THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CAMBODIAN REVOLUTION: THE RATIONALE FOR POL POT'S DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA by KATE G. FRIESON B.A., University Of British Columbia, 1984 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1986 © Kate G. Frieson, 1986 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date DE-6 (3/81) i i Abstract The full theoretical and historical significance of the Cambodian revolution will not likely be revealed except with the passage and perspective of time and the uncovering of additional relevant data. While the revolution itself brought unprecedented and sweeping change to Cambodia, so much so that the prerevolutionary society has been almost completely obliterated, there is precious little information available on the architects themselves or on the moral and political impetus behind their actions. Indeed, many of the macabre political battles that accompanied so much destruction in Democratic Kampuchea are still only vaguely understood. In short, there are many stray pieces of the puzzle of the Cambodian revolution that have yet to be put in place to make the picture clear and coherent. This thesis attempts to add to the small but growing body of scholarship that seeks to explain the rationale for one of the most violent and radical revolutions of this century. The narrative traces the major developments of the Cambodian revolution from the inception of the civil war in 1970 to the demise of Pol Pot's revolutionary regime in 1979, the latter occasioned by the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of the country. The first chapter examines the origins and struggle of the peasant-based communist revolution in Cambodia which culminated in the seizure of power by the Communist Party of Kampuchea in April, 1975. The socio-economic and political conditions which prevailed in Cambodia up to 1975 are analysed within the theoretical framework of revolutionary preconditions. The conditions generally believed to be necessary and sufficient for revolution to succeed were present in Cambodia. The second chapter details the process of internal consolidation of the revolution in the post-victory period, from 1975 to 1979. The Communist Party of Kampuchea came to power as an ideologically and militarily fragmented party. The emergence of a dominant faction that insulated itself, temporarily, from internal and external threats, form the substance of this chapter. The third chapter examines the ideas, policies, and actions of the Democratic Kampuchean regime. To explain the violent and radical policies of the period, this chapter investigates a matrix of intricately woven variables, such as the ideology and intentions of the party elite; the need to defeat and purge internal rivals; the ethnocentric orientation of the elite; and the perception of imminent external threats. The final chapter offers some conclusions on the nature of the radical experiment carried out in Democratic Kampuchea. The conclusion reached is that the CPK leadership, while at times proclaiming communist beliefs, was in fact acting from motives similar to those which have driven other Cambodian leaders throughout history, a desire for national survival. The Cambodian revolution is a story about how a zealous group of individuals within the communist party came to impose an ideology of nationalism on a communist organization. iv Table of Contents Abstract ii Glossary Of Terms And Abbreviations v List of Figures vi Acknowledgement vii Introduction 1 Chapter I THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN REVOLUTION: 1960-1975 ..11 Chapter II INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION AND THE RISE OF THE POL POT GROUP .54 Chapter III THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEAN REGIME: AN ANALYSIS OF CPK'S IDEAS, POLICIES AND ACTIONS 77 Chapter IV THE NATURE OF THE RADICAL EXPERIMENT: COMMUNIST, NATIONALIST, POPULIST, ANARCHIST...? 118 BIBLIOGRAPHY 150 v • Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations Angkar -- organization, term used by the Communist Party of Kampuchea to identify itself after 1975. Angkor — Khmer civilization (A.D. 802-1431) CPK — Communist Party of Kampuchea (1960-1981) DK Democratic Kampuchea, state-name of Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 DRV — Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1945-1976) FUNK — United National Front of Kampuchea GRUNK — Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (1970- 1976) ICP — Indochinese Communist Party (1930-1951) Khmer Rouges -- colloquial name for Khmer communists KPRP — Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (1951-1960) PRK — People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979-) SRV — Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976-) VCP — Vietnamese Communist Party (1976-) VWP — Vietnamese Workers' Party (1951-1976) vi List of Figures 1. Map of government and resistance held areas 37 2. Map of administrative zones in Democratic Kampuchea ..57 3. Map of zone leaders 58 vii Acknowledgement It gives me great pleasure to record my gratitude to all those who helped with the preparation of this thesis. Among the faculty members at U.B.C. who provided me with time, ideas, and stimulation are Terry McGee, R.S. Milne, and Alexander Woodside. John R. Wood has been an inspiring teacher for several years. I am particularly appreciative of his extensive comments and criticisms of Chapters One and Four which greatly improved the final presentation of analysis and argument. I would also like to thank David P. Chandler of Monash University who encouraged my research and whose own ideas and extensive knowledge of Cambodia are evident in many of the following pages. The thesis also benefitted from the substantive criticism offered by fellow students in Political Science. My greatest debt is to my advisor, Diane K. Mauzy who first encouraged my interest in Cambodia and whose close supervision of this research project from beginning to end aided in immeasurable ways. I am grateful for the investment of time, the care, and the patience that was given by her the past year. To my dear friends Mika Levesque and Lyn Vasey, who provided constant support from different sides of the world, my thanks are due. Finally, I would like to express gratitude to the Cambodian friends I met in Phanat Nikom and Khao I Dang refugee camps, Thailand, who eagerly shared their personal histories, memories and insight into what was undoubtedly a very difficult period of Cambodian history to have lived through. 1 INTRODUCTION Oh will there be a dreadful bloodbath When the Khmer Rouge come to town? Aye, there'll be a dreadful bloodbath When the Khmer Rouge come to town.1 Bright red blood which covers towns and plains Of Kampuchea, our Motherland, Sublime Blood of workers and peasants Sublime Blood of revolutionary men and women fighters The Blood changing into unrelenting hatred And resolute struggle On April 17th, under the Flag of the Revolution, Free from slavery! National Anthem of Democratic Kampuchea On April 17, 1975, the five year civil war that had ensued since the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970, and which had destroyed much of Cambodia, came to an end.2 Lon Nol's Republican forces surrendered to the revolutionary forces of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). FUNK was dominated militarily and ideologically by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Kyoto Press reported that day that "soldiers and people were seen shaking hands and in each other's arms. Refugees flocking into the city centre have returned home on jeeps escorted by soldiers. Fighting has stopped and the Cambodian civil war is now over."3 But, for the end of what some reporters have called the bloodiest war in Indochina, with acts of atrocity committed by both sides, the reconciliation between the victors and losers in Phnom Penh was shortlived. For one thing, fears of a bloodbath were not unfounded. As early as 1972, five-hundred Lon Nol 2 soldiers had been captured en masse and machine-gunned to death." Evacuees from the southwest region of Cambodia under Khmer Rouge control spoke of executions of poor peasants who resisted working on collectivized farms; cadres who disagreed with the more radical egalitarian rural policies implemented by the regional leadership were also killed. Khmer Rouge rule during the following four years was brutally harsh. At least one million of Cambodia's seven million people died by starvation, disease and execution over a four year period ending in 1979.5 The CPK leadership, composed of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan, embarked on an ambitious and sweeping transformation of the political, economic and social fabric of Cambodia, to make way for a new society, completely severed from its two-thousand year history. This was Year Zero. The features of the new society were spelled out by Pol Pot at a meeting of Cabinet Ministers and regional leaders on April 17, 1975, at which time he enumerated eight policy directives: 1. Evacuate people from all towns 2. Abolish all markets 3. Abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary currency that has been printed 4. Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice 5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders. 6. Establish high level cooperatives throughtout the country with communal eating. 3 7. Expel the entire Vietnamese population 8.