summarized as endeavoring to “manifest awe” (wei ) with respect to both foreign and domestic enemies. As by far the most powerful state within its sphere of infl uence for most of its existence, the primary goal of Ming rulers and policy makers was to maintain predominance for the sake of domestic prosperity and regional stability. This was accomplished by a number of means including building unequal alliances with neighbors via the so-called tributary system, launching punitive campaigns into the steppes and around China’s frontiers, building impressive defensive structures such Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 169 as the Great Wall, endeavoring to maintain military technological superiority vis- à-vis its neighbors, and dispatching huge armadas around the world to show the fl ag, so to speak. 39 Far from being non-competitive, the Ming consistently sought ways to retain its position at the apex of the political and economic order in East Asia. But the means by which the Ming did this varied over time according to the relative capabilities of the state and the predilections of its rulers and prominent offi cials. In other words, personalities mattered and the interests of emperors and their advisers played a major role in the articulation and application of grand strategy. Therefore, it is essential that scholars seeking to identify grand strategies familiarize themselves with the key personalities, factions, and debates of the era in question. For historians of the Western tradition, this might seem like common sense. It has long been standard practice to emphasize individual initiative in the pursuit of national goals for Western monarchies. Geoffrey Parker’s classic study of the grand strategy of Philip II of Spain serves as an outstanding example of examining the relationship between personal and national goals. 40 But until relatively recently, historians of China have been less attentive to the issue of imperial agency in policy formation and execution.41 Part of this may stem from the nature of the Chinese historical record. Emperors tend to be described in rather stock phrases for the express purpose of illustrating the possession of certain stock attributes such as benevolence, fi liality, or righteousness. Thus many of them emerge as rather colorless, disengaged fi gures, with the notable exception of dynastic founders. By the Ming period, however, we have the advantage of an exponentially larger primary source base that includes many private and unoffi cial materials that allow us to move beyond stereotypes and construct a better understanding of emperors and their offi - cials as individuals with particular interests and motivations.42 Furthermore, a large number of policy memorials, battlefi eld dispatches, and offi cial communications between commanders in the fi eld and the court have survived, enabling us to trace decision-making processes and rationales. A reading of hundreds of such documents from the late Ming period ( c.1570–1644) would suggest that there were four major determinants of Ming grand strategy. These were: textual authority and tradition, or past practice; immediate defense concerns; the current alignment of factions of offi cials; and the preferences and interests of the reigning monarch. The relative importance of these determinants with respect to one another varied by

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 time period and circumstances but all of them continuously interacted. Such an interpretation takes into consideration the elements of Chinese strategic culture and cultural paradigms highlighted by other authors as well as the general existence of a realpolitik approach to military threats. But it also allows for a greater degree of individual agency than is implied by more theoretical approaches. This is important because, in the end, we are in fact talking about an imperial, autocratic system. In theory, Ming emperors had absolute power. The degree to which they exercised that power varied by the individual, but one should never lose sight of the fact that it was a despotic system. 170 K.M. Swope When considering the Ming, or any other Chinese dynasty, comparative military historians should fi rst keep in mind the sheer size of the empire. Even though the Ming empire was much smaller than the succeeding Qing (1644–1911) state in terms of territory, it was still larger and far more popu- lous (200 million people by 1600) than any of its contemporaries. Managing an empire of this size required a massive military establishment capable of dealing with a multiplicity of threats in varying terrains. The Ming achieved just that. Even a cursory perusal of the Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty (Ming shilu) reveals that military affairs were always in the forefront of Ming concerns. And Ming emperors, not unlike their early-modern counterparts elsewhere, had to process an enormous amount of information on a daily basis just to keep abreast of basic developments. Such diffi culties were only exacerbated in times of crisis and often tested the abilities of emperors to both delegate and arrive at forceful, meaningful solutions to pressing problems. In this sense Parker’s likening the monarch of a vast empire to a modern CEO of a multinational corporation is a useful analogy that would apply to the Ming as well.43 When viewed in this light, one gets a better sense of the dynamism and fl exibility of Ming grand strategy as the empire constantly tried different ways to “manifest awe.” Before moving to an overview of the different eras of Ming grand strategy, it is useful to enumerate the primary security threats faced by the Ming. Note that these security threats varied over time and that they often overlapped with one another. Thus, a border disturbance could result in the mounting of a punitive campaign against a Mongol tribe or an incursion into a neighboring state such as Burma. But in a broad sense we can identify six major security problems faced by the Ming:

1 dealing with the Mongol threat 2 maintaining secure borders 3 maintaining internal security against bandits and peasant rebels 4 coastal threats and piracy 5 maintaining order among tributary states 6 the Jurchens/Manchus in Northeast Asia.

James Tong, on the other hand, identifi es three subtypes within the universe of armed uprisings in the Ming: dynastic contenders, military challengers,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 and armed disturbances.44 While not disagreeing with Tong’s categorizations from an empirical standpoint, the list is derived from readings of primary and secondary materials and is meant to refl ect the way security problems were treated in contemporary sources. Mongols, for example, are generally treated as distinct from sectarian rebels or common bandits. Some of these threats were unique to the late Ming, but most of them could be described as being endemic to traditional (prior to the nineteenth century) Chinese empires and some remain present today.45 Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 171 As a result of the multiplicity of these threats, far from being a static, insular, political ostrich content to hide behind a Great Wall, as suggested by Ray Huang and others, the Ming were constantly developing new technologies and experimenting with new tactics to realize the dynasty’s strategic aims. They were also more than willing to adopt superior foreign technologies, such as fi rearms, when they had the opportunity. When made aware of the effectiveness of Portuguese fi rearms in the early sixteenth century, Emperor Jiajing (r. 1522–66) ordered the Ministry of Works to establish a bureau for the manufacture of “red barbarian cannons” and other new weapons technologies.46 It is true that the Ming were not always successful in these endeavors. Responses to military threats varied according to relative dynastic military strength as well as the particular needs and interests of individual monarchs and competing offi cial power blocs. Thus it was only to be expected that under some emperors the Ming tended to be more aggressive, while adopting more conciliatory approaches to military problems under others. Nevertheless, on the whole, the Ming was far more aggressive and militarily competent than has been assumed. Overlooking this fact seems to be due in part to the tendency of both scholar offi cials at the time and later historians to gloss over the ever-present violence in and around Ming China in favor of extolling the empire’s many artistic and literary achievements. For these writers and their later admirers Ming China represented the apex of civilization. To dwell on violence and the need for a strong military to quell frequent outbreaks of violence would undermine this myth of domestic tranquility. The Manchu conquerors of the Ming embraced such views as well, offering their sanction to the composition of histories that contrasted the lawless disorder of the late Ming period with the halcyon earlier days of the empire when military prowess was less necessary.47 But, as recent studies have shown, Ming China, not unlike medieval and early-modern Western Europe, was a very violent place and high culture was a thin veneer more than anything else. 48 For example, a recent study fi nds that the Ming engaged in 579 military confl icts in the 275 years from the founding of the dynasty until 1643, thus leaving out the fi nal battles with domestic rebels, independent warlords, and Manchu invaders.49 Approximately two- thirds of the chapters of a famous topical history work from the Ming period, Gu Yingtai’s Mingshi jishi benmo, deal with military campaigns or military affairs.50 James Tong identifi es some 630 cases of collective violence over the 277 years of the Ming. 51 While Tong’s fi ndings indicate that outbreaks of col-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 lective violence tended to take place on the peripheries of the empire, more recent work by David Robinson suggests that even the capital region was not exempt from endemic violence and the constant threat of rebellion. 52 Works such as these argue convincingly for a recasting of the standard narrative of Ming history and demand scholars re-assess the nature of law and order in imperial China in general.53 In terms of periodization, I propose six eras of Ming grand strategy. While I suggest that the underlying goal was consistently to “manifest awe” and 172 K.M. Swope retain pre-eminence in East Asia, the means by which this general goal was pursued varied in accordance with military capabilities and imperial preferences. I conceptualize these eras as follows:

1 era of consolidation (c. 1355–1403) 2 era of expansion (c. 1403–49) 3 era of stability and defensiveness (c. 1450–1570) 4 interlude under Emperor Zhengde (1506–21) 5 renewed aggression and assertion of power (c. 1570–1610) 6 back on the defensive (c. 1610–44).

The era of consolidation (c .1355–1403) The era of consolidation spans the reigns of the fi rst two Ming emperors as well as the military rise of the dynastic founder, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–98), who reigned as Emperor Hongwu, or “Overfl owing Martial Brilliance,” from 1368 to 1398. He was just the second commoner to become emperor in Chinese history and he did so by virtue of his ability to both manage armies and co-opt civil offi cials, defeating a series of formidable rivals before driving the remnants of the Yuan (Mongol) imperial court to Inner Mongolia.54 He then embarked upon the systematic conquest and pacifi cation of the core provinces of China proper while also stabilizing his borders by both military actions and by opening tributary relations with neighboring states. The latter practice entailed the states around China recognizing the superiority of the Chinese emperor in exchange for the right to conduct trade and receive investiture from the emperor, which bolstered claims of domestic legitimacy. This had been done by earlier dynasties, but the Ming extended and refi ned the system considerably and it came to serve both trade and defense functions. In the latter case, in addition to providing the Ming empire with friendly neighbors, who could also serve as buffers, the rulers of these realms could call upon the Chinese for military assistance in the case of domestic disturbances or foreign invasions. Nonetheless, despite its hierarchical nature, in general the system provided a great degree of international stability, because, according to a recent study, it “provided a regionally shared set of formal and informal norms and institutions that guided relations” and allowed for considerable informal equality.55 This must be kept in mind when considering why and how

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the Ming intervened in Chos ŏ n Korea in 1592. Because Hongwu had been a peasant and had suffered under the Yuan, he sought to make Ming China a stable, agrarian empire. To this end he was very cautious about engaging in expensive foreign wars and cautioned his successors against recklessly attacking China’s neighbors, even compiling a list of countries that were not to be invaded. Nevertheless, he threatened the use of force against both Korea and Japan when they proved lax in sending tribute and acknowledging the new empire in the case of the former and in suppressing piracy in the case of the latter. Ming threats and internal factional politics Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 173 associated with the continuing support of the Mongol royal family led to the creation of a new dynasty in Korea in 1392 by a general who quickly sought recognition from the Ming. This was the same year that a long Japanese civil war ended, prompting the then shō gun to accept investiture from the Ming as the “King of Japan.” Thus, the tributary system was integral to early Ming grand strategy wherein the new monarch sought to reassert Chinese (as opposed to Mongol) hegemony in East Asia, albeit in a less expansive and aggressive fashion. His successor and grandson appeared poised to continue these policies but he was fi rst moved to curtail the military power of his uncles, who had been placed in command of military forces around the empire. Attempts at curtailment eventually prompted a civil war led by Zhu Yuanzhang’s fourth son, Zhu Di, who would reign as the Emperor Yongle (“Perpetual Happiness”) after crushing his nephew.56 Yongle’s reign began the next era of Ming grand strategy.

The era of expansion (c. 1403–49) The new emperor was very self-conscious about having been a usurper. Therefore he endeavored to become one of the greatest emperors in all of Chinese history so as to erase the potential shame of his deed. His offi cials fi rst erased the reign of his deposed nephew (whose corpse was never found after the imperial palace at Nanjing was burned at the end of the civil war) from the historical record, instead extending the reign of his father for another four years. The second Ming emperor’s reign, Jianwen, was not restored to the historical record until the reign of Wanli (1573–1620). Yongle then embarked upon a series of building projects, restoring and extending the Grand Canal, building a palace to relocate the capital in Beijing where his princedom had been located, and ordering the construction of the Temple of Heaven.57 He also ordered the compilation of an encyclopedia that was intended to gather classics, histories, philosophies, and literary works and preserve them for posterity. When the fi nal work was completed, it encompassed 22,877 chapters in 11,095 volumes and was called The Grand Encyclopedia of Yongle [Yongle da dian ].58 But he is best known for his military exploits and his dispatch of the fabled treasure fl eets across the seas as far as the east coast of Africa. Indeed, more than any other Ming monarch, Yongle embraced the principle of manifesting awe.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The Ming naval expeditions have been the subject of much interest and controversy over the past decade due to the publication of popular works that suggest the Ming discovered America in the course of these voyages.59 Leaving aside such speculations, the voyages can best be understood as efforts by Yongle to bolster his international reputation and prestige vis-à - vis other states in Asia with the military might and technological prowess of the Ming Empire. While traditional sources also suggested that Yongle launched the expeditions in search of his missing nephew, Edward Dreyer notes, on the basis of surviving Ming-period inscriptions, that the expeditions 174 K.M. Swope all used military force to resolve local disputes in the favor of the Ming and/ or enforced the Ming tributary system and confi ned sanctioned foreign trade within it. 60 The sheer size of the great Ming ships made a powerful impression upon the peoples they visited, just as the emperor intended. This is attested by the fact that records of their arrival can still be found in many of the countries they visited. Yongle also pursued an aggressive policy towards the Mongols, personally leading several major military campaigns into the steppe even as he sought to assimilate Mongols remaining in China proper into the Ming military and society. 61 Rejecting the sage advice of his father, Yongle also engaged in a failed effort to colonize Vietnam, which lasted from 1407 to 1428.62 In this instance the Ming were initially invited to intervene in a succession dispute by a deposed monarch. When the Ming escort columns accompanying the former ruler were ambushed en route to the Vietnamese capital, the court decided to react with full force, thereby honoring their commitment as tributary suzerain. The initial Ming counterattack was so successful that, acting on the advice of commanders in the fi eld, the Ming decided to annex Vietnam, making it the Chinese province of Jiaozhi. Although they had limited support from among some members of the literati class who identifi ed with elite Ming culture, a fi erce guerrilla movement spread throughout the countryside. Though the Ming government held on for over two decades, they eventually decided to cut their losses and pull out, accepting a face-saving offer to invest the erstwhile rebel leader as the legitimate king of Vietnam. By this time Yongle had died and his successors were committed to a less aggressive foreign policy. But this still did not indicate a total shift away from aggressive military operations as much as a re-prioritization of threats. The naval expeditions were curtailed after the early 1430s as too costly, in part because the court wanted to focus greater resources on countering the Mongol threat in the northwest. The Ming also continued to consolidate its control over southwest China, clashing with a rising Burmese polity known as Luchuan to the Chinese in the 1440s. After over a decade of fi ghting the Ming apprehended and executed a local ruler and came to an arrangement that more or less fi xed the Sino-Burmese border, though there were sporadic problems until the mid sixteenth century. 63 Meanwhile, the same man who had urged the Ming to pursue an aggressive policy in the southwest, the eunuch offi cial Wang Zhen,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 encouraged the young Ming emperor to personally lead the army against the Mongol chieftain Esen, who had been causing serious trouble for the Ming for some time and seemed on the verge of reunifying the Mongol tribes into a force that could seriously challenge Ming hegemony. Moreover, the Mongol leader had insulted the Chinese monarch by reputedly demanding an infl ated price for tributary horses he had sold to the Ming and by having the temerity to request the hand of a Ming princess in marriage for his son, presumably to strengthen the personal ties between the two rulers and enhance Esen’s own legitimacy vis- à -vis other steppe rulers. Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 175 Goaded into action by Wang Zhen, the Emperor Zhengtong hoped to emulate his great grandfather and ensure the continued reputation of the Ming Empire among the Mongol tribes. Having recently suppressed a pair of revolts in southeast China in addition to handling the ongoing troubles with Luchuan, the emperor felt confi dent that the Ming armies could control Esen. In the summer of 1449 the Ming assembled a massive army, said to number as many as 500,000, and set forth despite inadequate provisioning and an overall lack of preparations. Bad weather and internal strife among the offi cials hampered the army from the inception of the campaign and the army truncated its mission after just over two weeks and before they even entered the steppe, in part because Esen had decimated an advance column. But upon their return to Beijing, the army was ambushed by Esen’s forces near the postal station of Tumu and the emperor himself was captured. Shocked at his great fortune, rather than drive directly for Beijing, Esen retreated to the steppe with his imperial prize and war booty. To his astonishment, the Ming simply enthroned Zhengtong’s brother and went about bolstering the defenses of Beijing against an anticipated Mongol strike. Esen’s assault on the capital was thwarted in the autumn of 1449. After nearly a year of negotiations, the former emperor was returned to the Ming, in exchange for a restoration of Esen’s tributary relations. The Tumu Incident (Ch. Tumu zhi bian), as it became known, thus marked the end of the era of aggressive Ming military action.64

The era of stability and defensiveness (c. 1450–1570) Chastened by the failure at Tumu, the next century and more of Ming rule was generally marked by defensiveness and retrenchment. The economy was stable and the primary military threat remained the Mongol tribes to the northwest. This precipitated an endless series of policy debates at the Ming court between those who favored aggressive action in the form of a sustained military presence on the steppe with destabilizing punitive campaigns and surgical strikes into Mongol territories and those who advocated a static defense. The most signifi cant result of these debates was the construction of the Great Wall, which began in earnest from the 1470s. The vast majority of the Great Wall that tourists see today was in fact constructed during the mid to late Ming period. It was a compromise solution and was designed to augment

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the pre-existing Nine Border Garrisons that formed a defensive ring around the capital, oriented towards the north. And while many have emphasized the defensive character of the Wall, it is important to note that the Wall was also seen as a manifestation of Ming might and resources and was used as a staging area for offensive operations. Nonetheless, it is true that during this era the Ming military reached its nadir, marked by raids on Beijing led by the Mongol chieftain Altan Khan in the early 1550s. Still, the Ming court should not be seen as entirely oblivious to its military decay. Despite the defensive preferences of Ming rulers and their advisers in this era, there were repeated efforts to upgrade 176 K.M. Swope the quality of the Ming armies and create new training divisions in order for the Ming to retain its military edge. But such efforts were often subject to the vagaries of factional politics so implementation was not consistent.65 The reign of the Emperor Jiajing (r. 1522–66) also marked the heyday of so-called “Japanese” piracy in Ming China. 66 Most of these “pirates” were amphibious bandits. They were also not exclusively Japanese, but included seamen from all over Asia and even Africa. They usually operated along the southeast coast of China and had extensive contacts with local society. Many pirate bands were supported or sponsored by local offi cials. Ming relations with Japan were never as close as Ming–Korean relations and the two governments seldom cooperated in eradicating piracy.67 But when the Ming and the Ashikaga bakufu (1336–1573) were strong (perhaps up to 1470 in the case of Japan), piracy was controlled. The emergence of large-scale piracy at this particular period coincided with the onset of civil war in Japan. A bloody clash between Japanese tributary envoys and Chinese subjects at the port city of Ningbo in 1523 was followed by a general Ming ban on maritime trade with Japan in 1548, though it is unclear why it took more than three decades for the Ming to enact this prohibition. Coincidentally, piracy along China’s southeast coast spiked as the Ming was faced with the growing threat of the Mongol leader Altan Khan. As was true with many of the other threats described herein, the wokou (J. wak ō, K. waegu) never constituted a serious challenge to Ming authority. But the pirates highlighted dynastic corruption, ineffi ciency, and military weakness in the mid sixteenth century. The state’s inability to deal with this rather minor threat on its coasts led the Ming to develop a more formidable navy, which acquitted itself well in the war against Japan in the 1590s. Piracy also led to the appointment of Qi Jiguang (1528–88), who would become the most famous and infl uential of all Ming commanders, to the southeast theater, where he devised new tactics for engaging and defeating pirates.68 Qi later composed several training manuals describing the techniques he used. Some of these manuals were later studied by Korean commanders battling the Japanese in the 1590s. The suppression of piracy along the southeast coast coincided with two developments. The fi rst was the lifting of the general ban on maritime trade by Emperor Longqing (r. 1567–72) in 1567. The second was the general revival of Ming military power carried out under the auspices of the emperor’s top

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 adviser, Zhang Juzheng (1525–82), a patron of Qi Jiguang and the son of a military offi cer. In addition to appointing competent offi cers to important commands, Zhang believed in bolstering Ming defenses along the coast by improving early warning systems and reconstructing decaying walls and other coastal defenses. Of course, the Ming defenses were also aided by the fact that the Japanese situation was becoming more stable, particularly after Toyotomi Hideyoshi rose to power in 1582. Thus, while there were other piratical troubles throughout the remainder of the Ming period, the pirate scourge of the mid sixteenth century was eradicated by a combination of effective defensive Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 177 measures, pro-active naval construction, and more lenient trading policies.69 While the Ming court was not quite as active in this era as they had been earlier, they were still fl exible and pragmatic with respect to their policies and managed to retain their superior strategic position even against formidable threats.

The Zhengde interlude (1506–21) The Ming ruler Zhengde was perhaps the most interesting and colorful of all the Ming monarchs. Somewhat derogatorily canonized as Wuzong, the “Martial Ancestor,” Zhengde was the fi rst Ming emperor since Zhengtong to personally lead military expeditions against the Mongols in the steppe. He also consorted frequently with eunuchs, earning him more dislike from his staid Confucian advisers. But unlike his ancestor, Zhengde did not need to be prodded into military action, he reveled in it. He even went so far as to give himself a false identity as a Ming military offi cer and assigned himself to military missions. He supposedly took a few Mongol heads during some of his expeditions as he “earned” his way up through the ranks. He spent more time outside of Beijing than any emperor had since Yongle, even creating a Mongol-style mobile tent city to accompany him on forays to the northwest. His taste for the exotic even extended to a preference for Muslim girls from the steppe lands west of Ming China, now part of Xinjiang Province.70 For all his faults in their eyes, later Confucian-oriented historians grudg- ingly admitted that Zhengde achieved a fair amount to reverse the military decline of the Ming. His victory over a large Mongol raiding party in 1517 was one of the few times in the sixteenth century that the Ming defeated such a major force in an open fi eld battle, as opposed to a siege. In addition to his continuous military activities against the Mongols, the emperor presided over the quelling of an attempt at usurpation by the Prince of Ning, an effort that took only forty-three days, though he was unable to personally participate in the military operations because the rebellion had been suppressed so expeditiously. 71 However, in addition to his unbecoming love of all things martial, he was criticized for his womanizing, his drinking, his choice of unsavory personal companions, and his general disrespect towards civil offi - cials. In short, his personal vision of himself was not what his offi cials wanted in an emperor. 72 However, such concerns bring us back to the personal fac-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tor stressed at the outset of this chapter. Personality and personal interests mattered a great deal in the autocratic Ming system. No matter what their offi cials thought, forceful emperors could and did pursue their own strategic goals, particularly when they were able to adroitly use other power blocs, such as eunuchs and military offi cials, to counterbalance civil offi cials. Wanli (r. 1573–1615), while not as colorful or forceful as Zhengde, was able to achieve some of the same freedom of action to pursue military goals, and the short- term result was that the Ming reached a level of military competence and superiority it had not enjoyed since the Yongle era. 178 K.M. Swope The era of renewed aggression (c. 1570–1610) The late Ming has been regarded as particularly violent by contemporary observers and later scholars alike. Nearly four-fi fths of Tong’s cases of collective violence occurred between 1506 and 1644, which he identifi es as the late Ming period. 73 Gu Yingtai’s Mingshi jishi benmo, mentioned above, bears out Tong’s fi ndings. About two-thirds of the chapters covering events from this era deal with military matters. Additionally, the six chapters appended to the end of the work proper, which were most likely excerpted from the original version because of their political sensitivity, deal with strategic military concerns pertaining to the Manchu wars in the northeast dating from the late sixteenth century. 74 Thus this period provides the historian with a wonderful opportunity to study the kinds of strategic threats faced by Chinese states in general and the responses engendered by them. Furthermore, the fact that the Ming not only met these challenges, but also continued to prosper economically and even expand its borders and extend its infl uence in Asia until at least 1610, is a testament to the under-appreciated military prowess of the Ming. This period witnessed the Ming’s full-scale entry into the global economy, its military revival, and eventual defeat at the hands of a combination of internal and external foes. 75 In terms of military matters, this time also saw the Ming military’s transformation from a primarily hereditary to a primarily “modern” mercenary military, a transformation wrought by the desire to improve the overall effectiveness of the military on the battlefi eld and thereby enable the state to deal with emerging new threats as well as old ones. The development towards a “modern” military paralleled happenings in Europe, albeit for different reasons.76 It should be borne in mind, however, that the Ming faced a variety of threats and military challenges in this era and strict delineation between them is not always possible. It was possible for one event to lead on to others. Petty bandits could spark larger peasant rebellions, as could sectarian movements, particularly in times of widespread natural disaster and government turmoil as in the last two decades of the dynasty. Troop mutinies along the frontiers sometimes sparked Mongol raids or aboriginal uprisings as minority groups seized opportunities presented to them. Tong’s fi ndings indicate that while there was not always a direct correlation between the type and level of threat, in the eyes of the state it was the potential for expansion that mattered.77 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 As noted above, the Mongols were the primary threat to dynastic security until 1571 when the Ming concluded a peace treaty with the most powerful Mongol leader, Altan Khan (1507–82), granting him investiture as a tributary prince and opening up regular trade fairs along the frontiers.78 For the Ming this was a major diplomatic coup as Altan’s forces had conducted raids along the northwestern frontiers since the 1540s and even reached the outskirts of Beijing in the early 1550s. The peace treaty was facilitated by the defection of Altan’s grandson to the Ming and the shrewd negotiations of several able Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 179 Chinese commanders and advisers to the emperor. The general terms involved a pledge by Altan to refrain from raiding and to present a yearly tribute of 500 horses in exchange for recognition as a tributary prince for himself and several other Mongol chieftains and the opening of regular trade fairs. The arrangement was more or less successful as large-scale clashes between the two sides became far less frequent, but it would be erroneous to suggest that relations between the Ming and the Mongols were cordial from 1571 on. In fact, neither side kept to the terms of the agreement and right up until the very end of the dynasty, the Ming were launching quick strikes into Mongol territory with the aim of capturing livestock to destabilize certain tribal leaders even as the Mongols raided Chinese border towns and garrisons in hopes of exacting further concessions.79 Several Mongol chieftains embroiled themselves in a troop mutiny (discussed below) in the important garrison town of Ningxia in 1592, lured by vague promises of restoring the Mongol empire. Nonetheless, after 1571, the Mongols ceased to be the major threat to Ming security as they tended to be politically divided, and the Ming was in the process of a general military revival that would last until the second decade of the seventeenth century. The Japanese invasion of Korea, which continued from spring 1592 to late summer or early autumn 1598, was undoubtedly the single most serious challenge to the Ming prior to the Manchu invasion. Moreover, it was not only a challenge to Ming authority, but also Japan’s suzerain, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, endeavored to create a new East Asian world order, one with himself at the apex. 80 Thus, more so than any other previous event, this constituted a challenge to Ming awesomeness in Asia. Therefore, it provoked a considerable degree of debate in Ming court circles as well as further down the administrative hierarchy. As will be seen below, Ming debates often invoked historical precedents and serve to underscore their fundamental strategic goal of maintaining supremacy on the continent, a supremacy that Hideyoshi challenged. Turning to the background of the war itself, in diplomatic contact prior to the confl ict Hideyoshi asked the Koreans to allow his forces to cross through Korea unmolested so he could reach his real goal, China, prior to the eventual conquest of India as well. To this end he assembled a force of over 150,000 soldiers, bolstered by perhaps 200,000 reserves and equipped with not only the swords for which the Japanese were famous, but also fi rearms derived from

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Portuguese and Chinese models. Further, Japan was just coming out of more than a century of civil war. Its soldiers were disciplined, well trained, and highly motivated. In this war the Ming enjoyed neither numerical nor absolute technological superiority. Moreover, Hideyoshi disregarded the fi ghting capabilities of Chinese troops, fi guring that if a few disorganized Japanese pirates could wreak havoc along the Chinese coast in the 1550s, then the Ming armies would be no match for his skilled hordes. He predicted that Japanese swords would “cleave through Chinese soldiers as though cutting bamboo” and the Ming would be subdued within a year.81 180 K.M. Swope Hideyoshi was gravely mistaken. For one, he disregarded the strategic importance Ming China attached to Chos ŏ n Korea. Ming offi cials, as well as the Wanli emperor, repeatedly referred to Korea as “the lips to China’s teeth” and regarded Korea as China’s respectful child in the tribute system of foreign relations that had been followed since the dynasty’s founding. In anticipation of a possible Japanese thrust from the south, the Ming mobilized troops from all over the empire to augment and restore coastal defenses. They also mobilized a relief force of some 45,000 troops to go to the rescue of Korea in early 1593 after the initial Ming force of 3,000 men had been annihilated in P’yŏ ngyang in the summer of 1592.82 In fact the Koreans had asked for assistance from the Ming as soon as the Japanese landed. By the time the Japanese were advancing north from Seoul (a mere two weeks after landing at Pusan) a Ming offi cial from Liaodong sent a report to the Ministry of War, stating:

The Japanese bandits have reached the Taedong River so the Korean monarch and his ministers wish to escape and I fear the king and his soldiers will enter Liaodong. To prevent them would not be benevolent, but to receive them will be to invite trouble. 83

Thus we can see the Ming dilemma. On the one hand the defense of Korea was part of the Ming’s tributary obligations towards its vassal. It was also in its strategic interest. But owing to pressing military obligations on other frontiers, including a troop mutiny that had necessitated the redeployment of Ming forces that normally would have been stationed in Liaodong, the Ming were not in a position to send a large force, hence the small relief column mentioned above, which the Japanese handily destroyed. On the other hand, neither could Korea be abandoned, both for reasons of friendship and prestige. Nonetheless there were still doves at court who argued against intervention in Korea, using the example of the Ming incursion into Vietnam in the early fi fteenth century (which had resulted in a disastrous twenty-year failed annexation) as a cautionary tale. Still others invoked the failed Sui-Tang dynasty incursions into Korea. Their opponents argued that this situation was far different. First of all, Korea was friendly and the Koreans had welcomed the Ming. Second, Korea was much closer to China than Vietnam. Therefore,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 a large army could be easily supplied by land and sea and supplies could reach the front in just a few days. Additionally, there was the obvious fact that Korea was much more strategically important to China than Vietnam, by virtue of Korea’s proximity to Beijing.84 Therefore, after a series of spirited debates at court, the Ming Emperor Wanli decided to intervene militarily in Korea. His decision was predicated on three major (interrelated) factors. First, and perhaps foremost, it was in the Ming’s strategic interest to confi ne the war to the Korean peninsula. As some noted at the time, Korea was the “lips that protected China’s teeth” and Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 181 keeping the Japanese tied down there limited the damage to China. Second, there were many offi cials in China, not to mention the emperor himself, who seemed to harbor genuine feelings of friendship and tributary responsibility towards Korea. To be sure such sentiments were at times patronizing and self- serving, but neither were they false. After all, the neighbors had enjoyed good relations to mutual benefi t for two centuries. It would hardly do to turn their backs on Korea when help was needed. Finally, on a personal level Wanli, often stymied by offi cials at home when it came to asserting the imperial will, saw the war in Korea as a way to maintain Ming primacy in East Asia and thereby bolster his own prestige, at least internationally.85 It is perhaps most instructive to see Wanli’s position through his own decree, issued to the Koreans upon his decision to send military aid. The emperor notes:

For generations you have been our Eastern neighbor and you have always been docile and obedient. Your gentry take pleasure in learning and culture. I heard that your nearby land had been invaded and was being plundered by the rapacious Japanese villains and that your capital city has been looted and P’yŏngyang has been occupied, forcing your people to scatter near and far and I was deeply disturbed. And now Your Majesty has fl ed for the Western coast and is seeking refuge among the rustics. You must now focus your attention to the task at hand and strengthen your resolve. For, as soon as I heard the news yesterday, I ordered the border offi cials to begin mobilizing troops to come to your aid. I will also dispatch a high civil and a high military offi cial to act in concert. They will assemble 70,000 crack troops from the various defense commands around Liaoyang, which will be sent forth to assist you in chastising the [Japanese] bandits, and in conjunction with your own country’s men, they will catch the enemy in a vise and annihilate them. Furthermore, I have issued imperial commands to the tributary kings of the myriad states in all directions so that they too can assist in helping with this nasty business. I have also issued an order to the various coastal garrisons of the southeast and promulgated an edict to countries such as Siam and Ryūkyū to assemble an army of 100,000 to join us in attacking Japan and driving them from their nests … Now Your Highness must focus upon maintaining what your ancestors have bequeathed to you. How can you

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 just lightly cast it all away? Now you must exert all your energy in the business of saving your state and restoring its prestige, and you should order all your civil and military offi cials and ordinary people to likewise exert themselves to the utmost. For if Your Majesty’s mind is open and you rectify your past transgressions, then you will be able to recover the territory that you have lost. The masses will face this calamity out of fi liality to their father, and the ministers of your country, recognizing your righteousness, will certainly all look up to you. Your Majesty will thereby regain the respect you once had. 86 182 K.M. Swope Wanli’s desire to retain sovereign supremacy in East Asia can be seen through Wanli’s behavior over the next several years and in his communications with King S ŏnjo (r. 1567–1609) of Chos ŏn. In these exchanges Wanli alternately exhorts and berates the Korean monarch, urging him to both rectify his personal behavior and rally his beleaguered populace. Yet he also promises to send myriad troops to overwhelm the rapacious Japanese invaders and promises to send contributions from China’s other tributary vassals. In fact, while some of the other tributaries, including both the Jurchens under Nurhaci (see below) and the Thai leader at Ayudhya, offered to send troops to aid the Ming or even attack Japan, such offers were refused. It seems that the Ming thought accepting such assistance would undermine their own prestige or diminish their awesomeness in the eyes of other potential threats to their supremacy. Interestingly enough, Korean aid would be accepted some twenty- seven years later when the Ming mounted its fi rst major offensive campaign against Nurhaci. By this point, however, Ming military power had declined signifi cantly and Wanli was nearly on his deathbed, worn down by decades of illness and factional strife. While the war was poorly managed by both sides, in the end, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Korea without realizing any of Hideyoshi’s war aims, while the Ming embarked upon a massive suppression campaign of an uprising in distant Sichuan Province. From a larger strategic standpoint, the war preserved Ming China’s pre-eminent position in the East Asian world. In their eyes at least, and notwithstanding the contributions of Korea’s own forces, China had successfully defended its tributary from a formidable enemy and prevailed in a distant war under harsh conditions. The logistical achievements alone are noteworthy. Battles were waged on both land and at sea and included sieges, classic infantry confrontations, and guerrilla-style warfare. The Chinese proved adept at using their great cannon to devastating effect in set-piece battles, forcing the Japanese to change their tactics. Responding to tactical situations, the Ming rotated troops from southern China to the front, because they had more experience using the tactics pioneered by Qi Jiguang. Therefore, contrary to what many scholars claim, this writer is not inclined to believe that the war drained Ming military and economic resources to their breaking point. If that had been the case, how could the Ming have assembled a force of over 200,000 men to deal with the Yang Yinglong Miao uprising following so soon on the heels of the war in Korea? And how was the Ming

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 state able to last more than four more decades, fi ghting virtually the entire time? In any case, the Ming court remained wary of Japanese intentions for the rest of the dynasty’s existence and troops were stationed for several years thereafter in Korea to ensure against another invasion, an invasion which would not come for another 300 years. Minority (or aboriginal) peoples constituted an entirely different kind of threat. Viewed from the perspective of the central government as recorded in histories of the time, the various aboriginal peoples of southwest China Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 183 were uncivilized and superstitious. Writing in the early sixteenth century, the Ming writer Zhuge Yuansheng described the Miao of southwest China as being “skilled swordsmen, fond of sorcery and very superstitious, believing in ghosts.”87 Characteristics such as these made aboriginals prone to violence and susceptible to manipulation by crafty leaders in the eyes of the Ming state. Ironically enough, they also made aboriginal troops highly sought after as elite units or even bodyguards. Contingents of aboriginal troops were dispatched all over the empire and even to Korea to battle the Japanese. The most infamous of these were the so-called “Wolf Troops” of Guizhou, regarded throughout the empire as fi erce and savage fighters.88 In fact, for most of the Ming period, the court was content to let local aboriginal leaders rule as independent chieftains in exchange for pledges of loyalty, coupled with payment of “tribute taxes” and occasional military service. 89 As long as these aboriginal chieftains kept law and order in their jurisdictions, they were left alone by the central authorities and allowed to practice traditional customs. But according to offi cial sources, local chieftains often became arrogant and high-handed, fl aunting their positions and stirring up locals against their rightful Ming overlords. As they generally erupted in remote corners of the empire, such revolts could quickly overwhelm local resources. The largest of these, the rebellion of the Miao chieftain Yang Yinglong at the end of the sixteenth century, reportedly involved over 100,000 rebels and required nearly 250,000 government troops to suppress it. 90 Thus it can be seen why the Ming state regarded aboriginal threats so seriously. But as much as standard accounts of aboriginal rebellions seek to portray the instigators of these movements as anti-social malcontents, one more often sees these peoples as displaying passivity or aggression, depending on the circumstances. While they tended to distrust the central government and did what they could to maintain a measure of autonomy, they rarely threatened to overthrow the empire. Even the largest aboriginal uprisings of the Ming period were merely regional, although some encompassed several provinces. When examined from the larger perspective of Ming history, it seems as if most aboriginal uprisings were sparked by Han Chinese encroachment on traditional aboriginal lands and the empire-building efforts of Ming policy makers who sought to fi nd outlets for the empire’s expanding population. Some uprisings may have been instigated by resentment over increased

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tax burdens as aboriginal chieftains were sometimes forced to supply tim- ber for imperial construction projects. Encouraging Han Chinese to settle in aboriginal areas had a number of advantages. It brought more land under cultivation and into tax registers, as they were converted into regular prefects and districts, and it extended the process of Sinifi cation along the frontiers as these new administrative units necessitated the establishment of Confucian schools and other symbols of Han Chinese culture and authority. Local peoples were encouraged to cast aside their traditional ways in favor 184 K.M. Swope of those of the colonizers. When they resisted, they were branded as rebels by the government. Moreover, efforts to suppress one rebellion often sparked others as local economies were disrupted by military campaigns. Moreover, these military campaigns present the continued efforts of the Ming state in “manifesting awe.”

Back on the defensive (c. 1610–44) Despite their success in Wanli’s Three Great Campaigns, within a decade of the suppression of Yang Yinglong’s rebellion, the Ming found themselves increasingly on the defensive. The most serious challenge came from the northeast. The people who later called themselves the Manchus were known throughout the Ming period as the Jurchens and could claim descent from a dynasty that had ruled part of China in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, prior to the rise of the Mongols. They dwelt in northeast Asia and were military threats to both the Ming and the Korean Chosŏ n (1392–1910) dynasties. In fact China and Korea sometimes cooperated in sending punitive expeditions against recalcitrant Jurchen enemies. Administratively, the Jurchens were treated like both the Mongols and the aboriginal tribes of the southwest. Tribal leaders were invested with seals of authority and conferred hereditary titles of nobility in exchange for recognizing Ming sovereignty. They were sometimes asked to perform military services on behalf of the Ming state against local enemies. Some Jurchen leaders developed close working relationships with Chinese frontier commanders. Favored Jurchen commanders could even be taken under the wing of Ming military offi cials, as seen in the fateful case of Nurhaci (1559–1626), founder of the Later Jin state, which would become the Qing dynasty. Nurhaci was taken into the home of the renowned late Ming commander Li Chengliang (1526–1618) and was reportedly quite close to several of Li’s sons.91 When dealing with the Jurchens, the Ming tended to adopt the same types of approaches used against the Mongols. They would launch quick strikes into Manchu territory and offer Jurchen leaders Ming offi cial rank and trading privileges in exchange for loyalty. They were also not above double-crossing erstwhile allies if the opportunity presented itself. Livestock would be captured and settlements burned in an effort to keep potential threats scattered and disorganized. 92 It was during one such raid that Nurhaci’s father

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 was killed by Ming forces who demolished an enemy fortifi cation while he was still inside. Nonetheless, Ming policy worked quite well until the early seventeenth century. Nurhaci himself offered to lead Jurchen forces to Korea to battle the Japanese invaders on behalf of the Ming. While the Ming refused his offer, as noted above, Japanese sources indicate that Jurchens did indeed engage Japanese units that crossed the border and Nurhaci’s presence prevented the Japanese forces from fl anking the allies in Korea. What allowed the Manchus to rise above other threats described herein was their level of organization and their willingness to adopt Chinese bureaucratic Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 185 techniques. The Manchus made adroit use of classical rhetoric, invoking the ancient idea of the Mandate of Heaven, and offered competent civil and military offi cials great incentives for joining their side. They cloaked their actions in righteous indignation, fi rst at the treatment Nurhaci’s loyal family had received at the hands of the ungrateful Ming, and later at the usurpation of Ming authority by the roving peasant rebels. Signifi cantly, the Manchus also moved to neutralize the threat posed by Korea militarily and launched two invasions of Chosŏ n to bring that state into its own tributary orbit after the Koreans allegedly harbored fugitives and continued to evince loyalty to the Ming despite making agreements with the Manchus. As noted above, the Koreans, remembering the military aid provided by the Ming in the 1590s, sent signifi cant numbers of troops to ghtfi alongside the Ming commander Liu Ting (d. 1619) in the Liaodong campaign of 1619. Liu, incidentally, was a veteran of the war in the 1590s and was well regarded by the Koreans. Despite the defeat of the Ming in 1619 a faction in Korea continued to support the Ming cause, effecting a coup against King Kwanghae in 1623 because he refused to adopt a pro-Ming stance in the escalating war. This support for the Ming led to an invasion by the Manchu leader Hong Taiji (r. 1627–43) in 1627 leading to a peace agreement between the sides and a general pledge by the Koreans not to aid the Ming or harbor fugitives. But when they proved less than observant of the agreement (and Hong Taiji was more secure on his throne), the Manchus (now named the Qing) launched a full-scale invasion of Korea, capturing many members of the royal family and forcing the Koreans to acknowledge the Qing as their new tributary masters and renounce their loyalty to the Ming. This was a serious blow to Ming prestige and strategically important as it secured the Qing fl ank from attack. Moreover, the Manchus proved adept students of military technology and did their utmost to acquire cannons and other fi rearms for use in the war against the Ming. Interestingly enough, in a policy memorial, the late Ming military commander of the Liaodong region northeast of the Great Wall argued that he needed more troops and more guns because if he was not able to establish a strong presence in the region, the “Ming awesomeness” would be diminished and the Manchus would cease to fear them.93 In any event, Nurhaci soon died as a result of being clipped by cannon fi re, prompting the Manchus to redouble their efforts to obtain such technology not only from

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the Ming but also from foreign sources such as the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the Koreans. In spite of all this, it is still very possible that the Ming might have been able to defeat the Manchus if not for the concurrent outbreak of peasant rebellions in the northwest that forced the Ming to fi ght a two-front war. As the Ming was founded by a peasant rebel, it was probably fi tting that the dynasty was also toppled in large part by the efforts of peasant rebel armies. Unlike the Mongol threat, however, peasant rebellions tended to spring from specifi c socio-economic triggers including drought, famine, 186 K.M. Swope poor harvests, and other natural disasters. For example, the rebellion of one Wang Jiayin, which broke out in the autumn of 1628 and spread throughout the north China plain, was attributed to widespread starvation and depriv- ation.94 In general the policy for dealing with peasant rebels was to convince the leaders to turn themselves in (or convince their followers to do so), and then pardon the rank and fi le in the interest of maintaining stability. In some cases leaders who surrendered or betrayed their allies would even be rewarded with military ranks themselves. Famine or disaster relief measures were also implemented if deemed necessary by central authorities. Military force would be applied only if less severe measures failed. But, as was the case with Ming administration as a whole, much depended upon the abilities and predilections of particular offi cials assigned to deal with the problem in question. Such strategies met with mixed results for a variety of reasons. First of all, most soldiers themselves came from lower-class backgrounds and often sympathized with the plight of peasant rebels. Low-ranking offi cers who felt cheated by the government could often be lured into joining peasant rebel groups and assume leadership positions by virtue of their military experience. This meant that local peasant uprisings could quickly mushroom into regional or even national threats, especially in times of widespread natural disaster, as was the case in the late Ming.95 Isolated garrisons and government grain stores were favored targets and as they were often lightly defended, could be easily taken, offering valuable supplies needed in perpetuating rebellions. And, if and when government forces did come forth to engage these rebels in combat, they could melt into the countryside along with the rest of the peasantry. Frustrated government troops in turn sometimes executed innocents either in retribution or in an attempt to gain rewards from the government. Moreover, the policy of “rewarding” peasant rebel leaders who surrendered with military ranks sometimes resulted in false surrenders with the leader in question accepting Ming rank and privilege, only to rebel again when the opportunity arose. The two most notorious Ming peasant rebels, and the ones who were ultimately responsible for the dynasty’s military collapse in the northwest, were “The Dashing Prince,” Li Zicheng (1606–45), and Zhang Xianzhong (1605– 47), also known by his sobriquet, the “Yellow Tiger.”96 Collectively these two colorful rebels and their allies and followers were known as the Wandering

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Bandits in recognition of their wide geographic range and military mobility. They came to constitute the foremost threat to the late Ming state in conjunction with the Manchu invaders to the northeast. While the Manchus were regarded as militarily more dangerous by most Ming offi cials, the wandering bandits, like all peasant rebels, were particularly threatening because of their ability to assimilate into the local population and disappear. The Ming government could never be sure if they had bested the peasant rebels as they would often scatter before superior forces only to reunite later. Eventually they proved impossible to eradicate and it was actually the Ming peasant rebel Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 187 leader Li Zicheng who captured Beijing in the spring of 1644 at the head of a massive peasant army said to number over 200,000 followers. These elements of mass support, “class consciousness,” and righteous indignation on the part of late Ming peasant rebel leaders have imbued them with a romanticized image in twentieth-century China. Nonetheless, it should be noted that while peasant rebellions assumed primacy in the last two decades of the Ming, they were not seen to be as threatening as some of the other dangers described herein. The vast majority of peasant uprisings could be curtailed by measures such as grain distribution or tax remittance. Even when military force was needed, local garrisons usually suffi ced as peasant armies tended to be ill-equipped and poorly led, lacking the skill and discipline inherent in Mongol or Manchu units. Still, even a cursory examination of Ming governmental records and local gazetteers demonstrates that peasant unrest was by no means uncommon and the fact that most of these movements amounted to little is further evidence of Ming military capabilities. In conclusion, I maintain that the Ming had a consistent grand strategy, which was to “manifest awe” in the eyes of both its own subjects and potential military threats. The decision to intervene in Korea in 1592 was a concrete manifestation of this strategy and was connected to both the dynasty’s general goals of maintaining strategic supremacy in East Asia and Wanli’s personal goals of asserting himself vis-à -vis his troublesome offi cials. This overarching strategy was informed both by Chinese cultural and strategic traditions as embodied in the military classics and by historical precedents. Ming policy documents frequently invoke the latter when debating possible military actions. For example, when considering whether or not to aid Korea against the Japanese in 1592, Ming offi cials in favor of intervention referenced both the failed intervention in Vietnam in the 1400s and a much earlier Tang incursion into Korea in the 600s on behalf of one of three competing states. While both of these previous actions had failed, the proponents of aiding Korea noted that this time the Chinese had enthusiastic local allies as well as shorter supply lines. In essence, drawing upon the injunctions of the dynastic founder, Ming grand strategy was based on ensuring stability and advancing the empire’s interests with as little outlay of resources as possible. This does not mean that the Ming were unwilling to use direct military force, only that it was not always the fi rst resort if simply making a show of power could suffi ce.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Furthermore, the ways in which the empire “manifested awe” varied according to the interests and prerogatives of monarchs and ministers. Contrary to what many theorists might suggest, imperial agency mattered as the Ming was, after all, a despotic system. Some rulers, most notably Yongle, Zhengde, and Wanli, were much more inclined to fl ex the empire’s military muscles than others. The fi rst two did so largely on their own initiative. Wanli preferred to patronize favored military and civil offi cials to achieve his policy goals, rather than leading troops directly in battle. Nonetheless all recognized the strategic value of overawing one’s foes. 188 K.M. Swope Notes 1 Translation taken from “The Three Strategies of Huang Shih-Jung” (277–306) translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China , 2007, p. 301. 2 This is especially surprising when one considers the wealth of extant primary source materials dealing with military affairs. Chinese historians have begun to rectify this shortcoming, though most recent Chinese scholarship on the military tends to focus on institutional history rather than on campaigns, strategy, or the interplay between the Chinese military and society. For example, see He Zhiqing and Wang Xiaowei, Zhongguo bingzhi shi , 1997. Examples of recent works on the Ming include Wu Yanhong, Mingdai chongjun yanjiu, 2003, and Yu Zhijia, Mingdai junhu shixi zhidu, 1997. There are signs that this shortcoming is being rectifi ed. In addition to my own work, David Robinson has published several articles and two monographs on subjects pertaining to the Ming military, with another soon to appear. See Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven , 2001, and Empire’s Twilight , 2009, which deals with the origins of the Ming empire. For a general overview of the historiography of the Ming military, see Swope, “The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592–1600,” 2001, pp. 40–88. For a recent survey of the fi eld of modern Chinese military history in the West, see Swope, Warfare in China Since 1600 , 2005, pp. xi–xxxv. 3 Of course the same could be said for most Chinese dynasties. See David A. Graff and Robin Higham, A Military History of China , 2002, p. 1. On modern Sinologists’ tendency to perpetuate such stereotypes and regard warfare in traditional China as a “mere barbarous intrusion into a glorious cultural and political edifi ce,” see Sawyer, Fire and Water, 2004. It should also be noted that a number of scholars working on all periods of Chinese history are in the process of revising such out- moded interpretations of China’s past. For a recent example of such scholarship, see Nicola Di Cosmo, ed., Military Culture in Imperial China , 2009. 4 Ray Huang, China , 1997, pp. 169–85. 5 Sun Laichen, “Military Technology Transfers from Ming China and the Emergence of Northern Mainland Southeast Asia (c. 1390–1527),” 2003, pp. 497–9. 6 Edward Dreyer, Zheng He , 2007, pp. 1–9. 7 David Robinson, Martial Spectacles of the Ming Court , 2013. 8 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, p. 1. 9 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, p. 36. 10 For a discussion of the importance of historical writing and thinking about history in Chinese culture in general, see Grant Hardy, Worlds of Bronze and Bamboo , 1999, pp. 1–60. 11 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 1995, p. 36, note 2. 12 See Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and War, 2011; and Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007. 13 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, p. 17. 14 For a recent comparative analysis of war and state formation in Warring States Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 China and early-modern Europe, see Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe , 2005. 15 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, p. 20. 16 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, p. 25. 17 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, pp. 25–6. 18 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, p. 26. 19 For studies on the assimilation and colonization processes of Chinese empires, see John E. Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist, 2007, and Leo K. Shin, The Making of the Chinese State , 2006. For an examination of a specifi c campaign to crush an Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 189 aboriginal group and incorporate its lands, see Swope, “To Catch a Tiger,” 2011, pp. 112–40. 20 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, p. 26. 21 See Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 1990. For a discussion of the major features of “Confucian pacifi sm,” which include a culture of antimilitarism, defensive grand strategy, a theory of just war, and limited war aims, see Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, pp. 14–19. 22 Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture , 2007, p. 30. 23 The best overview of ancient Chinese philosophical schools can be found in William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1 , 1999. 24 These have been translated into English and include Sunzi’s Art of War. See Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China , 1993. 25 Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, pp. 2–3. 26 For a complete discussion of how Johnston conceptualizes strategic culture, see Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 1–31. For his discussion of the concept in relation to imperial China, see pp. 22–7. 27 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 117–22. 28 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 61–108 and 253–66. 29 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, p. 30. 30 See the discussion in Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, pp. 20–1. 31 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 244–5. 32 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 47–8. 33 See the policy analyses on pp. 186–215. 34 Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, pp. 21–3. 35 Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, pp. 24–7. 36 Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, p. 185. For Wang’s summary of the comparisons between Confucian pacifi st and structural realist models of Chinese grand strategy, see Harmony and War , 2011, p. 33. 37 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 112–13. 38 See the discussion in Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 116–17. 39 For a detailed examination of the Ming tribute system and its implications for international security, see David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West , 2010. 40 Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II , 1998. 41 An important recent corrective to this tendency can be found in several essays in Don J. Wyatt, Battlefronts Real and Imagined , 2008. 42 This is particularly evident in Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven , 2001, and in Swope, “Bestowing the Double-Edged Sword,” 2008, pp. 61–115. 43 See Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II , 1998, pp. xvii, 36–7. 44 James Tong, Disorder under Heaven , 1991, pp. 43–4. 45 Amazingly enough, throughout the twentieth century and well into the period of communist rule there were sporadic attempts to “restore” imperial dynasties such as the Song (960–1279) and Ming. The current regime’s fears of Falun Gong and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 other so-called heterodox or sectarian organizations indicate the tenacity of traditional beliefs in modern China. For more on this, see Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven , 2002, pp. ix–xxxi, 275–308. 46 See Zhang Tingyu et al. , Ming shi, 1994, p. 2264. Hereafter cited as MS . On Ming development of new fi rearms in particular, see Kenneth Chase,Firearms , 2003, pp. 142–50. 47 On the issue of Qing presentations of Ming history, see Swope, “The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592–1600,” 2001. Also see Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Introduction: Civil–Military Relations in Imperial China,” 2001, pp. 1–7. 190 K.M. Swope 48 The issue of violent disorder in medieval Europe and its subsequent obfuscation by misplaced notions of chivalry is discussed in Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe , 2001. 49 See Fan Zhongyi, “Mingdai junshi sixiang jianlun,” 1997, p. 38. For a recent popular examination of Ming battles, see Luo Bin, Ming chao de naxie zhanzheng , 2010. This volume contains 88 chapters on Ming military affairs, mostly battle accounts, and is part of a larger series of popular Ming histories published in conjunction with documentary television series. 50 See Gu Yingtai, Mingshi jishi benmo , 1997. Hereafter cited as MSJSBM. 51 Tong also provides empirical comparisons with contemporary European states. See Tong, Disorder under Heaven , 1991, pp. 16–42. 52 See Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven , 2001. 53 For another recent effort to offer typologies of confl ict in Ming–Qing China, see Kang, East Asia Before the West , 2010, pp. 88–93. 54 On the military origins of the Ming, see Edward Dreyer, “Military Origins of Ming China,” 1988, pp. 58–106. Hereafter cited as CHC 7. Also see Luo, Ming chao de naxie zhanzheng , 2010, pp. 1–50, and MSJSBM , pp. 1–98. Note that the latter volume has two paginations, one for the whole compilation and a separate one for the individual works within the compilation. Since the MSJSBM is a reprint, I use the latter pagination, which includes four small printed pages of text per single page. On the collapse of the Yuan, see Robinson, Empire’s Twilight , 2009. 55 Kang, East Asia Before the West , 2010, p. 54. 56 For a recent English-language biography of Yongle, see Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Perpetual Happiness, 2001. For a Chinese biography, see Chao Zhongchen, Ming Chengzu zhuan , 1995. 57 On the construction projects, see Chao, Ming Chengzu zhuan , 1995, pp. 414–39. 58 Tsai, Perpetual Happiness , 2001, pp. 132–3. 59 The foremost proponent of this theory is Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America , 2003. 60 Dreyer, Zheng He , 2007, pp. 147–8. 61 See Tsai, Perpetual Happiness, 2001, pp. 148–77, and Chao, Ming Chengzu zhuan , 1995, pp. 352–75. 62 On the Ming colonization efforts in Vietnam, see MSJSBM, pp. 343–70; Chao, Ming Chengzu zhuan , 1995, pp. 339–49; and Zheng Yongchang, Zhengzhan yu qishou , 1997, pp. 1–147. 63 See CHC 7 , pp. 314–16. 64 For detailed examinations of the Tumu debacle, see F.W. Mote, “The T’u-mu Incident of 1449,” 1974, pp. 243–72; and MSJSBM , pp. 471–6. 65 On these efforts, see Swope, “The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592–1600,” 2001, pp. 60–5. 66 The standard work in English on this phenomenon is Kwan-wai So, Japanese Piracy in Ming China During the Sixteenth Century , 1975. Also see Charles O. Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign against Hs ü Hai, 1556,” 1974, pp. 273–307.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 For a modern Chinese account, see Fan Zhongyi and Tong Xigang, Mingdai wokou shilue , 2004. A contemporary overview can be found in MSJSBM , pp. 839–70. 67 The best overview of Sino-Japanese relations during the Ming period is Zheng Liangsheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu , 1985. Zheng has also compiled an extensive series of primary documents concerning Japanese pirates in Ming China. See Zheng Liangsheng, Mingdai wokou shiliao , 1987. 68 Far too much has been written about Qi to go into detail here. For starters, see Ray Huang, 1587: A Year of No Signifi cance , 1981, pp. 156–88. Also see Luo, Ming chao de naxie zhanzheng , 2010, pp. 165–6. 69 I discuss these measures at length in Swope, “Cutting Dwarf Pirates Down to Size,” 2009, pp. 81–107. Ming grand strategy and the intervention in Korea 191 70 John W. Dardess, Ming China 1368–1644, 2012, p. 47. For more on Zhengde’s reign and eccentricities, see Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven , 2001, and CHC 7 , pp. 403–49. 71 See CHC 7 , pp. 423–30, and Luo, Ming chao de naxie zhanzheng , 2010, pp. 147–8. 7 2 CHC 7 , p. 439. 73 See Tong, Disorder under Heaven , 1991, pp. 6, 46. Note that Tong marks the division between early and late Ming China at the start of the reign of Emperor Zhengde (r. 1506–21). 74 These appendices are called the Mingshi jishi benmo buyi and are included in the edition cited in note 50 above. On their political sensitivity, see Lynn A. Struve, The Ming–Qing Confl ict, 1619–1683 , 1998, p. 350. 75 On Ming involvement in the world economy, see William S. Atwell, “Ming China and the Emerging World Economy, c. 1470–1650,” 1998, pp. 376–416, and Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient , 1998, pp. 108–23. 76 On the evolution of the Ming military, see Swope, “The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592–1600,” 2001, pp. 40–88. Also see Chase, Firearms , 2003, pp. 150–4. The “modernity” of the late Ming army is discussed in Chase, Firearms , 2003, pp. 167–71. On the growth of mercenary armies in Europe, see Michael Mallett, “Mercenaries,” 1999, pp. 209–29. 77 Tong, Disorder under Heaven , 1991, p. 44. 78 Again, there is a plethora of sources dealing with these matters. In English, see Henry Serruys, “Four Documents Related to the Sino-Mongol Peace of 1570–1571,” 1960, pp. 1–66. For relatively contemporary Chinese treatments, see Qu Jiusi, Zuben Wanli wugong lu, 1980, pp. 639a–784b (hereafter cited as WGL ); Zhuge Yuansheng, Liangchao pingrang lu , 1969, pp. 29–64 (hereafter cited as PRL ). 79 Accounts of these activities are scattered throughout source materials from the period, most notably the Wanli wugong lu. 80 On the international implications of the Korean War, see Swope, “Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence,” 2002, pp. 757–82. The war is treated in its entirety in Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail , 2009. Also see Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion , 2002; Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War , 2005. 81 Li Guangtao, Ming–Qing dang’an lunwenji , 1986, p. 757. 82 See Swope, “Turning the Tide,” 2003, pp. 1–22. 83 Zheng Liangsheng, Mingdai wokou shiliao , 1987, p. 478. 84 On the Ming debates, see Song Yingchang, Jinglue fuguo yaobian , 1986, pp. 9–10. 85 For a longer discussion of the Ming debates concerning the intervention in Korea, see Swope, “As Close as Lips and Teeth,” 2013, pp. 163–90. 86 Shin Ky ŏ ng, Chaejo Pŏ nbangji , 1980, pp. 238–9. 8 7 PRL, p. 401. For a brief overview of Han Chinese views of the Miao, see Norma Diamond, “Defi ning the Miao,” 1995. 8 8 MS , pp. 2274–5. 89 For a general overview of Ming relations with and attitudes towards aboriginal

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 peoples in all corners of the empire, see Yang Shaoxian and Mo Junqing, Mingdai minzu shi , 1996. 90 The standard primary source for this uprising is Li Hualong, Ping Bo quanshu, 1937. In English, see Swope, “Civil–Military Coordination in the Bozhou Campaign of the Wanli Era,” 2000, pp. 49–70. Also see Swope, “The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592–1600,” 2001, pp. 386–453. 91 The best source for the rise of the Qing state is Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise, 1985. On Nurhaci’s relationship with Ming military leaders, see Swope, “A Few Good Men,” 2004, pp. 34–81. 92 See MSJSBM , pp. 1401–16. 93 See Tan Qian, Guoque , 1978, p. 5259. 192 K.M. Swope 94 See Wu Weiye, Suikou jilue , 1968, 1.2a–2b. Note that this work follows traditional pagination so references are to chapters (juan ) and pages within the given chapter. 95 On the relationship between natural disasters and the expansion of peasant rebellions in late Ming China, see Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History , 2003, pp. 168–77. 96 Their offi cial biographies can be found in MS, pp. 7947–80. The standard general account in English of the late Ming peasant rebellions is James Bunyan Parsons, Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty, 1993. For a modern Chinese account, see Li Guangtao, Mingji liukou shimo, 1965. For a more comprehensive contemporary account, see Dai Li and Wu Qiao, Liukou changbian, 1991. Also see MSJSBM , pp. 1317–86.

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Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 10 Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan Rethinking China’s involvement in the Imjin Waeran

Harriet T. Zurndorfer

It has always been recognized as inadvisable for an egg to come into violent contact with a stone, or for a snake to challenge a dragon to mortal combat … Moreover, the small states beyond the sea, subject to Korea, are as compared to the Middle Kingdom, no bigger than a prefecture; the quantity of their stores and the number of their troops are but one ten-thousandth of Our resources. Your anger is like that of a mantis … Do not cause us to come and wipe you utterly out, thus making you a laughingstock for the other barbarians! “The Diplomacy of Li Taibo,” by Baowen Laoren (late Ming)1

Introduction The seven-year war in which the troops of Ming China fought Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s forces in Chosŏ n Korea was one of the three major campaigns of the Wanli reign (1573–1620), and one of 308 external wars in which the Ming dynasty confronted its enemies.2 The other two campaigns, a crusade to eradicate an aboriginal chieftain in the southwest and an offensive to quash a mutiny of Sino-Mongolian troops in the northwest, were not connected to the confrontation in Korea, but late Ming and early Qing contemporaries have classifi ed the confl icts together as a related series of events; they are known as the Wanli san da zheng (Three great punitive campaigns of the Wanli emperor).3 For example, three successive chapters in Gu Yingtai’s (died after 1689) well-known topical history of the Ming dynasty, the Mingshi jishi benmo (The major events of Ming history, 1658), discuss these campaigns.4 The implication of this publication, and other writings linking these military

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 confrontations, is their presumed connection to the fi nal breakdown of the Ming dynasty. To many observers, both contemporary and modern historians alike, the three campaigns constitute evidence of Ming decline already in the sixteenth century, leading to its “inevitable” failure in the early seventeenth. But these military contests may be viewed differently: as proof of Wanli China’s ability to wage war simultaneously and successfully on three fronts, as a sign of the regime’s strength, and as the culmination of efforts by a number of enterprising civil and military offi cials who, decades earlier, had laid the basis for Ming effectiveness in the battlefi eld.5 Nevertheless, given that 198 H.T. Zurndorfer so much contemporary and modern historical writing on the Wanli reign has castigated this era as a “turning point” in the downward fortunes of the dynasty, it may seem diffi cult to propose alternatives to the “fi n-de-siè cle” scenario.6 In any event, we hope here to reassess a number of factors that contributed to the vigor of Wanli China and its ability to counter Hideyoshi’s forces in Korea. Ming China’s involvement in Korea reveals a variety of means by which the dynasty reinforced its position of centrality in the East Asian cultural and political universes. This chapter explores three themes that are fundamental for understanding China’s role in the Imjin Waeran: fi rst, Ming relations with Korea 7 and Japan vis- à-vis the “tribute system,” a concept that has had serious revision since John Fairbank’s fi rst formulation of its dimensions many decades ago; second, Ming military strategy, another topic now undergoing “historical overhaul”; and, third, the fi nancial background to the war, an assessment of the burden of military expenses in relation to other pecuniary obligations engendered by the Ming state during the late sixteenth century.

Korea and Japan in the Chinese world order before the Imjin Waeran: realpolitik, female virgins, and the Wakō The immediate circumstance that plunged China into the Korean–Japanese confl ict in 1592 was a call for help from King Sŏ njo (r. 1567–1608) in the fi fth month of that year.8 The Ming government responded by dispatching an offi cial mission that reached Chosŏ n in the seventh month. Because the Chinese were suspicious, even believing that the Koreans were actually conspiring with the Japanese, the Ming government sent this delegation, headed by the civil offi cial Huang Yingyang, to investigate the claim of invasion. Huang considered reports and documents proffered by the Koreans at the king’s refuge, including two letters from Konishi Yukinaga, and then confi rmed Japan’s invasion to the authorities in Beijing.9 Huang’s certifi cation of the fall of P’yŏ ngyang on the twelfth day of the sixth month of 1592 eliminated whatever uncertainties Ming authorities entertained over Korea’s claims to military defeat: the Japanese invasion was now a “matter of defending the Ming border.”10 Chos ŏ n was a tributary state of Ming China, which meant that it publicly

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 recognized its “inferior” status in relation to China’s claim to universal rulership. By regularly paying tribute to the Ming government and exhorting the rhetoric of Confucian obeisance and ritual, Chosŏ n could expect imperial legitimation and even logistic support in the face of military attack. 11 The Sino-Korean connection went back to the Han dynasty, and was probably unmatched by Chinese relations with any other polity in East Asia.12 Scholars often mention Korea as the prototype tributary state. 13 Fairbank’s model of the tribute system fi tted Korea into the “Sinic Zone” (along with Vietnam) of China’s foreign relations. 14 Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 199 The concept of a tribute system encompassed a range of political relationships, from total submission, to equality, to “barbarian superiority.”15 Moreover, the Ming tribute system was not exclusive. 16 As Hamashita Takeshi has argued, states paying tribute to China also had reciprocal relations with other countries: the Chosŏ n Korea–Japan connection was one of several “satellite” tributary relations, others being that of Ryū ky ū paying tribute to Korea, Japan, and China, or Vietnam requesting tribute from Laos. The tribute system was a source of informal political integration embracing maritime Asia, from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia to Oceania.17 Although Fairbank categorized Japan, along with the states of South and Southeast Asia as part of the outer zone of “barbarians,” Japan was in fact within the sphere of the China-centered universe. Classical Chinese and the Chinese classics formed the basis of elite learning and political and cultural discourse in Japan (as in Korea and Vietnam) from the time of the Tang dynasty (618–906). Chinese scholarship remained relevant to the Japanese learned world until the end of the nineteenth century. These facts indicate how certain norms of Chinese civilization came to be institutionalized in Japan. There were other cultural ties with China as well. Already in the Sui dynasty (605– 17) Buddhist monks and other religious devotees came to China for contact with Chinese masters, and over the centuries a steady stream of these cultural envoys brought this learning back and infl uenced Japanese spiritual and material life. However, with time, such cultural affi nities were overshadowed by the waves of Japanese pirates, who from the time of the Yuan era (1279– 1368) began to plunder the Chinese littoral and cause great destruction. These two contrasting images of Japan, the land of the “sagacious monk” and the “bloodthirsty warrior,” came to dominate Chinese thought about Japan.18 As we review the narrative of Korean and Japanese relations with Ming China until 1592, what emerges is a complex history in which the pursuit of pragmatic economic goals often took precedence over ideological factors, including Confucian “protocol.” The fi fty-year period preceding the Imjin Waeran tested the fl exibility of the means by which China tried to maintain its position of centrality in the East Asian world order and, at the same time, to avoid military confrontation with its neighbors.

Korean and Japanese contact with Ming China before 1592

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 While Korea may have been the “ideal tributary state,” its relations with the early Ming government got off to a rocky start because the ruling elite of the Koryŏ dynasty had had close political and personal ties to the Mongol Yuan regime through marriage affi liations. The fi rst Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang (the Hongwu emperor) (r. 1368–98), initiated contact with Koryŏ to gain Korean confi dence and their obeisance to his new government. In an edict issued in 1372, the Chinese Emperor Hongwu ordered the Korean King Kongmin “to follow the ancient Chinese custom of visiting the court of the Son of Heaven once every three years, bearing tributary gifts.” 19 The 200 H.T. Zurndorfer Koreans complied, but they also continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Mongol Yuan rulers. Because so much of Manchuria remained under the authority of the Mongols who had not yet yielded to the Ming, King Kongmin was in a dilemma. Breaking ties with the Mongols on Korea’s northern border was an invitation to trouble and until 1387, when Ming armies fi nally established jurisdiction over the Liaodong peninsula and southern Manchuria, the Koreans could not give their undivided loyalty to the Ming.20 What happened thereafter was to set the tone for Ming–Korean relations for some time. Yi Sŏ nggye’s (1355–1405) seizure of the capital Kaegy ŏ ng (Kaes ŏ ng) in defi ance of Koryŏ ’s attempt to attack the Ming at the Yalu, and later, Yi’s takeover of the government in 1392, aroused Ming suspicions. The day after declaring himself king of Korea, Yi sent an envoy to Nanjing to petition investiture by the Ming court. Hongwu must have harbored distrust, because, while he did accede to the Korean request to name the new dynasty (choosing “Chosŏ n,” C. Chaoxian ), he rebuffed repeated attempts to establish regular tributary relations thereafter. 21 From the perspective of the Ming court, Korea was a security problem. Even Yi Sŏ nggye’s foreign policy, framed in classical terminology, “the way to protect the country is for the smaller to serve the larger” (C. shida , K. sadae), may have only strengthened Hongwu’s assessment that Yi needed security and probably legitimacy.22 Hongwu’s overriding concern was the security of the Sino-Korean border, and so a man with Yi’s military background, which included earlier contact with the Jurchens, did not inspire confi dence; Hongwu was preoccupied with a possible Korean–Jurchen alliance.23 Only an embassy led by Yi S ŏ nggye’s son, Yi Pangw ŏn, in 1394 seemed to have somewhat mollifi ed the emperor’s attitude towards Korea, but in general the relations between the Hongwu court and Chosŏ n were never easy.24 With Hongwu’s death in 1398, Ming–Chos ŏn relations began a new phase. Yi Pangw ŏn, enthroned as King Taejong (r. 1400–18), supported the Jianwen emperor (r. 1399–1402) during the civil war (1399–1402) with the emperor’s nephew, the Prince of Yan, Zhu Di. 25 The Korean court sent horses to aid Jianwen, but because of a series of military blunders on the emperor’s side, Zhu Di’s forces defeated the imperial contingent, and the prince ascended the throne as the Yongle emperor (r. 1403–25). Despite Chosŏ n’s help to the Nanjing regime, the Yongle emperor did not seek revenge, and almost imme-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 diately after taking the throne, he sent Yu Shiji (d. 1435), the assistant censor-in-chief, to inform the Korean king of his ascension. 26 In response the Korean king sent an embassy to congratulate him and to request a new seal and investiture. From then a regular exchange of embassies between the two countries ensued. 27 The offi cial list of Chosŏ n tribute items in the Da Ming huidian (Statutes of the Great Ming, 1587) contains gold, silver, a number of local products such as ginseng, and a fi xed supply of stud horses. 28 However, what does not appear was the demand for human tribute: female virgins and Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 201 eunuchs to serve the Inner Court.29 According to Korean sources, the Yongle emperor wanted Korean women to work either in the harem or in his palaces. 30 Of the 300 women sent to Beijing in 1408, fi ve were personally selected by the emperor’s eunuch envoy. Thereafter, the demand for “Korean beauties” became a customary request, despite anger and resentment in the Chosŏ n court. The Xuande emperor (r. 1426–36) also requested Korean women and demanded a regular supply of Korean female cooks to prepare his favorite dishes, including Korean-style fi sh and pickles.31 Three Chinese accounts from the fi fteenth century reveal dimensions of the “realpolitik” element in the Chinese–Korean connection, as opposed to only ideological or cultural considerations. These reports are: Chaoxian jishi (Memorandum on an Embassy to Korea, 1450) by Ni Qian (1415–79; 1439 js); Fengshi lu (Record of an Embassy, 1460) by Zhang Ning (1454 js); and Chaoxian zazhi (Various Recordings on Korea, 1488) by Dong Yue (1431– 1502; 1469 js). 32 The aim of Ni Qian’s visit to Korea in early 1450 was to obtain a declaration of loyalty to the new Ming emperor Jingtai (r. 1450– 7), installed by the courageous Minister of War Yu Qian (1398–1457) after Jingtai’s brother, the Yingzong emperor (r. 1436–50 and 1457–65), had been kidnapped by the Oyirat or Western Mongols.33 Ni Qian was also anxious to determine whether the Koreans were entertaining thoughts of backing the Oyirat against the Ming. As one modern historian has observed, the fact that Ni set out for Korea in mid-December, in the depths of winter, on a journey of approximately two months from Beijing is certain indication of how seriously the Chinese viewed any possible alliances between Chosŏ n and the Oyirat. 34 Even the formal niceties of the embassy itself, that is, banqueting, sightseeing, the exchange of gifts and poetry, etc., could not cover up the ser- iousness of the expedition. Ni Qian returned to China with assurances that Korea would remain loyal to the Ming. Like Ni Qian, Zhang Ning also tried to reach Korea in a hurry, in fear of a possible Chosŏ n collusion with Jianzhou Jurchens in Northern Manchuria. Aware that eastern Manchuria tribes paid tribute to Korea (and hence, were under Korean suzerainty), the Ming government had justifi able concerns. Zhang Ning, as a highly placed secretary in the Ministry of Rites and accompanied by a military commissioner familiar with northeastern affairs, set out for Seoul in 1460 in haste and reached the Korean capital in less than a month. Here Zhang sought out Korean assurances that they would maintain

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 order over their “unruly vassal.” 35 Fengshi lu, mainly a collection of poetry describing Zhang’s reaction to the sights he visited after the offi cial business was over, may be viewed not just as a “literary refl ection” but also a sign of the success of the diplomatic framework in which Ming–Chosŏ n relations were conducted. The Chinese understood where Korea had some independence in the matter of border disputes. Unlike these two visits, that by Dong Yue in 1488 to Korea, as reported in Chaoxian zashi, a private collection of notes, was much more low-key. 36 Dong took his time getting to Seoul, and once having crossed the Yalu, he found 202 H.T. Zurndorfer time to do sightseeing before heading for the capital. The purpose of his embassy was to inform the Koreans of the recent ascension of the Hongzhi emperor (r. 1487–1505). Upon arrival in the Chosŏ n court, he noted with delight how well the Koreans observed the correct rituals, and he promised to rectify the inaccurate accounts of Korean offi cial customs in Chinese publications.37 By the end of the fi fteenth century it seems that Chinese interest in Korea had shifted from anxieties over security to care and consideration of Korean adherence to ritual and correct etiquette. There were fewer embassies from the Chinese side (only ten between 1506 and 1567), implying the growing stability between the two neighbors.38 Nevertheless, what preoccupied both countries well into the sixteenth century was keeping the upper hand over two sets of mutual enemies: the three principal Jurchen tribal confederations in Jianzhou and sea-faring pirates (Ch. wokou J. wak ō). Although China and Korea were successful in “limiting the spread of Jurchen infl uence,” 39 the pirates were another matter altogether. Composed of both Japanese and Chinese, the pirates had their heyday in the 1550s when, according to the “bible of wak ō studies,” Chouhai tubian (An illustrated discourse on maritime defense, 1561–2), they plundered the coasts of Zhejiang and Fujian provinces.40 Korea viewed its previous efforts in the fi fteenth and early sixteenth centuries to transform piracy into peaceful commerce as being threatened when, in 1555, wak ō raided Tallyang and other areas of Chŏ lla Province’s southern coast; the intensity of the armed struggles presaged disaster. The Korean authorities must have breathed a sigh of relief when they realized that “the great tide of brigandage sweeping East Asian waters in the 1550s and 60s swirled about the coasts of China.”41 By that time, the Ming government had had some experience in both suppressing piracy and dealing with Japanese efforts to regularize contact with China. In 1403 the Yongle emperor received envoys from Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, a retired sh ōgun and an ardent Zen Buddhist, who professed a certain admiration (almost to the point of sinophilia) for the home of that form of Buddhist learning. Yoshimitsu was also in need of money and saw the Middle Kingdom as a source of tremendous wealth for which he was prepared to acknowledge China’s suzerainty in exchange for regular tributary contact, and hence favorable trade relations. His letter to Yongle, signed “your subject, the king of Japan,” was fraudulent on two counts: he was not Japan’s king, but had resigned from the shō gunate and become a Buddhist

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 monk; and he did not acknowledge China’s suzerainty. But for the Chinese willing to grant the Japanese offi cial trading status, he seemed the perfect ally to enlist in the suppression of piracy. 42 Until Yoshimitsu’s overtures, the Ming government had followed Hungwu’s 1369 policy statement towards the “island men.”

If you wish to pay us respect, then come to court; if not, tend your own military matters and protect yourself. But if you are to engage in piracy, Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 203 I should at once order my generals to subjugate you. O King, you had better consider this!43

Hungwu’s 1369 warning implies an important premise in China’s attitude towards foreign states: keep order within your own borders. Although the Ming court did establish tribute-trade relations from the time of the Yongle emperor, and Japan did present “tribute” some seventeen times between 1404 and 1547, the relationship never acquired any kind of standard ritual decorum. The “tribute missions” were confi ned to Ningbo (Zhejiang Province) where the Japanese carried on a “tally trade” with licensed Chinese brokers, under the supervision of the Maritime Trade Superintendency (tiju shibosi ). 44 The Japanese “embassies” brought armor, swords, and gilt fans, and the Chinese responded with sumptuous silk textiles, porcelain, and large sums of copper cash.45 The impact of this cash should not be underrated: because the bakufu did not mint coins, Chinese specie became the medium for both international exchange and Japan’s growing mercantile economy.46 Japanese Zen monks managed much of the trade and diplomacy during this period – as cultural brokers, Zen priests stimulated interest in Chinese art, and thus began the heyday of Japanese collections of Ming porcelains, landscape paintings, decorative furnishings, writing materials, and Buddhist scriptures. 47 Despite a few disturbing incidents such as the occasion in 1523 when two “tribute missions” arrived in Ningbo at the same time, 48 the relations between Muromachi Japan and Ming China functioned reasonably well until 1549 when smuggling and piracy overshadowed normal intercourse. A surge of pirate incidents triggered several decades of armed confl ict along China’s littoral. According to one set of fi gures, from 1440 to 1550, there were only twenty-fi ve raids, but for the single decade 1551–60, 467 separate pirate incidents were recorded, and another seventy-fi ve for 1561–70, after which the number of incursions subsided. 49 The causes of the swell of pirate attacks originated within China itself. 50 As the offi cial in charge of Zhejiang and Fujian coastal defenses, Zhu Wan (1494–1550), found out in his 1547 investigation of these disturbances: for decades local Chinese entrepreneurs protected by regional offi cials had been engaging in large-scale overseas trade – a practice that was strictly forbidden by Ming law. As a righteous offi cial, Zhu attempted to police the principal centers of illegal commerce off the Zhejiang coast. His efforts resulted only

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 in greater efforts by leading Chinese merchants, such as Wang Zhi (d. 1559), to enlist government support to promote “free trade.” When Wang failed to gain his objective by compromise and cooperation, he began to use all his resources, including easy access to armed fl eets manned by sailors and soldiers, to attack offi cial establishments and to raid all along the littoral. Between 1552 and 1559 pirate assaults spread into what is now Jiangsu and Anhui provinces in the interior, threatening great urban centers such as Nanjing, Suzhou, and Yangzhou. While one has to admit that the Chinese element 204 H.T. Zurndorfer in these gangs predominated, the Japanese were well represented among the membership. Once the Ming government forces dispersed the invaders from the China coast, the Japanese archipelago served as a suitable base to launch further attacks.51 The Ming government fi nally gained control, thanks to expert handling by Hu Zongxian (1511–65), a civil offi cial who eliminated the leading pirate chiefs by the end of the 1550s, and Qi Jiguang (1528–88), a military offi cer who commanded local troops from Yiwu (Zhejiang) in a number of swift victories.52 But despite their successes, there were long-term consequences. First, years of threats and actual destruction generated a powerful feeling of insecurity among a certain segment of the Jiangnan elite who blamed the marauders’ presence on the failure of the Chinese government. A number of literati doubted the government’s effectiveness, and this led local leaders to encourage defensive measures, not only building more walls around urban areas, but also stimulating interest in military matters. 53 Second, the defeat of the pirates lured the same authorities to ignore the metamorphosis of these pirates: Hideyoshi’s unifi cation process absorbed these pirates into “model vassals.”54 Had they realized the actions by this Japanese warrior, his invasion would not have caught them off-guard, envisioning his invasion to be another wak ō raid or bahan plague.55

The politics of Korean and Japanese tribute relations with Ming China Ming China conducted its foreign affairs according to a tribute system, but in effect this code of conduct was nothing like a monolithic, uniform framework – institutional innovations and crises of military strategy were just as important to the formulation of a particular policy of interstate relations at a given point in time. 56 In the case of Ming China and Chos ŏn Korea, the creation of tribute systems called on ideological justifi cation based on Neo- Confucian values as well as pragmatic concerns. In early Ming China, the triumph of Neo-Confucianism contributed to the imposition of a “unifi ed tribute system matrix on all foreign relations.” It may be viewed as a reaction born out of resentment towards more than three centuries of alien rulership when China found itself “among equals.” 57 The Hongwu emperor, in his zealous support of the Zhu Xi interpretation of Neo-Confucianism, which he believed would legitimate his rulership in the face of the literati elite,58 saw it

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 as his duty “to restore” what had been a “standard tribute system” practiced during the Han and Tang dynasties. His, and his successors’, “restoration was so successful that by the time the European maritime powers began to enter East Asian shipping lanes in the sixteenth century,”59 Westerners came to believe not only that the tribute system had always been the normal mode of Chinese intercourse with foreigners, but also that it was a form of subjugation by China towards outlying states. Recent studies call for a revision of this point of view: new archival research points to the element of fl exibility in China’s conduct of its foreign affairs, Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 205 particularly with regard to its relatively high level of tolerance in matters of “guest ritual.” For example, it is now known that “ritual visits” also offered “barbarians” the opportunity to abuse the system. Pamela Crossley writes about the Ming:

Jurchen ‘tribute’ missions to the Ming capital were actually expeditions for imposing upon the hospitality of the Ming court and its eunuch managers, collecting bribes in goods and cash to ensure another year of amic- ability, and wringing high prices for their horses.60

In any event, in Ming China the promulgation of a specifi c form of Neo- Confucian orthodoxy stimulated, in turn, the pursuit of a particular version of foreign relations and the myth of its perpetuity in Chinese history. Conversely, early Chosŏ n Korea, by pursuing a policy of sadae and thus adapting and adhering to the early Ming prescription of tribute relations (including compliance with the “informal” demands for virgins and pickles), laid the basis for the country’s eventual ideological commitment to Neo-Confucian values during and after the fi fteenth century. 61 In addition to conforming to the requirements of tribute ritual, the Korean state also formulated its foreign policy objectives out of pragmatic concerns about its own border security. In sum, Chos ŏ n Korea and Ming China consciously constructed power relations with each other according to both realist and cultural positions. These positions became clear in the summer of 1592 when King Sŏ njo begged for help from the Ming court. The initial Chinese reaction was not unifi ed, and the ritualized language of the tribute system could not conceal inherent tensions. According to Gu Yingtai’s account, the fi rst reaction of Ming authorities at court was to characterize the Korean king in the following way: “that he (the King) was a heavy drinker, leading a life of pleasure, and [not least] negligent in the matter of [his country’s] defense.”62 Clearly, these were not the words of a benevolent superior towards a dependable inferior. On the other hand, the Wanli emperor himself expressed personal sympathy for the Korean king. On fi rst learning in the early sixth month of 1592 about the invasion of Chosŏ n, he voiced compassion for the king’s plight, and several days later offered him refuge.63 China’s relations with Japan were entirely different. Chinese policy towards

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Japan lacked insight. Unlike the “realistic” ways the Ming government handled problems on its land frontier, successive Ming courts demonstrated an unshake- able faith in the use of bureaucratic controls. The “tally trade” was seen as the most appropriate and effi cient way to deal with both tribute and international commerce along its sea frontier. The government’s mismanagement of what had become multilateral private commerce in and out of China’s coastal ports mushroomed into armed confl icts that led to grave depredations of the Chinese coast, the transformation of traders into pirates, and not least, international- ization of the South China Sea region. The response of the Jiajing emperor 206 H.T. Zurndorfer (r. 1522–67), who particularly disliked China engaging in foreign trade outside the tribute system, only exacerbated the confl ict between “ordinary” (law- abiding) Chinese simply wanting to trade and pirates. Only with this emperor’s death in 1567 did the Ming government release the ban on Chinese participation in overseas trade. But the concept of “tribute trade” did not fade away, and the Ming government continued to rely on this institution as a way of defi ning the East Asian world order to its advantage. This attitude became the center of controversy during the “peace negotiations” with Japan after 1593.

The rescue of Korea by Wanli China

Preliminary remarks The last decades of the sixteenth century were a time of wide and increasing interest in military innovation. The efforts of leading civil offi cials such as the Grand Councilors Gao Gong (1512–78) and Zhang Juzheng (1525– 82),64 keen proponents of the need to revitalize Ming military capacities, were duplicated by leading literati who published treatises for the general populace on local defense and the use of new weapon technology. Lu Kun’s (1536–1618) handbook, Jiuming shu (Saving lives while defending a city, 1607 preface), informed a general readership in defense against bandits and included descriptions of small arms.65 Memories of the 1550s raids on the Jiangnan coast prompted local leaders to organize local militia once news of the Korean campaign became known. Modern literary scholars have noted that in the second half of the sixteenth century many Chinese writers began to attach great importance to the notion of xia (chivalry), and that they celebrated the values of “loyalty, gal- lantry, manly conduct, and heroism” in fi ctional narratives.66 China’s most famous novel of noble warriors, Shuihu zhuan (The Water Margin), was composed around this time. Interest in restoring a martial spirit to Ming culture pervades the writings of Song Maocheng (1569?–1620?), who idealized the knight-errant of the Warring States era, and also those of Chen Jiru (1558– 1639). Song and his literary circle were tied to the highest echelons of the Ming military elite, civil offi cials, and generals responsible for running the Korea campaign through the courtesan who liaised with them, the famous Xue Susu (fl . 1574–1635). 67 She had been the lover of Yuan Baode, a civil

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 offi cial with military duties in one of the other great Wanli campaigns, and also the one-time mistress of General Li Chengliang (1526–1618). Li was one of China’s best-known military chiefs, and the father of fi ve other great commanders, including the highly decorated Li Rusong (1549–98), who was to play such an important role in the Imjin Waeran.68 It was likely that Song through Xue became friends with another capable general, the southerner Liu Ting (d. 1619), who too was involved in the Korea campaign. Such affi liations between scholar-intellectuals and military offi cials imply a changing status of military men in Ming life. Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 207 Earlier interpretations that essentialize Chinese attitudes towards warfare as one of avoidance, or even incompetence, also need revision. It may be argued that China had two strategic cultures. One was based on the “Confucian– Mencian paradigm” that viewed warfare as aberrant and avoidable through good government. When unavoidable, war was best prosecuted through accommodationist and defensive strategies. The other culture was the parabellum mode, which assumed the continuity of possible confl ict, required an ever-ready state of war, and favored offensive strategies. 69 Ming policy makers preferred the latter paradigm – years of fi ghting the Mongols on the northern borders made the Confucian paradigm impossible to implement. 70 In general, the Ming record on foreign confl icts “shows a predilection for the use of force over negotiation.”71 The history of Chinese military literature also supports this tendency: almost one-third of the texts on military technology ever produced originated in the Ming dynasty.72 Unfortunately, information about Ming military manuals and treatises is not easy to locate. Documentation on innovative Ming military technology did not fi nd its way into the Mingshi , which was published in 1739, under heavy Manchu censorship. One reason that the military prowess of the Wanli era has been disparaged is due to the mis-characterization of the Wanli emperor himself. Biographical accounts usually represent him as a self-indulgent, emotionally incapacitated, uncommitted individual, too preoccupied with his own personal dilemmas to run the Ming empire effectively. 73 But recent historical research utilizing a number of neglected sources such as the Wanli dichao (Court gazette of the Wanli era, 1621) attempts to portray him as a much more forceful individual, anxious for the security of China’s borders, and keen on developing the armies of his empire into strong fi ghting forces.74 One writer proposes that Shenzong’s personal involvement in the Three Great Campaigns may be counted as his greatest achievement.75 One of the reasons for that success was the emperor’s ability to select capable personnel as the occasion arose and to run the court bureaucracy effi ciently and fairly. The quality of the Chinese forces in Korea had no resemblance to either the fi rst generation of troops who loyally formed the core of the rstfi Ming emperor’s hereditary military system, 76 or the weak and demoralized corps so quickly defeated at Fushun (Liaodong) in 1619.77 The Ming army that saw action in Korea from 1592 to 1593 and again in 1597–8 was a collection of mercenary regiments led by commanders who were familiar with logistical

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 and strategic techniques successfully employed in earlier campaigns against pirates on the coast and Mongols along the northern frontier. Mercenaries were the key to Qi Jiguang’s success in rooting pirates out of Zhejiang. He recruited 3,000 natives of Yiwu (located about 150 kilometers south of Hangzhou) to fi ght the invaders.78 Contemporary observers agreed that what made his military accomplishment so unique was the way he had trained his soldiers and employed them in new, innovative tactical formations. Qi published two military handbooks based on his experiences in the battlefi eld that became “standard reading” for army strategists and military commanders: 208 H.T. Zurndorfer Jixiao xinshu (A new treatise on disciplined service, 1562) gave practical advice on recruiting, organizing, training, and leading soldiers; and Lianbing shiji (A practical account of troop training, 1571) added to the information in his fi rst volume but from the perspective of fi ghting on the Ming northern borders. After his success against pirates, Qi was awarded command of the presti- gious Jizhou defense area, northeast of Beijing, where he served from 1569 to 1583.79 Many of Qi’s achievements were celebrated in Zhao Shizhen’s Shenqi pu (A written discourse on empire, 1598), a well-illustrated treatise on contemporary fi rearms and their regimental use according to Qi’s innovations. Qi’s contributions to Ming military tactics contrast with policies towards the Mongols. The Ming government pursued an “accommodationist” policy during the 1560s, resulting in a peace agreement with the Altan Khan in 1571. But the stratagem was, according to one leading Ming offi cial, Wang Chonggu (1515–89), a way to buy time – the government could use the detente to improve defensive instruments (walls, forts, and warning beacons) and ultimately ensure the security of the state.80 Ever since the mid fi fteenth century, military administrators had supervised the building of “long walls” to connect the western segments of the jiu bian zhen (nine border garrisons) situated along China’s northern and northwest frontiers. These fortifi ed garrisons were located at key defense points where large divisions of the Ming army were deployed.81 As the use of garrison troops became more important in the sixteenth century, the government promoted a program of strengthening fortifi cations, and so “armies” of brick and stonemasons were employed to create a “Great Wall.”82 The architect of the “accommodationist” strategy, but also the champion for the revitalization of the Ming forces was the Grand Secretary Zhang Juzheng (in post from 1571 to 1582). Zhang was personally responsible for Qi Jiguang’s appointment to the Jizhou command and the power behind increasing the numbers of troops (by a third) under Qi’s leadership. Zhang also encouraged Qi to make use of newly devised cart-fi ghting techniques and employing light artillery called folangji, which was a breech-loading swivel gun fi tted to a small mobile vehicle and manned by twenty soldiers.83 Zhang, the son of a minor military offi cial, gained hisjinshi degree in 1547 through his own talent but rose into the higher echelons of the bureaucracy by networking with a number of powerful men, including the infl uential Grand Secretary Yan Song (1480–1565). As the juvenile Wanli emperor’s tutor, Zhang had close access

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 to the monarch and taught him much about military matters, which also had some impact on the court’s handling of the Imjin Waeran. Wanli grew up with a great interest in border affairs and eventually perceived the advantages of having a contingent of loyal military offi cials at his disposal to counter the overwhelming infl uence of civil offi cials at court.84 To underwrite these military programs, Zhang initiated an overhaul of the Ming fi nancial structure. He directed his policies against “old wealth,” notably those Jiangnan families whose resources lay principally in extensive landholdings, and made a substantial number of enemies. 85 One of his major Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 209 deeds was to initiate a nationwide cadastral survey in 1578 whereby all the landholdings recorded in all the survey registers in local government offi ces were re-measured, utilizing new mathematics and a more precise form of calculation, with a view towards increasing the tax base. By 1581, Zhang was able to have the government adopt the so-called “Single Whip” method whereby the complex array of service levies and grain taxes were commuted to one payment in silver. 86 Zhang also revived the tradition of military farming and personally charged governor generals to increase production.87 These efforts, as well as pursuing tax delinquencies, resulted in bulging treasury vaults, plentiful grain, and cash deposits in provincial treasuries. By the 1580s, a general feeling of well-being can be traced to his program for fi scal management.88

In 1577 the expenses for armies in Xuanfu, Datong, and Shanxi were reported to be only 20–30% of what they had been before peace was made [in 1571], while in 1583 the armies were far better supplied than before. Subsidies to the Mongols amounted to only a tenth of what defense previously cost. 89

According to one estimate, at the end of the 1571–80 decade, there was a surplus of 353,000 taels of silver in the Ming treasury, and the fi rst surplus since the early sixteenth century.90 On the eve of Hideyoshi’s invasion, the Ming government enjoyed a renewal of its fi scal resources91 and possessed a reinvigorated military machine, thanks to the reforms of Qi Jiguang and Zhang Juzheng. The lowest ebb of the dynasty’s military resources had been overcome. A “Great Wall” had developed, as one frontier section was strengthened after another. And so, China could face its enemies with a certain amount of confi dence. In addition to the Japanese incursion in Korea, the Ming engaged in two other major confl icts, including a rebellion on the southwest frontier where a local hereditary aboriginal power-holder, Yang Yinglung (d. 1600), rose against the government in 1590 and for some ten years caused havoc. Yang led Miao tribesmen to raid into regions in Guizhou and southern Sichuan.92 On the northwest frontier, the Ming army faced Pubei (said to be a Chahar Mongol) and his son, both formerly in the service of the government, who, with the support of Ordos Mongols, threatened to take over Shaanxi in 1592. The Chinese general, Li Rusong, later to become an important leader in the Korean campaign, suc-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 cessfully destroyed Pubei and his supporters in 1592. 93

The rescue According to the Mingshi, in 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi made known his desire to conquer both China and Japan.

He summoned the remnants of [the pirate] Wang Zhi’s former gang for inquiry and through them he learned that the Chinese were afraid of 210 H.T. Zurndorfer the Japanese who seemed like tigers, and he became very arrogant. He ordered the preparation of arms, armament, and ships; conferring with his subordinates, he made a plan to use Koreans as guides for the invasion of China’s Beijing and to use Chinese as guides for the invasion of such coastal provinces as Zhejiang and Fujian.94

The Mingshi account identifi es Chen Jia, a Chinese trader from Fujian, as the informant to the governor of Fujian, Zhao Canlu (1571 js), about Hideyoshi’s intentions, but it does not refer to Hideyoshi’s letter delivered to the 1590 Korean embassy to Japan. This document made clear his demand that Korea support Japan with its invasion of China. 95 On the embassy’s return to Seoul, the Korean court debated whether to brief Beijing of Hideyoshi’s intended invasion. But in the meantime Zhao Canlu informed the Chinese Ministry of War (Ch. Bingbu ) of Chen’s message, and the Ryū ky ū prince Shō Nei also sent a missive to the Ming government about Hideyoshi’s designs.96 By the time Korea did notify the Wanli court in late 1591 about their encounter with Hideyoshi, the Chinese had grown suspicious regarding Korea’s loyalty; hence the cool reception to King S ŏ njo’s plea for help. The rescue of Korea by Wanli’s China endured three phases: 1592–3, a period of heavy warfare in Korea ending in a stalemate; 1593–6, years of inconclusive peace talks; and 1597–8, the second and fi nal military campaign in Korea, resulting in Japan’s defeat. 97 The fi rst phase of the war began when the Wanli emperor ordered Chinese troops to Korea to fi ght the Japanese. This decision was taken by Shenzong himself, without any pressure from ministers or military advisors. 98 His principal concern was that the coastal regions of Liaodong and Shandong (known as “Military Zone 1”) were well protected against sea attacks – no doubt recollecting pirate attacks. He also saw “Korea as a hazard.” 99 Believing the reports from the Ministry of War that described only the weakness of the Korean king’s army, he was determined to contain the Japanese invasion within the Korean border and to push the invaders back to Japan. Thus, with great disappointment the Wanli emperor learned of the defeat on 16–17.7.1592 by Konishi’s forces at P’yŏ ngyang of 3,000 troops under the vice-commander of Liaoyang, Zu Chengxun ( fl . 1570–1600), with support from the Mobile Corps commander Shi Ru.100 The Ming debacle was due to poor planning and inclement weather – several weeks of heavy rains had

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 made the terrain diffi cult for moving men and supplies. Hearing about the severe losses, Shenzong took immediate action. In September, he commissioned Song Yingchang (1530–1606; 1565 js), a career bureaucrat, to the rank of vice-minister in the Ministry of War, with the specifi c duty of organizing the Chinese resistance along the seacoast of Jizhen, Liaodong, Shandong, and Baoding, and gave him the general task of preparing the military strategy to defeat the Japanese. 101 In addition, the emperor assigned two other civil offi cials, Liu Huangshang (1527–93; 1586 js) and Yuan Huang (1533–1606), to serve as Military Councilors for the next expeditionary force to Korea, Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 211 planned for early 1593.102 The Wanli emperor also recruited Li Rusong to lead that expedition. At the time of his appointment, Li was still in the Ningxia region in combat against Pubei and the Mongols, but by the end of 1592, with his tremendous success there, he was ready to take up his new command.103 Among his many responsibilities, Song Yingchang had to arrange weapons and other military supplies. He ordered the Ministry of War to procure 10,000 Liaodong soldiers, along with 26,000 more troops from other northern commands, who were to be aided with 360 “mobile carts,” 70,000 cannon of various types, 27,000 bows and crossbows, 2,000 felt shields, and more than several million arrows, as well as an indeterminate number of land mines and fi re arrows. 104 In total, Song planned that some 42,000 men from fi ve northern military districts plus 3,000 soldiers trained in the use of Western fi rearms from South China prepare for the 1593 offensive. 105 Song additionally ordered that the Koreans be supplied with 300 heavy guns for their own defense.106 A censor at court, Guo Shi (1583 js), criticized the vice-minister’s plans on the grounds that they were “impractical and cost overburdening.” 107 The emperor became furious at what he considered a “personal attack” by Guo on Song’s initiatives and denounced Guo for acting irresponsibly. Charging him with spreading rumors that aided the enemy, Shenzong ordered Guo be punished. He also made clear that any other “servants” among the “Nine Chief Ministers and Supervisors, Secretaries, and Censors” (i.e., the Wanli court’s top bureaucracy) opposing Song’s plans would also be chastised. 108 The emperor sought success and displayed great interest throughout the entire campaign. It is not apparent whether Guo was part of the faction loyal to the aims of the Minister of War, Shi Xing (1538–99; 1565 js). Shi openly preferred negotiation to armed struggle; he felt war would prove too expensive and its costs exceed the Ministry of War’s budget.109 After Zu Chengxun’s defeat in P’y ŏ ngyang, at the end of summer 1592, Shi sent his personal envoy, Shen Weijing (1540–97), a member of neither the civil nor military bureaucracy, to Korea to meet with Konishi Yukinaga to discuss the terms of “peace.” Shi was acquainted with Shen through his in-laws: the parents of Shi Xing’s wife lived next door to Shen’s parents in Jiaxing (Zhejiang).110 Shen could speak Japanese and conducted conversations with Konishi about a possible truce. For his part, Konishi demanded that China become a vassal of Japan and agree to “tributary status” and that Korea cede the territory south of the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Taedong River to Japan. In response, Shen succeeded by the middle of the eighth month to convince Konishi to call a truce of fi fty days during which time he would return to Beijing to consult offi cials there about Konishi’s claims.111 This was a stratagem to buy time while Song Yingchang and Li Rusong made fi nal preparations for war in Korea.112 In the eleventh month the Ministry of War ordered Shen to return to P’y ŏngyang and “to negotiate” with Konishi a peace settlement that would offer Japan “tributary status” as a trading partner and Chinese investiture for the king of Japan (Ch. Riben guowang ) in exchange for Japanese withdrawal 212 H.T. Zurndorfer from Korea. 113 Konishi must have believed that China was still entertaining Japan’s terms (i.e., China withdraw aid to Korea), because on the fourth day of the fi rst month of 1593, as Li Rusong was leading his troops into the suburbs of P’yŏ ngyang, he sent twenty petty military offi cers to welcome Li. In Konishi’s mind, Li was there to back up Shen’s peace mediations, but Li killed three of Konishi’s retainers, while the remaining offi cers fl ed back to the daimy ō ’s camp. Astonished by this, Konishi sent a note to Shen with the message: “Is the latest incident the result of a problem of (language) translation?”114 He also demanded from Shen a copy of the original Chinese letter that had set the terms for the peace negotiation. But by the sixth day of the fi rst month, 1593, Li’s troops were already outside the gates of P’yŏ ngyang, and after two days of heavy fi ghting, Konishi had no choice but to eefl towards Seoul.115 Li announced his victory to the Ministry of War: the Chinese forces had beheaded more than 1,500 Japanese and killed another 6,000. A further 5,000 Japanese troops drowned as they fl ed P’yŏ ngyang.116 Song reported even larger numbers of Japanese killed, including 10,000 soldiers burned to death. 117 No doubt both sides exaggerated their gains and underestimated their losses; it was also not unknown for both belligerents to kill Korean civilians to exaggerate their counts.118 “The P’y ŏ ngyang victory intoxicated Li Rusong,” 119 and he continued his campaign. With only a small vanguard of 3,000 men he pushed southward towards Seoul, but some 70 li (40 km) north of the city, at the postal station Pyŏ kchegwan, the Japanese counterattacked with a detachment of 6,000–7,000 men and Li was nearly killed.120 With heavy losses, he fl ed back to P’y ŏngyang; around the same time, Konishi and Kat ō Kiyomasa (1562–1611) decided to leave Seoul and head towards Pusan. And so began the diffi cult second phase of negotiations. 121 Diplomatic efforts were hampered by the fact that neither side had suffi - cient military strength in the spring of 1593 to defeat the other, 122 although non-Chinese tribesmen from the southwest frontiers, including some Siamese under the leadership of Liu Ting (1552–1619), arrived in Korea as the Japanese began to evacuate Seoul.123 The Japanese decampment was due to their lack of supplies (a contingent of Chinese and Korean soldiers had burned most of their food) and threats by Shen that China was prepared to send 400,000 troops should they not retreat. Liu’s army served as a backup detachment as Li withdrew the bulk of the Chinese forces and headed back to China. 124

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 When the peace negotiations began, there were altogether 7,600 Chinese troops under Liu and Wu Weizhong in Korea, while some 16,000 Liaodong troops under Li Rusong stood ready.125 Once again Shen served as the Chinese contact, and in the fi fth month of 1593 he, along with two other “negotiators,” arrived in Nagoya where Hideyoshi received them as ‘“Ming imperial envoys.” 126 As the discussions were taking place, Japanese forces under Katō took Chinju and massacred some 60,000 inhabitants. When the Chinese mission returned to Pusan and learned of this new atrocity, they probably thought that the ending of the hostilities was Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 213 more important and decided not to push Konishi about it.127 The Chinese negotiators carried a memorial to the Ming emperor from Hideyoshi. The document contained seven stipulations for peace, including the demands that China offer an imperial princess “as consort to the emperor of Japan” and that half of the territory of Korea be ceded to Japan.128 Another condition was the restoration of the tally trade. Hideyoshi’s aides-de-camp realized that their master’s pomposity, in both language and demands, would not further the peace initiative, and so both parties agreed at Pusan to temper the original memorial. An important “modifi cation” to this communiqu é was the request that Hideyoshi be confi rmed a “tributary prince” ( feng wei fanwang ).129 Even once these arrangements had been settled between Shen and Konishi in early autumn 1593, it still took almost a year before Naitō Joan (1560?–1626) or Konishi Joan, a vassal of Konishi’s and Hideyoshi’s envoy to China, fi nally received permission from the Chinese to enter China and proceed to Beijing for the peace settlement. Court debates about peace conditions dominated palace exchanges in Beijing long before Naitō ’s arrival. Given his pecuniary concerns, no one was surprised by Shi Xing advocating that Japan be granted tribute trading status. At the end of summer 1593 Shi informed the emperor that the Japanese had left Pusan and that only a small force remained with Konishi at S ŏ saengp’o. Shi also convinced the emperor of Hideyoshi’s desire for investiture, like some of the Mongol leaders. 130 In the ninth month Vice-Minister Song voiced his opposition to Shi’s idea that Japan be granted this privilege.131 Another offi - cial from the Ministry of War, Zeng Weifang, replied to Song’s points and argued that the entire disaster was due to King Sŏ njo himself because he neglected his responsibilities. Zeng urged the king to abdicate so that Korea’s territory could become part of China.132 Shenzong responded that no such idea would be entertained, ever. Then he wrote to the king chastising him for his refusal earlier to face up to the Japanese threat, with the result that his ministers had lost faith in him: “If the cart in the lead has overturned, how can those behind it not overturn?” 133 He also suggested that the king return to Seoul, strengthen his navy, and then the Ming would withdraw all their forces from Korea. 134 Throughout, the Chinese emperor continued to help his neighbor and was willing to override the decisions of his ministers. As Shen and his Japanese counterparts prepared the “peace document”

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 in autumn 1593, the Wanli emperor gave instructions to the Liaodong civil governor Gu Yangqian (1537–1604; 1565 js) to begin the fi nal withdrawal of the bulk of Chinese troops. 135 The token force under Liu lent some assurance against potential Japanese attacks, which the emperor clearly considered possible. The Wanli dichao reports Shenzong’s assessment on the fi fth day of the eleventh month, 1593: “but the Japanese are crafty and deceitful, I do not think we can consider this matter fi nished.”136 By early 1594 ministers, offi cials, and bystanders were hotly debating whether Japan should be granted tribute trading status. Those opposed, such 214 H.T. Zurndorfer as the censors Yang Shaocheng and Cheng Jili, reminded the court about the history of Ming–Japanese trade relations:

since the time of [Emperor] Yongzheng there were tribute trade relations with Japan, but gradually irregularities occurred, and some [Japanese] spied upon the interior [of China], and fi nally they entered the interior [of the country], plundered, and robbed. By the Jiajing era, the southeast coast was in a state of catastrophe. This all came about because [the Japanese] were allowed to engage in tribute trade.137

The Minister of Rites, He Qiaoyuan (1558–1632; 1586 js), who administered tribute relations, also opposed the extension of this privilege to Japan. 138 He gained support from the censor Zhao Wanbi, the Supervising Secretary of Revenue Wang Dewan (1554–1621), and the Ministry of War offi cials Lu Zhongli, Gu Long, Xu Guanlan, Chen Weizhi, and Tang Yipeng. 139 In response, Minister of War Shi Xing made it known that he would be unable to deal with Hideyoshi while he had to resist Gu Yangqian and his “war contingent.”140 In the eighth month of 1594 Gu Yangqian proposed a “compromise”: that the Japanese be allowed to enter into tribute trade at Ningbo on the condition that Konishi withdraw all his troops from Korea. At this point, the Korean king petitioned the Wanli court to grant Hideyoshi the trade option, so that the Japanese would leave Korea.141 By the end of the ninth month Shenzong had had enough of the squabbling and issued an edict summing up the options: (1) send another force to Korea to expel the Japanese; (2) wait until the enemy attacked again, and then send an army; (3) avoid war and permit the Japanese to trade at certain points but not as a tributary partner. 142 Shi Xing opposed all three options, declaring that trade (without tribute) would lead to further expenses: the coastal provinces would have to increase their armed forces by 10,000 men, and it was not certain this would be suffi - cient to maintain order. 143 The emperor also corresponded with the Korean king about these alternatives. On the eve of Naitō ’s arrival in the capital, Minister Shi once again said that China could not afford any future punitive actions against Japan.144 Once Nait ō (called Xiao Xi Fei by the Chinese) arrived in Beijing, a protocol problem developed. Shi wanted the Japanese representative to lodge in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the imperial palace and be received as if he were a tribute envoy from “far- away.” Shenzong, suspicious about any “matters Japanese,” commanded his grand secretary that the Japanese guest be kept waiting in one of the fortress gates surrounding the palace. 145 Finally, on the eleventh day of the twelfth month of 1595, the Ming court presented to Naitō its three conditions to end the hostilities: (1) withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea; (2) except for investiture of its ruler, Japan was not to seek a relationship with the Ming government, not even trade; and (3) Japan was to establish good relations with Korea as a fellow vassal state of the Ming. 146 After Nait ō agreed to these Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 215 conditions, arrangements were made to send a Chinese delegation to Japan to invest Hideyoshi with the title “King of Japan” as “the king who has become obedient” (shun hua wang), and to bestow upon him the relevant imperial regalia.147 Despite the prospect of future peace, a certain number of Ming offi - cials were not in favor of this arrangement. But, since the Wanli emperor had made clear his disgust with the court’s in-fi ghting, these administrators were open to dismissal. Guo Shi, the censor who had criticized Song Yingchang’s military preparations in 1592, now submitted a memorial opposing China’s peace-making conditions, and the emperor made him a commoner on the grounds of his contentiousness at court.148 It took more than a year for the Chinese embassy to reach Japan. At Pusan, still under Japanese occupation, the chief Chinese envoy, Li Zongcheng, who may have realized Hideyoshi’s real terms, fl ed back to China, and only the deputy ambassadors Shen Weijing and Yang Fangheng proceeded to Japan.149 Li’s fl ight led the court to believe the peace talks would fail and it prepared for war. 150 Shen and Yang continued their mission, and enjoyed a month’s celebration before the investiture ceremony. But what followed thereafter, at Osaka Castle on the fi rst day of the ninth month, 1596, is what Ray Huang and other China historians have called “one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of all time.”151 After Shen and his entourage kowtowed at the ceremony and convinced the Japanese that their original seven demands for peace were accepted, Hideyoshi retreated to the countryside. There, seven days after the ceremony, the monk Saishō Sh ō tai read out Wanli’s investiture “to the King of Japan.” 152 Realizing that none of the seven conditions for peace had been honored, Hideyoshi fl ew into a rage, swore revenge on the Korean people, and the peace negotiations ended. For their part, the Chinese “negotiators,” convinced of their triumph, and probably unaware of Hideyoshi’s cognizance of the situation, returned to Korea, and sent a letter to the Wanli court informing the emperor and ministers that the Japanese had accepted the peace terms and the investiture. They arranged for a number of exotic goods, such as pearls, swan feathers, and even an orang- utan (procured from Southeast Asia), to be dispatched to Beijing, as “tribute” from Hideyoshi. 153 The court was not fooled: severe punishments for Shen and Yang followed, as well as for Shi Xing. 154 The third phase began in early 1597 as Hideyoshi sent Kat ō , Konishi, Nabeshima Naoshige, and their troops to join the small Japanese contin-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 gent at Pusan. 155 The Japanese leader added men from the armies of other tozama to create a full force of around 140,000 for the Korea operation. In the meantime the Wanli emperor set in motion the Ming counter-assault. He ordered the Liaodong Military Governor, Li Hualong (1554–1612),156 and the Liaodong Military Commander, Sun Kuang (1542–1613),157 to prepare the region as a launching ground for some 38,000 Chinese ground troops under general Ma Gui. 158 These forces were assisted by a naval contingent of 21,000 under the command of Chen Lin (d. 1607), a Guangdong native already with a distinguished career.159 Other army units were transferred from the Chinese 216 H.T. Zurndorfer interior giving the Chinese total strength at about 75,000 men.160 With further warnings from Ma Gui that large numbers of Japanese ships had entered Korean waters in the fi rst month of 1597, 161 the emperor continued to pursue victory with purpose and speed. He appointed Yang Hao (?–1629) Supreme Commander of the army and overall Regulator of Korean Military Affairs ( Jingli Chaoxian junwu ) 162 and Xing Jie (1571 js) as Defense Coordinator.163 In the sixth month of 1597, the Japanese returned to Korea with an initial force of 20,000 men, but the Chinese expected more troops to arrive. 164 Unexpectedly, the Japanese had a naval victory against the inept Korean commander W ŏn Kyun, with the result that Chŏ lla Province became vulnerable to Japanese armies.165 The main Ming military force, camped around Seoul and anticipating a Japanese assault, held their position, but the Korean side had a great victory in the ninth month (14.9.1597). The Japanese fl eet, on its way to support land forces, was intercepted by the Korean navy commanded by Yi Sunshin (1545–98). In the naval battle of Myŏ ngnyang, the Japanese lost control of the seas. 166 Hereafter, Japanese land forces could only take defensive positions along the littoral from Ulsan in the east to Sunch’ŏ n in the west. However, setbacks for the Chinese followed at the siege of Ulsan in the fi rst month of 1598 that ended in heavy losses, and Yang Hao was charged with poor leadership and the loss of some 20,000 troops.167 By the fourth month of 1598 Chen Lin’s forces were in place to pick up Korean detach- ments along the coast and to begin coordinated attacks with the land forces. In the ninth month of 1598 Ma Gui’s forces, consisting of 24,000 Chinese and 5,500 Koreans, laid siege to Ulsan, while another Chinese commander, Dong Yiyuan, with 13,000 Chinese and 2,300 Koreans, pressed the Japanese at Sach’ŏ n. They were joined by Liu Ting’s men numbering 13,600 Chinese and over 10,000 Koreans. By the end of that month Chen Lin’s forces, 13,200 Chinese and 7,300 Koreans in about 500 ships, arrived in the waters around Sunch’ ŏ n.168 Unexpectedly the battle here proved a defeat for the Chinese side, and the situation was heading for a stalemate once again. But shortly thereafter the court in Beijing learned of Hideyoshi’s death on the eighteenth day of the eighth month of 1598, thus signaling a “de facto end” to the seven- year war that the Japanese called ry ū t ō -dabi (“a dragon’s head followed by a snake’s tail”). 169

Cost of Ming China’s contribution to the Imjin Waeran Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 One of the common complaints voiced by late Ming contemporaries, early Qing writers, and later, modern scholars about the late Ming was the government’s unregulated monetary outgoings, especially the supposedly large percentage in military expenditures. According to Wanli san da zheng kao ,170 the cost to the Chinese government of the seven-year confl ict in Korea was ten million taels of silver, of which the Koreans paid four million taels. 171 Another contemporary source, Zuben Wanli wugonglu (Record of military exploits during the Wanli reign, 1621) by Qu Jiusi (1573 js), gives a similar Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 217 fi gure and also claims that the Koreans themselves contributed signifi cant amounts to the Ming military expenses. 172 We may also add Zhuge Yuansheng’s calculation of around eight million taels. 173 The pecuniary estimates by Mao Ruizheng, Qu Jiusi, and Zhuge Yuansheng contrast enormously with that by the writer Huang Zongxi (1610–95), who alleged in his well-known treatise, Mingyi daifang lu (Waiting for the dawn: A plan for the prince, 1667), that the expenditure for mercenaries enrolled to fi ght the Japanese in Korea was totally out of proportion to their effectiveness.174 But Huang’s computation was based on false assumptions: he claimed that in Korea the mercenaries operated in addition to hereditary soldiers.175 This misrepresentation of both the fi scal background of the confl ict and the budgetary obligations of the Ministry of War may be viewed as a post-Ming effort by a critical Confucian scholar to account for the downfall of the dynasty.176 There are several problems in estimating the military expenditures of the Wanli court. First, it was not unknown to see “defl ation” of the actual number of troops on active duty by military commanders anxious to acquire additional manpower from the Ministry of War. Second, it was also common to see “infl ation” of the number of troops to the Ministry of Revenue in order to obtain further funds and supplies. In the long run, these tendencies inhibited the accuracy of the fi scal military record. 177 Estimates vary only slightly regarding the cost of mercenaries. One assessment fi nds that by the late Wanli era each mercenary cost between 18 and 23 taels per year.178 Another cal- culates that in the late Wanli each mercenary was paid 1.5 taels per month, in addition to 2 taels for weapons and 5 taels as a “consolation fee” for his family in the fi rst month.179 As we now know, the annual revenue of the Ming state was around 37 million taels of silver.180 Although not all of this amount could be collected, the outlay of approximately 2 million taels per year for the military campaigns was well within the total budget. Nevertheless, the Wanli emperor was forced to seek out other sources of income, and in the 1590s he dispatched tax commissioners to each province of the empire to raise additional revenues through the kuangshui (mining excises and commercial taxes).181

Some concluding observations Ming China’s war against the forces of Toyotomi Hideyoshi is one of those

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 events in Chinese history that has not received the amount of attention it is due. Above, I have suggested new ways of looking at Ming military capability, re-assessed the active (and positive) role of the Wanli emperor, and contrasted the realpolitik of the Ming government’s conduct of foreign affairs with its impractical (and idealized) vision of the tribute system. One may well ask what did contemporaries and later Qing historians make of this war, and how signifi cant was this confrontation for China? Given China’s preoccupation with its centrality in East Asian affairs, it should seem no surprise that the offi cial account of the Korean–Japanese war inMingshi made 218 H.T. Zurndorfer both Korea and Japan sound like troublemakers: Korea for causing China enormous expense and loss of life, and Japan for having invaded the “eastern kingdom” (Korea) in the fi rst place. In late Ming literature about Japan, Hideyoshi is frequently assigned the role of “fl ood-dragon,” which according to Chinese myth and legend is an evil force that can summon wind and rain to cause fl oods. In some literary references, it is not only Hideyoshi who is a fl ood-dragon but also his military offi cers, princes, and ministers. A poem by the Ming scholar Tang Shunzhi (1507–60), who actively fought pirates under Hu Zongxian, recalled the enduring image of the Japanese: “Sunken ships and decapitated corpses fi ll the sea with a stench. Flood-dragons hiding at the bottom of the ocean spurt bloody spittle.”182 Despite the unusual powers held by a number of Ming commanders during the Imjin Waeran, a court-led civilian bureaucracy far away from the combatants and military theaters basically administered China’s involvement in the war. Because the Ming authorities were so relatively far removed from the sites of destruction they could not really share either Korea’s primary sense of deso- lation or Japan’s feeling of self-glorifi cation. Thus, the two most common and contradictory images of this war were not available to Chinese contemporaries, and consequently, the Imjin Waeran seemingly had less signifi cance to China than to the other two countries. At the same time, one must not forget that the Ming preoccupation with Japan through most of the 1590s would “afford” the Manchus the opportunity to prepare for their eventual conquest of China.183 For China, this confl ict was not a noble, purifying, and elevating experience, nor was it an event of awesome transformation, and thus the Chinese emerged from the hostilities without any grand illusions; there was no need to endow Chinese involvement with great meaning nor to exaggerate its achievements in historical accounts. The crisis of the Japanese invasion of Korea did not threaten China’s sense of identity nor the position of superiority that it wished to impress upon its neighbors. Unlike the successor Qing dynasty, the Ming was not an expansive empire, but what territory fell along its borders was subject to its control and protection. The “rescue of Korea,” as the Imjin Waeran is known in Chinese sources, may not have been any ordinary police action, but for the Ming authorities, it was a military operation that invoked both idealistic notions of the tributary order and realistic geopolitical concerns. Finally, it should be remarked that without the Wanli emperor’s capability to manage the court’s contentious factions the war might have had

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 another outcome. Thus, the “rescue of Korea” is testimony to Ming China’s ability to function as both a civilizing polity and a forceful military power in East Asia in the late sixteenth century, and therein lies the signifi cance of this episode in Chinese history.

Abbreviations CHC 7: Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7 : The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644 , Part I, ed. by Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 219 CHC 8: Cambridge History of China, Vol. 8 : The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644 , Part II, ed. by Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. CSJCCB: Congshu jicheng chubian . Shanghai: Shangwu, 1935–7. DMB: Dictionary of Ming Biography, ed. by L.C. Goodrich and Chaoying Fang. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. ECCP: Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period , ed. by Arthur O. Hummel. Washington: Library of Congress, 1943. MTJ: Ming Tongjian (明通鑑 ). WLDC: Wanli dichao (萬曆邸鈔 ).

Notes 1 Chin Ku Ch’i Kuan: The Inconstancy of Madame Chuang , 1924, pp. 79–80. 2 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 1995, p. 184. Another source claims that Ming China engaged in 579 large and small military confl icts from 1368 to 1643, exclusive of the fi nal battles with peasant rebels and Manchu invaders. Fan, “Mingdai junshi sixiang jianlun,” 1997, p. 38. 3 Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, pp. 563–74, also groups these three events together in his exposition of Wanli history. 4 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo (1658), fascicle 62–4. On Gu Yingtai, see ECCP, p. 426. Another primary work that sees the wars as related events is Wanli san dazheng kao (1621) by Mao Ruizheng (fl . 1597–1636). On Mao Ruizheng, see DMB, pp. 1041–2; Franke, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History, 1968, pp. 209–10; and Struve, The Ming–Qing Confl ict, 1619–1683, 1998, p. 184. Another important narrative and analysis of the three wars is the work by Zhuge, Liangchao pingrang lu (1606). The discussion of the Korean campaign may be found in fascicle 4, pp. 197–398. 5 The achievements of Zhang Juzheng (1525–82) towards improving fi scal and military administration and Qi Jiquang (1528–88) in fostering military innovations are discussed below. 6 A very infl uential negative view of the Wanli reign has been Huang, 1587 , 1981. Mote, Imperial China , 1999, which presents an intensive study of Ming history, does not really offer a corrective to Huang’s 1587 . Mote contrasts “late Ming political decline 1567–1627” (pp. 723–44) with “a vigorously growing and changing society” and “burgeoning economy” of the late Ming (pp. 743–75). It would seem scholars have diffi culty distinguishing periodswithin reign era from broader trends of Chinese history. For discussion of this problem, see Zurndorfer, “Consumption and Production in a Great Empire,” 2001, and for a review of Mote’s book, see Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Zurndorfer, “Review of Frederick W. Mote,” 2000. 7 The fi rst modern historian to recognize the signifi cance of examining Ming–Chosŏ n relations for understanding the contemporary development of Northeast China was Wu Han (1909–69). His discovery in 1932 in the Beiping Library of Chos ŏ n wangjo shillok (Veritable Records of the Chosŏ n Dynasty) launched a new phase in the study of Ming history. Because the Manchus had exerted enormous control over available documentation on the Ming dynasty, it was not until the fi rst decades of the Republican era that China scholars could access these important sources. Wu Han, like other contemporaries, viewed the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 as one more reason to investigate the background of the China–Korea connection. Wu Han’s remarkable twelve-volume compilation from the shillok , which he began 220 H.T. Zurndorfer to work on before September 1934, was printed posthumously. On Wu Han’s life and work, see Mazur, Wu Han , 2009. 8 According to the Mingshi, 322:8358, in the fi fth month of 1592, “the Korean king abandoned his capital [at Seoul], fl ed to P’yŏ ngyang and to Ŭ iju. Messengers were sent in succession [to the Wanli Court] to report the imminent danger.” But the same source (320:8291) also notes that already in the eleventh month of 1591, Hideyoshi threatened to invade Korea if the Chos ŏ n court did not yield to his demands. For a clear summary in English of the Korean mission in 1590 to negotiate with the Sō clan over the issue of Korea paying tribute to Japan, and its consequences for Korean politics, see Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology, 1997, pp. 86–94. For earlier relations between Korea and Japan, see Yu, The Book of Corrections , 2002, pp. 19–31. Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, pp. 285–90, discusses at length the institutional regulations vis-à -vis Ming China enabling the Korean king to make the request for military aid, and the Chinese prerequisites for extending such help. He refers to the concept of yuan neishu (desiring internal dependency), mentioned in Mingshi , 320:8292, by which Korea entered “temporary” incorporation into the Chinese polity. So, instead of the king simply requesting aid or rescue (qiujiu ), he asked for help on the basis of his “dependent status.” The implication here is that Chosŏ n Korea was willing to forgo its rank as an independent kingdom in exchange for Ming military assurance. See the discussion by Lewis in this volume. 9 Ledyard, “Confucianism and War,” 1988–9, pp. 85–6, n. 2. The Ming emperor’s positive reaction to offer help, according to the WLDC, pp. 673–4, occurred earlier than other sources seem to suggest. 10 Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 1998, p. 295. Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 313, maintains that both the Chosŏ n and Ming courts were aware that Hideyoshi’s major goal was the conquest of China and also notes Ming “indifference” to the Japanese threat before the actual invasion. 11 For a general overview of Sino-Korean relations during the Ming, see Clark, “Sino- Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 1998. See also Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology , 1997, p. 81, for a diagram illustrating Korea’s and Japan’s diplomatic and ideological perceptions of each other and of Ming China at the end of the fi fteenth century. 12 See Huang, Zhong-Han guanxi , no date, for a bibliography on Chinese–Korean relations. 13 Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 1998, p. 272. Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” 1968, pp. 12–13, 16. 14 Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” 1968, p. 2. 15 Franke and Twitchett, “Introduction,” 1994, pp. 14–18. Already in 1968 Joseph Fletcher described the early-fi fteenth-century diplomatic exchanges between the Timurid monarch and the Ming emperor in terms of equality. See Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368–1884,” 1968, pp. 209–16. Mote, Imperial China , 1999,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 pp. 380–1, discusses how these “inferior states” could also play at a tribute system of their own. When in 916 the Khitans declared their own imperial state known as Liao, they requested tribute from Korea. But only after the landmark 1005 Treaty of Shanyuan, by which Song China settled its differences with the Khitans and other nomadic steppe invaders (i.e., Tanguts and Jurchens) through the payment of a high indemnity to avoid war with them, did the newly unifi ed Korean polity of Koryŏ accept formal subordination to the Liao. Although there was ritualized diplomacy between Liao and Koryŏ , the Koreans had a distinct superiority complex over their Khitan overlords – the Koreans considered them “latecomers” to civilization. See Rogers, “National Consciousness in Medieval Korea,” 1983. See Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 221 also Breuker, Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 2010, for an elaboration of Koryŏ ’s view of itself in relation to Liao. See also Robinson, “Centering the King of Chos ŏn,” 2000, which reassesses Korea’s role in East Asian maritime diplomacy and underlines the weaknesses of a sinocentric model of international relations. 16 Zurndorfer, “Tribute, Trade, and the Demise of the Chinese ‘World Order’,” 2004. 17 Hamashita, Kindai Chū goku no kokusaiteki keiki, 1990. Part of Hamashita’s study here is translated into English. See Hamashita, China, East Asia and the Global Economy , 2008. 18 Fogel, Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors , 2002. 1 9 Taizu shilu , 76:1401. In the beginning of his reign, Hungwu adopted a defensive posture towards Korea and other states. In his “Ancestral Instructions,” Huang Ming zu xun lu ( c .1373), he ordered his successors to avoid foreign wars and listed fi fteen states (of which Korea was the fi rst) that should not be invaded. See Zhu, Huang Ming zu xun lu, 3:1588–91. For a translation of the relevant passage, see Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang, 1995, pp. 119–21. In a study of early Ming foreign relations based on Ming Taizu yuzhi ji (1374), the modern scholar Wu Jihua makes clear that Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude towards Korea was indicative of his general policy towards tributary states: that they had “to make themselves capable of maintaining internal order and long-lasting security.” See Wu, “Basic Foreign- policy Attitudes,” 1981, p. 71. In other words, according to the Ming vision of world order, tributary states had their own responsibility for keeping domestic peace. 20 Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 1998, p. 274. 2 1 Taizu shilu , 223:3267; DMB, pp. 1601–2; Langlois, “Ming Law,” 1998, p. 167. 22 Chung Chai-sik’s study shows how Chong Toj ŏ n (d. 1398) was in actual fact the architect of Yi Sŏ nggye’s pro-Confucian policy. Chung, “Chŏ ng Toj ŏ n,” 1985, pp. 65ff., argues that Chong Tojŏ n’s sadae policy did not originate out of some kind of Confucian belief in the moral righteousness of the tribute system but from a realistic assessment of the best way to protect Korean interests vis-à -vis its bigger and stronger neighbor. The reference of a smaller state submitting to a larger originates in the Mencius , Book I, Part B, ch. 3. Lau, translator, Mencius , 1976, p. 62. 23 Robinson, “From Raiders to Traders,” 1992, pp. 99–101. 2 4 Taizu shilu , 234:3422–3; DMB, pp. 1594–8. 25 DMB, pp. 1595–7. 26 Chan, “The Chien-wen,” 1988, p. 199. 27 Clark, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” 1998, p. 283. The total number of Ming embassies to Korea from 1392 to 1644 was 186, an average of less than one per year, but the majority (95) took place between 1392 and 1450, in the period of “stabilization.” Embassy traffi c picked up again during King ŏS njo’s reign when 35 Ming embassies went to Korea, the majority of which, according to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Clark, occurred from “the need to coordinate Ming and Korean defense.” 2 8 Da Ming huidian , 1587, 105:4. 29 Tsai, The Eunuchs in the Ming Dynasty, 1996, pp. 16, 135–40, suggests that the order for human tribute was a Mongol innovation, as there had never been this kind of requisition by Chinese dynasties prior to the Yuan period. Tsai, Perpetual Happiness, 2001, pp. 192–3, discusses the relationship between the Korean women and eunuchs in the Yongle emperor’s household. 30 DMB, p. 1597, refers to the idea that this emperor himself may have had a Korean mother, which may account for his preference. Compare Shao Xunzheng, “The Historical Signfi cance,” 1937. 222 H.T. Zurndorfer 31 Chan, “The Chien-wen,” 1988, p. 301, based on Wu, Chaoxian Lichao shilu , 1980, pp. 330, 334, 348, 365. 32 For bibliographical information on these sources, see Franke, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History , 1968, p. 228. 33 On this episode in Ming history, see de Heer, The Caretaker Emperor , 1986. 34 De Heer, “Three Embassies to Seoul,” 1993, p. 244. 35 De Heer, “Three Embassies to Seoul,” 1993, p. 255. The Jianzhou tribes also paid tribute to the Ming dynasty. 36 On further printed accounts by Dong, see DMB, p. 259. 37 De Heer, “Three Embassies to Seoul,” 1993, p. 252. 38 Robinson, “Korean Lobbying at the Ming Court,” 1999. Robinson’s discussion of a minor incident between the two countries occurring in 1506 reveals the subtleties by which Korea’s history was recorded by Mingshi historians. 39 Mote, “The Ch’eng-hua and Hung-chih Reigns, 1465–1505,” 1988, p. 389. But on the northern borders, the Mongols continued to remain Ming China’s chief threat. 40 Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea, 2003, pp. 19–28. As is well known, the expression wak ō hardly does justice to the membership of these fl oating assem- blies, which included not only Chinese and Japanese but also Malaccan, Siamese, Portuguese, Dutch, and even African adventurers. Sailing from Japanese and Chinese coastal ports and offshore islands, these motley adventurers engaged in regular seagoing freebooting, that is, piracy. 41 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 249. 42 Mote, Imperial China , 1999, p. 613; Chan, “The Chien-wen,” 1988, p. 300. 4 3 Mingshi , 322:8341–2. 44 The “tally trade” refers to the special tally documents (C. kanho , J. kang ō) given to the Japanese shō gun’s representatives permitted to trade at Ningbo, the only port open for Japanese tribute missions. The Japanese tallies matched those kept by Chinese administrators in the tiju shibosi (Maritime trading intendancy) and thus served as a form of offi cial identifi cation for Japanese vessels seeking entry into Ningbo. 45 Chan, “The Chien-wen,” 1988, p. 300. 46 Cohen, East Asia at the Center, 2000, p. 171. See also von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , 1996, pp. 88–96, 131–2, on the role of Chinese coins in Japan. 47 Cohen, East Asia at the Center , 2000, p. 171. 48 By then Japan’s commerce with China was under the control of several powerful families, which began to compete with each other. In that year there was armed confl ict between the Hosokawa and Ōuchi families who both attempted to gain a monopoly of the China trade; the dispute ended with the Hosokawa looting in Ningbo and a Chinese offi cial, representing theŌ uchi faction, fl eeing from his post. For a detailed discussion of all incidents leading to the breakdown of the tribute system vis- à-vis Japan before the 1550s, see Geiss, “The Chia-ching Reign, 1522–66,” 1988, pp. 491–3 and Saeki in this volume. 49 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, pp. 249–50.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 50 Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea, 2003, pp. 22–6, argues that maritime bans on Chinese trading overseas spurred piracy to new heightened levels from 1520 to 1570. The fi rst Ming emperor Hongwu beginning in 1371 issued a series of maritime prohibitions (haijin ) forbidding Chinese people from leaving the empire via the sea and foreigners from entering it. Regulations also outlawed the building of ships of more than one mast for any reason. Although these imperatives were in effect until the 1570s, until then there was still a fl uid and chaotic maritime society in South China. For further information on the bans and their effects, see Li, The Ming Maritime Trade Policy , 2010. 51 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, pp. 251–5; So, Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the 16th Century , 1975, pp. 1–40. Wilson, “The Maritime Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 223 Transformation,” 2009, pp. 259–61, considers “the Ming anachronistic policies [of maritime prohibitions] the major cause of piracy because they held back a fl ood of Chinese commercial dynamism.” Elsewhere in the same essay, pp. 265–6 and 273, Wilson discusses the effects of “a southern elite with vested interests in keeping the state out of the commercial and maritime economies.” The implication here is that southern-based literati offi cials with infl uence at court prevented stricter central governmental regulation of maritime affairs because an interventionist and preda- tory state would have intruded upon their own indirect involvement in trade and commerce. Perdue, “From Turfan to Taiwan,” 2005, p. 39, makes the same point that in southern coastal regions local elites and political offi cials (often related through kin and friendship ties) might ally themselves with merchants to carry out profi table joint ventures. 52 Nimick, “Ch’i Chi-kuang and I-wu County,” 1995. See also So, Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the 16th Century , 1975, and Hucker, “Hu Tsung-hsien’s Campaign against Hs ü Hai, 1556,” 1974, for excellent analyses of China’s experiences with pirates in the sixteenth century. On Qi Jiguang, see also Millinger, “Ch’i Chi-kuang,” 1973, and DMB, pp. 220–4. As Tong, Disorder under Heaven , 1991, points out, until Qi reorganized efforts to combat pirates, Ming resistance was piti- able (p. 121). Here Tong refers to an incident when “a contingent of 67 pirates [sic] managed to wander several thousand li inland, plunder six prefectures, and infl ict 4,000 to 5,000 casualties.” A Ming Chinese li equals 0.56 km or 0.353 mile, so the pirates roamed some 1,600 km inland. 53 See Barr, “The Wanli Context,” 1997; Meskill, Gentlemanly Interests , 1994. 54 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, pp. 262–5. 55 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 265. 56 On changing conceptions of the tribute system, see Kang, East Asia Before the West , 2010, pp. 54–81; Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar , 1995, pp. 11–15; and Wang, Harmony and War , 2011, pp. 173–80. 57 The expression “China among equals” derives from revisionist historical writing on the tribute system. The phrase describes China’s ability “to adopt fl exibly and practically to unfavorable conditions imposed by the powerful steppe emperors” during the time of the Song. See Mote, Imperial China, 1999, p. 378; and Rossabi, “Introduction,” 1983; and Kang, East Asia Before the West , 2010, pp. 54–81. 58 Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy , 1983. 59 Mote, Imperial China , 1999, p. 376. 60 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 1999, p. 72. In a note on the same page, she suggests that the Jurchens’ exploitation resembled that of the Mongols who also sent thousands of attendants to the Ming court, which could only accommodate 100 representatives. 61 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 93, argues that until the Chosŏ n era, Korea’s political policy was to maintain its independence from the threat of Chinese rulership or intervention. 62 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:45.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 63 See the report of the Pacifi cation Commissioner at Liaodong, Hao Jie (1530–1600), to the Ministry of War. On Hao Jie, see Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin, 1965, 1:422. WLDC, pp. 673–4, records this reaction by the Wanli emperor on 1592.6.4. 64 On Gao Gong, see Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin, 1965, 1:388; and for a general discussion on the efforts of these men in military renewal, see Wei, Zhang Juzheng he Mingdai zhonghou zhengju , 1999, pp. 352–8. 65 In a discussion following the presentation of a paper by Robin Yates, “Empowering the People: L ü Kun’s Strategies and Late Ming Military Discursive Practices,” delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in March 2001, the signifi cance of earlier efforts by the well-known philosopher and offi - cial Wang Shouren (also known as Wang Yangming [1472–1529]) towards military 224 H.T. Zurndorfer renovation in local community defense was debated at length. Some discussants suggested that Wang Shouren’s interest in military matters stimulated a more positive attitude among the literati towards the value of physical pursuits. 66 Barr, “The Wanli Context,” 1997. 67 Tseng, “Hs ü eh Wu and Her Orchids,” 1955. See also Berg, “Cultural Discourse on Xue Susu,” 2009. 68 On the Li family generals, see ECCP, pp. 450–2. See also Swope, “A Few Good Men,” 2004. 69 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, p. 249. Perdue, “Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy,” 2000, p. 254. See also Zurndorfer, “What Is the Meaning of ‘War’ in an Age of Cultural Effl orescence?,” 2010. 70 As van de Ven, “Introduction,” 2000, pp. 4–5, points out, European misconcep- tions about Chinese military prowess probably began with the Jesuit program to idealize Confucianism and continued under the infl uence of Enlightenment think- ers such as Voltaire who emphasized Chinese civil institutions. 71 Perdue, “Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy,” 2000, p. 255. 72 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 5, Part VII, 1986, pp. 29–36. See the “ultimate” late Ming text on Chinese military technology and strategy, Mao Yuanyi’s (d. 1629) Wubei zhi , completed in 1621. It is a massive, comprehensive collection of writings focused on military tactics and strategy beginning from the late Zhou to the early seventeenth century. The last chapters include contemporary treatises on armaments, war machinery, military organization, and border defense accompanied by maps. Not unexpectedly, the collection was “prohibited” by the Manchus. See Franke, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History , 1968, p. 209, for further information. 73 For example, his biography in the DMB, pp. 324–38 by Hucker, and that by Huang, 1587 , 1981, pp. 1–41. 74 Biography by Fan Shuzhi, or the discussion in Wang and Xu, Ming chao shiliu di , 1991, pp. 290–4. It is possible to consider this change in attitude towards the Wanli emperor in terms of a shift in current Chinese historical writing that is “res- cuing” China’s past from “old Qing” interpretations. For further discussion on how modern nationalism is infl uencing the writing of Chinese history nowadays in the People’s Republic of China, see Zurndorfer, “What the Concept ‘The Rise of the West’ Teaches Us,” 1998, pp. 358–61. In modern Western language writing on the Ming, many scholars have relied on “pro-Donglin” primary source materials that also portray this emperor as incompetent. It may be remembered that the members of the Donglin Academy, formed in 1604 at Wuxi in southern Jiangsu, considered themselves “pure critics” of Ming politics and condemned the policies of Zhang Juzheng and by implication the Wanli emperor himself. “Equating personal virtue with administrative talent” (Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567– 1620,” 1988, p. 536) became an obsession and a watchword of the literati during the Wanli reign. The emperor’s struggles with these literati who wanted to keep the state out of the southern economy hampered the court’s ability to deal with other

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 frontier threats. For an analysis of the early-seventeenth-century tensions at court with the Donglin faction, see Dardess, Blood and History in China , 2002, pp. 1–30. Where possible I have relied on Wanli dichao for information concerning the court’s handling of matters related to the Imjin Waeran, as opposed to leaning exclusively on Shenzong shilu. Ono, “‘Banreki teishō ’ to ‘Banreki shosh ō’,” 1981, offers a very thorough study of Wanli dichao . Since the publication of Wanli qijuzhu (Court diaries of the Wanli era), 9 vols. (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1988), scholars have the opportunity to compare Shenzong shilu accounts with what is recorded in this collection. For a corroborative treatment of the Wanli emperor as seriously engaged with the conduct of the war, see Swope, A Dragon’s Head, 2009, and his essay “Bestowing the Double-edged Sword,” 2008. Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 225 75 Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993, p. 227. 76 Wakeman, The Great Enterprise , 1985, pp. 62–4. Ironically, the Chinese troops defeated in the Liaodong encounter were led by Yang Hao, who had also seen defeat before Hideyoshi’s troops in 1598. See Huang, “The Liao-tung Campaign of 1619,” 1981. See also Yu, Mingdai junhu shi xi zhidu, 1987; Liew, The Treatises on Military Affairs , 1998; Hucker, A Dictionary of Offi cial Titles , 1985, pp. 78–9. 77 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, pp. 205–12. 78 Nimick, “Ch’i Chi-kuang and I-wu County,” 1995. 79 DMB, pp. 220–4. 80 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 1995, pp. 193–215, examines memorials of leading Ming policy makers over 145 years and concludes that accommodation contributed to overall Ming offensive strategy. 81 Waldron, The Great Wall of China , 1992, pp. 140–1. 82 Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 1992, p. 141. Interestingly, as Waldron points out, relatively little is known about the actual building of the Great Wall, that is, the network of brick-kilns, quarries, and transportation routes. Mote, Imperial China , 1999, p. 696, writes: “The Ming walls enhanced the means for maintaining secure communications, and provided more defended points at which garrison solders under attack could group themselves and resist the nomad cavalry. Throughout the sixteenth century, many sections of such ‘long walls’ ( changcheng ) were built, eventually connecting the entire earlier defensive system of the Nine Garrisons with their hundreds of barriers and passes.” See also Waldron, “Chinese Strategy,” 1994. 83 Once the Ming army began to use fi rearms, the importance of wagons (once the mainstay of ancient Chinese warfare until the introduction of cavalry) became crucial. As Chase, Firearms , 2003, p. 162, notes, wagons became “fi ghting plat- forms.” For an excellent illustration, originally from Zhao Shizhen’s Shengqi pu , that illustrates how fi ghting units utilizing different kinds of weaponry from pikes to fi rearms mounted themselves behind wagon walls, see Chase, Firearms , 2003, p. 164. The original drawing may be found in Shengqi pu , 3:7b. On the use of fi rearms in the Imjin Waeran, see Chase, Firearms, 2003, pp. 186–93. Huang, 1587 , 1981, pp. 179–81, gives a detailed description of Qi’s use of folangji. For an inven- tory of fi rearms in use during the Ming, see Mingshi , 92:2263–6. 84 Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993. On Wanli’s early interest in didactic picture books and Zhang’s instruction on military matters, see Murray, “Didactic Picturebooks for Late Ming Emperors,” 2008, pp. 243–8. 85 Huang, 1587 , 1981; Zurndorfer, “Old and New Visions of Ming Society and Culture,” 2002. 86 Mote, Imperial China , 1999, p. 731. 87 Waldron, The Great Wall of China , 1992, p. 187. Zhang’s military reforms are discussed at length in Zhang, Zhang Juzheng gaige , 1993, pp. 29–60. 88 Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth Century Ming China,” 1970, pp. 56–7. 89 Waldron, The Great Wall of China , 1992, p. 186. 90 Tong, Disorder under Heaven, 1991, p. 123, based on Quan and Li, “Ming

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 zhongye,” 1973. 91 Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” 1998, p. 164. 92 DMB, pp. 1553–6. 93 DMB, pp. 830–2. 9 4 Mingshi , 322:8357. 95 Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology , 1997, pp. 90–1. 96 Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology , 1997, p. 93. 97 Li, Wanli ershi san nian feng , 1967, provides detailed documentation of the entire rescue operation. A more recent narrative study in Chinese, also well-referenced, may be found in Zheng, Mingdai Zhong-Ri guanxi yanjiu, 1985, pp. 578–624; and in English, Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009. 226 H.T. Zurndorfer 98 WLDC, p. 673. 99 WLDC, p. 674. 100 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 279, points out that about the same time the Chinese saw defeat by the Japanese, the Koreans had waged a successful struggle against the enemy, “isolating Konishi Yukinaga’s army at P’yŏ ngyang and securing Chinese waters free from the fear of Japanese attack, so the ‘the Celestial Army could come by land to the assistance’ of Korea”; see also DMB, p. 832. It is highly likely that Zu Chengxun led cavalry forces into northern Korea and realized too late that the mountainous terrain, inundated by the summer rains, was unsuitable for such an operation. 101 DMB, p. 832; Song Yingchang’s own account of his work may be read in his Jingl üe fuguo yaobian (1592–4). Song Yingchang’s observations are analyzed in Li, “Chaoxian renchen Wohuo yu Li Rusong,” 1950, pp. 268–72. 102 DMB, pp. 1632–3. 103 Li Rusong was the eldest of fi ve sons (all of whom became military leaders) of another renowned military commander, Li Chengliang (1526–1618), who distinguished himself by defeating repeated invasions of Mongols and Manchus into the Liaodong region. Interestingly, the Li family’s origins were Korean. See ECCP, pp. 450–2. Upon his appointment to the Korean campaign, Li Rusong was promoted to rank 1b tidu (Provincial Military Commander). For further information on Li Rusong’s role in the fi rst phase of the Korean rescue, see Li, “Chaoxian renchen Wohuo yu Li Rusong,” 1950, and Wang, “Li Rusong zheng dong kao,” 1947. 104 WLDC, pp. 695–9. According to later reports in the same source, Japanese muskets and cannon proved inferior to this Chinese arsenal. On Japanese armour and related topics, refer to Chase, Firearms , 2003, pp. 177–96; see also Perrin, Giving up the Gun , 1979. 105 Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, p. 568. Berry, Hideyoshi , 1982, p. 209, notes that Hideyoshi had as many as 158,700 soldiers at his disposal for the Korean invasion. It is unlikely that the Chinese command had intelligence of the Japanese potential military might. 106 DMB, p. 173. 107 On Guo Shi, see Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin , 1965, 1:497. 108 WLDC, pp. 698–9. 109 On Shi Xing, see DMB, p. 834. Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” 1998, pp. 152–5, summarizes the basic fi scal arrangements of the Ministry of War, and the options available if a military crisis should arise. 110 Shen, Wanli ye huo bian , 1980, p. 438. Shen Defu provides a rather amusing description of Shen Weijing as a veteran of wak ō battles (where he picked up the Japanese language) and something of a “smooth talker.” For further info on Shen Weijing, see Ono, “Min Jitsu wahei kō sh ō o meguru seisō ,” 1990; and DMB, p. 730. 111 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:45–6.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 112 Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993, p. 238, suggests that the Wanli emperor himself at this point offered 100,000 pieces of silver to Li Rusong’s troops, either as reward should China drive the Japanese out or as bounty compensation to their families should China meet defeat. 113 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 280. 114 Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993, p. 238. 115 Li Rusong’s entry into P’y ŏngyang via the Small Western Gate and his brother Li Rubo’s incursion via the Great Western Gate are described in detail in Mao, Wanli san dazheng kao , 1971, pp. 36–7; and in Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:46. For a detailed analysis of the weather and terrain conditions that Li Rusong faced in Korea, see Wang, “Li Rusong zheng dong kao,” 1947, pp. 349–55. Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 227 116 WLDC, p. 729. 117 DMB, p. 833. 118 DMB, p. 833. For a general discussion on the documentation related to accounting losses and gains, see Wang, “Li Rusong zheng dong kao,” 1947, pp. 343–7. 119 DMB, p. 833. 120 Wang, “Li Rusong zheng dong kao,” 1947, p. 348, and Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 281, both give varying estimates on how many Japanese were killed. Excellent maps concerning this fi rst phase of the war may be found in Turnbull, Samurai Invasion , 2002, pp. 43, 76, 138, 144. 121 At this point the differences between Li and Song Yingzhang became more pronounced. Li wanted to abandon the entire rescue movement altogether, while Song aimed at continuing the operation by both fi ghting and negotiating. See DMB, p. 834. 122 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, pp. 280–1, discusses how, at this time (second month of 1593), Korean forces defeated the Japanese at Haengju, forcing the Japanese once again to retreat to Seoul. Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, p. 570, suggests that Hideyoshi probably had the desire to push even harder, but he was “biding his time” to recoup his troops. He must have calculated “his grasp on power in Japan would not remain secure if there were a setback in Korea.” There were still skirmishes along the coast, culminat- ing in the siege of Chinju in the sixth month (1593) under the leadership of Kat ō Kiyomasa. 123 On Liu Ting, see Wang, “Liu Ting zheng dong kao,” 1948. By the fourth month, the Japanese evacuation was complete. On 1593.4.19, Li Rusong and Song Yingchang entered the city to fi nd a starving and brutalized community. 124 WLDC, p. 794. Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:49. 125 Wang, “Liu Ting zheng dong kao,” 1948, pp. 138–40. 126 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 281. 127 DMB, p. 731. 128 The chapters in this volume by Kitajima and Sajima discuss the terms of negotiations in detail. See Berry, Hideyoshi , 1982, p. 214, who also lists all the conditions. The “annex” of Korean territory to Japan was made under the guise that the four southern Korean provinces and Seoul be “returned” to Korea. Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 282, analyses Hideyoshi’s justifi cation for his demands. 129 DMB, p. 731. Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 283, notes that Hideyoshi blamed all bellicosity between China and Japan on the Koreans. See Sajima in this volume for a discussion of Hideyoshi’s view of Korea. 130 Tan, Guoque , 1978, 76:4709. 131 Tan, Guoque , 1978, 76:4709. 132 Tan, Guoque , 1978, 76:4711. 133 Tan, Guoque , 1978, 76:4711; Shenzong shilu , 264:4929 (dated 1593.9.25). 134 Tan, Guoque, 1978, 76:4711. It was well known that the Korean authorities had

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 seen enough damage committed by Ming soldiers to question whether their presence was really for the good. See Hur in this volume for a discussion of the Korean view of the Ming rescue. 135 Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin, 1965, 2:957; Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:49. 136 WLDC, p. 794. 137 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:49. 138 On He Qiaoyuan, see Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin, 1965, 1:297; DMB, p. 507. 139 Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993, p. 241. 140 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:49. 228 H.T. Zurndorfer 141 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:49. MTJ, 70:2753; Mingshi , 320:8294. 142 WLDC, pp. 857–8; Shenzong shilu , 277:5130. 143 Tan, Guoque , 1978, 76:4736; Shenzong shilu , 277:5130. 144 Tan, Guoque , 1978, 76:4743. 145 Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993, p. 243; Shenzong shilu , 280:5172. 146 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 284. See also WLDC, pp. 867–8, 877. 147 Nait ō ’s visit to the Ming court and the various exchanges are discussed throughout Shenzong shilu , 280–282:5172–209. 148 See Fan, Wanli zhuan , 1993, p. 242; WLDC, pp. 828–9. 149 Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:50. On Li’s perception of Hideyoshi, see WLDC, p. 953. Other sources claim Li abandoned the mission because during his stay in Pusan before departure to Japan he became (amourously) involved with the daughter of Konishi Yukinaga. See MTJ, 71:2764. Compare Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 284. See Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 217–18. 150 WLDC, pp. 950–1. Dissension at court was still rife. When one censor, Cao Xuecheng criticized Shi Xing’s peace policy, Shi’s supporters had him arrested and sentenced to death. Only the appeal to the Wanli emperor, on behalf of Cao’s fi lial duty to his ninety-year-old mother, had his sentence commuted to imprison- ment. See MTJ, 71:2764. 151 Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, p. 571. 152 WLDC, p. 1039; Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, pp. 284–5. 153 WLDC, p. 1041. 154 WLDC, p. 1064; Mingshi, 320:8295. Shen and Shi were both sentenced to death in the ninth month of 1597. See MTJ, 71:2778. 155 Berry, Hideyoshi , 1982, p. 233. 156 DMB, pp. 822–6. 157 Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin , 1965, 1:446. 158 Chang, Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin , 1965, 1:446. 159 DMB, pp. 167–74. 160 Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, p. 572. 161 WLDC, p. 1019. 162 ECCP, pp. 885–6. 163 Xing Jie had earned a good reputation as a Vice-Minister of War in charge of the campaign against Yang Yinglung in the southwest. See DMB, p. 1554. 164 WLDC, p. 1030. 165 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 286. 166 Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity,” 1991, p. 287. 167 Ledyard, “Confucianism and War,” 1988–9, pp. 86–7; Li Guangtao, “Ding Yingtai yu Yang Hao,” 1982. Yang Hao’s reputation during the Korean crusade may have been tainted by his failure later in the 1619 campaign in Liaodong. 168 DMB, pp. 171–2, discusses these maneuvers. 169 Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, p. 574.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 170 On the Wanli san dazheng kao (1621) by Mao Ruizheng, see note 4 above. 171 Mao, Wanli san dazheng kao, 1971, p. 86. The WLDC, p. 1125, estimated that the second Korean expedition cost 3 million taels as of early 1598. 172 Qu, Zuben Wanli wu gong lu , 1980, p. 522a. On this publication, see Franke, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History, 1968, p. 63. The Zuben Wanli wu gong lu outlines the military achievements of the Wanli era in the form of biographies of opponents inside and outside the frontiers of the empire. Gu, Mingshi jishi benmo , 62:44ff, also offers a similar sum for the costs of the Korean war. In their publications, both Mao and Qu also note the costs of each of the other two Wanli campaigns, settling on a fi gure of around two million taels for each of these crusades. Thus, one may conclude that the fi nal sum of eleven to twelve million taels was the price of these military actions. Wanli China versus Hideyoshi’s Japan 229 173 Zhuge, Liangchao pingrang lu , 1969, p. 383. 174 See de Bary, Waiting for the Dawn , 1993, pp. 139–40. De Bary’s own commentary to Huang’s treatise confi rms (on p. 238, n. 8) a fi gure of six to eight million taels for hiring mercenaries, based on his reading of the Mingshi fascicles 20 and 21. 175 As Huang wrote, “the people of one country support enough armies for two countries.” De Bary, Waiting for the Dawn , 1993, p. 139. 176 In the words of his biographer, “his protest (against Ming imperial institutions) breathes the fi re of robust indignation.” De Bary,Waiting for the Dawn , 1993, p. 4. 177 It is unfortunate that further editions of the reliable work, Wanli kuai ji lu (Record of the accounting procedures of the Wanli reign, 1581), assembled under the auspices of the then Minister of Revenue Zhang Xueyan, were never issued. Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, p. 535, claims that if more of these compilations had been done then “the sorry reality [whereby] the diversity (of fi scal units and fi scal procedures) prevailing throughout the empire could never be totally integrated into a uniform system of management” would have been more obvious. One may argue that the contents of much of von Glahn’s book ( Fountain of Fortune , 1996) challenges Huang’s statement. 178 Tong, Disorder under Heaven, 1991, p. 121, citing Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth Century Ming China,” 1970, p. 53. 179 Tong, Disorder under Heaven, 1991, p. 242, note 146, citing Quan and Li, “Ming zhongye,” 1973, pp. 211–12. 180 See Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” 1998, pp. 106–41, for an explanation of this fi gure. 181 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , 1996, p. 161. Feng Menglong’s mention of the “sale of places in the Imperial College” may in fact have been a reference to the kuangshi which proved very unpopular and had to be withdrawn several years after its implementation. 182 Wang, “Realistic and Fantastic Images of ‘Dwarf Pirates’,” 2002. 183 Rawski, “China’s Relations with Korea and Japan,” 2009, p. 64.

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Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 11 The celestial warriors Ming military aid and abuse during the Korean War, 1592–8

Nam-lin Hur

Introduction Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s desire to invade the Korean peninsula proved to be an unprecedented test to the peaceful relationship between Chosŏ n Korea and Ming China. Soon after the Korean envoys to Japan returned in the fi rst month of 1591 and submitted confl icting reports on Hideyoshi’s military plot to King Sŏ njo, the Chosŏ n court had to wrestle with the issue of whether or not to report the new intelligence on Japan to the Ming emperor. This issue became a diplomatic headache for two reasons. The fi rst reason was the fact that the Chos ŏn court had sent an embassy to Japan in 1590 without providing any notice to the Ming court. Chosŏ n’s independent action could be construed as a deviation from the lord–vassal relationship between Ming China and Chos ŏ n Korea. Ming China, as Chosŏ n Korea’s suzerain state, had keen interests in the latter’s foreign affairs. The second reason was that Chos ŏ n leaders were divided in assessing the intelligence on Japan. The ambassador of the 1590–1 embassy, Hwang Yun’gil, reported that Japan’s continental invasion seemed both likely and imminent; vice-ambassador Kim S ŏ ng’il insisted that there was no evidence pointing to an invasion. How did the two highest envoys of the same embassy – two people who were never apart during their visit to Japan – arrive at such contrasting conclusions? It seems that Kim’s strong anti-Japanese sentiments prevented him from objectively assessing the danger of Japan’s military strength while Hwang took a relatively realistic approach.1 Neither envoy was an intelligence or military expert, and their intelligence gathering was by and large within the Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Confucian moral framework of personal impressions and conjectures that they had collected through meetings with Japanese offi cials or encounters with things Japanese during their time in Japan. Their meeting with Hideyoshi was very brief and not particularly signifi cant. 2 Nevertheless, after returning from their “fact-fi nding” mission, each envoy submitted conclusive reports to the king, and each stood fi rmly by his fi ndings. Kingŏ S njo, who showed an intense feeling of abhorrence towards Japan’s political reshuffl ing, leaned towards Kim S ŏ ng’il’s report portraying Hideyoshi as an evil usurper. The celestial warriors 237 While the intelligence pertaining to Japan remained politically unsettled, in the fourth and fi fth months of 1591 court offi cials debated how and what to report to the Ming emperor regarding Chos ŏn Korea’s 1590–1 communication with Japan. Some court offi cials, led by Yun Tusu, who sided with Hwang Yun’gil, argued that Hideyoshi’s suspicious movements should immediately be reported to Ming, which would be in accordance with Chosŏ n Korea’s track record of “having served the great,” or sadae . In particular, Defense Minister Hwang Ch ŏng’uk pointed out that, even though Hideyoshi’s alleged plot was insane, if Korea reported it to Ming China, then this would both strengthen the bond between the two countries and function to enhance their defense against the belligerent Japanese. Hwang Chŏ ng’uk warned that not to report Hideyoshi’s conspiracy would be construed as “an attempt to violate the Central Kingdom.” In contrast, Yi Sanhae insisted that reporting the matter to Ming China would inevitably reveal that the Chos ŏ n court had been in communication with Japan. He further argued that the contents of the letter Hideyoshi addressed to King Sŏ njo might mislead the Ming court into thinking that Korea and Japan had secretly been working together to foment a military scheme.3 Torn, King Sŏ njo hesitated for some time, but eventually decided to take the middle path suggested by Yu Kŭ n. Yu K ŭn thought that the king should report the dispatch of an embassy to Japan without consulting Ming but that, at least for the time being, he should not report the contents of Hideyoshi’s letter. Yu K ŭ n insisted that Chosŏ n Korea should ignore Hideyoshi’s empty threats and thereby avoid agitating Ming China. At the same time this response would avoid upsetting Japan. In the fi fth month of 1591 King Sŏ njo dispatched Kim Ŭ ngnam to Beijing, where the latter “lightly” mentioned to the Ming emperor that the Chos ŏn court had sent a diplomatic mission to Japan. What he did not mention was the rumor that Hideyoshi was concocting a military plot against Ming China.4 Upon hearing the report, the Ming court became more suspicious than ever that Korea was hiding something. In fact, in possession of information transmitted in the fourth month of 1591 by the Fujian merchant Chen Jia (or Chen Shen) that there were “unusual” movements taking place between Korea and Japan, Ming China was keeping a watchful eye on its northeastern boundaries. Chen Jia, who was trading in Ryū ky ū, informed the Fujian military commander Zhao Canlu of the rumor that Hideyoshi was mobilizing forces

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 in order to invade China. 5 Based on Zhao’s warning and other intelligence reports, the Ming court deduced that, if Hideyoshi invaded China, then his troops would pass through the Korean peninsula. It also deduced that such an action would not be possible without Korea’s collaboration. While Ming China’s suspicion remained, another informant, the Chinese physician Xu Yijun (or Xu Yihou) of Satsuma, transmitted the same intelligence to Fujian military headquarters in the ninth month of the same year. Realizing that its ties with Ming China might well be jeopardized over this, in the tenth month of 1591 the Chos ŏ n court dispatched an emergency embassy, 238 Nam-lin Hur led by Han Ŭng’in, to the Ming court and insisted on the falsity of the rumor that “Chosŏ n had already submitted to Japan, sending three hundred Koreans, and [that] Japan would soon build up ships [for the invasion] and use those Koreans as guides.” 6 In the eleventh month of 1591, when a regular annual embassy was sent to Beijing, King S ŏnjo reiterated Korea’s unfailing loyalty to the Ming emperor and explained Japan’s cunning fabrication of “Korea’s conspiracy.” Through Ambassador Yi Yuin, King S ŏnjo assured the Ming emperor that, if and when he obtained new information on the situation in Japan, he would immediately report it to the emperor. He further promised that, if necessary, he himself would lead an expeditionary force against Japan so as to return the favor the Ming emperor had conferred upon Korea. King S ŏ njo sounded sincere: “How could I possibly betray the parent country in favor of the Japanese enemy?” 7 After poring over these diplomatic communications and intelligence reports, Ming leaders concluded that, even though they could not determine exactly when it might be put into action, Hideyoshi’s alleged plan of continental aggression should be taken very seriously. The Ming government began to strengthen its coastal defense and intensifi ed its effort to collect information on the movements of Japan and Korea. In the second month of 1592 the War Ministry informed the emperor that Hideyoshi, along with the forces of Ry ū ky ū and a number of southern barbarians (Europeans), was likely to invade Ming China. And it suggested that, when this happened, Korea might well betray China and guide the Japanese troops. After this briefi ng, the Ming emperor sent spies to Korea in order to increase China’s surveillance of that country. 8 As far as Ming China was concerned, its lord–vassal relationship with Chos ŏ n Korea was not set in stone; rather, it was precarious and subject to the whims of geopolitics, which could be motivated by forces beyond its control. In particular, after having barely struggled through the havoc wrought by “Japanese pirates,” who had devastated its southern coastlines in the 1550s and 1560s, Ming China could not completely shake off the specter of a vassal country (like Korea) joining forces with a non-vassal country (like Japan). 9 From the Ming Chinese point of view, Hideyoshi – who had displayed amazing military prowess in subjugating the Japanese pirates and who had, thereby, pacifi ed East Asian waters – was not a man whom it could afford to underestimate.10

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 To be sure, Chos ŏn Korea reiterated its pledge to “serve the great,” but Ming leaders were not sure what might happen to this pledge should push come to shove over issues of security. The Ming–Chos ŏ n relationship had never been clearly defi ned in terms of reciprocal security arrangements, and its stability owed much to a peacetime environment within which Japan had by and large complied with the Sinocentric regional order. From the mid-sixteenth century on, however, Japan had emerged as a military power with the capability to tip the balance of the regional order. Nobody at the Ming court was sure what impact a unifi ed Japan could bring to bear on the lord–vassal relationship The celestial warriors 239 between Ming China and Chosŏ n Korea. Under the tension Hideyoshi was adding to the region, the previously trouble-free Korean–Chinese relationship was being pushed into uncharted terrain. It seemed that the Ming–Chosŏ n relationship was being reconfi gured, and it was looking as though this process of reconfi guration would transpire in military rather than in cultural terms. The following discusses how Ming China responded militarily to the Japanese invasion of one of its most trusted vassal states. The conventional terms of the lord–vassal relationship between Ming China and Chos ŏ n Korea suddenly lost their relevance as peacetime diplomatic exchanges were replaced by military operations. The presence of Chinese troops in Korea, which would double and quadruple as the war deepened, proved to be a crucial factor that would produce a new chapter in the Ming–Chosŏ n relationship. However, at the same time, it should be noted that China’s military aid to Korea was more than what the word “aid” might convey. This aid was provided not so much for the sake of Chosŏ n Korea as for the sake of China’s own national security. I examine the Chinese military intervention from the standpoint of Chinese defense strategies, which were geared towards sustaining Ming China’s claim to universal sovereignty. The Chosŏ n government, with its limited military strength, understood that it could not repel the Japanese invaders on its own, and Korea became a de facto battle ground for China’s defense. Bearing in mind that there is no such thing as free military help, this chapter examines the heavy social, political, and material costs to Korea of the Chinese military intervention. In the fi nal analysis, the sufferings and hardships that the Koreans had to endure did not invalidate Ming China’s military aid, but Korea, which survived the crisis, was left with many scars.

Dimensions of China’s military sovereignty Ming China sent tens of thousands of troops to Chosŏ n Korea between the sixth month of 1592 and the tenth month of 1600, when its last troops crossed the Yalu River on their way back to Liaodong. Over this period, Ming China paid a dear price in lives and treasure. During the fi rst phase of Japanese aggression, the Ming government committed a force of about 50,000, and during the second phase that number almost doubled. Ming China not only provided manpower but also food, horses, and other war supplies. The loss

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of a large number of its soldiers to battle, disease, and other misfortunes was extreme. The war eventually cost China more than eight million taels of silver and weakened its public treasury. 11 In addition, China’s celestial warriors were stricken by crushing defeats at P’yŏ ngyang, Py ŏkchegwan and Sach’ŏ n. All these sacrifi ces were undergone for Chosŏ n Koreans – alien people to whom China often referred as “eastern barbarians.” Why did Ming China send its soldiers to fi ght an invader of a foreign country? There was no security arrangement that forced the Chinese to defend Chos ŏ n Korea. Did Ming China, being Chosŏ n Korea’s suzerain state, feel 240 Nam-lin Hur morally obliged to defend it? Or was China’s military rescue operation actually more concerned with its own national security? Whatever triggered the Ming court to commit tens of thousands of its dwindling troops to the Korean war, it was a diffi cult decision made amidst other pressing troubles. At that time, China’s most serious problem was a mutiny on the part of its Sino-Mongolian troops. This mutiny had broken out in the third month of 1592 at Ningxia, a northwestern border town, and it was feared it might lead to a Mongol raid on Ming territory. In order to quash this rebellion, in the late seventh and early eighth months of 1592 the Ming court dispatched Li Rusong, along with reinforcements from the eastern military districts. It took almost three months for the government forces to quash the rebellion.12 Also a source of headaches was the southwestern border area, where an aboriginal people, the Miao, were allowed to govern themselves under the aegis of the Ming dynasty. During the 1590s the overlord of the region, Yang Yinglung, challenged the Ming authorities by launching raids on Ming forces. In suppressing this rebellion the Ming government had to mobilize an army of 200,000 troops from various regions, and the job was not completed until the war in Korea had concluded. In the end, 22,000 rebels were put to death during a sweeping crackdown.13 It should be noted that all these rebellions occurred when Ming China had lost much of its military vigor and fi nancial health due to ongoing troubles within and disasters from without. The Japanese pirates, who devastated the southern coastal regions in the 1550s and 1560s, sapped much of China’s already waning military strength. On top of that, Zhang Juzheng’s (1525–82) successful reform efforts, which had been put into effect from the mid-1570s to the early 1580s, had given way to corruption and political incompetence right after his death. 14 Nevertheless, by 1592 Ming China was still able to mobilize a sizable force, but it was doubtful if it could subjugate a Japanese invading force of around 150,000 tightly organized warriors – warriors who had been hardened through the long decades of the Warring States from the late fi fteenth century. On receiving intelligence that Hideyoshi was preparing to invade the Korean peninsula, the Ming government strengthened its border defense while following up hearsay evidence indicating that Chosŏ n Korea seemed to be collaborating with Japan. Soon after the fi rst division of Japanese forces landed in Pusan on the twelfth day of the fourth month of 1592, Ming China

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 seriously began trying to formulate a course of action. National security was the focus of the court debate, and options were weighed in terms of feasibil- ity and probable cost. However, at that early stage, the idea of sending rescue troops to Korea did not rally strong support. The situation in Korea was no different, either. Initially, even though King Sŏ njo had been forced to fl ee and the Japanese had taken over Hansŏ ng, Chos ŏn court offi cials were not united with regard to whether to ask Ming China for military help. For example, Yi Hangbok was in favor but Yun Tusu, who argued in favor of mustering a spirited self-defense, was not. However, all of them, including King Sŏ njo, The celestial warriors 241 soon realized that self-defense was not an option: the Japanese forces were simply too powerful. King Sŏ njo dispatched messengers to Ming China one after another, pleading for quick military help. Korea’s entreaties resulted in heated discussion among the offi cials at the Ming court, and suggestions ranged from mounting a defense at the Yalu River to dispatching limited rescue troops to Korea after consolidating a defense line along the Yalu River to an immediate full-scale military expedition against the Japanese invaders.15 The option of dispatching troops eventually won the approval of the Wanli emperor (Emperor Shenzong), but the Ming government implemented it in a cautious, step-by-step manner. The Chinese court made a major military commitment in the eleventh month of 1592. This was after the small-scale battle at P’yŏ ngyang in the seventh month of 1592 had proved disastrous, and all suspicions about Korea’s loyalty to China had been dispelled. King Sŏ njo, who had once gone so far as to ponder whether or not he should relocate his court to China, kept appealing to the Ming emperor for help; and the latter, who had claimed overlordship over Chos ŏ n Korea, fi nally approved a major military commitment. Nevertheless, it would be naive to believe that Ming’s decision to commit a large force to Korea was based on King Sŏ njo’s repeated pleas for help and the Wanli emperor’s “feelings of obligation toward Korea” as the tributary father of the former. 16 Kenneth M. Swope writes that “Chinese offi cials demonstrated their anger that the Japanese did not realize that the Ming defense umbrella extended not only over Korea but also over Ryū ky ū and the island countries of the south seas.”17 The fact of the matter is that “the Ming defense umbrella” never extended “over Ryū ky ū .” When Satsuma forces invaded the Ry ū ky ū kingdom in 1609, Ming China did not, and could not, do anything about it. Wanli’s promise that “he would mobilize other tributary states like Siam, the Philippines, and the Ryū ky ūs to help Korea” 18 was nothing but haughty rhetoric. Swope does not entirely deny that Ming’s dispatch of a rescue force to Korea was also meant “to defend its own border,” or carried elements of self-interest, but his active estimation of “the importance of the tributary relationship” between Chosŏ n Korea and Ming China prevents him from discerning the blurred lines between rhetoric and reality. 19 Behind the decision to rescue Korea were Ming China’s national defense concerns, which were closely interwoven with its desire to claim universal sovereignty. In order to maintain universal sovereignty, Ming China had devel-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 oped two key military strategies: waiyi jimi and waifan lifu . The combination of these two strategies formed a military framework for what it desired to obtain within the vision of a Sinocentric world order, and this is what forced China to send a major force to Korea. Waiyi jimi, which literally means “outer barbarians and the bridle and reins,” refers to a defense strategy that features “controlling wild horses and cows by pulling up or loosening the reins.” 20 This idea was based on two assumptions. One was that ethnic groups outside China proper were uncivilized barbarians. These groups were collectively referred to as the “four barbarians” and were 242 Nam-lin Hur often likened to wild horses or cows. In this vision of Chinese world order, both the Koreans and the Japanese were classifi ed as “eastern barbarians.” The other assumption was that the only effective way of controlling the wild- ness of “barbarians” was through the use of physical violence like “pulling up or loosening the reins,” namely, military power. It is commonly known that during the time of Ming China the so-called Sinocentric international order was premised on the acceptance of the Central Kingdom’s universal sovereignty and cultural supremacy, which required the surrounding vassal states to submit themselves voluntarily to its rule. Specifi cally, as an expression of their submission to the Central Kingdom, the kings of vassal states were expected to bring tribute to the Chinese emperor, who was regarded as the Son of Heaven. In return, and in accordance with the political principles of Confucian cultural decorum, the Son of Heaven was supposed to sanction the supplicant as the legitimate ruler of his state by granting him imperial investiture. 21 This system of international order was justifi ed through the assumption of Chinese political and cultural superiority. In reality, however, it was implemented through the means of the waiyi jimi strategy sustained with the backing of China’s overwhelming military power. 22 Historically, when China failed to maintain military superiority over its surrounding countries, and when strong “vassal states” refused to submit to it, there was almost nothing the Central Kingdom could do to maintain its alleged universal sovereignty. In this case, the Central Kingdom was often forced to camoufl age its military weakness through unusual diplomatic arrangements; sometimes it was even reduced to employing submissive tactics so as to pre-empt being humiliated by a stronger “barbarian” state.23 Without the protective shield of superior military power, the Sinocentric international order was nothing more than a cultural fantasy. Interestingly, Chos ŏn Korea, which regarded itself as a continuum of the civilization commanded by the Central Kingdom, applied the same binary vision to itself and Japan as China did to non-Chinese countries; that is, Korea saw itself as civilized and Japan as barbarous. Unlike the Sino-Korean relationship, the Korean–Japanese relationship had been shaped by Korea’s bitter experiences with the Japanese pirates ( waegu) from Tsushima Island and other island bases around Kyū sh ū. In denigrating Japan, Korea did not hesitate to use the image of these pirates as a collective representation of the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 entire nation. For Chosŏ n Korea, Japan and the Japanese were all waegu . When contact with waegu was unavoidable, the Koreans tried to assert their cultural superiority by employing the strategy of waiyi jimi on their own. But the strategy of waiyi jimi towards Tsushima gradually fell into disuse in the sixteenth century as Korea’s military might struggled to deal with the increasing military vigor of the Japanese pirates; rather, the Chos ŏ n government turned more and more to the rhetoric of cultural diplomacy, a move that, in 1471, Shin Sukchu had already proposed in his Haedong chegukki (A Record of All Countries East of the [Yellow] Sea ): The celestial warriors 243 The Japanese have a violent disposition and excellent military skills. They are well accustomed to navigation, and we are neighbors separated by the sea. To appease and control them, our relations must be controlled with ye [upright behavior] … The way to control barbarians is not to expel them, not to defend frontier areas militarily, but to depend on the law and order of Confucian decorum.24

Korea’s tactics usually included granting Tsushima islanders court titles, permitting them to conduct trade with Korea, offering them fi shing facilities, and giving them rice and beans. Despite the rhetoric of cultural appeasement, these pre-emptive measures were meant to bribe the islanders. The cultural version of the waiyi jimi strategy served Chosŏ n Korea well until Hideyoshi’s invasion. 25 Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea posed an outright military challenge to the entire framework of the Sinocentric international order. Although military provocation was not unprecedented in Ming China, the Japanese challenge, which came through Japan’s occupation of China’s most trusted vassal state, Chos ŏn Korea, was feared because it might jeopardize the Central Kingdom’s long-treasured defense strategy – waifan lifu or siyi fanping – a strategy that, along with waiyi jimi, sustained universal sovereignty. The waifan lifu strategy literally means “outer frontiers [represented by the four barbarians] and fences and bars” and implies that the function of the Central Kingdom’s neighboring barbarian countries was to protect the civilized country that they surrounded; that is, China.26 The Central Kingdom’s traditional strategic notion of national security involved seeing itself as being shielded by the four barbarians, who were supposed to fend off any barbarian entity attempting to attack China. In other words, China’s national security strategy amounted to fi ghting barbarians with barbarians. Like previous Chinese empires, Ming China tried to assign the proxy role of defender to the barbarian vassal states located along its boundaries. China believed that this was the most cost-effective and practical way to secure its long borders. Indeed, owing to the buffer zone supplied by Chosŏ n Korea, Ming China’s northeastern boundaries were relatively secure and calm. Even during the havoc caused by the “Japanese” pirates during the 1550s and 1560s, the Ming court’s sovereignty over its northeastern areas was never seriously threatened. To be sure, Ming China was becoming increasingly uneasy about

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Sengoku Japan, which was emerging as a military power outside the mar- gins of the Sinocentric geopolitical order. However, the strategy of employing “barbarians against barbarians” had worked well for China’s universal sovereignty – until the time of Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea represented the most disturbing military challenge to the framework of Sinocentric international order in two centuries. Ming China construed the Japanese aggression as a crisis that might ruin the two cardinal defense strategies buttressing Chinese universal sovereignty and national security. It was clear that, so far from subjugating themselves to 244 Nam-lin Hur Chinese reins, the Japanese barbarians were apparently attempting to take over the entire region. 27 Furthermore, the rumor that Korea was secretly collaborating with Japan put the strategy of pitting barbarians against barbarians to a serious test.28 It was within this context that the Ming court was forced to attempt to salvage its national security strategy and its assumption of universal sovereignty. The War Ministry urged Emperor Shenzong to dispatch a rescue army to Korea in the following terms:

The defense of China against the Japanese should occur in the outer yard. The places adjoining the [Chinese] borderland are the outer yards of China. The four barbarians are simply a line of protective barriers. Defense lies with the four barbarians, but it is not for them. Korea is loyal and obedient, so when she is attacked, we should console her; when she asks for military help, we should immediately send aid; and when she brings prisoners of war to us, we should reward her. This is how we treat vassal states. 29

In the end, the Ming court concluded that defending China against the Japanese invaders in Korean territory was the best course of action to prevent Chinese territory from being violated by the Japanese. Moreover, Chinese leaders anticipated that the burden of the fi ghting would be shared with the Korean troops and that, as a result, the loss of Chinese lives would be signifi cantly reduced. As far as the Ming court was concerned, Korean soldiers could be used as a sort of surrogate force against the Japanese barbarians. Thus, Ming China’s decision to dispatch its troops to Korea, which was the fi rst time in its history that it came to the direct military aid of a foreign country, was the product of a politico-military calculation. However, for Chos ŏn Korea the Ming court’s military operation in the peninsula soon proved to involve more than military aid. Along with its troops, Ming China began to impose its own conditions with regard to all matters related to fi ghting and dealing with the Japanese. Two things in particular bothered Chosŏ n Korea: (1) Ming China’s assumption of the command of Korea’s military forces when necessary and (2) its exclusive handling of all diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese. China’s exercise of its suzerain power infringed upon the sovereignty of Korea to the point where the Chosŏ n

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 court found itself cut off from decisions taken concerning its war against the Japanese. It was not only the Ming court but also the Chinese fi eld generals who were eager to exercise their power over Chosŏ n Korea. They believed that the purpose of China’s military aid was, in the last analysis, to shore up China’s national defense, not Korea’s. For example, when Li Rusong led a large army across the Yalu River, he clearly understood why he was being dispatched and what he was supposed to do: The celestial warriors 245 Liaodong is the arms of Beijing, and Korea is the fence of Liaodong. Tianjin is the gate of Beijing. In the past two hundred years the Japanese pirates troubled the Fujian and Zhejiang regions but could not penetrate into Liaoyang and Tianjin. Isn’t it because Korea served as a shield of protection? If the Japanese were to occupy Korea, then the people of Liaodong would not sleep at night.30

To Chinese fi eld generals Korea was nothing but an outer fence dedicated to China’s defense, and it was only as such that Korea deserved protection. By extension, the Koreans were expected to carry out their masters’ demands. Indeed, Ming China’s military help did not come cheaply. Of all the demands Ming China imposed upon Korea, the most onerous was to share the burden of providing food supplies (mostly rice and beans) to the Chinese fi ghting forces and their horses. In addition, when grains were shipped from China to Korea, it was the latter’s responsibility to transport them to the Chinese troops. The Ming court worried that without the full cooperation of the Korean people it would not be easy to feed its forces and wanted to make sure that all matters related to food provisioning were in order. Initially, the Ming government planned to provide its soldiers in Korea with individual monthly salaries; however, it soon realized that they would have diffi culty buying foodstuffs in Korea.31 Thus the Ming government pur- chased grains and fodder in China, shipped them to Korea, and asked the Korean government to distribute them. But there was one sore point. As the war dragged on, it became increasingly costly and cumbersome to supply feed for Chinese horses directly from China. The Ming government began to send silver to the Chos ŏn government on the understanding that it would procure fodder for Chinese horses in Korea. At the same time, the Ming government increasingly pressured the Chosŏ n court to contribute to food supplies for the celestial warriors. There is little evidence that Ming China deliberately tried to impose on the Korean people the tasks of feeding its soldiers and horses and of procuring weapons and other war supplies. However, China’s relatively modest expectation that the Chosŏ n court should do something for the Chinese troops became an almost unbearable burden on the Korean people, who were struggling for survival. When the fi rst division of celestial warriors was about to arrive, King S ŏnjo charged Yu S ŏngnyong with the task of procuring enough

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 rice and other foodstuffs to feed 5,000 soldiers for fi fteen days. Yu Sŏ ngnyong, in collaboration with local offi cials, was barely able to secure 500 to 600s ŏ k (1 s ŏ k = 120 liters) of rice from the villages in the Kasan area.32 And this was only a very small, and the earliest, part of the price the Korean people would have to pay to maintain the Chinese troops. As more and more rescue forces arrived in Korea after Zu Chengxun’s defeat at P’yŏ ngyang, both Ming and Chos ŏ n offi cials began to pay a great deal of attention to the matter of securing food supplies for the Chinese fi ghting 246 Nam-lin Hur forces. Although by the eleventh month of 1592 the Ming court had been able to store enough grains to feed a force of 50,000 for two months, it soon established a long-term plan: it would purchase grains in the Shandong area and ship them to Liaodong for storage, thus securing enough food to sustain all the Chinese forces in Korea for at least one year. In the early twelfth month of 1592, Song Yingchang, the Ming commander in Korea, heard that the Chosŏ n court had already secured grain enough to feed a Chinese force of 50,000 for twenty days as well as fodder for 20,000 horses. Song Yingchang’s concern over food supplies was such that he insisted that the stock be carefully inspected.33 Such meticulous planning and care had, to a great extent, relieved the Chinese forces of their constant concern with food and transportation, at least until the Japanese began to retreat to the south in accordance with the truce arrangements. As tens of thousands of Chinese troops began to be deployed in the southern provinces for longer and longer periods of time, the need to supply them with food spelled extreme hardship for Koreans. Local Koreans were forced to give up grain that was meant for their own consumption and, on top of that, they had to transport food supplies from the far north of the peninsula to the southern Chinese camps. The routes for transporting grain and foodstuffs from China to Korea involved crossing both sea and land: from Liaodong to Ŭiju involved a sea route, from Ŭ iju to Yongch’ ŏ n involved a land route, from Yongch’ŏ n to Kanghwa involved a sea route, and from Kanghwa to the southern camps involved both sea and land routes. The complex mix of transportation routes, which forced people to load and unload constantly, made the task of supplying food painful indeed. A shortage of ships was a constant problem, and, as far as land transportation was concerned, there were simply not enough horses or oxen to carry the many bags of grain. Most labor was supplied by Korean men and women, who were forced into labor whenever and wherever they were found. Enduring their own hunger, these corv ée laborers had to carry heavy sacks of grain on their backs along the poorly maintained, narrow rugged roads leading to the south. Further compounding the problem was the casual corruption, extortion, and embezzlement committed by grain merchants and offi cials, who were often either greedy or negligent or both. In a number of cases, large amounts of grain were either stolen while being transported or were abandoned to rot due to lack of care. 34 If a designated amount of grain was

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 not delivered as had been ordered, then Korean laborers were often accused of theft or negligence and were harshly punished. Supplying food to Chinese troops was often a point of dispute between the Ming and Chosŏ n courts as both sides struggled to cope with their own fi nancial constraints. The Chosŏ n court, which had no option but to rely on Ming China’s military help, was delighted when more and more troop reinforcements arrived from China. But its jubilation quickly dissipated when it had to wrestle with the burden of supplying these troops with food. By the same token, the Ming court was not always happy with how the Korean court was The celestial warriors 247 treating its celestial warriors. And Ming offi cials sometimes used their dissatisfaction as a reason for exercising tighter control over the Chosŏ n court. In the second month of 1593, for example, Minister of Revenue Secretary Ai Zixin, who was in charge of supplying food to the Chinese troops in Korea, fl ogged Korean offi cials (Military Affairs Commissioner Kim Ungnam, Taxation Vice-Minister Min Yŏ ’gy ŏng, and Ŭiju Magistrate Hwang Chin) for not transporting food supplies fast enough.35 In any case, it was always ordinary Korean people who shouldered the largest share of the pain caused by the nationwide efforts to collect and transport grains for the Chinese soldiers. In the eighth month of 1593, as the truce negotiations dragged on even after the main body of Chinese forces had returned to their country, the task of feeding the remaining Chinese force of 18,000, which was to be stationed in Korea for one more year, increasingly fell to Korea. Under the threat of Chinese withdrawal, which Ming generals often mouthed, Korean offi cials ran about collecting food resources wherever they could fi nd them, while local Koreans frantically hid food to ensure their own survival. In 1593 and 1594, due to widespread famine and epidemics, the situation was especially distressing. 36 After having suffered unspeakable hardships for more than two years, in the eighth month of 1594 the Korean people saw the Chinese forces return to their country. The remaining Japanese troops were all confi ned to narrow strips along the southern coast, and by 1596 Korea had returned to relative calm. However, with the resumed movement of Japanese aggression in early 1597, which Ming China countered by dispatching an even larger force (close to 100,000 troops) than it had in its fi rst stage of the war, the Korean people were once again plunged into despair. This time there was no doubt that the number of Chinese troops far exceeded what Chos ŏn Korea could possibly support. Further to this, Korean offi cials, who were expected to treat a large number of Ming generals with appropriate protocol, found their task both materially and spiritually exhausting. In order to raise food supplies for these helping hands from its suzerain state, the Chos ŏ n court desperately dispatched a large number of grain collectors to the provinces. The effort to wrest food resources from starving people literally resulted in another war. King S ŏ njo succinctly referred to it as the “fear of the coming of Ming troops.”37 Those who could not endure the government’s endless commandeering of their dwindling food stocks deserted their villages, opting to become vagrants or

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 bandits. The sufferers included more than helpless ordinary Koreans. Paradoxically, Korea’s fi ghting forces also fell victim to the nationwide effort to feed the Chinese troops; this was because, after the Chinese fi ghting forces gobbled up the dwindling food stocks, there was not much left for them. Throughout the war a chronic shortage of food crippled the combat strength of Korean soldiers. 38 Unfortunately, in spite of receiving the best of the food and other resources, the Chinese soldiers rarely managed to garner sound victories over the Japanese; meanwhile, the Korean soldiers became demoralized, thus 248 Nam-lin Hur further draining the fi ghting spirit of the allied forces. This situation of double jeopardy prolonged the suffering of combatants and noncombatants alike. Out of frustration, in the fi fth month of 1598, the Kyŏ ngju magistrate Pak Ŭijang insisted that local Korean warriors in the Kyŏ ngju area, who were struggling to maintain their fi ghting spirit, could be re-energized “if grain left over after feeding the Ming soldiers were supplied to them, even if it were rot- ten.”39 Hunger and malnutrition tortured the Korean people until the end of the war, but they knew that they must somehow bear it as long as the Japanese remained in the peninsula. Chosŏ n Korea, which was not strong enough to repel the Japanese by itself, endured through these terrible times in the hope that the celestial warriors – no matter how inappropriate the adjective “celestial” was proving to be – would somehow save them. In fact, from the outset, Korean offi cials had little hope in the “celestial” nature of Chinese warriors because they knew precisely what it would take to bring foreign soldiers from a powerful country to the aid of a country on the brink of collapse. When the Chosŏ n court debated asking Ming China for military help, some court offi cials worried that Chinese soldiers, once they set foot on Korean soil, might cause trouble for the Korean people. Soldiers from Liaodong were most feared as they were well known for their “roisterous” character. Fortunately, however, Dai Chaobian and Shi Ru’s 1,000 celestial warriors, who fi rst crossed the Yalu River on the nineteenth day of the sixth month, 1592, turned out to be as orderly and disciplined as Yi Tŏ khy ŏ ng had previously assured King S ŏ njo they would be.40 However, Zu Chengxun’s troops, who soon followed the fi rst division, were unruly and rough. Local Korean offi cials atŬ iju, shocked at the behavior of the Ming soldiers (who casually invaded people’s private homes whenever they felt like it), reported that “the people in the [Ŭ iju] fortress have all deserted their residences.” 41 More trouble followed with the arrival of Li Rusong’s 43,000 troops. Some Ming soldiers, who were competing with one another to produce Japanese heads (for which they expected to be rewarded), killed many Korean civilians and claimed that they were Japanese. 42 Things got so bad that the Ming court had to dispatch inspectors to the Korean warfronts in order to distinguish between Korean heads (which were supposed to have a white impression on their forehead caused by horsehair headbands) from Japanese heads (with shaved foreheads).43 When there were no battles, Chinese soldiers easily transformed themselves

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 into local tyrants, casually plundering the homes of civilians, raping women, and abusing local Korean offi cials with demands for food, liquor, and so on. Some Ming generals pressured the Chosŏ n court to supply them with local staples such as candles, honey, rush mats, and other luxury items that would make barracks life more comfortable. 44 The Chinese soldiers were usually at their worst right after a defeat or when they were about to head off to other fronts.45 The war turned into a stalemate with the start of ceasefi re negotiations after the Pyŏ kchegwan battle, and the Chinese soldiers lost much of their fi ghting spirit. Nonetheless, they persisted in infl icting hardships upon The celestial warriors 249 the Koreans. In fact, the Chinese troops who followed the retreating Japanese and entered Chŏ lla Province and other areas from the summer of 1593 created so much havoc that local Koreans could often see no difference between them and the Japanese.46 The abuses committed by the celestial warriors were more frequent among the cavalry soldiers from northern China than among the foot soldiers from southern China. The northern soldiers saw themselves as Korea’s saviors and felt free to act in an unruly, violent, and arrogant manner. They simply did not concern themselves with the well-being of the Koreans.47 For example, Song Yingchang tried to maintain a high level of military discipline among his northern troops, and, among the thirty articles he issued, three specifi cally addressed the problem of civilian atrocities. He warned that those who cut down even one tree without reason, that those who raped women, and that those who killed Korean men and women (whether or not they had confessed to having collaborated with the Japanese) would receive the death penalty. But his efforts did not have much effect.48 In contrast, the majority of the southern soldiers were orderly. The southern soldiers were quite critical of the disorderly behavior and violence of the northern soldiers, and they tried to distinguish themselves from them by prac- ticing strict military discipline. Generals like Wu Weizhong and Liu Ting, who commanded the southern troops, were able to maintain strict military discipline; indeed, they became famous for rarely causing the local people any trouble. For their part, Chos ŏ n offi cials, who were dismayed at what the northern soldiers were doing to the Korean people but who were nonetheless expected to provide them with food, went so far as to ask the Ming court to send southern soldiers only. The Chinese troops, who re-entered Korea in the summer of 1597 after the Japanese had launched the second major aggression, were no better than were the ones who had preceded them. Reports of the violence and plundering that Chinese soldiers were perpetrating upon innocent Korean civilians alarmed the Chos ŏn court. It was even reported that Chinese soldiers, fl eeing after their defeat at Namwŏ n, destroyed and pillaged government storehouses and behaved more abominably towards local villagers than had the Japanese. When people heard that the Chinese were going to pass through their villages, it was said that they would hide in deep valleys and mountains during the day, venturing out only at night. It was also said that they would bury

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 their tools, furniture, grain, and whatever else they were able to salvage.49 In the fi rst month of 1598, after the attack on the Ulsan fortress had failed, the Chinese soldiers vented their frustration on whatever fell in their path as they retreated to the north. Some of Commander Ma Gui’s soldiers made a habit of straying into nearby villages under the pretext of seeking food, only to loot and rape civilians. According to Yi Tŏ khy ŏng, villages within twelve or sixteen kilometers of the Chinese camps were completely emptied.50 The people in the southern provinces shunned the Chinese soldiers; and, when direct encounters could not be avoided, they fl ed. 250 Nam-lin Hur Despite the efforts of Chinese commanders such as Xing Jie, who did attempt to discipline their troops, it was almost impossible to keep the Chinese soldiers away from the Koreans. In general, Chinese commanders were rather sympathetic towards their soldiers who, after all, were thrown into a war in an alien country, were under the constant threat of losing their lives, and were suffering from disease, injury, malnutrition, and homesickness. There was almost nothing Chosŏ n Korea could do about the atrocities committed by the Chinese soldiers: it knew that, without the help of Ming China, it simply could not defend itself.

Conclusion Ming China’s attempt to rescue Chos ŏn Korea eventually turned out to be a success when, at the end of the eleventh month of 1598, the Japanese invaders decided to abandon their ill-fated military desires and return to Japan. But China’s success was a result not so much of its own military victories as of Japan wearying of prolonged and hopeless battles in a foreign country. It is not easy to list many battles in which the Chinese achieved a decisive victory over the Japanese. The Chinese soldiers, who were very concerned with self- protection, were constantly trying to fi nd ways of avoiding risky confrontations with the Japanese. In the case of a military failure, the Chinese usually tried to shirk blame through political maneuvering, such as, for example, after the Battle of Ulsan in late 1597 and early 1598. After the unsuccessful attack on Katō Kiyomasa’s Ulsan fortress, Field General Yang Hao returned to Hans ŏ ng and attempted to blame his failure on the Korean troops by accusing thousands of Korean soldiers of collaborating with the Japanese. Similarly, Xing Jie, the supreme commander of the Ming forces, composed a false report for his emperor, stating that the imperial soldiers almost destroyed Katō Kiyomasa’s troops – who had been reduced to drinking rainwater and urine – but that he had to withdraw due to exhaustion and bad weather. He did not forget to add that it would have been only a matter of time before he and his troops would have annihilated the Japanese. The Ming emperor praised the valor of Xing Jie’s soldiers, but his pleasure was to be short-lived.51 In the sixth month of 1598, Ding Yingtai, a military superintendent (Ch. Zanhua shushi ), sent the Ming court a series of secret reports that indicated

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 what had actually happened at the Battle of Ulsan. They revealed that the Ulsan campaign had been a total failure; that there had been a high number of casualties; that the failure was attributable to Yang Hao’s ineffect- ive command and to the poor leadership of the Chosŏ n court; and that Yang Hao had conspired with King S ŏnjo to fabricate a misleading report. Upon hearing this, the outraged Ming emperor proceeded to punish Yang Hao and others involved in the scheme. 52 For his part, King S ŏnjo, who was extremely concerned over Ding Yingtai’s charges, dispatched envoys one after another to the Ming court to explain his position until all accusations were The celestial warriors 251 fully exonerated in the spring of 1599.53 Amid this squabbling, Chief State Councilor Yu Sŏ ngnyong was blamed for not pushing hard enough in defending King S ŏ njo and was replaced by Yi W ŏ n’ik. The avoidance of confrontation by the Ming military went so far as to involve a backdoor deal with the retreating Japanese. Consider, for example, the last battles of the war in the Waegyo and Noryang areas, where the allied forces of Chen Lin, Liu Ting, Yi Sunshin, and Kwŏ n Yul were fi ghting the forces of Konishi Yukinaga. Despite possessing overwhelming power, the Ming commander Liu Ting seemed quite reluctant to strike down the Japanese force. It was rumored that he had made a secret deal with Konishi, who was desperate to fi nd a way to escape from his Waegyo hideout.54 Hideyoshi had died two months previously, and the Japanese government decided to end the war by pulling all of its troops out of Korea. In an attempt to ensure a safe withdrawal, Konishi bribed Ming generals with swords, silver, and other precious metals. In the early eleventh month of 1598, Konishi’s troops, who were still trapped in their fort by the Chinese and Korean squadrons under Chen Lin and Yi Sunshin, made every effort to ensure a safe escape. An entry for 16.11.1598 in the Nanjung ilgi (War Diary of Yi Sunshin) reads: “Commodore (Ch. Dudu ) Chen sent Chen Wentong to the Japanese camp. After a while three Japanese boats brought a horse, swords, spears, and other items and offered them to the Commodore.” 55 The bribe seemed to have little effect, because the Chinese and Korean forces did not open up a way out. After a desperate rescue and intense sea battle at Noryang, the Konishi forces eventually made good their escape to Pusan, where they shortly set sail for Japan. Ming China provided military aid to its outer-fence state, Chosŏ n Korea, in order to defend itself against the Japanese. This was considered to be a cost-effective way of dealing with the Japanese threat – to play one group of barbarians off against the other. In return for China’s help, Chosŏ n Korea had to give up most of its sovereignty, diplomatic rights, and military force to Ming China. When King Sŏ njo realized what Ming China’s overlordship really meant, he found himself fi ghting not only the Japanese but also the “parent country,” which was making excessive intrusions into an already fragmented and struggling Korea. The problem did not stop there. The Chinese celestial warriors did not show much sympathy towards the Koreans; worse yet, some of them often harassed, humiliated, and plundered those whom they were supposed to protect.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that Ming China’s military aid was the determining factor in eventually derailing Japan’s ambitions. The presence of tens of thousands of Chinese troops, which were deployed from land and sea, disheartened the Japanese aggressors. The Japanese fi eld generals realized that the Chinese military force was far larger and stronger than they had previously imagined. Before the invasion, Hideyoshi used to ridicule “the long-sleeved country of the Great Ming,” maintaining that it could not be a match for his “Japan, a country of warriors and furious internecine struggles.”56 His generals, as they advanced towards Hans ŏng after having landed 252 Nam-lin Hur in Pusan, found that even the Korean peninsula was huge. And they never got the chance to see the far larger land mass of the Great Ming. As time went on, it seemed clear that Ming China was indeed a massive country that was in fi rm command of a regional geopolitical order. Ming China was never violated by Japan’s “furious warriors,” and Hideyoshi’s continental ambition fi zzled. In this sense, Ming China’s defense strategies proved to be successful. To be sure, its celestial warriors had to undergo much suffering and sacrifi ce in an “outer barbarian country.” In addition, the drain on China’s public treasury did weaken the regime, forcing it to sink a bit further into dynastic decline. But this was the price paid for dealing with an imminent danger to national security. Korea was saved, but it was left in ashes and anguish. Nobody at the Chos ŏn court challenged the view that the Chinese celestial warriors had helped prevent Korea from succumbing to an even worse fate. No matter what horrible things the celestial warriors did to the Koreans, and no matter how much they hurt the dignity and pride of the Chos ŏ n court, all of this was negligible next to the fact that they had preserved the country. King S ŏnjo had sometimes been bitter about Ming China’s haphazard exercise of suzerainty over Chosŏ n Korea. However, after the war, he consolidated his grip on power by attributing Korea’s survival to his “loyal” devotion to the Chinese emperor. His regime continued to honor the principles of China’s universal sovereignty.

Notes 1 When Yu S ŏngnyong, who was perplexed by divided opinions at the court, asked Kim Sŏ ng’il what he would do if the Japanese invaded, Kim responded, “How could I guarantee that the Japanese would not invade? But I was afraid that the whole country would be frightened and confused (by Ambassador Hwang’s words), so that I said so in order to lessen the worry.” See Yu S ŏ ngnyong, Chingbirok , 1973, p. 246. 2 For how intelligence on Japan was gathered, see Kim Sŏ ng’il, Haesarok , 1985. 3 S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:11b–12b (1591.4–5). 4 S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 25:12b–13a (1591.5). For more details, see Kitajima Manji, “Jinshin Waran ki no Chō sen to Min,” 1992, pp. 129–31. 5 Shenzong shilu , 238:4416–17. 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 25:14a (1591.10.24). 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 27:18a (1592.6.26).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 8 Shenzong shilu , 245:4571–2. 9 For a detailed account of Ming’s diffi culties in dealing with the “Japanese pirates,” see Jurgis Elisonas, “Inseparable Trinity,” 1989, pp. 249–62. 10 Elisonas, “Inseparable Trinity,” 1989, pp. 262–5. 11 According to Shin Ky ŏng, the author of Chaejo p ŏ nbangji, Ming China spent 5.832 million taels of silver for food supplies and another three million taels of silver for other expenses. See Shin, Chaejo p ŏ nbangji , 1985, p. 556. 12 Ray Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, pp. 566–7. See also Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 24–34. 13 Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, pp. 564–5. See also Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 34–40. The celestial warriors 253 14 For more details, see Huang, “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” 1988, pp. 518–29. For a counter-argument to Ming military decline, which proposes that “from about 1570 to 1610 the Ming military was probably at its strongest since the Yongle reign” (p. 24), see Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 13–24. 15 Yu, Chingbirok , 1973, p. 306. 16 Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, p. 123. 17 Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, p. 123. 18 Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, p. 125. 19 Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, pp. 123, 127. 20 That the waiyi jimi strategy appeared as early as the Han period is indicated by its appearance in the Shi ji and the Han shu. Ming China used this strategy to control the northern Jurchen tribes. See Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” 1968, pp. 31–3. 21 For a helpful account of the origin of the Chinese world order, see Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” 1968, pp. 4–11. 22 For how this issue was handled in Chinese historical works, see Wang, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia,” 1968, pp. 36–54. 23 Diplomatic arrangements employed in an attempt to deal with stronger “barbarians” ranged from an agreement of courtesy, to the offer of political sanction and benefi ts of trade and culture, to threats and bribery, to the sending of hostages. 24 Shin, Haedong chegukki , 1973, p. 35. 25 Was this approach benefi cial to Korea? The answer is both yes and no: yes in that it worked well (at least for security purposes) until the Imjin War; no in that, from the outset, Korea refused any possibility of incorporating trade benefi ts into its own economy. Korea regarded Japan as a political object, not as an economic or cultural counterpart; it fi rmly believed that nothing could be gained from Japan, either economically or culturally. This was a sort of reverse cultural chauvinism, and it directed the international behavior of traditional Korea towards Japan. 26 See Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” 1968, pp. 21–2. 27 For a similar argument, see Swope, A Dragon’s Head , 2009, p. 11. 28 For details, see Shenzong shilu , 248:4613–28. 2 9 Shenzong shilu , 250:4649. 3 0 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 26:36a (1593.9). 31 A monthly salary for Chinese soldiers was set as follows: 6.8 taels of silver for southern soldiers, 6 taels of silver for northern soldiers, and 7.8 taels of silver and fodder for specially recruited soldiers. For a discussion of diffi culties involved in procuring war supplies in the Korean market, see Han, Imin Waeran kwa Han- Chung kwangye , 1999, pp. 91–8. 3 2 Sŏ njo sillok , 27:10a–10b (1592.6.16). 33 Han, Imin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwangye , 1999, p. 134. 34 Han, Imin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwangye , 1999, pp. 135–6. 3 5 Sŏ njo shillok , 35:1a (1593.2.1). 36 For accounts of the terrible famine years of 1593 and 1594, see Ch’oe, Imjin

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Waeran chung ŭ i sahoe tongt’ae, 1975, pp. 88–106, and Yi, Imjin Waeransa yŏ n’gu , 1999, pp. 326–32. 3 7 Sŏ njo shillok , 89:48b (1597.6.30). 38 Yi, Imjin Waeransa yŏ n’gu, 1999, pp. 245–51. 39 Han, Imin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwangye , 1999, pp. 141–2. 4 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 27:10b (1592.6.17). 4 1 S ŏ njo shillok , 27:13a, 15a (1592.6.20, 22). 42 After the battle, Shandong Censor-in-Chief Zhou Weihan and Supervising Secretary of the Offi ce of Scrutiny for Personnel Yang Tinglan reprimanded Li Rusong. Among the heads he had claimed as the product of the fi ghting, half of them were actually Koreans. Almost all 10,000 “enemies,” who had been burned 254 Nam-lin Hur to death or drowned in another lot, were also Koreans. S ŏ njo shillok , 34:15a (1593.1.11). 43 Song, Jinglue fuguo yaobian , 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 640–1. 4 4 Sŏ njo shillok , 35:46b (1593.2.22). 45 When the Korean offi cials could not fulfi ll the demands of the Chinese, they were often killed or otherwise severely punished. In the ninth month of 1593 the Chinese soldiers stationed in Hwanghae tethered local Korean offi cials by their necks with ropes and hauled them out onto the streets. S ŏ njo shillok , 42:16b–17a (1593.9.6). 4 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 41:37b (1593.8.14), 41:47b (1593.8.23), 42:17a (1593.9.6). 47 Soldiers mobilized from the Jurchen tribe were particularly notorious for their reckless rampages and senseless killings. Some of them casually killed Koreans they encountered on the street and, after shaving the foreheads of those murdered, claimed they were Japanese. S ŏ njo shillok , 35:36b–38b (1593.2.20). 48 Song, Jinglue fuguo yaobian , 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 270–1, 273–4. 4 9 S ŏ njo shillok , 92:29b (1597.8.29). 5 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 97:3b (1598.2.2). 5 1 Shenzong shilu , 319:5934. 52 Ledyard, “Confucianism and War,” 1988–89, pp. 86–8. 53 For a detailed account of the matter, which dragged on into the fi fth month of 1599, when King Sŏ njo was fi nally “exonerated” by the Ming emperor, see Ledyard, “Confucianism and War,” 1988–9, pp. 88–115. 54 Cho, Nanjung chamnok , 1985, Vol. 7, pp. 216–19. 55 Yi, Nanjung ilgi ch’o , 1935, p. 301. 56 Asao, “The Sixteenth-Century Unifi cation,” 1991, p. 76.

References Asao , Naohiro . “The Sixteenth-Century Unifi cation,” in John Whitney Hall , ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1991 , pp. 40–95 . Ch’oe Y ŏ ngh ŭ i ( 崔永禧 ). Imjin Waeran chung ŭ i sahoe tongt’ae ( 壬辰倭亂中㦮社會動態 ). Seoul : Han’guk y ŏ n’guw ŏ n , 1975 . Cho Ky ŏ ngnam ( 趙慶男 ). Nanjung chamnok ( 綧中雜錄 ), in Kug’y ŏ k Taedong yasŭ ng , Vols. 6–7 ( 國譯大東野乘 ). Seoul : Minjok munhwa mungo kanhaenghoe , 1985 . Elisonas , Jurgis . “Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1989 , pp. 235–300 . Fairbank , John K. “A Preliminary Framework,” in John King Fairbank , ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1968 , pp. 1–19 . Han My ŏ nggi (韓明基 ). Imin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwangye ( 㧚㰚㢲⧖ὒG

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 䞲㭧ὖἚG). Seoul : Y ŏ ksa pip’y ŏ ngsa , 1999 . Huang , Ray . “The Lung-ch’ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620,” in Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett , eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988 , pp. 511–84 . Kim S ŏ ng’il ( 金誠一 ). Haesarok ( 海槎錄), in Haehaeng ch’ongjae, Vol. 1 ( 海行摠載 ). Seoul : Minjok munhwa mungo kanhaenghoe , 1985 , pp. 183–360 . Kitajima Manji ( 北島万次 ). “Jinshin Waran ki no Ch ō sen to Min (壬辰倭亂期の朝鮮と明 ),” in Arano Yasunori ( 荒野泰典 ), Ishii Masatoshi ( 石井正敏 ), and Murai Sh ōsuke ( 村井章介 ), eds., Ajia no naka no Nihonshi, II: Gaikō to sens ō ( アジアのなかの日本史 , II 外交と戰爭 ). Tokyo : Tokyo daigaku shuppankai , 1992 , pp. 127–60 . The celestial warriors 255 Ledyard , Gari . “ Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598 ,” Journal of Korean Studies 6 ( 1988–9 ): 81–119 . Shenzong shilu ( 神宗實錄 ), 183 vols. Nan’gang : Zhongyang yanjiu yuanli shiyu yanjiusuo , 1962–8 . Shin Ky ŏ ng ( 申炅 ). Chaejo pŏ nbangji ( 再造藩邦志 , A Chronicle of the Restoration of a Vassal Country), in Kug’y ŏ k Taedong yasŭ ng , Vol. 9 (國譯大東野乘 ). Seoul : Minjok munhwa mungo kanhaenghoe , 1985 . Shin Sukchu ( 申叔舟 ). Haedong chegukki ( 海東諸國記), in Han’guk my ŏ ngj ŏ tae- chŏ njip: Haedong chegukki, Kanyangnok ( 韓國名著大全集 : 海東諸國記 , 看羊錄 ). Seoul : Taeyang s ŏ j ŏ k , 1973 , pp. 31–163 . Song Yingchang ( 宋應昌 ). Jinglue fuguo yaobian ( 經略復國要編 ), 2 vols. Taibei : Huawen shuju , 1968 . S ŏ njo sillok (宣祖實錄 ). S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng sillok ( 宣祖修正實錄 ). Swope , Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 . Norman, OK : University of Oklahoma Press , 2009 . Wang , Gungwu . “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in John King Fairbank , ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1968 , pp. 34–62 . Yang , Liensheng . “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in John King Fairbank , ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1968 , pp. 20–33 . Yi Changh ŭ i ( 蝗章熙 ). Imjin Waeransa yŏ n’gu ( 壬辰倭亂史硏究 ). Seoul : Asea munhwasa , 1999 . Yi Sunshin ( 蝗舜臣 ). Nanjung ilgi ch’o ( 綧中日記草 ), in Chos ŏ n saryo ch’onggan, che- yuk: Nanjung ilgi ch’o, Imjin chang ch’o ( 朝鮮史料叢刊第蜄 : 綧中日記草 , 壬辰蟳草 ). Ky ŏ ngs ŏ ng : Chos ŏ n ch’ongdokpu , 1935 . Y u S ŏ ngnyong ( 蛢成龍 ). Chingbirok ( 懲毖錄), in Han’guk my ŏ ngj ŏ tae-ch ŏ njip: S ŏ aejip, Chingbirok ( 韓國名著大全集 : 西厓集 , 懲毖錄 ). Seoul : Taeyang s ŏ j ŏ k , 1973 , pp. 227–406 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 12 International relations and the Imjin War

James B. Lewis

Introduction As Northeast Asia regains its historical position as a world center, the history of regional relations to the nineteenth century becomes more critical. Heretofore, Europeans and Americans have largely considered East Asia for its failure to modernize, industrialize, and democratize. Now, with every East Asian success, considerations are shifting to: why are they successful while we languish? In addition to importing pedagogical approaches to improve the desultory state of Western secondary education, can we also fi nd styles of international relations that might preserve peace?1 Why and how did Northeast Asia maintain nearly fi ve centuries of international peace from 1400 to the late nineteenth century, and why was this peace broken by only one major war – the Imjin War?2 The questions are no longer antiquarian.

Pre-modern Northeast Asian international relations Europeans and Americans have overlooked Northeast Asian international relations for several reasons. First, historians focused on one-country studies because regional systems were shattered from the late nineteenth century by imperialism, colonialism, international and civil wars, and the Cold War, and because the linguistic demands are great. Second, scholars have often assumed that Northeast Asians were forced into the Westphalian system – the self- determination of states, the equality of states, and non-intervention – from the Opium Wars onwards.3 Therefore, relations that pre-date the nineteenth century have been seen as purely historical and of little relevance to the Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 present. Since the 1990s, the limitations of single-country empiricist agendas, historical ignorance, and the limitations of transatlantic theory have become too great to ignore. The past of the region is now more relevant than ever to the present and the future. Indeed, transnational, transcultural, multilateral, comparative, and regional studies of East Asia have all begun to appear. 4 Western scholars now seem to grasp that the West cannot view the rapid re-emergence of China in terms developed to explain the rise of Germany in the nineteenth century, and they are beginning to suspect that pre-modern relations before the irruption of International relations and the Imjin War 257 Euro-American structures into the western Pacifi c in the nineteenth century might well set future styles of relations in the region and confound Western understanding.5 It has long been clear to historians of the region that until scholars in the West have a far richer body of data on specifi c cases and the ability to analyze that data, nearly all attempts at universalist theory, even theory designed for and limited in application to the transatlantic world, will have signifi cant fl aws and remain dependent on a narrow comparative fi eld.

What to do with East Asia? The good news is that international relations (IR) scholars are beginning to question old assumptions.6 Alastair I. Johnston points out that East Asia is generally excluded from analytical scholarship published in the United States and Europe, although researchers believe that East Asia is the “most strategically important area of the globe.” 7 Even when East Asia is included in datasets, studies of transatlantic relations risk errors because little or no attention has been paid to “local knowledge.”8 Johnston’s implication is that IR can never make valid general claims about human behavior if the fi eld ignores variables and explanations suggested by East Asian history. Johnston argues for the usefulness of area studies to correct factual mis- takes and to provide theoretical propositions. As a corrective to transatlantic limitations, he points out several new variables suggested by East Asian history and practice: different types of engagement, hedging techniques, and insurance (risk control). These behaviors have often been seen in a setting of benign hierarchy (tributary for Northeast Asia and mandala-like for Southeast Asia). The presence of hierarchy assumes civilizational narratives in which actors participate willingly. Civilizational narratives (such as Confucian identity), rather than narratives focused on states, might explain a lot of interstate relations, although Johnston points out that civilizational narratives have yet to be adequately explained for their causes and mechanisms.9 East Asian history also suggests the importance of racism as a signifi cant factor in engagement between the region and the Atlantic world as well as within the region. Constructed historical memories are also relatively more important and often serve to bolster legitimacy.10 To these points we can add David C. Kang’s argument that East Asian history can inform theory in regards to legitimacy, hierarchy, and balance-of-power.11 Johnston and Kang lay out broad and fer-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tile research agendas. But, returning to the Imjin War, we still need to ask how Northeast Asians maintained an international peace for over four centuries ( c.1400 to the late nineteenth century), and why was this peace broken by only one major, interstate war? War was as endemic to European society as the pox, therefore an answer to this question is more than historical. Perhaps an answer lies in civilizational narratives, processes, or strategic cultures. Johnston has discerned at least two Chinese strategic cultures. 12 One was the symbolic, idealized discourse of the Confucian–Mencian view (no or low levels of violence and reliance on moral suasion), and the other was an 258 J.B. Lewis operational set, which he calls parabellum or a preference to use force to eliminate security threats. Strangely, he limits his research to the Ming Chinese concern with the Mongols.13 In focusing his attention on the Mongols, Johnston may be unnecessarily limiting his study. If democratic polities exhibit weaker aggressive tendencies, 14 then a shared Confucian identity for Korea, Vietnam, and Japan may have contributed to the low frequency of interstate violence. 15 A focus on the Mongols would overly limit the discussion, because the civilized/barbarian dichotomy was surely the meta-view in Northeast Asia with civilized states standing against the various threats of barbarism. The civilized/barbarian dichotomy defi ned the Mongols as beyond moral suasion and only amen- able to brute force. The civilized/barbarian dichotomy also existed within Korean and Chinese societies, appearing as a guiding principle behind law. Those with a noble character, or those who were schooled in the Confucian– Mencian ideology, were governed by etiquette and rites, but commoners were governed by corporal punishments as prescribed in the penal codes. Likewise, the Confucian–Mencian strategy was mainly used for other Confucianized states or those already educated enough to understand moral suasion, and the parabellum strategy was for barbarians such as the Mongols or those who were savage and uneducated. Because Johnston primarily examines policies towards the Mongols, he fi nds that the parabellum discourse dominated Chinese strategic discussions. That conclusion would explain why he does not discuss the Imjin War, which differed from the Mongol case in that it was both a civilized–barbarian confl ict and an intra-Confucian confl ict. 16 War involving other Confucianized states, even with Japan, was very rare, but such a rare event as the Imjin War was one of the most important defi n- ing moments of Ming Chinese strategic culture. The sixteenth-century confl ict tested the limits of Northeast Asia’s meta-narrative, the civilizational discourse. Robert E. Kelly and David Kang have written on the civilizational narrative underpinning that intra-Confucian world. Kelly argues that a “Confucian substratum” produced East Asian peace and points to the Imjin War as the “one major pre-Westphalian confl ict” in Sino-Japanese relations and to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam (1788–9) as the only “intra-Confucian war” in the period 1644 to 1839.17 Kelly focuses on the Confucian attributes of respect for age and concern with social harmony and hierarchy as the shared

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Confucian culture that kept the international peace. 18 His argument is heavily cultural and he takes issue with the “realist” proponents. 19 Kang leans towards realpolitik and points to the benefi ts of living under Chinese hegemony, stressing hierarchy. Clearly, China’s peripheral states accepted some sense of benefi t, as evidenced by their disinclination to form alliances in an attempt to check Chinese power. Kelly discounts Kang’s argument for Chinese hegemony or what Kelly calls a “Sinic Peace.” 20 Nevertheless, Kelly and Kang are not at odds. They are merely emphasizing two aspects of the same cultural power. “Cultural power” has a long pedigree in Northeast Asia. There was International relations and the Imjin War 259 an international order that put great emphasis on the intangibles of prestige, standing, or honor. Northeast Asia did not live in a state of international anarchy.21 Nevertheless, while Kang and Kelly may partly explain the bilateral peace between China and the peripheral states in the region, their arguments have diffi culty explaining the peace that held between the peripheral states, and they cannot explain the startling outbreak of Japanese state-directed violence towards Chosŏ n Korea in 1592. Answers are most likely to be found in the history of relations between the peripheral states and in their own self-conceptions and constitutions. Over the several decades from the 1980s, historians of Korea and Japan have been discussing the re-creation of Chinese-style tributary orders by the peripheral Confucian polities, including Japan, in premodern times. For example, it is now widely accepted that the Chosŏ n court and intellectual society after the middle of the seventeenth century (and perhaps even earlier) saw themselves as a sohwa . The term is often translated as “small China,” but that is not its meaning. The English word “China” is too limiting. Rather, the term could be rendered as something along the lines of “a legitimate successor to civilization.” 22 For the peripheral states, the Confucian–Mencian reliance on moral suasion was paramount, because they might not have the luxury of the parabellum option or they might become the object of parabellum action and had to explain why that would be a mistake. In short, the peripheral states had more invested in being regarded as civilized than the Middle Kingdom itself. That desire for respect was not just for the good times. While the continent might become corrupt or be overrun by barbarians, the peninsula and the islands could bank the fi res of civilization in anticipation of the continent regaining its vigor, as it did with the Ming dynasty. In this sense, the Korean self-conception in sohwa reproduced a central kingdom order on the peninsula and that explains why the Chosŏ n state created its own tributary order.23 The Japanese case is more complex but the ideals still held true even in the chaos of the islands, primarily directed towards Ezo/Hokkaid ō and the Ry ū ky ūs. The study of IR, as developed from Euro-American case studies, is still in its infancy, because it suffers from the natural limitations of being derived from a narrow regional base – the transatlantic. Only by learning about the diplomatic histories of other regions will the Western academy fi nally come of age. Northeast Asian countries possess some of the most elaborate, per-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 haps the most elaborate, historical document bases in the world, and they are open for investigation. As we learn more about East Asia (or any other region for that matter), we learn more about the peculiarities and universalities of the Atlantic world. It might be instructive to consider three aspects of the Imjin War where contemporary IR theory could fi nd profi t. Due to ignorance and space constraints, the following points are offered as merely suggestive. The fi rst point relates to the nature of what constituted “just war” in Northeast Asia and could be taken forward into comparative studies of international law. The 260 J.B. Lewis second looks at the mechanics of hierarchy and hegemony in a crisis, and the fi nal point begs the question of the geopolitical lessons of the Imjin War.

Just war A shared civilizational narrative can be revealed through a study of “just war.” Willem J. Boot discusses the word seibatsu (chastisement24 ) in the title of a 1659 Japanese text chronicling the war.25 The term seibatsu implies a war waged by a lord to defend or restore the unity of the kingdom, even civilization itself. Before 1592, Hideyoshi had already waged three seibatsu wars (Shikoku, Kyūshū, and Odawara) in his campaigns to unify Japan, and then he looked to do the same with Korea and East Asia. Hideyoshi’s seibatsu campaigns had fi ve aspects: (1) when the opposite number rejected his reasonable demands, action was justifi ed; (2) action was public, took time, and involved overwhelming force; (3) demands were issued for the opposite number to become a vassal and send hostages to Hideyoshi; (4) Hideyoshi would confer on the new subordinate a recognition of possession of lands; and (5) to demonstrate loyalty, the new subordinate would lead the vanguard for the next campaign.26 Boot treats us to a historical judgment in a denunciation of Hideyoshi’s Imjin campaign from Kaibara Ekiken (1630–1714), a retainer of the lord of the Fukuoka domain. Ekiken called on the authority of the Zuo Zhuan in outlining fi ve types of war: just war (J. seigi ), defensive war (J. jiei ), avaricious war (J. hinyoku), arrogant war (J. g ō man), and malicious war (J. akui ), and declared that only the fi rst two are wars waged by “superior men” and can be called just. Ekiken concludes that the Imjin War was an avaricious, arrogant, and malicious war and not a just war. Houses fall for waging unjust wars, and the destruction of the Toyotomi house in 1615 demonstrated this principle.27 Kim Shiduk (Kim Shid ŏ k) picked up on Boot’s theme and elaborated the idea of just war (J. seibatsu or C. zhengfa ) in Chinese classical literature and how terms for just war, such as seibatsu , were used in early-modern Japanese popular literature towards Korea, the Ryūkyūs, and the Ainu, or the three Japanese frontiers: east, south, and north. Kim emphasizes the classical Chinese use of “just war” as referring to the type of action required to suppress barbarism in the name of civilization, even barbarism within one’s own kingdom. This view was adopted by the smaller Sinifi ed states surrounding

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 China and saw extensive elaboration in Tokugawa period martial literature ( gunkimono ). 28 In Japan, though, the idea of “just war” was modifi ed and the object of just wars became the external, savage barbarian (on the northern frontier), and other countries.29 The question of what constituted “just war” is far more complex than these brief notes suggest. Even if we can identify the language used, only a few scholars have begun to examine that language critically. Kim and Boot are chasing the associations and resonances of rhetoric in both classical and contemporary texts and pointing to contextual settings and usage. Future research International relations and the Imjin War 261 could open into comparative philosophical and legal discussions within the Northeast Asian region as well as between Northeast Asia and Europe.

Hierarchy Hierarchy and hegemony were (and perhaps are) signifi cant questions for Northeast Asia. Tributary relations were designed to demonstrate hierarchy, but in the crisis of the Imjin War, the Korean king’s 1592 plea to the Ming court for permission to seek refuge in China illustrates where custom left off and innovation took over. In a crisis where the Korean king was asking for shelter in Liaodong, we can see that the participants had different conceptions of the mutual responsibilities between suzerain and tributary. The Korean king was willing to explore new arrangements, but the Ming court was not. A brief review of events can remind us of the moment when King Sŏ njo considered leaving his own country. The narrative is fairly well known.30 On the thirteenth and fourteenth days of the fourth lunar month (1592.4.13–14), the Pusan Garrison and the Tongnae county offi ces fell to the Japanese. From the fi rst reports of the Japanese attack, the court began formulating counter-policies: appointing generals to stop the Japanese advance, planning for defense of the capital by sending instructions to each province to supply reinforcements, establishing Prince Kwanghae as the crown prince, and begin planning a possible retreat by King S ŏnjo from Hansŏ ng. When Ch’ungju fell just fourteen days later, the following three policies were put into effect: the king would retreat to P’yŏ ngyang, 31 two princes would be sent to Kangwŏ n Province and Hamgy ŏ ng Province to raise troops, 32 and troops would be requested from the Ming. While in P’y ŏngyang, the king dispatched a regular, congratulatory envoy to the Ming court on the twenty-ninth day of the fi fth month, 1592, about six weeks after the beginning of the invasion. The envoy was instructed to raise the question of naebu (C. neifu, “incorporate,” “internally attach,” or “come and submit”),33 or, in other words, the possibility of King S ŏ njo fl eeing to Liaodong. On the eleventh day of the sixth month, 1592, the king sent a formal note to the Ming requesting troops and left P’yŏ ngyang. Two days later, he arrived in Yŏ ngby ŏ n, intending to go into Hamgyŏ ng in the northwest, but he was persuaded by Yi Hang-bok to go to Ŭ iju on the Yalu River at the Chinese border and await Ming troops. On the same day (1592.6.13), the king depu-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 tized the crown prince to handle state affairs in his absence. Also on the same day, in a discussion with his courtiers, the king defended his intention to “enter China to have an audience with the Emperor” (K. ipjo ), by citing the example of the Ming intervention of 1407 to restore the Tran dynasty in Vietnam. 34 On the following day (1592.6.14), King S ŏnjo made plans to go to Liaodong. He sent an offi cial dispatch regardingnaebu to the Liaodong Regional Military Commissioner (Liaodong dusi ),35 gave the ancestral tablets to the crown prince, sent him to Kanggye for safety, and divided his courtiers, 262 J.B. Lewis sending some with the crown prince. 36 According to the Kijae sach’o by Pak Tongnyang, King S ŏ njo wrote a farewell to the crown prince:

Alive, I am the prince of a ruined country; dead, I will become a demon in a foreign land. Father and son part, and the day when we will see each other again is [probably] not [to be]. My only hope is that the Crown Prince will re-create the old order. Above, he comforts the spirits of the ancestors. Below, he welcomes the return of his father and his mother.37

On that day, the king left Yŏ ngby ŏ n bound for Ŭ iju. The next day, P’y ŏ ngyang fell to the Japanese. On the sixteenth day of the sixth month of 1592, the king and his offi - cials arrived at Kasan and discussed the appeal to the Ming Court for naebu . The king stated his willingness to go anywhere the Ming might direct if not Liaodong. 38 The next day, the king arrived at Ch ŏngju and heard that a Ming force of 1,029 troops with 1,093 horses had crossed the Yalu River on the fi fteenth.39 Five days later (1592.6.22), the king arrived in an abandoned Ŭ iju. All the local people had fl ed at word of the fall of P’yŏ ngyang and at rumors that Ming forces had crossed the river and were intent on pillage. The king ordered preparations to decamp to Liaodong, but his courtiers argued that it would be premature to raise the matter. 40 On the twenty-sixth, King S ŏ njo heard that the Chinese had looked at his letter regarding naebu and that they were planning to billet the king in an empty government building in Kuandian-pu. The news must have been unappealing, since he then decided on a lengthy stay in Ŭ iju.41 Early in the seventh month (1592.7.3), the king’s envoy, Yi Tŏ khy ŏ ng, arrived back from Liaodong with news of the requests for troops and for naebu . The response to the troop requests was quite positive, and assurances were given by regional commanders that military assistance would be extended, but the response to the request for naebu was less than enthusiastic. Yi Tŏ khy ŏ ng was told by the Chinese that if Korea is completely overrun, then even without an imperial order, the regional commanders would confer about the Korean king seeking refuge in China. Later in the discussion, Yi iterated that, if one village is left untouched by the Japanese, then the king and court would have to stay in the country. He went on to report that the Liaodong offi cials said that they

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 have no appropriate accommodation, and if the king were to go to Liaodong, he should come with only a small retinue. Yi elaborated on the rugged roads, sparse settlements, bad lodgings, unclean water, and bad climate in further attempts to dissuade the king.42 Eight days later (1592.7.11), we see a memorandum in the Chosŏ n veritable records of what appears to be a note from the Chinese Ministry of War addressed to the Liaodong Regional Military Commissioner with an appended Imperial edict. The memorandum recognizes Korea as an upstand- ing, even leading member of the international community (K. taeguk , International relations and the Imjin War 263 C. daguo) and laments the “appalling” invasion by the Wae (C. Wo). It goes on to state that,

if that country (Korea) loses its national altars (K. sajik, C. sheji , that is, its sovereignty) and [the Korean king] comes suddenly as a refugee only to meet with no offer of refuge, then [this] external dependency (K. waebok, C. waifu, that is, Korea) will lose its sense of reliance (K. angnoe , C. yanglai ) [on China].

In short, this appears to be a leaked memorandum that grants the Korean king entry to China without using the word naebu or anything vaguely similar. It goes on to limit the number of people he can bring with him to 100. Finally, it quotes the emperor pledging to defend and restore the Chosŏ n king.43 The Ming veritable records carry nearly the same document, but there we can see slight differences. Again, the message is from the Ministry of War to Liaodong offi cials:

the Wae bandits crossed the Taedong River. The [Korean] Prince and his ministers have already gone into hiding. [We] are afraid that the king’s army will be defeated and [he] will enter (K. ip , C. ru) Liao[dong]. To resist this would be inhumane (K. puin, C. buren), but to grant this would pose diffi culties.

The emperor’s statement is also attached and iterates the same sympathetic sentiments as those in the Korean veritable records.44 The Ming Dynastic History’s basic annals refer not to naebu but merely state that the Koreans requested aid (K. kugu , C. qiujiu ).45 The Dynastic History’s historical biographies section devoted to Korea does not mention naebu but mentions naesok (C. neishu , “internal attachment”). 46 The Guo Quan mentions naesok as well, but also states that the request was refused (K. puh ŏ , C. buxu ). 47 The Wanli shilu mentions that on the sixth day of the seventh month “Chosŏ n begged for naebu. ” 48 Hugh Walker describes King S ŏnjo’s request as unprecedented in Korean history and the “culmination of Korea’s ascent to the zenith of its intimate relationship with China,” 49 but he dwells on the discrepancies in language between the Chinese and Korean sides.50 It is clear that both sides did not

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 share a language to discuss what King Sŏ njo was proposing. Walker did not fi nd the Korean term (naebu ) at all, and I have found it in only one Chinese reference. The closest Chinese term seems to have been neishu (K. naesok ), but most reports simply record “enter.” Amidst the vagueness of both positions, Walker argues that King Sŏ njo may have been proposing a closer dependency on China that would have created a new category of relations, as yet undefi ned. King S ŏnjo probably considered the status temporary until his kingdom was restored.51 He may have known of at least one instance of a Jurchen coming down from the north and requesting naebu from the Chosŏ n 264 J.B. Lewis Kingdom.52 In that case, the term meant that the individual wished to come and live in Chos ŏ n. It did not imply that any territory was being attached to Chos ŏ n or ceded to Chosŏ n. Of course, King Sŏ njo’s ministers did not want him to go to Liaodong, because his departure would have been extremely bad for morale and would have rendered his court offi cials powerless. The king had already given the crown prince the ancestral tablets and deputized him to direct the government in its war effort. In essence, the king had already taken one step shy of abdication by giving his son sweeping responsibilities. Crossing the Chinese border would have completed the process of abdication. Therefore, it is likely that King S ŏnjo’s intention was to go to Liaodong temporarily, but he may have been naive concerning the signifi cance of crossing the Yalu River. His use of the term naebu never seemed to have implied that Korean territory would be attached to China. Concern rested primarily with the physical whereabouts of the king and securing Chinese military help to expel the Japanese and restore the king to his throne. Finally, there is no indication that the Ming court came to any conclusion about what the request meant. The lack of discussion on the Chinese side clearly indicates hesitation and lack of enthusiasm. The Ming court apparently lacked any appetite to take direct and long-term responsibility for the Korean peninsula, but it did busy itself in preparing to expel an invader from its buffer state. If we accept that Northeast Asia maintained an international society and that hierarchy was its dominant mode of operation from c .1400 to the late nineteenth century, then we have about 500 years of diplomacy, trade, and war in the operation of a very different system from the transatlantic world. The Imjin War is a case of hierarchy being tested to the limit. Future research has the power to examine the precise function of hierarchy and hegemony in East Asia and to relativize the Westphalian egalitarianism of the transatlantic world.

A Korean war Kenneth M. Swope refers to the Imjin War as the First Great East Asian War and suggests that the Japanese campaigns from 1931 to 1945 were the Second Great East Asian War. The chief commonality was the Japanese attempt to displace China as the center of an East Asian system. For this reason, he dismisses earlier wars, such as the Shillan unifi cation, and he has

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 nothing to say about the Korean War of the 1950s. 53 His interpretation has validity, if we were to consider the Imjin War merely as a contest between Japan and China. But the view is Sinocentric and Japanocentric and risks overlooking the relations between Korea and Japan and the process of the war itself. The following focuses on a few geopolitical principles of the war and characterizes the Imjin War as one in a series of a type I would like to call “a Korean war.” The fi rst instance of “a Korean war” was in the seventh century. Competitive wars among Kogury ŏ, Paekche, and Shilla had been going on for centuries, International relations and the Imjin War 265 but from the 550s, Shilla gained the Han River basin, and direct access to China became possible. Shilla could by-pass Paekche and seek a Tang alliance against its old rival Paekche: Tang helps Shilla to destroy Paekche and Shilla helps Tang to destroy Kogury ŏ . The twelfth-century Samguk sagi relates how the aristocrat, diplomat, and future king Kim Ch’unch’u traveled to the Tang court and fashioned an alliance. The prestige of the Chinese connection must have helped Kim become king, but the concrete alliance was designed to put Paekche in a pincer between Shilla and Tang and then put Koguryŏ in the same pincer. After Paekche and Koguryŏ were conquered, Shilla was to get Paekche; Tang was to get Kogury ŏ . Shillan forces pressed into Paekche from the east, while one of Ch’unch’u’s sons, who had been left at the Tang court as a hostage, led a Tang fl eet to land on the Korean west coast. The pincer movement was too much for Paekche, even with its ally the Yamato state. The Paekche capital at Sabi fell in 660, and a Paekche restoration attempt supported by a massive fl eet and army from Yamato was defeated at the Paekgang River 54 in 663. 55 Once Sabi had fallen and the Paekche restoration crushed, the Tang and Shillan forces then turned to defeat Koguryŏ , which fell in 668. Tang policy then betrayed the alliance and sought to establish a puppet Paekche state, while also seeking to subvert and suborn Shilla. A war of resistance began that primarily involved Shilla cutting off supplies to the Tang army and repelling Tang naval attacks in the West Sea in 671 and 675. 56 Tang was eventually forced to abandon P’yŏ ngyang in 676 and withdraw to Liaodong. The Liaodong region saw a local rebellion that started along the Liao River in 696 and eventuated in the establishment of the Manchurian state of Parhae (K.) or Bohai (Ch.) (712–926). Tang eventually made peace with Shilla and Parhae/Bohai, but it was never able to extend its forces east of Liaodong again. What should we take from this series of wars and campaigns to constitute what I mean by “a Korean War”? There were three principles at work. The fi rst is control of the West Sea. A Shillan prince guided a Tang fl eet to the west coast, enabling a landing that directly threatened Sabi from the west while Shillan armies entered Paekche from the east, leaving no way out, and the Paekche state fell. A Paekche restoration was attempted with support from Yamato, which brought force to bear from the West Sea, but the attempt was defeated at sea and on land. It appears that whichever force controlled the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 West Sea access could decide Paekche’s fate and threaten the entire west coast of the peninsula. The second principle is the importance to any outside power of having a peninsular ally. Tang forces on the peninsula had to rely on logistical support and even security from their Shillan allies, because their logistics lines led back to continental Chinese granaries and armories. When Tang began to betray Shilla, local support was withdrawn, and logistical diffi culties overwhelmed Tang, forcing it to withdraw or to respect the original agreement with Shilla. Because logistical and tactical diffi culties on the frontier with Koguryŏ had 266 J.B. Lewis provided one of the motivations for Tang to ally with Shilla in the fi rst place, Tang leadership surely knew the risks in betraying Shilla. If they failed to anticipate the risk, it must have become clear in hindsight. Finally, the third principle is the importance of the northern frontier. As Tang ships lost control of the West Sea and as Shilla withdrew from provisioning the Chinese, Tang found itself back where it began in facing a hostile Korean frontier. Over the next twenty years the security of the Chinese–Korean frontier became precarious, and the Tang court faced two prospects. Either it could commit vast resources for little hope of gain or it could withdraw, make peace with the peninsular power, and thereby neutralize any threat from the peninsula. It chose to withdraw, and that experience from the seventh century has remained a part of the Chinese historical memory towards the Korean peninsula into the present. At least, later behavior strongly suggests this to be the case. The Imjin War displays the same principles at work. Although the invading Japanese seemed triumphant and drove King Sŏ njo from his capital, the Japanese met resistance on land and especially at sea that resulted in their campaign stalling on the Korean peninsula.57 As early as the late summer of 1592, the Japanese had essentially lost the war and found that they could not move forward and could not withdraw without Japanese leadership facing serious questions of legitimacy. Why did the Japanese fail strategically? First, they were never able to gain unfettered access to the West Sea to re-supply their forces moving northwards. That denial of access was a result of Admiral Yi Sunshin’s strategic and tactical brilliance and was the fatal frustration to the invasion. While Japanese armies could cover land quickly and reach nearly to the Yalu River, their logistics lines on land were over-stretched and vulnerable to Korean guerrillas. The key to the China campaign lay in securing unfettered access to the Korean west coast and control of the entirety of southern Korean rice production. The Korean navy withheld those prizes. Second, Japanese vulnerability to logistical weaknesses – having to supply themselves largely from Kyūshū – was a direct result of not having a Korean ally on the peninsula. Ming troops, like the Tang troops seven centuries earlier, were able to operate on the peninsula, in part, because they had a Korean ally who could raise supplies locally and who did not harass them.58 Third, the northern frontier was not contested by the Koreans. The Chinese could move easily and securely back and forth.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The truly interesting difference between the seventh century and the sixteenth century lay in the fact that the Ming court resisted King Sŏ njo’s unclear fl irtation with placing Chos ŏn Korea under the suzerainty of China, and the Ming armies did not remain in Korea; nor did the Ming attempt to extract territorial concessions. The Chinese were greatly concerned about the security of the peninsula but rejected direct control.59 From as far back as the eighth century and the rapprochement with Shilla, Chinese courts came to see a stable and friendly Korean power on the peninsula as the preferable way to maintain an important buffer. That lesson was repeated with the experiences International relations and the Imjin War 267 of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties, three successive waves of invaders from the tenth century to the fourteenth century that came down from the north and entered the central Chinese regions. The invaders were able to move south into Chinese territory because they had neutralized the Korean Kory ŏ state, which held their left fl ank. Our third Korean War is, of course, the confl ict of the 1950s. The conduct of the war is also well known and also displays the three principles outlined here. Similar to the seventh century, the Chinese became embroiled in a Korean civil war, but the confl ict also saw engagement by outside powers, similar to both the seventh and the sixteenth centuries. Kim Ilsung’s attempt to unify the peninsula was met with an unexpectedly negative external response. United Nations forces aligned themselves with the Republic of Korea, thereby giving them an ally on the peninsula with a base in Pusan, open to the sea. MacArthur’s strategic genius was to see control of the West Sea as the key to any successful drive northwards, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was undone by not having at its command a Yi Sunshin to block MacArthur. MacArthur’s mistake was to underestimate the importance of Korean security to China and push northwards to threaten the Chinese frontier just as Hideyoshi had done. Just like every preceding Chinese dynasty, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could not allow the Korean peninsula to be under the sway of a non-Chinese state or to be governed by a Korean state hostile to China. By approaching the Chinese frontier, MacArthur provoked a war with China, but that may have been his intention anyway. The Korean frontier with China remained beyond UN control, and the DPRK opened it to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The war was protracted, in part, because both the PLA and the UN forces could maintain footholds on the peninsula by virtue of their Korean allies. I have argued that there are three principles at work that had to be met for any successful campaign in Korea. First and foremost is control of the West Sea. Because the theater of operations is a peninsula, the East Sea should be as signifi cant, 60 but a north–south mountain range presents an obstacle to a ground force moving from an east coast landing to the fertile west coast plains where all major cities have historically been and are still found today. Any force that can control the seas around the south and into the West Sea will be able to leap-frog enemy positions on land and marshal supplies and reinforcements almost anywhere along the coast even as far

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 north as the Chinese frontier. Second, an ally on the peninsula that can provide supplies and security is necessary for any external force. Finally, control of the Chinese–Korean frontier is essential for the security of any Korean state and for the security of any state seeking to establish itself in the area we call Manchuria. Neutralization of that frontier was necessary for all the conquest dynasties and for the security of the Chinese central plains. Parhae/ Bohai, the Khitan Liao, the Jurchen Jin, the Mongols, and the Manchu Qing all appreciated this consideration, which was also not lost on the Ming court or on the leadership of the PRC. 268 J.B. Lewis Conclusion Johnston, Kang, Kelly, and other IR scholars share a desire to produce more regional and comparative work on the history of East Asian relations. The notes and bibliographies of their studies reveal the growing curiosity among many of their colleagues, but IR theorists will, in the near term, continue to meet with frustration in their attempt to fi nd universal, generalizable ndings.fi The reason is not because East Asia and other non-European regions lack systems and theory in need of explication to Western analysts, or that all situations are unique and cannot be accommodated within theoretical constructs. The reason that frustration will be slow to dissipate is because ignorance of the most important facts of East Asian history is still widespread in Western societies. Historically documented cases are the only data available for the social sciences, and we do not have very many of these. Interstate wars in East Asia were, relative to the Atlantic world, atypical events. Nevertheless, the sixteenth-century Imjin War provides us with a number of lessons. In this chapter, I have suggested just a few departure points for research: we can range over the philosophical content of what made a “just war”; we can take a micro-historical peek at the mechanics of hierarchy; and we can explore the relation between geography and history and try to identify the dominant characteristics of war in Korea. There are many more opportunities for research. Wars are very geo-specifi c, but they are also set within historical and cultural contexts that temper the behavior of the actors. We should consider cultural narratives to contextualize the behavior of actors, but we must remember that cultural narratives were not the only factor at work and they were not immutable, despite their apparent longevity in recent centuries. We can see changes in Chinese behavior, but some patterns have held. In the seventh century, Tang China sought to control Korean territory directly. That policy failed and has not reappeared again, despite the opportunities presented in the late sixteenth and mid twentieth centuries. A perceptive reader will note that I have not discussed the fi rst Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 during which Qing China fought to control Korea. Kirk W. Larsen makes a convincing case that late-nineteenth-century Qing China changed its views and ways of dealing with Korea to the point that Qing policies became indistinguishable from the imperialist policies of Japan and the Euro-American powers. 61 Qing imperialism was blocked by a rising Japan, so it is impossible to say what Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 would have been the result of those new policies. I have also not touched on the second Sino-Japanese War of 1931–1937–1945.62 One might offer the rejoinder that the 1890s and the 1930s were anomalous times and that these wars were not fought on the Korean peninsula, nor was any state on the peninsula attacked. Nevertheless, Larsen’s salutary lesson is that cultural narratives, historical precedents, or even geographical limitations do not determine Chinese, Korean, or Japanese policies; they merely predispose those policies to follow familiar precedents. International relations and the Imjin War 269 When we return to a focus on the Korean peninsula, there are patterns. The Chinese predisposition tends towards a wariness regarding intervention and a disinclination to occupy the peninsula for long periods. The Korean predisposition tends towards a low degree of militarization but a high degree of resistance when attacked. Resistance is coupled with appeals to Chinese interests to secure aid. The Japanese predisposition tends towards ambiguous engagement with the dominant order holding hegemony on the continent and the peninsula, often standing outside of it, participating when profi table, and occasionally engaging in active subversion. The background to these predis- positions are to be found in the history of East Asian diplomacy, in the geography of interstate relations surrounding the Korean peninsula, and also in the cultural narratives of the region.

Notes 1 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, in Non-Western International Relations Theory , 2010, ask why is there no non-Western international relations theory? Their “goal is to introduce non-Western IR traditions to a Western IR audience” (p. 2), but they fi nd that there is generally nothing to introduce: “There is not much current IRT to be found in Asia” (p. 222). They fail to mention that Western researchers often do not know enough of the languages or history of East Asia to appreciate its classical theory and contemporary application. 2 Kang, East Asia Before the West, 2010, p. 90ff. Kang fi nds only two interstate wars between the late fourteenth and early nineteenth centuries: Japan and China in Korea in the 1590s and a Chinese invasion of Vietnam in the early 1400s. 3 For a discussion of how the tributary order and the Westphalian system were both veneers for power relations, see Kirk Larsen, “Comforting Fictions,” 2013. For a discussion of how the Westphalian system was not a sudden shock to East Asia, see SeoHyun Park, “Changing Defi nitions of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century East Asia,” 2013. 4 From 2000 to the present, the annual conference of the Association for Asian Studies has promoted “Border Crossing” panels that fi nd coherence across discip- lines, periods, countries, and regions, usually within East or South or Southeast Asia but also across these regions. While the Association is focused on humanist concerns in a context of area studies, scholars trained in international relations are attempting the same. See the Journal of East Asian Studies 13:2 (2013), edited by David Kang, for articles that employ historical cases from East Asia to address the theoretical concerns of international relations. 5 Kang, in “International Relations Theory and East Asian History,” 2013, p. 182, implies as much: “Because of the triumph of the nation-state system, it is forgotten that other international orders have existed, and might exist again.”

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 6 For a cogent but brief survey of theoretical concerns, see Kang, “International Relations Theory and East Asian History,” 2013. 7 Alastair Johnston, “What,” 2012, p. 54. 8 Johnston, “What,” 2012, p. 57. 9 Civilizational narratives may explain the apparent lack of regional institutions as compared to the Atlantic world. The thinness of regional institutions in ASEAN may illustrate not a more primitive state of affairs but a focus on “processes of integration, not degrees of integration” (Johnston, “What,” 2012, p. 64, emphasis in original). The ASEAN process creates “shared identities” (Johnston, “What,” 2012, p. 63) rather than standardization (with its EU-like intrusion into sovereignty) and fi nality (as sought by Euro-American bureaucratism and adversarial legalism). 270 J.B. Lewis 10 Johnston, “What,” 2012, pp. 66–9. Regarding memory, its construction, uses, and signifi cance, see the chapters by Han Myung-gi (memory and foreign policy), Kuwano Eiji (legitimacy and state rituals), Choi Gwan (popular literature), and Michael Pettid (social and gender relations) in this volume. 11 Kang, “International Relations Theory and East Asian History,” 2013. 12 Although Johnston discusses “Chinese” strategic cultures, he argues that they are not “self-evidently unique.” Johnston, Cultural Realism, 1995, p. xii. Johnston’s propositions might be profi tably compared to Kenneth M. Swope’s chapter in this volume, which melds the parabellum approach of the state with cultural narratives. 13 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, p. 59. 14 Johnston, Cultural Realism , 1995, p. 264. 15 Japanese involvement with the continental order was always precarious, and that precarious character is illustrated in the chapters by Saeki Kō ji, Han Moon Jong, and Kenneth R. Robinson in this volume. 16 Robert E. Kelly depicts it as an intra-Confucian confl ict, but that would depend on how “Confucian” one considers sixteenth-century Japan to have been. Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’ in pre-Western East Asia?,” 2012. 17 Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’,” 2012, pp. 413, 419. 18 Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’,” 2012, p. 412. 19 Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’,” 2012, p. 424. 20 Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’,” 2012, p. 422. 21 See the chapter by Kenneth M. Swope in this volume for a Chinese desire to create “awe.” Richard Lebow argues for the importance of prestige to societies and states and assumes that there is an international society where identity relies heavily on self-esteem, which is largely derived from prestige. See Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations , 2008. 22 Sun Kwan Song, “Intellectuals and the state,” 2013, p. 78. Song translates the phrase as “legitimate successor to Chinese civilization,” but the insertion of “Chinese” is too limiting as other “civilizations” were not recognized. 23 The reader should refer to the chapter by Kenneth R. Robinson in this volume for suggestions of a Korean world order. 24 “Chastisement” is my translation. Willem J. Boot’s essay is only in Japanese and Korean. 2 5 Chō sen seibatsuki (A Record of the Chastisement of Korea) (my translation). See Boot, “ Ch ō sen seibatsuki,” 2008, pp. 263–319, particularly pp. 284ff. The earlier Korean version is: W.J. Bot’u, “ Chos ŏ n ch ŏ ngb ŏ lgi sok ŭ i Imjin Waeran,” 2007, pp. 233–84. 26 Boot, “ Chō sen seibatsuki ,” 2008, pp. 287–8. Elsewhere in this volume, Sajima Akiko and Kitajima Manji elaborate on Hideyoshi’s views of jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (right conduct in war). Boot adds that in the post-bellum world, Hideyoshi intended to seize China’s central authority, take what it had, insert the Japanese in the place of the Chinese, and acquaint the world

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 with the feudal order Hideyoshi had established in Japan, but he was not interested in setting up a larger tributary order focused on Kyōto. 27 Boot, “ Chō sen seibatsuki ,” 2008, pp. 285–6. 28 For more on gunkimono, see the essays by Kitajima Manji, Murai Shō suke, and Choi Gwan in this volume. 29 Kim Shiduk, Ikoku seibatsu senki no sekai , 2010, in particular pp. 4–34. 30 The narrative is drawn from Nakamura Hidetaka, Nissen kankeishi , 1969, pp. 148– 52, and Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, pp. 284–92, unless indicated otherwise. 31 The belief was that, if P’y ŏ ngyang could be held, the kingdom could be held. International relations and the Imjin War 271 32 They were turned over to the Japanese by the local populace. 33 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 285, translates naebu as “internally attach” or “incorporate.” 34 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 285, n. 89. S ŏ njo shillok , 27:7b (1592.6.13). 35 I have been unable to fi nd the text of this document in the S ŏ njo shillok , the Ming Shenzong shilu , or the Mingshi . The Kuksa p’yŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe editors of the Chungguk Ch ŏ ngsa Chos ŏ nj ŏ n (note 512, p. 201) found corroboration in the Chinese records (Mingshi jishi benmo) that a request was made, but they also fail to fi nd any document from the Korean king. 36 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 285. S ŏ njo shillok , 27:8b (1592.6.14). 37 Quoted in Nakamura, Nissen kankeishi , 1969, p. 151, n. 11. 3 8 Sŏ njo shillok , 27:10a–b (1592.6.16). 3 9 Sŏ njo shillok , 27:11a (1592.6.17). 4 0 Sŏ njo shillok , 27:15a (1592.6.22). 4 1 Sŏ njo shillok , 27:16b (1592.6.26). 4 2 Sŏ njo shillok , 28:7a–8a (1592.7.3). 4 3 Sŏ njo shillok , 28:15a–b (1592.7.11). 4 4 Ming Shenzong shilu , 250 (1592.7.2), p. 4648. 4 5 Mingshi , benji, 20:12a (1592.5). 4 6 Mingshi, liezhuan 208, waiguo (外國 ) 1, Chaoxian (朝鮮 ), 320:14b (1592.5). See Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 287, for “internal attachment.” 4 7 Guo Quan , quoted in the Mingshilu, Linguo Chaoxian pian , 1983, p. 320. 4 8 Wanli shilu , quoted in the Mingshilu, Linguo Chaoxian pian , 1983, p. 321. 49 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, pp. 286, 290. 50 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, p. 287. 51 Walker, “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement,” 1971, pp. 288–9. See a brief discussion of this matter in note 8 in the chapter by Zurndorfer in this volume. 5 2 Yŏ nsan’gun ilgi , 12:22a (1496.2.4). 53 Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragon’s Head, 2009. Some of the issues mentioned here have already been discussed in my review article on Swope’s book. See Lewis, “The Wanli Emperor,” 2011. 54 The common term in South Korea is the Battle of the “Paek River,” and the site was near the mouth of the river formerly known as the Paek River (Paekgang) but now known as the Kŭ m River (K ŭ mgang). Upstream at Paekche’s capital of Puyŏ , where some 3,000 court women are said to have thrown themselves off a cliff into the river rather than be enslaved by the Tang or Sillan armies, the river was called the Paekma River (Paekmagang). Scholars of Japanese history usually refer to the site of the battle as Hakusukinoe (“white village river”) and render those characters into Korean pronunciation as Paekch’on (River). 55 The Paekche refugees to the Yamato court in the late 600s fashioned a great deal of the governance and culture of the Yamato state and were absorbed into island aristoc-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 racy. Their descendants are present in the Shinsen shō jiroku of 815 where we can see that fully 30 percent of island aristocracy was peninsular and continental. The seventh century is the leading example of Japanese dividends from forays into Korea, but Ha Woo Bong in this volume discusses the loot, booty, and cultural riches taken back to Japan by Hideyoshi’s armies. As he points out, though, the fl ow was two-way. 56 Koreans refer to the West Sea; Chinese refer to the Yellow Sea. 57 For discussions of the Korean resistance offered on land and at sea, the reader should refer to the chapters in this volume by Yi Min’ung and Nukii Masayuki. 58 For a discussion of the Korean costs to support the Chinese military, see the chapter by Nam-lin Hur. 272 J.B. Lewis 59 The Ming court, including the emperor, was very engaged with the war, and the fi nances of the empire allowed the engagement. For more discussion on these topics, see the chapter by Harriet Zurndorfer. 60 Koreans refer to the East Sea; Japanese refer to the Sea of Japan. 61 Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade , 2008. 62 As mentioned above, Swope sees strong parallels between the 1590s and the 1930s in Japanese powers setting out to dislodge China from centrality in the Northeast Asian system.

References Acharya , Amitav and Barry Buzan , eds. Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia . London; New York : Routledge , 2010 . Boot , Willem J. ( ウィム ዘブート ). “ Ch ō sen seibatsuki ni kakareta sensō : sengo no aru Nihonjin jugakusha no shisen kara mita Hideyoshi ( 『朝鮮征伐記』に描かれた戦争 : 戦後のある日本人儒学者の視線から見た秀吉 ),” in Ch ŏ ng Tuh ŭ i ( 㩫⚦䧂 , 鄭杜熙 ) and Yi Ky ŏ ngsun ( 㧊ἓ㑲 , 蝗璟珣 ), eds., Kim Munja ( ₖⶎ㧦 , 金文子 ) and Obata Michihiro ( 小幡倫裕 ), trans., Jinshin sensō : 16 seiki Nit-Chō - Ch ū no Kokusai sensō ( 壬辰戦争 : 16 世紀日 ዘ朝 ዘ中の国際戦争 ). Tokyo : 明石書店 , Akashi shoten , 2008 , pp. 263–319 . [The same essay in Korean is W.J. Bot’u (W.J. ⽊䔎 ). “ Chosŏ n ch ŏ ngb ŏ lgi sok ŭ i Imjin Waeran: chŏ nhu han Ilbon yuhakja ŭ i ses ŏ n ŭ ro pon Hideyoshi ( « 㫆㍶㩫⻢₆ ( 朝鮮征伐記 ) » ㏣㦮㧚㰚㢲⧖ : G㩚䤚G䞲G 㧒⽎G 㥶䞯㧦㦮G 㔲㍶㦒⪲G ⽎G 䧞◆㣪㔲 ),” in Ch ŏ ng Tuh ŭ i ( 㩫⚦䧂 , 鄭杜熙 ) and Y i K y ŏ ngsun ( 㧊ἓ㑲 , 蝗璟珣), eds., Imjin Waeran tong Asia samguk ch ŏ njaeng ( 㧚㰚㢲⧖ ☯㞚㔲㞚㌒ῃ㩚㨗 , A Transnational History of the Imjin Waeran 1592–1598: The East Asian dimension). Seoul : Hyum ŏ nis ŭ t’ ŭ , 2007 , pp. 233–84 . Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe ( 國史編纂委員會), ed. Chungguk Ch ŏ ngsa Chos ŏ nj ŏ n, y ŏ kju, 4 ( 中國正史朝鮮傳譯註 , 4). Seoul : Kuksa p’y ŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe , 1990 . Guo Quan ( 國權 ) quoted in the Mingshilu, Linguo Chaoxian pian ( 明實錄 , 隣國朝鮮篇 ). Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan ( 中國社會科學院 ), 1983 . Johnston , Alastair Iain . Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1995 . Johnston , Alastair Iain. “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about International Relations Theory? ” Annual Review of Political Science 15 ( 2012 ): 53–78 . Kang , David C. “ International Relations Theory and East Asian History: An Overview ,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13 :2 ( 2013 ): 181–205 . Kang , David C. East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute . New York : Columbia University Press , 2010 . Kelly , Robert E. “ A ‘Confucian Long Peace’ in Pre-Western East Asia? ” European Journal of International Relations 18 :3 ( 2012 ): 407–30 . Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kim Shiduk (Kin Shidoku, Kim Shid ŏ k, 金時得 ). Ikoku seibatsu senki no sekai: Kan hant ō , Ry ūky ū rett ō , Ezo chi ( 異国征伐記の世界 : 韓半島 ዘ琉球列島 ዘ蝦夷地 ). Tokyo : Kasama shoten , 2010 . Larsen , Kirk W. Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chos ŏ n Korea, 1850–1910 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Asia Center , 2008 . Larsen , Kirk W. “ Comforting Fictions: The Tribute System, the Westphalian Order, and Sino-Korean Relations ,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13 :2 ( 2013 ): 233–57 . Lebow , Richard Ned . A Cultural Theory of International Relations . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2008 . International relations and the Imjin War 273 Lewis , James B. “ The Wanli Emperor and Ming China’s defence of Korea against Japan, a review article of A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 , by Kenneth M. Swope ,” International Journal of Asian Studies 8 :1 ( 2011 ): 73–80 . Mingshi ( 明史 ), benji ( 本紀 ). Mingshi ( 明史 ), liezhuan (蕝傳 ), waiguo ( 外國 ) 1, Chaoxian ( 朝鮮 ). Mingshi jishi benmo ( 明史紀事本末 ). Ming Shenzong shilu ( 明神宗實錄 ). Huang Chang-chien ( 黃彰健), ed. Ming shilu, fulu, jiaokan ji ( 明實錄 , 附錄 , 校勘記 ). Taibei : Chungyang yenchiu y ü an Lishih y ü yen yenchiuso , 1963–8 . Nakamura Hidetaka ( 中村榮孝 ). Nissen kankeishi no kenky ū , ch ū ( 日鮮關係史の硏究 , 中 ). Tokyo : Yoshikawa K ō bunkan , 1969 . Park , SeoHyun . “ Changing Defi nitions of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century East Asia: Japan and Korea Between China and the West ,” Journal of East Asian Studies 13 :2 ( 2013 ): 281–307 . Song , Sun Kwan . “Intellectuals and the State: The Resilience and Decline of Neo- Confucianism as State Ideology in Joseon Korea,” Ph.D. dissertation, SOAS, University of London, 2013 . Sŏnjo shillok (宣組實錄). Swope , Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598 . Norman, OK : University of Oklahoma Press , 2009 . Walker , Hugh Dyson . “The Yi–Ming Rapprochement: Sino-Korean Foreign Relations, 1392–1592,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1971 . Wanli shilu ( 萬曆實錄 ), quoted in the Mingshilu, Linguo Chaoxian pian (明實錄 , 隣國朝鮮篇 ). Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan (中國社會科學院 ), 1983 . Y ŏ nsan’gun ilgi ( 燕山君日記 ).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Part III Impact and memory Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 13 “The inestimable benevolence of saving a country on the brink of ruin” Chos ŏ n–Ming and Chos ŏ n–Later Jin relations in the seventeenth century

Han Myung-gi ( 䞲ⳛ₆ )

Introduction The Imjin Waeran began with Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Chosŏ n Korea in the fourth month of 1592, and developed into a “world war” in Northeast Asia from the seventh month, when the Ming Chinese army joined the battle. Chosŏ n was overwhelmed by the crisis, and Ming China participated on Chos ŏn’s side after a request for reinforcements. Ming’s participation, however, was motivated more by self-defense than by the intention to help Chos ŏn. At the time, Japan had explicitly declared its plans to “borrow a road to enter the Ming.” Because of this, Ming feared for the security of Liaodong, and eventually came to worry about the threat to Beijing from a Chos ŏ n occupied by a Japanese army.

I recall that when the Imjin Waeran broke out in Chosŏ n, we gathered and mobilized all of our military power from the start. Why did China exhaust her wealth and strength to save this wretched little tributary state? To save Chosŏ n was to save Liaodong, and to save Liaodong was to protect Beijing.1

As stated above by Li Zhengyi in 1618, Ming participated in the Imjin Waeran in order to secure its own safety by stopping the Japanese army in Chos ŏ n. The Ming army entered the war on Chosŏ n’s side and was stationed in Korea for a long period of time. It came to violate Chos ŏn’s sovereignty by

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 meddling in internal affairs, and its demands created a great nuisance for ordinary people. The Ming army left behind many negative repercussions. 2 Nevertheless, by defeating the Japanese at the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang in the fi rst month of 1593, Ming forces reversed a war situation characterized to that point by a one-sided Japanese military superiority. Soon after receiving news of the victory at the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang, the Chos ŏn court and the common people celebrated Ming’s assistance as a “benevolent deed to re-establish the country.” This understanding steadily deepened towards the end of the Imjin 278 Han Myung-gi Waeran to the point where the Ming army’s military involvement came to be praised as chaejo chi ŭ n , or “the inestimable benevolence of saving a country on the brink of ruin.” From that time onwards, the concept of chaejo chiŭ n became a primary factor in Chos ŏ n relations with Ming China. After the Imjin Waeran, as the power of the Jianzhou Jurchen (later known as Later Jin and Qing China), led by Nurhaci, began to grow, the drift towards the Ming–Qing transition came into view. The Chos ŏ n court agonized over a response to these changes. Was Chos ŏn to continue adhering to the Ming-centric Sinitic world order? Or was Chosŏ n to accept the reality of Later Jin’s increasing power? These were the central concerns. Political strife that involved these two positions developed within the court during the reign of Prince Kwanghae (r. 1608–23). In 1623, political power shifted with the coup d’é tat that brought King Injo to power and dethroned Prince Kwanghae. Shortly after the coup, in 1627, the country suffered the Ch ŏ ngmyo horan or the fi rst Manchu invasion. In 1636, Korea had to endure a second Manchu invasion, the Py ŏ ngja horan, that resulted in the state’s submission to Qing. Taking these events into account between the end of the Imjin Waeran and the mid-seventeenth century, the following examines the Chosŏ n ruling class’s responses to the changing international order at the time of the Ming–Qing transition. Specifi cally, I examine the formative process of Korean gratitude towards Ming, or the chaejo chiŭ n ideology that emerged with Ming’s participation in the Imjin Waeran, and consider the political infl uence and signifi cance that chaejo chiŭ n carried. Finally, this study attempts to observe the infl uence that chaejo chi ŭ n had on Chos ŏn–Ming and Chos ŏn–Later Jin relations by the time the Ming–Qing transition became a conspicuous reality in the early seventeenth century.

The Imjin Waeran and Chaejo chi ŭ n Ming sent an army to Chos ŏn in order to prevent its own country from becoming a battleground during the Japanese invasion. From Ming’s viewpoint, merely tying down the Japanese army on Chosŏ n territory was enough to fulfi ll the minimal goal behind its participation in the war. With that limited goal as the background and with battlefi eld progress and Ming domestic circumstances in the foreground, the Chinese army advanced or

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 retreated or engaged in decisive battles with the Japanese. A circumscribed goal is clearly evident following the victory at P’yŏ ngyang in the third month of 1593 and Ming’s pursuit of the Japanese. As soon as the Chinese met defeat at the Battle of Py ŏ kchegwan shortly after P’yŏ ngyang, the Ming army abandoned decisive battles against the Japanese forces and sought to end the war through negotiations. The peace negotiations between Ming and Japan were not carried out successfully and only delayed matters. 3 Once the negotiations started, the Ming army did not attempt to fi ght the Japanese army, but merely settled into Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 279 positions opposite the Japanese. Nevertheless, Chosŏ n had to continue supplying the Ming army with provisions, and the Chosŏ n people suffered greatly as a result of these impositions. Because of this, a few Chosŏ n offi cials complained of the uselessness of the Ming army. For example, in the second month of 1599, Hong Y ŏsun stated: “The Ming army, merely causing chaos among the people of the border regions, was of no help in stopping the Japanese army.”4 Moreover, a Ming offi cial at the time of the war, Xu Guanlan, criticized the role of the Ming army, stating: “What has the Ming army achieved since coming to Chos ŏ n? The Ming army cannot be relied on,” and emphasized that Chosŏ n needed to establish its own measures for self-strengthening.5 Despite these sorts of deprecating evaluations of the Ming army and its role, why was there admiration for its participation in the war as trumpeted by the term chaejo chiŭ n ? What were the grounds for respect and admiration? Moreover, why was it that chaejo chi ŭ n developed into a type of ideology after the invasion and continued to impart great infl uence politically and ideologically throughout the late Chosŏ n period? Here we must draw attention to the degree of desperation that the country as a whole faced during the Imjin Waeran. As King S ŏnjo, his court offi cials, and the ruling class became acutely aware of imminent danger, the implication of the Ming army’s participation and assistance could only become more signifi cant, and the formation of chaejo chi ŭ n was natural. The Chos ŏ n court became aware of extreme danger from the beginning, when the Japanese army landed in Pusan on the thirteenth day of the fourth month of 1592, and the sense of crisis mounted as the Japanese won battle after battle. The Chosŏ n army repeatedly collapsed without being able to put up a credible resistance, and King S ŏnjo had to fl ee his capital. Under such circumstances, the ruling class and the common people concluded that the country would eventually perish. Fearing an end to the monarchy and the Chos ŏn government, a great number of offi cials avoided accompanying King S ŏnjo on his journey or started out in attendance only to abandon him and run away later on.6 During their fl ight, King S ŏ njo and his court offi cials witnessed fi rst-hand how they had lost the support of the people. As the king left the palace, one of the commanders said in a veiled rebuke, “This enemy did not come from Heaven. He was created by man.” The extremity of the situation was such that a common soldier even said, “[The Japanese army] has now arrived and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 saved us. I will gladly receive the enemy.”7 The people of Kaes ŏ ng threw stones at the king’s palanquin as it left Kaesŏ ng and again headed north. The people of P’y ŏ ngyang blocked the queen’s procession and assaulted the Minister of Taxation, Hong Y ŏsun, who was accompanying her.8 Among the people of Sukch’ ŏ n in P’yŏ ng’an Province, there were some who scribbled information on walls for the Japanese army that pointed to the direction of the king’s fl ight.9 Kuk Ky ŏ ng’in, a traitor from Hamgyŏ ng Province, captured and delivered Prince Imhae and Prince Sunhwa to the Japanese army commander Kat ō Kiyomasa. 280 Han Myung-gi Under these circumstances, there was a sharp increase in the number of people who became friendly towards the Japanese as their pacifi cation efforts intensifi ed. In the villages that they occupied, the Japanese army put up proc- lamations that included statements such as: “We will not kill you. We have come because your king has mistreated you.” 10 When the Japanese army stationed in Hwanghae Province, where there existed great animosity against the royal court from before the Imjin Waeran, publicly pledged to reduce and exempt corvé e labor, it is said that the people of Hwanghae Province quar- reled among themselves and then surrendered. 11 There was even a widespread rumor that half of the Japanese army consisted of Koreans. 12 King S ŏ njo was eventually driven as far as the Ming–Chosŏ n border city of Ŭ iju, where he insisted on crossing the Yalu River and going to Liaodong. When his ministers objected to the idea of seeking refuge in China, he revealed his wretched despair at the impasse, saying, “If you can tell me of a more suitable place, I will not go to Liaodong.”13 For King S ŏnjo and his ministers, pursued by the Japanese army and witnessing fi rst-hand the complete desertion of public support during their harried fl ight, the Ming army’s participation was, in a word, the “gospel” (K. pog ŭ m ). As soon as the Ming army achieved victory at the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang in the fi rst month of 1593, the war situation reversed itself, and the Japanese army was forced to retreat. In that moment, King Sŏ njo was, for the fi rst time, able to escape from the worst of the crisis and maintain his political power. In fact, on the ninth day of the fi rst month of 1593, when the king heard the news of the Ming victory at the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang, he declared: “As the Emperor’s benevolence is immeasurable, I am at a loss for words.” 14 The next day, offi - cials from the Ministry of Rites stated: “The recovery of the country was solely due to Ming’s victory at the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang.” 15 A deep gratitude for the Ming army’s victory prevailed in the Chos ŏn court from that moment forward. After the victory at P’y ŏngyang, the royal court of Chos ŏn began to serve the Ming army commanders with great devotion.16 In summary, the early stages of the Imjin Waeran offered nothing but opaque circumstances where the survival of the country hung in the balance following defeat after defeat in battle. The king and his offi cials felt the sting of clear, popular defi ance against them during their fl ight, and the realization of imminent danger reached its climax among the ruling class. It was at this stage, when the Ming army joined the war, and with their victory at the Battle

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of P’y ŏngyang, that the Chos ŏn ruling class gave birth to the notion of praising Ming benevolence, or chaejo chi ŭ n . After the victory at P’yŏ ngyang, the royal court of Chos ŏn began the work of exalting the meritorious service of the Ming generals. Immediately following the victory at P’yŏ ngyang, in the second month of 1593, the court decided to erect a monument praising the services of Li Rusong, produce his portrait, and construct a shrine in his honor (K. saengsa-dang ). 17 Subsequently, they built the Muyŏ lsa shrine in P’yŏ ngyang, raised portraits of the Ming Minister of War Shi Xing and the four generals Li Rusong, Li Rubo, Yang Yuan, and Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 281 Zhang Shijue, and performed sacrifi cial rites in their honor every spring and fall.18 In 1599, the Chosŏ n government constructed the Sŏ nmusa shrine to the memory of Supreme Commander Xing Jie and there hung a plaque with the words “chaejo pŏ nbang ” (lit. rebuilding a vassal country) brushed by King S ŏnjo himself and carved in relief.19 Moreover, the court founded the Board of Compilation for Offi cials from the Heavenly Court (Ch’ ŏ njo changgwan ch’anjip ch’ ŏ ng), which published documents recording the meritorious services of Ming offi cials who came to Chosŏ n. 20 But the people to whom Chosŏ n was most grateful were the Wanli emperor Shenzong and the Coordinator of Korean Affairs (Ch. Jingli yushi ) during the second invasion of 1597, Yang Hao. During the war, Shenzong particularly concerned himself with the Imjin Waeran while bothering with his own government affairs only three days out of a month. For this, he was known as the “Son of Heaven of Korea” (Ch. Gaoli tianzi , K. Kory ŏ ch’ ŏ nja ) in Ming China.21 Yang Hao was appraised as having been the most devoted in his duties among the Ming soldiers who had come to Chosŏ n, and for his great efforts to stop his soldiers causing trouble he was called the “Premier of Korea” (Ch. Gaoli zaixiang , K. Kory ŏ chaesang ).22 In 1611, the Chosŏ n court erected a commemorative stele praising Yang’s good deeds, and produced a collection of poetry titled “A Verse Manuscript to Eulogize the Virtue of the Coordinator of Korean Affairs Yang [Hao]” (K. Ky ŏ ngni ŏsa Yang sŏ nsaeng songd ŏ k sigo , Ch. Jingli yushi Yang xiansheng songde shigao ). As such, the sense of gratitude towards the “benevolence of the Ming” developed with time. Towards the end of the Imjin Waeran, the situation was such that there were men among the Chosŏ n offi cials who referred to the Imjin Waeran as “the rebuilding” (K. chaejo ). 23 Given the elite sentiment, we should ask what did the common people at the time think of the Ming army and their participation in the war? As there are very few documents related to this, we cannot know for certain. However, from the saying, “When ordinary people meet someone in Ming Chinese army uniform, they fear and respect him,” we know that the common people also regarded the Ming army cordially. 24 Although the common people may have been grateful for Ming’s benevolence, the extent of their gratitude was different from that of the ruling class. The reason is that the common people experienced great hardship from abuse at the hands of the Ming army and suffered from the Ming army’s requisitioning of food provisions and war sup-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 plies. Kw ŏ n Chin memorialized:

In the seven years of the Wae [Japanese] bandits’ rampage, the fl ames of war continued, and the fi ghting did not stop. Fortunately, however, the Emperor’s benevolence extended so far that our country has been rebuilt … After suffering from the fl ames of war, the people have no stable livelihood and have been scattered, living everywhere. Moreover, since the Ming army continuously infringes on them with the transportation of provisions, press-ganging of troops to fi ll the ranks, and all sorts 282 Han Myung-gi of forced labor, all the toil and troubles experienced by the people are beyond description.25

In fact, the situation was such that Ko Sang’an (1553–1623), a local magistrate during the Imjin Waeran, stated: “As a result of giving all of our country’s grain supplies to the Ming army in 1593 and 1594, the Chosŏ n people have been starving to death, and the country has weakened.” 26 The abuses gratuitously delivered to the people by the Ming army were so severe that the saying “The Japanese army is a fi ne-tooth comb, and the Ming army is a wide-tooth comb” began to spread. This situation developed to the point where people came to have antagonistic feelings against the Ming army, and eventually these feelings developed into animosity against the ruling class, which did not suffi ciently restrain the reckless abuse of the Ming army. This fact is confi rmed in oral folklore that depicts lower-class mentality at that time. 27 In short, the attitude towards the Ming army among the lower classes – those who suffered damage because of the Chinese soldiers – was one of disapproval, and the extent of their respect for chaejo chiŭ n was most certainly weaker than that of the ruling class. What then was the signifi cance of the veneration ofchaejo chiŭ n by the ruling class during the Imjin Waeran? In the early period of the invasion, there were many instances of local magistrates and military commanders running away from the fi ght against the enemy. As previously observed, King Sŏ njo also failed to present countermeasures to stop the enemy and was intent on taking fl ight. On the other hand, many literati out of offi ce such as Kwak Chae’u raised irregular armies (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng, “righteous soldiers”) and fought against the Japanese. The reason why Chosŏ n did not perish but was able to persevere during the early stages of the Imjin Waeran was owing to the righteous army’s activities. 28 Naturally, the authority of the righteous army leaders Kwak Chae’u, Ch ŏ ng Inhong, and Kim Tŏ ngny ŏ ng rose, while the authority of King S ŏnjo and the men in offi ce fell. Moreover, the righteous army leaders and the people criticized the offi cials who displayed irresponsible and craven behavior during the war. Among certain circles, there were even insinuations that “the government and the people had become enemies.” 29 During the invasion, there were also continuous popular uprisings, both big and small. For example, Song Yujin, the leader of a rebel army, demanded that King Sŏ njo abdicate. Furthermore, certain

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 members of the literati class advised King Sŏ njo to abdicate in favor of Prince Kwanghae. In these circumstances, where the king’s authority was declining due to the challenges made by the lower classes and the gentry out of offi ce, King Sŏ njo’s sense of crisis deepened. Accordingly, his dependence on the Ming army also naturally increased. Even after the Ming unilaterally entered peace negotiations and avoided combat with the Japanese army, King Sŏ njo supported the Chinese army, saying, “If the Ming army were not here, we would not be able to sustain our country.” 30 Furthermore, he actively stressed the important role Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 283 of the Ming army. In the third month of 1601, when the question of honoring people of merit in the war was raised, King S ŏ njo stated the following:

It is solely owing to the Ming army that we have now suppressed the Japanese [K. Wae ] bandits. Our army troops occasionally followed behind the Ming army, and merely obtained the heads of straggling enemy soldiers by a stroke of luck. They never cut off the head of a single enemy chief or plundered a single enemy camp. Among them, the victories of admirals Yi Sunshin and W ŏn Kyun at sea and the great victory of Kw ŏ n Yul at Haengju shine to some extent as glorious deeds. If you ask why the Ming army entered the war, it is because numerous, faithful offi cials, despite falling down along the rugged road, followed me all the way to Ŭ iju, and appealed to Ming. It is because of this that we were able to suppress the enemy and recover our territory.31

In the statement above, King Sŏ njo ascribes full credit to the Ming army for ending the war, but does not mention a single word about the role and service of the irregular guerrilla forces. Meanwhile, he quietly stresses that the main agents to call on the Ming army – the force that “suppressed the confl ict” – were himself and the offi cials who had followed him. What kind of signifi cance does this hold? In the end, King Sŏ njo was able to restore some of his debased authority by stressing Ming’s role, or chaejo chi ŭ n . Hence, by ascribing all the merit involved in overcoming the disturbances of war to the Ming army, while also highlighting that it had been the court who had called in the Ming army, King S ŏnjo and his loyal offi cials were attempting to restore the authority that had collapsed with their successive defeats and fl ight in the early stages of the war. In other words, emphasizing chaejo chiŭ n was an important means to heighten the political currency of King S ŏ njo and his offi cials.

Chaejo chi ŭ n and Chosŏ n–Ming relations during the reign of Prince Kwanghae Others besides the ruling class of Chosŏ n emphasized chaejo chi ŭ n . As time passed, the imperial court of Ming China and the commanders of the Ming army also began to stress that they had “displayed benevolence to Chosŏ n.”

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 For example, shortly after the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang in early 1593, the Ming army’s group of leaders reproached the Chosŏ n government for sitting still and merely observing the situation while they had fought for their lives, won back P’y ŏngyang, and saved Chos ŏn on the brink of ruin.32 After the second invasion of 1597, the Ming military leaders also used the term chaejo chiŭ n .33 In 1599, after the Supreme Commander Xing Jie pointed out that the war was over, he insisted that Chos ŏn had to provide part of the funds required for the Ming palace construction. He was urging Chosŏ n to repay Ming fi nancially for the “benevolence” Ming China had provided.34 284 Han Myung-gi In reality, the Ming government suffered great losses in military and fi nancial terms by participating in the Imjin Waeran. With the prolongation of the war and war expenditures, Ming China’s fi nancial problems became noticeable, and this overlapped with the problems associated with the Mining Excises and Commercial Taxes (Ch. kuangshui ), which was causing problems in China at the time. 35 A sense of crisis emerged that was epitomized in the statement: “We helped the Koreans, but it may be that Ming is ruined before Chos ŏ n.”36 This sort of awareness was naturally followed by a Ming request to Chos ŏn to return the favor for its “benevolence.” An air of pride as Chosŏ n’s “benefactor” became notably conspicuous by the time of Prince Kwanghae’s reign, which began in 1608.

The Dispatched Commander [Ch. Zhihui shichaiguan] of Liaodong Jiang Tianze came [to Chosŏ n] with an offi cial document … “As our court gathered all of our people and made them run into a fi re pit nineteen years ago in the ‘war to help Chosŏ n [Imjin Waeran],’ the number of losses in death has been more than several tens of thousands. This was an act of abandoning our own people and stopping a disastrous war in a foreign country, and our benevolence, extreme and heavy, covered the whole world in love. The people who survive in Chosŏ n today, the goods that have been produced there since, and the wealth, sons, and daughters [that the country enjoys now] – who made all this possible?”37

The Ming administrator Jiang Tianze, sent to Korea in 1610, uttered these words. He emphasized the fact that Ming China had “sacrifi ced herself for Chosŏ n” during the Imjin Waeran and that Chosŏ n Korea should repay the kindness. The Ming state was being challenged by Nurhaci’s Jianzhou Jurchens after the Imjin Waeran and the idea spread that the Ming court must actively draw in and use Chosŏ n troops to restrain the Jurchens. In this context, the court urged the Chosŏ n government to repay the favor of chaejo chi ŭ n . Shortly after Nurhaci attacked and occupied Fushun, Ming’s Supervising Secretary in the Offi ce for Scrutiny of Revenue (Ch. Huke geishizhong ), Guan Yingzhen, asserted that the Chinese should use Korean troops as follows:

The Supervising Secretary Guan Yingzhen states three measures to ward off the barbarians. … When Chosŏ n was hit by the invading Japanese,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 it received an enormous favor with our aid. Naturally, we must borrow troops and cavalry from north of the passes and attack the right fl ank of the barbarians, and mobilize two to three thousand rifl emen from Chos ŏn, have them cross the Yalu River with our soldiers, and attack the left fl ank of the barbarians. This is generally striking at Nurhaci by way of mobilizing submissive barbarians. 38

The above plan presented by Guan Yingzhen was a typical example of the policy of using barbarians to control barbarians. Throughout the reign of Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 285 Prince Kwanghae the Ming court based its policies on such thinking and imposed the concept of chaejo chiŭ n in order to put pressure on the Chosŏ n government. Chos ŏ n government policies towards China during Prince Kwanghae’s reign had to tread a fi ne line. Nurhaci’s threat to the Ming state became signifi cantly greater after the Imjin Waeran. From 1599, Nurhaci began full-scale attacks on the Haixi Jurchens, and his intention to establish an autonomous country was clearly revealed with the proclamation of the country’s name as Jianzhou in 1605. This was an explicit challenge to Ming authority, which up to that time had restrained the emergence of powerful groups among the Jurchen through policies of divide and rule. The development was also a great threat to Chos ŏn, which had lived peacefully within the Ming-centered Sinitic world order.39 Faced with these circumstances, Prince Kwanghae unfolded a skillful foreign policy. He assumed the traditional policy of submission (K. sadae chŏ ngch’aek) towards the Ming state while deploying a restraining policy (K. ki’mich’aek) towards the Later Jin state in an attempt to maintain peace. Because he was an illegitimate child born to a concubine, Prince Kwanghae encountered great diffi culties as the new ruler in gaining the Ming emperor’s approval. From the time he ascended the throne, he had to fi ght to secure his royal authority, and despite his vulnerable political state, securing the peace and safety of the border regions was a pressing matter. With a fl exible view of foreign affairs – “Even in the event of war, my envoys must always remain in between” – Prince Kwanghae unrelentingly gathered information related to both Ming China and Later Jin. 40 The core of his policy towards Later Jin lay in discerning trends from intelligence, preventing invasions through a restraining policy, and establishing countermeasures to cope with the worst possible case during the time bought by restraint.41 In 1618 Prince Kwanghae’s efforts to avoid being mixed up in the confrontation between Ming China and Later Jin crashed into a wall. In the same year, Later Jin issued “seven grudges” against the Ming court and attacked and occupied Fushun. This was Later Jin’s declaration of war against China as well as the de facto trigger for the developments that would eventuate in the Ming–Qing transition. While forming an expeditionary army to punish Later Jin, the Ming government also pressured Chosŏ n to mobilize a military force and participate together in the fi ght.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In considering whether or not to accept Ming China’s demand for the dispatch of troops, the positions taken by Prince Kwanghae and the offi cials of the Border Defense Council (K. Piby ŏ nsa ) divided along two lines. Prince Kwanghae tried to reject the request in light of the extreme diffi culties facing Chos ŏ n in the aftermath of the Imjin Waeran, while the offi cials of the Border Defense Council stressed that Chos ŏn had to accept the Ming court’s request in order to repay them for chaejo chi ŭ n . 42 In the end, Prince Kwanghae’s hope to refuse a dispatch of troops dis- solved under pressure from the Ming government. In the fi rst month of 1619, 286 Han Myung-gi a Chos ŏn army of around 10,000 soldiers led by commander-in-chief Kang Hongnip crossed the Yalu River to attack Later Jin, and shortly afterwards was placed under the command of the Ming commander Liu Ting. In the third month of that year, the Chos ŏn army, pushed out into the battlefi eld and stripped of independent tactical authority or command authority, was defeated by the Later Jin army at the Battle of Shenhe, and Kang Hongnip surrendered to Nurhaci. At the time, Nurhaci displayed a sympathetic atti- tude43 that accepted Chosŏ n’s participation as the result of Chinese demands and Chosŏ n’s return of favors in response to chaejo chiŭ n . Peace was maintained between the two countries even after the Shenhe battle. After the Shenhe battle, Prince Kwanghae returned to promoting a neutral foreign policy. He repeatedly rejected conscription requests from the Ming court and attempted to detect Later Jin’s intentions by sending envoys to their encampments. Moreover, to the greatest extent practicable, he returned to Ming the Chinese refugees from Liaodong, who had poured into Chosŏ n after Liaodong fell to Later Jin, and he held in check the Ming commander, Mao Wenlong, who had entered Chos ŏn clamoring for the “reclamation of Liaodong.” On a few occasions, he also enacted policies to deceive the Ming court. 44 Through such diplomatic acumen by its ruler, the Chosŏ n state was able to maintain neutrality between Ming China and Later Jin. In short, Prince Kwanghae’s foreign policy, which tried to avoid being dragged into the confrontational frame that had developed between Ming China and Later Jin, contained steps that pragmatically adapted to the realities and vicissitudes of the period referred to as the “Ming–Qing transition.” However, his policy stood in fundamental opposition to the Chinese policy of using barbarians to control barbarians by deploying Chos ŏn troops through invocations of repayment for chaejo chi ŭ n . From that point onwards, though, it was also a policy that could not avoid a clash with high-ranking government offi cials who cherished a worldview that separated the “civilized” from the “barbaric.” The result of these stresses was the military coup in 1623 (K. Injo panj ŏ ng ) by the man who would become King Injo.

Chaejo chi ŭ n and Chosŏ n–China relations during the reign of King Injo In 1623, Injo, who was Prince Kwanghae’s nephew, and the Westerner’s

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 faction (K. S ŏ in) initiated a military coup, dethroning Prince Kwanghae. Carrying forward their coup d’ é tat, the plotters stated an important pretext for their actions, “Prince Kwanghae had betrayed chaejo chi ŭ n and tried to establish friendly relations with Later Jin.” When the coup took place in Korea, the Ming court criticized it as an act of illegal usurpation. Among the Ming offi cials, there were even some who asserted that they should mobilize a military force and reinstate Prince Kwanghae. However, the Ming government decided to exploit the coup in order to impose leverage over the Chosŏ n court. Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 287 Hence, for the price of investing Injo as the “King of Chosŏ n,” the Ming court wanted to involve Chos ŏ n troops in the fi ght against Later Jin.45 The success of the Injo coup suggested that later developments in the Chos ŏn government’s foreign policy, or the Chos ŏn court’s response to the Ming–Qing transition, would be based on a traditional civilized vs. barbarian paradigm. In truth, after the coup, sentiments proliferated arguing the necessity of repaying the favor of Ming’s chaejo chiŭ n during the Imjin Waeran. In the third month of 1623, King Injo criticized Prince Kwanghae to a Ming offi cial for “betraying chaejo chi ŭ n. ” 46 Moreover, shortly after the coup, Shim Kwangse (1577–1624) emphasized Ming’s benevolence as follows:

During the Imjin Waeran, the Wanli Emperor turned down many people’s objections, and raised back up a country that was about to be obliterated. For seven years he consumed funds, twice mobilized the masses, and gave life back to our country. Among our Chosŏ n people, there is no one who has not benefi ted from Shenzong’s resuscitating grace.47

In short, right after the coup, a widespread sentiment was on the rise that glorifi ed chaejo chi ŭ n , insisted on its repayment, and was “pro-Ming and anti- Later Jin.” In reality, however, the direction of the foreign policy, as chosen by the leaders of the coup between the time of the coup’s success and the eruption of the Manchu invasion (K. Ch ŏ ngmyo horan) in 1627, was by no means unam- biguously “pro-Ming, anti-Later Jin.” While “pro-Ming” was undoubtedly stressed towards the Ming court and its representatives, the policy towards the Later Jin government was not necessarily “anti-Later Jin.” Considering the policy towards Later Jin proposed to Injo by the Border Defense Council shortly after the coup’s success in the third month of 1623,48 and considering that most of the individuals who had carried out foreign policy during the reign of Prince Kwanghae were reappointed,49 the new policy was essentially one of maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, in the fourth month of 1624, when Mao Wenlong asked the Chosŏ n court for a military force to attack Later Jin and proposed that Ming and Chos ŏ n armies attack Later Jin together, the Chosŏ n court demurred. If worse came to worst, the Chosŏ n government intended to clothe its soldiers in Ming uniform and dispatch them.50 Inasmuch as they had raised a coup d’ é tat and assumed political power with

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 diffi culty, the leaders of the coup were not going to launch into an escapade that would irritate Later Jin and jeopardize their position. In contrast to Prince Kwanghae’s cold reception of Mao Wenlong, the Injo administration warmly received Mao. Each year, they provided him with a generous supply of rice provisions and offered intelligence information related to Later Jin. Moreover, because King Injo had received continuous help from Mao Wenlong during the process of obtaining his investiture from the Ming emperor, the Chos ŏ n court could not treat Mao indifferently.51 In 288 Han Myung-gi short, repayment for chaejo chi ŭ n during the reign of King Injo essentially materialized as elaborate receptions for Mao Wenlong. Between the time of the Injo coup and the Manchu invasion of 1627 the character of Chosŏ n government policy towards Later Jin was, in actuality, maintenance of the status quo. The Chosŏ n court took the view that if the existing, traditional Sinocentric world order did not waver greatly and the Chos ŏ n state could remain within that order, then Chosŏ n Korea could coex- ist with Later Jin. This is shown by the fact that when the invasion, which was provoked by Later Jin’s economic and military needs, occurred in 1627, King Injo and the ruling class formed peaceful and fraternal relations with Later Jin without any particular trouble or confl icts.52 However, with their continuous increase in military and political capacity, Later Jin challenged the Ming-centered Sinitic world order. In 1636, the rulers of Later Jin changed the name of their state to Da Qing, or Great Qing, adopted the reign name Chongde, and declared Great Qing to be an imperial country. This was something that the Chosŏ n court, which was still hoisting a pro-Ming standard and thinking of chaejo chiŭ n , could not possibly accept. When the Chos ŏn government refused to acknowledge these changes, the Qing ruler decided to invade, and the result was the second Manchu Invasion in 1636 (K. Py ŏ ngja horan ). As Qing’s invasion ended with Chos ŏ n’s surrender, the Chosŏ n state joined a new Sinocentric world order with Qing China as its center. With the imminent realization of Ming collapse, and the shock of having “surrendered to barbarians,” general sentiment in Chos ŏn ruling circles was unsettled. Qing broached the possibility of directly controlling Korea and meddled in the internal politics of Chosŏ n Korea by driving a wedge between King Injo and his crown prince and cultivating a pro-Qing faction at the Chosŏ n court. By doing these things, Qing set out to tame the Chosŏ n state.53 Even after the 1636 invasion, a dual attitude emerged within the Chosŏ n court, which involved actual submission to Qing but ideological service to an already fallen Ming. The “Strike North” (K. puk p ŏ llon) thesis at the time of King Hyojong (r. 1650–9) – “We must revenge the Ming by striking at the Qing” – was the most extreme example of this posture. Symbolically, efforts were made by many Korean intellectuals to retain their loyalty to Ming by declaring themselves “recluses who remain loyal to Ming” (K. sunj ŏ ng ch’ ŏ sa or taemy ŏ ng k ŏ sa ), even after having experienced the 1636 invasion and learn-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ing of Ming’s collapse in 1644. 54 Since the veritable records of Chosŏ n have become more widely known, we can see that the Chosŏ n court never abandoned its loyalty and respect for the Ming dynasty and to its very end considered the Qing dynasty to be barbarous. Nearly 200 years passed since calls from Ming remnants to exclude the Manchu people were last heard in China, but they reappeared after Qing’s power weakened. During this time, there was not a moment when Chosŏ n did not wish for Qing’s immediate destruction, even during the height of the Qing. 55 Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 289 This point is made by the modern Chinese historian Meng Sen. He has also compared the policies of Ming and Qing China towards Chos ŏ n Korea and emphasizes that the Ming state actually imposed considerable socio- economic damage on Chos ŏn Korea, while the Qing state tried to appease Chos ŏ n Korea by reducing the level of such abuse. Meng points out that despite this difference the Chos ŏ n court held Qing rule of China in contempt.56 As such, the feelings of antagonism and rejection against Qing rule that extended across the Chosŏ n intelligentsia from the seventeenth century was something that even the Chinese found unusual. It is obvious that the veneration of the Ming state, formed with the participation of the Ming army in the Imjin Waeran and encapsulated in chaejo chiŭ n , long remained in the background. In short, chaejo chi ŭ n was an essential factor that cannot be disregarded in understanding the relationship between Chosŏ n Korea and China in the seventeenth century.

Conclusion Ming China participated in the Imjin Waeran in order to protect its own security. The Ming army’s participation in the war and the long-term stationing of troops resulted in many adverse consequences, including interference in Chos ŏn Korea’s domestic politics and abuses of the local populace. However, the Ming army’s direct involvement and assistance were inevitably Heaven- sent for the Chosŏ n ruling elite who were in great danger of losing their ancestral shrines because of the army’s serial defeats. In the early stages of the Imjin Waeran, when the ruling elite had fallen into panic because of the Japanese army’s pursuit of them northward and had encountered fi rst- hand the alienation of the populace, the Ming army’s victory at the Battle of P’yŏ ngyang offered an opportunity for the restoration of their power, and ultimately that situation could only be grasped as “[Ming’s] benevolence in restoring the country.” After the Battle of P’y ŏ ngyang, the Chosŏ n court worked hard to repay the favor of chaejo chi ŭ n by, among other things, building shrines to commemorate Ming army commanders such as Li Rusong. In short, chaejo chi ŭ n was forged in an awareness of extreme crisis. On the other hand, there was a specifi c political background to King ŏS njo and the Chos ŏn ruling class’s emphasis on returning the favor for chaejo chiŭ n . It was used as a means to restore an authority that had been debased with the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 war and to break the challenge thrown up by the righteous army commanders and lower classes to government authority. In fact, many members of the lower class groaned under abuses at the hands of the Ming army and the burden of having to provide them with war supplies. Taking these matters into account, there were clearly different views on chaejo chi ŭ n , depending on one’s social class. From around the time of the end of the Imjin Waeran, as Ming offi cials also used terms such as chaejo chiŭ n and “rescue the east” (K. tong’w ŏ n ), they posed as Chosŏ n Korea’s savior. This tendency became conspicuous in the 290 Han Myung-gi time of Prince Kwanghae’s reign, when the military threat from the Later Jin was increasing. In the midst of Later Jin’s aggrandizement, Prince Kwanghae laboriously attempted to spy out Later Jin’s movements, all the while working hard to maintain amicable relations with the Jurchen. In 1618, the Ming court demanded that the Chosŏ n government send reinforcements and participate in a joint assault on Later Jin. To this, Prince Kwanghae tried to decline in consideration of Korea’s lack of recovery from the wounds of the Imjin Waeran, while the offi cials of the Border Defense Council wished to accept the Chinese demand, insisting on repaying the favors for chaejo chi ŭ n . In 1619, the Chos ŏn government eventually sent an army, but they were defeated at the Battle of Shenhe. These events show that chaejo chiŭ n remained as the underlying core of the Chosŏ n state’s relations with Ming China in the time of Prince Kwanghae’s reign. Prince Kwanghae refused the Ming court’s continuous demands for assistance even after the Battle of Shenhe. He not only avoided the second dispatch of an army but also avoided, whenever possible, settling the Liaodong refugees in Korea and receiving Mao Wenlong. These actions were, again, taken in order to maintain harmonious relations with Later Jin. While attempts at an equidistant policy by Prince Kwanghae were outstanding in that they prevented war, it gave his internal political adversaries a pretext. In 1623, he was dethroned following a military coup by Injo. King Injo and the leaders of the coup d’ é tat claimed “Prince Kwanghae’s betrayal of chaejo chiŭ n ” as their justifi cation. Even then, while Chosŏ n raised a pro-Ming banner after the coup, the government composed a policy that also sought to maintain the status quo with Later Jin. By treating Mao Wenlong very hospitably, the Chosŏ n court clearly practiced a pro-Ming policy while not exercising an anti- Jin policy towards Later Jin; that is, not until the rulers of Later Jin changed the name of the state and established its fi rst emperor. Later Jin declared itself an empire in 1636, and when the Qing court demanded that the Koreans subjugate themselves, the Chosŏ n court refused. The result was the invasion in 1636. After the 1636 invasion, while the Chos ŏn government was obedient to Qing in practical terms, it looked up to the now deceased Ming state in ideological terms. In the background to this type of dualistic attitude, there undoubtedly remained consideration of chaejo chi ŭ n . Chaejo chiŭ n , formed on the occasion of the Ming army’s participation in the Imjin Waeran, bore great infl uence in the seventeenth century not only in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 regard to Chosŏ n Korea’s relations with China but also in regard to Chos ŏ n’s internal politics. In short, we can say that relations between Chosŏ n Korea and China from the time of the Imjin Waeran until the mid seventeenth century took place within a “ chaejo chi ŭ n system.”

Notes Translated by Grace Koh with James B. Lewis. 1 Li, “Zaoji,” in Chouliao shuohua , 4:3a–3b. 2 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 125–45. Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 291 3 Sajima, “Jinshin Waran,” 1994. 4 S ŏ njo shillok , 109:1a–1a (1599.2.1). 5 S ŏnjo shillok , 109:5a–5a (1599.2.2). 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 27:13b–13b (1592.6.21). 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 26:13b–14a (1592.5.14). 8 S ŏnjo shillok , 27:3b–4a (1592.6.10). 9 S ŏ njo shillok , 27:18b–18b (1592.6.28). 1 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 26:3b–3b (1592.5.3). 11 Yi, Saryujae chip , 1990, 8:28b–28b (1592.6.4), p. 332. 1 2 S ŏ njo shillok , 26:6a–6a (1592.5.4). 1 3 S ŏ njo shillok , 27:10b–10b (1592.6.16). 1 4 S ŏ njo shillok , 34:9a–9a (1593.1.9). 1 5 S ŏ njo shillok , 34:10a–10a (1593.1.10). 1 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 36:10a–10a (1593.3.6). 1 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 35:2b–2b (1593.2.2). 1 8 S ŏ njo shillok , 77:24b–25a (1596.7.29); S ŏ njo shillok , 99:22b–23a (1598.4.21). 1 9 S ŏ njo shillok , 117:2a–2b (1599.9.1); S ŏ njo shillok , 118:5b–5b (1599.10.5). 2 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 119:3b–4a (1599.11.4). 21 Kim, Yuyŏ ndang chip , 1978, 3:28–9. 22 Kim, Yuyŏ ndang chip , 1978, 3:26. 23 Ko, T’aech’on chip, 4:13a–13a, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan, 2000–9, Vol. 59, p. 259. 24 Yi, Obong chip , 14:28a–28b, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan , 2000–9, Vol. 59, p. 543. 2 5 S ŏ njo shillok , 107:12b–13a (1598.12.12), pp. 543–4. 26 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, p. 142. 27 Im, S ŏ rhwa , 1989, pp. 102–13. 2 8 S ŏ njo shillok , 32:15a–b (1592.11.16). 29 Yi, Song’am chip , 3:11a–11a, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan , 2000–9, Vol. 54, p. 52. 3 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 42:20b–20b (1593.9.9). 3 1 Hos ŏ ng s ŏ nmu (1601.3.13), 1999, p. 11. 3 2 Sadae mun’gwe , 3:12a–12b (1593.1.15). 3 3 Ming Shenzong shilu , 317:5904–4 (1597.12.5). 3 4 S ŏ njo shillok , 110:4b–4b (1599.3.8). 35 Translator’s note: Richard von Glahn describes the kuangshui or “Mining Excises and Commercial Taxes,” between 1596 and 1606, as an attempt by the Wanli government to bolster its coffers by obtaining as much additional revenue as possible from the commercial sector. It was “undoubtedly the single most vilifi ed feature of Wanli’s highly controversial reign.” Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune , 1996, p. 161. 3 6 Ming Shenzong shilu , 314:5872–3 (1597.9.13). 3 7 Kwanghaegun ilgi , 25:2b–3b (1610.2.4). 3 8 Ming Shenzong shilu , 569:10718–19 (1618 Intercalary 4.17). 39 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 224–9. 4 0 Piby ŏ nsa t ŭ ngnok , Vol. 1, p. 20 (1617.4.10).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 41 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 224–44. 42 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 244–55. 4 3 Qing Taizu shilu , 6:16a–16b (1619.3.21). 44 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 280–6. 45 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 348–52. 4 6 Injo shillok, 1:24a–24b (1623.3.22). 47 Shim, Hyuong chip , 4:2b–3a, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan , 2000–9, Vol. 84, pp. 369–70. 4 8 Injo shillok , 1:34b–34b (1623.3.27). 49 After the success of the Injo coup, Yi Kyŏ ngj ŏ n, Yun Hwŏ n, and Yi Minsŏ ng, who were dispatched to Ming to inform them of the change, all held important posts under Prince Kwanghae. Moreover, Yun Hwi, who positively supported Prince 292 Han Myung-gi Kwanghae’s even-handed diplomacy, held high offi ce after the 1627 invasion. Injo( shillok , 15:12b–13b (1627.1.21)). 5 0 Pibyŏ nsa t ŭ ngnok , Vol. 1, p. 216 (1624.4.27). 51 Han, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 374–84. 52 Kim, “Ch ŏ ngmyo Horanshi,” 1978. 53 After receiving the Chos ŏn court’s surrender, the Qing government worried over methods to handle Chosŏ n Korea. Certain Qing high offi cials at that time insisted that they leave King Injo with two provinces and that the Qing government directly govern the remaining six provinces. This proposal was not realized, but the Qing court later used this argument to control the Chosŏ n court. Injo shillok , 43:22a– 22b (1642.10.12). 54 In seventeenth-century Korea, there were many who styled themselves as sunj ŏ ng ch’ ŏ sa or taemy ŏ ng k ŏ sa . For example, Pak Such’un (1572–1652) and Kim Sion (1598–1669) posed as sunj ŏ ng ch’ ŏ sa and Yi Hŭ iryang (1584–1646) fancied himself a taemyŏ ng k ŏ sa . 55 Meng, “Huang Mingyi minfuxu,” 1980, p. 156. 56 Meng, “Huang Mingyi minfuxu,” 1980, pp. 155–7.

References Han My ŏ nggi (Han Myung-gi, 䞲ⳛ₆ ). Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Chung kwangye ( 㧚㰚㢲⧖ὒG䞲㭧ὖἚ ). Seoul : Y ŏ ksa pip’y ŏ ngsa , 1999 . Hos ŏ ng s ŏ nmu ch’ ŏngnan kongsin togam ŭ igwe ( 扈聖宣武淸難功臣都監儀軌 ). Seoul : Seoul Taehakkyo, Kyujanggak , 1999 . Im Ch’olho ( 㧚㻶䢎 ). S ŏ rhwa ŭ i minju ŭ i y ŏ ksa ŭ isik ( 說話㢖民衆㦮蔫史意識 ). Seoul : Chimmundang , 1989 . Injo sillok ( 仁祖實錄 ). Kim Taehy ŏ n ( 金大賢 ). Yuy ŏ ndang chip (悠然堂集 ), in Kyujanggak , No. 5472. Kim Jongw ŏ n ( 金鍾圓 ). “ Ch ŏ ngmyo Horanshi ŭ i Hu-Jin ŭ i ch’ulby ŏ ng tonggi (丁卯胡亂時㦮後紼㦮出兵動機 ) ,” Tongyang sahak y ŏ n’gu (東洋史學硏究 ) 12–13 ( 1978 ): 55–93 . Ko Sang’an ( 高尙顔 ). T’aech’on chip ( 泰村集), in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan ( 韓國文集叢刊 ), Vol. 59. Seoul : Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe , 2000–9 . Kwanghaegun ilgi ( 光海君日記 ). Li Zhengyi ( 蝗徵儀 ). “Zaoji fangjiao yi gufeng jiangshu ( 早計防剿以固封疆疏 ),” in Chouliao shuohua ( 籌蘹碩畵 ), 1620. Meng Sen ( 孟森). “Huang Mingyi minfuxu (皇明遺民傳序),” in Ming–Qing shi lunshuo jikan ( 明淸史論著集刊 ). Taibei : Shijie shuju ( 世界書局 ), 1980 . Ming Shenzong shilu ( 明神宗實錄 ). Piby ŏ nsa t ŭ ngnok ( 備邊司謄錄 ). Qing Taizu shilu (淸太祖實錄 ). Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Sadae mun’gwe ( 事大文軌 ). Sajima Akiko ( 佐島顕子). “Jinshin Waran kō wa no hatan o megutte ( 壬辰倭亂講和の破綻をめぐって ) ,” Nenp ō Ch ō sengaku ( 年報朝鮮學 ) 4 ( 1994 ): 23–40 . Shim Kwangse ( 葘光世 ). Hyuong chip ( 休翁集), in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan ( 韓國文集叢刊 ), Vol. 84. Seoul : Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe , 2000–9 . S ŏ njo sillok ( 宣祖實錄 ). von Glahn , Richard . Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000– 1700 . Berkeley : University of California Press , 1996 . Chosŏn–Ming and Chosŏn–Later Jin relations 293

Y i C h ŏ ng’am (G蝗廷馣 ). Saryujae chip ( 四留齋集 ). Seoul : Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe , 1990 . Yi Homin (G蝗好閔 ), Obong chip ( 五峰集) 14:28b–28b, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan ( 韓國文集叢刊 ), Vol. 59. Seoul , Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe , 2000–9 . Y i N o ( 蝗編 ). Song’am chip ( 松巖集 ), in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan ( 韓國文集叢刊 ), Vol. 54. Seoul : Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe , 2000–9 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 14 Chosŏ n Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran State rituals in the Later Chos ŏ n period

Kuwano Eiji ( 桑野栄治 )

Introduction Following the outbreak of the Imjin Waeran at the end of the sixteenth century, the Chosŏ n government established two shrines, the Kwanwangmyo shrine in honor of the military god Guan Yu and the Sŏ nmusa to deify the generals of the Ming army. Rituals performed at Kwanwangmyo shrine and Sŏ nmusa were recorded in a compilation of rituals (K. saj ŏ n ) as state sacrifi ces or rites to honor the gods of heaven, earth, and man as performed by a kingdom. This manner of public worship provided a space in which Confucian beliefs could be enacted visually. The Chos ŏ n state noted all its rituals in a compilation of ritual protocol, producing Kukcho orye ŭ i (The Five Rites of the State) in 1474.1 In the mid-eighteenth century, the government compiled a supplement, entitled Kukcho sok oryeŭ i (Supplement to the Five Rites of the State), completed in 1744. 2 It was in this book of protocol from the later Chos ŏn period that the Kwanwangmyo shrine and the Sŏ nmusa, two shrines closely associated with the Imjin Waeran, newly gained their places as sites of low rituals.3 Because the rituals celebrated a military god and soldiers, the chief celebrants at the Kwanwangmyo shrine and the Sŏ nmusa were military offi cials (Jr. 2) rather than civil offi cials.4 Kukcho oryeŭ i divided all state rituals into three categories: high, middle, and low. 5 High ritual was conducted at the Sajikdan, a shrine to the gods of the land and an altar for the worship of the millet of the gods of a rich harvest, and at the Chongmyo, the royal shrine that housed the spirit tablets of former kings. Although rituals for Confucius were middle level, the Chos ŏ n court used Neo-Confucianism as its ruling ideology and placed emphasis on rites Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 celebrating Confucius (K. munmyoje, J. sekiten). The government established altars in the S ŏ nggyungwan, which was the state university, and in provincial schools.6 To emphasize the legitimacy of the Chos ŏ n kingdom, the government also conducted middle-level rituals for the founders of various Korean kingdoms such as Tan’gun and Kija of Old Chosŏ n, King Tongmy ŏ ng, Onjo, and Pak Hy ŏ kk ŏse of the Three Kingdoms, and Wang Kŏ n, the dynastic founder of Koryŏ . 7 However, Chos ŏn rituals differed from the Chinese case in certain ways.8 For example, the Wŏ n’gudan rituals that celebrated Tiandi, Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 295 the highest deity of Heaven for Confucians, were excluded from the Chosŏ n roster, because the only person who could celebrate Heaven was the Ming emperor.9 This understanding of the W ŏn’gudan rituals carried over into the late Chos ŏ n period. Recognition of the Kwanwangmyo shrine and the S ŏ nmusa as state rituals in the period after the Japanese invasion marks a radical break with the period before the invasion. Formerly, the Chosŏ n government had been renowned for placing more importance on the pen than the sword. Now, they were sanctioning the worship in Chosŏ n Korea of the military god Guan Yu and the Chinese generals who came to Chos ŏ n’s aid. Needless to say, in the background to this break with tradition were the wars of the Imjin Waeran and the Manchu invasions, as well as the change in the greater circumstances of East Asia as seen in the dynastic change from Ming to Qing. Nakamura Hidetaka pointed out that small shrines to worship the Ming generals had already been constructed by the time the Kwanwangmyo shrine was built in Hans ŏng. Reverence for the Chinese relief army increased together with the promotion of a general cult of remembrance and adoration for the Chinese aid extended during the Imjin Waeran (K. mo’my ŏ ng sasang ).10 The term mo’myŏng itself referred to “admiration of the Ming.” Furthermore, Nakamura also pointed out that during the reigns of King Sukcho (r. 1674–1720) and King Y ŏngjo (r. 1724–76), the Chos ŏ n government actively encouraged state rituals that inspired adoration of Ming China. 11 For example, under King Sukcho, the Ming Wanli emperor Shenzong (r. 1572–1620) and the Chongzhen emperor Yizong (r. 1627–44) were worshipped in the Mandongmyo, a shrine built privately by Kw ŏn Sangha, a disciple of Song Shiyŏ l, in 1703 in Hwayang-dong at Mt. Koe in Ch’ungch’ ŏng Province (Song Shiy ŏl’s home). Of course, Wanli was the emperor who provided relief aid to Korea during the Imjin Waeran, and Chongzhen was the last emperor to rule Ming China. Song Shiyŏl’s desire was to encourage village scholars and offi cials to honor the victims of the Japanese and Manchu invasions, and to realise the establishment of a national shrine to venerate the Ming. 12 The year 1704, one year after the completion of the Mandongmyo, was the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Ming dynasty in 1644, and the Chosŏ n government showed its respect to Ming China, who had rescued the Korean dynastic house from extinc- tion, by constructing the Taebodan (also known as the Hwangdan) in the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Ch’angd ŏkkung palace to celebrate the Wanli emperor. 13 The Taebodan was a ritual institution that embodied Chos ŏn’s consciousness of itself as a smaller incarnation of Sinitic civilization (K. so Chunghwa ŭ ishik ). King Y ŏngjo later deifi ed two Ming emperors, the Hongwu emperor (r. 1368– 98), founder of the Ming dynasty, and the Chongzhen emperor, to be worshipped alongside the Wanli emperor. 14 After another sixty years, on the nineteenth day of the third month of 1764, the king himself conducted an elaborate state ritual at the Taebodan to display gratitude towards Ming China on behalf of the whole nation. The nineteenth day of the third month 296 Kuwano Eiji was the day Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide on a hill behind the Forbidden City. There are several studies on state rituals in Korea from the second half of the seventeenth century that offer information on how Korean intellectuals viewed rituals and how they viewed the Chinese in the later Chosŏ n period. In the following, I will consider how the Chosŏ n government dealt with the Chinese from the time of the Imjin Waeran to the Ming–Qing transition. It has been noted that the Chosŏ n government was mistrustful of the Chinese army;15 how then did the Chos ŏ n government justify including state rituals that had such strong links with the Chinese army? This chapter will examine changes in state rituals from the end of the sixteenth century to the fi rst half of the seventeenth century and consider the impact of the Imjin Waeran on the views and behavior of late Chos ŏ n society towards the Ming and Qing dynasties.

The Kwanwangmyo shrine rituals for Guan Yu during the Imjin Waeran: praying for victory in war The Guan Yu cult was brought to Korea by Ming generals. In the fourth month of 1598, the Ming generals who led the Korean relief operation erected the South Kwanwangmyo shrine outside the Sungnyemun (Namdaemun) gate of Hans ŏng. In the eighth month of 1601, the Chosŏ n government complied with a request made by Ming generals to have an East Kwanwangmyo shrine built outside the Hŭ ng’inmun (Tongdaemun) gate. 16 The Ming generals did not restrict the construction of Kwanwangmyo shrine to the royal capital in Hans ŏng. They also built shrines to pray for victory in war at Kangjin (1597) and Namwŏ n (1599) in Chŏ lla Province and at Sŏ ngju (1597) and Andong (1598) in Kyŏ ngsang Province. Because Korea had never seen anything like the Kwanwangmyo shrine, with its worship of Guan Yu as a militaristic deity, the dynastic government could not hide its nervousness when there was only a day left before the thirteenth of the fi fth month, Guan Yu’s birthday. The Board of Rites expressed its opinions to King S ŏ njo in the following memorial:

Our country has no precedent of observing the rites of the Kwanwangmyo, and we have yet to be able to make a fi nal decision on the formalities

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 for the ceremony. Needless to say, it would be distressing to treat this matter lightly. If the Celestial Generals (Ming generals) strongly urge his Majesty to worship, then it becomes unavoidable. Perhaps we could, for the time being, do as the Border Defense Council (K. Piby ŏ nsa) has suggested, which is to conduct a simple ceremony of burning incense to show our respect. The King ordered that to be done.17

A report submitted to King Sŏ njo by the Border Defense Council on the same day records a dialogue exchanged between the High State Councilor Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 297 ( U ŭ ij ŏ ng ), Yi Tŏ khy ŏ ng, and a Ming general. “Our senior generals always make four bows, so we suggest the Korean king do the same,” said the general; “We see no reason why the King of Chosŏ n should not kneel before the Kwanwangmyo shrine once. After all, it was built specially for Korea.”18 It was not only the Border Defense Council and the Board of Rites that regarded the Kwanwangmyo shrine ceremony with perplexity. The Offi ce of the Special Counselors (K. Hongmun’gwan ) scholars studied documents on ceremony after receiving the king’s order, but could fi nd no previous examples that would be useful as a model for the Kwanwangmyo shrine ceremony. By consulting Da Ming huidian (Collected Statutes of Great Ming), the Offi ce of the Special Counselors was at least able to report that in China they dispatched offi cials to take part in ceremonies on the festival days of “the beginnings of the four seasons” (fi rst, fourth, seventh, and tenth months in the lunar calendar were designated as the fi rst months of the four seasons), the year-end festival, and Guan Yu’s birthday.19 The Chos ŏ n government had frequently turned to Da Ming huidian for instructions on maintaining a sound administrative structure in the past, and they had printed and distributed a Korean imprint of the Chinese manual to offi cials during the reign of King My ŏ ngjong (1545–67).20 In China, the Hongwu emperor performed rites for Guan Yu in Nanjing, and after the capital was moved to Beijing, the third emperor, Yongle, also held regular services for Guan Yu. The Wanli emperor was an avid patron of the Guan Yu shrine in Jiezhou, Shanxi Province (Guan Yu’s birthplace) and in Luoyang, Henan Province, where Guan Yu’s head was entombed. The Wanli emperor idolized the military god to the extent of conferring the title of “Emperor” on him. 21 The news of Ming fervor for Guan Yu even reached Chos ŏ n. For example, Yu Sŏ ngnyong (1542–1607) saw Guan Yu’s shrines along the route between Liaodong and Beijing and recounted them in the popular collection of his writings, S ŏ ae chip, printed in 1633.22 Later, when King Sŏ njo gave audience to Xu Guowei, he learned from the Ming commander that during the reign of Taizu, Guan Yu was enfeoffed as King Wuan as a result of his secret support for Taizu, and in 1585 he was enfeoffed as the Xietian Dadi, or “Great Emperor that Collaborated with Heaven.”23 In the end, King S ŏ njo knelt before the South Kwanwangmyo shrine, lit incense, raised a toast in honor of Guan Yu, and then performed a kowtow. 24

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 This was the fi rst instance of a Kwanwangmyo shrine ceremony having been conducted by a Korean king. Although Sok Taejŏ n , the basic civil code of the later Chos ŏn period compiled in 1746, specifi es that the king of Chosŏ n perform the kowtow when he visits the Kwanwangmyo shrine, 25 King Sŏ njo’s personal conduct of the rituals was a rare case. In the following year (1599), on the thirteenth day of the fi fth month, ŏS njo dispatched an offi cial of the Board of Rites to the South Kwanwangmyo shrine to conduct the ritual, a more typical case. 26 Under the formality of “administrative conduct,” the Chos ŏn government sent bureaucrats to conduct rituals instead of the king. 27 298 Kuwano Eiji In short, the government was not enthusiastic about the Kwanwangmyo shrine rites. The likely scenario was that the Chosŏ n court felt obliged to establish these rituals, because the Ming generals observed Guan Yu’s birthday. Herein, we can glimpse an image of Ming China. In the sixth month of 1599, the Chos ŏ n government fi nalized plans to construct the East Kwanwangmyo shrine, but the work was delayed due to the general confusion in the country following the war and the tremendous burden it would have placed on the people, not to mention the size of a Chinese- scale edifi ce.28 The following comments by court historians represent a view shared by members of the Chos ŏ n government towards China:

Corvee labor to build the Kwanwangmyo is absurd in the extreme. It was wrong to have the Kwanwangmyo outside the Namdaemun [Great South Gate] in the fi rst instance, but we could not stop it being built. Now the government is about to embark on raising another one outside the Tongdaemun [Great East Gate]. How do we expect the survivors of the war to live? 29 Guan Yu is not even a Buddha, but the Chinese have an ashram set up in their Kwanwangmyo. This is abominable.30

The Chos ŏn government was opposed to the construction of both the South and the East Kwanwangmyo shrines. In the eyes of the Confucian bureaucrats, the sight of the Ming generals worshiping at the Kwanwangmyo shrine was bizarre. To Nakamura Hidetaka, “It appears that the Chos ŏ n government attached greater importance to the East Kwanwangmyo shrine. This is natural, because the Koreans themselves constructed this Kwanwangmyo shrine in the midst of hardship.”31 Nakamura poses a hypothesis of Korean interest, but there is no evidence in S ŏ njo shillok that S ŏnjo actually worshipped at the East Kwanwangmyo shrine after it was completed. Additionally, we fi nd no evidence of any discussions concerning the management of the Kwanwangmyo shrine ceremonies between the tenth month of 1601 and the end of the Sŏ njo era. At least during Sŏ njo’s reign, therefore, we cannot say that the Chos ŏ n government took any particular interest in the East Kwanwangmyo shrine. The Offi ce of the Inspector General summed up the situation: “From the beginning, the construction of the Kwanwangmyo shrine was never of national signifi cance, but this shrine

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 was built over three years of resentment.”32 References to such antipathy against the establishment of the Kwanwangmyo shrine can also be found surviving from the King Kwanghae period (r. 1608–23). According to the Kwanghaegun ilgi manuscript preserved in the T’aebaeksan archive, King Kwanghae ordered the Board of Rites in 1612 to improve the maintenance and repair of the Kwanwangmyo shrine, but in the process, he divulged his true feelings: “If only the Ming generals had not bothered to build the Kwanwangmyo shrine, we would not be in this position.” 33 The Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 299 T’aebaeksan manuscript note was deleted during the editing of the Korean veritable records, 34 but it illustrates that the establishment of the Kwanwangmyo shrine did not have the wholehearted support of the Chos ŏ n government. One suspects that King Kwanghae had no choice but to resign himself to the situation as it was then. We cannot fi nd any evidence inKwanghaegun ilgi of King Kwanghae having conducted a ceremony in person, or of even having attended any services. The Chos ŏ n government merely dispatched offi cials to conduct rites at the Kwanwangmyo shrine twice annually, the fi rst at ky ŏ ngch’ip (when insects awaken and appear in the second month of the lunar calendar, or early March), and the second at sanghang (when the world surrenders to frost in the ninth month of the lunar calendar, or late October or early November).35

Muyŏ lsa shrine and the Sŏ nmusa shrine: ritual ceremonies for the Ming auxiliary army

The construction of the Muy ŏ lsa shrine A saengsa, which is a “shrine for the living,” is a small shrine erected in recognition of a celebrated living person. The oldest example of a saengsa is documented in the Chinese chronicle, Hanshu . 36 The fi rst mention of state rituals for the purpose of the Ming auxiliary troops appears in S ŏ njo shillok in the second month of 1593. 37 The Border Defense Council presented a memorial proposing to erect a stone monument bearing an inscription honoring Supreme Commander (Ch. Tidu ) Li Rusong of Ming China and proposing that his portrait be commissioned and enshrined in a saengsa . As is well known, in the twelfth month of 1592, Li Rusong led an army of 40,000 men drawn together as an “Eastern Expedition Army,” crossed the Yalu River, and recaptured P’y ŏngyang in the fi rst month of 1593.38 Li Rusong had serving directly under him the Left Commander Yang Yuan, the Middle Commander Li Rubo, and the Right Commander Zhang Shijue. It is important to note that the Chosŏ n government fi rst put a plan forward to have a saengsa constructed for Li Rusong rather than the Minister of War (Ch. Bingbu Shangshu ) Shi Xing, who was included as an after-thought. King S ŏnjo authorized this plan to go ahead, but it took some time before the Muy ŏ lsa shrine was fi nally completed. Nakamura Hidetaka observed that the exact establishment of the Muyŏ lsa

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 shrine “is not clear.”39 The following 1593 extract from S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok illustrates the point:

Li Rusong was outstanding in appearance and magnanimous in character … Later, under the command of his majesty the king, a shrine dedicated to Shi Xing and Li Rusong was erected in P’yŏ ngyang, and Li Rubo, Zhang Shijue, and Yang Yuan were also enshrined as subsidiaries. In the 300 Kuwano Eiji hall of prayers a plaque was hung, inscribed with the characters muy ŏ l [military passion or merit].40

Taedong chiji by Kim Ch ŏngho, completed in 1864, mentions the installation and worship of memorial tablets for the fi ve heroes in the Muyŏ lsa shrine: Shi Xing, Li Rusong, and the three Ming commanders in 1593. 41 The gazetteer compilation Y ŏ ji tos ŏ , from the Yŏ ngjo period (1724–76), mentions the construction in 1593 by Governor Yi Wŏ n’ik.42 Certainly, Yi W ŏ n’ik was in service as both the civil and military governor of P’yŏ ng’an Province at the time, and he recaptured P’yŏ ngyang with Li Rusong.43 These notes make it appear that the Muyŏ lsa shrine was built in 1593, but the completion seems to have been much later. The available evidence is vague and lacks suffi cient detail to determine the matter. Concrete debate over the construction of the Muyŏ lsa shrine appears in the veritable records from 1594. In that year the Chos ŏ n government decided to authorize the worship of Shi Xing and Li Rusong in the same shrine in P’y ŏ ngyang:

The Border Defense Council memorialized His Majesty, “Minister Shi is the one who deserves the greatest accolade, because it was he who helped us in the beginning by defying a barrage of counter-arguments and sending an army. We must have a tablet prepared in his name, have it enshrined alongside Supreme Commander Li and the other three commanders, and offer rites. That would represent our most earnest and respectful feelings towards him.” The king replied, “Do just that. But I feel that three commanders are too many, so discuss the matter further.”44

Originally, the Border Defense Council had planned to enshrine Li Rusong in P’y ŏngyang, but they were now considering the outstanding qualities of the Ming Minister of War Shi Xing. King S ŏ njo approved of this but expressed reservations about rites for “the three commanders,” Li Rubo, Zhang Shijue, and Yang Yuan. It is quite possible that the difference of opinion was the reason behind the delay in the construction of the Muyŏ lsa shrine. When the new year arrived, King Sŏ njo sent an offi cial note to the Royal Secretariat (K. S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n ):

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The matter regarding Minister Shi’s saengsa has been fi nalized. Although we cannot build a saengsa for any other Ming generals, Minister Shi and Commander Li will be commemorated together. There will be a state ritual performed in their honor before the Celestial Ambassador comes to court. This news must be communicated to the “civilized men” [hwa’in or Ming Chinese]. 45 Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 301 King S ŏ njo was in favor of holding commemorative services for Shi Xing and Li Rusong, but delayed a decision about doing the same for Li Rubo, Zhang Shijue, and Yang Yuan. It must be noted, however, that neither Li Rusong’s portrait nor a stone monument bearing an inscription had been prepared at that point. A stonemason was standing by with a suitable stone to start work on the stele in P’yŏ ngyang, but he had to wait for the return of the Minister of Rites Yun Kŭnsu, who was away in Beijing on a mission, before he could inscribe Yun’s commemorative message on the stone. 46 Thus a realistic date of commencement for the construction of the Muyŏ lsa shrine was after the fi rst month of 1595. Another reason for delays in the construction of the Muyŏ lsa shrine was resistance or dissatisfaction from among the commanders. Among the three commanders, Yang Yuan made the following objections to the construction of the Muyŏ lsa shrine. As he was one of the people to be worshipped there, his comments are rather interesting.

I have heard that in Chosŏ n, you paint a portrait of commanders and hang that in the shrine, but today the merit accruing from the subjugation of the enemy lies with the martial prowess (K. wimu ) of the Ming Emperor. Why are you denigrating the achievements of His Majesty and talking of my strength? 47

Yang Yuan emphasized the Wanli emperor’s “martial prowess,”48 but herein we can fi nd a hint of jealousy directed towards Li Rusong. Again, it seems that the construction date of the Muy ŏ lsa shrine is unclear from this evidence, but there is more information that does allow a rough estimate. A Korean veritable record source dating after this time tells us that Chŏ ng Kiw ŏn, the Sixth Royal Secretary of the Royal Secretariat (S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n Tongbus ŭ ngji), was in China as S ŏnjo’s royal envoy. He was delivering a message from his government, asking for military support in preparation for Japan’s renewed attack. On this occasion, Chŏ ng Kiw ŏ n said to Yang Yuan, “We cannot forget the achievements of Li Rusong, so we have built a shrine in his honor in P’y ŏ ngyang.”49 It was in the eleventh month of 1596 that Ch ŏ ng Kiw ŏn went to China under King S ŏnjo’s command, following the breakdown of the peace negotiations between China and Japan. 50 We can deduce from this that by the eleventh month of 1596, at the latest, the construction

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of the Muy ŏ lsa shrine had been completed in P’y ŏ ngyang. Afterwards, news arrived in Chos ŏ n of Shi Xing’s dismissal as Minister of War, having been held responsible for the breakdown of peace negotiations between China and Japan in 1597. Two years later, a report arrived stating that he had died in prison.51 Li Rusong, on the other hand, was a Korean- Chinese, and according to T’aengniji (1754, by Yi Chunghwan), Li Rusong always used to say, “I am Korean in origin.”52 Chonju hwip’y ŏ n ( c.1830) reports that in the Yŏ ngjo era, Li Rusong was enshrined at the Taebodan as a 302 Kuwano Eiji subordinate to Emperor Wanli. 53 The Chos ŏn government rated the achievements of Li Rusong, who actively took charge of the situation in Korea, higher than those of Shi Xing, who commanded the military rescue from his desk in Beijing.

The construction of the S ŏ nmusa shrine Following the end of the Imjin Waeran, in 1599, the Chosŏ n government enshrined Military Commissioner (Ch. Junmen ) Xing Jie in Hansŏ ng.54 This was the S ŏ nmusa shrine. The conditions under which it was built, however, were different from the Muy ŏ lsa shrine in P’y ŏ ngyang. The idea of erecting the Sŏ nmusa shrine did not come from the Chosŏ n government but was constructed at the request of the Ming offi cial himself. According to S ŏ njo shillok , the Border Defense Council addressed the following to the king:

It was the Military Commissioner himself who told us to prepare a shrine and poetry in his honor. It would be wise to do as he says quickly to pla- cate him. The problem is that if we prepare a shrine and poetry for the Military Commissioner, the commanders of the four route armies [east, middle, west, and water made up the “Eastern Expedition Army”] will undoubtedly want to be treated in the same way. An uncomfortable situation will arise if we treat them unfairly, for those who are denied their shrine and poetry will become indignant. What I suggest is, fi rst, tell the Military Commissioner about our plan to build his shrine and then be slow about painting his portrait and constructing the building. As for the poetry, that should be composed fi rst and sent to him. The King agreed and ordered it done. 55

It is clear that the Border Defense Council, unwilling to accept Xing Jie’s request straight away, advised King S ŏ njo to deal with the painting of the portrait and the construction of the shrine with discretion. Although the portrait and the shrine were both completed about six months later in the ninth month of 1599, the ceremonial program, the offerings to be placed in front of the altar, and even the name for the shrine remained undecided. The comptroller of state rituals, the Board of Rites, memorialized the following Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 to the king:

Because the portrait has been fi nished, we should hang it in the shrine, but the protocol for the rite has not been completed, so we have delayed matters until the present. Now, considering carefully the guidelines for the shrine that celebrates Supreme Commander Li [Rusong] [emphasis added], it appears that the ceremony should take place on a designated day in the middle of every second month [mid-spring] and eighth month [mid-autumn]. We should prepare the offerings to be placed in front of Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 303 the altar according to Jingzhonglu [1585] and in consideration of our own military rites (K. tukche ). The decision over the name of the shrine has been assigned to the Offi ce of Royal Decrees.56

The Muy ŏ lsa shrine that celebrated Li Rusong and others served as a model when the Board of Rites was considering how the S ŏ nmusa shrine rites should be performed. The memorial above makes it clear that the offerings at the Muy ŏlsa shrine were decided in accordance with the guidelines specifi ed in Jingzhonglu , 57 and that the ceremony structure was organized with the tukche military rites in mind. The character tuk refers to military banners and che to rites. During King Sejong’s reign (1418–50), the military rites were classifi ed as low ritual in the offi cial directory of state rituals. 58 Since Koreans had no precedent in worshipping a historical fi gure as a military god, they followed the example of the Chinese and worshipped military standards that symbolized war gods. Evidently, the Board of Rites had conducted a thorough survey into matters relating to the shrine. For the Chosŏ n government, this would be the fi rst time it had conducted state rituals to enshrine a portrait dedicated to a living person. For this reason, the Border Defense Council asked King S ŏ njo to have the Board of Rites conduct deliberations. Not only the Border Defense Council and the Board of Rites, but the king as well exercised caution in this matter and sent the following directive to the Royal Secretariat (S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n ):

On the day when we hang the portraits in the shrine we should compose a special address as the ceremonial statement for the enshrined spirits, dispatch an offi cial, and have him read it. This is not just ceremonial liturgy, but is also done in hopes that our resident generals will hear of it. Discuss this proposal and tell me what you think.59

All this would not matter so much if the Ming armies had already withdrawn, but they were still in the country. For this reason, King Sŏ njo must have been carefully considering the ceremonial questions in connection with the presence of the Ming generals. Above all, he pressed for the content of the special address to avoid any disparagement of dignity (K. ch’aemy ŏ n ). 60 There is a difference between preserving “dignity” and “remembrance and adoration for the Chinese.” In response to the king’s directive, the Board of Rites offered a Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 compromise proposal stating,

to compose a special address as the ceremonial statement and go into detail regarding the intentions behind establishing the shrine with its portrait and reading this on the day of enshrinement should pose no confl ict with the annual recitation of the memorial statement already sanctioned by His Majesty.

The king accepted this.61 304 Kuwano Eiji It is obvious that the Board of Rites structured the Sŏ nmusa shrine ceremony according to the precedent of the Muy ŏlsa shrine in P’y ŏngyang, but there was another similarity. Let us return to the expression in the Korean veritable records for the Muy ŏ lsa shrine, “the shrine that celebrates Supreme Commander Li [Rusong].” Although the memorial tablet celebrating Shi Xing was dominant over the others enshrined in the Muy ŏlsa shrine in P’y ŏ ngyang,62 the Chos ŏn government favored the subordinate Li Rusong, and this is why the veritable records refer to the Muy ŏ lsa shrine in this fashion. The Sŏ nmusa shrine was to have a similar favorite who was also a subordinate deity. In the seventh month of 1604, Sŏ njo commanded that Yang Hao, a Commissioner (Ch. Jingli ) for the Ming government, also be honored as a subordinate hero in the Sŏ nmusa shrine.63 Yang Hao is famous for directing an army of elite troops to Mount Chiksan in Ch’ungch’ŏ ng Province where they successfully blocked Japanese troops from advancing on Hansŏ ng.64 The Chos ŏn government may have constructed the S ŏnmusa shrine in compliance with the wish of the Ming generals, but the idea to revere Yang Hao was S ŏ njo’s own. In the tenth month of 1599, Sŏ njo instructed the Royal Secretariat to have the four characters that meant “rebuilding a vassal country” (K. chaejo p ŏ nbang), which he had personally brushed, carved on a board for display at the Sŏ nmusa shrine. 65 The four characters signifi ed that the suzerain state, China, had reconstructed its subordinate, bulwark state, Chosŏ n. 66 The meaning of the four characters becomes clear from the internal debate over the installation of Yang Hao. In this connection, let us consider King S ŏ njo’s memoranda (K. pi’manggi ) to the Royal Secretariat.

In 1597, Namwŏ n fell, and the bandit forces were victorious and stream- ing northwards. They were pressing on Kijŏ n. The local people had fl ed into hiding and the capital was in a panic. At that moment, Commissioner Yang [Hao] came to our aid from P’yŏ ngyang. He donned his armor and covered twice the distance in half the time, entering the capital and taking command. He distributed the commanders between Ch’ŏ n’an and Chiksan for an ambush, put the bandits in a pincer, and defeated them. Because of this, the capital was secured and we restored our superior position … In the old days, as soon as a shrine was built, we always

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 chose subordinates to be worshipped alongside the main fi gures, but the S ŏnmusa has no subordinate. I wish to put forward Commissioner Yang to take this subsidiary position. Discuss this widely and report to me. If it is deemed satisfactory, tell the Border Defense Council to determine how the Winter Envoy to Ming China could bring back a portrait [of Yang Hao].67 Send my most loyal offi cials to the ŏS nmusa and have them perform rites. As for the shrines dedicated to the Celestial (Ming) soldiers, the Minch’ungdan, send bureaucrats to the shrine in Hans ŏng, and for those Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 305 in the provinces, appoint provincial governors and county magistrates as celebrants.68

King S ŏ njo addressed the fi rst paragraph of the above extracts to the Border Defense Council and the second to the Board of Rites. On receiving this royal directive, the Board of Rites replied, “Rites have already been performed at the Sŏ nmusa shrine, so it would be proper, from the perspectives of both sentiment and decorum, to hold rites at the Muyŏ lsa shrine as well.” The king responded to this advice by ordering that specially chosen government offi cials from Hans ŏng be sent to conduct the Muyŏ lsa rites.69 It was clear that, in the Chos ŏ n period, the two state rituals – the Sŏ nmusa and the Muyŏ lsa – were closely related. No record exists in the Korean veritable records for 1604 of how the rituals honoring Ming soldiers at the Minch’ungdan (to be discussed below) were conducted in either Hans ŏ ng or the provinces. The Border Defense Council’s reply to the king was slightly later than that from the Board of Rites. The Border Defense Council raised no objections to the king’s wishes in both matters, the appointing of Yang Hao as a subsidiary god and acquiring a portrait of him. 70 On the contrary, the Border Defense Council assessed the achievements of Yang Hao – that he helped rebuild Chos ŏn – very highly, even to the extent of recommending that he be made the main deity in the S ŏ nmusa shrine. As they did for the Muy ŏlsa shrine, the Chos ŏn government attached more importance to the subsidiary deity in the Sŏ nmusa shrine, Yang Hao, than to its primary deity, Xing Jie. The following provides an insight into the level of respect Yang Hao had won.

Yang Hao left Chosŏ n, having been dismissed from his post. His majesty the king led all the offi cials [outside the city walls] as far as the Guest House for the Chinese ambassador (K. Hongjew ŏ n )71 shedding tears to bid fi nal farewell to Yang Hao. The townsfolk of Hansŏ ng, both men and women, shook their heads in despair, and the elderly went out from the city walls reciting prayers for Yang Hao’s safe journey. In recognition of the illustrious career of Yang Hao, our country has erected a stone stele in the Mohwa’gwan extolling his accomplishments and the offi cials composed poetry as a parting gift.72

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 The above extract is taken from Shin Kyŏ ng’s Chaejo pŏ nbangji , a work that documents the relationship between Korea and China during the Imjin Waeran. It was published in 1753 in Y ŏ ngch’ ŏ n, Ky ŏ ngsang Province. 73 According to Shin Kyŏ ng, an erudite pundit of the early seventeenth century, Yang Hao’s sacking was a result of slander, and he went back to China in the eighth month of 1598.74 King S ŏnjo, very sorry to have to part with the Chinese hero, traveled beyond the city walls of his capital to see him off, even as far as the Guest House for the Chinese ambassador. Shin states that the Chos ŏ n government erected a stele in honor of the Chinese general. This 306 Kuwano Eiji memorial tablet was later transferred to the S ŏnmusa shrine on the occasion of the Taebodan ritual in 1764.75

The S ŏ nmusa shrine and the Muy ŏ lsa shrine in the early half of the seventeenth century Now let us turn our attention to how the dynastic government after King S ŏ njo dealt with the Sŏ nmusa shrine and the Muyŏ lsa shrine ceremonies. From the fi rst half of the seventeenth century, hardly any Korean veritable records regarding the shrines are left. From the King Kwanghae era, only the following record from 1614 appears.

Repair work on the Nampyŏ lgung, the Taep’yŏ nggwan, the Kwanwangmyo, the Sŏ nmusa, and the Yang Ŏ sa [Ch. Yang Hao] memorial tablet building are carried out without fail when we expect a visit from the Ming envoy, but once he leaves, the buildings once again fall into decay. From now on, give strict orders to the ministry responsible for maintaining these prop- erties so that they are kept in good condition.76

This kingly directive dating from 1614 was omitted from the later manuscript version of Kwanghaegun ilgi or the Chŏ ngjoksan archive manuscript for unknown reasons. At the time, King Kwanghae raised questions about the maintenance of the two diplomatic residential buildings used for Ming embassies, the Nampy ŏlgung and the Taep’y ŏnggwan. He also mentioned the Kwanwangmyo shrine, the S ŏnmusa shrine, and the Yang Ŏ sa memorial tablet building, which were institutions connected with the Chinese military aid during the Imjin Waeran. The Nampy ŏlgung was an alternative royal residence, but during the Imjin Waeran the Supreme Commander of the Japanese army, Ukita Hideie, and his Chinese equivalent, Li Rusong, both billeted there.77 Afterwards, the successive Korean kings received ambassadors from Ming and Qing at the Nampyŏ lgung. The Taep’y ŏnggwan was built as a reception hall for Ming envoys. 78 The Yang Ŏsa stele was erected in 1612 by the Chosŏ n government honoring Yang Hao. It was placed beside the Mohwa’gwan, an arrival and departure reception hall for Ming envoys. 79 The Chos ŏ n government erected all these buildings for the benefi t of its suzerain state, Ming China. Some time later, when news reached his court that a Ming envoy was coming, King

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kwanghae had repair work carried out on the East Kwanwangmyo shrine and the Yang Hao tablet hall. 80 Hence, we can see from King Kwanghae’s directive the solicitous concern of the Chosŏ n kingdom towards Ming China. At the same time, it speaks of negligence following the Imjin Waeran towards the buildings with Chinese diplomatic and military associations. In the succeeding King Injo period (1623–49) are two Korean veritable record entries relating to the Muyŏ lsa shrine and Sŏ nmusa shrine. The following extract from Governor Chang Shin’s report from P’y ŏng’an Province illustrates the state of the Muy ŏ lsa shrine after the Manchu invasion of 1627. Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 307 The Muyŏ lsa of P’y ŏ ngyang is actually a shrine for the fi ve generals of the Eastern Expedition at the time of the Imjin Waeran. The shrine structure survived the 1627 Manchu invasion, but of the fi ve portraits only the one of Minister Shi [Xing] remains unimpaired. Li Rubo’s portrait is missing from the waist down, and we do not know what has become of the remaining three. Sooner or later, we are bound to receive an envoy from Ming China, and even at this moment we have a “Tang general” [Ming general] staying here. Someone will notice the missing portraits. Please have deliberations begun in the appropriate ministry [about what to do].81

When Chang Shin wrote this in 1634, seven years had elapsed since the 1627 Manchu invasion, and the 1636 Manchu invasion was still two years in the future. In the confusing aftermath of the 1627 invasion, the three missing portraits of the Ming generals could not be traced. For the seven years following the end of the fi rst Manchu invasion in 1627, the Muyŏ lsa services in P’yŏ ngyang must surely have been greatly inconvenienced by the missing portraits. The Board of Rites responded to this problem by restoring Li Rubo’s portrait, and it fi nally conceded, though reluctantly, to have memorial steles prepared to substitute for the missing three portraits. 82 The Muy ŏlsa shrine portraits were not the only loss. Another record from the King Injo period states that the Sŏ nmusa shrine was also stripped of its portraits, probably destroyed by fi re when the Qing army invaded Chosŏ n, and the celebrants found it very diffi cult to perform the services. The Chosŏ n government, however, could not suddenly abolish the services. The Board of Rites had memorial steles erected to replace the missing portraits and requested that the services continue as before. King Injo approved this, 83 but it is probable that during that period, the Sŏ nmusa shrine ceremonies were discontinued.

The Minch’ungdan shrine: the ritual protocol for the worship of the Ming war dead

The establishment of the Minch’ungdan shrine Although the state ritual for the Minch’ungdan is not specifi ed in the Kukcho sok oryeŭ i , it is also a ritual institution closely associated with the Imjin

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Waeran. In 1593, after the outbreak of the war, the Ming Ministry of Rites (Ch. Libu ) memorialized the Wanli emperor asking for the establishment of the Minch’ungdan shrine. S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok concisely records the circumstances as follows.

When the [Ming] Ministry of Rites memorialized the emperor that they wished to honor their war dead by creating shrines in P’yŏ ngyang, Kaes ŏ ng, Py ŏkche, and Hans ŏng, the emperor replied, “Call each of them the Altars of Grieving for Loyalty (K. Minch’ungdan shrine )” and 308 Kuwano Eiji gave his blessing. The Ministry of Rites was given government silver to prepare the offering utensils for the ceremonies.84

Just as it was for the Sŏnmusa shrine and Kwanwangmyo shrine, the founding of the Minch’ungdan shrine was not initiated by the Chosŏ n government. Not only that, but the Wanli emperor himself handed down the name. The fact that the Ming government subsidized the acquisition of the offering utensils must have appeared to the Koreans at least as a saving grace. The object of worship was not a specifi c Ming general, but the members of the Chinese army who died in the confl ict, and the Korean veritable records describe the Minch’ungdan shrine as “celestial court created shrines for the celestial soldier war dead. We call these the Minch’ungdan.”85 Actually, in the fi rst month of 1593, a fi erce battle between the Chinese and Japanese armies unfolded near Pyŏ kchegwan in Koyang County, Ky ŏ nggi Province. 86 On the fi rst day of the tenth month of 1593, when Sŏ njo returned to Hansŏ ng from his refuge in Ŭiju, P’yŏ ng’an Province, the fi rst thing he did was to go to the Mohwa’gwan and thank the emperor, performing four kowtows.87 Then he commanded that a shrine be erected in Pyŏ kche to honor the Ming soldiers who died there.88 There is no doubt that the Chosŏ n government established the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony in response to the Ming Ministry of Rites’ request, but the extract from S ŏ njo sujŏ ng shillok , quoted above, is too brief to substantiate further exactly which side initiated the matter. The letters from the Liaodong Regional Military Commission (Ch. Liaodong duzhi huishisi or Liaodong dusi ) addressed to the Korean king are a good source to consult on matters such as the scale of the Minch’ungdan shrine, its purpose, and practices. These diplomatic letters are found in the collection of Chosŏ n–Ming diplomatic documents called Sadae mun’gwe , compiled around 1619.89 It is highly likely that during the process of compiling the Sadae mun’gwe the compilers used record copies (K. t ŭ ngnok ) kept in the Offi ce of Diplomatic Correspondence S( ŭ ngmunw ŏ n ). 90 The earlier extract from S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok was based on these diplomatic letters.91 According to the series of letters exchanged between the Korean king and the Liaodong Regional Military Commission in Sadae mun’gwe , Ming China communicated to Chosŏ n the following four points: (1) In China, each district, province, and prefecture has their own “shrine to appease the dead” (K. y ŏ) and state rituals are performed in the spring and autumn in order to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 pacify the spirits of the dead. 92 That being so, we will set up four shrines in Chos ŏn, in P’yŏ ngyang, Kaes ŏ ng, Py ŏkche, and Hansŏ ng. 93 (2) The dimensions of the ceremonial grounds shall be 20 zhang (approx. 60 m) deep by 10 zhang (approx. 30 m) wide. The altar shall be 4 che (approx. 1.2 m) high and its width 4 zhang (approx. 12 m). 94 (3) A name-board reading “minzhong” (K. minch’ung ) shall be put up on the south side of the shrine gate, and around the four sides of the ground shall be erected steles with the inscription, “A stele in remembrance of the Great Ming troops who died in the war to subdue the east.” (4) For the time being, a member of the Liaodong Regional Military Commission will be dispatched as a celebrant. Sending a celebrant each year, Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 309 however, will become tedious, so we will send silver back with one of your Korean tribute envoys so that you can fi nance the ceremonies. The Minch’ungdan shrine ceremonies, therefore, were fundamentally memorial services for the deceased Ming soldiers. From the point of view of the Ming government, an element of appeasement must have been a con- tributory element when they founded this ritual, because there had been many disgruntled soldiers who were unhappy to be sent abroad to fi ght,95 and that is why the Ming government was very keen to institute this ritual. For example, we know that in 1595 Ming Commander (Ch. Youji ) Chen Yunhong held a memorial service for the war dead at the Minch’ungdan shrine in P’yŏ ngyang and Pyŏ kche. In P’yŏ ngyang the Ming general Zu Chengxun was defeated by the Japanese; at Pyŏ kchegwan, Li Rusong was also overwhelmed by a Japanese force. The fact that the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremonies were held under the directives of the Ming government can be confi rmed from the report written by Yi Shibal, who was the Escort Commissioner (K. ch ŏ ppansa, a temporary appointment for the purpose of entertaining foreign embassies) assigned to Chen Yunhong.

Today, the Commander [Chen Yunhong] held a Minch’ungdan ceremony at the Guest House for the Chinese ambassador [outside the city walls of Hans ŏng]. He formulated his own ceremony, and commanded that the rites be conducted accordingly hereafter. He had me pray at his side, and later said to me, “I would like to erect a stone memorial on this spot, and I would like to inscribe on the stone that I had been given an imperial command to conduct this service and that I did so.” Please have the appropriate agencies carry out his wish as quickly as possible.96

The Minch’ungdan shrine was erected near the Guest House for the Chinese ambassador. The points we can glean from this report in particular are fi rst, the ceremony was drawn up by a Ming general, not the Chos ŏ n government, and second, the Wanli emperor sent a military offi cial to Chosŏ n as the celebrant. They both underline the fact that, fundamentally, it was the Ming government that sponsored and carried out the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremonies. Although Commander Chen insisted on the “emperor’s command,” he took the matter to heart. The letter that the Liaodong Regional Military Commission sent

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 to King Sŏ njo recorded the ceremonial utensils and the offi cial statement of condolence (to be read in front of the spirits in the ritual), and starts with the sentence, “The Emperor sends an offi cer from the Liaodong Regional Military Commission who will conduct a memorial service for those who lost their lives in the war in Korea.” 97 To summarize, not only the name Minch’ungdan shrine, but everything related to this ritual – the celebrant, the statement of condolence, the fi nan- cing of the offerings – was prepared in accordance to the Chinese emperor’s orders. In a reply to the Liaodong Regional Military Commission, King Sŏ njo wrote, “I graciously accept his majesty’s kindness and compassion that have 310 Kuwano Eiji moved me to tears.”98 It becomes clear later, when we examine the practice of the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony, that this emotional response from King S ŏ njo was merely a diplomatic guise.

The revival of the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony A seventy-year gap yawns in the Korean veritable records before the next mention of the Minch’ungdan shrine in 1668. The reason for this can be surmised from the following entry.

His majesty the King has commanded a performance of the Minch’ungdan ceremony. The shrine is situated near the Guest House for the Chinese ambassador. Following the Imjin Waeran, Ming China founded an altar to commemorate the deaths of their soldiers who fought in the Eastern Campaign. Our country inherited these rites and observed them, but by the time of the 1636 Manchu invasion, they had ceased to be observed. Minister Kim Chwamyŏ ng of the Board of Taxation [K. Hojo ] has called for a revival of the ceremony. 99

Apparently, the Mingch’ungdan rites were suspended and resumed in 1668. 100 The exact date of suspension is not known, but it is clear that the practice of the Mingch’ungdan ceremony had died out before the Manchu invasion in 1636. In those days, the memorial tablets of the Chinese war dead were enshrined in the innermost sanctum (the spirit’s chamber) in Pongsangsa shrine, but details of the services were apparently not recorded in the offi cial directory of state rituals.101 Of course, from the time of the Manchu invasion, Chosŏ n’s suzerain state changed from Ming to Qing. The Minch’ungdan shrine was originally established as a result of Ming government desires, so now there was no pressing need for the Chosŏ n government to appease the dead spirits of Ming soldiers. Ming collapsed, ceasing to be Chos ŏn’s suzerain country, and Chosŏ n was invaded by Qing and surrendered. Because of all these changes, it was no surprise that the Minch’ungdan shrine rituals were forgotten. Let us now turn our attention to the reasons why the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony was revived in 1668. On the surface, it appears as if the cult of adoration for Ming China (K. mo’my ŏ ng sasang) reached new heights during King Hy ŏnjong’s reign (1659–74). That, however, is not the reason. In 1668, the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Korean peninsula was ravaged by famine, and contagious disease in the same year took 230 lives in Ky ŏ ngsang Province.102 Stories of how Kim Chwamy ŏ ng helped the people of Hansŏ ng and Ky ŏ nggi by handing out bowls of rice porridge reached the king.103 The Korean veritable records report the “great famine” in Ky ŏnggi, Hwanghae, and Ch’ungch’ŏ ng provinces and speaks of the severity of contagious diseases.104 The Chos ŏn government responded to this emergency by sending very senior offi cials (Sr. 2) to the Yŏ dan Altar in the northern suburb of Hansŏ ng to conduct the y ŏ je rites.105 They also sent offi cials (K. oktang ) from the Offi ce of Special Advisors to pacify the Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 311 war dead at the fi ve places that became the center of fi ghting in the Manchu invasion: Hŏ mch’ ŏ n River and Sangny ŏ ng Mountain in Kwangju in Ky ŏ nggi Province, K ŭmhwa in Kangw ŏn Province, T’osan in Hwanghae Province, and Kanghwa Island in Kyŏ nggi Province.106 Because Chos ŏ n did not have descendants who would pay homage to the Ming soldiers who fought in the Imjin Waeran, the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony took on a similar character to that performed at the Y ŏ dan Altar. The Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony owes its revival to this series of developments under King Hyŏ njong. Chos ŏn, however, suffered a further setback in 1670; this time from drought. The Chosŏ n government organized prayers for rainfall in Hansŏ ng but no time was found for ceremonies outside the capital. An offi cial from the Offi ce of the Inspector General memorialized the king on this occasion: “It is precisely at times like this, when natural disasters have struck, that we should restore our lapsed ceremonies.” The Chos ŏ n government sent trusted offi cials to Namwŏ n in Ch ŏlla Province and Chinju in Kyŏ ngsang Province, places where bloody battles were fought in the Imjin Waeran, in order to appease the spirits of the soldiers who died there. The model for these prayers was the “encouragement” rites performed in 1668.107 The Chos ŏn government had always reacted sensitively to natural disasters. For example, King T’aejong (r. 1400–18), who was profoundly infl uenced by the idea of divine punishment, revived the ritual of the state worship of Heaven (W ŏ n’gudan) as a prayer for rain. 108 In the King Hy ŏ njong period, the revival of the Minch’ungdan shrine ceremony at the time of famine and then drought refreshed memories of the Imjin Waeran in the minds of the Confucian offi cials. In the year following the drought (1671) the Chosŏ n government ordered the “encouragement” rites to be carried out in Hans ŏ ng and the provinces. They took the rites of 1668 as an example, and sent senior ministers to be celebrants at the Minch’ungdan shrine.109 The “provinces” here refers to the twelve sites that became the battlegrounds for the Imjin Waeran (Chinju, Namw ŏ n, K ŭ msan, Talch’ ŏ n, Sangju, Wŏnju, Ulsan) and the Manchu invasion of 1636 (Hŏ mch’ ŏ n, Sangny ŏ ng, K ŭ mhwa, T’osan, and Kanghwa). All these sites were described as “places where the king’s troops perished.” 110 Considering these developments, we can confi dently say that there was a revival of the Minch’ungdan shrine rites in the King Hyŏ njong period, and that there was also heightened awareness towards those who died in the two

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 confl icts. However, the revival of the Minch’ungdan shrine ritual instigated by Minister Kim Chwamyŏ ng of the Board of Taxation in 1668 was part of a relief program to combat famine. Famine and drought lay behind the resurrection of a custom that had once died out, rather than the promotion of a cult of adoration for Ming China. It would be correct to say that, in the early seventeenth century, the Minch’ungdan shrine rites had been forgotten by Korean society. As with the Kwanwangmyo shrine and the S ŏnmusa shrine, the Minch’ungdan shrine also became a focus of attention during the King 312 Kuwano Eiji Y ŏ ngjo period (r. 1724–76) when there was much structural enlargement in the organization of the Taebodan rituals.111 T’aesangji , completed in 1873, explains the Minch’ungdan shrine: “The altar is to the right of the Guest House for the Chinese ambassador. It originally celebrated the dead soldiers of the Great Ming, but these rites have been stopped.”112 The memorial tablets of the deceased Chinese soldiers at fi rst lay in the inner sanctum of Pongsang-sa temple, but in 1760, the Chosŏ n government moved them to the eastern side of the Sŏ nmusa shrine where the Chŏ ngdong Kwan’gunsa (the shrine for the soldiers of the Campaign to Pacify the East) was erected. 113 This was because King Y ŏngjo had issued a directive saying that, since the memorials of the Ming soldiers are inscribed with the brushwork of a Ming government offi cial, it is more appropriate that they be worshipped together with the Ming generals at the S ŏ nmusa shrine.114

Conclusion This chapter examined the Chosŏ n government response to Ming China during the period between the Imjin Waeran and the Ming–Qing transition from the perspective of Korean state rituals. Three types of rituals, each contributing to the distinctive character of the later Chos ŏ n period’s state rituals, were taken up for consideration: fi rst, the Guan Yu cult brought to Korea by the Chinese military; second, the ceremonies for the Ming generals; and third, the memorial services for Ming soldiers who died in Korea. The results can be summarized as follows. The Kwanwangmyo shrine ritual that worshipped the military god Guan Yu had no precedent in Chosŏ n. News of the Chinese devotion to Guan Yu reached Chosŏ n Korea via Yu S ŏngnyong’s travel diary, the regulations in Da Ming huidian, and talks between the Korean king and the Ming generals. After the construction of the Kwanwangmyo shrine, King Sŏ njo was left with no choice but to worship Guan Yu himself together with a Ming general on the birthday of the military god. In 1598, King Sŏ njo personally offi ciated at the Kwanwangmyo shrine, but afterwards the Chos ŏ n government sent a bureaucratic representative of the king twice yearly (spring and autumn) to conduct the service. When we examine the details of the discussions held at the time, it becomes apparent that the Chosŏ n government was opposed not only to the building of the South Kwanwangmyo shrine, but also to the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 East Kwanwangmyo shrine. The original manuscript of Kwanghaegun ilgi is particularly insightful in describing King Kwanghae’s skepticism about the Kwanwangmyo shrine. The Muyŏ lsa shrine in P’y ŏngyang and the S ŏnmusa shrine in Hans ŏng were built specifi cally for worship of the Ming commanders and generals. It is probable that the Muyŏ lsa shrine was built some time between the fi rst month of 1595 and the eleventh month of 1596. The Chosŏ n government enshrined the Ming Minister of War Shi Xing, Supreme Commander Li Rusong, and three other lesser generals in the Muyŏ lsa shrine. Of the fi ve, Li Rusong commanded most respect from the Koreans, because he had actually taken the Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 313 role of leader on the warfront. In the King Yŏ ngjo period, Li Rusong was honored in the Taebodan as a secondary fi gure to the Wanli emperor. While the Chos ŏn government built the S ŏnmusa shrine in Hansŏ ng in 1599 to honor Military Commissioner Xing Jie and later Commissioner Yang Hao, King Sŏ njo held the subsidiary fi gure, Yang Hao, in greater regard. When Yang Hao was dismissed from his post due to slander and was departing for China, the Korean government erected a stele in his honor. Although both the Muy ŏlsa shrine and the Sŏ nmusa shrine were built to demonstrate Chosŏ n’s respect and gratitude to the Ming troops, they were built under very different conditions. The Sŏ nmusa shrine was not proposed by the Chosŏ n government; it was the Ming generals themselves who requested it. During the King Kwanghae era, the administration of such institutions became very lax, and the situation was aggravated by the Manchu invasion of 1636, so much so that it posed a threat to the performance of rituals at these shrines. The Chos ŏ n government stepped in by replacing the portraits damaged by fi re with tablets so that services could be continued at both the Muyŏ lsa shrine and the Sŏ nmusa shrine. The Minch’ungdan shrine did not commemorate specifi c Ming generals, but rather ordinary Chinese soldiers who participated in the Korean campaign. In 1593, four Minch’ungdan shrines were erected (P’yŏ ngyang, Kaes ŏ ng, Py ŏ kche, and Hansŏ ng) in response to a request by the Ming Ministry of Rites to the Wanli emperor. Aware that they had to somehow mitigate the sorrow and displeasure of their soldiers, the Ming government supported the institutions willingly, offering a celebrant, preparing the prayers, and even paying for the offerings. Despite this, the shrines fell into disrepair from before the 1636 Manchu invasion. The Minch’ungdan shrine, being essentially an institution promoted by Ming China, fell prey to negligence, particularly after the Ming–Qing transition. The Minch’ungdan shrine services were revived in 1668, but behind that revival was famine and drought that brought havoc to the Korean peninsula. The Chos ŏn government hoped to instill a sense of security in its people by resuscitating discontinued rituals. A possible explanation as to why the service started to take on a different structure, one that was more akin to the more generalized rites of “encouragement” in times of duress, is because the dead Chinese soldiers enshrined in the Minch’ungdan shrine had no descendants in Korea. Consequently, it is diffi cult to relate directly the revival of Minch’ungdan shrine ritual during the reign of King Hy ŏ njong with a heightening of admiration for Ming China. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Notes A version of this chapter was published as “Ch ō sen k ōki ni okeru kokka saishi girei no hend ō: Jinshin Waran chokugo no Ch ōsen to Min,” Kurume daigaku bungakubu kiy ō , kokusai bunka gakka hen , 23 (2006): 31–53. Translated by Nakajima Sanae and Rachel Payne with James B. Lewis. 1 O n Kukcho orye ŭ i , see Yi P ŏ mjik, Han’guk chungserye sasang yon’gu, 1991, pp. 377–9, and Kuwano Eiji, “Chō sen jidai no kokka saishi to jukyō ,” 2003, pp. 37–41. 2 For a discussion of the editing process, see Yi Y ŏ ngch’un, “Chos ŏ n hugi,” 2002. 314 Kuwano Eiji

3 See Kukcho sok orye ŭ i s ŏrye in Kukcho oryeŭ i , 1979, fascicle 1, kirye (吉薰), pyŏ nsa ( 辨祀), p. 584. According to Yukch ŏ n chorye (1869), the Kwanwangmyo was upgraded from low to middle ritual. Yukch ŏ n chorye, 1979, last volume, fascicle 5, yej ŏ n ( 禮典 ), yejo (禮曹 ), ch ŏ nhyangsa ( 典享司 ), chesa ( 祭祀 ), p. 623. 4 Kukcho sok orye ŭ i s ŏrye , fascicle 1, kirye (吉薰), chegwan ( 齊官), p. 585. By the end of the nineteenth century, the rites were conducted by members of the hyangni class in Namwŏ n, Ch ŏ lla Province. See Honda Hiroshi, “Rizoku to mibun dentō no keisei,” 2004, pp. 50–4. 5 Kukcho oryeŭ i s ŏrye in Kukcho oryeŭ i , 1979, fascicle 1, kirye ( 吉薰 ), py ŏ nsa (辨祀 ), p. 351. 6 Kuwano Eiji, “Ch ō sen shoki,” 2000. 7 Kuwano Eiji, “Rich ō shoki no shiten,” 1990; and Kuwano Eiji, “Rich ō shoki ni okeru K ō rai Ō -shi saishi,” 1992. 8 Kaneko Sh ū ichi, Kodai Ch ū goku to k ō tei shisai , 2001, pp. 5–11. 9 Kuwano Eiji, “K ō rai kara Richō shoki ni okeru Enkyū tan [W ŏ ngudan] saishi,” 1996. This article was revised and included in Kuwano Eiji, K ō rai makki kara , 2004. 10 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen ni okeru Kan-U [Guan Yu],” 1973, p. 257. 11 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen no bomin shisō ,” 1972, p. 198. 12 Pak Chu, “Chos ŏ n Sukchong-jo,” 1980, p. 237. Chŏ ng Manjo, Chos ŏ n sidae sŏ w ŏ n y ŏ n’gu , 1997, pp. 148–54. For case studies from Kyŏ ngsang Province, see Yamauchi Tamihiro, “Waran kiroku to kenshō , saishi,” 2003. 13 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen no bomin shisō ,” 1972, pp. 210–17. Chŏ ng Okcha, Chos ŏ n hugi , 1998, p. 69. Yi T’aejin, “Chos ŏ n hugi tae-Min,” 1994, pp. 4–7. 14 Kuwano Eiji, “Ch ō sen sh ō ch ū ka ishiki,” 2001. For more on the Taebodan rituals, see Yi K ŭ nho, “Y ŏ ngjo ŭ i My ŏ ng T’aejo ihae,” 2003; Yamauchi K ō ichi, Ch ō sen kara mita kai shis ō , 2003, p. 44; Yi Y ŏ ngch’un, “Chos ŏ n hugi,” 2002, pp. 211–12. 15 Inaba Iwakichi, Kō kaikun [Kwanghaegun] jidai, 1933, pp. 81–91; Yu Kus ŏ ng, “Imnanshi Myŏ ngby ŏng,” 1976; and Pak Chaegwang, “Imjin Waeran y ŏ n’gu ŭ i hy ŏ nhwang kwa kwaje,” 2005, pp. 50–1. 16 Kim Yongguk, “Kwanwangmyo,” 1965, pp. 13–23; Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen ni okeru Kan-U [Guan Yu],” 1973; Han Myŏ nggi, Imjin Waeran, 1999, pp. 180–4; Shim Sŭ nggu, “Chos ŏ n hugi mumyo,” 2003, pp. 423–8. For the locations of the Kwanwangmyo, see Kim Chŏ ngho, Taedong yŏ jido , 1936, Kyŏ ngjo obu (京兆五部 ). To the east of the H ŭ ng’inmun is Tongmyo, and to the south of the Sungnyemun is the Nammyo. 1 7 Sŏ njo shillok , 100: 18a–18b (1598.5.12). 1 8 Sŏ njo shillok, 100: 17b–18a (1598.5.12). On bureaucratic systems in Korea and China in the sixteenth century, see Kitajima Manji, “Jinshin Waran ki no Chō sen to Min,” 1992, pp. 159–60. 1 9 Sŏ njo shillok, 100:18a (1598.5.12). Yamane Yukio, Sh ōtoku Dai Min kaiten (Ch. Zhengde Da Ming huidian ), 1989, fascicle 85, jisi (祭祀 ) 6, libu (禮部 ) 44, hesish- enqi ( 合祀神祇 ) 1, houzeng shenqi (後增神祇 ), p. 262.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 20 A 1552 edition of Zhengde Da Ming huidian is preserved in the H ōsa bunko ( 蓬左文庫 ) in Nagoya. See Kuwano Eiji, “Ch ō sen ban Sh ō toku dai Min kaiten ,” 1998. 21 Inoue Ichitame, “Kan U [Guan Yu] shimy ō,” 1937, pp. 61–5. Kojima Tsuyoshi, “Kokka saishi ni okeru gunshin no henshitsu,” 1992, p. 72. 2 2 Sŏ aejip , 1990, fascicle 16, chapjŏ ( 雜著 ), “Ki Kwanwangmyo” ( 記關王廟 ), p. 321. 2 3 S ŏ njo shillok , 111:13b–14a (1599.4.17). 24 Due to heavy rain on the thirteenth day of the fi fth month, the service given by King S ŏ njo was postponed until the following day. S ŏ njo shillok , 100:18b (1598.5.13); S ŏ njo shillok , 100:18b (1598.5.14). 2 5 Sok taejŏ n , 1972, fascicle 3, yej ŏ n ( 禮典 ), cho ŭ i ( 朝儀 ), p. 225. Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 315 2 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 113:8a (1599.5.13). 27 Even during the Tang dynasty, deputy priests substituted for the emperor in common state rites because imperial rituals were costly. Kaneko Shū ichi, Kodai Ch ū goku to k ō tei shisai , 2001, pp. 59–61. 28 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ōsen ni okeru Kan-U [Guan Yu],” 1973, pp. 253–4. Shim S ŭ nggu ( 沈勝求 ), “Chos ŏ n hugi mumyo,” 2003, pp. 425–6. 2 9 S ŏ njo shillok , 114:21a–21b (1599.6.22). 3 0 Sŏ njo shillok , 117:18a (1599.9.17). 31 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen ni okeru Kan-U [Guan Yu],” 1973, p. 257. 3 2 Sŏ njo shillok , 141:1a (1601.9.3). 3 3 Kwanghaegun ilgi , T’aebaeksan archive manuscript, 54:1a–1b (1612.6.1). 34 On the differences between the Ch ŏngjok-san archive text (the later manuscript version of the Kwanghaegun ilgi) and the original copy, the T’aebaeksan archive manuscript, see Suematsu Yasukazu, Ch ō senshi to shiry ō , 1997, pp. 342–5. 3 5 Kwanghaegun ilgi, T’aebaeksan archive manuscript, 54:1a–1b (1612.6.1). Kukcho sok oryeŭ i s ŏrye , fascicle 1, kirye (吉薰 ), shiil ( 時日 ), p. 584. In short, the Korean government systemised the ritual at the Kwanwangmyo as well as the Muyŏ lsa following the example of the tukche or military rites (discussed below). 3 6 Hanshu , 1962, fascicle 71, liechuan (列傳 ) 41, Yu Dingguo ( 于定国 ), p. 3041. 3 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 35:2b (1593.2.2). 38 For the outline of the war, see Yi Kyŏ ngs ŏ k, Jinshin senranshi , 1977, pp. 181–93. 39 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen no bomin shisō ,” 1972, p. 197. 4 0 S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 27:17b–18a (1593.9.–). 4 1 Taedong chiji , 1976, fascicle 21, P’yŏ ng’an-do, P’y ŏ ngyang, saw ŏ n ( 祠院 ), Muy ŏ lsa ( 武烈祠 ), p. 449. 4 2 Yŏ ji tos ŏ , fi nal volume, 1973, P’y ŏ ng’an-do, P’y ŏngyang-bu, Tanmyo (壇廟 ), Muy ŏ lsa ( 武烈祠 ), p. 651. 43 Ch ō sen sō tokufu ch ū s ū in, Chō sen jinmei jiten , 1937 (1972), p. 452. 4 4 S ŏ njo shillok , 56:29b–30a (1594.10.13). 4 5 S ŏ njo shillok , 59:2b (1595.1.4). 4 6 S ŏ njo shillok , 59:2a–3b (1595.1.6). 4 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 35:10b (1593.2.8). 48 Yang Yao made a similar point at a later date, again invoking the emperor’s “[martial] authority (K. wiry ŏ ng ).” S ŏ njo shillok , 35:31b–32b (1593.2.18). 4 9 S ŏ njo shillok, 86:26a–27a (1597.3.25). In the 1597 invasion, Chŏ ng Kiw ŏ n acted as an aide to Yang Yuan and died participating in the defense of Namwŏ n. S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 31:6a (1597.9.–). Yang Yuan was held responsible for the defeat and executed. See Ch ō senshi henshū kai, Ch’obon Chingbirok , 51, “the fall of Namw ŏ n ( 南原城陷 )”; S ŏ aejip, fascicle 16, chapchŏ ( 雜著), ki Namw ŏn hampaesa ( 記南原陷敗事 ). 5 0 Sŏ njo shillok , 82:32b (1596.11.12). 5 1 Liangchao pingranglu , fascicle 4, Riben shang (日本上 ), 1597.2.18 entry, pp. 95–8. S ŏ njo shillok , 118:21b (1599.10.17).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 5 2 Mingshi, fascicle 238, liechuan (列傳) 126, Li Chengliang ( 李成梁), Li Rusong ( 蝗如松 ), pp. 6183, 6192. T’aengniji , 1912, P’yŏ ng’an-do, p. 5. There is some controversy over the dating of the T’aengniji . I rely on Koishi Akiko, “Yi Chunghwan to T’aengniji ,” 1985, p. 84. 5 3 Chonju hwip’yŏ n , last volume, 1985, fascicle 8, Hwangdanji (皇壇志 ), Chongyang cheshin ( 從享諸臣), pp. 117–18. Chonju hwip’y ŏ n was commissioned under King Ch ŏ ngjo (r. 1776–1800) and completed under King Sunjo (r. 1800–34). For details on its compilation process, see Chŏ ng Okcha, Chos ŏ n hugi , 1998, pp. 129–40. 54 For a synopsis of the construction of the S ŏnmusa, see Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ōsen no bomin shis ō,” 1972, pp. 197–8; Han My ŏ nggi, Imjin Waeran , 1999, 316 Kuwano Eiji pp. 82–4. The Sŏ nmusa can be identifi ed inSus ŏ n ch ŏ ndo by Kim Chŏ ngho, just to the north of the Sungnyemun (Namdaemun). See Han’guk tosŏ gwanhak y ŏ n’guhoe, Han’guk ko chido , 1977, p. 121. 5 5 Sŏ njo shillok , 107:28a (1598.12.29). 56 Offi ce of Royal Decrees (Yemun’gwan ). S ŏ njo shillok , 117:2a–2b (1599.9.1). 57 In order to boost troop morale, King S ŏnjo had reprinted information on the establishiment of the ancestral hall for the Southern Sung dynasty patriot Yue Fei (1103–42), who resisted the invasion of the Jin. S ŏ aejip, fascicle 17, pal ( 跋 ), ch ŏ ngch’ungnokpal ( 精忠録跋), pp. 343–4. See also Maema Ky ō saku ( 前間恭作 ), Kosen sappu , 1944, pp. 1094–5. 58 Kuwano Eiji, “Rich ō shoki ni okeru kokka saishi,” 1993, pp. 137–40. For Ming period rites for military standards, see Yamamoto Sakura, “Mindai no Kit ōby ō ,” 2004. 5 9 S ŏ njo shillok , 117:18a (1599.9.17). 6 0 S ŏ njo shillok , 117:18a (1599.9.17). 6 1 S ŏ njo shillok , 117:18a (1599.9.17). 62 Minister of War at the time of the Imjin Waeran, Yi Tŏ khy ŏ ng, evaluated Shi Xing’s initial dispatch of troops and recapture of the three cities of P’yŏ ngyang, Kaes ŏng, and Hans ŏng very highly. Kwanghaegun ilgi , Ch ŏngjok-san archive text, 57:6a–6b (1612.9.3). 6 3 Sŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 38:5b (1604.7.–). 64 On battle details, see Yi Ky ŏ ngs ŏ k, Jinshin senranshi , 1977, pp. 629–34. 6 5 S ŏ njo shillok , 118:5b (1599.10.5). 66 Nakamura Hidetaka, “Ch ō sen no bomin shisō ,” 1972, pp. 197–8; Han Myŏ nggi, Imjin Waeran , 1999, pp. 67–8. 6 7 Sŏ njo shillok , 176:6a–6b (1604.7.19). 6 8 Sŏ njo shillok , 176:6b (1604.7.19). 6 9 Sŏ njo shillok , 176:7b (1604.7.20). 7 0 Sŏ njo shillok, 176:8b–9a (1604.7.23). According to Ch’ungwan t’onggo (compiled approx. 1788), which comprehensively surveys the state ceremonies practiced by the Chos ŏn kingdom, Yang Hao’s portrait was dedicated to the Sŏ nmusa in 1610. Ch’ungwan t’onggo chung , Vol. 2, 1976, fascicle 44, kirye (吉薰 ), S ŏ nmusa ( 宣武祠 ), p. 259. 71 The Hongjew ŏ n (rendered in two ways) was the facility for the Chinese embassy to stay for the day before they entered Hans ŏ ng and was outside the city walls to the northwest. Shinj ŭ ng tongguk yŏ ji s ŭ ngnam , fascicle 3, Hans ŏ ngbu, y ŏ gw ŏ n ( 驛院 ), Hongjew ŏ n ( 洪濟院 ), p. 77. Taedong chiji , fascicle 1, Hansŏ ngbu, kungshil ( 宮室 ), Hongjew ŏ n ( 弘濟院 ), p. 23. 7 2 Chaejo pŏ nbangji , 4:27a. 73 In 1753, four volumes of a woodblock imprint were produced in Yŏ ngch’ ŏ n in Ky ŏngsang Province. Maema Ky ō saku, Kosen sappu, 1944, Vol. 2, p. 633. Throughout this chapter, I have used the microfi lm version of Chaejo p ŏ nbangji preserved in the Imanishi Ryū collection housed in Tenri University Library.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Similar entries can be found in Yi Sŏ ngy ŏ ng’s Ch’unp’adang ilwŏ llok , completed in the period 1659–1720. See Book 7, S ŏ njo taewang shillok 4 (–.8.1598). 74 The inscription on the tablet ends with the date Wanli 26 (1598, S ŏnjo 31) eighth month. Keij ō fu, Keij ō fushi, Vol. 1, 1934, pp. 363–5; Seoul T ŭ kpy ŏ lshisa p’yŏ nch’an wiw ŏ nhoe, Seoul T ŭ kpy ŏ lshisa, koj ŏ kp’y ŏ n , 1963, pp. 843–8. 7 5 S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n ilgi , fascicle 1228, p. 146 (1764.3.20). Y ŏ ngjo shillok , 103:15a–15b (1764.3.20). On the ninth plate of the Tos ŏ ng taejido , between the Sahyŏ n and the Mohwa’gwan, can be seen the Pigak. This is most likely Commissioner Yang’s stele. See Seoul Yŏ ksa Pangmulgwan, Tos ŏ ng taejido , 2004. Yi Sangt’ae’s essay (“Tosŏ ng taejido e kwanhan y ŏn’gu”) in the same volume places the date of composition of Tos ŏ ng taejido as no earlier than 1753 and no later than 1764 (pp. 72, 77). 7 6 Kwanghaegun ilgi , T’aebaeksan archive manuscript, 79:4b–5a (1614.6.12). Chosŏn Korea and Ming China after the Imjin Waeran 317

7 7 Taedong chiji, fascicle 1, Hans ŏngbu, kungshil ( 宮室 ), Nampy ŏ lgung ( 南別宮), p. 23. 7 8 Shinjŭ ng tongguk y ŏ ji s ŭ ngnam, fascicle 3, Hans ŏngbu, kungshil ( 宮室 ), Taep’y ŏ nggwan ( 大平館), p. 69. Taedong chiji, fascicle 1, Hans ŏ ngbu, kungshil ( 宮室 ), Taep’y ŏ nggwan (大平館 ), p. 23. 7 9 Kwanghaegun ilgi , Ch ŏ ngjoksan archive text, 54:6a (1612.6.4). Taedong chiji , fascicle 1, Hans ŏ ngbu, Kungshil ( 宮室 ), Mohwa’gwan Pigak (慕華館碑閣 ), p. 23. 8 0 Kwanghaegun ilgi , Ch ŏ ngjoksan archive text, 134:12a (1618.11.18). 8 1 Injo shillok , 29:5b (1634.2.19). 8 2 Injo shillok , 29:5b (1634.2.19). 8 3 Injo shillok , 34:59b–60a (1637.5.18). 8 4 S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok , 27:9b (1593.4.–). 8 5 S ŏ njo shillok , 71:21a (1596.1.16). 86 On battle details, see Yi Ky ŏ ngs ŏ k, Jinshin senranshi , 1977, pp. 206–13. 8 7 S ŏ njo shillok , 43:1a (1593.10.1). 8 8 Sŏ njo shillok, 43:1a (1593.10.1). S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok, 27:18a (1593.10.–). See also Yi Kyŏ ngs ŏ k, Jinshin senranshi , 1977, pp. 166–9. 8 9 Sadae mun’gwe , 12:23b–27a (1594.11.28): Ryodong toji hwisasaja Chosŏ n kukwang ( 遼東都指揮使司咨朝鮮國王 ); Sadae mun’gwe, 12:27a–29b (1595.2.16): Chos ŏ n kugwangja Ryodong toji hwisasa (朝鮮國王咨遼東都指揮使司 ). 90 Nakamura Hidetaka, Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū , Vol. 2, 1969, p. 398. The S ŭ ngmunw ŏn was the offi ce that managed the composition of diplomatic correspondence for China and Japan. Kuwano Eiji, “Richō shoki ni okeru Shō bun’in [S ŭ ngmunw ŏ n],” 1994, pp. 37–46. 9 1 Sŏ njo shillok, 45:52b–53b (1593.intercalary 11.20) also contains a summary of the record in the Sadae mun’gwe . 92 “Y ŏ ( 厲)” refers to a fi erce god with no offspring who requires placating and includes war casualties. Zhengde Da Ming huidian, Vol. 2, fascicle 87, jisi ( 祭祀 ) 8, libu ( 薰臠) 46, he sishen qi (合祀神祇) 3, jili ( 祭厲) (K. cheyŏ ), p. 277. For an outline of y ŏ je or cheyŏ in Ming China, see Walrab ŏ n, “Chos ŏn shidae,” 2001, pp. 4–6. 93 The Hans ŏ ng Minch’ungdan will be addressed below. Late Chosŏ n-period gazetteers, such as Y ŏ ji tos ŏ and Taedong chiji , mention the Minch’ungdan in P’y ŏ ngyang, but not in Kaes ŏ ng and Py ŏ kche. 94 Ming-era measures: 1 che was approximately 31.1 cm, and 1 zhang was 10 bei or approximately 3.11 meters. 95 For a depiction of the misery of the Ming troops, see Okano Masako, “Hideyoshi no Ch ō sen shinryaku to Chū goku,” 1977, p. 147. 9 6 Sŏ njo shillok , 60:31b (1595.2.15). 9 7 Sadae mun’gwe, 12:26b (1594.11.28): Ryodong toji hwisasaja Chosŏ n kukwang ( 遼東都指揮使司咨朝鮮國王 ). 9 8 Sadae mun’gwe, 12:29a (1595.2.16): Chos ŏn kugwangja Ryodong toji hwisasa ( 朝鮮國王咨遼東都指揮使司 ). 9 9 Hy ŏ njong shillok , 14:43a (1668.3.23).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 100 Hy ŏ njong kaesu shillok , 18:52b (1668.3.23), records the same. 101 S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n ilgi, fascicle 207, p. 154 (1668.3.23). The Pongsangsa managed the props and clothing and conducted the memorial ceremony. Kuwano Eiji, “Rich ō shoki ni okeru H ō jō ji [Pongsangsa],” 1996, pp. 11–15. 102 Hy ŏ njong shillok, 14:43a (1668.3.24); Hy ŏnjong kaesu shillok , 18:52b (1668.3.24). 103 Hy ŏ njong shillok , 14:32a (1668.1.12); Hy ŏ njong kaesu shillok , 18:31b–32b (1668.1.12). 104 Hy ŏ njong shillok , 14:35a (1668.2.3). 105 The y ŏ je was systemized under King Sejong and was included in national rites as a minor ceremony. The Chosŏ n government established a y ŏ dan in every county. 318 Kuwano Eiji Kuwano Eiji, “Rich ō shoki ni okeru kokka saishi,” 1993, pp. 140–4; Walrabŏ n, “Chos ŏn shidae,” 2001, pp. 2–3; Kim Haey ŏ ng, “Chos ŏn wangjo,” 2003, pp. 398– 407. Translator’s note: See also Walraven, “Confucians and Restless Spirits,” 1993. Y ŏ je might be translated as “rites for restless or disgruntled spirits.” Translation suggested by Boudewijn Walraven. 106 Hy ŏ njong shillok , 14:42b (1668.3.19); Hy ŏ njong shillok , 14:43b (1668.3.26); Hy ŏnjong kaesu shillok, 18:52a (1668.3.19); Hy ŏnjong kaesu shillok , 18:53a (1668.3.26). 107 Hy ŏ njong kaesu shillok , 22:35a–35b (1670.3.25). 108 Kuwano Eiji, “K ō rai kara Rich ō shoki ni okeru Enkyū tan [W ŏ ngudan],” 1996, pp. 12–19. 109 Hy ŏ njong shillok , 19:20b (1671.4.19). 110 Hy ŏ njong kaesu shillok , 24:5b (1671.4.19). 111 Kuwano Eiji, “Ch ō sen sh ō ch ū ka ishiki no keisei to tenkai,” 2001, pp. 168–9. 112 Yi K ŭ nmyŏ ng, T’aesangji , 1980, fascicle 4, sajŏ n ( 祀典 ), Minch’ungdanje ( 愍忠壇祭 ). 113 Y ŏ ngjo shillok , 95:21a (1760.6.3). For details on the Chŏ ngdong Kwan’gunsa, see Yi K ŭ nmy ŏ ng, T’aesangji , 1980, fascicle 4, saj ŏ n ( 祀典 ), Kwan’gunsa ( 官軍祠 ). 114 S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n ilgi , fascicle 1182, p. 113 (1760.6.3).

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Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 15 War and cultural exchange

Ha Woo Bong ( 河宇鳳 )

Introduction When we consider the number of participating countries in the Imjin Waeran, the size of the war, and its repercussions, a similar example cannot be easily found in the history of East Asia. The participants included not only the three countries of Chosŏ n Korea, Japan, and Ming China, but also, although as indirect participants, Southeast Asians such as those from Ry ū ky ū and Thailand and the Spanish and the Portuguese. The domestic situations of the three East Asian countries that participated in this war changed completely as a result. In Japan, the Toyotomi regime, which had led the invasion, collapsed, and the Edo bakufu established itself in 1603. In China, the Ming government, which had disbursed immense expenditures on this war, degenerated in strength, and was eventually ruined by the Jurchen Qing. In Chosŏ n, while the government did not change, the social order of early Chosŏ n practically disintegrated. For this reason the Imjin Waeran became the watershed that divided the Chosŏ n period into early and late periods. In these ways, the Imjin Waeran was a devastating war that restructured the entire international order of East Asia. On the other hand, cultural exchanges took place between Korea and Japan during the war. While this had not been the original aim, it came to infl uence considerably the historical development and cultural life of the two countries after the war. This chapter will examine the circumstances of cultural exchanges, both in wartime and post-war, between Korea and Japan and consider their historical signifi cance.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Japan’s importation of Chosŏ n’s cultural products From the beginning of the war, Toyotomi Hideyoshi formed six special units in addition to the fi ghting units, and they systematically looted Chosŏ n’s cultural commodities. The names and objects of plunder of these units were as follows: (1) Book unit (J. toshobu ) (for classical books); (2) Artisan unit (J. k ō geibu ) (for objects of craftwork, carpenters, and ceramicists); (3) Captives unit (J. horyobu) (for civilians); (4) Metal unit (J. kinzokubu ) (for weapons, 324 Ha Woo Bong metal craftwork, and moveable metal type); (5) Treasure unit (J. h ō butsubu ) (for gold and silver treasures, and rare objects); and (6) Livestock unit (J. chikbu ).1 The systematically expedited plunder by the Toyotomi regime earned the Imjin Waeran yet another sobriquet, that of “a war of cultural pillage” (K. munhwa yakt’al chŏ njaeng ). Moreover, from the fact that not only products but even people and livestock became objects of plunder, the invasion took on the character of a pirate raid. From this viewpoint, the Japanese appear to have practiced “piracy on a national scale” (K. kukkaj ŏk kyumo ŭ i Waegu ). As Japan plundered human and material resources in this way, it assimi- lated Chosŏ n’s advanced culture in large doses, and this provided the turning point for the development of culture in the Edo period after the war. Among Chos ŏn’s cultural commodities that were transmitted to Japan through the Imjin Waeran, we will examine those with the most impact, including Korean Neo-Confucianism, moveable metal type, classical books, and ceramics.

Korean Neo-Confucianism Before the Edo period, the mainstream world of thought in Japan had been Buddhist, while the level of scholarship and infl uence from Confucianism was weak. Even within Confucianism, Han and T’ang Chinese scholarship formed the core, and Neo-Confucianism (that is, the teachings of Zhu Xi) that developed in Song China remained at a rather immature stage. While there was an occasion when Neo-Confucianism was introduced in Japan by the monk and Confucian scholar Gen’e (1279–1350) in the Southern and Northern Courts period (J. Nanbokuch ō jidai), it was not widely accepted, and disappeared from view. In short, Neo-Confucianism in Japan before the Imjin Waeran had been merely transmitted as an object of curiosity among a few scholar monks in the Ky ōto Gozan temples, and had remained at the stage of an amalgamation of Confucianism and Buddhism. Ending the period of warring states that lasted a century or more and opening a new era by establishing the Edo bakufu in 1603, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616) attempted to establish a peaceful order both domestically and internationally. In order to stabilize matters, Ieyasu implemented reform policies such as separating warriors from the peasantry, establishing a social class system, and reinforcing ethics. To give these reforms a theoretical underpin-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ning, he believed that Neo-Confucian ideology, which maintained the cen- tralization of rulership, was most appropriate and applied it positively. To shift the ruling ideology from Buddhism to Neo-Confucianism presented the world of Japanese thought with something of a revolution. Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619) taught Neo-Confucianism to Ieyasu. Owing to Seika, Confucianism in Japan took a step away from the amalgamated view of Confucianism and Buddhism, and away from Han and T’ang Confucianism towards Neo-Confucianism. However, behind Seika was the Korean scholar and offi cial Kang Hang (1567–1618).2 While detained in Japan as a captive, War and cultural exchange 325 Kang met Seika, who, at the time, had been intellectually searching his way between Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. Kang, as an independent Confucianist, exerted a decisive infl uence on Seika. Kang and Seika fi rst met at the mansion of Akamatsu Hiromichi (1562– 1600)3 in Fushimi, between Kyō to and Ō saka, in the autumn of 1598. Exchanges between them after their fi rst meeting continued for a year-and- a-half until Kang returned to Korea. For Seika and Hiromitsu, who were fi lled with an intellectual craving for Neo-Confucianism, Kang was a good advisor. 4 As concrete evidence of their exchange, there are some twenty volumes of Shisho gokyō Wakun (Japanese Readings of the Four Books and Five Classics) that were completed by Seika in the second month of 1599. The compilation added Japanese readings to Zhu Xi’s commentaries on the Four Books and Five Classics and not only marked the starting point of a full-fl edged Neo-Confucian understanding of Confucianism in Japan, but also played a decisive role in the dissemination of Neo-Confucianism. This compilation is also the reason why Seika is called the father of Neo- Confucianism or early-modern Confucianism in Japan. Needless to say, Kang’s assistance played an important role in the completion of the work. In addition, Kang made great efforts to propagate Neo-Confucianism in Japan by transcribing twenty-one volumes of Neo-Confucian texts. 5 The exchanges between Kang, Seika, and Hiromitsu in Fushimi bore great signifi cance to Japanese Confucianism, because they gave rise to Seika’s transformation from Buddhist monk to self-reliant Confucian scholar and created an opportunity for the admission of Neo-Confucianism as early- modern Japan’s orthodoxy. At the same time, their exchange was a laudable episode of intellectual contact that blossomed amid the disturbances of war and a pioneering example of cultural exchange between Korea and Japan in the late Chos ŏ n period. After his fi rst meeting with Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1593, Seika began lecturing on the Zhengguan zhengyao . In the ninth month of 1600, after the Battle of Sekigahara, Seika debated with Saishō Sh ō tai (1548–1607) in front of Ieyasu at Nij ō Castle in Ky ōto over philosophies of governance. Afterwards, Ieyasu appealed to Seika for assistance, but he declined. Instead, Seika recommended his pupil Hayashi Razan (1583–1657) in 1605. Razan served as a tutor to four generations of shō guns, from the fi rst shō gun Ieyasu to the fourth sh ō gun, Ietsuna, and played a great role in establishing Neo-Confucianism as the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 bakufu ’s governing doctrine. Moreover, Razan was appointed to the offi ce of Daigaku no kami (Chancellor of the State University) and the offi ce became heritable in his house, which took the lead in bakufu literary and diplomatic affairs. Kang’s scholarship, which succeeded to the tradition of Chosŏ n Neo- Confucianism that fl owered with Yi Hwang (T’oegye, 1501–70) and Yi I (Yulgok, 1536–84) in the mid sixteenth century, carried an impressive lineage and was inherited by Seika and Razan, forming the mainstream of the offi cial doctrine taught in the bakufu academy.6 Seika and Razan’s disciples 326 Ha Woo Bong were invited to numerous domains, and made efforts to promote and propagate Confucian culture. As a result, Neo-Confucianism spread throughout the country, and became the governing doctrine of Edo-period Japan. While it has been said that the infl uence of Neo-Confucianism in Japan was relatively weaker than it was in Chosŏ n, the status of the bakufu academy was resolutely maintained to the point where a decree prohibiting heterodoxy was issued in 1790. If Kang had infl uence on the offi cial embrace of Neo-Confucianism through Seika, there were also Korean captives who transmitted Confucian thought at the level of various domains. These included Yi Chin’yŏ ng and his son Yi Chŏ njik, Hong Hoy ŏn, and Takamoto Shimei. We will now briefl y examine the activities of these people.

Yi Chin’y ŏ ng and Yi Ch ŏ njik of Kii domain Yi Chin’y ŏng (1571–1633) was a Confucian scholar from Ch’angny ŏ ng County in Kyŏ ngsang Province. He came to live in the domain of Kii as a prisoner of war captured by Asano Nagamasa’s army during the fi rst Chinju battle in the seventh month of 1592, when he participated as a righteous army soldier under the command of Kwak Cheu. The lord of the domain, Tokugawa Yorinobu, respected his scholarly achievements, and invited him on many occasions to perform a memorial service for his ancestors. After having repeatedly declined invitations to join Yorinobu’s retinue, when his chances of returning to Chosŏ n disappeared in 1626, Yi Chin’y ŏ ng became a tutor to the lord of the domain and instructed him in Neo-Confucianism and the Imperial Way (K. chewanghak ). After Yi Chin’yŏ ng’s death, his son Yi Chŏ njik (1617–82) became a Confucian offi cial of the domain at the age of seventeen. 7 In 1634, after studying in Ky ōto, Yi Ch ŏnjik became tutor to Tokugawa Mitsusada, the second lord of the domain, and instructed him in his studies. He composed Fuboj ō (Notes on Parents), which emphasized Confucian ethics, and circulated it in the domain. He also wrote Taikun geng ō roku (Analects of the Taikun, in two volumes), Tokugawa s ōgy ō kik ō i (Documentary consideration of the establishment of the Tokugawa [house], in ten volumes), Ekisetsu (Commentary on the Book of Changes ), Senka zakki (Senka miscellany), and Baikei bunshū (A Baikei anthology). In these ways, Yi Chin’y ŏng and Yi Ch ŏnjik made signifi cant contributions: tutoring

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the domainal lords and planting Chosŏ n Neo-Confucianism fi rmly in the soil of Kii. Through their writings, they exercised great infl uence over the politics and culture of Kii for some time.8 Even within the Gosanke, or the three Tokugawa houses of Kii, Owari, and Mito, the domain of Kii was a hegemon that dominated the bakufu from the mid-Edo period onwards. The fi fth lord of Kii, Tokugawa Yoshimune, became the eighth shō gun. Thereafter, Kii produced sh ōguns over seven generations up to the fourteenth sh ō gun, Tokugawa Iemochi. Moreover, with the activities of Seika’s disciple Nawa Kassho (1595–1648) 9 and Razan’s pupil Nagata War and cultural exchange 327 Zensai (1597–1664) 10 and by maintaining its deep acquaintance with Chos ŏ n Neo-Confucianism that was based on Yi Hwang’s Confucianism, the domain of Kii exerted intellectual infl uence on thebakufu . Within Kii’s cultivation of a lustrous Confucian culture, the mediating agents were Yi Chin’yŏ ng and his son. Furthermore, if we consider Kii’s relations with the bakufu , we can see that the ideological orthodoxy of Yi Chin’yŏ ng and his son became one of the foundations for post-eighteenth-century bakufu policies and ideology.

Hong Hoy ŏ n of Saga domain Hong Hoyŏ n (1581–1657) was the son of a local functionary (K. hyangni ) of Ky ŏngsang Province, and was captured as a boy of twelve by Nabeshima Naoshige in 1593 during the Battle of Chinju. Naoshige noticed that Hong’s talents were extraordinary and sent him to study in Kyō to at a Gozan temple. After his return from Kyō to, Hong Hoy ŏn was appointed tutor to the fi rst lord of Saga domain, Katsushige, who was Naoshige’s son, and established the foundation for Saga’s scholarship. Hong left many works not only as a Confucian scholar but also as a calligrapher. He married a daughter of the retainer Taku, received exceptional treatment from the lord of the domain, and committed suicide on the death of Katsushige. 11 Hong’s descendants also held important posts in Saga. One of them adopted the son of the great Saga scholar Koga Seiri (1750–1817), who was known as one of the “Three Masters of the Kansei period” (1789–1800), allowing the Hong family lineage to continue.12

Takamoto Shimei of Kumamoto domain As the third-generation lecturer at Kumamoto’s domain school Jishū kan, Takamoto Shimei (1738–1813) was revered as a great scholar. He was the sixth-generation descendant of the Korean captive Yi Chonghan and usually called himself Yi Sun (J. Ri Jun).13 Since coming to Japan, his ancestors had been physicians, but Shimei changed to Confucian studies, and entered Jish ū kan as an instructor. Later, he became the third lecturer in charge of the institute. As the pioneer of domain schools in Kyū sh ū, the Jish ūkan was the center of Kumamoto’s education. The second lecturer at the Jish ū kan was Yabu Kozan (1735–1802), who venerated Yi Hwang’s Neo-Confucianism. As

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 a learned scholar of letters and the theory of loyalty and duty, Shimei, who was called “Teacher Yi” and revered in the domain, was devoted to Yi Hwang’s Neo-Confucianism. It was this line of Neo-Confucianism that considerably infl uenced the ideology and politics of Kumamoto domain. Later in his life, Shimei set his heart on the study of National Studies (J. Kokugaku ), which emphasized veneration for the national polity (J. kokutai ). He visited Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), with whom he established a relationship as master and pupil. 14 As the descendant of a Chos ŏn captive, Shimei embraced Yi Hwang’s Neo-Confucianism, coupled it to National Studies, and provided 328 Ha Woo Bong the ideological foundation in the bakumatsu period for Kumamoto’s leading role in the Meiji Restoration as a champion of royalism (J. kin ō ha ). Attention is drawn to Shimei’s intellectual life for the linking role he played in the conversion of Yi Hwang’s Neo-Confucianism from an offi cial doctrine of the Tokugawa shō gunate to the basic philosophy undergirding the Imperial Rescript on Education (J. Kyō iku Chokugo ) after the Meiji Restoration. In Kumamoto domain, besides Takamoto Shimei, there was a Korean captive by the name of Yŏ Taenam. He had lived in Kumamoto since his capture as a youth in Korea. Although we do not know much about his life, such as where he was born or the dates of his life, like Hong Hoyŏ n, his talent was recognized, and after studying at one of the Gozan temples in Kyoto, he returned to Kumamoto and contributed to the development of scholarship.15 There seem to have been quite a few Korean captives in many domains during the Tokugawa period, who spent their lives leading the aristocratic lifestyle of a domain scholar.16 The majority of the Korean captives who became domain bushi were omnipresent in the fi elds of Chinese Classics, Confucianism, and medicine.17 Aside from these, there were those given subordinate responsibilities such as the manufacture of ceramics. To become a bushi and join the aristocratic class did not mean that they became warriors, but rather that they became scholars and technicians. Considering this evidence, we can see that after the Imjin Waeran those Koreans taken as captives to Japan during the war made signifi cant contributions in many regions of Japan and played central roles in the fi elds of Confucianism and technology.

Moveable metal type and books Chos ŏn-era moveable metal-type printing was based on techniques fi rst invented in the Koryŏ period and preceded Johannes Gutenberg’s (1399–1468) fabrication of moveable metal type in Germany in 1450 by over two centuries, making Kory ŏ-era metal type the world’s earliest.18 These techniques were further developed and fl ourished in the early Chosŏ n period. In 1403, a type foundry was established, and 100,000 kyemi (the sexegenary year for 1403) type characters were made. In 1420 and 1434, some 200,000 ky ŏ ngja and kabin type characters were produced, and in 1484, more than 300,000 kyech’uk type characters were manufactured. In particular, the kabin type produced in King Sejong’s time was considered a superior font and the glory

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 of Chos ŏn printing. It was used in various publication projects during Sejong’s reign and widely known in Japan as the “Korean copper seal” type (J. K ō rai d ō in ). In the early Chos ŏ n period, Japan’s Muromachi bakufu sent envoys to Chos ŏ n and repeatedly asked for copper metal type and information on the production technique, but the Chosŏ n court did not grant their requests. As a result, moveable metal type was one of the fi rst objects to be plundered during the Imjin Waeran. It is said that the commander-in-chief of the Japanese army during the 1597 invasion, Ukita Hideie (1573–1655), raided the Offi ce of Government War and cultural exchange 329 Publication (K. Kyos ŏ gwan) type foundry in Ky ŏngbok Palace, took away 200,000 metal characters, printing devices, and Korean and Chinese books and presented all these to Hideyoshi.19 Aside from metal type, the Japanese commanders also stole Chosŏ n wooden types 20 that were mainly used in Buddhist temples. Wooden type was later used to print Kobun k ōky ō (“old” version of the Xiao jing or Classic of Filial Piety 21) in 1593 and M ōgy ū (the eighth-century Mengqiu , a collection of anecdotes in poetry form that acted as a primer for children) in 1596. Moreover, the famous Nanki Library (Nanki Bunko ), a library in the domain of Kii, one of the Gosanke of the Tokugawa clan, was founded owing to Chosŏ n moveable copper type and type made as copies of the same. After a number of unsuccessful attempts, success was fi nally achieved with the fi rst, moveable metal-type publication ofDaiz ō ichiransh ū (A catalogue of the Tripitaka) in eleven volumes in 1615 and the Gunsho chiyō (Collected political commentary) in fi fty volumes in 1616. 22 These were accomplished with moveable copper type taken from Chos ŏn and Japanese moveable copper type cast after 1605. By the mid seventeenth century, publications using moveable copper type became more prevalent. In these ways, metal and wood moveable types looted from Chos ŏn became catalysts for the development of printing technology and scholarship in the Edo period.23

Chos ŏ n classical texts Ieyasu, who won the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, confi scated the Korean books that had been plundered during the war by Ukita Hideie and Ankokuji Ekei, and in 1602 founded the Fujimitei Library (Fujimitei Bunko) and the Suruga Library (Suruga Bunko). The collection at the Suruga Library amounted to over ten thousand volumes. Ieyasu’s last will and testament divided the volumes among the libraries of Fujimitei, 24 the Owari Library (Owari Bunko) in Owari han, 25 one of the Gosanke, the Kii Library (Kii Bunko) in the domain of Kii,26 and the Mito Library (Mito Bunko) in Mito domain.27 In this way, the bakufu and the Tokugawa collateral houses (J. shinpan daimyō ), composed of the Gosanke, adopted Neo-Confucianism as their governing doctrine and promoted the principles of civil administration. The foundational libraries for the study of the ideology was supplied by books from Korea.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Aside from the Tokugawa clan, provincial daimy ō who went to war in Chos ŏ n also held plundered Korean books. For example, there are 1,073 Korean books in the Sonkeikaku Libary (Sonkeikaku Bunko) of Maeda Toshiie (1538–99). The Seikad ō Library (Seikadō Bunko)28 in T ō ky ō and the Mō ri Library (Mō ri Bunko) in Yamaguchi Prefecture were founded with Korean books looted by M ōri Terumoto (1553–1625). Books seized by Uesugi Kagekatsu (1555–1623) are currently in the Yonezawa Library, and books taken by Shimazu Yoshihiro (1535–1619) are kept in the Kagoshima University Library. Others include the S ō Library (Sō -ke Bunko) 29 in Tsushima.30 The libraries that were established 330 Ha Woo Bong in the Edo era with books plundered at the time of the Imjin Waeran are the ancestors of today’s Japanese libraries.31 According to the Haeyurok by Shin Yuhan, Secretary for the Korean Communication Embassy of 1719, even aside from these holdings, there were many Korean books to be found among Ō saka’s booksellers and in private collections. Owing to the infl ux of a large number of moveable type and books, the Edo period saw a cultural renaissance. The development of the cultural renaissance in the early Edo period was surely based on Ieyasu’s policy to promote civil administration. However, it is clear that Chos ŏn’s moveable metal type and books were of great assistance in the successful promotion and popular- ization of this policy. On the other hand, Chosŏ n experienced diffi culties in printing books for a long time after the war, owing to the massive plundering during the war. Among the books taken to Japan, those of great ideological signifi cance included Yi Hwang’s Chujas ŏ ch ŏ ryo (Essentials of Zhu Xi’s Correspondence), Ch’ ŏ nmy ŏ ng tos ŏ l (Discourse on the Diagram of the Mandate of Heaven), Chas ŏ ngnok (Record for Self-Refl ection), and Y ŏ np’y ŏ ng mundap (A Dialogue at Yianping). These books were reprinted with moveable type and widely distributed during the Edo period, having great infl uence on Japan’s Confucianist circles, including Fujiwara Seika, Hayashi Razan, and Yamazaki Ansai (1618–82). 32 Korean Neo-Confucianism, synthesized by Yi Hwang, became the mainstream for Japanese Neo-Confucianism and the foundation for Confucianism within the bakufu as well as within many domains. It can be said that one reason behind 260 years of peace between Chos ŏn and Japan during the Edo period was the common ideology of Neo- Confucianism.33

Ceramics On the twenty-ninth day of the eleventh month of 1593, Hideyoshi ordered Nabeshima Naoshige (1538–1618) to capture and bring him Chos ŏ n craftsmen and seamstresses, and sent the same order by a red sealed letter (J. shuinj ō ) to Shimazu Yoshihiro. This offers evidence of the fact that the Japanese generals considered skilled captives to be very important. Among the skills transmitted to Japan on the occasion of the Imjin Waeran, the production of ceramics cannot be overlooked.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In Japan at the time, Sen no Rikyū (1522–91) was popularizing ceremonial tea drinking among eminent people such as Oda Nobunaga (1534–82), Hideyoshi, and various other daimy ō. While the tea ceremony had been revered as an elegant pastime of the daimy ō since the time of the Muromachi bakufu , it became much more popular in the later decades of the sixteenth century. Accordingly, the demand for fi ne ceramics increased. Chosŏ n ceramics were more developed and refi ned in comparison to those of Japan. The Japanese called them Kō raimono, and the daimy ō treasured them. Commanders such as Shimazu Yoshihiro and Mō ri Terumoto who were tea savants not only War and cultural exchange 331 rushed to snatch ceramic products during the war, but also kidnapped ceramicists and even took clay and glaze from Chos ŏ n. In particular, Nabeshima Naoshige of Saga domain abducted many Chosŏ n ceramicists from regions around Ungch’ŏ n, Chinju, Kimhae, and Ulsan in southern Kyŏ ngsang Province. Naoshige had the potters live in Saga domain and produce ceramics. In Arita in Saga, kilns were founded by the Korean ceramicist Yi Samp’yŏ ng (?–1656) 34 and included a group led by a female potter Paek P’asŏ n (1561–1656). 35 Saga domain’s Karatsu ware is also famous. Shimazu Yoshihiro of Satsuma domain established kilns to produce Satsuma ware (the founders were Pak P’yŏ ng ŭ i, Kim Pangjung, and Shim Tanggil), Katano ware (the founders were Kim Hwa and Kim Ka), and Chosa ware (the founder was Kim Hae). Kuroda Nagamasa of Fukuoka domain also built ceramic kilns such as those that produced Takatori ware (the founder was P’alsan). Hosokawa Tadaoki of Kokura domain opened the kilns that produced Agano ware and Takada ware (the founder was Chonhae). M ō ri Terumoto of Yamaguchi domain established Hagi ware (the founders were Yi Kugwang and Yi Ky ŏng). Aside from these, there was also Yatsushiro ware in Kumamoto domain and Hirado ware from Nagasaki domain. Most of the kilns in the Kyū sh ū and central regions of Japan were constituted by Korean captives. In addition to the known ceramicists, unknown potters were spread throughout Japan and formed the origins of many types of Japanese ceramics. The Korean ceramicists grouped in particular areas and produced their work under the protection of the feudal lords. Each domain supported these ceramicists because they contributed greatly to the domain’s fi nances. For example, the Arita kilns exported 45,000 pieces to the Netherlands in 1644 and contributed handsomely to the domain’s economy. While the Japanese techniques for producing ceramics had been less developed than Korean techniques until the end of the sixteenth century, they developed rapidly because of the Korean ceramicists captured during the Imjin Waeran, and Japan in the Edo period became one of the world’s great exporters of ceramics. The successors to these ceramicists formed illustrious schools of pottery production, which continue to exist today and form the mainstay of the Japanese ceramics industry. For this reason, the Imjin Waeran is also called “the ceramics war” (J. tojagi ch ŏ njaeng ). Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Cultural transmission through Japan There were also cultural artifacts transmitted to Chos ŏ n by way of Japan during the war. These were not necessarily from Japan originally, but from other countries that came via Japan. Intellectuals in Chosŏ n had traditionally dismissed Japanese culture as barbaric and had ignored it, believing that there was nothing to learn from it. Moreover, after the Imjin Waeran, with hostility and an intensifi ed perception of the Japanese as barbarians, it was especially diffi cult for a receptive attitude towards Japanese culture to develop. At 332 Ha Woo Bong minimum, these attitudes spanned the seventeenth century. As Japanese culture began to be introduced in Chosŏ n by returning envoys from the embassies that visited Japan (K. T’ongshinsa ), attitudes began to change, and different dimensions of perception emerged among a few Practical Learning (K. shirhak) scholars, but these new ideas appeared only after the mid-eighteenth century. We will examine the cultural items that were transmitted to Chosŏ n by way of Japan during the Imjin Waeran: the arquebus, Catholicism, red pepper, and tobacco.

Arquebus rifl es One of the main reasons behind Chos ŏn’s defeat on land during the early stages of the Imjin Waeran was the Japanese army’s possession of the matchlock, musket, or arquebus. The arquebus was a portable fi rearm that was used as the principal weapon by the Japanese infantry during the Imjin Waeran. In Japan, the arquebuses were originally called “iron cannon,” or ashigaru teppō (foot soldier’s gun), but in Chosŏ n, it was called a “bird rifl e” (K. choch’ong ) because “it could easily hit even a fl ying bird.” The arquebus was fi rst produced at the end of the fi fteenth century in Europe,36 and transmitted to Japan by the Portuguese who appeared in Asia in the sixteenth century. According to the Japanese Tepp ō ki (Record of the Musket), Portuguese merchants presented a brace of arquebuses to the feudal lord of Tanegashima on the twenty-third day of the ninth month of 1543, and taught him the methods of fi rearm production, how to mix gunpowder, and marksmanship. These techniques were passed on to craftsmen in the city of Sakai, where 600 rifl es were produced in 1544, and these were distributed throughout Japan. In particular, Oda Nobunaga developed a war strategy using arquebuses, and attained a great victory at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575. Afterwards, the arquebus was supplied to all parts of the country and used as the main weapon of foot soldiers. During the Imjin Waeran, the Japanese army consisted of cavalry and foot soldiers, and the foot soldiers were divided into rifl emen, archers, and lancers. Among them, approximately 10 to 30 percent were rifl emen. In these ways, the Japanese army strategically combined the new arquebus with traditional close-combat weapons such as the pike and bow to create effective combat tactics. The Chosŏ n army, which relied on traditional, long-range combat

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 methods, found itself nearly helpless against this systematic combination of distant and close fi ghting techniques. The arquebus was extremely effective with its ability to terrify, but more importantly, it had an accuracy and fatality rate fi ve times that of the Chosŏ n army’s bow. Even King Sŏ njo marveled at the arquebus as “the world’s con- summate weapon” (K. ch’onha chi shingi ). As a result, the Chos ŏ n court made efforts to acquire the manufacturing techniques.37 In particular, Yi Sunshin, Kim Shi’min (Magistrate of Chinju), and Kim Sŏ ng’il led the way in fabricating reproductions. They secured arquebuses as war trophies, and War and cultural exchange 333 appointed people with skills in making arquebuses from among the Japanese who surrendered (K. hang-Wae ). As a result of their efforts, they were able to acquaint themselves with the production technique by the third month of 1593, and by the twelfth month of the same year arquebuses were being produced even in provincial headquarters and army commands. The probable reason why the Chos ŏ n army was not driven out of the battlefi eld by the Japanese army after its initial defeat was owing to the domestic manufacture of arquebuses. 38 Even after the Imjin Waeran, the Chos ŏn court held a profound interest in arquebuses, and developed their production techniques. 39 Consequently, the technical standard of Chosŏ n’s manufactures was acknowledged when Qing China offered to purchase great numbers of arquebuses from Chos ŏn in 1657.40

Catholicism During the Imjin Waeran, Western missionaries came to Chosŏ n as Japanese army chaplains and engaged in missionary work. This event has historical signifi cance for the fact that it was the fi rst time Catholic priests came and engaged in missionary work in Korea. The Spanish priest Gregorio de Cespedes (1551–1611) had engaged in missionary work in Japan under the auspices of the Jesuits and came to Chosŏ n as the chaplain for Konishi Yukinaga. Father de Cespedes stayed in Yukinaga’s headquarters at Ungch’ŏ n in Ky ŏ ngsang Province from the twenty-seventh day of the twelfth month of 1593 until the sixth month of 1595.41 He mainly served in giving the Sacrament of Penance to the Japanese Catholic soldiers and propagating Catholicism within the armies under Yukinaga and the Tsushima daimy ō S ō Yoshitoshi. However, de Cespedes’s work was restricted due to Hideyoshi’s policy of prohibiting Catholic priests from accompanying the army and from surveillance by Yukinaga’s rival Kat ō Kiyomasa. As a result, he had to return to Japan after a year-and-a-half.42 There are no records of him proselytizing to Korean people during his time in Chosŏ n. The only fact that has been confi rmed is that he took a Chos ŏn youth who came to be called Vincent Kouan Cafi oie (his Japanese name was Gongabee) from Tsushima on his way back to Japan and had him educated in a theological seminary.43 According to Father Luis de Guzman’s Historia de las missiones (1601), there were many Chos ŏ n captives in Japan during the Imjin Waeran who converted to Catholicism. Over 2,000

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Koreans received baptism in 1594 in the two regions of Ōmura and Arima alone, and in 1596 all Chos ŏn captives living in these regions were baptized. More than 7,000 Chosŏ n captives converted to Catholicism between 1594 and 1598. It is presumed that de Cespedes played an important role in these conversions.44 If we examine records written by Western missionaries who were evangel- izing in Japan at the time, it is clear that many Korean captives converted to Catholicism in the midst of despair. It is said that, even in Spanish literary works, there are stories about Chos ŏn captives who converted to Catholicism 334 Ha Woo Bong in Japan. Although there are no records of the propagation of Catholicism on Korean soil, there are records of many Koreans joining the Catholic Church in Japan. De Cespedes in the sixteenth century was the fi rst Westerner to arrive in Korea and the only European eyewitness to the Imjin Waeran. He informed Europeans about the situation through four letters. 45 Although he also engaged in a great deal of proselytizing among the Chosŏ n captives, there are mixed opinions about the signifi cance of his missionary work. Contrary to the missionary histories that highly regard de Cespedes’ work in sowing the fi rst seeds of the gospel in Korea, the main stance taken by today’s Korean Catholic Church historians regard his work as marginal. They fi nd it diffi - cult to recognize de Cespedes’ missionary work with the Chos ŏn captives because that took place in Japan and is not confi rmed in Chosŏ n records. The conventional wisdom in South Korea today is that “the initial contact with western culture for traditional Chos ŏ n society did not develop from the efforts of westerners, but by the autonomous efforts of Koreans over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”46 Thus, the founding year of the Korean Catholic Church has been established as 1785, when Catholicism was embraced by converts in Korea with an independent religious will. However, there is important signifi cance in the facts that a Catholic priest came to Chos ŏ n during the Imjin Waeran, and, despite the conversions having taken place in Japan, as many as 7,000 Korean captives became Catholics. Among these converts, twenty-one were martyred during the repression by the Edo bakufu in the early half of the seventeenth century. In 1867, among the 205 Japanese beatifi ed, nine were from Chos ŏn. Moreover, it is said that there were Catholic captives who returned to Chos ŏ n in 1605, and they brought Matteo Ricci’s Tianzhu shiyi (De Deo Verax Disputatio or The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven), written in classical Chinese, to spread the doctrine to their compatriots.47

Food and luxuries Among the items that were introduced to Chosŏ n through the Imjin Waeran, the most representative are chili peppers and tobacco. As these affected the diet and taste of the Chosŏ n people immensely, they bear very important signifi cance in the economic and cultural history of the late Chosŏ n period.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Chili peppers originated from Central America, but according to the Japanese text S ō moku rokubu kō shuh ō , they were introduced to Japan by the Portuguese in 1542. While it is not clear when exactly they were introduced in Chosŏ n, it is assumed that they were brought in during the Imjin Waeran. Yi Sugwang’s Chibong yusŏ l mentions that chili peppers were introduced from Japan, and that they were called “Japanese mustard.” From the fact that other records refer to chili peppers as the “southern barbarian herb” or the “Japanese herb,” it is assumed that they were certainly introduced from Japan. Since the late Chos ŏn period, chili pepper has become an absolutely essential food product on the Korean table, while black pepper, used prior to War and cultural exchange 335 this period, has been marginalized. In particular, as the spice ingredient for kimch’i , the chili pepper has changed Korean cuisine. There are two opinions on when tobacco was introduced in Chos ŏ n. One is that it was brought in with the Imjin Waeran, and the other is that it was introduced in 1617. However, the tobacco that was brought in by the Japanese was called “southern herb” or “Wae herb,” and was distinguished from “western herb” that was imported through Beijing from the west. The tobacco from Japan was introduced earlier. In late Chosŏ n society, tobacco was not only consumed domestically, but also became a major export item to China through commercialized tobacco cultivation.

Conclusion Within the tranquil stream of history, war is like a powerful vortex. Although it destroys the existing order, it also plants a fl ower on the wretched battlefi eld. At times, war becomes the basis for the quickening of a new order, and at times, it becomes the force of historical development. The Japanese historian Tokutomi Soh ō (1863–1957) wrote of the Imjin Waeran: “While neither Japan nor Chosŏ n gained any advantages from this war, Japan gained cultural benefi ts from the importation of moveable type printing, technological benefi ts from ceramics, and diplomatic benefi ts from its contact with Ming China.” By way of summation, he commented that “the war in Korea was an extravagant chance for the Japanese to study abroad.” 48 As Soh ō indicated, while Japan paid an expensive price for the war, it was also able to absorb much of Chosŏ n culture. Neo-Confucianism and ceramics technology, which were transmitted through Chosŏ n captives, and the great infl ux of moveable metal type and books all became the foundation for the development and cultural renaissance of early-modern Japanese society. For this reason, schools of historians have referred to this war as “a culture war” or “a ceramics war.” At the same time, while Chos ŏ n suffered tremendous damage on all levels with the war, it also gained some benefi ts from Japan. The transmission of fi rearms manufacture, Catholicism, chili peppers, and tobacco all carried signifi cance for late Chosŏ n society.

Notes

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Translated by Grace Koh with James B. Lewis. 1 In the early stages of the war, Japanese troops even robbed the tombs of King S ŏ ngjong (S ŏ ll ŭ ng) and King Chungjong (Chŏ ngn ŭ ng) in a competition to plunder treasure. According to the second letter by the Spanish priest, Gregorio de Cespedes, who accompanied Konishi Yukinaga’s army for a year-and-a-half from the twelfth month of 1593, the Christian generals sumptuously decorated their lodgings with exorbitant war booty. Considering the evidence, it is clear that the Japanese generals plundered a number of treasures and cultural artifacts from the very beginning of the campaign. Pak Ch’ŏ l, “S ŏ gu’in’i pon Imjin Waeran,” 1999, p. 87. 2 Kang Hang was born in Y ŏ nggwang County in Ch ŏ lla Province. At the time of Hideyoshi’s second campaign, as a Junior Secretary (Sr. 6) in the Board of Punishments, he was captured by the naval forces of Tō d ō Takatora (1556–1630) 336 Ha Woo Bong in the ninth month of 1597 in the water off Yŏ nggwang County. He was taken to Iyo Province in Shikoku, transferred through Ō saka to Fushimi, where he met and engaged with Seika. Kang was a Confucianist, a student of Sŏ ng Hon (1535–98), and has left us Kanyangnok , Unjerok , T’onggam hoeyo , Suŭ njip , Chwa-ssi chŏ nghwa , Muns ŏ n ch’anju , and other works. Translator’s note: For illustrations of some of Kang’s writings, see Kungnip Chinju Pangmulgwan, Imjin Waeran Chos ŏ n’in p’oro ŭ i ki ŏ k , 2010, pp. 72–5. 3 Akamatsu Hiromichi was lord of Tatsuno Castle in Harima Province, and although a military man, was introduced to the new thought of Zhu Xi and wanted to reform Japan. 4 Seika was six years younger than Kang Hang and revered Kang as his teacher. See Fujiwara Seika, Seika sensei bunshū , fascicle 4 (題菊花圖答姜沆 ). Kang recommended Seika’s pen name – Seika. Kang also contributed four pieces to Seika’s collected works ( Seika sensei bunshū ). 5 The original manuscripts of these texts are preserved in the Naikaku Bunko in T ō ky ō . 6 Translator’s note: For an argument that contests the importance of Yi Hwang (T’oegye) as a contributor to Japanese Neo-Confucianism (1501–70), see Boot, “Yi T’oegye and Japan,” 1982. 7 In 1617, Yi Ch ŏnjik was born the son of Yi Chin’yŏ ng and an aristocratic Japanese woman. His pen name was Baikei. He was recommended by Nagata Zensai (1597– 1664), a Confucianist with the Kii domain, and set off at a young age to study in Kyō to. He accompanied his lord, Tokugawa Yorinobu, to Edo for his required attendance at court (sankin k ō tai) and after living in Edo for ten years, he met the 1655 Korean Communication Embassy. 8 C h ŏnjik’s son, Ch’ ŏ ngh ŏn, also became a Confucianist of the Kii domain. See Yi Sangh ŭ i, P’ashin ŭ i nunmul , 1997, pp. 349–55. 9 Nawa Kassho was one of the famous “Four gods” (shitenn ō , leading scholars) of the Fujiwara School and a fi rst-class Confucianist of the period. Following Yi Chin’y ŏ ng, he became personal teacher to the lord of the domain. 10 As Hayashi Razan’s disciple, Zensai was recommended by his teacher and became a Confucianist for the Kii domain. A teacher to Yi Chŏ njik, Zensai also became Yi’s father-in-law. 11 Komiya Mutsuyuki, “K ō Kō zen,” 1996, pp. 77–80. 12 Detailed information on Hong Hoy ŏn is recorded in Koga Seiri’s K ō K ō zen den (Biography of Hong Hoy ŏ n). Koga Seiri’s son, who was adopted into the K ō (Hong) house, became Hong Chinsŏ ng and served in the important post of toshiyori or elder advisor of the domain. He left us some writings. In the precincts of the Amidaji temple in the city of Saga are the tombs of Hong Hoyŏ n and his clan. The Hong or Kō clan is even today considered one of the illustrious clans of Saga Prefecture. 13 When Yi Chonghan was in Hy ŏ n’gam village in Indong County, Ky ŏ ngsang Province, he was captured by Hosokawa Tadaoki (1563–1646) and taken to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kumamoto domain. The Takamoto surname was coined by Yi Chonghan’s son Keitakudai and was composed of one character from the Koryŏ dynasty ( taka(i) in Japanese) and one character (hon ) from the Japanese word for Japan (Ni-hon ), whereas hon can be read as moto ; hence Takamoto. Matsuda Kō , “Ch ō senjin,” reprint 1976, pp. 106–7. 14 Matsuda K ō , “Ch ō senjin,” reprint 1976, pp. 112–13. 15 Ken Ninshō (Kwŏn Insŏp), Ch ō sen to Nihon no Kankeishi , 2000, p. 210. 16 Tsuruzono Yutaka, “Nihon kinsei,” 1991; Kibe Kazuaki, “Hagi han,” 1999; Ō ishi Manabu, “Kinsei Nihon,” 2001. 17 Nakano Setsuko, “Kaga-han,” 1991. War and cultural exchange 337 18 In 1234, at Ch’oe U’s order, the Kog ŭ m sangch ŏ ng yemun was printed. Although no longer extant, it is the earliest attested book in Korea produced using cast, metallic type. Son Po-gi, K ŭ msok , 1976, pp. 171–2. 19 Hideyoshi bestowed these books upon Manase Sh ō rin. Afterwards, Sh ō rin founded the Yoan’in Library (Yoan’in Bunko). See Yi Chun’gŏ l, Chos ŏ n sidae , 1986, p. 181. 20 In Japan, this was referred to as “K ō rai iri .” 21 Translator’s note: Gloss taken from Kornicki, The Book in Japan , 1998, p. 129. 22 Kang Chae ŏ n [Ky ō Zaigen], “Bunroku Keichō no eki,” 1980. 23 Translator’s note: See Kornicki, The Book in Japan, 1998, pp. 127–8, for a discussion of the comparatively large impact of Korean typography on Japanese culture. 24 Among these, there are 943 Korean books in the Kunaich ō Shory ōbu and 2,966 in public archival depositories throughout Japan. 25 Currently, the H ō sa Bunko in Nagoya contains 1,492 books in 163 categories. 26 Later, this became the Nanki Bunko and is housed in the Central Library of the University of T ō ky ō . 27 Later, this changed to the Sh ō kō kan Bunko. The second lord of Mito domain, Tokugawa Mitsukuni, reprinted the Korean history Tongguk t’onggam (Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom). Mituskuni had a great interest in history, and this tradition carried through for the next 250 years in the compilation of the Dai Nihonshi in Mito. 28 The later incarnation of the Fushimi Gakk ō Shoz ō Bunko established by Ieyasu is the National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan). 29 Currently, the main holdings are divided between the Nagasaki Kenritsu Tsushima Rekishi Minzoku Shiryō kan and the Han’guk Kuksa P’yŏ nch’an Wiw ŏ nhoe. 30 Yi Chung ŏ l, Chosŏ n sidae , 1986, p. 184. 31 Ono Noriaki, Nihon toshokanshi , 1973, p. 103. 32 Abe Yoshio, Nihon Shushigaku to Chō sen , 1971, part 3, chapter 1. 33 It is a historical irony that Yamazaki Ansai’s intellectual descendants, who advocated sonn ō -ron (respect the emperor) at the end of the Tokugawa era, found the theoretical roots of an ideological conversion to a “restoration of imperial government” (J. ō sei fukko ) in Yi Hwang’s thought. 34 In 1594, Nabeshima Naoshige’s forces abducted Yi Samp’yŏ ng. Later, at Takuko in Karatsu, he fi red pottery. In 1616, at Arita, he discovered white chinaware clay, moved with eighteen others to Arita, set up the Tengudani kiln, and it was here that Japanese porcelain production began. As a result, Yi is respected as the father of ceramics in Japan, and in Arita there was erected a stele commemorating Yi Samp’y ŏ ng as the “father of [Japanese] ceramics.” At the Sueyama Shrine, he is venerated as the “god of ceramics.” Translator’s note: For illustrations and documents pertaining to Yi Samp’yŏ ng, the Tengudani kiln, Arita ware, and porcelain production by Korean potters in Japan, see Kungnip Chinju Pangmulgwan, Imjin Waeran Chos ŏn’in p’oro ŭ i ki ŏ k , 2010, pp. 42–71. For an argument that discounts

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the input from Korean potters and revises the emphasis put on Yi Samp’yŏ ng, see Rousmainere, Vessels of Infl uence , 2012, pp. 120 ff. 35 Paek P’as ŏ n and her potter husband were abducted and in 1618, after he died, she led potters to relocate to Arita, and they produced ceramics. Today at Hō anji temple in Arita is a stone stele that celebrates her accomplishments. See Yi Naeok, “Ch ŏ njaeng,” 1999, p. 193. 36 The arquebus that was transmitted to Asia was invented by the Ottoman Turks and developed by the Portuguese. 37 In fact, on the fi rst day of the seventh month, 1589, while Keitetsu Gensō and Sō Yoshitoshi were requesting the dispatch of Korean envoys, they presented a pair of 338 Ha Woo Bong peacocks and several arquebuses to the court, but the Chosŏ n court expressed little interest and stored them away in an arsenal. S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng sillok, 23:8b (1589.7.–). 38 Pak Chaegwang, “Ch ŏ njaeng dogu,” 1999, pp. 102–5. 39 When the third Reply and Prisoner Repatriation Envoy (K. Hoetap ky ŏ m swaehwansa ) visited Japan in 1624, they also obtained arquebuses. 40 Pak Chaegwang, “Ch ŏnjaeng dogu,” 1999, p. 104. See also Yi Kwangmu, “Chos ŏ n hugi,” 1998; Yi Kangch’il, “Chos ŏ n Hyojong cho,” 1982. Translator’s note: For a study of Korean interest in muskets and volley techniques, see: Andrade et al. , “A Korean Military Revolution?”, 2014. 41 Kim Yangs ŏ n, “Imjin Waeran,” 1964, pp. 721. 42 There is a contention that de Cespedes came to Chos ŏn again in the summer of 1597 and stayed for two months. Kim Yangsŏ n, “Imjin Waeran,” 1964, p. 720. 43 Vincent Kouan Cafi oie became an outstanding preacher. He was arrested at the time of the Shimabara Rebellion and martyred. Kim Yangsŏ n, “Imjin Waeran,” 1964, p. 736. 44 Kim Yangs ŏ n, “Imjin Waeran,” 1964, pp. 733–5. 45 De Cespedes dispatched four letters from Korea, and if we include his letters from Japan, the total is fourteen. For a discussion of the contents, see Pak Ch’ ŏ l, Ses ŭ p’edes ŭ , 1987, pp. 181–2. 46 Yi W ŏ nsun, Chosŏ n s ŏ haksa y ŏ n’gu , 1986, p. 462. 47 Yu Hongy ŏ l, Han’guk ch’ ŏ nju kyohoesa , 1962, pp. 35–7. 48 Tokutomi Soh ō , Chō sen eki , 1922.

References Abe Yoshio ( 阿都吉雄 ). Nihon Shushigaku to Ch ō sen ( 日本朱子學と朝鮮 ). T ō ky ō : T ō ky ō daigaku shuppankai (東京大學出版會 ), 1965 (2nd edn., 1971). Andrade, Tonio, Hyeok Hweon Kang, and Kirsten Cooper. “A Korean Military Revolution? Parallel Military Innovations in East Asia and Europe,” Journal of World History 25:1 (March 2014): 51–84. Boot , W.J. “ Yi T’oegye and Japan ,” Korea Journal 22 :2 (February 1982 ): 16–30 . Fujiwara Seika ( 藤原惺窩 ). Seika sensei bunsh ū ( 惺窩先生文集 ). Kang Chae ŏ n (J. Ky ō Zaigen, 姜在彦 ). “ Bunroku Keich ō no eki to Chō sen Ts ū shinshi ( 文祿慶長の役と朝鮮通信使 ) ,” Nihon no naka no Ch ō sen bunka ( 日本の中の朝鮮文化 ) 48 ( 1980 ): 28–9 . Ken Ninsh ō (K. Kw ŏ n Insŏ p, 權仁燮 ). Chō sen to Nihon no kankeishi ( 朝鮮と日本の関係史 ). Tokyo : Akashi shoten ( 明石書店 ), 2000 . Kibe Kazuaki ( 木部和昭). “Hagi han ni okeru Ch ōsenjin horyo to bushi shakai ( 萩藩における朝鮮人捕虜と武士社会 ) ,” Rekishi hy ō ron ( 歴史評論 ) 593 ( 1999 ): 47–59 . Kim Yangs ŏ n (金蓥善). “Imjin Waeran chon’gun shinbu Ses ŭ p’edes ŭ [Cespedes] ŭ i nae-Han hwaldong kwa k ŭ y ŏ nghyang ( 壬辰倭亂從軍神父㎎㓺䗮◆㓺㦮G緈韓活

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 動ὒ ⁎ 影響 ) ,” Sahak y ŏ n’gu ( 史學硏究 ) 18 ( 1964 ): 703–40 . Komiya Mutsuyuki ( 小宮睦之 ). “ K ō K ō zen [K. Hong Hoy ŏ n] to Saga han (洪浩然と佐賀藩 ),” Saga Kenritsu Nagoyaj ō Hakubutsukan Kenkyū Kiy ō ( 佐賀縣立名護屋城博物館硏究紀要 ) 2 ( 1996 ): 25–32 . Kornicki , Peter . The Book in Japan: A Cultural History from the Beginnings to the Nineteenth Century . Leiden : Brill , 1998 . Kungnip Chinju Pangmulgwan ( ῃⰓ㰚㭒⹫ⶒὖ), ed. Imjin Waeran Chosŏ n’in p’oro ŭ i ki ŏ k ( 㧚㰚㢲⧖G 㫆㍶㧎G 䙂⪲㦮G ₆㠋 ). Chinju : Kungnip Chinju Pangmulgwan , 2010 . War and cultural exchange 339

Matsuda K ō ( 松田甲 ). “Ch ōsenjin o sosen to seru Kumamoto no sekigaku Takamoto Shimei (朝鮮人を祖先とせる熊本の碩學高本紫溟 ),” Nissen shiwa (日鮮史話 ), Vol. 1. Tokyo: Hara shob ō ( 原書房 ), 1926 (reprint 1976), pp. 105–20 . Nakano Setsuko ( 中野節子 ). “Kaga-han kashindan hensei to Wakita Naokata ( 加賀藩家臣団編成と脇田直賢 ),” in Kaga-han o ch ū shin ni ( 加賀藩を中心に ), 1990 Monbush ō kagaku kenky ū hi kenky ū seika h ō kokusho (1990 文部省科学研究費研究成果報告書 ), Kanazawa daigaku , 1991 . Ō ishi Manabu ( 大石学). “Kinsei Nihon shakai no Chō senjin hanshi ( 近世日本社会の朝鮮人藩士 ) ,” Nihon rekishi ( 日本歴史 ) 640 :9 ( 2001 ): 83–4 . Ono Noriaki ( 小野則秋 ). Nihon toshokanshi ( 日本圖書館史 ). Tokyo : Genbunsha ( 玄文社 ), 1973 . Pak Ch’ ŏ l ( 朴哲 ). “S ŏ gu’in’i pon Imjin Waeran ( ㍲ῂ㧎㧊G ⽎G 㧚㰚㢲⧖ ),” in Saeropge tashi po’nŭ n Imjin Waeran ( ㌞⫃ỢG┺㔲G⽊⓪G㧚㰚㢲⧖ ). Chinju : Chinju pangmulgwan , 1999 , pp. 79–88 . Pak Ch’ ŏ l (朴哲 ). Ses ŭ p’edes ŭ (Cespedes): Han’guk pangmun ch’oech’o s ŏ guin ( ㎎㓺䗮◆㓺 – 䞲ῃG ⹿ⶎG 㾲㽞G ㍲ῂ㧎 ). Seoul : S ŏ gang taekhakkyo ch’ulp’anbu , 1987 . Pak Chaegwang ( 朴宰光 ). “Ch ŏnjaeng dogu ( 戰爭道具),” in Saeropge tashi po’n ŭ n Imjin Waeran ( ㌞⫃ỢG┺㔲G⽊⓪G㧚㰚㢲⧖G). Chinju : Chinju pangmulgwan , 1999 , pp. 89–122 . Rousmainere , Nicole Coolidge . Vessels of Infl uence: China and the Birth of Porcelain in Medieval and Early Modern Japan . London : Bristol Classical Press , 2012 . Son Po-gi ( ㏦⽊₆ ). Kŭ msok hwalja wa inswaesul ( ⁞㏣䢲㧦㢖G㧎㐚㑶 ). Seoul : Sejong taewang kiny ŏ m sa ŏ phoe , 1976 . S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng sillok ( 宣祖修正實錄 ). Tokutomi Soh ō ( 徳富蘇峰 ). Ch ō sen eki, Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi , Vol. 2 (朝鮮役 , 近世日本國民史 , 下 ). Tokyo : Miny ū sha ( 民友社 ), 1922 . Tsuruzono Yutaka ( 鶴園裕). “Nihon kinsei shoki ni okeru torai Chō senjin no kenkyū : Kaga-han o ch ū shin ni ( 日本近世初期における渡来朝鮮人の研究 : 加賀藩を中心に),” in 1990 Monbushō kagaku kenky ū hi kenky ū seika h ō kokusho (1990 文部省科学研究費研究成果報告書 ), Kanazawa daigaku , 1991 . Yi Chun’g ŏ l ( 蝗俊杰 ). Chosŏ n sidae Ilbon kwa sŏ j ŏ k kyoryu yŏ n’gu ( 朝鮮時代㧒⽎ὒ 書籍交流硏究 ). Seoul : Hong’ikchae , 1986 . Yi Kangch’il ( 蝗康七 ). “ Chos ŏ n Hyojong-cho nachŏ ngb ŏ l kwa p’ia choch’ong e taehan sogo (朝鮮孝宗朝継禪征伐ὒ 被我烏銃㠦對䞲小考 ) ,” Komunhwa ( ἶⶎ䢪 ), Han’guk taehak pangmulgwan hy ŏ phoe 20 ( 1982 ): 15–28 . Yi Kwangmu ( 蝗旺茂 ). “ Chos ŏn hugi choch’ong chejo e kwanhan yŏ n’gu: 17–18 segi r ŭl chungsim ŭ ro (㫆㍶䤚₆ 鳥銃製造㠦 ὖ䞲㡆ῂ : 17 ෹ 18 ㎎₆⯒G㭧㕂㦒⪲ ) ,” Kyŏ nggi saron ( 京畿史論 ) 2 ( 1998 ): 153–5 .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Yi Naeok ( 蝗乃沃 ). “Ch ŏ njaeng ŭ l t’onghan munhwa kyoryu ( 㩚㨗㦚G䐋䞲Gⶎ䢪ᾦ⮮ ),” in Saeropge tashi po’nŭ n Imjin Waeran ( ㌞⫃ỢG┺㔲G⽊⓪G㧚㰚㢲⧖ ). Chinju : Chinju pangmulgwan , 1999 , pp. 190–7 . Yi Sangh ŭ i ( 蝗相熙 ). P’ashin ŭ i nunmul (波臣㦮G⑞ⶒ ). Seoul : P ŏ musa , 1997 . Y i W ŏ nsun ( 蝗元淳 ). Chos ŏ n s ŏ haksa y ŏ n’gu ( 朝鮮西學史硏究 ). Seoul : Iljisa , 1986 . Y u H ŭ ngyŏ l ( 蛢洪烈 ). Han’guk ch’ŏ nju kyohoesa ( 韓國天主敎會史 ). Seoul : K’at’ollik ch’ulp’ansa , 1962 .

16 The Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature

Choi Gwan ( 崔官 )

Introduction At the end of the sixteenth century, the Imjin Waeran shook Chosŏ n Korea, Ming China, and Japan to their roots with repercussions continuing long after the war’s conclusion. In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, harboring an ambition to conquer Ming China, mobilized approximately 150,000 troops and ordered them to invade Chos ŏn. The Japanese armies, with their extensive experience from the sengoku period and equipped with muskets, a new weapon, fi rst seized Pusan and then swept all before them to dominate the Korean peninsula. Despite these rapid victories, the Japanese army’s momentum from the early stages of the war did not continue for long. It was eventually pushed onto the defensive with the righteous army’s guerrilla attacks, the victories of the Chos ŏ n naval forces led by Yi Sunshin, the dispatch of a relief army from Ming China, and the counterattacks by Korean government army troops. At a certain point, peace negotiations between the Ming government and the Toyotomi regime began, but when the negotiations failed, the Japanese army launched a second full-scale invasion in 1597. With the death of Hideyoshi, Japanese forces evacuated from the peninsula at the end of 1598, and the Imjin Waeran, a tragic confl ict that took many lives over seven years, came to an end. Afterwards, Tokugawa Ieyasu, who seized power from the Toyotomi regime, requested the restoration of diplomatic relations with Chosŏ n Korea, and the Chos ŏn court fi nally resumed diplomatic relations with the Edo bakufu in 1607 in preparation against the threat of the Manchu tribes who were newly on the rise in the northern regions. The clash between the three countries of East Asia began without even a declaration of war and ended Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 without any change in territory or a peace treaty. Former relations among the belligerents were resumed after nine years, but the shock and repercussions caused by this war were truly of an unprecedented nature. In the case of China, its heavy war expenditures became one of the causes for the Ming government’s collapse. In the case of Japan, political power fell into the hands of Ieyasu with the failure of Japan’s fi rst war of foreign conquest and Hideyoshi’s death. In the case of Korea, while the dynasty Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 341 did not change, there were fundamental changes in the society as a whole, as expressed in the division of the Chos ŏ n period into early and late with the Imjin Waeran as the point of demarcation. As such, the Imjin Waeran brought historical changes to each country, certainly for Korea and Japan, which were the opposing countries in the war, and also for China, which sent reinforcements. In regional terms, the execution of this long, bloody war by the three countries, which each fought bearing their country’s fate, was the fi rst of its kind from the beginning of the region’s history. While there were clashes prior to 1592,1 the Imjin Waeran affected the East Asian region with such strength and intensity that nothing else has compared. The Imjin Waeran was a direct challenge by Japan to the Sinocentric East Asian world order up until that time. Similar Japanese challenges have reappeared in modern times. If we narrow our attention to Korea and Japan, the Imjin Waeran brought about great changes not only to the two countries’ politics, economies, and societies, but also to their cultures. Ideologically, Fujiwara Seika, who is hailed as the founder of early-modern Confucianism in Japan, became devoted to Chos ŏ n’s Neo-Confucianism (K. s ŏ ngnihak ), and became a Neo-Confucian scholar himself through personal exchanges with the young Korean Neo- Confucian scholar Kang Hang, who was captured and taken to Japan as a prisoner of war. And Seika’s pupil, Hayashi Razan, who was offered a post under Ieyasu on the recommendation of Seika, devised a political doctrine for the Edo bakufu based on Neo-Confucianism. This became the foundation for a bakufu academy. 2 Moreover, the fact that the Imjin Waeran has been in later times regarded as a war for ceramics, books, printing, and human captives points to the many Chos ŏn cultural resources that were forcibly taken to Japan. The Japanese army plundered widely, as though their aim were to acquire matériel and people, and it is certain that these became a great impetus to the development of Japanese culture in early-modern times. On the other hand, Chosŏ n cultural arts, such as printing with moveable type and ceramics, which were of a world standard at the time, slipped into a long stagnation. Literary works in both countries that depict the Imjin Waeran illustrate the extent of the shock of the war. Between the time of the Imjin Waeran and the present, the Imjin Waeran has been recorded and depicted in various forms, many of which are extant today. These include not only historical records, war diaries, records of service in war, personal memoirs, prisoner of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 war memoirs, and stories of military feats, but also novels, stories, poetry in classical Chinese, Korean verse (K. shijo ) and folk songs, Japanese folk verse (J. senry ū ), and productions for the Japanese theater (J. kabuki ) and the puppet theater (J. ningy ō j ō ruri ). These works refl ect well the perceptions of the adversaries generated by the two countries’ extreme confl ict, the times, and the spirit of the author. If we compare how each country mythologized the historical events of the war, we may also grasp the distinguishing features of each country’s literature. Research, however, on the relationship between the 342 Choi Gwan Imjin Waeran and literature has been neglected. Until now, studies related to the Imjin Waeran have usually focused on historical research, and in Japan there has even been a tendency to treat the Imjin Waeran as a part of research on the Toyotomi regime. Fortunately, there has been an increase in the number of studies on the relation between culture and the Imjin Waeran in recent years, but it can be said that a systematic and general study on literature dealing with the Imjin Waeran has yet to be done. This chapter organizes and presents a rough overview of Korean and Japanese literary works on the Imjin Waeran from the perspective of comparative literature.

The inscription of the Imjin Waeran in Korean literature Above all, the greatest wounds infl icted by the Imjin Waeran were in Chosŏ n, the battleground of the war. For 200 years following the establishment of the Chosŏ n dynasty in 1392, a peaceful life had been maintained, but this was destroyed in an instant when the Japanese army invaded. King Sŏ njo left his palace and fl ed to P’yŏ ngyang and then to Ŭ iju, and the entire Korean peninsula was drawn into the vortex of war. As 109 battles took place during the war, there were numerous casualties, and even instances where tens of thousands of people were massacred within the walls of a single city. There were very few villages that did not suffer the ravages of war, and the situation was such that the few areas in the mountains that did not suffer damage were later called utopias. 3 With nothing to eat, innumerable people starved to death. It is estimated that the number of people whose noses were cut off as proof of the Japanese army’s military exploits or those who were captured and taken off as prisoners of war totaled hundreds of thousands.4 There were very few Chosŏ n people who did not suffer, including assault or murder in front of one’s family, or the separation of an entire family without knowledge of each other’s fates. The Imjin Waeran touched not only the soldiers, but the entire country – from the king all the way down to the nobi . 5 The fact that the amount of rice production after the Imjin Waeran was less than 30 percent of that prior to the war indicates clearly just how ruined the entire land became over seven years. It was an unprecedented, wretched spectacle in Chos ŏ n history. Because the Japanese army also suffered major damage and evacuated without achieving their war aims, the war was not necessarily a defeat for

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Chos ŏ n. On the other hand, it was not a victorious war, either. It was a war that had no victor, but which merely left behind ruins on the Korean peninsula. With such an extremely wretched spectacle, the image of Japan as a merciless invader and an irreconcilable enemy became fi rmly established. While Koreans initially gave complete support to the Ming army troops who came as reinforcements, their tyranny and plunder manifested themselves, and the need for autonomous efforts was strongly felt. An objective consciousness of the international situation took shape, and at the time, Koreans could not Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 343 help but criticize and refl ect on what internal elements had incited such a terrible disaster: Why had they been negligent in their preparations for war? Chos ŏ n society had been accustomed to peace for a long period of time and was thrown into great confusion in the early stages of the war. The society displayed resilience, however, with the resistance that arose, and ordinary people came to display a sense of “national” identity. The Imjin Waeran increasingly made the Chosŏ n people stand together, and many “righteous soldiers” (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng ) from various parts of the country voluntarily rose against the Japanese. The resistance of the people from every social group and social class went against the Japanese army’s expectations and reversed Japanese plans. Widespread resistance became an important factor in pushing the invaders onto the defensive. While in the past there had appeared “national” heroes who fought off foreigners when they invaded, the Imjin Waeran generated more heroes than did any other war. The distinguished war service and loyal spirit of those honored as sacred heroes today, including the commanders Yi Sunshin,6 Kim Shi’min,7 K w ŏ n Yul,8 and Kim Ŭ ngsŏ ,9 the righteous army leaders Kwak Chaeu,10 Kim Ch’ungny ŏ ng, 11 and Kim Ch’ŏ n’il, 12 and the female entertainers (K. kisaeng ) Non’gae and Kyewŏ lhyang, 13 have been reproduced in literary works and legends, and have come down to us in these forms. As is generally known, the Imjin Waeran was not merely a war between Korea and Japan. With the participation of the Ming army and dark-skinned soldiers from Southeast Asia who accompanied the Ming army, the Imjin Waeran came to assume aspects of an international war involving multinational troops. European missionaries accompanied the Japanese army as battlefi eld chaplains, and the progress of the war was reported to Europe through Jesuit letters. 14 Moreover, records of Korean prisoners of war in Japan who managed to escape and return via China depict personal experiences in the East Asian world beyond the confi ned space of the Korean peninsula. The Imjin Waeran occasioned an expansion of Koreans’ consciousness beyond Chosŏ n to East Asia and even the world. In the end, the country was destroyed, and an anti-Japanese sentiment became grounded in the experiences of confl ict. Numerous war heroes were born as national heroes. At the same time, there also appeared an objective outlook on the war and an expansion of people’s consciousness regarding the wider world. On this basis the war was recorded and depicted in literary

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 works. The progress of the Imjin Waeran is recorded in detail in various non- fi ction accounts. Foremost among these are the dynastic veritable records, Chos ŏn wangjo shillok. Aside from the veritable records, there are numerous memoirs that record personal war experiences from the viewpoint of a court statesman, a commander at the front, a righteous army leader, and a peasant soldier. In Korea, these works are collectively called shilgi or non-fi ction records. The number and quantity of non-fi ction is vast, so vast that new 344 Choi Gwan materials are being discovered even now. Among them, we can list the known major works as follows:

• Y u S ŏ ngnyong, Chingbirok, records events between 1592 and 1598. The author Yu S ŏngyong was a disciple of Yi Hwang and discovered and promoted Yi Sunshin. Yu held important posts at the court, including Minister of War (K. Py ŏ ngjo p’ans ŏ) and Wartime Commander (K. Toch’ech’alsa ).15 After the war, he wrote about the Imjin Waeran with the intention to warn posterity, “I will be severely critical of recent events and let future generations be worried and prudent.” As a record that expounds on the loyal and patriotic spirit of a self-refl ective statesman during the war period, Chingbirok is considered a basic document on the Imjin Waeran. It was carried to Japan and was also essential reading for the Korean communication embassies (K. T’ongshinsa ). • Yi Sunshin, Nanjung ilgi, 1592.1.1–1598.11.17. This is Yi Sunshin’s memoirs written at his naval base. • Yi No, Yongsa ilgi. As a staff offi cer under Kim Sŏ ng’il, Yi No recorded battles in detail. • Cho Ky ŏ ngnam, Nanjung chamnok. This is a miscellaneous, unoffi cial history (K. yasa ) by an author who participated in the war as a righteous army leader. • Cho Ch ŏ ng, Imjin Waeran ilgi . This contains stories of personal experience and observations by an author who served as a righteous army soldier. • O H ŭ imun, Swaemirok. These are stories of personal experiences and observations by a man from an illustrious family during his wartime wanderings. • Ch ŏ ng Y ŏ ngbang, Imjin chobyŏ n saj ŏ k . These are records of tragedies suffered by a scholar’s family. • Yun Kukhyŏ ng, Munso mallok . These are writings related to the Imjin Waeran by an offi cial involved in overseeing revenue and expenditures under the royal purview. • Yu Chin, Imjin nok . Yu S ŏ ngnyong’s son Yu Chin recorded his personal experiences during the war. The text is in Korean. • Kim Yong, Hojong ilgi. These are records kept while attending the king as a court historian.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 • Ch ŏng T’ak, Yongsa ilgi. These are records kept while accompanying the crown prince around the country.

These extant works record actual things experienced, seen, and heard by an individual in his given situation during the Imjin Waeran. 16 Among these, there are a number of works that are widely recognized for their value as historical documents, such as Yu S ŏ ngnyong’s Chingbirok . There are also records written by people who were taken as captives to Japan during the war. Captives’ records depict their personal experiences Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 345 and observations in a foreign country. Among them, Kang Hang’s famous Kanyangnok is a memoir written in classical Chinese about the author’s experience as a prisoner of war and observations on Japanese affairs from the time he was captured by a Japanese army in late 1597 until his escape in early 1600, spanning four years. Kang was an offi cial and a young Confucian scholar, whose patriotism and sober assessments are well expressed. Aside from these, there are other works such as W ŏ lbong haesangnok by Chŏ ng H ŭ id ŭ k, whose scholarly achievements were recognized in Japan, and K ŭ mgye ilgi by No In, who escaped from Japan to China and then returned to Korea. When the war ended in 1598, accounts that went beyond the recording of facts, or works that fi ctionalized the war, emerged from early on.Talch’ ŏ n mongyurok , written in 1600, eulogizes loyal and patriotic martyred generals. It is regarded as the fi rst fully fi ctional work in both Korea and Japan that depicts the Imjin Waeran. As its title suggests, it is a dream novel and treats dreams as its subject. It is a pioneering work that consists of a plot in which the hero of the novel dreams of meeting “grieving ghosts” (K. w ŏ n kwi ) who died in the invasion and listens to their stories. Talch’ ŏn was the site of a Korean defeat early in the invasion where General Shin Ip’s army, after having fought numerous battles, faced a decisive battle and was annihilated by Konishi Yukinaga’s forces. Talch’ ŏ n mongyurok was the literary product of the author Yun Kyes ŏn’s feelings on his visit to Talch’ ŏ n. He died mysteriously at an early age, four years after he wrote this text. A total of twenty-seven loyal and patriotic martyred commanders who died in battle, beginning with Yi Sunshin, appear in the work. They each express their resentment and feelings in turn. Afterwards, they beg P’adamja, the literary incarnation of the author, to exert himself in serving the country in their stead. When P’adamja wakes up from his dream, he com- poses a ritual address and performs sacrifi cial rites in order to comfort the loyal spirits of these commanders. The intention driving this work lay in a desire to memorialize loyal and patriotic martyrs and take a historical lesson from their deaths. In addition to Talch’ ŏ n mongyurok , other dream novels that deal with the Imjin Waeran are P’isaeng my ŏ ng mongnok and Yongmun mong’yurok . 17 Kangdo mong’yurok, which deals with the 1636 Manchu invasion, is also well known. The most representative of literary works from the Chosŏ n period that deals with the Imjin Waeran on all levels is unquestionably Imjin nok . Carrying

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 the theme of the Imjin Waeran as its title suggests, Imjin nok is a historical war story that reveals the rise of a “national” spirit and sense of superiority over the Japanese. Despite the fact that considerable numbers of the book disappeared because it was banned during the Japanese colonial period of 1910–45, over forty different versions have come to light. 18 These versions may share the same title, but they often differ in content and character from one another. The Imjin nok consists of a series of individual tales that have independent characteristics and signifi cance. Its structure suggests how easily particular stories may have been omitted or added. Its variety refl ects the fact 346 Choi Gwan that it was created by people from all social classes whose historical understanding of the Imjin Waeran differed one from the other. The author of Imjin nok is unknown, and the date of composition is presumed to be some time between the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century. The existence of numerous alternative versions written in Korean, Korean and classical Chinese mixed script, and classical Chinese, suggests that it was a popular novel about the Imjin Waeran that targeted readers from all social classes. While it was originally created for the literati of its time and there are a few classical Chinese versions, many versions were aimed at the general public. It was read widely and re-created into new forms. Although there are matters yet to be clarifi ed, Imjin nok today has been highly praised as “literature that forced an awakening of the masses, a literature that expressed an internal awareness and external fury, a literature of formative growth, a literature of the people.”19 The illustrious heroes in Imjin nok include Yi Sunshin, Kwak Chaeu, Kim T ŏ ngny ŏ ng, Non’gae, Ch’oe Kyŏ nghoe,20 K y e w ŏ lhyang, Kim Ŭ ngsŏ , 21 and Yuj ŏ ng Sa’my ŏ ngdang. 22 Tales related to these people, together with legends from all parts of the country, have been combined, extended, reproduced, and survive today. Another novelistic form was offered by captives who returned. Estimates of the numbers of people who were captured and taken to Japan during the Imjin Waeran range from several tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people. 23 Among them, some returned to Chos ŏn during the process of re-establishing diplomatic relations with the Edo bakufu , some escaped, and others remained and lived in Japan. Some were sold off as slaves to Southeast Asia or went as far as Europe and ended their lives there. An elaboration of the wanderings of these captives and their experiences produced works of fi ction with innovative content set against the background of the Imjin Waeran. Cho Wihan’s Ch’oe Ch’ŏ k ch ŏ n tells the story of Ch’oe Ch’ ŏk, who goes to Ming China, his wife, who is taken to Japan, the couple’s dramatic reunion in Chinese Annam, and their return home after these ordeals. Nam Yun ch ŏ n , written by an unknown author, is a novel with a unique storyline that recounts the story of Nam Yun, who is taken to Japan as a prisoner of war by the Japanese army and marries the princess of the Japanese king. He escapes with the help of the princess, and fi nally returns home by way of China. Other novels of this genre include Kwŏ n P’il’s two

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 works Chu Saeng ch ŏ n and Yi Hallim ch ŏ n .24 There is also a unique category of literary works that developed under the stimulus of the Imjin Waeran. S ŏ Yuy ŏ ng’s Yungmi tanggi, set in the Silla period, follows Kim T’aeja’s dispatch of troops when Japanese pirates plan another invasion, Kim’s conquest of the Japanese capital of Edo, the surrender of the Japanese king, and the troops’ return home. Among other works are Yi Yun’gu chŏ n , a story of fi ghting off Japanese pirates set in the Kory ŏ period, and Yi Changbaek ch ŏ n , which deals with Ming’s dispatch of reinforcements. Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 347 Stories of heroes who saved the country during the Imjin Waeran reappeared from the late nineteenth century when the Japanese invaded again. Examples include Yi Sunshin ch ŏ n , Kim T ŏ ngny ŏ ng ch ŏ n , Samy ŏ ngdang ch ŏ n , and Kim Ŭ ngs ŏ shilgi, which were written in a condescending tone towards Japan with the aim of heightening popular morale and overcoming the national crisis through heroism. The Imjin Waeran has also been represented in classical Chinese verse and poetry in hang ŭ l . Intellectuals, such as offi cials and Buddhist monks, expressed sentiments and described circumstances experienced during the Imjin Waeran through classical Chinese poetry, which occupied an important place in the literature of the yangban at the time.25 Among Korean kasa poetry written by those who experienced the war are “Kogong ga” by H ŏ Ch ŏn, Yi W ŏ nik’s “Kogong tapjuin ga,” Ko Ŭ ngch’ ŏk’s “Tosan ga,” Ch’oe Hy ŏ n’s “Yongsa ŭ m,” and Pak Illo’s “T’aep’yŏ ng sa,” “Sŏ nsang t’an,” “Nuhang sa,” and “Y ŏ ngnam ga.”26 We also have the “Chaeil ponjang ga” and “Hwaan insu ga” by Paek Suhoe, who spent nine years in Japan as a prisoner of war, and “Moha tang- sulhoe ga” by Kim Ch’ungsŏ n, who surrendered to the Japanese army and was naturalized in Japan. Verses depicting the Imjin Waeran continued to be produced until the early twentieth century and include Kim In’gyŏ m’s “Ildong changyu ga” (1764). Even the Tonghak leader Ch’oe Cheu (1824–64) produced “Anshim ga” (1860) and “Hanyang obaengnyŏ n ga” (published in 1913). Among shijo, one of the most traditional Korean verse forms, there are works by Yi Sunshin, Kim Tŏ ngny ŏ ng, Ko Kyŏ ngmy ŏ ng, Yi Tŏ g’il, Paek Suhoe, and Sil My ŏ ng. 27 The contents of these Korean verses cover many topics, including the reality of the war, criticism of court offi cials, patriotic sentiments, the pursuit of peace, and the feelings of war prisoners. In general, those who experienced the war express their personal sentiments. Later works are not numerous, and wrath directed at Japan is central.

The inscription of the Imjin Waeran in Japanese literature Hideyoshi’s invasion of Chosŏ n has been referred to as “the Taik ō ’s subjugation of Chos ŏ n” ( Taik ō no Ch ō sen seibatsu), “the subjugation of the Samhan” (Sankan seibatsu ), “the conquest of Han” (seikan ), “the Chosŏ n war” ( Ch ō sen eki), “the Chos ŏn campaign” ( Ch ō sen jin), or “the dispatch of troops to Chos ŏ n” ( Ch ō sen shuppei) in early-modern Japan, and more

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 recently as the Bunroku–Keich ō no eki (the war of the Bunroku and Keich ō eras) following the reign titles for the Japanese emperor at the time of the war. Whatever it was called, this was Japan’s fi rst war of foreign conquest. While the Japanese army also had many casualties, and evacuated without attaining their goals, the numerous material and human resources that they took away from Chosŏ n were a great help in the development of early-modern Japanese thought, industry, and culture. After the death of Hideyoshi from disease, Japan was enveloped in a whirl- wind of struggles for power, and in 1600 was divided into two armies (east and 348 Choi Gwan west) that fought a great battle for supremacy. At the Battle of Sekigahara, the army of the east, led by Tokugawa Ieyasu, defeated the army of the west, which included members who had participated in the war in Chosŏ n, such as Ishida Mitsunari and Konishi Yukinaga. Ieyasu, who seized political power, established the Edo bakufu , and in 1615 defeated surviving forces that served Hideyoshi’s young son Hideyori at Ō saka. In the course of these events a considerable number of people who had experienced the Imjin Waeran were killed, and the recording of the facts of the invasion became diffi cult in the chaos during the transition of political power. Ieyasu made efforts to restore diplomatic relations with Chosŏ n, emphasizing the fact that he had not participated in the invasion. Diplomatic relations were restored when he accepted the demands of the Chosŏ n court. After the normalization of diplomatic relations, the amicable, egalitarian relationship between the Chos ŏ n court and the Edo bakufu continued until the modern period without resolving the resentment incited by the Imjin Waeran. Until 1811, Chos ŏn communication embassies of around 400–500 men visited Japan on twelve occasions, and each visit was a great event that stirred Japanese society.28 The Edo bakufu strictly regulated contact with foreign countries. Until the opening of ports towards the end of the Tokugawa period, Japan could develop only an individual culture under an isolationist policy. However, Japan’s perception of Chos ŏn, which had changed from being yesterday’s war opponent to the only country with which Japan had diplomatic relations, could never be the same as perceptions of other countries. This was because, from Japan’s viewpoint, Hideyoshi’s invasion of Chosŏ n was Japan’s fi rst war of foreign conquest. Not only was it a serious incident that could not be easily erased from people’s memories, but the existence of numerous Korean prisoners of war who remained in Japan and the Korean Communication Embassy visits made Japanese rather conscious of the Imjin Waeran. In reality, however, the bakufu strengthened regulations on publication, and banned not only the infl ux and publication of books related to Christianity, but also those that dealt with incidents related to Ieyasu or used the real names of warriors. Following this, books that dealt with Hideyoshi or the Imjin Waeran also became targets for control. 29 Although there were no records organized and produced by the bakufu on the Imjin Waeran, the writing of historical records and the production of literature on the war proceeded pri-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 vately. Despite bakufu restrictions, curiosity about the Imjin Waeran grew. During the Edo period alone approximately ten kinds of war tales (J. gunki ) and realistic novels (J. jitsuroku-tai sh ō setsu) depicting the Imjin Waeran were published for commercial gain, and the military exploits of individual warlords and observations by Buddhist monks following the campaigns were transcribed. These were usually in forms that sought after veracity or emphasized the military merits of Japanese leaders and were read within Japanese society. Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 349 Ch ōsen gunki monogatari or “tales from the Chosŏ n war” constituted a genre of works that usually surveyed the Imjin Waeran in a broad, general way. Major works of this genre published in the Edo period include:

• Oze Hoan, Taik ō ki. Of the twenty-two volumes that deal with the life of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, volumes 13, 14, and 15 treat the Imjin Waeran. It was published and re-published many times, including in 1646, 1661, and 1703. • Hori Kyō an, Ch ō sen seibatsuki , nine fascicles, published in 1659. • Furuhashi Y ū gen, Kiyomasa-ki , three fascicles, published in 1663. • Ō ta Gy ū ichi, K ō raijin nikki, three fascicles with one supplement, published in 1702. • Baba Shibunori, Ch ō sen Taiheiki , thirty fascicles, published in 1705. • Seiki, Ch ōsen gunki taizen, thirty-eight fascicles with two supplements, published in 1705. • Takenouchi Kakusai, Ehon Taikō ki, seven volumes, eighty-four fascicles, published between 1779 and 1802. • Akizato Rit ō , Ehon Ch ō sen gunki , ten fascicles, published in 1800. • Amano Sadashige, Amano Genuemon Ch ō sen ikusa monogatari , one fascicle, published in 1831. • Aoyama Nobumitsu, Seikan zasshi , one fascicle, published in 1839. • Kikuchi Kasugarō , Tsurumine Shigenobu, and Hashimoto Sadahide, Ehon Ch ō sen seibatsuki, two volumes, twenty fascicles, published in 1853 and 1854. • Yamazaki Hisanaga, Ch ō sen seit ō shimatsuki , fi ve fascicles, published in 1854. • Hachik ō sha Tokusui and Ichiyū sai Kuniyoshi, Ehon Toyotomi Kunk ō ki , nine volumes, ninety fascicles, published in 1858.

As is clear from this list, works in the Ch ō sen gunkimono genre were continuously published over the Edo period. Among them, though, the bakufu forbade further printing of the 1703 edition of Oze Hoan’s Taik ō ki , Hori Kyō an’s Ch ō sen seibatsuki, Takenouchi Kakusai’s Ehon Taik ō ki, and others. The fact that so many works of the Ch ō sen gunkimono genre were published for commercial gain despite the bakufu ’s rigid controls illustrates the great interest in early-modern Japanese society for books on the Imjin Waeran.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In addition, a notable work was acquired from Chosŏ n and published in Japan. In 1695, Yu S ŏ ngnyong’s Chingbirok was published in Kyō to with a preface written by Kaibara Ekiken (1630–1714) and included a map of Chos ŏ n.30 Through the Chingbirok , Japanese readers came to know of the actual circumstances in Chosŏ n during the Imjin Waeran, and later works of the Ch ō sen gunkimono genre included content from the Chingbirok . In this way, the Chos ŏn hero Yi Sunshin’s name came to be known in Japan. Yi was highly respected by the Japanese navy in modern times.31 350 Choi Gwan Aside from the original publications, many manuscript editions circulated and were passed down.32 Most of these were typeset in the Meiji period and later, and continue to be read. The Imjin Waeran has infl uenced modern Japanese literature, as shown by the numerous works that have the war as the theme or subject.33 The number of works that fall into the Ch ō sen gunkimono genre are a refl ection of the Japanese people’s continuous interest in the Imjin Waeran. In these works Japanese views on war, life and death, and Chosŏ n are projected. Today, the discovery and systematized research on works in this genre continue with historical and literary concerns at the forefront. Japanese during the Edo period seem to have been most concerned with apprehending the actual circumstances of the invasion, and the number of fi ctional treatments of the war are fewer in comparison with the number produced in Korea. While the number is smaller, Japanese fi ction still exhibits characteristics unique to Japan. For the majority of the Japanese people, who were not sent to fi ght in Chosŏ n, the Imjin Waeran evoked a vague image. Because of this, there appeared a group of works that fi ctionalized particular incidents and characters from the war, and produced particularly vivid images. An example is Katō Kiyomasa’s story of the tiger hunt, which is known even today. 34 Works that reveal the distinctive features of this kind of fi ctional- ization are often found in popular theater, such as kabuki and ningy ō j ō ruri (puppet theater). In these pieces, Korean generals are either tragically killed by Japanese commanders or portrayed as wizard rebels who go to Japan and plot its destruction. The most representative Chos ŏn general to appear is a character called Mokuso-kan. The name “Mokuso” came from the Korean word moksa , which was a Chosŏ n government term for magistrate, and in this case referred to the Magistrate of Chinju (Chinju moksa ). The Chosŏ n army won at the fi rst Battle of Chinju, which was later appraised as one of the three decisive Korean victories in the Imjin Waeran. The Japanese army, after the shock of their fi rst defeat on land, thereafter used the proper nounmokuso or bokushi to refer to the Magistrate of Chinju, who was the commander on the Chosŏ n side. In the following year after the initial defeat, Hideyoshi fi elded a massive army of over 90,000 soldiers and wiped out Chinju. The head of the magistrate was sent to Japan and displayed in Kyō to. The victory and tragic death of the magistrate left a strong impression on the Japanese people, and he appeared in many later theater pieces as the character Mokuso-kan.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Chikamatsu Monzaemon created the brave Chos ŏn general Mokuso Hangan based on the character of Mokuso for his stage play Honch ō sangokushi . In Tenjiku Tokubee ikoku banashi by Tsuruya Nanboku, whose works opened up the Edo kabuki scene, Mokuso is dramatized as a Korean wizard harboring a grudge against Japan and has his son, Tenjiku Tokubee, the hero of the play, seek revenge on Japan. 35 In addition to these there are a number of plays on rebellion and treason with plots in which Koreans appear as rebels, wiz- ards, and Christians bearing grudges against Japan and try to overthrow the bakufu . In the end, they fail due to the actions of loyal Japanese subjects. Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 351 Conclusion The production of literary works in Korea and Japan displays different aspects in each country. In Korea, the production of literature on the Imjin Waeran was based on the experiences of the entire populace in the war, and was produced in all genres. These works mainly depict the tragic circumstances of the war and express a sense that the country’s crisis will be overcome through loyalty. They regard the Japanese invaders with hostility and a condescending sense of superiority and offer fi ctional depictions designed to inspire spiritual victory over Japan. In contrast, efforts to discover the actual circumstances of the Imjin Waeran continued in Japan even under the strict control of the bakufu , and as a result, the Ch ō sen gunkimono genre appeared. The contents of these works usually highlighted the military achievements of Japanese leaders. Fictional work on the Imjin Waeran can only be found in a few theatrical pieces, and these texts produced particular images of the Imjin Waeran. A theater of rebellion emerged, which cast Korean characters as represented by Mokuso-kan, the wizard who harbors a deep grudge against Japan. Numerous literary works illustrating opposition between the two countries have implanted a sense of supremacy about one’s own country in both places and have stimulated nationalism in each country. Through these works, mutual perceptions were established. Korea’s image of the Japanese was of an aggressive and barbaric people, and Japan’s image of the Chosŏ n people was of an effeminate and weak people. The wounds left by the Imjin Waeran have not healed even with the passage of time, and the modern era opened with an already existing, deep anger between the neighboring countries. This anger came back to life in various new forms and under new circumstances in each country. As Japan embarked on imperialism following the Meiji Restoration, Hideyoshi was reborn as a hero who had displayed Japanese military prowess throughout East Asia. In stark contrast, biographies of the Imjin Waeran heroes, who had helped to maintain Chosŏ n’s existence by giving up their lives, were published in Korea. In fact, the Imjin Waeran occupies the starting point for Korean and Japanese relations from the early-modern era onwards. Without an understanding of this invasion, an understanding of the reality of relations between Korea and Japan is impossible.36

Notes Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Translated by Grace Koh with James B. Lewis. 1 In 663, at the Paekch’on River, near the mouth of the Kŭ m River, a combination of Silla and Tang forces fought with Japanese forces assisting Paekche. In the late thirteenth century, an alliance of Mongol and Koryŏ forces invaded Japan twice. Both times, the battlefi elds were limited to specifi c locations and the time spent ghting fi was not long. 2 Translator’s note: The bakufu academy was popularly known as the Sh ō heizaka Gakumonsho. 3 For example, it came to be said that “for the duration of the Imjin Waeran, they received fi sh and meat. Only [Yi Saeng]’s village saw no disruption caused by the 352 Choi Gwan military, and for this reason it was called a Shangri-la ( tow ŏ n ) deep in the mountains.” See An Pin’gung simny ŏ n toks ŏ , 1985, p. 560. 4 During the second invasion in 1597, Japanese soldiers cut off the noses of Koreans and sent these to Japan as evidence of their military merit. At fi rst, they also cut off ears, but noses became more important. A tomb for these noses was constructed as the Mimizuka in front of H ō k ō ji temple in Kyō to. For a study of the Mimizuka, see Kumu, Mimizuka , 1994. 5 Translator’s note: Nobi is often translated as “slave,” but “unfree labor” may be more accurate regarding the social and legal positions of those identifi ed as nobi . 6 Yi Sunshin (1545–98) was Chos ŏ n’s most famous military commander. As soon as he rose to become the Naval Commander (K. Sugun ch ŏ ltosa) of Left Ch ŏ lla Province, he predicted a Japanese invasion, constructed armored battleships known as k ŏ buks ŏ n , and prepared for war. When the Imjin Waeran broke out, he defeated the Japanese navy everywhere and dominated the seas. However, because of slander, he was demoted to the rank of an enlisted man, and during that period, nearly the entire Chosŏ n navy was destroyed. When he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Southern Provinces (K. Samdo sugun tongjesa ), only twelve ships remained. With these he deployed outstanding tactics that destroyed scores of Japanese naval vessels and blocked Japanese military operations on land and sea. He commanded the fi nal, decisive sea battle against the Japanese when they were evacuating in 1598 and although he was routing the Japanese forces, he was hit by a bullet and killed. He moved everyone with his extreme sense of loyalty, his noble character, his leadership, his brilliant tactics, and his gallant death. He came to be adulated as a hero of the people, who aided the country in a national crisis. Yi Sunshin’s life has been the subject of countless biographies and works of art, and his fame has reached even Japan. 7 Kim Shi’min (1554–92), as the Magistrate of Chinju County, repelled and was victorious against a besieging Japanese force at the fi rst Battle of Chinju in 1592, but he was struck by a bullet and killed at his post. This victory stopped the Japanese from invading Ch ŏ lla Province and was judged to have been one of the three great Korean victories of the Imjin Waeran together with Yi Sunshin’s victory at Hansan Island and Kw ŏ n Yul’s victory at the mountain fortress of Haengju. Kim Shi’min appears in Chosŏ n literature as a loyal commander and martyr for the country. From the Japanese military point of view, Kim Shi’min, who infl icted on them their fi rst defeat on land, is known as Mokuso and thereafter, in Japanese literature, he appears as a famous commander or as a rebel who has come over from Chos ŏ n. 8 K w ŏn Yul (1537–99) directed the victory at Haengju and was the supreme commanding general ( Tow ŏ nsu ) of the Chosŏ n army. 9 Kim Ŭ ngs ŏ (1564–1624) recaptured P’yŏ ngyang and Pusan during the Imjin Waeran and took in many Japanese defectors. 10 Kwak Chaeu (1552–1617) was the fi rst to expend his private wealth and raise an irregular guerilla force of “righteous soldiers” (K. ŭ iby ŏ ng). He wore a scarlet

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 cloak as a commander of the righteous soldiers and stood at the head of his forces. With a distinguished war record, he came to be called the “Red General.” His outstanding accomplishments and skill have become the subject of literary works. 11 Kim Ch’ungny ŏng (1567–96) achieved fame as a ŭ iby ŏ ng commander, but because of slander from a traitor, he died in prison, and his unjust death has become a literary subject. 12 Kim Ch’ ŏ n’il (1537–93) was an offi cial at the time of the outbreak of war. He raised a “righteous” army and was victorious in combat at various places. At the second Battle of Chinju in 1593, when the city fell, he threw himself into the Nam River fl owing below the walls, dying a martyr’s death for the country. Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 353 13 Non’gae was a female entertainer of dance and song, a woman who offered enter- tainment in pleasurable times, and she was said to have been a kisaeng on government retainer (K. kwan’gi ). As members of the lower class, the social status of the kisaeng was low, but they engaged with scholar-offi cials (K.sadaebu ), and there were many cultured kisaeng who were highly refi ned sophisticates. Though being low-class and not expected to have any loyalty to the existing order, Non’gae, a Chinju kisaeng who gave up her life for the country, stirred the sentiments of many with her pathos. Kyew ŏlhyang, a P’y ŏ ngyang kisaeng, is also remembered for her self-sacrifi ce. Their stories have been passed on in legend and literature. 14 The Spanish Jesuit priest Gregorio de Cespedes was the fi rst Westerner to step on Korean soil. He served as the chaplain for Konishi Yukinaga (Christian baptismal name Augustine). At the time, the Society of Jesus introduced the Imjin Waeran to Europeans through their annual reports and the war even appeared frequently in Historia de Japam by the Portuguese missionary Lu í s Fr óis, then resident in Japan. 15 Translator’s note: “Wartime Commander” was the supreme commander of provincial military affairs in lieu of the king. 16 Among collections put together later are Ch’ae Hyujing’s Maeh ŏ n shilgi , Shin Kyŏ ng’s Chaejo p ŏ nbangji , Hong Yangho’s Honam chŏ r ŭ irok , Song Kyep’il et al. , S ŏ ho ch’ungy ŏ llok , Ch ŏ ng Ch’ihy ŏ ng et al. , Imjin Waeran sus ŏ ngnok , and Kim Ch’ungjang-gong yusa , among others. See also Hwang, Imjin Waeran , 1992. 17 Translator’s note: For more on dream novels, see Haboush, “Dead Bodies,” 2003. 18 Translator’s note: For an example of a popular version, see Lee, The Record of the Black Dragon Year , 2000. 19 So Chaey ŏ ng, Imjin Waeran , 1980, p. 264. See also Im, Imjin nok yŏn’gu , 1986. 20 Non’gae and Ch’oe Ky ŏ nghoe. At the second Battle of Chinju, the city fell and the Chinju kisaeng Non’gae took the opportunity of the Japanese army throw- ing a victory celebration to make herself up and appear. Grabbing a Japanese commander who was dancing with her, they both fell into the Nam River fl owing below the city walls and died. Later, praising Non’gae’s virtue, on the stone in the river from where she leapt were carved characters reading ŭ iam (righteous rock), and a shrine was established nearby where sacrifi ces were offered. She came to be worshipped as a “righteous [ki]saeng” and beloved by the people as Korea’s Joan of Arc. Vestiges of Non’gae were added to the Imjin nok and embellished with a love affair between Non’gae and Ch’oe Ky ŏnghoe, a defender of the city. The Japanese commander that Non’gae killed is presumed to be Keyamura Rokusuke. In Japan, Keyamura is the main character in the famous kabuki play Hikosan gongen Chikainosuke dachi and has come to be known as a representative fi lial son and strongman. 2 1 K y e w ŏ lhyang and Kim Ŭ ngs ŏ . The story of the P’yŏ ngyang kisaeng Kyew ŏ lhyang, who helped Kim Ŭ ngs ŏ kill a Japanese commander and then died herself, is one of the sadder tales in the Imjin nok . Akutagawa Ryū nosuke, the early-twentieth- century Japanese writer, has left her tale in his Kin Sh ō gun .

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 22 Sa’myŏngdang (1544–1610), Buddhist name Yujŏ ng, was a monk at the outbreak of the war. He raised a monk’s army and won martial fame. After the war, he was sent to Japan as head of the 1605 delegation to negotiate peace and even returned with several thousand prisoners taken in war. His outstanding achievements became legend in later years, and in Imjin nok, he is mythologized as having gone to Japan and obtained their surrender. 23 The representative study on prisoners of war taken to Japan is Nait ō Shunpo’s Bunroku-Keich ō no eki ni okeru hironin no kenky ū , 1976. 24 Yi, Imjin Waeran p’oro shilgi yŏn’gu, 1995; Kim, Han’guk kojŏn sosŏl yŏn’gu , 1983; Kim et al. , Imjin Waeran kwa Han’guk munhak , 1992. 354 Choi Gwan 25 Many in the intellectual class expressed a variety of sentiments in records of actual events and in their collected writings. Notable examples are Yu Songnyŏ ng, Yun Tusu, Kwŏ n P’il, Hŏ Kyun’s Hong Kiltong chŏ n , Yu Mong’in, who wrote the Ŏ u yadam, Yi Sunshin, Sa’myŏngdang, monks such as Sŏ san Taesa, and even those who were taken to Japan, such as Kang Hang, Chŏ ng H ŭ id ŭ k, and No In. See also Kang, Han’guk shiga munhak yŏn’gu , 1986. 26 Translator’s note: Kasa began to appear from the late Koryŏ period and were popular in the Chosŏ n period. These were long, lyric poems or rhymed prose and often carried a narrative. See McCann, Early Korean Literature , 2000. 27 Space forbids listing sijo poems with the war as a theme, but two that are widely known in South Korea are Yi Sunshin’s Hansan-do ka and an anonymous poem paying tribute to Non’gae. Many are included in Han’guk sijo taesaj ŏ n , edited by Pak Ŭ lsu, 1992. 28 The Korean Communication Embassy (T’ongshinsa ) was an offi cial delegation bearing a state letter and dispatched by the king of Chosŏ n to the shō gun in Edo. There were twelve sent from 1607 to 1811. From the fourth in the post-war period, in 1636, the delegations were called T’ongshinsa . In general, when a new shō gun ascended and in answer to a request from Japan, an embassy for the purpose of amity and with an entourage of up to 400–500 people was sent to Edo and back. The Japanese spent vast sums to entertain the T’ongshinsa and the coming and going of the Korean embassy under the seclusion policy (J. sakoku ) was an enormous event that might be enjoyed only once or twice in a lifetime. The last T’ongshinsa in 1811 exchanged state letters on Tsushima. Because the Japanese army in their push towards the Chosŏ n capital had followed the routes of the Japanese envoys who had visited Korea before the war, the Korean government refused to allow Japanese envoys to visit the capital after the war. The Japanese called in Pusan to request the dispatch of T’ongshinsa , to conduct diplomacy, and to trade. Ri et al., Ch ōsen Tsūshinshi to Nihonjin , 1992; Miyake, Kinsei Ajia no Nihon to Chōsen, 1993. 29 Ozaki, Hō Taikō bunken ichiran, 1935. Translator’s note: For more on censoring Hideyoshi, see Davis, “The Trouble with Hideyoshi,” 2007. 30 Translator’s note: For more on Kaibara Ekiken’s preface, see Boot, “Kaibara Ekiken’s preface to Chingbirok ,” 2010. 3 1 Y u S ŏ ngnyong appeared in the Japanese puppet theater as well, because his Chingbirok had been published in Japan. For example, in Chikamatsu Hanji’s Shonichi Yamashiro no kuni chikushō zuka, Yu takes the stage as the “most important Korean minister.” In particular, Chingbirok relates in detail the selection of Yi Sunshin and his active role, and this introduced the naval commander’s name to Japanese. It is said that, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, to pray for a successful surprise attack on the Russian Baltic Fleet, Japanese navy offi cials visited a shrine to Yi Sunshin in Chinhae and offered sacrifi ces, and before moving the fl eet out, they offered silent prayers to Yi Sunshin. Tō g ō Heihachirō , the Japanese commander who defeated the Russian Baltic Fleet, was later called the Nelson of the East when he visited England, but he himself said that he could not measure

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 up to the stature of Yi Sunshin. Fujii Nobuo, Ri Shunshin oboegaki, 1982, p. 266; Kim T’aejun, “Nihon ni okeru Ri Shunshin no meisei,” 1981. 32 Representative of these are Takenaka Shigekado’s Toyokagami ; Ō k ō chi Hidemoto’s Ch ō sen monogatari ; Ō ta Gy ū ichi’s Taik ō sama gunki no uchi ; Keinen’s Ch ō sen hinikki ; Ōzeki Sadasuke’s Ch ō sen seibatsuki; Yamazaki Hisanaga’s Ry ō koku jinran jikki ; and Sessai Sanjin (節齋散人 )’s Ch ō sen seibatsu gunkikō . Aside from these, there are Shimazu K ō rai gunki and Wakisaka-ki , which record various commanders’ military careers. 33 Representative modern examples are Akutagawa Ry ū nosuke’s Kin Shō gun , Nakajima Atsushi’s Junsa no iru f ūkei , and End ō Sh ū saku’s Tetsu no kubikase . Imjin Waeran in Korean and Japanese literature 355 34 During the Imjin Waeran, Kat ō Kiyomasa became well known for his outstanding bravery. Through Ehon Taikō ki and other writings, an anecdote that conveyed his martial bravery was the tale of his tiger hunt in Korea, which became well known among the Japanese. Tigers were unknown in Japan. There also was composed a senry ū poem entitled “Kiyomasa Tramples Down the Ginseng Field.” Ginseng was a famous Korean product and highly prized in Japan, but Kiyomasa was expend- ing so much effort with his fi ghting that he was oblivious to the presence of ginseng and trampled a fi eld of the precious plant. 35 For example, Mokuso-kan said the following in his last will and testament to his son Tenjiku Tokubee: “I am not of Japan. I am Mokuso-kan, a minister of Chosŏ n. To pay back our country’s enemies, cross to Japan … [and] in my stead, raise the standard of rebellion and satisfy your father’s deepest desire against the enemy of our master, the enemy of our country.” For details on the literary incarnations of Mokuso, their relation to historical facts, and the appearance of Koreans in the Japanese theater of rebellion, see Che Guan (Choi Gwan), Bunroku-Keich ō no eki, 1994. See also: Tsuda, Bungaku ni arawareta waga kokumin shisō no kenkyū , 1977. 36 Even in China one can fi nd numerous works on the Imjin Waeran. For example, there are Ming Shenzong shilu , Jinglue fuguo yaobian , Liangchao Pingrang-lu , Wanli san dazhenggao , Lianbing shiji , Zhanjiaoji , Lianxiang-ji , Shuihu houzhuan , and Yesou baoyan. The event was also known in Europe through missionary reports. In modern times, the appearance of Konishi Yukinaga in a French novel, embellished as a commander-in-chief who despises Caucasians, is yet another example of the transfi guration of the Imjin Waeran abroad. See Hirakawa Sukehiro, “Kō karon,” 1990, on É mile-Cyprien Driant, Capitaine Danrit: L’Invasion Jaune , 1909.

References An Pin’gung simnyŏ n toks ŏ ( 安貧窮十年讀書 ), Ch’ŏ nggu yadam ( 靑邱野談 ). Sŏ by ŏ k oesa haeoe su ilbon (栖碧外史海外蒐佚本 ). Seoul : Asea munhwasa , 1985 . Boot , W.J . “ Kaibara Ekiken’s preface to Chingbirok: A Japanese Edition of the Book of Corrections,” Korean Histories 2 :1 ( 2010 ): 85–9 (online: www.koreanhistories. net/fi les/Volume_2_1/KH_2_1%20Boot-Kaibara%20Ekiken%27s%20preface%20 to%20Chingirok.pdf ). Che Guan (Choi Gwan, Ch’oe Kwan, 崔官 ). Bunroku-Keich ō no eki Jinshin-Teiyū Waran: bungaku ni kizamareta sensō ( 文禄 ዘ慶長の役 : 壬辰 ዘ丁酉倭乱 : 文学に刻まれた戦争 ). T ō ky ō : Kodansha , 1994 . Ch ō sen seibatsu gunkik ō ( 朝鮮征伐軍記講 ). Davis , Julie Nelson . “ The Trouble with Hideyoshi: Censoring Ukiyo-e and the Ehon Taik ō ki Incident of 1804 ,” Japan Forum 19 :3 ( 2007 ): 281–315 . Fujii Nobuo ( 藤居信雄 ). Ri Shunshin oboegaki ( 蝗舜臣覺書 ). T ō ky ō : Furukawa

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 shob ō , 1982 . Haboush , Jahyun Kim. “Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea: Subversion and Literary Production in the Private Sector ,” Journal of Asian Studies 62 :2 (May 2003 ): 415–42 . Hirakawa Sukehiro ( 平川祐弘 ). “K ōkaron to kokusai seiji (黃禍論と國際政治 ),” in Hirakawa Sukehiro ( 平川祐弘 ) and Tsuruta Kinya ( 鶴田欣也 ), eds., Uchi naru kabe: gaikokujin no Nihonz ō-Nihonjin no gaikokujinz ō ( 内なる壁 : 外国人の日本人像 ዘ日本人の外国人像 ). T ō ky ō : TBS Britannica , 1990 . Hwang P’aegang ( 黃浿江 ). Imjin Waeran kwa shilgi munhak ( 壬辰倭亂ὒ 實記文學 ). Seoul : Iljisa , 1992 . 356 Choi Gwan Im Ch’ ŏ lho (螞哲鎬 ). Imjin nok yŏ n’gu (壬辰錄硏究 ). Seoul : Ch ŏ ng’ ŭ msa , 1986 . Kang Ch ŏ ns ŏ p ( 姜銓燮 ). Han’guk shiga munhak yŏ n’gu ( 韓國詩歌文學硏究 ). Seoul : Taewangsa , 1986 . Keinen ( 慶念 ). Chō sen hinikki ( 朝鮮日々記 ). Kim Kidong ( 金起東 ). Han’guk koj ŏ n sos ŏ l y ŏ n’gu ( 韓國古典小說硏究 ). Seoul : Kyohaksa , 1983 . Kim T’aejun ( 金泰俊 ), et al . Imjin Waeran kwa Han’guk munhak ( 㧚㰚㢲⧖ὒG 䞲ῃⶎ䞯 ). Seoul : Min ŭ msa , 1992 . Kim T’aejun ( 金泰俊 ). “ Nihon ni okeru Ri Shunshin no meisei ( 日本における李舜臣の名声 ) ,” Hikaku bungaku kenky ū ( 比較文學硏究 ) 40 ( 1981 ): 20–33 . Kim T’aejun ( 金泰俊 ). Imjin Waeran kwa Chosŏ n munhwa ŭ i tongj ŏ m ( 壬辰倭亂ὒ 朝鮮文化㦮東漸 ). Seoul : Han’guk y ŏ n’guwon , 1977 . Kumu Byondon ( 琴秉洞 ). Mimizuka: Hideyoshi no hanagiri, mimigiri o megutte ( 耳塚 : 秀吉の鼻斬りዘ耳斬りをめぐって ). T ō ky ō : S ō washa , 1994 . Lee , Peter H. The Record of the Black Dragon Year. Seoul : Institute of Korean Culture, Korea University , 2000 . McCann , David R. Early Korean Literature: Selections and Introductions . New York : Columbia University Press , 2000 . Miyake Hidetoshi ( 三譹英利 ). Kinsei Ajia no Nihon to Ch ō sen ( 近世アジアの日本と朝鮮 ). T ō ky ō : Asahi shinbunsha , 1993 . Nait ō Shunpo (内藤雋輔 ). Bunroku-Keich ō no eki ni okeru hironin no kenkyū ( 文禄ዘ 慶長役における被擄人の研究 ). T ō ky ō : T ō ky ō daigaku shuppankai , 1976 . Ō k ō chi Hidemoto ( 大河內秀元 ), Chō sen monogatari ( 朝鮮物語 ). Ō ta Gy ū ichi ( 太田牛一 ). Taik ō sama gunki no uchi ( 大かうさまくんきのうち ). Ozaki Ky ū y a ( 尾崎久彌 ). Hō Taik ō bunken ichiran ( 豊太閤文獻一覽 ). Tō ky ō : Isseisha , 1935 . Ō zeki Sadasuke ( 大關定祐 ). Ch ō sen seibatsuki ( 朝鮮征伐記 ). P a k Ŭ lsu ( 朴乙洙 ), ed. Han’guk shijo taesajŏ n ( 韓國時調大事典 ). Seoul : Asea munhwasa , 1992 . Ri Genshoku (K. Yi W ŏ nshik, 李元植 ) et al . Ch ō sen Ts ū shinshi to Nihonjin ( 朝鮮通信と日本人 ). T ō ky ō : Gakuseisha , 1992 . Sanb ō Honbu , ed. ( 芔謀本部編 ). Nihon senshi Chō sen eki (日本戰史朝鮮役 ). T ō ky ō : Kaik ō sha , 1924 . Shimazu K ō rai gunki ( 島津高麗軍記 ). So Chaey ŏ ng ( 蘇在英 ). Imjin Waeran kwa munhak ŭ isik ( 壬丙蓐亂ὒ 文學意識 ). Seoul : Han’guk y ŏ n’guw ŏ n , 1980 . Takenaka Shigekado ( 竹中重門 ), Toyokagami ( 豊鑑 ). Tokutomi Soh ō ( 德富蘇峰 ). Ch ō sen eki ( 朝鮮役 ). Tō ky ō : Meiji shoin , 1935 . Tsuda S ō kichi ( 津田左右吉 ). Bungaku ni arawareta waga kokumin shisō no kenky ū , 4 文學に現われたる我が國民思想の硏究四 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 ( , ). T ō ky ō : Iwanami shoten , 1977 . Wakisaka-ki ( 脇坂記 ). Yamazaki Hisanaga ( 山崎尙長 ). Ry ō koku jinran jikki (兩國壬亂實記 ). Yi Ch’aey ŏ n ( 蝗埰衍 ). Imjin Waeran p’oro shilgi y ŏ n’gu ( 壬辰倭亂捕虜實記硏究 ). Seoul : Pak Yij ŏ ng , 1995 . Y i H y ŏ ngs ŏ k ( 蝗炯錫 ). Imjin chollansa ( 壬辰戰亂史 ). Seoul : Shinhy ŏ n silsa , 1976 .

17 Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue The virtuous woman in post-war literary discourse

Michael J. Pettid

Introduction Literature has formed consensus and swayed popular opinion throughout history. Such manipulation can be either intentional or accidental. Calculated infl uence is seen in the creation and propagation of the “imagined political community,” or the nation through a master narrative.1 Spontaneous inducement is found in the spread and perpetuation of urban legends as truth.2 Whether intended or not, these types of persuasion are effective and underscore a crucial function of literature, the consolidation of authority or truth, which becomes self-validating in the course of the narrative.3 During times of crisis or social upheaval, public opinion requires massaging for the governing authorities to maintain power, all the more so in the face of mis-governance or neglect of the people’s welfare. Michel Foucault argued that power exists in a circular relationship with the “truth,” and “‘truth’ is understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements.” 4 By creating “truths” through such statements, ruling elites are able to maintain their grip on the populace, control their actions, and manipulate their behaviors in a manner benefi cial to the rulers. One means to create “truths” is with didactic literature that helps shape the beliefs, actions, and history of a people. An excellent example of such manipulation is found in Korean accounts of the Japanese invasions of 1592–8. While there is little doubt the invasions resulted in great hardships and suffering for the people of Chosŏ n, we fi nd clear evidence that the ruling elites sought to emphasize certain behaviors among the people that matched Confucian notions of fi lial piety, loyalty, and Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 virtuous womanly behavior. At the same time, other behaviors that contradicted the Confucian sense of morality were ignored or glossed over. Didactic works published directly after the invasions mirror this pattern and focus on shaping the actions of the people into a Confucian model. There are, however, other accounts of the invasions that cast doubt upon the exemplary behavior described in the didactic literature of this time. This chapter focuses on the confl icting literary representations of women during the invasions and how the ideal of a virtuous woman (K. y ŏ lly ŏ ) was strengthened and reifi ed in the aftermath of the crisis. 358 M.J. Pettid The measure of the virtuous woman would serve as the model for all Korean women from after the invasions until the late nineteenth century. While this notion existed long before the tumultuous times of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, it was elevated to a new high with the havoc visited upon the people and the country during this period.5 Compounding the catastrophic impact of the invasions were unrealistic social expectations for women coupled with the rewards that families could garner by having a female family member recognized as a virtuous woman. Such rewards were no small matter, as families could receive economically tangible compensation in the form of relief from certain taxes along with less palpable honors such as special gates honoring the woman in question. It was in this environment that the discourse on the virtuous woman was strengthened and extended to all social classes.

Women and the invasions: the offi cial discourse6 It could be posited that of all Koreans women suffered the greatest from the invasions. Non-combatants for the most part and largely abandoned by menfolk, women fell prey to Japanese troops seeking spoils of war. Moreover, to those women who escaped the direct touch of the enemy fell the responsibility of feeding their children.7 Various accounts confi rm this situation:

Throughout the night the ghastly cries of women could be heard from every place within the stockade. It seems that the Japanese troops burnt their way through in the night. It is a horrid situation.8 Master Ch ŏ n lived in Sangju and was an esteemed scholar of the Yŏ ngnam area. The day they met and fought the evil enemy, the father and son were fl eeing with his mother, wife, and daughter-in-law before encountering the Japanese thieves. First, they [the Japanese] took his wife and ordered them to surrender. They then beheaded the father and son and drug the daughter-in-law off to a barley fi eld where ten of the enemy raped her. The daughter-in-law later hung herself. What fortune is this?9

Women, with little protection offered by Korean troops, were left to fend for themselves, oftentimes with disastrous consequences. It is said that common practice among the Japanese troops was to capture a woman and rape her Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 on the spot if there was no immediate fi ghting. Also, at times, gang rape was practiced by the Japanese troops. 10 Additionally, many women were taken to Japan as prisoners. Making the diffi culties for women all the more onerous were the burdens placed upon them by the unrealistic expectations of a society constructed on the morals and ethics of Neo-Confucianism. Early elites in Chosŏ n recognized the value of Confucianism for ordering society. Thus, from the earliest days of the Chosŏ n dynasty the government had printed and distributed didactic works aimed at fashioning a Neo-Confucian Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 359 society. Focus was on eliminating the infl uences of Buddhism and shamanism, which were viewed as degenerate and corrupt, and strengthening Confucian notions such as the samgang (three bonds) and oryun (fi ve relationships).11 T o achieve this end, the government printed and distributed educational works such as Samgang haengshil-to (Conduct of the Three Bonds with Illustrations, 1432) and Sok samgang haengshil-to (Expanded Conduct of the Three Bonds with Illustrations, 1514).12 The infl uence of these works, however, was grad- ual and took centuries to fi lter down from the upper layers of society to the lower classes. Nonetheless, the desire of the ruling elites to enforce Confucian morality throughout society seldom waned, as various entries in the dynastic record confi rm. A 1512 entry states:

Nowadays the samgang (three bonds) have crashed to the ground. Customs are disorderly, the people have lost their original character, and kindness and gentleness are unknown. In the time of the late king, in order to strengthen the samgang and oryun (fi ve relationships) a book recording the portraits and achievements of loyal retainers, fi lial sons, and virtuous women was made. The book, Samgang haengshil , was distributed to the capital and provinces and moved the common people. How could such a work not help with ruling [the country]?13

By the sixteenth century Confucian education had begun its spread in earnest in Chos ŏn, and social expectations for women were tinged with these ideals. This was particularly true in regards to rape, where the “choice” for a proper Confucian woman was suicide – the concept of fi delity (K.ch ŏ ngj ŏ l ) was one that was repeatedly present in didactic literary works aimed at women and also omnipresent in informal education. 14 Of particular importance to the discourse concerning the bodies of women were works such as Naehun (Instructions for the Inner Quarters) that heavily emphasized proper womanly behavior and the importance of Confucian mores. 15 The crisis represented by the Japanese invasion, however, was unmatched in the previous two centuries of Chos ŏ n and severely tested the limits of maintaining fi delity. The Chos ŏn government realized the need to put on a good face after the disastrous consequences of the invasion and the suffering and hardships that were wrought upon the people. The invasion was a period of chaos and marked by primal human behaviors aimed at survival. Such instinctual

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 actions were antithetical to the structured and harmonious society pursued by Confucianists. Rather than dwell on the collapse of Confucian morals during the crisis, however, the ruling elites emphasized positive behaviors. One means to create the illusion that people made great sacrifi ces for the values that Neo-Confucianism held dear – loyalty, fi lial piety, and virtuous womanly conduct – was by honoring exemplars of these qualities. Entries in the shillok confi rm the belief of the ruling elites that those who died with honor (K. saj ŏ l ) should be honored in order to encourage similar behaviors among others. 16 360 M.J. Pettid At the same time, other entries in the shillok demonstrate the weakness of these values in Chos ŏ n society. Various accounts in the dynastic records lament the dissipation of the people’s customs and way of life and pronounce a pressing need to create a didactic work similar to Samgang haengshil-to . 17 Moreover, court offi cials urged that this work should be “translated” into vernacular Korean, thus enabling it to reach the widest possible audience.18 Clearly, didactic texts were to be aimed not solely at the upper-class literati families, but also at the lower classes, and especially at women, who were most often literate in only han’g ŭ l . During the reign of S ŏnjo’s successor, Prince Kwanghae (r. 1608–23), plans to create a compilation to honor the fi lial, loyal, and virtuous actions of the people were fi nalized. This was to be a massive project requiring dozens of compilers, copyists, carvers, and writers, and carried out at great expense to the Chos ŏn government. The grand scope bespeaks the perceived importance of this endeavor at a time when the fi nances of the government were severely depleted due to the havoc and destruction resulting from the invasion of just ten years earlier. To spread the economic benefi t of the project, the government prepared woodblocks in various parts of the country. 19 While economic realities caused the scale of the project to be reduced – the original plans called for 1,600 sets of the work to be printed, but this number was later lowered to 400 and fi nally to 50 sets – it was completed by 1617 and widely distributed. Titled Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil (New and Expanded Korean Conduct of the Three Bonds), its contents are impressive. The text contains the accounts of over 1,500 individuals divided into eight volumes of fi lial deeds, one volume of actions by loyal retainers, eight volumes detailing the virtuous conduct of women, and a supplemental volume of the seventy-two exemplars recorded in the two earlier compilations. 20 Each entry features an account of the individual’s fi lial, heroic, or virtuous action in both literary Chinese and han’g ŭ l script, and this is accompanied by an illustration depicting the noteworthy activity. The composition of the work allowed it to reach a wide audience: literary Chinese for yangban literati, han’g ŭ l for those with less education such as women, commoners, and children, and illustrations for the illiterate. The chief concentration of Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil is the actions of the people during the invasions, particularly women. There are some 356

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 accounts of women who died while protecting their virtue at the time of the invasions. This is in stark contrast to the accounts of only sixty-seven fi lial sons and eleven loyal retainers for the same period. 21 In actuality, there are many more than 356 women from the period of the invasions honored in this work as some of the entries feature multiple deaths, even up to twelve “honorable” deaths in a single account.22 The idea of purity and its preservation in the face of the Japanese invasions is prominent throughout Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil . The narratives present a binary relationship between Chos ŏ n purity and Japanese impurity, Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 361 emphasizing an enemy that sought to degrade the country by entering and soiling it. The narratives further demonstrate the Confucian solution to such a threat, that being suicide. The images of virtuous women in Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil contain a plethora of such behavior, all strengthening the offi cial discourse on the actions of the people during the invasion. All varieties of women are represented in Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil including married and unmarried, upper- and lower-status groups, and young and old. By reading these pitiful accounts, the reader would have been fi lled with both a sense of horror at the atrocities and satisfaction at the unan- imity of women’s actions during this time of great crisis. Figure 17.1 is the account of an unmarried woman:

The maiden Ch’oe was from the Samch’ŏ k district and the daughter of the minor offi cial (chikchang ) Ch’oe Ŏn’gi. The Japanese invaders came to the place where she was and captured her, but she scolded them and would not obey their demands. They cut off her hands, but she still would not yield to them, and died. A gate was erected in her honor.23

Figure 17.2 retells the actions of two upper-class women and their choice of death over rape. Their fi delity and correct actions can easily be contrasted with the fate of their maidservant in the narrative:

Lady Kim was the wife of Yu Yŏ nggy ŏ m and Lady Shin was the wife of Yu Yŏ ngsun. They both lived in the capital. After the outbreak of the Imjin [1592] invasion, together they fl ed from the enemy. Finally the enemy arrived at their hiding place and seized their maidservant, stripped, and raped her. Lady Kim hung herself and Lady Shin ran, jumped off a cliff into water, and died. The king ordered gates erected in their honor. 24

Figure 17.3 , however, is an account of a commoner-status woman who preserved her honor:

The commoner K ŭ nshim was of Kimhwa and the wife of the provisioner (Poin) Chŏ ng Kuk. When the [Japanese] thieves tried to grab and dirty her, she resolutely would not obey them, and they chopped her body into

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 pieces. The king ordered a gate erected for her.25

Such accounts give the undeniable impression that the actions of women from all classes were aimed at preserving their fi delity, whatever the sacrifi ce. The narratives contained in Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil retell dozens of ways that women protected their honor: jumping into rivers or wells, running off cliffs, stabbing themselves, self-infl icted hanging, and other ways. They also fought off their attackers and suffered deaths from severed hands, feet, breasts, and even decapitation. There is a stark uniformity to the narratives of Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Figure 17.1 Maiden Ch’oe. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Figure 17.2 T w o w i v e s . Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016

Figure 17.3 K ŭ nshim. Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 365 these virtuous women and the reader is introduced to one heroic death after another at the hands of the marauding Japanese troops.26 The educational message contained in this work is very clear: the proper choice when faced with rape is suicide or a heroic death while resisting one’s attackers. The woman who had the audacity to survive an attack, however, was scorned by both her family and society. As Susan Brownmiller reminds us about rape, “In war as in peace, the husbands of raped women place a major burden of blame for the awful event on their wives. The hallowed rights of property have been abused, and the property herself is held culpable.”27 In the case of Chos ŏn, the solution seems quite obvious, as death for their women was preferred over rape. Those women who survived the attacks would present a thorny problem for post-invasion society, as will be discussed below. We should also be aware of the connection between the rape of a woman by the invader and the rape of the country by a foreign army. There is often a clear link between a woman’s body and the body politic. Wai-Yee Li writes of this phenomenon in Qing-period literature as, “If the shame of conquest is sometimes experienced by women as rape and abduction, then chastity becomes a logical metaphor for loyalism.”28 Similarly, Martin W. Huang comments that the act of female chastity runs parallel to the ideal of male political loyalty in early Qing novels such as Guwangyan (Preposterous Words). 29 An analogous relationship is found in Korean narratives of the invasions and the bond between male loyalty to the king and country and female fi delity.30 The fact that those women who were said to have committed suicide before being raped were recognized and honored by the Chos ŏ n government demonstrates that suicide before dishonor was a means of serving the country.31 Preserving the purity of the country was the highest goal among Chosŏ n Confucian elites. Narratives of women who sacrifi ced their lives to preserve lineage purity perpetuate an image of the Japanese as destroyers of families and lineages. The preservation of one’s lineage by producing male heirs was a principal means of honoring one’s ancestors. By violating the mothers of the next generation, the Japanese enemy was made to represent not only a threat to the people of Chos ŏ n and their descendants, but also to their ancestors because of the linkages over generations symbolized in ancestral rituals. Those women who preserved their purity through death were thus elevated as paragons of Confucian propriety and became honored by their descendants for their self-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 sacrifi ce.

The unoffi cial discourse: other images of women Despite the hegemonic authority of the offi cial discourse presented inTongguk shinsok samgang haengshil , we can uncover inconsistencies and alternative narratives within the text and in tension with other texts. In particular, accounts of the invasion in literary and yadam or yasa (unoffi cial histories) collections provide other, and perhaps more realistic, views of the actions of 366 M.J. Pettid women during the invasions. Unoffi cial records represent the understanding of the invasions from those who suffered through the distressing events and provide an opportunity to examine how individuals engaged with the emerging offi cial discourses concerning the invasions and the actions of the people.32 It is in this ongoing dialogic interaction that discordant images emerge. One such record is Chibong yus ŏ l (Topical Discourses by Chibong) written by Yi Sugwang (1563–1628). 33 Yi’s accounts have both a didactic edge and another side that seems to bemoan the lack of “proper” behavior on the part of some women. Consider the following account:

During the Imjin Waeran the wife of a scholar was fl eeing together with her maidservant and had arrived at a ferry to cross a river. Many people were taking the boat, so [the two women] held hands and were about to board. A person on the boat took the hand [of the scholar’s wife] and pulled her up. The woman cried, “Now my hand has been dirtied by an outside man, how can I live?” and then plunged into the river and died. The servant looked upon this scene, exclaiming, “My lady has died. How can I live alone?” before jumping to her death in the water. During a chaotic time like this, it is distressing that such a person is not widely known.34

Yi Sugwang’s account, while praising the virtuous actions of two women, implies condemnation of other, unnamed women for not following such an exemplary course. Yi’s description should not be read as a literal account, but rather as an idealized depiction of Confucian morality, echoing didactic texts written for women. 35 While the Confucian ideal for a woman was to avoid even the slightest contact with men outside her immediate family, such an impractical concept would not match well with the circumstances dictated by fl ight from an enemy in times of war when contact and cooperation with the opposite sex would most likely be inevitable and even necessary for survival. 36 Hence, I interpret this narrative not as a factual reporting of an event, but instead as an idealization of virtuous behavior. The closing com- ment by Yi also insinuates that such exemplary behavior was rare during the invasion. If for no other reason than to justify the great number of deaths during the invasions, various narratives describe what can only be labeled as heroic

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 actions. One of the most famous accounts of heroic and selfl ess actions is that of the kisaeng (female entertainer) Non’gae. Although very little is factually known of her, Non’gae continues to represent an ideal of loyal and virtuous behavior.37

Non’gae was a government kisaeng in Chinju. Histories record that in 1593, Kim Ch’ŏ n’il led his volunteer army into the city walls of Chinju and fought the Japanese troops. The city walls eventually collapsed, the soldiers were routed, and the citizens slaughtered. At that time, Non’gae Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 367 put on a heavy layer of makeup and magnifi cent clothes. She stood atop a steep crag under Ch’oksŏ k Pavilion, directly overlooking a precipitous drop, below which fl owed a river. The Japanese troops saw Non’gae and were enamored. Yet, none were bold enough to approach her. However, a Japanese general bravely walked straight towards her. Non’gae smiled to entice the general, and when he was close, she grasped his waist and hurtled with him into the water, killing both of them.38

While the actions of Non’gae seem heroic, this earliest surviving account of her conduct was not recorded until 1621, nearly thirty years after the supposed incident. Considering the widespread destruction and gap between event and recording, we have no means of ascertaining what actually might have happened in Chinju in 1593. We can, however, speculatively strip away some of the layers of the story to get beyond the surface account. For example, if we remember the negative view of kisaeng and others of the lowest classes held by Neo-Confucian literati, then it almost seems that Non’gae’s actions were probably not for the country as now offered by most accounts. Consider the postscript to the description above:

At the time of the invasion there were many kisaeng , far more than history records, who wished to save their honor from the Japanese and instead choose death. This does not refer only to Non’gae, but rather to a great number of kisaeng whose names have been lost. Kisaeng are all licentious entertainers and to praise them as chaste is not correct. Yet, in dying and preventing the enemy from defi ling them they have drawn the king’s praise for not turning away from their country. This is nothing other than loyalty. 39

While the author clearly interprets the actions of Non’gae as martyrdom for the country, his disdain for kisaeng in general also is clear. This account of Non’gae is clearly aimed at fashioning a loyal heroine for consumption by readers from the lowest classes. The message is transparent: it is far better to give one’s life for the country than be “stained” by the Japanese enemy. Yet, the account of Non’gae is problematic in several aspects. First, it attributes a sense of loyalty to the country from a member of a profession that was highly oppressed and victimized by the ruling elites. While it seems

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 illogical to expect loyalty from a slave, the account of Non’gae is just that.40 Kisaeng were born or sold into government service, where they were forced to work as “entertainers” – a thinly veiled euphemism for prostitutes – for upper-class men. It is thus very diffi cult to believe that Non’gae’s actions as described in the above narrative arose purely from patriotic sentiments. We can imagine that she may have been simply seeking revenge before being massacred. A probable bit of apocrypha is the story that Non’gae was in love with a Chosŏ n general and her actions were motivated by revenge – a good kisaeng twist. Or, her motivations may have included revenge on the Japanese 368 M.J. Pettid for having killed her fellow kisaeng and her lovers, or for having burned her wardrobe? We will probably never know. Additionally, a strong underlying theme in the account of Non’gae is one of purity. Rather than being dirtied through sexual relations with a Japanese, she and, if the above narrative is to be believed, many other kisaeng selected death over sexual violation. Hence, their heroic deaths helped preserve the purity of the people of Chos ŏ n. Many of those who lived through the invasions saw a side of society that was very far removed from an idyllic Confucian vision of virtuous behavior. For example, Yun Kukhy ŏ ng (1543–1611) wrote that there “appeared many woman dirtied by the enemy” and described the situation as being so dire that “amid the heaps of corpses scattered on the plains with no one to bury them … there were fathers who sold their children.” 41 The graphic descriptions of Yun do not conjure up visions of a society operating under Confucian mores, but rather a war-torn land where simple survival would have dictated human behavior. Despite a situation like Yun described above, most post-invasion accounts often laud the admirable and self-sacrifi cing behavior of women. Amid the carnage of the invasion and the damage infl icted upon the country, one of the strongest recurrent images of the invasions is that of the virtuous woman. This particular ideal was not only promoted by the ruling elites of Chosŏ n in works such as Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil, but also by individual families who sought to reap the prestige and fi nancial gain – realized through the relief from certain taxes – that would come from the government recognizing a wife or other female family member as having died a virtuous death during the invasions. In fact, “virtuous” women may have been created by their own husbands and clans. The abandonment of women and other family members during the invasion was a commonplace occurrence. O H ŭ imun (1539–1613) remarked in his wartime diary:

Yesterday on the road, I saw a seven or eight year-old child wailing on the roadside. Next to him was sitting a woman also crying with her face buried in her hands. It seemed strange, so I asked why. She replied, “My husband just abandoned us, a mother and son, and left.” I asked why and she replied, “The three of us were wandering and begging for food. Now there is no place to get food, so we will soon starve to death. Therefore,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 my husband left us, a mother and son. We are crying because we will soon starve to death.” To hear this story, I could not overcome my sadness and the pity I felt.42

The diffi cult circumstances of the invasions created hardships for all. Nonetheless, some saw the opportunity to elevate the fortune of their family by exploiting the government’s desire to honor virtuous women. Certainly not all women who encountered the Japanese committed suicide. Fear of death or the desire to live might have easily overridden the social codes that emphasized suicide before dishonor. Some writers of the period suggest far more realistic Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 369 circumstances surrounding the fate of women during the invasion. Consider these comments by Ko Sang’an (1553–1623):

During the invasion of 1592 the capital fortress collapsed and an uncountable number of married women were taken away by the Japanese. Occasionally some of these women were honored as being dead, and after the hostilities ceased, a gate ( chŏ ngmun) would be erected in their honor. However, since there was no means to verify that the women taken by the Japanese were dead, some, whose wife’s whereabouts were unknown would lie and petition to have a gate erected in honor of their wife. This problem was truly a blind spot in the law. In 1604 an envoy was sent to Japan. When he returned he bore the letters of many still-living women who had been taken to Japan as prisoners. Among the letters were those of women who had been declared dead and had gates erected. These letters were not delivered to the families in question.43

Undeniably, surviving women constituted a thorny problem made all the more onerous by the fact that families sought to elevate the prestige of the lineage by having a wife or mother gone missing recognized as a “virtuous woman” by the government. The following account is more specifi c and illustrates the point:

During the Japanese invasions, the wife of Chang Hong was captured. He reported that his wife defi ed the enemy and bravely committed suicide. [Based on this account,] the court praised her and erected a gate in her honor. In 1596, Hwang Shin went to Japan as an envoy. When he returned he brought back many men and women who had been taken to Japan as prisoners. Among them was Chang’s wife. Thus, people began to frown upon Chang and he was later accused by the government of the crime of deceiving the king.44

This narrative demonstrates that the purity of one’s lineage was more important than a woman’s life. The husband, after losing his wife, sought to gain favor with the government and prestige for his lineage by declaring that she had bravely resisted the enemy. It seems clear that the actual fact of purity

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 was not the most important concern; rather, it was the perception of being pure and the benefi ts that came with the designation of “virtuous woman.” Perhaps perceptions became more important to the men left behind, because the reality was so awful to consider. There are numerous accounts that describe the terrible real fates of many women. 45 In the following account, O H ŭ imun describes women captured and taken to Japan as prisoners:

I heard the Japanese selected women they liked among the Y ŏ ngnam elite families (K. sany ŏ), loaded them into fi ve ships and sent them to their country. They had them comb their hair, powder their faces, and 370 M.J. Pettid draw eyebrows – if they did not they [the Japanese] would become angry. The women, scared to death, followed these orders. All these women, in fact, had been raped prior to this. The rest, who were not pleasing to the Japanese, were gang raped. How sad and cruel it is to hear this.46

Women, regardless of the period or country, are often those who suffer the greatest humiliation and scars during a war. We should also keep in mind that the rape of the Chos ŏ n women was not only a crime of the Japanese. Ch’oe and Ha point out that Korean women were also raped by the Ming Chinese troops who intervened in the war on behalf of Chosŏ n and by Korean men who seized opportunities to commit violence against women.47 Yet, beyond the tragic act of rape itself, women of Chosŏ n were further burdened with idyllic Confucian visions of chaste behavior for women. Some women, however, managed to overcome their humiliation at the hands of their attackers and strike back with vengeance. Rather than the helpless image perpetuated by narratives such as those contained in Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil, these women were able to extract revenge. Consider the following account of a capable and strong woman:

In 1594 the people were impoverished and even worse was the swarm of thieves. Men were being killed frequently after encountering the thieves and their wives taken away. In one house of Ŭ nch’ ŏk Village, thieves entered, killed the husband, and took the wife away. Contrary to the wife’s hope of avenging her husband’s death, she lived with the thief for three years and even bore a son. One day, the thief went away for several days and in that time she brewed some strong liquor. When he returned and looked for drink, she offered him several cups of the strong brew. The thief became drunk and passed out. The woman then drug him into a room, put the child next to him, locked the door, went outside, and set the house afi re. She then shouted to the neighbors, “I’m settling my husband’s debt with his enemy, don’t put the fi re out!” After a while, when the fi re had nearly burned out, the woman, all alone, left.48

Reading the above narrative might cause one to ponder the fate of the woman who won her revenge. Did she next commit suicide as the many women

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 described in the didactic works of the period? It seems to me that she would not have done so. Rather, she would have continued living, having satiated her thirst for revenge, moving on to a new life and, perhaps, a new love. Conceivably, there were many other women like her during this diffi cult time.

The post-invasion Y ŏllyŏ discourse The invasions of the late sixteenth century were to have long-lasting repercussions on Chos ŏn society. Aside from the immediate devastation Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 371 brought by the invasions, these events were to transform the manner in which the government and elites guided society. The chaos and turmoil following the invasions resulted in a concerted effort by the ruling powers to fashion the country as a Confucian model. 49 This is particularly true in regard to women and the emphasis on following Confucian mores. Thus, we should examine more closely the motivations for redoubling the pace of remaking the early- seventeenth-century woman into a paragon of Confucian virtue.50 We know from accounts in the veritable records and elsewhere that many women did not commit suicide and instead survived attacks by Japanese and others. These women presented a formidable problem for Chos ŏ n society in regard to the Confucian discourse on womanly virtue as described in the following account:

During the Imjin Waeran, the enemy occupied the country for six or seven years and there were many wives of scholars who were captured by the enemy and lost their honor. After the enemy withdrew, those families that luckily were not visited by calamity would not allow marriages with families that had met with misfortune. King Sŏ njo worried about this problem: if the trend continued for long it seemed that the country would be nearly without sound literati families; it was important that both the royal family and aristocratic families actively marry with those families that had experienced calamity. After this the distinction between those families that had experienced misfortune began to disappear.51

Conclusion The realities of the aftermath of the Japanese invasions followed by the disastrous Manchu invasions of the early seventeenth century forced Chosŏ n’s ruling elites to come to terms with the fact that a great number of women had been violated, kidnapped, or killed by invaders, Chinese soldiers, and opportunists. It would also have been common knowledge that many women of all social classes had not acted in accord with what could be described as Confucian propriety. Yet, in order to continue to build a society based upon the Confucian worldview, the unfortunate histories of the victims of rape, kidnapping, and other violence necessarily had to be forgotten collectively by society.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 In this milieu Chos ŏn elites reifi ed the exemplar of the virtuous woman and moved the didactic discourse on such women towards hegemonic status. Rather than dwell on the obvious and socially repugnant fact that many women of all classes had lost their honor (K. shilj ŏ l ) and thus tainted their lineages, a fact that would have severely crippled upper-class society in attempting to form a ruling consensus, elites recast the discourse. They sought to force the lower classes into a Confucian model, with the result that women, both real and fabricated, who matched the model were brought into the lime- light. Accordingly, didactic texts and offi cial records emphasized such models. 372 M.J. Pettid At the same time, those women who did not fulfi ll the image of a virtuous woman were de-emphasized and ignored in offi cial records, no matter how heroic their actions might have been. The creation of exemplary, virtuous women was an ongoing process after the invasion. After examining an early-eighteenth-century narrative concerning a virtuous woman, Chŏ ng Ch’urh ŏn has concluded that this particular case was fabricated by the ruling elites with the government’s complicity in order to preserve social order and encourage like behavior among the commoner classes. 52 Such Confucian-inspired actions were a means to protect the privileges of the ruling classes and to create a more easily governed ruled class. The case Ch ŏ ng writes of does not stand alone. There were clearly similar cases in the wake of the Japanese and Manchu invasions. 53 Yet, a recurring theme of offi cial records during this time is the need to honor exemplary cases in order to educate the people and elevate their customs, which were seen as iniquitous by the ruling powers. 54 Highlighting such behavior can be understood as a refl ection of an actual absence of the very same behavior. It is for this reason that we should question the hegemonic discourse that dominates offi cial accounts of the period, especially as represented in didactic works such as Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil . Following Foucault’s thesis that power produces the “truths” of a given society, the hegemonic discourse that has emerged from the Japanese invasions of 1592–8 seems easier to explain. In order to protect the Confucian social structure and privileges of the upper-class elites, the image of the virtuous woman was solidifi ed in the post-invasion period. Both the government and ruling classes were complicit in constructing such a model built on both actual and fabricated accounts because it ensured the continuation of their power and status. The prevarication was remarkably effective, as the image of the virtuous woman has maintained hegemony to the present day and has nearly completely obscured alternative understandings of the invasions and of Korean women.

Notes 1 Anderson, Imagined Communities , 1991, pp. 5–6. 2 Brunvand, The Study of American Folklore , 1998, pp. 205–9. 3 For further discussion, see Said, Culture and Imperialism , 1993, pp. 74–7. 4 Foucault, The Foucault Reader , 1984, p. 74. Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 5 While this chapter will focus on the impact of the Japanese invasion of 1592 and 1598 and the images of women from this time, the subsequent Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1636–7 magnifi ed both the tragedy for Korean women and the attempts by the government to enforce Confucian mores in society. 6 Portions of this section are based on Michael J. Pettid, “Confucian Educational Works for Upper Status Women in Chos ŏ n Korea,” 2011. 7 For further discussion, see Ch’oe and Ha, Han’guk y ŏ s ŏ ng sa , 1993, pp. 399–407. 8 Recorded in Hogurok (Records of Hogu) by Kwŏ n Tumun. Quoted in Chang Kyŏ ngnam, Imjin Waeran , 2000, p. 201. Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 373 9 Recorded in Ch ŏ ngmallok (Record of the Savage’s Attack) by Yi T’ag’yŏ ng. Quoted in Chang Kyŏ ngnam, Imjin Waeran , 2000, pp. 200–1. 10 Ch’oe and Ha, Han’guk yŏ s ŏ ng sa , 1993, pp. 401–2. 11 The three bonds are subject to ruler (loyalty), children to parents (fi lial piety), and women to men (hierarchy). The fi ve relationships are between ruler and vassal, father and son, elder and younger, husband and wife, and friend and friend. 12 Editor’s note: For a study of the history of the production of the Samgang haengshil-to and later revisions and publications, see Oh, Engraving Virtue , 2013. 1 3 Chungjong shillok , 17:4a (1512.10.08). 14 Every woman recorded in the Samgang haengshil-to and subsequent editions was, at the very least, an exemplar of fi delity. Moreover, of the eight Korean women recorded in Samgang haengshil-to who faced being raped, all committed suicide. 15 This work was written by Queen Sohye in 1475 for teaching proper behavior to young women. For an excellent overview of this work, see John Duncan, “The Naehun and the Politics of Gender in Fifteenth-Century Korea,” 2004, pp. 26–57. 1 6 Sŏ njo shillok , 65:34a (1595.07.19); S ŏ njo shillok , 65:34b (1595.07.20); S ŏ njo shillok , 163:6a (1603.06.09). 1 7 Sŏ njo shillok , 199:21b (1606.05.21); S ŏ njo shillok , 199:23a (1606.05.24). After the Manchu invasion, similar accounts are found, such as Hyojong shillok , 15:8b (1655.07.26), among others. 1 8 Sŏ njo shillok , 199:21b (1606.05.21). 1 9 Kwanghaegun ilgi, 97:9b (1614.11.11). The preface to the 1958 edition of the original text of Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil states that woodblocks for the work were carved in fi ve provinces. See Yi ŏS ng et al. , Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil , 1958, p. 12. 20 The earlier works are the aforementioned Samgang haengshil-to (1431) and Sok samgang haengshil-to (1514). The former work contains more accounts of Chinese personages than Koreans (eighty-nine Chinese, sixteen Koreans); the latter has accounts of fourteen Chinese and fi fty-six Koreans. In contrast,Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil only records the exploits of Koreans. 21 Ch’oe and Ha, Han’guk yŏ s ŏ ng sa , 1993, pp. 400–1. 2 2 Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil , 8:61. 2 3 Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil , 6:17. 2 4 Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil , 3:4. 2 5 Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil , 6:68. 26 One aspect of the images of the women in the Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil- to is the lack of emotion and pain in their representations. Ko Yŏ nh ŭ i notes that the repetition of these images of stoic women, with their hands, feet, and even breasts cut off, would not permit the reader to come away with an image of a woman’s suffering, but rather with the impression that women were something to be quite easily discarded. See Ko Y ŏ nh ŭ i, “Chos ŏ n shidae yŏ lly ŏ -do koch’al,” 2001, pp. 205–6. 27 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will , 1976, p. 40.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 28 Wai-Yee Li, “Heroic Transformations,” 1999, p. 424. 29 Martin W. Huang, Desire and Fictional Narrative in Late Imperial China , 2001, p. 261. 30 The contents of works such as Tongguk shinsok samgang haengshil refl ect such beliefs in that they honor fi delity, fi lial piety, and loyalty equally depending upon one’s station in life (i.e., women should practice fi delity, children fi liality, and ministers loyalty). Other didactic publications similar to the above include the various reprintings of the Samgang haengshil-to (up until the nineteenth century) and the Oryun haengshil-to (五倫行實圖 Conduct of the fi ve relations, with illustrations), along with educational books specifi cally aimed at women. 374 M.J. Pettid 31 This sentiment, that a woman who dies while protecting her honor is also serving the country, is found in various entries in the veritable records. For example, see S ŏ njo shillok, 163:6a (1603.06.09), p. 489; Kwanghaegun ilgi, 26:24b (1610.03.20), p. 554. 32 For discussion on the lack of fi nality in “truth,” see Robert J.C. Young, Torn Halves , 1996, p. 58. 33 Among other offi cial positions, Yi served as an envoy to Ming China during the invasion. 34 Yi Sugwang, Chibong yus ŏ l , 15:15a–15b. 35 The following passage from Naehun (1:3b) details how a woman should act around a man (other than her close relatives): “Men and women should not sit in the same place; their clothes should not be hung on the same clothes rack; they should not use the same scarf or comb; and they should not become friendly.” 36 Consider, for example, the wartime diary kept by Yi Chŏ nghoe (1542–1612) during the fi rst two years of the invasion. In Yi’s daily entries, it is clear that the efforts of both him and his wife were needed for survival, and, moreover, that they interacted, hid, ate, and slept with individuals of all classes while fl eeing from the Japanese troops. See Yi Chŏ nghoe, Songgan ilgi , fascicle 2, entries for 1592–3. 37 At Chinju Castle the monument and structures dedicated to Non’gae are the immediate focus of the visitor upon entrance to the park. Not only is there a stele dedicated to the memory of the righteous kisaeng ( ŭ igi), but Ch’oks ŏ k Pavilion has been reconstructed, a shrine with an artist’s conceptualization of Non’gae has been built, and a large monument with stone carvings of the event has been erected. For a recent study examining some of the processes in the fashioning of the narrative surrounding Non’gae, see Jung Ji Young, “War and the Death of a Kisaeng ,” 2009, pp. 157–80. 38 Recorded in Yu, Ŏ u yadam ( Ŏ u’s Unoffi cial Histories), compiled by Yu Mong’in in 1621, p. 261. 39 Yu, Ŏ u yadam , 1621, p. 261. 40 Indeed, we should consider the rampage of the slaves in the capital as perhaps being more indicative of what to expect from an enslaved population when given the chance to strike back at their oppressors. 41 Yun, Munjo mallok (Scattered Records of Munjo), 2:1a. This account further mentions that people desperate for food were eating corpses and that death from starvation and disease were commonplace. 4 2 O , Swaemirok (Records of a Refugee), 1962, 193 (1593.07.15). 43 Recorded in Ko, Hyobin chapki (Literary Miscellany by Hyobin), 1:28b–29a. 44 Recorded in Kim, Hadam p’ajŏ ngnok (Hadam’s Tales to Pass Time), 79b, written by Kim Shiyang (1581–1643). 45 Peter Lee cites several Japanese and Korean sources, putting the number of those taken to Japan at over 30,000. Presumably, many of these would have been women. See Lee, The Record of the Black Dragon Year , 2000, pp. 47–8. 4 6 O , Swaemirok , 1962, p. 13.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 47 Ch’oe and Ha, Han’guk yŏ s ŏ ngsa , 1993, p. 405. 48 Ko Sangan, Hyobin chapki , 1969, 1:25a–25b. 49 JaHyun Kim Haboush wrote that the Japanese and Manchu invasions brought about “transformations ranging from the economy and family structure to ideology and worldview.” See Haboush, “Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth Century Korea,” 2003, pp. 416–17. 50 A study by Lee Sook-in argues that female chastity was an ideology that was utilized in reconstructing war-torn Chos ŏn. See “The Imjin War and the Offi cial Discourse of Chastity,” 2009, pp. 137–56. 51 Ch ŏ ng, Kongsa mun’gyŏ llok (Record of Public and Private Observations), 1:5a–5b, written by Ch ŏ ng Chaeryun (1648–1723). Fashioning womanly Confucian virtue 375 52 Ch ŏ ng’s study concerns the death of a commoner woman named Hyangnang who was honored as a virtuous woman. His article demonstrates that Hyangnang did not commit suicide to preserve her chastity but rather due to her diffi cult life after marriage. Hyangnang’s suicide seems largely the result of an abusive husband and the indifference of her in-laws to her plight. See Ch ŏ ng, “ Hyangnangjŏ n ŭ l t’onghae pon yŏ lly ŏ t’ansaeng ŭ i mek’anij ŭ m,” 2001, pp. 151–7. 53 An interesting case following the Py ŏ ngja horan (Manchu invasion of 1636) concerns the wife of then Deputy Magistrate for Kanghwa Island, Yi Min’gu (1589– 1670). Yi was a prominent offi cial prior to the Manchu invasion and later bore much of the blame for the surrender of King Injo to the Manchu army and was exiled for a number of years. Yi, and his family, insisted that Yi’s wife had been killed by the Manchus while protecting her honor after capture and even claimed to have later found her body and given it a proper burial. Yet, narrative accounts cite eyewitness evidence to the contrary and describe the wife as being a part of a Manchu procession taken to the Qing capital. This account is found in Kim Shiyang, Hadam p’aj ŏ ngnok , 79b–80a. 54 With particular reference to virtuous women for the period surrounding the Japanese invasion, see S ŏ njo shillok, 65:34a (1595.07.19), p. 539; S ŏ njo shillok , 65:34b (1595.07.20), p. 539; S ŏ njo shillok , 144:17b (1601.12.26), p. 329; S ŏ njo shillok, 163:6a (1603.06.09), p. 489; S ŏ njo shillok, 199:21b (1606.05.21), p. 200; S ŏ njo shillok , 199:23a (1606.05.24), p. 201; Kwanghaegun ilgi , 54:1a (1612.06.01), p. 422; and Kwanghaegun ilgi, 97:11b (1615.11.11), p. 559. In the period after the second Manchu invasion there are also numerous records including Injo shillok , 16:23b–24b (1638.03.11), p. 200; Hyojong shillok, 4:43b–45b (1650.07.23), pp. 446– 7; Hyojong shillok, 21:11b–12a (1659.02.18), pp. 175–6; and Hy ŏ njong shillok , 14:48b (1668.05.01), p. 579, among others.

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Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Conclusion

Lest we forget, the war began because the Japanese invaded Korea. While Korean scholarship is the most extensive, and the least known, Japanese scholarship is also extensive, and these two bodies of scholarly literature fi ll libraries. By contrast, the paucity of studies in English and even Chinese is quite striking. Published studies of the war in English attempt to achieve breadth, but they often lack depth. Without a large number of detailed research monographs there is still no base that can support broad analytical studies, and a single author working on the Imjin War usually fi nds that there is too much raw archival information to digest. The present volume collects studies from scholars in South Korea, Japan, and the West, who were asked to provide introductions to large areas of concern and to identify analytical problems. Our hope is that the collection will inspire readers to isolate particular questions for detailed, comparative, transnational, transcultural, and transdisciplinary research, and that younger scholars will build a base of monographs to help us better understand pre-modern East Asian international relations. More immediately, we hope that this volume will contribute signifi cantly to early-modern Northeast Asian history as well as to the histories of the individual countries of Korea, Japan, and China. For example, Saeki Kō ji, Han Moon-jong, and Kenneth Robinson show that while local Japanese elites could control trade with the Korean and Chinese governments they could not prevent violence, and that the subterfuges of certain elites in Tsushima, Kyū sh ū , and western Honshū signifi cantly lowered the value of Korean intelligence on Japan. In the second part, Kitajima Manji and Sajima Akiko offer insight

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 on Hideyoshi’s thinking and on wider Japanese attitudes about warfare in Korea and the governance of conquered territories. These essays undermine Hideyoshi’s well-crafted public image of being the undefeated paramount power, even in Japan. Murai Shō suke illustrates the fact that Hideyoshi’s generals had their own problems with legitimacy and brought back tales of heroism and adventure in hopes that many would forget there was no land to distribute. Yi Min’ung and Nukii Masayuki clarify the tactical problems of war on the Korean peninsula and open onto larger strategic questions that James Lewis mentions. Kenneth Swope illustrates the overriding desire in the Conclusion 379 Ming court for prestige (“awe”) and acknowledgment of that prestige. Harriet Zurndorfer expresses the wholesale revision occurring in Ming studies regarding the Wanli emperor. Nam-lin Hur introduces the depredations Koreans endured from their would-be rescuers and together with Han Myung-gi and Kuwano Eiji complicate our understanding of how Koreans both during and after the war felt about China. Regarding cultural transmission and cultural memory, Ha Woo Bong asks us to consider the signifi cance of the Korean input into the Tokugawa renaissance and points towards environmental, cultural, economic, and social histories. Choi Gwan and Michael Pettid on post- war literature show individual writers, Japanese and Korean elites, and even the Chosŏ n state enlisting memory for personal and social catharsis as well as the construction of political discourses designed to ensure the continuation of elite rule. In sum, this volume offers the broadest treatment of the Imjin Waeran available in English by approaching the war from multiple perspectives with multiple problematic points to the fore. It provides the measured views of leading scholars from South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Europe and presents their fi ndings both thematically and analytically.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Glossary and index

Agano 上野 331 ashigaru tepp ō 足輕鐵砲 332 Ai Zixin 艾自新 (dates unknown) 247 Ashikaga bakufu 足利幕府 176 Akaguni 赤國 115 Ashikaga sh ō gun 足利將軍 12 , 17 Akamagaseki 赤間關 5 4 Ashikaga Yoshiharu 足利義晴 Akamatsu Hiromichi 赤松廣通 (1511–1550) 18 (1562–1600) 325 Ashikaga Yoshimasa 足利義正 (dates Akana Ky ū nai 赤穴久内 (dates unknown) 54 unknown) 86 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義滿 akichi 空地 8 5 (1358–1408) 98 , 202 Akizato Rit ō 秋里籬島 (dates Ashikaga Yoshitane 足利義稙 unknown) 349 (1466–1523) 44 akui 悪意 260 atakebune 安譹船 122 , 130 , 133 Akutagawa Ry ū nosuke 芥川龍之介 (1892–1927) 353–4 Baba Shibunori 馬場信意 Alan 阿蘭 7 4 (1669–1728) 349 Amano Genuemon Ch ō sen ikusa monogatari bahan 八幡 204 天野源右衛門朝鮮軍物語 3 4 9 Baigan 梅岸 (dates unknown) 46–7 Amano Sadashige 天野貞成 (dates Baikei bunsh ū 梅溪文集 326 unknown) 349 Baikei 梅溪 ( s e e Yi Ch ŏ njik) 336 Anby ŏ n 安邊 77–8 , 152 bakufu 幕府 17 , 22 , 26 , 33 , 43 , 45–6 , Andong 安東 146–7 , 296 50 , 54–5 , 57 , 59 , 68 , 92 , 94 , 176 , angnoe 仰賴 263 203 , 323–4 , 325–30 , 334 , 340–1 , 346 , Angol-p’o 安骨浦 12 , 125–6 , 131 348–9 , 350–1 Ankokuji Ekei 安國寺惠瓊 (d. 1600) bakuhansei kokka 幕藩制國家 41 , 108 144 , 151 , 329 bakumatsu [period] 幕末 (c. Anshin T ō d ō 安心東堂 (dates unknown) 1853–1869) 328 28 , 30–1 , 33 , 47 , 50 bandit 78 , 137 , 142 , 155 , 170 , 176 , 178 , Any ō ji 安養寺 85 , 90 180–1 , 186 , 188–9 , 190 , 192–5 , 206 , Aoguni 青國 115 247 , 263 , 281 , 283 , 304 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Aoyama Nobumitsu 靑山延光 (dates Baoding 保定 210 unknown) 349 baptism 333 , 353 Arima 有馬 118–19 , 333 barbarian 18 , 20 , 36 , 171 , 197 , 199 , 205 , Arita 有田 87 , 331 , 337 238–9 , 241–4 , 251–3 , 258–60 , 284 , arquebus ( 鳥銃 , C. niaochong , K. 286–8 , 331 , 334 choch’ong ; 鐵砲 , J. tepp ō ) 5 , 38 , 122 , Beijing 北京 48 , 75 , 98 , 100–2 , 107 , 173 , 129 , 137 , 332–3 , 338 175 , 177–8 , 180 , 186 , 198 , 201 , 208 , Asano Nagamasa 淺野長政 (1547–1611) 210–11 , 213–6 , 237–8 , 245 , 277 , 287 , 79 , 89 , 326 301 , 335 Asano Yoshinaga 淺野幸長 Beppu Toneri 別府舎人 (dates (1576–1613) 83 unknown) 113 Glossary and index 381 Bingbu Shangshu 兵部尙書 (Minister of Ch’ ŏ n’an 天安 304 War) 299 ch’ ŏ ndo 遷都 157 , 315 Bingbu 兵部 ( s e e Ministry of War) 210 Ch’ ŏ ngju 淸州 150 , 151 Bizen Ch ū nagon 備前中納言 ( see Ukita ch’ongt’ong 銃筒 38 , 121 , 129 , 136 Hideie) 115 Ch’onha chi shingi 天下之神器 332 Bizen Kanemitsu 備前兼光 113 Ch’ ŏ nja ch’ongt’ong 天字銃筒 3 8 Board of Rites [Chos ŏ n] ( 薰曹 , K. Yejo ) Ch’ ŏ njo changgwan ch’anjip ch’ ŏ ng 天朝 50–1 , 296–8 , 302–5 , 307 將官撰集廳 , 281 Bodon č ar 孛端叉児 74–5 Ch’ ŏ nmy ŏ ng tos ŏ l 天命圖說 , 330 bokushi 牧司 350 ch’ot’osa 招討使 , 148 , 155 Border Defense Council [Chosŏ n] ( 備邊 ch’oyusa 招諭使 143 司 , K. Piby ŏ nsa ) 33–4 , 36–8 , 131 , 285 , Ch’ung’ikbu 忠翊府 161 287 , 290 , 296–7 , 300 , 302–5 Ch’ungch’ ŏ ng(-do) 忠淸 (道 ) 23 , 34 , 77 , b u 分 (3 mm. or one-tenth of a sun ) 116 82 , 83 , 115 , 134 , 143 , 144 , 145 , 148 , Buddhism 157 , 159 , 324–5 , 359 149 , 150 , 151 , 152 , 295 , 304 , 310 bugy ō 奉行 76 , 104 ch’ungchwawi 忠佐衛 161 Bungo Usuki 豊後臼杵 (dates Ch’unghunbu 忠勳府 161 unknown) 85 Ch’ungju 忠州 38 , 261 Bungo 豊後 30 , 47 Ch’ung ŭ iwi 忠義衛 149 , 161 Bunroku-Keich ō no eki 文緫 · 慶長の役 6 chaejo chiŭ n 再造之恩 278 , 279 , 280 , bureaucracy 151 , 159 , 207–8 , 211 , 218 282 , 283 , 284 , 285 , 286 , 287 , 288 , buren 臺仁 263 289 , 290 bu-Wae 附倭 141 , 143 , 160 chaejo p ŏ nbang 再造藩邦 281 buxu 臺許 263 chak 勺 8 8 Chang Shin 張紳 (d. 1637) 306 , 307 candles 248 changgye 蟳啓 , 137 cannon 38 , 40 , 122 , 129 , 137 , 171 , 182 , changny ŏ ng 掌令 144 185 , 211 , 226 , 332 Chaoxian jishi 潮鮮紀事 201 captive ( see prisoner of war) 45 , 87 , 97 , Chaoxian zazhi 潮鮮雜志 201 324 , 327–8 Chaoxian 朝鮮 200 Catholicism 5 , 332–5 Chas ŏ ngnok 自省錄 330 cavalry 38 , 225–6 , 249 , 284 , 332 Chen Jia (Chen Shen) 陳甲 ( 陳申 ) ceramics 323–4 , 328 , 330–1 , 335 (dates unknown) 210 , 237 Ch’ae Hyujing 蔡休徵 (dates Chen Jiru 陳繼儒 (1558–1639) 206 unknown) 353 Chen Lin 陳璘 (d. 1607) 134 , 135 , 215 , ch’aemy ŏ n 体面 303 216 , 251 ch’albang 察訪 (Superintendent of Post Chen Weizhi 陳維芝 (dates Stations) 145 , 149 unknown) 214 Ch’angd ŏ kkung 昌德宮 295 Chen Wentong 陳文同 (dates Ch’angny ŏ ng 昌寧 143 , 145 , 326 unknown) 251 ch’ang ŭ isa 倡義使 148 , 161 Chen Yunhong 陳雲鴻 (dates Ch’angw ŏ n 昌原 113 unknown) 309 Ch’ech’alsa 體察使 131 Che-p’o 薺浦 11–13 , 15 , 31–2 , 43–4 , 51

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Ch’ilch’ ŏ llyang 漆川梁 82 , 86 , Ches ŭ ng pangnyak 制勝方略 3 4 120–1 , 131–2 chewanghak 帝王學 326 Ch’oe Ch’ ŏ k ch ŏ n 崔陟傳 346 cheyonggam ch ŏ ng 濟用監正 145 Ch’oe Haesan 崔海山 (1380–1443) 121 Chi Talw ŏ n 池達源 (1570–1632) 153 Ch’oe Ky ŏ nghoe 崔慶會 (1532–1593) Chiba Mototane 千葉元胤 (d. 1464) 15 , 149 , 353 45 , 62 Ch’oe Mus ŏ n 崔茂宣 (1325–1395) 121 Chiba of Hizen 肥前千葉 (dates Ch’oe Paech’ ŏ n 崔配天 (dates unknown) 14–15 unknown) 153 Chibong yus ŏ l 芝峰蜃說 334 , 366 Ch’oe U 崔瑀 (d. 1249) 337 chigy ō 知行 1 5 Ch’oe Y ŏ ngh ŭ i 崔永禧 (1926–2005) 120 chija ch’ongt’ong 地字銃筒 3 8 382 Glossary and index

Chikamatsu Hanji 近松半二 Ch ŏ ng Taeim 鄭大任 (1553–1594) 146 (1725–1783) 354 Ch ŏ ng Un 鄭運 (1543–1592) 126 Chikamatsu Monzaemon 近松門左衛門 Ch ŏ ng Y ŏ ngbang 鄭榮邦 (1653–1724) 350 (1577–1650) 344 chikbu 畜部 324 Ch ŏ ng’ ŭ p 井邑 8 3 chikchang 直長 361 ch ŏ ngch’ ŏ l ch’ongt’ong 正鐵銃筒 129 chikch ŏ nb ŏ p 職田法 2 3 Chongde 崇德 288 Chiksan 稷山 85 , 304 Ch ŏ ngdong Kwan’gunsa 征東官軍祠 chin’gwan ch’eje 鎭管體制 2 5 312 , 318 Chindo 珍島 133 Ch ŏ ngjo [King] 正祖 (r. 1776–1800) 315 Chingbirok 懲毖錄 162 , 344 , 349 , 354 Ch ŏ ngjoksan 鼎足山 306 Chinju 晋州 79–80 , 95 , 105 , 127 , 145 , ch ŏ ngj ŏ l 貞節 ( see fi delity) 359 212 , 227 , 311 , 326–7 , 331–2 , 350 , Ch ŏ ngju 定州 150–1 352–3 , 366–7 , 374 Ch ŏ ngmi yakcho 丁未約條 (1547) 52 Chirye 知薰 143 ch ŏ ngmun 旌門 369 Cho Ch ŏ ng 趙靖 (1555–1636) 344 Ch ŏ ngmyo horan 丁卯胡亂 (Manchu Cho Chongnam 趙宗男 (dates Invasion of 1627) 278 , 287 unknown) 155 Chongmyo 宗廟 294 Cho H ŏ n 趙憲 (1544–1592) 36 , 145 , Ch ŏ ngp’y ŏ ng 定平 77 , 153 149–51 Chongzhen [Emperor] Yizong 崇禎毅宗 Cho Kwangjo 趙光祖 (1482–1519) 25 (r. 1627–1644) 295–6 Cho Ky ŏ ngnam 趙慶男 (1570–1641) 344 Chonhae 尊楷 331 Cho Shik 曺植 (1501–1572) 142–4 , 161 ch ŏ nho 佃戶 2 3 Cho Ung 趙熊 (d. 1597) 149 Chonju hwip’y ŏ n 尊周彙編 301 , 315 Cho Wihan 趙緯韓 (1567–1649) 346 Ch ŏ nju 全州 145 , 148 ch ō 町 (109.09 m.) 116–17 ch ŏ ppansa 接伴使 309 Chobangjang 助防將 3 4 Ch ō sa Hikozaemon oboegaki 帖佐彦左衛 choch’ong 鳥銃 332 門覚書 110 Ch ŏ kchin-p’o 赤珍浦 123 Ch ō sa Rokushichi 帖佐六七 (dates ch ŏ lch’ung changgun 折衝將軍 146 unknown) 114 Ch ŏ lla chwasusa 全羅左水使 (Left Chosa 帖佐 331 Naval Commander of Chŏ lla Ch ō sen bugy ō 朝鮮奉行 7 6 Province) 123 Ch ōsen eki 朝鮮役 347 Ch ŏ lla ususa 全羅右水使 (Right Naval Chō sen gunki monogatari 朝鮮軍記物 3 4 9 Commander of Chŏ lla Province) 123 Ch ō sen gunki taizen 朝鮮軍記大全 349 Ch ŏ lla 全羅 23 , 37–8 , 53 , 58 , 77 , 82–5 , Ch ō sen gunkimono 朝鮮軍記物 349–51 87 , 113 , 123 , 132 , 138–9 , 144–50 , Ch ō sen hinikki 朝鮮日々記 109 155–6 , 160 , 202 , 249 , 296 , 311 , 314 , Ch ō sen jin 朝鮮陣 347 335 , 352 Ch ō sen kokuso zeich ō 朝鮮國租稅牒 7 7 Ch ŏ ng Ch’ihy ŏ ng 丁致亨 (dates Ch ō sen nikki 朝鮮日記 109 unknown) 353 Ch ō sen seibatsuki 朝鮮征伐記 270 , Ch ŏ ng Ch’ŏ l 鄭澈 (1536–1593) 25 349 , 356 Ch ŏ ng H ŭ id ŭ k 鄭希得 (1573–1623) Ch ō sen seit ō shimatsuki 朝鮮征討始末

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 345 , 354 記 349 Ch ŏ ng Inhong 鄭仁弘 (1535–1623) 142 , Ch ō sen shuppei 朝鮮出兵 347 144–5 , 149 , 162 , 282 Ch ō sen s ō shi kunitsugu no shokei oboe 朝 Ch ŏ ng Kiw ŏ n 鄭期遠 (1559–1597) 鮮送使國次之書契覺 1 5 301 , 315 Ch ō sen Taiheiki 朝鮮太平記 349 Ch ŏ ng Ky ŏ ngdal 丁景達 Ch ō sogabe Motochika 長宗我部元親 (1542–1602) 129 (1538–1599) 130 Chŏ ng Munbu 鄭文孚 (1565–1624) Chos ŏ n wangjo shillok 朝鮮王朝實錄 153 , 159 27 , 32 Ch ŏ ng T’ak 鄭琢 (1526–1605) 344 Chouhai tubian 籌海圖編 202 Glossary and index 383 Christian 108 , 335 , 353 Easterner Faction ( 東人 , K. Tong’in ) 25 , Chu Chaho 朱子豪 (dates unknown) 146 35 , 130 , 142–3 Chu Saeng ch ŏ n 周生傳 346 Eda T ō emon oboegaki 江田藤右衛門覚 Chujas ŏ chŏ ryo 朱子書節要 330 書 110 Chungjong [King] 中宗 (r. 1506–1544) Ehon Ch ō sen gunki 繪本朝鮮軍記 349 12 , 25–6 , 42–4 , 48–50 , 52 , 56 , 157 , 335 Ehon Ch ō sen seibatsuki 繪本朝鮮征伐 Chungnogun 中路軍 135 記 349 Ch ū uemon 晝右衛門 (dates Ehon Taik ō ki 繪本太閤記 349 , 354–5 unknown) 117 Ehon Toyotomi Kunk ō ki 繪本豊臣勳功 chwarang 佐郞 144 記 349 Chwa-ssi ch ŏ nghwa 左氏精華 336 Ekisetsu 易說 326 Communication Embassy Ekish ū 易宗 (dates unknown) 14 ( see T’ongshinsa ) 35 , 74 , 79 , 103 , 128 , emperor 4 , 18 , 49 , 74–5 , 79–82 , 96–7 , 330 , 336 , 348 , 354 100 , 102–3 , 157–8 , 163–4 , 166–7 , Confucianism 87 , 142 , 151 , 157 , 165–6 , 169–77 , 179–81 , 197 , 199–203 , 205–8 , 168 , 204 , 224 , 294 , 324–30 , 335–6 , 210–11 , 213 , 215–18 , 220–4 , 226 , 228 , 341 , 358–9 236–8 , 241–2 , 250 , 252 , 254 , 263 , 281 , copper 29 , 49 , 55 , 122 , 203 , 328–9 285 , 287 , 290 , 295 , 297 , 301 , 307–9 , corv é e (labor) 24 , 152 , 154 , 246 , 280 , 298 312–15 , 337 , 347 , 379 cotton 24 , 29–30 , 33 , 50–1 , 63 End ō Shū saku 遠藤周作 (1923–1996) 354 coup (d’etat) (of 1623, see Injo panjŏ ng ) epidemics ( see disease) 25 , 127–8 , 247 25 , 185 , 278 , 286–8 , 290–1 Crane Formation ( see hag’ikchin) 126 faction 23 , 25 , 35 , 128 , 130–1 , 137 , 142 , crown prince 75 , 261–2 , 264 , 288 , 344 146 , 169 , 172 , 176 , 182 , 185 , 211 , 218 , cupellation 48–9 222 , 224 , 286 , 288 Fajia 法家 (Legalists) 166 Da Ming huidian 大明會典 200 , 297 , 312 famine 5 , 151 , 185 , 247 , 253 , 310–11 , 313 Da Qing 大淸 288 feng wei fanwang 封爲藩王 (invested as Dai Chaobian 戴朝弁 248 tributary prince) 213 Dai Min chokushi ni kokuhō subeki jō moku Fengshi lu 奉使錄 201 大明勅使に告報すべき條目 80–1 folangji 佛郞機 208 , 225 Dai Nihonshi 大日本史 337 fraudulent envoys ( see imposter envoys) 22 dai tepp ō 大鐵砲 137 Fuboj ō 父母蟳 326 Daigaku no kami 大學頭 325 Fuchinobe Kazuemon oboegaki 淵邊量右 Daigen 大原 (dates unknown) 14 , 29 衛門覺書 111–12 , 118 Daiin 大蔭 (dates unknown) 14 Fuchinobe Kazuemon 淵邊量右衛門 daikan 代官 13 , 76–7 (dates unknown) 111–12 daimy ō 大名 (Japanese feudal lord) Fujimitei Bunko 富士見亭文庫 329 59 , 73 , 76 , 83–8 , 94–5 , 103–4 , 109 , Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窩 (1561–1619) 111–12 , 115 , 122 , 130 , 143 , 150 , 212 , 87 , 324 , 330 , 336 , 341 329–30 , 333 Fukuda Kansuke 福田勘介 (dates Daiz ō ichiransh ū 大藏一覽集 329 unknown) 87 desertion 151 Fukunaga Sukej ū r ō 福永助十郞 (dates

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Ding Yingtai 丁應泰 (b. 1553, 1583 unknown) 114 js) 250 Fukuoka 福岡 260 , 331 disease 25 , 127–8 , 131 , 136 , 239 , 250 , Fukushima Masanori 福島正則 310 , 347 , 374 (1561–1624) 77 , 150 Dong Yiyuan 董一元 (dates unknown) Furuhashi Y ū gen 古橋又玄 (dates 135 , 216 uknown) 349 Dong Yue 董越 (1431–1502; 1469 js) 201 Fushimi Gakk ō Shoz ō Bunko 伏見學校 Donglujun 東路軍 134 所藏文庫 337 Dudu 都督 (Commodore) 251 Fushimi 伏見 325 , 336 Dutch 222 Fushun 撫順 207 , 284–5 384 Glossary and index fu-Wa 附倭 ( see bu-Wae) 141 Hachik ō sha Tokusui 八功舍德水 (dates Fuzongbing 副總兵 8 4 unknown) 349 Hachisuka Iemasa 蜂須賀家政 Gao Gong 高栱 206 , 223 (1558–1638) 83 Gaodiji 高帝紀 8 8 Hadong 河東 115 Gaoli tianzi 高麗天子 281 Haedong chegukki 海東諸國紀 15 , 68 , Gaoli zaixiang 高麗宰相 281 242 , 255 Gaozushang 高祖上 8 8 Haeju 海州 153–6 Gen’e 玄惠 (1279–1350) 324 Haenam 海南 83 , 91 , 115–16 Genpo Reisan 玄圃霊三 (dates Haengju 幸州 227 , 283 , 352 unknown) 80 Haeyurok 海游錄 330 Genp ō 玄方 ( see Kihaku Genp ō ) 28 hag’ikchin 鶴翼陣 (Crane Genso 玄蘇 ( see Keitetsu Genso) 28 , Formation) 126 31–3 , 35–6 , 47 , 58 , 60 , 71–9 Hagi 荻 90 , 331 , 338 gobugy ō 五奉行 8 6 haijin 海禁 222 gold seal ( 金印 , C. jinyin , K. k ŭ m’in , J. Hakata 博多 3 , 12 , 19 , 33 , 39 , 43–7 , 49 , kin’in ) 98–100 , 102 54 , 57 , 59–62 , 64 , 79 g ō man 傲慢 260 Hakusukinoe 白村江 271 Gongabee 權嘉兵衛 (dates Hamgy ŏ ng 咸鏡 48–9 , 53 , 77–8 , 91 , unknown) 333 152–4 , 159 , 261 , 279 Gosanke 御三家 326 , 329 Hamh ŭ ng 咸興 77 , 152 Goshomaru 御所丸 1 2 Hamj ŏ k kaesalb ŏ p 陷賊皆殺法 144 , 153 Gotair ō 五大老 135 Han Hy ŏ n 韓絢 (d. 1596) 150 Got ō 五島 1 9 Han Hyosun 韓孝純 (1543–1621) 146 Governor of Tsushima ( 對馬島主 , J. Han My ŏ ng’yun 韓明胤 Tsushima t ō shu , K. Daema toju ) 14 , 54 (1542–1593) 149 Go-Y ō zei [Emperor] 後陽成 (r. Han shu 漢書 253 Han Ug ŭ n 韓ٜ劤 (1915–1999) 120 75 (1611–1586 Gozan (temples) 五山 324 , 327–8 Han Ŭ ng’in 韓應寅 (1554–1614) 36 , 238 grain 77 , 82 , 127 , 129 , 133 , 142 , 144 , hanagiri 鼻切り 85 , 356 146 , 152 , 154–6 , 158 , 186–7 , 209 , hangg ŏ Waein 恒居倭人 ( see resident 245–9 , 282 Japanese) 11 Great Ming ( 大明 , C. Da Ming; hang-Wae 豭倭 ( s e e surrendered s e e Ming dynasty) 80 , 96 , 99 , 200 , Japanese) 333 251–2 , 297 , 308 , 312 Hansan 寒山 115 Gregario de Cespedes (1551–1611) Hansan-do ka 閑山島歌 354 333–5 , 338–9 , 353 Hansan island 閑山島 125–6 , 134 , Gu Long 顧龍 (dates unknown) 214 139 , 352 Gu Yangqian 顧養謙 (1537–1604) Hanshu 漢書 90 , 299 , 318 213–14 Hans ŏ ng 漢城 38 , 48 , 51 , 54 , 57–8 , Gu Yingtai 谷應泰 (1620–1690) 171 , 60 , 75–9 , 81 , 100–1 , 143–6 , 148–50 , 197 , 205 , 219 , 230 154–8 , 240 , 250–1 , 261 , 295–6 , 302 , Guan Yingzhen 官應震 284 304–5 , 307–13 , 316–17

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Guan Yu 關羽 294–8 , 312 , 318–20 Hanyang 漢陽 127 , 347 guerrilla forces ( see ŭ iby ŏ ng ) 2 , 4 , 22 , 39 , Hao Jie 郝傑 (1530–1600) 223 120 , 127 , 129 , 141–51 , 153 , 155 , 157 , Hapch’ ŏ n 陜川 142 , 144–5 160 , 174 , 182 , 266 , 283 , 340 Hap-p’o 合浦 123–4 gun 113 , 121 , 129 , 185 , 208 , 211 , Harima 播磨 336 232 , 332 Hashiba Toshihide 羽柴秀俊 gunki 軍記 348 (1582–1602) 75 gunkimono 軍記物 260 , 270 Hashimoto Sadahide (Utagawa gunpowder 7 , 38 , 121 , 129 , 163–4 , Sadahide) 橋本貞秀 ( 歌川貞秀 ) 232 , 332 (1807–1878?) 349 Gunsho chiy ō 群書治要 329 Hatakeyama Yoshiaki 畠山義賢 (dates Guo Shi 郭實 (1583 js) 211 , 215 , 226 unknown) 55 Glossary and index 385 Hatakeyama Yoshinari 畠山義就 Hongwu [Emperor] Taizu 洪武太祖 (r. (1437–1491) 55 1368–1398) 172 , 199–200 , 204 , 222 , Hatakeyama 畠山 31 , 55 , 67 295 , 297 hatto 法度 7 6 Hongzhi [Emperor] Xiaozong 弘治孝宗 Hayashi Razan 螞羅山 (1583–1657) 325 , (r. 1487–1505) 202 330 , 341 Hongzhi tally 17 He Qiaoyuan 何喬遠 (1558–1632, 1586 Honn ō ji 本能寺 3 2 js) 214 , 227 Honsh ū 本州 12 , 34 , 49 , 54–5 , 59 , Henan 河南 297 85 , 378 Hikosan gongen Chikainosuke dachi 彦山 hop 合 8 8 權現誓助劍 353 Hori Ky ō an 堀杏庵 (1585–1643) 349 hinyoku 貧欲 260 Horinouchi Ujiyoshi 堀內氏善 Hirado 平戶 19 , 42 , 52 , 331 (1549–1615) 124 Hirata Seiemon 平田清右衛門 (dates horses 97–8 , 100 , 127 , 174 , 179 , 200 , 205 , unknown) 111 239 , 241–2 , 245–6 , 251 , 262 hiro 尋 (1 hiro = 5–6 shaku = 1 ken =1.8 horyobu 捕虜部 323 m, therefore 2–3 hiro = 3.6-5.4 m.) 114 H ō sa Bunko 蓬左文庫 337 Hishikari Ky ū bee Ch ō sen hō k ō oboe 菱刈 Hosokawa Tadaoki 細川忠興 (1563– 休兵衛朝鮮奉公覺 110 1646) 331 , 336 Hizen Nagoya 肥前名護屋 37 , 45 , 61 , hostage 12 , 77–8 , 80 , 82 , 94 , 96–7 , 99 , 75–6 , 80–1 , 212 , 338 101 , 103 , 105 , 253 , 260 , 265 H ŏ Kyun 許筠 (1569–1618) 353 Hu Zongxian 胡宗憲 204 , 218 H ŏ S ŏ ng 許筬 (1548–1612) 35 Huang Yingyang 黃應陽 198 h ō butsubu 寶物部 324 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 217 hoch’o 胡椒 ( see pepper) 13 , 45–7 , 60 Huke geishizhong 戶科給事中 H ō ch ū D ō toku 弸中道徳 (dates (Supervising Secretary in the Offi ce unknown) 44 , 62 for Scrutiny of Revenue) 284 Hoeryesa 回禮使 2 6 hully ŏ n togam 訓練都監 153 Hoery ŏ ng 會罋 153 hun’gu 勳舊 2 5 Hoery ŏ ng-p’o 會罋浦 133 H ŭ ng’inmun 興仁門 296 , 314 Hoetap ky ŏ m swaehwansa 回答兼刷還 hwa’in 華人 300 使 338 hwacha 火車 3 8 Hojo 戶曹 48 , 310 Hwang Chin 黃璡 (1542–1606) 36 , 247 Hojong ilgi 扈從日記 344 Hwang Ch ŏ ng’uk 黃廷彧 H ŏ mch’ ŏ n 險川 310–11 (1532–1607) 237 Honam ch ŏ r ŭ irok 湖南節義錄 353 Hwang Hasu 黃河水 (dates Honch ō sangokushi 本朝三國志 350 unknown) 155 Honch ō 本朝 7 5 Hwang Shin 黃愼 (1560–1617) 104 , 106 , honey 115 , 248 130 , 139 , 369 Hong Chins ŏ ng 洪晉城 (dates hwang tangs ŏ n 荒唐船 5 2 unknown) 336 Hwang Yun’gil 黃允吉 (1536-?) 26 , 32 , Hong Hoy ŏ n 洪浩然 (1581–1657) 326–8 , 35–6 , 58–9 , 236–7 , 252 336 , 338 Hwangdan 皇壇 295 , 315 , 321

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Hong Kiltong ch ŏ n 洪吉童傳 353 Hwanghae 黃海 77 , 153–7 , 159 , 254 , Hong Kyenam 洪季男 (dates unknown) 280 , 310 149–51 Hwanghae-do ŭ iby ŏ ng chang kyŏ m Hong Ŏ nnam 洪彦男 (dates ch’ot’osa 黃海道義兵將兼招討使 155 unknown) 149 Hwangs ŏ k 黄石 8 4 Hong Taiji (r. 1627–43) 185 Hwaw ŏ n 花園 144 Hong Yangho 洪蓥浩 (dates Hwayak kamjoch’ ŏ ng 火藥監造廳 unknown) 353 (Offi ce for the Manufacture and Hong Y ŏ sun 洪汝諄 (1547–1609), 279 Control of Gunpowder) 121 Hongjew ŏ n 弘濟院 / 洪濟院 305 , 316 Hwayang-dong 華陽洞 295 Hongmun’gwan 弘文館 297 hyakush ō 百姓 154 Hongw ŏ n 洪原 77 , 153 hyang t’ongsa 鄕通事 5 1 386 Glossary and index

hyang’an 鄕案 142 Ishida Mitsunari 石田三成 (1560–1600) hyanggyu 鄕規 142 76 , 79 , 86 , 91 , 96 , 348 hyangni 鄕吏 314 , 327 Iteian 以酊菴 2 8 hyangyak 鄕約 142 It ō Gentaku yuishogaki 伊東玄宅由緒書 h y ŏ n’gam 縣監 149 112 , 118 h y ŏ nja ch’ongt’ong 玄字銃筒 3 8 It ō Gentaku 伊東玄宅 (dates unknown) Hy ŏ njong [King] 顯宗 (r. 1659–1674) 111–12 310–11 , 313 It ō Iki ny ū d ō Gentaku oboegaki 伊東壱 Hy ŏ np’ung 玄風 143 , 145 岐入道玄宅覚書 112 Hyuj ŏ ng 休静 (1520–1604) 157–8 Iwami 石見 19 , 33 , 49 Iw ŏ n 利原 77 , 152 Ich’i 梨峙 148 Iyo 伊予 336 Ichigaku 一鶚 (dates unknown) 14 , 30 Izumi sh ūch ū It ō Gentaku K ō raijin Ichiy ū sai Kuniyoshi 一勇齋國芳 (dates oboegaki 出水衆中伊東玄宅高麗陣覚 unknown) 349 書 109 Iki 一岐 54 , 59 , 112 , 118 Izumi sh ūch ū It ō Gentaku m ō shide 出水 ikki yakura 一揆輩 161 衆中伊東玄宅申出 111–12 , 118 ikki 一揆 ( see rebellion) 95 , 161 Izu-no-kami 伊豆守 1 4 Ikoma Kazumasa 生駒一正 (1555–1610) 83 Japan House ( see Waegwan) 43 Ikusa metsuke 軍目付 8 4 Jesuits 333 Ilbon kugwang 日本國王 ( see King of Ji Jin 季金 (dates unknown) 134 Japan) 44 Jiajing [Emperor] Shizong 嘉靖世宗 (r. Im Kyey ŏ ng 任啓英 (1528–1597) 149 1522–1567) 171 , 176 , 205 , 214 Imhaegun 臨海君 (1574–1609) 97 , Jiang Tianze 蔣天澤 (dates 152 , 279 unknown) 284 Imjin choby ŏ n saj ŏ k 壬辰遭變事蹟 344 Jianwen 建文 (r.1399–1402) 173 , 200 Imjin nok 㧚㰚⪳ 344–6 , 353 , 355 Jianzhou Jurchen 建州蔑眞 201–2 , 222 , Imjin River 螡津江 154 278 , 284–5 Imjin Waeran ilgi 壬辰倭亂日記 344 jiei 自衛 260 Imjin Waeran susŏ ngnok 壬辰倭亂守成 Jiezhou 解州 297 錄 353 jing 境 7 8 Imperial Envoy ( 天使 , K. ch’ ŏ nsa , J. Jingli Chaoxian junwu 經理朝鮮軍 tenshi ) 80 , 99 務 216 impostor (envoy/identity) 2–3 , 11–12 , Jingli 經理 (Commissioner) 304 14–17 , 20 , 22 , 26 , 28 , 33 , 37 , 39 , Jingli yushi 經理御史 (Coordinator of 42–7 , 50–62 Korean Affairs) 281 Imshin yakcho 壬申約條 (1512 Jinglue fuguo yaobian 經略復國要編 191 , Agreement) 11 , 13 , 44 194 , 255 , 355 Indong 仁同 336 Jinglue 經略 8 5 infantry 182 , 332 Jingtai [Emperor] Daizong 景泰代宗 (r. Injo [King] 仁祖 (r. 1623–49) 278 , 286–8 , 1450–1457) 201 290 , 292 , 306–7 , 375 Jingzhonglu 精忠錄 302–3

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Injo panj ŏ ng 仁祖反正 278 , 286 Jinshin yakuj ō 壬申約條 1 1 inkstones ( すずり箱 , J. suzuribako ) Jish ū kan 時習館 327 46 , 62 jitsuroku-tai shō setsu 實錄體小說 348 insurrectionists 161 jiu bian zhen 九邊鎮 208 intelligence (gathering) 3 , 28 , 37–8 , Jiuming shu 救命書 206 123 , 126 , 226 , 236–8 , 240 , 252 , 285 , Jixiao xinshu 紀效新書 208 287 , 378 Jizhen 薊鎮 210 ip 入 263 Jizhou 薊州 208 ipjo 入朝 261 j ū gun oboegaki 従軍覚書 108–9 , 111 irregular (troops) ( see ŭ iby ŏ ng ) 6 , 95 , Junmen 軍門 (Military 145 , 147–8 , 282–3 , 352 Commissioner) 302 Glossary and index 387

Junsa no iru f ūkei 巡査の居る風景 354 kasa 歌詞 347 Jurakudai 聚樂第 7 4 Kasan 嘉山 245 , 262 Jurchen ( 女真 , C. n ü zhen , K. y ŏ jin ) 22 , kashin 家臣 (direct vassals) 122 33 , 38 , 53 , 64 , 152 , 161 , 170 , 182 , 184 , Katano 堅野 331 200–2 , 205 , 220 , 223 , 253–4 , 263 , 267 , K a t ō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 (1562–1611) 278 , 284–5 , 290 , 323 76–8 , 80 , 82–92 , 97–9 , 101–2 , 106 , Jurchen Jin 女真金 267 109–10 , 125 , 130 , 134–5 , 152 , 154 , jushokunin 受職人 1 3 159 , 161 , 212 , 215 , 227 , 250 , 279 , 333 , jutoshonin 受圖書人 1 3 349 , 350 , 354 kato ny ū min 仮途入明 7 9 kabin 甲寅 328 K a t ō Yoshiaki 加藤嘉明 (1563–1631) 83 , kabuki 歌舞伎 5 , 341 , 350 , 353 125–6 , 137 Kad ŏ k 加徳 82 , 115 Keich ō 慶長 6 , 111 , 347 Kaegy ŏ ng 開京 200 Keinen 慶念 (dates unknown) 7–8 , 85 , Kaery ŏ ng 開罋 143–4 , 146 90 , 109 , 354–5 Kaes ŏ ng 開城 154–5 , 161 , 200 , 279 , Keirin T ō dō 景林東堂 (dates unknown) 307–8 , 313 , 316–17 14 , 30 , 33 Kaes ŏ ng yusujik 開城留守職 155 Keitakudai 慶譹代 336 Kaes ŏ ngbu 開城府 161 Keitetsu Genso 景轍玄蘇 (1537–1611) Kagoshima 緯兒島 90 , 110–12 , 28–9 , 31–2 , 47 , 58 , 66–7 , 79–81 , 337 118–19 , 329 ken (1.818 m. or 6 shaku ) 間 113–17 Kagoshima-ken shiry ō 鹿児島県史料 Keyamura Rokusuke 毛谷村蜄助 (dates 112 , 118 unknown) 353 kahaeng chaeso 假行在所 147 , 161 Khitan Liao 契丹遼 267 Kaibara Ekiken 貝原益軒 (1630–1714) ki’mich’aek 羈縻策 285 260 , 349 , 354–5 Kihaku Genp ō 規伯玄方 (1588–1661) 28 Kai 甲斐 5 5 Kii 紀伊 326–7 , 329 , 336 Kamei Shigenori 龜井玆矩 Kii Bunko 紀伊文庫 329 (1557–1612) 125 Kija 箕子 294 Kamiya Jutei 紙屋寿貞 (dates Kijae sach’o 寄齋史草 262 unknown) 49 Kij ŏ n 畿甸 304 Kang Hang 姜沆 (1567–1618) 7–8 , 66 , Kikuchi Kasugar ō 菊地春日樓 (dates 87 , 90 , 324 , 335–6 , 341 , 345 , 354 unknown) 349 Kang Hongnip 姜弘立 (1560–1627) 286 Kilju 吉州 77 , 152 , 154 Kangbok 降福 7 8 kiln 5 , 225 , 331 , 337 Kangdo mong’yurok 江都夢遊錄 345 Kim Ch’ ŏ n’il 金千鎰 (1537–1593) 147–8 , Kanggye 江界 261 343 , 352 , 366 Kanghwa 江華 148 , 155–6 , 246 , 311 , 375 Kim Ch’unch’u 紼春秋 (604–661, r. as Kangjin 康津 296 T’aejong muy ŏ l wang 太宗武烈王 , kang ō 勘合 20–1 , 81 , 89 , 96–7 , 222 654–661) 265 Kangwae chinsalb ŏ p 降倭盡殺法 153 Kim Ch’ungjang-gong yusa 金忠壯公遺 Kangwae yuinb ŏ p 降倭誘引法 153 事 353 Kangw ŏ n 江原 53 , 77 , 261 , 310 Kim Ch’ungny ŏ ng 紼忠齡 (1567–96)

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kanpaku 關白 75 , 90 , 107 , 130 343 , 352 Kanrei 管領 (Deputy Shogun) 55 Kim Changsaeng 金長生 (1548–1631) 39 kansei teisetsu 感生帝説 74 , 90 Kim Chinsu 金進壽 (dates Kantō 關東 1 9 unknown) 155 Kanyangnok 看羊錄 7–8 , 66 , 87 , 89–90 , Kim Ch ŏ ngho 金正浩 (1804?-1866) 255 , 336 , 345 300 , 319 Kara iri 唐入り 105 Kim Chwamy ŏ ng 金佐命 (dates K a r a 唐 7 5 unknown) 310–11 Karashima 唐島 112 Kim Hae 金垓 (1555–1593) 146 Karatsu 唐津 45 , 331 , 337 Kim Hae 金海 331 kar ō 家老 111 Kim Ho 金虎 (d. 1592) 146 388 Glossary and index

Kim Hwa 金和 (dates unknown) 331 Kobayakawa Hideaki 小早川秀秋 Kim Ka 金加 (dates unknown) 331 (1582–1602) 75 , 83 , 85 Kim Mansu 金萬壽 (1553–1607) 155 Kobayakawa Takakage 小早川隆 Kim My ŏ n 金沔 (1541–1593) 142–5 , 149 景 (1533–1597) 77 , 82 , 89 , 91 , 107 , Kim Pangjung 金芳中 (dates 144 , 148 unknown) 331 k ŏ buks ŏ n Ệ⿗船 (龜船 ) 123 , 125 , Kim Shi‘min 金時敏 (1554–1592) 332 , 133 , 352 343 , 352 Kobun k ōky ō 古文孝經 329 Kim Sion 金是榲 (1598–1669) 292 K ŏ ch’ang 居昌 84 , 142 , 144 Kim S ŏ ng’il 金誠一 (1538–1593) 35–6 , Koe 槐 295 39 , 58–60 , 66 , 143 , 145–6 , 236 , 252 , Koga Seiri 古賀精里 (1750–1817) 254 , 332 , 344 327 , 336 Kim Su 金睟 (1537–1615) 143 k ō geibu 工藝部 323 Kim T’aeja 金太子 (dates unknown) 346 Kog ŭ m sangch ŏ ng yemun 古今詳定薰 Kim Taehy ŏ n 金大賢 (1553–1602) 292 文 337 Kim T ŏ ks ŏ ng 金徳誠 (dates K o g ǔ m Island 古今島 133–4 unknown) 155 Kogunsan Island 古群山 133 Kim T ŏ ngny ŏ ng ch ŏ n 金德齡傳 347 Koha Island 高下 133 Kim T ŏ ngny ŏ ng 金德齡 (1567–1596) K ŏ je Island 巨濟 82 , 86 , 100 , 112 , 149 , 151 , 282 , 346–7 124 , 129 Kim Ŭ ngnam 金應南 (1546–1598) k ŏ jin 巨鎭 143 237 , 247 k ō ki wak ō 後期倭寇 18 , 21 Kim Ŭ ngs ŏ shilgi 金應瑞實記 347 koku 石 77 , 88 Kim Ŭ ngs ŏ 紼應瑞 (1564–1624) 343 , Kokugaku 國學 (National Studies) 327 346 , 352–3 Kokura 小倉 331 Kim Yong 金涌 (1557–1620) 344 Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 國立國會 Kim Yunmy ŏ ng 金允明 (1541–1604) 146 圖書館 337 Kimhae 金海 102 , 331 Kokusho s ō mokuroku 國書總目錄 kimyo sahwa 己卯士禍 2 5 112 , 119 Kin Sh ō gun 金將軍 353–4 kokutai 國體 327 kin 斤 4 6 Kongju 公州 150 Kinai 畿内 3 , 75 Kongmin [King] 恭愍 (r. 1351–74) King of Japan (日本國王 , C. Riben 199 , 200 guowang , K. Ilbon kugwang , J. Nihon kongnapche 貢納制 23 , 40 koku ō ) 12 , 14 , 16–18 , 29–32 , 58 , 82 , Konishi Joan 小西如庵 (如安 ) (1550?- 98 , 100 , 103 , 173 , 215 1626) ( see Nait ō Joan) 213 kin ō ha 勤王派 328 Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長 (d. 1600) kinzokubu 紼屬部 323 60 , 77–9 , 81–4 , 87 , 93–101 , 103–5 , kisaeng 妓生 343 , 353 , 366–8 , 374 , 376 107 , 109 , 130 , 134–5 , 154 , 157–8 , 198 , Kitajima T ō shiaki 來島通之 (dates 211 , 226 , 228 , 251 , 333 , 335 , 345 , 348 , unknown) 125 353 , 355 Kitsukawa Hiroie 吉川広家 (1561–1625) K ŏ njŏŭ i sag ŏ n 建儲議事件 2 5 86 , 146 K ō rai dō in 高麗銅印 328

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kiyomasa K ō rai [no] jin oboegaki 清正 K ō rai iri 高麗入 118–19 , 337 高麗陣覚書 86 , 89 , 91–2 , 110 K ō rai nikki 高麗日記 92 , 107 , 109 , Kiyomasa-ki 淸正記 349 112 , 119 Kiyu yakcho 己酉約條 (1609) 60 K ō raijin nikki 高麗陣日記 349 K ō K ō zen den 洪浩然傳 336 K ō raimono 高麗物 330 K o K y ŏ ngmy ŏ ng 高敬命 (1533–1592) Kory ŏ ch’ ŏ nja 高麗天子 281 145 , 147–50 , 347 Kory ŏ chaesang 高麗宰相 281 K o Ŏ nbaek 高彦伯 (d. 1609) 151 koshin 告身 4 4 Ko Sang’an 高尙顔 (1553–1623) 282 , Kos ŏ ng 固城 124 292 , 369 Koyang 高陽 308 Glossary and index 389 K ō yasan 高野山 8 6 Kwangju 廣州 147–8 , 310 K o y ŏ ng 高薠 144 Kwanwangmyo 關王廟 294–9 , 306–7 , Kuandian-pu 寬奠堡 262 312–13 , 315 , 319 , 321 kuangshui 礦税 217 , 284 , 291 K w ŏ n Chin 權縉 (1572–1624) 281 kugu 求救 263 K w ŏ n P’il 權韠 (1569–1612) 346 , 353 Kuk Ky ŏ ng’in 鞠景仁 (d. 1592) 153 , 279 K w ŏ n Sangha 權尙夏 (1641–1721) 295 Kuk Se’p’il 鞠世弼 (dates unknown) 153 K w ŏ n Ŭ ngsu 權應銖 (1546–1608) 146–7 Kukcho orye ŭ i 國朝五薰儀 294 , 313 , 319 K w ŏ n Yul 權慄 (1537–1599) 34 , 131–2 , Kukcho orye ŭ i s ŏrye 國朝五薰儀序 148 , 251 , 283 , 343 , 352 例 314 kyech’uk 癸丑 328 Kukcho sok orye ŭ i s ŏrye 國朝續五禮儀序 Kyehae yakcho 癸亥約條 (1443 例 313–14 Agreement) 13 Kukcho sok orye ŭ i 國朝續五薰儀 294 , kyemi 癸未 328 307 , 319 K y e w ŏ lhyang 桂月香 343 , 346 , 353 Kuki Yoshitaka 九鬼嘉隆 (1542–1600) k y e w ŏ n yusa 繼援有司 129 125–6 , 130 K y ō goku 京極 55 , 59 kukkaj ŏ k kyumo ŭ i Waegu ῃṖ㩗G K y ō iku Chokugo 敎育勅語 328 ′⳾㦮G㢲ῂ ( 國家的規模㦮倭寇 ) 324 k y ŏ ngch’ip 驚蟄 299 Kukwangsa 國王使 3 3 K y ŏ nggi 京畿 77 , 85 , 136 , 143 , 148 , 156 , Kumagai Naomori 熊谷直盛 (d. 1600) 308 , 310–11 84 , 91 Ky ŏ ngguk taej ŏ n 經國大典 51 , 88 , 90 , 139 Kumamoto 熊本 327–8 , 331 , 336 k y ŏ ngja 庚子 328 K ŭ mgang Mountains 金剛 158 K y ŏ ngju 慶州 135 , 146–7 , 155 , 248 K ŭ mgang River 錦江 271 k y ŏ ngk’waes ŏ n 輕快船 3 4 K ŭ mgye ilgi 錦溪日記 345 Kyŏ ngni Ŏ sa Yang s ŏ nsaeng songd ŏ k sigo K ŭ mhwa 紼化 311 經理御史楊先生頌德詩稿 281 K ŭ msan 錦山 144–5 , 148–51 , 311 K y ŏ ngsang chwasuyŏ ng 慶尙左水營 k ŭ n 斤 4 6 (Left Naval Command of Ky ŏ ngsang Kunaich ō Shory ō bu 宮内庁書陵部 337 Province) 122 Kunaich ō 宮內庁 5 8 K y ŏ ngsang ususa 慶尙右水使 (Right kuni 國 75 , 90 , 354 Naval Commander of Ky ŏ ngsang kuninami 國並 15 , 66 Province) 122 kunitsugu 國次 1 5 K y ŏ ngsang 慶尚 23 , 36–9 , 43 , 51 , 53 , 58 , kunsu 郡守 145 77 , 80–5 , 87 , 122–4 , 126 , 137 , 141–9 , kuny ŏ k chedo 軍役制度 23 , 40 155 , 158 , 160 , 296 , 305 , 310–11 , 314 , Kuroda kafu Ch ō sen [no] jin ki 黑田家譜 316 , 326–7 , 331 , 333 , 336 朝鮮陣記 8 6 K y ŏ ngsang-do u’py ŏ ngsa 慶尚道右兵 Kuroda Nagamasa 黑田長政 (1568– 使 146 1623) 77 , 83 , 85–6 , 154 , 156 , 331 K y ŏ ngs ŏ ng 鏡城 153 Kuroda Yoshitaka 黑田孝高 (1546– k y ŏ ng ŭ i 敬義 142 1604) 79 , 86 K y ŏ nnaeryang 見乃梁 126 kuryu 九流 148 Kyorin kwan’gye 交隣關係 2 6 Kwaj ŏ nb ŏ p 科田法 23 , 40 K y ō shi Bank ō 仰之梵高 (dates

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Kwak Chaeu 郭再祐 (1552–1617) 142–3 , unknown) 28 145–6 , 148 , 151 , 343 , 346 , 352 Kyos ŏ gwan 校書館 329 kwan’gi 官妓 353 K y ū sh ū tandai 九州探題 4 6 Kwan’ ŭ m-p’o 觀音浦 135 Kwanch’alsa 觀察使 147 Later Jin 後金 (1616–1636) 277–8 , Kwanghaegun [Prince or King] 光海君 285–8 , 290 (r. 1608–1623) 146 , 261 , 278 , 282–7 , Li Chengliang 李成梁 (1526–1618) 184 , 290–2 , 298–9 , 306 , 312–13 , 318 , 360 206 , 226 , 315 Kwanghaegun ilgi 光海君日記 298–9 , Li Hualong 李化龍 (1554–1612) 191 , 306 , 312 , 315 193 , 215 390 Glossary and index

Li Rubo 蝗如柏 (dates unknown) 226 , Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576–1629) 280 , 299–300 , 306 286–8 , 290 Li Rusong 蝗如松 (1549–1598) 158 , 206 , maritime trade ( see trade) 11 , 52 , 100 , 211–12 , 226–7 , 231 , 234 , 240 , 244 , 176 , 203 , 231 248 , 280 , 289 , 299–302 , 304 , 306 , 309 , Mashita Nagamori 增田長盛 (1545– 312 , 315 1615) 79 , 89 , 96 Li Zhengyi 蝗徵儀 (dates unknown) massacre ( see minagoroshi ) 78 , 85 , 94 277 , 292 masu 升 8 8 Li Zongcheng 李宗城 (dates unknown) Matsura Shigenobu 松浦鎮信 101 , 215 (1549–1614) 109 Lianbing shiji 練兵實記 208 , 355 Meiji [period or Restoration] 明治 Liangchao pingrang-lu 蓐朝平攘錄 355 (1868–1912) 5 , 328 , 350–1 Lianxiang-ji 蓮襄記 355 Meng Sen 孟森 (1868–1937) 289 , 292 Liao 遼 220–1 , 267 merchant 19 , 43 , 47 , 49 , 60 , 237 Liao River 遼 265 metal type 5 , 324 , 328–30 , 335 , 337 , 341 Liaodong dusi 遼東都司 261 , 308 Milyang 密陽 158 Liaodong duzhi huishisi 遼東都指揮使 Mimizuka 耳塚 352 , 356 司 308 Min Y ŏ ’gyŏ ng 閔汝慶 (1546–1600) 247 Liaodong 蘹東 78 , 85 , 180 , 185 , 200 , minagoroshi 皆殺し ( see massacre) 207 , 210–13 , 215 , 223 , 225–6 , 228 , 85 , 94–5 239 , 245–6 , 248 , 261–5 , 277 , 280 , 284 , Minamoto Gi 源義 (dates 286 , 290 , 297 , 308–9 unknown) 42–4 Libu 薰部 307 , 314 , 317 Minch’ungdan 愍忠壇 304–5 , 307–11 , Liu Bang 劉邦 (256 or 247 BCE-195 313 , 317 BCE) 74 Ming dynasty 明朝 (1368–1644) 163–6 , Liu Huangshang 劉黃裳 (1527–93; 1586 168 , 170 , 197 , 207 , 219 , 222 , 240 , 259 , js) 210 288 , 295 Liu Ting 蛐綎 (1552–1619) 135 , 185 , Ming Shenzong shilu 明神宗實錄 273 , 206 , 212 , 216 , 227 , 234 , 249 , 251 , 286 292 , 355 logistics 127 , 154 , 156 , 265 , 266 (Ming Taizu) yuzhi ji (明太祖 ) 馭製 Lu Kun 呂坤 (1536–1618) 206 集 221 Lu Zhongli 逯中立 (1589 js) 214 Ming Taizu 明太祖 ( see Hongwu Luis Frois 104 , 107–8 Emperor) 234 Luoyang 洛陽 297 Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待訪錄 217 mining (copper, silver) 48–9 , 63 , 217 , Ma Gui 麻貴 (dates unknown) 134 , 284 , 291 215–16 , 249 Ministry of War (Ming) ( 兵部 , C. Maeda Gen’i 前田玄以 (1539–1602) 104 Bingbu ) 102–3 , 180 , 210–14 , 217 , 223 , Maeda Toshiie 前田蝍家 (1538–1599) 226 , 263 138 , 329 Miryang 密陽 101 Maeda Toshinaga 前田利長 missionaries 108 , 333–4 , 343 , 353 , 355 (1562–1614) 138 Mito Bunko 水戶文庫 329 Maeh ŏ n shilgi 梅軒實記 353 Mito domain 水戶 326 , 329 , 337

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 maengs ŏ n 猛船 34 , 122 Miyakonoj ō Shimazu 都城島津 112 , mal/tu 斗 8 8 118–19 Manase Sh ō rin 曲直瀨正琳 (dates mo’my ŏ ng sasang 慕明思想 295 , 310 unknown) 337 M ōgy ū 蒙求 329 Manchu invasions ( see Pyŏ ngja horan Mohwa’gwan 慕華館 305–6 , 308 , 316 and Ch ŏ ngmyo horan ) 179 , 278 , 287–8 , Mok-p’o 木浦 133 306–7 , 310–11 , 313 , 345 , 373 , 375 moksa 牧使 145 , 350 Manchuria ( see also Liaodong) 200–1 , Mokuso hangan 牧司判官 350 219 , 267 Mokuso-kan 木曾官 350–1 , 355 Mandongmyo 萬東廟 295 monks (as diplomats and students) 14 , Manji 万治 110–11 , 118 28 , 47 , 60 , 80 , 199 , 203 , 324 , 347–8 Glossary and index 391 monks (as soldiers) 148 , 150 , 157–9 , 162 , Nagato 長戸州 5 9 348 , 354 Nagoya (in Honsh ū ) 郞古耶 (from the M ō ri Bunko 毛利文庫 329 early seventeenth century 名古屋 ) 59 , M ō ri Hidemoto 毛利秀元 314 , 337 (1579–1650) 83 Nagoya (in Ky ū sh ū ) 名護屋 37 , 45 , 61 , M ō ri Motoyasu 毛利元康 75–6 , 80–1 , 212 , 338 (1560–1601) 146 Naikaku Bunk ō 內閣文庫 90 , 107 , 336 M ō ri Terumoto 毛利輝元 (1553–1625) Nait ō Joan 内藤如庵 ( 如安 ) (1550?- 77 , 143–4 , 330–1 1626) 213 Mori Yoshinari 森吉成 or 毛利吉成 (d. Naju 羅州 84 , 147 1611) 77 , 83 , 158 Nakabayashi 中林 1 8 Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 Nakajima Atsushi 中島敦 (1730–1801) 327 (1909–1942) 354 mugwa 武科 53 , 67 Naktong River 洛東江 142–6 Mugye 茂溪 143 Nam Kon 南袞 (1471–1527) 33 Mun’gy ŏ ng 聞慶 146 Nam My ŏ ng 南冥 ( see Cho Shik) mun’in 文引 15 , 43 142 , 162 mun’in palhaenggw ŏ n 文引發行權 3 4 Nam Yun chŏ n 南允傳 346 Munch’ ŏ n 文川 77 , 153 nam’in 南人 143 munhwa yakt’al ch ŏ njaeng Namdaemun 南大門 296 , 298 , 315 ⶎ䢪㟓䌞㩚㨗 ( 文化掠奪戰爭 ) 324 Namgang River 南江江 143 munmyoje 文廟祭 294 Nammyo 南廟 314 Munso mallok 聞韶漫錄 344 Nampy ŏ lgung 南別宮 306 , 316 Muns ŏ n ch’anju 文選纂註 336 Namw ŏ n 南原 83 , 85–7 , 101 , 115 , 132 , Muromachi bakufu 室町幕府 17 , 33 , 43 , 249 , 296 , 304 , 311 , 314–15 , 318 45 , 50 , 54 , 59 , 328 , 330 Nanbokuch ō jidai 南北朝時代 324 musket ( see arquebus) 226 , 332 Nanjung chamnok 綧中雜錄 90 , 138 , Muy ŏ lsa (shrine) 武蕢祠 280 , 299–307 , 254 , 344 312–13 , 315 Nanjung ilgi 綧中日記 7–8 , 139–40 , 251 , My ō hō in 妙法院 58 , 66 255 , 344 Myohyang 妙香 158 Nanki Bunko 南葵文庫 329 , 337 My ŏ ngjong [King] 明宗 (r. 1545–1567) Nanko 南湖 (dates unknown) 14 , 29 25 , 27 , 45–6 , 52 , 55–7 , 61 , 121 , 157 , Nanzenji 南禪寺 8 0 161 , 297 National Studies 國學 ( see Kokugaku) My ŏ ngnyang 鳴梁 120–1 , 132–3 , 138 , 216 327 Natsuka Masaie 長束正家 (d. 1600) Nabeshima Katsushige 鍋島勝茂 89 , 107 (1580–1657) 84 , 327 Nawa Kassho 那波活所 (1595–1648) Nabeshima Naoshige 鍋島直茂 (1538– 326 , 336 1618) 77 , 83 , 90 , 92 , 109 , 152 , 154 , neifu 內附 261 215 , 327 , 330 , 331 , 337 neishu 內屬 220 , 263 nadegiri 撫切り 8 5 Neo-Confucianism 87 , 142 , 204 , 229 , naebu 內附 261–4 , 271 273 , 294 , 324–30 , 335–6 , 341 , 358–9

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Naeshirogawa 苗代川 8 7 Ni Qian 倪謙 (1415–79, 1439 js) 201 naesok 內屬 263 nichirin no ko 日輪の子 7 4 Nagano Rokubee 長野六兵衛 (dates Nihon koku ō 日本国王 ( see King of unknown) 114 Japan) 44 , 67 Nagasaki 長崎 331 Ningbo 寧波 2 , 11 , 17–18 , 75 , 81 , 176 , Nagasaki Kenritsu Tsushima Rekishi 203 , 214 , 222 Minzoku Shiry ō kan 長崎縣立對馬歷 ningy ō j ō ruri 人形淨瑠璃 5 , 341 , 350 史民俗資料館 337 No In 編認 (1566–1622) 345 , 354 Nagashino 長篠 [Battle of] 332 nobi 奴婢 23 , 144 , 148 , 154 , 342 , 352 Nagata Zensai 永田善齋 Non’gae 緰介 (d. 1593?) 346 , 353–4 , (1597–1664) 336 366–8 , 374 , 376 392 Glossary and index Noryang 露梁 [Battle of] 86–7 , 120–1 , Oze Hoan 小瀬 ( 瀨 ) 甫庵 134–5 , 251 (1564–1640) 349 N ŭ ngs ŏ ng 綾城 149 Ō zu 大洲 8 7 Nurhaci 緢兒哈赤 (1559–1626) 182 , 184–5 , 191 , 278 , 284–6 P’adamja 坡潭子 345 P’aldo sipyuk chongdo ch’ongs ŏ p ŭ is ŭ ng O H ŭ imun 吳希文 (1539–1613) 8 , 344 , 八道十蜄宗都總攝義僧 158 368–9 , 376 P’alsan 八山 331 oboegaki 覺書 (memorandum or p’anoks ŏ n 板屋船 34 , 37 , 121–2 , 136 memoir) 75 , 109–12 , 117 p’il 匹 5 0 Oda Hidenobu 織田秀信 (1580–1605) 75 P’isaeng my ŏ ng mongnok 皮生冥夢 Oda Nobunaga 織田信長 (1534–1582) 錄 345 32 , 34 , 75 , 330 , 332 P’ungsan 豊山 147 Oda Nobutada 織田信忠 (1558–82) 75 P’yohun Temple 表訓寺 158 ofumidokoro 御文所 110 P’y ŏ ng’an Province 平安道 48 , 77 , 147 , Okch’ ŏ n 沃川 150 154 , 156–8 , 279 , 300 , 306 , 308 Ō kō chi Hidemoto 大河内秀元 (dates p’y ŏ ngj ŏ s ŏ n 平底船 122 unknown) 90 , 109 , 354 , 356 P’y ŏ ngsan 平山 155 Ok-p’o 玉浦 123 P’y ŏ ngyang 平壤 127 , 154–8 , 181 , 220 , oktang 玉堂 310 226 , 261–2 , 270 , 279–80 , 300–4 , Oku Sekisuke 奥関助 (dates unknown) 306–9 , 313 , 316–17 , 342 110–13 P’y ŏ ngyang 平壤 [Battles of] 78–9 , Oku Sekisuke oboegaki 奥関助覚書 108 , 81 , 127 , 158 , 180 , 195 , 211–12 , 239 , 110–12 , 118–19 241 , 245 , 278 , 280 , 289 , 299–300 , Omodaka Rench ō b ō 面高連長坊 (dates 309 , 352–3 unknown) 109 Pae S ŏ l 裵楔 (1551–1559) 133 Omodaka Rench ō b ō Kō rai nikki 面高連 Paek P’as ŏ n 百婆仙 (1561–1656) 長坊高麗日記 90 , 109 331 , 337 Ō nin War 應仁の亂 4 5 Paekch’ ŏ n (or Paech’ŏ n in Hwanghae Onjo 溫祚 294 Province) 白川 155–6 ŏ nmun 諺文 154 Paekch’ ŏ n River 白川江 271 , 351 Onyang 温陽 151 Paekche 百濟 265 , 271 , 351 oryun 五倫 359 Paekgang 白江 265 , 271 ō sei fukko 王政復古 337 Paekmagang 白馬江 271 Ō shige Heiroku Kō rai oboegaki 大重平六 Pak Ch’igong 朴致公 (dates 高麗覚書 110 unknown) 137 Oshikawa Rokubee mō shide 押川六兵衛 Pak Ch’unmu 朴春茂 (1568–1646) 149 申出 110 Pak Hy ŏ kk ŏ se 朴赫居世 (trad. dates: 69 Ō ta Gy ū ichi 太田牛一 (b. 1527) 349 , BCE-4 CE; 57 BCE-4 CE) 294 354 , 356 Pak P’y ŏ ng ŭ i 朴平意 (1558–1623) 331 Ō ta Kazuyoshi 太田一吉 (d. 1617) 109 Pak Such’un 朴壽春 (1572–1652) 292 Ō tani Yoshitsugu 大谷吉繼 (1559–1600) Pak Tongnyang 朴東亮 (1569–1635) 262 79 , 96 Pak Ŭ ijang 朴毅長 (1555–1615) 248

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Ō tomo 大友 30 , 33 , 39 , 52 , 54 , 64 panggun sup’oje 防軍收布制 2 4 Ō tomo Sō rin 大友宗麟 (1530–1587) 47 pangnap 防納 2 3 Ō tomo Yoshimune 大友吉統 Pang ŏ sa 防禦使 3 4 (1558–1610) 154 Parhae/Bohai 渤海 265 , 267 Ŏ u yadam 於于野談 374 , 377 peace negotiations 29 , 31 , 79–82 , 84 , 93 , Ō uchi 大內 12 , 17–18 , 21 , 28 , 33 , 39 , 44 , 95 , 97–100 , 102–4 , 121 , 127 , 157 , 159 , 46–7 , 52 , 54–5 , 59 , 64 , 66 , 222 206 , 212 , 215 , 282 , 301 , 340 Ō uchi Yoshitaka 大內義隆 pepper (including chili; see hoch’o) 5 , 13 , (1507–1551) 18 45–7 , 60 , 332 , 334–5 Owari Bunko 尾張文庫 329 Piby ŏ nsa 備邊司 ( see Border Defense owi 五衛 161 Council) 33 , 131 , 285 , 296 Glossary and index 393 Pigak 碑閣 316 146 , 150 , 180 , 212–13 , 215 , 228 , 240 , pigy ŏ k chinch’ ŏ lloe 飛擊震天雷 3 8 251–2 , 261 , 267 , 279 , 340 , 352 , 354 pike 38 , 225 , 332 Puy ŏ 扶餘 83 , 271 pi’manggi 備忘記 304 Py ŏ kchegwan 碧蹄館 [Battle of] 127 , piracy ( see pirate) 19 , 44 , 52–4 , 56–7 , 212 , 239 , 248 , 278 , 307–9 , 313 , 317 61 , 80 , 160 , 170 , 172 , 176 , 192 , 194 , Py ŏ kp’ajin 碧波津 133 202–3 , 222–3 , 324 Py ŏ ngja horan 丙子胡亂 (Manchu pirate 11–14 , 16 , 18 , 20–1 , 26 , 29 , 33–5 , Invasion of 1636–1637) 278 , 288 , 375 37–8 , 43–4 , 51–2 , 57–8 , 81 , 121–2 , Py ŏ ngjo p’ans ŏ 兵曹判書 344 176 , 179 , 190 , 194 , 196 , 199 , 202–10 , p y ŏ ngnong ilch’ije 兵農一致制 2 4 218 , 223 , 229 , 234 , 238 , 240 , 242–3 , 245 , 252 , 324 , 346 Qi Jiguang 戚繼光 (1528–88) 176 , 182 , plunder 37 , 52 , 78 , 84 , 154 , 181 , 199 , 204 , 207–9 , 223 202 , 214 , 223 , 248–9 , 251 , 283 , 323–4 , qiujiu 求救 220 , 263 328–30 , 335 , 341–2 Qu Jiusi 瞿九思 (1546–1617) 216–17 , 232 Pobingsa 報聘使 2 6 pob ŏ p 保法 2 4 rape 6 , 20 , 249 , 358–9 , 361 , 365 , 370–1 , 373 poetry 47 , 201 , 281 , 302 , 305 , 329 , rebellion 12 , 17 , 94 , 99 , 147 , 152–3 , 171 , 341 , 347 177–8 , 183–7 , 191–2 , 209 , 240 , 265 , pog ŭ m 福音 280 338 , 350–1 , 355 Poin 保人 361 recognition envoy ( 册封使 , C. cefengshi , pongjokche 奉足制 2 4 J. sakuh ō shi ) 101–4 pongsa 奉事 146 resident Japanese ( 恒居倭人 , K. hangg ŏ Pongsan 鳳山 154–5 Waein ) 11–12 Pongsangsa 奉常寺 310 , 317 , 320 revolt ( see rebellion) 3 , 94–5 , 105 , 151–2 , pongsangshi ch’ ŏ mj ŏ ng 奉常寺僉正 151 155 , 168 , 175 , 183 Portuguese 18 , 45 , 171 , 179 , 185 , 222 , Riben guowang 日本國王 211 323 , 332 , 334 , 337 , 353 rice 12–14 , 23–4 , 26 , 34 , 77 , 101 , 115–16 , Pos ŏ ng 寶城 149 129 , 142 , 157 , 243 , 245 , 252 , 266 , 287 , Post Stations ( see ch’albang) 145 , 149 310 , 342 post-station attendants 148 rifl e ( see arquebus) 332 , 340 pottery ( see ceramics) 19 , 60 , 87 , 331 , 337 rifl emen 38 , 284 prince ( see crown prince) 80 , 82 , 96–7 , righteous soldiers ( see ŭ iby ŏ ng ) 22 , 78 , 99 , 101 , 103–5 , 160 , 177–9 , 186 , 200 , 95 , 282 , 343 , 352 210 , 213 , 217 , 230 , 261–5 , 288 , 344 Rinzai Zen 臨済禅 28 , 44 , 47 , 60 Prince Imhae ( see Imhae-gun) 97 , Riot of the Three Ports ( see Samp’o 152 , 279 Waeran) 11–12 , 14–18 , 22 , 26 , 28–9 , Prince Sunhwa ( see Sunhwa-gun) 97 , 31 , 33 , 37–8 , 43 152 , 279 ritual 2 , 5 , 163 , 198 , 202–3 , 205 , 220 , princess 96–8 , 100 , 104 , 161 , 174 , 213 , 346 270 , 294–300 , 302–3 , 305 , 307–15 , prisoner of war 87 , 326 , 341 , 345–7 345 , 365 provisions ( see supplies) 78 , 82 , 127–9 , ri 里 (3.927 km or 2.44 miles) 115–17 134 , 142 , 149 , 156–7 , 159 , 175 , 245 , ru 入 263

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 266 , 279 , 281 , 287 , 361 R y ō uemon 量右衛門 (dates pug’in 北人 143 unknown) 117 puh ŏ 臺許 263 R y ū ky ū 琉球 14 , 18 , 20 , 36 , 45 , 47 , 54 , puin 臺仁 263 73 , 108 , 181 , 199 , 210 , 237–8 , 241 , puk p ŏ llon 北伐語 288 259–60 , 323 Pukch’ ŏ ng 北靑 77 , 152 ryū to-dabi 龍頭蛇尾 216 pukp’y ŏ ngsa 北評事 153 purity 360 , 365 , 368–9 Sa’my ŏ ng taesa 四溟大師 ( s e e ‘Yuj ŏ ng’) Pusan-p’o 釜山浦 (alternate 富山浦 ) 158 11–12 , 29 , 38 , 43 , 51 , 58 , 61 , 76 , 81 , 83 , Sa’my ŏ ngdang 泗溟堂 ( s e e ‘Yuj ŏ ng’) 93 , 95 , 101–2 , 125–6 , 131 , 135 , 143–4 , 346 , 353–4 394 Glossary and index Sa’my ŏ ngdang ch ŏ n 泗溟堂傳 347 seigi 正義 260 sany ŏ 士女 (aristocratic women) 369 Seikad ō Bunko 靜嘉堂文庫 329 Sach’ ŏ n 泗川 86–7 , 111 , 123 , 125 , 135 , Seikan zasshi 征韓雜志 349 216 , 239 seikan 征韓 91 , 347 , 349 sadae 事大 200 , 205 , 221 , 237 Seikanroku 征韓録 87 , 91 , 110–11 sadae ch ŏ ngch’aek 事大政策 285 Seiki 姓貴 349 Sadae mun’gwe 事大文軌 308 , 317 seimin ky ō dō 征明嚮導 75 , 79 sadaebu 士大夫 353 Seisei nikki 西征日記 109 saengsa-dang 生祠堂 280 Seizanji 西山寺 28 , 47 saengsa 生祠 299–300 Sejo [King] 世組 (r. 1455–1468) 24 , Saga 佐賀 327 , 331 , 336 27 , 121 Sago-gun 佐護郡 1 4 Sejong [King] 世宗 (r. 1418–1450) 26–7 , sahwa 士禍 2 5 121 , 303 , 317 , 328 Sahy ŏ n 沙峴 316 sekibune 關船 122 , 133 Saikensen 歳遣船 1 2 Sekigahara 關ヶ原 [Battle of] 325 , Saish ō Shō tai 西笑承兌 (1548–1607) 329 , 348 215 , 325 sekiten 釋奠 294 sajik 社稷 263 Sen no Riky ū 千利休 (1522–1591) 330 Sajikdan 社稷壇 294 Sengoku (period) [Japan] 戰國 saj ŏ l 死節 (die with honor) 359 (1467[1493]–1590) 85 , 122 , saj ŏ n 祀典 294 243 , 340 Sakai 堺 43 , 47 , 59–60 , 62 , 74 , 332 Senka zakki 潛窩雜記 326 sakoku 鎖國 354 senry ū 川柳 341 , 354 sakuh ō 冊封 95 , 97 shaku (30.3 cm.) 尺 113 , 115 samch’ang 三倉 2 6 Shandong 山東 210 , 246 , 253 Samdo sugun tongjesa 三道水軍統制 Shanxi 山西 209 , 297 使 352 sheji 社稷 263 samgang 三綱 359–61 , 365 , 368 , Shen Weijing 沈惟敬 (d. 1599) 78–9 , 81 , 370 , 372–3 87 , 96–7 , 99–101 , 103–4 , 157–8 Samguk sagi 三國史記 265 Shenhe 深河 286 , 290 samno py ŏ ngjin 三路竝進 134 Shenzong 神宗 ( s e e Wanli Emperor) Samp’o Waeran 三浦倭綧 (Riot of the 207 , 210–11 , 213–14 , 224 , 241 , 244 , Three Ports, 1510) 12 , 22 , 43 281 , 287 , 295 , 355 sanghang 霜豭 299 Shi ji 史記 253 Sangju 尙州 146 , 311 , 358 Shi Ru 史儒 (dates unknown) 210 , 248 sangmu 尙武 142 Shi Xing 石星 (1538–99; 1565 js) 78 , 101 , Sangny ŏ ng 雙嶺 310–11 211 , 213–15 , 226 , 228 , 280 , 299–301 , Sankan seibatsu 三韓征伐 347 303 , 312 , 316 sankin k ō tai 芔勤交代 336 Shiba 斯波 5 5 sanlu bingjin 三路竝進 134 shida 事大 200 Sanpo no ran 三浦の綧 12 , 21 shijo 時調 341 , 347 Sappan kyū ki zatsuroku, k ō hen 薩藩旧記 Shikoku 四國 260 , 336 雑録後編 91 , 107 , 111–12 , 118 shilj ŏ l 失節 (lose honor) 371

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 sappanwood 丹木 13 , 31 , 45 Shilly ŏ ng 新罋 146 sarim 士林 25 , 142 , 155 Shim Sugy ŏ ng 沈守慶 (1516–1599) saro py ŏ ngjin 四路竝進 134 149–50 sarumi さるみ 116 Shim Tanggil 葘當吉 (dates Saryang 蛇梁 16 , 31 , 43 , 51–2 unknown) 331 sasong 使送 2 8 Shimabara 島原 338 Satsuma 薩摩 73 , 87 , 108–9 , 111–13 , Shimai S ō shitsu 島井宗室 (d. 1615) 47 , 117 , 237 , 241 , 331 58 , 64–5 segy ŏ ns ŏ n 歳遣船 (Annual Trading Shimazu Hisamichi 島津久通 Ships) 12 , 26 (1604–1674) 111 seibatsu 征伐 260 Shimazu Iehisa 島津家久 (1576–1638) 89 Glossary and index 395

Shimazu Moriemon 島津守右衛門 silk 46 , 203 (dates unknown) 113 silu bingjin 四路竝進 134 Shimazu Nakatsukasa 島津中務 (dates Sinocentric regional order 238 unknown) 115 siyi fanping 四夷藩屛 243 Shimazu Sagami 島津相模 (dates slaves ( see ‘nobi’ ) 51 , 53 , 346 , 374 unknown) 116 smuggling 12 , 19 , 49 , 51–2 , 203 Shimazu Tadatsune (Shimazu Iehisa) 島 so Chunghwa ŭ ishik 小中華意識 295 津忠恒 ( 島津家久 ) (1576–1638) 84 , S ō Daizen-no-suke Kuniyuki 宗大膳亮 86 , 111 國幸 (dates unknown) 15 Shimazu Yoshihiro 島津義弘 (1535– S ō Daizen-no-suke 宗大膳亮 (dates 1619) 82–3 , 85–6 , 89 , 111 , 113 , 135 , unknown) 14–16 329–31 S ō Izu-no-kami Kuniyuki 宗伊豆守國幸 Shimazu Yoshihisa 島津義久 (1533– (dates unknown) 14 1611) 86 , 91 S ō Kuniyuki 宗國幸 (dates unknown) 16 Shimazuke K ō raijin hiroku 島津家高麗陣 S ō Morihide 宗盛秀 (dates unknown) 14 秘録 112 , 117 S ō Moritoshi 宗盛俊 (dates shimman yangpy ŏ ng s ŏ l 十萬養兵說 3 9 unknown) 14 Shimokawa Heiday ū 下川兵大夫 (dates S ō Sadakuni 宗貞國 (1468–1492) 14 , 28 unknown) 91 S ō Saemon daibu oboegaki 宗左衛門大 Shin Ip 申砬 (1546–1592) 54 , 361 夫覺書 1 2 Shin Ky ŏ ng 申炅 (1613–1653) 252 , S ō Shigemoto 宗成職 (dates 305 , 353 unknown) 28 Shin Sejun 申世俊 (dates unknown) 153 S ō Yoshimori 宗義盛 (1476–1520) Shin Yuhan 申維翰 (b. 1681) 330 13–16 , 62 shin’gij ŏ n 神機箭 3 8 S ō Yoshishige 宗義調 (1532–1588) 57 Shinsen sh ō jiroku 新選姓氏録 271 S ō Yoshitoshi 宗義智 (1568–1615) shinshowa 深處倭 1 3 32 , 35 , 58 , 60 , 79 , 91 , 94 , 109 , 130 , shirhak 實學 332 333 , 337 Shisho goky ō Wakun 四書五經倭訓 325 S ŏ Yuy ŏ ng 徐有英 (1801–1874) 346 shitenn ō 四天王 336 S ŏ ae chip 西厓集 297 Sh ō Nei 尚寧 (1564- r.1587–1620) 210 S ŏ ch’ ŏ n 舒川 115 Sh ō fukuji 聖福寺 44 , 47 , 62 , 79 sog’ogun 束伍軍 145 sh ō gun 將軍 12 , 16–18 , 26 , 28 , 44 , 46–7 , s ŏ gye 書契 4 3 50–1 , 54–5 , 58 , 60–2 , 66 , 98 , 173 , 202 , S ŏ ho ch’ungy ŏ llok 西湖忠蕢錄 353 222 , 325–6 , 328 , 353–4 sohwa 小華 259 Sh ō heizaka Gakumonsho 昌平坂学問 S ŏ in 西人 ( see ‘Westerner Faction’) 所 351 35 , 286 shokei 書契 15 , 43 s ŏ ja 庶子 150 Sh ō kō kan Bunko 彰孝館文庫 337 Sok Taejŏ n 續大典 297 shominzoku zakkyo 諸民族雜居 1 9 s ŏ k 石 12–13 , 26 , 77 , 88 , 245 Sh ō ni 少貳 12 , 28–9 , 31 , 46 , 50 , 59 S ō -ke Bunko 宗家文庫 329 Shonichi Yamashiro no kuni chikushō zuka S ŏ mjin River 蟾津江 132 初日山城の國畜生塚 354 S ō moku rokubu k ō shuh ō 草木蜄部耕種

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Shory ō bu 書陵部 58 , 65 , 337 法 334 Shuangyu 雙嶼 1 9 s ŏ n’gwa 禪科 157 , 161 shugo 守護 1 2 S ŏ ng Hon 成渾 (1535–1598) 150 , 336 Shuihu houzhuan 水滸後傳 355 Song Kyep’il 宋啓弼 (dates Shuihu zhuan 水滸傳 206 unknown) 353 Shuilujun 水路軍 134 Song Maocheng 宋楙澄 (1569?- shuinj ō 朱印蟳 330 1620?) 206 shun hua wang 順化王 215 Song Shiy ŏ l 宋時蕢 (1607–1689) 295 Shushigaku 朱子學 ( see Neo- Song Suqing 宋素卿 (d. 1525) 17 Confucianism) 87 Song Yingchang 宋應昌 (1536–1606) siege 85 , 148 , 158 , 177 , 182 , 216 , 227 191 , 210–11 , 215 , 226–7 , 246 , 249 396 Glossary and index

Song’un taesa 松雲大師 ( see Yuj ŏ ng) 158 Sunhwa-gun 順和君 (1580?-1607) 97 , S ŏ nggyungwan 成均館 294 152 , 279 S ŏ ngjin 城津 77 , 152 , 154 Sunjo [King] 純祖 (r. 1800–1834) 315 S ŏ ngjong [King] 成宗 (r. 1469–1494) Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法 189 26–7 , 54 , 56–7 , 61 , 121 , 157 , 161 , 335 sun 寸 (3.03 cm.) 113–14 , 116 S ŏ ngju 星州 143–6 , 296 sup’o taeripche 收布代立制 2 4 s ŏ ngnihak 性理學 341 supplies (military) 50 , 76 , 122 , 180 , S ŏ ngyo chongp’ansa ky ŏ m tangsang 186 , 210–12 , 217 , 239 , 245–7 , 252–3 , kwanjik 禪敎宗判事兼堂上官職 158 265–7 , 281–2 , 289 S ŏ njo [King] 宣祖 (r. 1567–1608) 7 , 25 , Surak 水落 158 27 , 31 , 39 , 50 , 57–9 , 61 , 64 , 94 , 101 , Surogun 水路軍 134 131 , 157 , 182 , 198 , 205 , 210 , 213 , 221 , surrendered Japanese ( 降倭 K. hang- 236–8 , 240–1 , 245 , 247–8 , 250–2 , 254 , Wae , J. k ō -Wa ) 333 261–4 , 266 , 279–83 , 289 , 296–305 , Suruga Bunko 駿河文庫 329 307–9 , 312–13 , 315–16 , 332 , 342 , Sus ŏ n Ch ŏ ndo 首善全圖 315 360 , 371 Su ŭ njip 睡隱集 336 S ŏ njo shillok 宣祖實錄 254 , 271 , 298–9 , Suzhou 蘇州 49 , 203 302 , 315–17 , 373–5 suzuribako すずり箱 ( s e e inkstones) 46 S ŏ njo suj ŏ ng shillok 宣祖修正實錄 3 9 , Swaemirok 鎖尾錄 8 , 344 299 , 307–8 , 315 swords 38 , 46 , 179 , 203 , 251 Sonkeikaku Bunko 尊經閣文庫 329 swordsmen 115 , 156 , 183 S ŏ nmusa 宣武祠 281 , 294–5 , 299 , 302–7 , 311–13 , 315–16 T’aebaeksan 太白山 298–9 , 315–16 sonn ō -ron 尊王論 337 T’aejong [King] 太宗 (r. 1400–1418) S ŏ nsan 善山 129 , 146–7 26–7 , 121 , 311 S ŏ rogun 西路軍 134 T’aengniji 擇里誌 301 , 315 S ŏ san Taesa 西山大師 ( see Hyuj ŏ ng) T’an’g ŭ mdae (Ch’ungju) 彈琴臺 ( 忠 150 , 157 , 354 州 ) 38 S ō setsu 宗設 1 8 T’oegye 退溪 ( s e e Yi Hwang) 142 , 325 , s ŏ w ŏ n 書院 2 5 336 , 338 soyu’gw ŏ n 所有權 2 3 t’ ŏ ng’ŏ y ŏ ng 統禦營 136 state letter ( 國書 , C. Guoshu , K. Kuks ŏ , t’ongch ŏ ng taebu 通政大夫 147 , J. Kokusho ) 18 , 33 , 35 , 58–61 , 98–100 , 151 , 154 102–3 , 354 T’onggam hoeyo 通鑑會要 336 strategic culture 164–9 , 189 , 207 , T’ongjesa 統制使 129 257–8 , 270 t’ongjey ŏ ng 統制營 136 Sudos ŏ sŏ n 受圖書船 2 6 T’ongshinsa 通信使 (Communication Sueyama Shrine 陶山神社 337 Embassy) 26 , 30 , 32 , 35 , 74 , 103 , 128 , Sugun ch ŏ ldosa 水軍節度使 (Naval 332 , 344 , 354 Command-in-Chief) 121 , 352 T’osan 兎山 310–11 sujik 受職 2 6 Tachibana Ch ō senki 立花朝鮮記 109 sujo’gw ŏ n 收租權 2 3 Tachibana Muneshige 立花宗茂 (d. Sukch’ ŏ n 肅川 279 1642) 83 , 109

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Sukcho [King] 肅宗 (r. 1674–1720) 295 Tachibana Yasuhiro 橘康廣 (dates Sun Kuang 孫礦 (1543–1613) 215 unknown) 28 , 32 Sun’an 順安 158 Tachibana Yasutoshi 橘康年 (dates Sunch’ ŏ n 順天 83 , 134 , 216 unknown) 28 , 32 s ŭ ngja ch’ongt’ong 勝字銃筒 3 8 Taebodan 大報壇 295 , 301 , 305 , sungj ŏ ng ch’ ŏ sa 崇禎處士 288 , 292 311–12 , 314 S ŭ ngj ŏ ngw ŏ n 承政院 300–1 , 303 , 316–17 Taedong chiji 大東地志 300 , 316–17 S ŭ ngmunw ŏ n 承文院 308 , 317 Taedong River 大同江 79 , 81 , 154 , Sungnyemun 崇薰門 296 , 314–15 180 , 211 s ŭ ngnyo t ŭ ngyongmun 僧侶登龍門 162 Taedongb ŏ p 大同法 24 , 152 s ŭ ngwa 僧科 161 taeguk 大國 262 Glossary and index 397

Taej ŏ n hu songnok 大典後續錄 5 1 tiju shibosi 題擧市舶司 (Maritime taemy ŏ ng kŏ sa 大明居士 288 , 292 trading intendancy) 203 , 222 Taep’y ŏ nggwan 大平館 306 , 316 Tobacco 5 , 332 , 334–5 taika 対価 4 9 Toch’ech’alsa 都體察使 344 Taik ō no Ch ō sen seibatsu 太閤の朝鮮征 T ō d ō Takatora 藤堂高虎 (1556–1630) 伐 347 85 , 87 , 89 , 124 , 135 , 335 Taik ō ki 太閤記 349 toe/s ŭ ng 升 8 8 Taikun gengō roku 大君言行錄 326 T ō g ō Heihachir ō 東鄕平八郞 354 Taizu 太祖 ( s e e Hongwu Emperor) T ŏ g’w ŏ n 徳源 77 , 153 221 , 297 T ō hoku 東北 8 5 Tajiri Akitane 田尻鑑種 (d. 1593) 109 tojagi ch ŏ njaeng G☚㧦₆㩚㨗GG(陶瓷器戰 Takada 高田 331 爭 ) 331 Takamoto Shimei 高本紫溟 Tokugawa Iemochi 德川家茂 (1738–1813) 326–8 (1846–1866) 326 Takatori 高取 331 Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康 (1542–1616) Takenouchi Kakusai 武內確齋 (dates 159 , 324–5 , 340 , 348 unknown) 349 Tokugawa Mitsukuni 德川光國 (dates Taku 多久 327 unknown) 337 Takuko Karatsu 多久古唐津 337 Tokugawa Mitsusada 德川光貞 Talch’ ŏ n mongyurok 達川夢遊錄 345 (1626–1705) 326 Talch’ ŏ n 獺川 311 , 345 Tokugawa s ōgy ō kik ō i 德川創業記簊 Tallyang Waeby ŏ n 達梁倭變 16 , 33 異 326 Tallyang 達梁 16 , 53 , 202 Tokugawa Yorinobu 德川賴 ( 頼 ) 宣 Tamazato Bunko 玉里文庫 110 , 112 , (1602–1671) 326 , 336 118–19 Tokugawa Yoshimune 德川吉宗 Tamyang 潭陽 147 , 149 (1684–1751) 326 Tan’gun 檀君 294 tokus ō sen 特送船 1 2 Tanch’ ŏ n 端川 48–50 , 77 , 152 , 154 Tokutomi Soh ō 德富蘇峰 Tanegashima 種子島 19 , 332 (1863–1957) 335 Tang Shunzhi 唐順之 (1507–1560) 218 Tomohito 智仁 (dates unknown) 75 Tang Yipeng 唐一鹏 (1583 js) 214 Tong’in 東人 ( s e e Easterner Faction) Tangdong Bay 塘洞灣 124 35 , 142 Tanghang-p’o 唐項浦 123 , 125 tong’w ŏ n 東援 289 Tang-p’o 唐浦 123 Tongdaemun 東大門 296 , 298 Tatsuno 竜野 336 Tongguk T’onggam 東國通鑑 337 tax 23–5 , 48–9 , 53 , 76–8 , 84 , 101 , 152 , Tongji Chungch’ubusa 同知中樞府 161 , 183 , 187 , 209 , 217 , 247 , 279 , 284 , 事 157 291 , 310–11 , 358 , 368 Tongmyo 東廟 314 Tengudaniyo 天狗谷窯 337 Tongmy ŏ ng 東明 294 Tenjiku Tokubee ikoku banashi 天竺德兵 Tongnogun 東路軍 134 衛韓噺 350 Tongp’y ŏ nggwan 東平館 5 1 Tenjiku 天竺 75 , 350 , 355 tongyak 洞約 142 Tenkei 天荊 (fl . 1577–1592) 109 Toragari no ki 虎狩之記 4 , 112 , 119

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Tepp ō ki 鐵砲記 332 tosa 都事 149 Terazawa Hirotaka 寺澤廣高 Toshiyori 蔷寄 336 (1563–1633) 99 toshobu 圖書部 323 Tetsu no kubikase 鐵の首枷 354 t ō shu 島主 1 2 theater ( see kabuki and ningy ō j ō ruri ) tos ŏ 圖書 16 , 42 176 , 218 , 267 , 341 , 350–1 , 354–5 T o w ŏ n 桃源 352 Tiandi 天帝 294 T o w ŏ nsu 都元帥 131 , 158 , 352 Tianjin 天津 245 Toyotomi (Hashiba) Hidenaga 豊臣 ( 羽 Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義 334 柴 ) 秀長 (1540–91) 75 Tidu 提督 (Supreme Commander) Toyotomi (Hashiba) Hideyasu 豊臣 ( 羽 226 , 299 柴 ) 秀保 (1579–95) 75 398 Glossary and index

Toyotomi Hidetsugu 豊臣秀次 Ŭ iry ŏ ng 宜罋 142–3 , 145 (1568–95) 130 Ŭ is ŏ ng 義城 146–7 Toyotomi Hideyori 豊臣秀賴 ( 頼 ) Ŭ is ŭ ng todaechang 義僧都大將 158 (1593–1615) 348 ŭ is ŭ ngby ŏ ng 義僧兵 ( s e e monks [as Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1536– soldiers]) 150 , 158 1598) 6 , 35 , 43 , 64–5 , 73 , 93 , 108 , 122 , Ukita Hideie 宇喜多秀家 (1573–1655) 126 , 176 , 179 , 197 , 209 , 217 , 236 , 277 , 75 , 77 , 83 , 115 , 138 , 306 , 328–9 323 , 340 Ŭ lmyo Waeby ŏ n 乙卯倭變 16 , 33 , 121 Toyotomi regime ( 豐臣政權 , J. Toyotomi Ŭ lsa sahwa 乙巳史禍 2 5 seiken ) 22 , 73 , 86 , 93–5 , 99 , 105 , 141 , Ulsan 蔚山 85 , 134–5 , 216 , 249–50 , 160 , 323–4 , 340 , 342 311 , 331 Toyozaki-gun 豊崎郡 1 4 Ungch’ ŏ n 熊川 99 , 128 , 331 , 333 tozama 外様 215 Ungji 熊峙 148 trade 2–3 , 11–19 , 23–5 , 29–31 , 33 , 35 , universal rulership 163 , 198 42–62 , 75 , 80–1 , 96–100 , 129 , 172 , universal sovereignty ( see universal 174 , 176 , 178–9 , 202–3 , 205–6 , 210 , rulership) 239 , 241–4 , 252 213–14 , 222–3 , 243 , 253 , 264 , 354 , 378 Unjerok 雲提錄 336 tribute system 45 , 180 , 189 , 198–9 , uprisings ( see ‘rebellion’) 153 , 170 , 178 , 204–6 , 217 , 220–3 183 , 186–7 , 282 Tsurum ŏ e Shigenobu 鶴峯戊申 Usuy ŏ ng 右水營 133 (1788–1859) 349 Utsunomiya K ōrai kijin monogarari 宇都 Tsuruya Namboku 鶴屋南北宮高麗帰陣物語 109 (1755–1829) 350 Utsunomiya Kunitsuna 宇都宮国綱 Tsushima 對馬 2–3 , 11–17 , 19 , 28–31 , (1568–1607) 109 33–5 , 39 , 42–7 , 52–62 , 64–5 , 73–4 , 79 , U ŭ ij ŏ ng 右議政 149 , 297 242–3 , 329 , 333 , 337 , 354 , 378 T s ū shinshi 通信使 7 4 verse ( see poetry) 5 , 281 , 341 , 347 Tuch’ijin 豆耻津 132 virgins, female [sent as tribute] (K. tukche 纛祭 302–3 , 315 kongny ŏ 貢女 ) 198 , 200 , 205 t ŭ ksongs ŏ n 特送船 1 2 virtuous woman ( see y ŏ lly ŏ ) 357–9 , t ŭ ksong 特送 2 8 368–9 , 371–2 , 375 Tumu Incident ( 土木之變 , C. Tumu zhi bian ) 175 , 190 Wae 倭 5–7 , 11–12 , 16 , 19–20 , 22–4 , 26 , Tumu zhi bian 土木之變 ( see Tumu 33–4 , 36–9 , 43 , 73 , 78 , 93 , 108 , 120–2 , Incident) 175 126 , 135–6 , 141 , 143–4 , 148 , 153 , 160 , T u m u 土木 175 , 190 176 , 197–9 , 206 , 208 , 216 , 218 , 224–5 , t ŭ ngnok 謄錄 308 242 , 253 , 263 , 277–85 , 287 , 289–90 , tunj ŏ n 屯田 129 294–6 , 302 , 305–7 , 310–12 , 315–16 , 323–4 , 328 , 330–8 , 340–55 , 366 , U Paes ŏ n 禹拜善 (1569–1621) 144 371–3 , 379 Uchiyama Saemonsa 內山左衛門佐 waebok 外服 263 (dates unknown) 13 Waegu 倭寇 ( s e e piracy) 122 , 144 , 148 , Ueno Gon’emon 上野権右衛門 (dates 176 , 242 , 324

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 unknown) 114 Waegwan 倭館 (Japan House) 43 Uesugi Kagekatsu 上杉景勝 (1555– Waeno 倭奴 3 9 1623) 138 , 329 waifan lifu 外藩籬輔 241 , 243 Ŭ i chŏ ng i t ŏ k 義政以德 58 , 65 waifu 外服 263 ŭ iam 義巖 353 waiyi jimi 外夷羈縻 241–3 , 253 Ŭ ibinbu 儀賓府 161 Wakisaka Yasuharu 脇坂安治 ŭ iby ŏ ng 義兵 22 , 39 , 78 , 95 , 141 , 143 , (1554–1626) 125–6 145 , 150 , 155 , 282 , 343 , 352 wak ō -teki j ō ky ō 倭寇的狀況 1 8 ŭ iby ŏ ng taejang 義兵大將 145 Wakō 倭寇 ( s e e piracy) 11 , 18 , 144 , 176 , Ŭ ig ŭ mbu 義禁府 161 198 , 202 , 204 , 222 , 226 Ŭ iju 義州 48 , 147 , 154 , 157 , 220 , 246–8 , Wang Chonggu 王崇古 208 261–2 , 280 , 283 , 308 , 342 Wang Dewan 王德完 (1554–1621) 214 Glossary and index 399

Wang K ŏ n [Kory ŏ king] 王建 (877–943, Yan Song 嚴嵩 (1480–1565) 208 r. 918–943) 294 Yanagawa ikken 蛢川一件 (1635) 28 Wang Zhi 王直 (d. 1559) 19 , 203 , 209 Yanagawa Shigenobu 柳川調信 (d. 1605) Waniura 鰐浦 1 9 28 , 32 , 36 , 58 , 103–4 Wanli [Emperor] Shenzong 萬曆神宗 (r. Yang Fangheng 楊方亨 102–3 , 215 1573–1620) 207 , 210–11 , 213–14 , 241 , Yang Hao 楊鎬 (d. 1629) 216 , 225 , 228 , 244 , 281 , 287 , 295 250 , 281 , 304–6 , 313 , 316 Wanli qijuzhu 萬暦起居注 224 Yang Jian 楊堅 ( s e e Wendi emperor) 74 Wanli san da zheng 萬暦三大征 197 Yang Ŏ sa 楊御史 306 Wanli san dazhenggao 萬暦三大征ٜ 216 Yang Shaocheng 楊紹程 wei 威 (awe) 168 (1549–1617) 214 Wendi 文帝 (r.581–604) 74 Yang Tinglan 楊廷蘭 253 Westerner Faction (西人 , K. S ŏ in ) 130 , 137 Yang Yuan 楊元 (d. 1597) 84 , 280 , W o 倭 263 299–301 , 315 Wokou 倭寇 ( s e e ‘piracy’) 144 , 176 , yang 蓐 33 , 50–1 190 , 202 yangban 兩班 23 , 36 , 53 , 61 , 142–4 , 147 , W ŏ lbong haesangnok 月峯海上錄 345 149–50 , 155 , 158–60 , 347 , 360 w ŏ n kwi 寃鬼 345 yanglai 仰賴 263 W ŏ n Kyun 元均 (1540–1597) 82 , 122 , yasa 野史 344 , 365 130–2 , 216 , 283 Yasuda Jirobee 安田次郎兵衛 (dates W ŏ n’gudan 圓丘壇 294–5 , 311 , 314 unknown) 113 W ŏ nju 原州 311 Yatsushiro 八代 331 Worship 294–6 , 298 , 300–1 , 303–4 , y e 禮 243 307–8 , 311–12 , 353 Yean 禮安 146 Wu Weizhong 吳惟忠 (dates unknown) Yech’ ŏ n 醴泉 146–7 212 , 249 Yegyo 曳橋 134–5 Wuan 武安 297 Yejo 薰曹 ( s e e Board of Rites) 50 , 313 Wujiang 呉江 4 9 Yemun’gwan 藝文館 316 Yesou baoyan 野叟曝言 355 xia 俠 206 Yi Changbaek ch ŏ n 蝗長白傳 346 Xiao Xi Fei 小西飛 ( s e e Konishi Joan) 214 Yi Chin’y ŏ ng 蝗眞榮 (1571–1633) Xie Sheng 解生 8 5 326–7 , 336 Xie Yongzi 謝用梓 (1559–1600) 80 Yi Ch ŏ ng’am 李廷馣 (1541–1600) Xietian Dadi 協天大帝 297 155–7 , 159 Xilujun 西路軍 134 Yi Chonghan 蝗宗閑 (dates unknown) Xing Jie 邢玠 (dates unknown) 85 , 216 , 327 , 336 228 , 250 , 281 , 283 , 302 , 305 , 313 Yi Ch ŏ nghy ŏ ng 李廷馨 (1549–1607) 155 Xu Guanlan 徐觀瀾 (dates unknown) Yi Ch ŏ njik 蝗全直 (1617–1682) 326 , 336 214 , 279 Yi Chunghwan 蝗重煥 (1690–1752) Xu Guowei 許國威 (dates unknown) 297 301 , 315 Xu Yiguan 徐一貫 (dates unknown) 80 Yi Hae 李荄 (b. 1544) 150 Xu Yijun (Xu Yihou) 許儀俊 ( 許儀後 ) Yi Hallim ch ŏ n 蝗翰林傳 346 (fl . 1586–1596) 237 Yi Hangbok 蝗恒福 (1556–1618) 240

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Xuande [Emperor] Xuanzong 宣德宣宗 Yi Homin 蝗好閔 (1553–1634) 293 (r. 1426–36) 201 Yi H ŭ iryang 蝗希良 (1584–1645) 292 Xue Susu 薛素素 (fl . 1574–1635) 206 Yi Hwang (T’oegye) 蝗滉 ( 退溪 ) (1501–1570) 142–3 , 325 , 327–8 , 330 , Yabu Kozan 藪孤山 (1735–1802) 327 336–7 , 344 yadam 野談 354 , 365 Yi I (Yulgok) 蝗珥 ( 蜚谷 ) (1536–1584) Yamaguchi 山口 329 , 331 34 , 39 , 53 , 64 , 325 Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇齋 (1618–1682) Yi Kugwang 蝗勾光 (dates 330 , 337 unknown) 331 Yamazaki Hisanaga 山崎尙長 (dates Yi K ŭ mgwang 李金光 (dates unknown) 349 , 354 unknown) 87 Yi Kwang 李洸 (1541–1607) 147 400 Glossary and index

Y i K y ŏ ng 蝗敬 (dates unknown) 331 Y ŏ ng ŭ ij ŏ ng 領議政 146 Y i K y ŏ ngj ŏ n 蝗慶全 (1567–1644) 291 Y ŏ np’y ŏ ng mundap 延平問答 330 Yi Mins ŏ ng 蝗民宬 (1570–1629) 291 Y ŏ nsan-gun [King] 燕山君 (r. 1494– Yi No 蝗編 (1544–1598) 344 1506) 27 , 48 , 63 , 161 Yi Pangw ŏ n 李芳遠 (r.1400–18) 200 y ŏ ny ŏ n ch’ ŏ l wi ŭ n 鍊鉛鐵爲銀 Yi Pong 李逢 (dates unknown) 150–1 ( see cupellation) 48 Yi Samp’y ŏ ng 蝗芔平 (d. 1656) 331 , 337 Y ŏ san 砺山 148 Yi Sanhae 蝗山海 (1539–1609) 237 Yoshiga 吉賀 1 5 Yi Shibal 蝗時發 (1569–1626) 309 Yoshihito 良仁 (dates unknown) 75 Yi S ŏ nggye 李成桂 (1335–1408) 200 , 221 Yoshino Jingozaemon 野甚五左衛門 Yi Sugwang 蝗晬光 (b. 1623) 334 , 366 (dates unknown) 109 Yi Sun 蝗順 (b. 1605) 327 Yoshino nikki 吉野日記 109 Yi Sunshin ch ŏ n 蝗舜臣傳 347 Yoshira 要時羅 (dates unknown) 130 Yi Sunshin 蝗舜臣 (1545–1598) 4 , 6–7 , Youji (jiangjun) 遊擊將軍 (Commander) 22 , 34 , 39–40 , 120 , 123 , 125 , 128 , 130 , 78 , 309 132 , 134–6 , 216 , 251 , 266–7 , 283 , 332 , Yu Chin 蛢袗 (dates unknown) 344 340 , 343–7 , 349 , 352 , 354 Yu Chonggae 蛢宗介 (1558–1592) 146 Yi T ŏ khy ŏ ng 蝗德馨 (1561–1613) 248–9 , Yu Dingguo 于定國 (d. 40 BCE) 315 262 , 297 , 316 Yu K ŭ n 蛢根 (1549–1627) 237 Yi W ŏ nik 蝗元翼 (1547–1634) 131 , Yu Mong’in G蛢夢寅 (1559–1623) 353 , 374 137 , 347 Yu Qian 俞謙 (1398–1457) 201 Yi Yuin 蝗裕仁 (1533–1592) 238 Yu Shiji 俞士吉 (d. 1435) 200 Yi Yun’gu ch ŏ n 蝗允九傳 346 Yu S ŏ ngnyong 柳成龍 (1542–1607) 7 , Yijo sam ŭ i 吏曹芔議 155 158 , 162 , 245 , 251–2 , 297 , 312 , 344 , Yingzong 英宗 (1427–1464, r. as 349 , 354 Zhengtong Emperor 正統 1436– Y u Ŭ ngsu 柳應秀 (b. 1558) 78 1450; Tianshun Emperor 天順 Yuan Baode 袁保德 (dates 1457–1465) 201 unknown) 206 Yoan’in Bunko 養安院文庫 337 Yuan dynasty 元 (1271–1368) 172 , 190 , Y ŏ dan 厲壇 310–11 , 317 199–200 , 221 , 267 y ŏ je 厲祭 310 , 317 Yuan Huang 袁黃 (1533–1606) 210 Y ŏ ji tos ŏ 輿地圖書 300 yuan neishu 願内屬 220 y ŏ lly ŏ 蕢女 (virtuous woman) 357 , 370 Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103–1142) 316 Y ŏ m-p’o 塩浦 1 1 Yugok 幽谷 145 Y ŏ n’an 延安 155–7 Yuj ŏ ng (Sa’my ŏ ngdang, Song’un taesa) Yonezawa 米澤 329 惟政 ( 泗冥堂 , 松雲大師 ) (1544–1610) Y ŏ ngby ŏ n 寧邊 261–2 158–9 , 346 , 353 Y ŏ ngch’ ŏ n 榮川 305 , 316 Yukch ŏ n chorye 六典條例 313 Y ŏ ngch’ ŏ n 永川 146 Yul-p’o 蜚浦 123 Y ŏ nggwang 薠光 335–6 Yun Hwi 尹暉 (1571–1644) 291 Y ŏ nggyu 靈圭 (d. 1592) 145 , 149–51 Yun Hw ŏ n 尹暄 (1573–1627) 291 Y ŏ ngh ŭ ng 永興 77 , 153 Yun Kukhy ŏ ng (S ŏ n’gak) 尹國馨 ( 先覺 ) Y ŏ ngjo [King] 英祖 (r. 1724–76) 295 , (1543–1611) 150–1 , 344 , 368

Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 300–1 , 311–12 , 316 Yun K ŭ nsu 尹根壽 (1537–1617) 301 Yongle [Emperor] Chengzu 永樂成祖 Yun Kyes ŏ n 尹繼善 (1577–1604) 345 (r. 1403–1425) 173–4 , 177 , 187 , 190 , Yun Tusu 尹斗壽 (1533–1601) 131 , 137 , 200–3 , 221 , 253 , 297 237 , 240 , 353 Yongle da dian 永樂大典 (The Grand Yungmi tanggi 蜄美堂記 346 Encyclopedia of Yongle) 173 Yongmun mong’yurok 虙門夢遊錄 345 zanhua zhushi 贊畫主事 (military Y ŏ ngnam 蕾南 34 , 36 , 142 , 149 , 155 , superintendent) 250 347 , 358 , 369 Zeng Weifang 曾偉芳 (dates Yongsa ilgi 虙蛇日記 344 unknown) 213 Y ŏ ngsan 薠山 143 , 145 Zenrin kokuh ō ki 善隣國寶記 27 , 32 Glossary and index 401

zhafu 箚符 102 Zhengguan zhengyao 貞觀政要 325 zhang (K. chang) 丈 308 , 317 Zhihui shichaiguan 指揮使差官 Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582) 176 , (Dispatched Commander) 284 206 , 208–9 , 219 , 223–5 , 240 zhonglujun 中路軍 135 Zhang Ning 張寧 (1592 js) 201 Zhou Weihan 周維翰 (1580 js) 253 Zhang Shijue 張世爵 (dates unknown) Zhu Di 朱棣 ( s e e ‘Yongle Emperor’) 281 , 299–300 173 , 200 Zhanjiaoji 斬蛟記 355 Zhu Wan 朱紈 (1494–1549) 203 Zhao Canlu 趙參魯 (1571 js) 210 , 237 Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 ( see ‘Hongwu Zhao Wanbi 趙完璧 (dates Emperor’) 172–3 , 199 , 221 unknown) 214 Zoku gunsho ruij ū 続群書類従 112 , 117 Zhengde [Emperor] Wuzong 正德武宗 Zu Chengxun 祖承訓 (fl .1570–1600) (r. 1505–1521) 17 , 172 , 177 , 187 , 190–1 210–11 , 226 , 245 , 248 , 309 zhengfa 征伐 260 Zuo zhuan 左傳 260 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016 Downloaded by [New York University] at 00:16 07 August 2016