IAN KEMISH

056438-790

SUPERVISOR: M. STUART-FOX

HISTORY HONOURS THESIS

"The Breakdown in Relations Between the Communist Parties of Kampuchea and , 1963-1975".

(26 500 words) PREFACE

The absence of reliable documentation covering Kampuchean-

Vietnamese communist relations during the 1960's and early

1970's has placed certain constraints on this paper. During

the period under discussion the Kampuchean revolutionary leaders with their penchant for extreme secrecy, ensured that very

little was written down. The Khmer communists have subsequently made up for their earlier reticence by issuing a number of documents which provide retrospective accounts of VWP-CPK relations during this period. These accounts tend to be little more than questionable tales of Vietnamese deviousness and perfidy, however. The Vietnamese, for their part, have been particularly reluctant to respond to the Kampuchean's

allegations.

Nevertheless, a few captured and Viet Cong documents written during the early 1970's are now available to the historian, as are various reports provided by communist

defectors and western intelligence services. By consulting

these and other sources, and by reading between the lines of

the "histories" provided by the leaders of

and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, it has been possible to

piece together the story of how the rift between these two

parties‘developed. Unfortunately, many of the documents

consulted are not available in published form. I am

particularly indebted to Dr. Ben Kiernan for providing me with

so many of the documents in his possession. INTRODUCTION 1

Although the outbreak of war between the Kampuchean and

Vietnamese communist regimes during the late 1970's came as a surprise to those Western policy makers who had refused to discard the notion of Indochinese as a monolithic force, this conflict marked the culmination of tensions which had been developing since the early 1960's. It is the development of this rift between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties, which was given little attention in the West until hostilities began in 1977, that this paper seeks to examine.

For the purposes of this discussion, the period 1963-1975 will be split into four sections: each chapter will cover a period of approximately three years. The discussion proper begins with the departure of the group from in 1963. The second chapter commences with the 1967 Samlaut uprising and draws to a close at the end of 1969, on the eve of Prince 's deposition. The following section finishes with the signing of the Paris Accords in January 1973, and the final chapter ends with the Kampuchean revolutionaries' victory over the regime in . As will be seen, each of these developments marked a significant point in the breakdown of the relationship between the communist parties of Vietnam and Kampuchea. Before proceeding with this discussion, it will be useful to conduct a brief examination of the relationship between the revolutionary movements of these two countries as it developed between 1930 and 1963: this background study will largely be based on secondary sources. 11

In February 1930, on the initiative of ,

three Vietnamese communist groups met in Hong Kong to discuss

the formation of a unified communist party. During this

meeting Ho Chi Minh urged against the assertion of a

Vietnamese responsibility for revolution in Laos and

Kampuchea. In fact, he suggested that the term "Indo-Chinese" would be too broad to describe the new p a r t y . ^ By the

time the meeting finished, it had been agreed that a new

party - the Vietnam Communist Party - should be formed. Soon

afterwards, however, Stalin's Communist International directed

that the name be changed to the Indochinese Communist Party

(ICP), and that committees be established in Laos and (2 ) Kampuchea. Although the Vietnamese communists obediently

implemented this directive, their initial reluctance to take

responsibility for the political fate of their neighbours

clearly demonstrated that they considered the encouragement

of revolutionary potential within countries like Kampuchea to

be much less important than the struggle for the liberation

of Vietnam itself.

The new party was not particularly active in Kampuchea

during the 1930s. Seeing little prospect for organising an

indigenous Khmer communist movement, the ICP concentrated its

organisational activities in Kampuchea on tfre Vietnamese

Í 3) . population there. During this period the ICP made it quite

clear that, if all three Indochinese states were to be

involved in the revolution, Vietnam would lead the struggle.

In 1934, an ICP document stressed that there was

no place for considering a Kampuchean revolution on its own. There can only be an Indochinese Revolution. (4)

In 1935 the Vietnamese communists proposed that, after Ill the struggle against imperialism was over, Kampuchea and

Vietnam should join with Laos in forming an "Indochinese

(5 ) Federation". Documents published by the Democratic

Kampuchea regime during the 1970s have claimed that what the

Vietnamese communists really envisaged was a single post­ colonial state dominated by Vietnam, and that the Vietnamese never abandoned this desire for hegemony over Indochina:

Vietnam, which has always had the ambition to annex and swallow Kampuchea, and to exterminate the nation of Kampuchea through its sinister strategy of "Indochina Federation", has carried out the most perfidious activities for many decades. (6)

On the other hand, the Vietnamese communists have maintained that the idea of an Indochinese federation was abandoned in (7) 1951. In fact, it has been asserted that the Vietnamese were never particularly interested in the idea: that the

Vietnamese proposal was little more than a reluctant concession to Comintern demands. 7

Events which unfolded in 1945 forced the ICP to pay more attention to Kampuchea. The Japanese surrender, the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in and the threat of French re-occupation of Indochina created immediate strategic problems. The Vietnamese communists1 I choice of policy on Kampuchea was influenced by the fact that certain non-communist Kampuchean nationalists were willing to (9) unite with the Vietnamese to oppose the returning French.

The ICP quickly became involved in the development of the

"Khmer Issarak" (Free Khmer) movement: a broadly based revolutionary front organisation. At the same time, the ICP sought to encourage the growth of a pro-communist element IV within this movement.

Towards the end of the 1940s certain developments forced the ICP to revise its strategies, giving real urgency to the building of a communist movement within Kampuchea for the first time. In 1949 the French recognised the "independence"

(within the French Union) of the Royal Governments of Laos and Kampuchea, as well as that of the Bao Dai regime in

South Vietnam. The ICP leaders - who were, according to

Porter, "eager not to be portrayed as the only remaining imperialists in Indochina" - began to re-assess the whole question of a single party for all three countries.

Moreover, the Vietnamese communists were beginning to lose the support of their non-communist Khmer allies, partially as a result of the granting of "independence". A considerable number of Issaraks, believing that there was no longer any need to continue the struggle, abandoned the revolutionary movement at this time. This trend was climaxed in 1949, by the surrender to the French of Dap Chhuon, a powerful (12) Khmer nationalist. Although a number of independent

"warlords" continued to participate in the anti-colonial struggle, many became increasingly hostile towards the (13) Vietnamese communists and their leftist allies. Also, communist forces emerged as the victors of the civil war in

China in 1949. The ICP regarded this triumph as a signal for the transition to a new phase of the Indochinese war, which would ultimately see the launching of a general counter- (14) offensive against the French: in 1950, General Giap called for the "active construction" of independent armies in (15) Laos and Kampuchea.

In April 1950, following secret negotiations between the V

ICP leadership and a number of pro-Vietnamese Issaraks, the United Issarak Front (UIF) was formed at the "First

National Congress of the Khmer Resistance". The central committee of the UIF was led by Son Ngoc Minh - the ICP leader of the Issaraks' South West military zone. This congress also established a proto-government, which was almost entirely made up of ICP members.

These developments were soon followed by the 1951 decision to disband the ICP and establish separate parties in

Laos and Kampuchea. The statutes of the new Khmer Peoples

Revolutionary Party (KPRP) - also led by Son Ngoc Minh - gave it a mandate to fight against Imperialism, but did not mention

communism. ' According to Vietnamese documents, the KPRP did not only represent the proletariat, but rather, gathered together "all the patriotic and progressive elements of the (19) Khmer population". It has been asserted that, by assigning the KPRP a low ideological status, the Vietnamese party was seeking to define the Kampuchean movement as an

"adjunct to the Vietnamese resistance against the French".

Although ethnic Khmers held a number of key positions within the new party organisation, most members of the KPRP (21) provisional central committee were Vietnamese: these

leaders, undoubtedly agreed with the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) on such issues as the need for a co-ordinated revolutionary

struggle in Indochina.

Captured docuemnts indicate that the VWP

leaders were determined to maintain their influence over the (22) Kampuchean party.v ’ Under the direction of Tou Samouth

(Son Ngoc Minh's lieutenant), training programs for Khmer

revolutionaries - usually run by Vietnamese instructors or VI

í 23) conducted in Vietnam itself - were established. in this (24 ) way the "foundations of Khmer Communism" were laid.

The early fifties marked a period of growth for the

Kampuchean movement: in 1952 French intelligence services estimated that UIF guerrillas were operating freely over two- (25) thirds of the countryside. Although ethnic Vietnamese still dominated the higher administrative levels of the KPRP, the proportion of ethnic Khmers involved in the movement (26) increased steadily during this period.v 1 However, by the end of 1954 this period of growth had come to a rather abrupt end.

In 1953 Prince Sihanouk began his "royal crusade" for unqualified independence from France. The success of this

"crusade" cut the ground from beneath the feet of Sihanouk's revolutionary opponents. Following the recognition of full political independence in November 1953, a large number of (27) non-communist Issarak bands decided to lay down their arms.

Then, in 1954, the Viet Minh succeeded in forcing the French to the conference table in Geneva.

The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea have claimed that the

Vietnamese communists betrayed their Kampuchean comrades at

Geneva. According to this view, the Vietnamese communists - by abanàoning their demands that the UIF be represented at the

Conference and that regroupment zones for the Issarak forces be established within Kampuchea - sacrificed the Kampuchean movement in order to extract a more favourable settlement for

themselves. A careful examination of the events

surrounding the conference suggests that, in fact, the

Vietnamese communists only discontinued their efforts on

behalf of the Kampuchean revolutionaries when the major Vil

communist powers - in particular, China - exerted pressure (29) on them to do so.

There seems to be little basis, however, to assertions

that China was seeking to foster a rift between the Kampuchean

and Vietnamese parties. The Chinese were primarily motivated 5 by fears for their own security:

Dulles had made it clear that the United States was prepared

to "internationalise" the war. Zou Enlai was unwilling to

provide the Americans with an excuse to gain a foothold in

South East Asia, and - according to one source - was

suspicious that the conference was being used as a delaying

tactic : to give the United States more time to prepare its

forces. Given this scenario, it is not surprising that

the Chinese decided the Kampucheans' cause was expendable.

Thus, the Khmer communists became victims of the Cold War.

However, by compromising over Kampuchea the Vietnamese

communists were sowing the seeds of future bitterness.

The Geneva settlement called for the complete withdrawal

of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. The Vietnamese withdrew

not only their troops but their party cadres as well, thus

leaving the Kampuchean party entirely in the hands of their

Khmer comrades for the first time. On the advice of the

Vietnamèse, however, many KPRP members - including Son Ngoc

Minh and other party leaders - also left Kampuchea for

Hanoi. (31)

The communists who remained behind organised the Krom

Pracheachon (Citizens' Group)- a legal front organisation for

the KPRP - to contest the September 1955 elections for the

Kampuchean National Assembly. The campaign, which was marked

by the violent repression of various leftist groups by vi i i

(32) Sihanouk's security forces, resulted in an overwhelming

"victory" for Sihanouk's organisation. ( 33 )

The Vietnamese communists' reaction to the 1955 elections was one of censure : Hanoi accused the Royal Khmer government of violating the Geneva Accords by holding elections without (34) democratic freedoms. However, as the first signs of a neutral Kampuchean foreign policy began to emerge during the mid fifties, with Sihanouk's growing opposition to an

American military presence in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese became less vociferous in their condemnation of the Prince's (35) repressive activities Although the Vietnamese communists' view of Sihanouk must have improved as a result of the

Prince's involvement in The 1955 Bandung Conference, the real turning point came in 1956, when he rebuffed pressures (36) to join SEATO. J A policy of non-alignment was something

Hanoi wished to encourage. The VWP leadership began to emphasize the importance of maintaining the status quo in

Kampuchea, recommending that the KPRP limit itself to (37) "peaceful political struggle". Warmer relations between

Phnom Penh and Hanoi did not prevent repression of the radical ( 38 ) left within Kampuchea from continuing, however.

Those young Khmers whose first exposure to left-wing politic's took place during this period had little reason to be endeared to the Vietnamese communists. A small group of young Kampuchean communists who spent the early 1950's

studying in France deserve special attention. These students (39) formed a "Marxist Circle" in Paris in 1950. Some of the members of this circle were later to emerge as the leaders of

the Kampuchean communist party. Kiernan comments that, while

in Europe, these young ideologues were unlikely to have IX

remained in touch with the "fundamental motivations of

Kampuchean communists at home"

In 1953 Saloth Sar - one of these young intellectuals -

returned to Kampuchea. After a short period in Phnom Penh,

Sar set out for the UIF headquarters near the border with (41 ) Vietnam. There, he was appointed to an ICP cell. This

fact has led Heder to assert that Sarfs "essential political . . (42) training was m the ICP tradition". According to a number of sources, however, Sar did not enjoy this experience: he felt that his intellectual capabilities were

ignored, and grew to resent the Vietnamese who directed his

training.

By 1956, Sar and a few other students from the "Marxist

Circle" had found their way back to Phnom Penh, where they

became involved, through the Phnom Penh committee of the (44) KPRP, in the formation of the . Over the next

few years this group extended its influence, reportedly coming

into frequent conflict with the KPRP leadership over (45) strategy. While the party leaders were prepared to

adhere to the Vietnamese communists* recommendation that the

KPRP limit its activities to "peaceful political struggle",

the younger communists led by Saloth Sar and

» yLÄ \ rejected this strategy, referring to it as "revisionism". '

These men and women apparently considered the struggle

against Sihanouk to be necessary regardless of the effects

it might have on their Vietnamese brethren.

At the 1960 KPRP Congress it was decided that the party

should assume Marxist-Leninist status and change its name to

the Workers Party of Kampuchea (WPK), thus bringing it into (47) line with the Vietnam Workers' Party. Also, a number of the young Kampuchean radicals were elevated to important party positions: most notably, Saloth Sar was elected to the number three position in the WPK politburo.

In 1962, party secretary Tou Samouth disappeared: it has never been conclusively established whether Samouth was eliminated by Sihanouk's police or by the radical faction of (49) the WPK. Saloth Sar assumed the position of acting secretary, and the conflict between the two factions crystallized into a clear cut struggle for the formal leadership of the party.At the Third Party Congress in

1963, Saloth Sar was confirmed as secretary-general of the

WPK. The newly elected central committee which he headed included very few veterans of the pre-1954 struggle.

Although the VWP was reportedly determined to oppose the (Si) "infantile communism" of the "Parisians", it is unclear whether or not they opposed Sar's leadership bid.

It would be appropriate, at this stage, to make a number of general observations concerning the relationship between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese revolutionary movements over the period 1930-1963.

Once they had put their initial reluctance to involve

themselves in Kampuchea behind them, the Vietnamese communists

exhibited a certain amount of consistency in their emphasis

on the importance of having some sort of influence within

Kampuchea. On the other hand, there was striking discontinuity

in the means by which they sought to maintain this influence.

From 1955 onwards - and, to a lesser extent, during the late

1940's - the Vietnamese communists showed that they were

prepared to neglect their relationship with the Khmer

communists in order to form advantageous alliances with non- XI communist figures in Kampuchea. Throughout this period the

Vietnamese were guided by what they considered to be the best interests of the Vietnamese revolution: they felt that the subordination of the Kampuchean communists' cause was justified by what they considered to be the objective realities of the Indochinese war. The Kampucheans would just have to wait until victory had been achieved in Vietnam. However, as

Heder has said,

promoting nationalism outside of Vietnam and at the same time defining Vietnam as the vanguard (was) bound to lead to trouble. (53).

The Kampuchean communists were to look back on this period as (54) one of repeated betrayals.

By 1963 the WPK was a divided party. The majority of its veterans had either abandoned the struggle or were leading a life of exile in Hanoi: those who went to were to be used, years later, in a Vietnamese attempt to regain control of the Kampuchean revolution. Back in Phnom Penh, the Party had come under the control of a group of inexperienced extremists who did not embrace the principle of international co-operation with as much warmth as their predecessors had: these "second generation" Kampuchean communists were already beginning to realise that their « interests were at odds with those of their Vietnamese brethren.

Under the leadership of Saloth Sar - soon to change his name to Pol Pot - this group.began to consider their options. CHAPTER 1

1963-1966 In May 1963 - only months after assuming the leadership of the WPK - Pol Pot left Phnom Penh for the countryside. He was accompanied by Ieng Sary, by then a member of the party

Politbüro. , another politburo member, went underground in Phnom Penh at the same time, and followed the others a year later.^ Over the next few years a considerable number of party members joined these men in the maquis. The Kampuchean revolutionary struggle, as it developed from this time onwards, owed little to the experiences of the Issarak period. With (2 ) ninety per cent of the central committee m the countryside, party congresses were impossible to organise, and consequently policy was decided by a handful of people - the party "centre"

- who belonged to a new generation of Kampuchean communists.

If one accepts the version of events put forward by the

CPK more than ten years later, this exodus marked a significant point in the breakdown in relations between the Kampuchean and

Vietnamese parties. According to the CPK, these departures

resulted from a deliberate decision: that the party should begin to prepare the peasantry for armed struggle against the

Sihanouk regime - a policy which clearly clashed with the

Vietnamese communists' strategy for Kampuchea. As Serge

Thion notes,

It is tempting to date the real rupture from this period - by which I mean the Khmer communists' decision for a political line deliberately contrary to what Hanoi wished. (3).

The CPK has alleged that this decision was made as early as

1960 - at the Second National Congresé, where the party "took (4) up the task of mobilizing the masses":' ' while some party

members were asked to continue to work in the open, "in the (5) guise of representatives of parliament or functionaries", 3 others were put vin charge of "clandestine operations to promote / c \ the mass movement". '

This retrospective version cannot be relied upon: the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were clearly prepared to re-write history in order to show that, since its "inception" in 1960, the CPK had pursued an independent program which was f 7 ) consciously opposed to the recommendations of the Vietnamese.

However, a number of scholars have described the departure / o \ from Phnom Penh as a deliberate anti-Sihanouk move ' - something which the VWP would certainly have condemned.

According to one writer, the Kampuchean communists believed that Sihanouk's anti-imperialism was "shaky", and that his opposition to communism within Kampuchea might, by strengthening the hand of the right, bring about some sort of (9) American takeover. To the WPK, Sihanouk's nationalist image was also a problem. As will be seen, during the 1960s the movement sought to minimize Sihanouk's contribution to the pre-1953 struggle for independence. The communists may have decided in 1963 that, if they were to be seen as the party which represented the nationalist aspirations of the

Kampuchean people, it was necessary to discontinue the practice of competing with Sihanouk on his home ground - < that is, through legal political means.

Nevertheless, even some of those commentators who accept

that the departure of the Pol Pot group was motivated by a belief that the party should begin to direct the organisation of peasant opposition to the Sihanouk regime maintain that a

lot less thought went into the decision to leave Phnom Penh

than the CPK would have us believe. Heder "presumes" that

this decision was actually made in 1963. A 1973 history published by the CPK's Eastern Zone "military political service" supports this view. According to this document, the

1963 "congress" was opened to "approve a decision for a new operational direction". Elizabeth Becker - who agrees that the Kampuchean communists "abandoned their policy of tying their hopes to an Indochina wide struggle" in 1963 - claims that the party leadership was influenced by student riots which took place in Siem Reap and other centres early (12) in 1963. According to this argument, these developments convinced the WPK leaders that they had underestimated the revolutionary potential within their own country. Fearing that the students' actions were being co-ordinated by rightist, anti-Sihanouk politicians, the Kampuchean communists felt that they had little choice: "they either moved in or (13) abdicated leadership".

Unfortunately, Becker provides no evidence to substantiate her assertions. It must also be noted that the unrest of early 1963 took place in Kampuchea's cities: the fact that the Khmer revolutionaries devoted little attention to the development of an urban base over the next ten years - (14) despite claims made by Pol Pot in 1977 - prevents unreserved acceptance of this interprétation. However, the argument? that the WPK was in fact reacting to events which were beyond their control is worth pursuing. There is a body of opinion which holds that it was simply Sihanouk's repression which drove the party leaders into the jungle:

the suppression of the Pracheachon group and the anti-leftist campaign throughout 1962 convinced party leaders that they should disappear. (15) .

On March 8th 1963 Sihanouk published a list of 34 subversives

- which, as Kiernan points out, was almost entirely made up of leftist urban intellectuals. Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and

Son Sen were included on this list. Becker maintains that this - linked with the recent murder of Tou Samouth - convinced the Pol Pot group that Sihanouk's police knew a (17) great deal about them. The question of Tou Samouth's murder is, of course, a moot point, and in any case, Pol Pot has acknowledged that he had little reason for concern:v ' in a 1978 interview he remarked that, at the time of his departure, the authorities were unaware of his position within (19 ) the party. However, it remains a possibility that Sihanouk' list convinced Pol Pot and his comrades that they.should continue their activities in the countryside, where greater secrecy could be maintained.

Although it is likely that it was a combination of all these factors which convinced the WPK leaders to leave Phnom

Penh, this matter will remain unresolved due to a lack of contemporary evidence. However, this lack of evidence, combined with the abundance of alternative theories, makes one important conclusion possible: it is not necessary to accept CPK assertions that, in 1963, the party embarked on a deliberate, carefully thought out program which they knew to be directly contrary to the wishes of their Vietnamese comrades*.

Thiounn Mumm, who admits that he didn't understand the decision to leave Phnom Penh, has asserted that

The 1963 move was done without anyone's approval. The Vietnamese did not approve, nor did anyone else. It was just as in the case of our party formation. (20).

In fact, Thiounn Mumm was probably not in a good position to (21) know, for he was in Paris m 1963. If the VWP was concerned that the WPK seemed to have abandoned urban-based peaceful political struggle, they did not show it at the time. There is no specific mention of these departures in any available Vietnamese documents. There are, however, references to what the Kampuchean communists did after they left Phnom Penh. These activities demand close attention. After leaving Phnom Penh, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary first moved to the Kompong Cham region, near the border with (22) Vietnam. According to Becker, this location was chosen because "contact and co-operation with the Vietnamese would (23) be easier". By 1964 Pol Pot and other members of the WPK centre were apparently enjoying the hospitality of the NLF, at "Office 900" in the South Vietnamese province of (24) Tay Ninh. Here, the Vietnamese and Kampucheans are reported to have enjoyed quite amicable relations. Years later, recalled that "the Vietnamese protected the office completely A 1965 CIA report noted that photographic evidence had recently revealed a concentration of newly constructed huts in the extreme North-Eastern salient of . (26)

This was probably the new headquarters of the WPK, which Pol Pot estáblished in the North-Eastern area of Ratanakiri at (27) about this time. There are a number of possible reasons why this region was chosen. To begin with, it was sufficiently remote for there to be little danger from Sihanouk's security

forces. Also, there was a considerable amount of revolutionary

potential in Ratanakiri: the sparse population was composed mostly of impoverished hill peoples ... who had for some time been the victims of heavy 7

handed and chauvinistic treatment by the Sihanouk regime. (28).

Kiernan notes that, rural unrest was growing in the North East at this time, due to soil exhaustion, the diminishing size of ( 29 ) family holdings, and "land grabbing" by landlords.

Finally, as Serge Thion points out, this was the area where the Ho Chi Minh trail came into Kampuchea.The same CIA report observed that

improved trails link the area to the Laotian infiltration complex, strongly suggesting that the activity is not of Cambodian origin. (31).

Although the Americans' conclusion was probably incorrect, it is certainly true that the WPK had established its head­ quarters in an area where access to North Vietnam and communist-controlled zones in Laos and was relatively easy.

The WPK centre was apparently keen to maintain contact with the Vietnamese communists. It does not necessarily follow that relations between the two organisations were not strained. Indeed, both parties probably believed that it was in their own interest to maintain this contact: the

Kampucheans required material support from the Vietnamese, and the Vietnamese would have been keen to continue exerting a contrólling, stabilising influence on WPK activities.

However, the fact that the Pol Pot group was so evidently intent on keeping the lines of communication open casts some doubt on Heder's assertion that, at the time,

Pol Pot was anti-Vietnamese ' because they were the greatest threat to his position of leadership in the party organisation ... (and) represented the greatest threat to an essential (sic) independence of the Cambodian revolutionary movement. (32). 6

The CPK has not denied that the two parties were in contact with each other during this period. However, they do claim that relations were strained by the Vietnamese communists' subversive activities. In 1978 the leaders of

Democratic Kampuchea published their Black Paper, which is subtitled "Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and

Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea". According to this and other CPK documents, the Vietnamese communists - alarmed by the "vigorous" development of the Kampuchean movement - constantly opposed the activities of the Khmer communists during the early 1960s, forcing them to "struggle on the (33) outside". The Vietnamese apparently made it clear that they disagreed with the Khmers' class analysis, arguing that

Kampuchea had not yet reached "the stage of a society divided ( 34 ) into classes". They also condemned the WPK strategy of (35) "waging armed and political struggle in combination". In fact, the Vietnamese apparently made a direct attempt to replace this strategy with one of their own:

They elaborated a political line for the Communist Party of Kampuchea and handed over this document in the Vietnamese language to the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. (36).

This Vietnamese document - "conspicuous for its confusion" - is reported to have ignored class conflict and the struggle (37) against U.S. imperialism. The Black Paper also asserts that, in 1964, angered by the Kampucheans' unwillingness to accede to their demands, the VWP "broke out" against the WPK, ( 38 ) accusing it of being "adventurist and leftist". After this, they allegedly sought to use every means within their power to bring about the destruction of the Kampuchean movement by organising a network of pro-Vietnamese Khmer Q

communists, who "created troubles and disorders" wherever they

„ent.<39>

At times, the Kampucheans* allegations became ridiculous.

In 1977 was forced to "confess" that during the mid

1960's - acting as a double agent for the Americans - he

formed a "Marxist-Leninist CIA party" in Kampuchea.He

also admitted that, while he was carrying out these "traitorous

activities", he was in contact with members of the Vietnamese

party, who were apparently organising a similar group in (41) North-Eastern Kampuchea. The objectives of these two

subversive organisations were the same: "revisionism",

"negotiations with the enemy", and "the building of a (42) capitalist state". 1

Although the Vietnamese communists have made a number

of general allegations concerning the allegiance and (43) activities of their Kampuchean counterparts during the 1960s,

they have never directly responded to the Khmers* accusations.

However, they have made it quite clear that they were

opposed to the WPK strategy of pursuing armed and political

struggle against the Sihanouk regime. Vietnamese party

sources are reported to have acknowledged that

the difference between the two party "lines" became clearer when in the (Vietnamese) communists' phraseology, "U.S. imperialism became the direct enemy of the Cambodian people, and Sihanouk held high the banner of national independence. While the (Vietnamese) line favoured promoting Sihanouk, the other line, led by Pol Pot, opposed this. (44).

Implicit in the Kampucheans' allegations is the idea that

the Vietnamese communists were alarmed by the progress of the

WPK's activities. Relations would indeed have been strained

if the Vietnamese had truly felt that the Khmers were 10 successfully developing a rural revolutionary base of their own which might threaten the increasingly important under­ standing the VWP had with Sihanouk. It is quite clear that, during their first two or three years in the countryside, the

Pol Pot group began to make at least some preparations for a (45) peasant-based revolution. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that, contrary to CPK claims, the development of the Kampuchean revolutionary struggle did not take place in a deliberate, concerted manner.

The CPK has asserted that, during this period, the

Kampuchean party was transformed into

one which now played a leading role in the revolution, which had a solid revolutionary position. (46). (47) The struggle was said to be "most seething" in 1964. '

Despite the fact that many cadres were arrested, tortured and killed,

the surviving comrades continued to carry out their activities, to strengthen and expand our defence forces without letup. (48)

Indeed, it has been claimed that the WPK became "master of the (49) country" well before 1966¡ and that the Vietnamese had,

"lost control of the revolutionary movement in Kampuchea" by

the mid 1960*s.^^

Acqording to a 1975 edition of Revolutionary Flag - the

internal party magazine of the CPK - a revolutionary army began

to develop soon after 1963. However, the tasks of this "secret

defence force" were simply to

defend the revolutionary bases, to provide protection for roving cadres and to stand guard at various meetings and conferences. (51) .

In other words, this force was not involved in a war of

national liberation. The Annotated Party History acknowledges 11 that this was not a period of consistent development:

the order of the revolutionary struggle and the fury and bitter struggle against the enemy regressed... and became very passive in a few places and during certain periods of time. (52).

It adds, rather self consiously, that

another important point (about the 1960-1967 period) was the fact of having launched once and for all an absolutely revolutionary movement, whether the movement is large or small.(53). (my emphasis)

If the Kampuchean revolutionary movement became "master of the country" during this period, this fact escaped the notice of the western intelligence services. According to the CIA, there were no signs of a separate Khmer insurgency in

Kampuchea in 1965.

The Kampuchean communists' activities would have given the VWP leadership little immediate cause for concern. For this reason, retrospective claims that a serious rift had already emerged between the two movements by the mid

1960's must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communists' interests had begun to diverge. This divergence was increased by tensions generated by the . These external forces - and particularly Sihanouk's response to them - demand careful examination.

Prince Sihanouk seemed to have taken a conscious "step to the left" during the early 1960's. On the 1st of August 1963, the Phnom Penh regime severed diplomatic relations with South

Vietnam. On November the 10th, at Sihanouk's urging, the

Kampuchean government decided to nationalise all banking and foreign commerce. In the same month, the U.S. military mission (55) was expelled and all American aid was renounced. In his 12 memoirs, Sihanouk explained the motives behind this move:

I decided to make a clean break. I felt the terms were so onerous that they amounted to national humiliation, and that dollar aid actually retarded our development. (56).

In Hanoi, news of these developments was no doubt greeted as confirmation of the wisdom behind the Vietnamese communists' campaign to improve relations with Sihanouk. This campaign, which had entered a new phase in May 1963 - when the North

Vietnamese government recognised Kampuchean sovereignty over (57) certain islands in the Gulf of Siam - was considered essential for

encouraging Sihanouk's anti-Americanism and anti-Diemism, and thus protecting the flank of the struggle to liberate South Vietnam. (58).

According to Pol Pot, however, the rejection of U.S. aid was a result of

the struggle waged by (the Kampuchean people) ... This was a momentous event in the struggle of the people. (59).

It is certainly true that the developments which took place in 1963 provided the CPK with "momentous" opportunities. As a result of Sihanouk's measures, the Phnom Penh government struggled to increase export earnings - particularly in rice - over the next few years. The average price offered to

rice producers fell by 20% between 1963 and 1964, thus

considerably reducing peasant incomes. Rice production

stagnated and a general economic crisis emerged.As Heder

has noted, this crisis

drew the CPK deeper into involvement with peasant grievances against the Sihanouk regime, and improved the prospects for organising the peasants. (62).

In addition, the measures introduced by Sihanouk in 1963 threatened to undermine the Khmer communists1 radical / 6 3 ) v position. In response to this threat, the WPK leaders began to cultivate the development of an anti-Sihanouk, nationalist image: the party began praising the pre-1954 struggle of the Issaraks, saying that independence had actually resulted from this struggle rather than Sihanouk's efforts. The Prince was, of course, outraged.

Such activities, which Sihanouk might blame on Vietnamese communist subversion, threatened to undermine VWP efforts to improve relations with the Phnom Penh government. Sihanouk's moves thus sharpened the conflict of interests between the two parties. While it was in VWP interests that the Kampuchean party should "try to be more flexible in searching for tactically expedient ways to co-operate with Sihanouk", the WPK - if it was to survive as an independent entity - had little choice but to focus its struggle against the Phnom Penh r o e g i - rm n o e . <6 6 >

Meanwhile, the war in South Vietnam was escalating. The

Viet Cong stepped up their activities, and the Saigon regime became more and more dependent on American support: by 1965 (67) United States forces had become directly involved in the war.'

In 1964 Sihanouk's relations with the United States deteriorated even further, mainly as a result of American and

South Vietnamese attacks on the Viet Cong in the region (68) bordering Kampuchea and Vietnam. At the same time,

Sihanouk's relations with the DRV and the NLF, which condemned (69) these attacks, 'improved. In February and March 1965

Sihanouk hosted a "Conference of the Indochinese Peoples" in

Phnom Penh. The "Fatherland Front" of North Vietnam, the NLF and the political wing of the Pathet Lao were represented. l¿

í 71) Of course, the Khmer communist movement was not, ^3\mong other

things, the conference called for the re-convening of the

Geneva Conference in order to guarantee Kampuchea's (72) neutrality. The extent of the Vietnamese communists'

commitment to the Phnom Penh regime is reflected in a 1965 Lao

Dong directive, which emphasized the importance of respecting

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sihanouk's

Kampuchea: this document also denounced American and South (73) Vietnamese violations of this integrity. Meanwhile, the

repression of the Kampuchean left wing by Sihanouk's security

forces increased. In Kiernan's words, "violent repression became the norm."

By 1965, the year Sihanouk finally severed diplomatic

relations with the United States, the border regions of

Kampuchea had taken on considerable importance for Vietnamese

communist strategy. With the escalation of U.S. involvement

in South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh trail network increased in

value as a supply route, and the Viet Cong began to establish (75) "sanctuaries" on Kampuchean territory.

According to the CPK,

when (the Vietnamese communists) came back to Kampuchea in 1964, they resumed their activities in the same objective. (76).

- that is, their objective to annex Kampuchea. The Viet Cong

allegedly

extended more and more their penetration, using if necessary corruption. In 1965 there were 150,000 Viet Congs settled in Kampuchea, at 2 to 5 kilometres deep from the borders. (77)

The Black Paper expresses resentment over the motives behind

the Viet Cong presence: 15

Those who did not know reality thought that the Viet Cong had come (to help) the Kampucheans' revolution. In fact, they had no more territory at home, in South Vietnam. (78).

The Vietnamese had no reason to assist the Kampuchean revolutionaries. Even if Sihanouk did not publicly approve of the Viet Cong presence, their relationship with the prince (79) guaranteed their use of Kampuchean territory.

Kiernan maintains that, by the end of 1965, these developments had

driven the bulk of the Khmer communist movement into dissidence with the strategy of the Vietnamese party. (80).

Although certain Kampuchean leftists continued to follow

Vietnamese recommendations by pursuing the struggle through the existing political framework after 1965,v 1 events which unfolded on the other side of the South China Sea in that year did nothing to convince the WPK centre of the wisdom of this strategy. The impact which the destruction of the PKI in

Indonesia had on the outlook of the Kampuchean communists is revealed in one CPK document:

If our analysis had failed, we would have been in greater danger than (the communists) in Indonesia. (82)

The clash of interests between the WPK and the VWP came

to the •surface in the summer of 1965, when Pol Pot and other

leading Kampuchean cadres went to Hanoi. During their visit

to North Vietnam - which is reported to have lasted "a few (83) months" - formal liaison was established with the VWP:

this was the first time the leaders of the two parties had met

face-to-face. According to CPK sources the Vietnamese

delegation, which was led by Le Duan, called on the Khmers to

renounce military struggle. Le Duan allegedly presented 16 a document which pledged that

when Vietnam had achieved the victory, it would come to liberate Kampuchea. (85).

A Vietnamese source agrees that the VWP delegation tried to convince the Kampuchean communists to "support Sihanouk while criticising him, and maintain a political but not a military struggle". ' According to the Black Paper, even though the debate over this issue was "very keen", the WPK did not bow to Vietnamese pressure.' ' As Porter points out, the terms of the debate between the two parties were to remain unchanged until 1970. (88)

The two delegations were apparently able to agree that

Vietnamese communist forces should be allowed to continue to take refuge in zones under the control of the Kampuchean party, and that in return the Khmer revolutionaries should be permitted refuge in South Vietnamese areas under the control of the ( 89 ) NLF. Pol Pot's group also held meetings with "Cambodian comrades resident in Hanoi"- the old guard of Khmer communism, led by Son Ngoc Minh, which had spent, the ten years since the Geneva Conference in North Vietnam. Nothing seems to have been resolved at these meetings, however» Chandler points out that Pol Pot was either "unable or unwilling" to (91) lure any of these men home.

It was probably during this visit that one of the more

fascinating incidents described in the Black Paper took place,

if it took place at all:

In 1965 the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea called HO Chi Minh "Comrade Ho Chi Minh". Ho Chi Minh himself and his circle turned ... crimson with rage. The Vietnamese wanted everyone to call him "Uncle Ho", for this appelation has a meaning closer to their ambition of being "Father" of Indochina.(92). 17

Even if relations were not as tense as such retrospective versions claim, the Kampuchean communists would have been

fully aware of the conflict between their own interests and those of their Vietnamese counterparts by the time they left

Hanoi for .

At the time Pol Pot was in Beijing in 1965 Prince (93) Sihanouk arrived on a state visit. Since Sihanouk's renunciation of American aid, the Peoples Republic of China had been the Prince's main benefactor, supplying his regime with substantial military assistance and general economic (94 ) aid. The Chinese communists' policy on Kampuchea during this period was, according to Heder, consistent with their policies towards other South-East Asian countries, where they encouraged a "high level of co-operation between anti-imperialist (95) states and local communist parties". In fact, it has been

asserted that Chinese policy on Kampuchea was identical to that (96) of the North Vietnamese. }

Kiernan maintains that, although the Chinese were likely

to have asked Pol Pot to refrain from outright rebellion against

the Sihanouk regime, the Kampuchean party secretary probably

received some encouragement in Beijing:

A party that was traditionally aligned f with Vietnam but whose leadership was showing signs of resentment was not to be ignored. (97).

Nayan Chanda agrees:

Even if there were no overt support for an anti-Sihanouk struggle, China might have backed Pol Pot in his differences with the Vietnamese. (98).

The Vietnamese communists have gone so far as to claim that

in 1965, after securing control of the Pol Pot clique, they (the Chinese) enjoined the latter to wage an armed struggle against the Sihanouk administration. (99). 18

The VWP has alleged that this was done because the Chinese were keen to prevent "every united action by progressive and

revolutionary forces in the world". The Chinese did hold a banquet for Pol Pot and his comrades just before the

Kampuchean delegation left Beijing. During this banquet, which a number of Vietnamese representatives attended,

Chairman Mao himself made a speech praising the efforts of the Kampuchean party.^^1) According to Kiernan,

The Chinese message was clear: the revolutionary leadership of the Kampuchean party enjoyed their protection. (102).

Claims that China was seeking to drive a wedge between

the Kampuchean and Vietnamese parties are based on the

assumption that the Chinese were concerned about what they

perceived to be growing co-operation between Vietnam and the

Soviet Union. Although it is true that, by 1965, "the world communist movement was beginning to disintegrate",

there is little evidence to suggest that Vietnam was really an

issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute at this time.in fact,

there is no concrete evidence to support retrospective claims

that the Sino-Vietnamese rift began before 1968, when the

failure of the convinced the VWP to abandon

Maoist revolutionary strategies :^^6) As one Vietnamese f document points out, the Chinese communists began to withdraw

the "carrot of aid" in the same year.The Vietnamese

communists were generally successful in carrying out a

delicate "balancing act" - managing to retain the support of

the Soviets and the Chinese - during the 1960's.On the

surface at least, the Chinese and the Vietnamese were enjoying

amicable relations in 1965.^^^ Even if there was little

depth to this apparent friendship, it is unlikely that Pol Pot 19 would have been aware that this was the case. He would have been hesitant to criticise the Vietnamese communists in front of those he perceived to be their loyal comrades, and so the

Chinese leaders may not even have been aware of the developing

anti-Vietnamese sentiment within the WPK at this time.

It is certainly true, however, that China was seeking to

create a separate Maoist bloc during the 1960's, sponsoring

anti-Soviet breakaway groups within a number of Asian

communist movements - for example, in Burma, and

Bengal. a Vietnamese document maintains that

The Chinese authorities wanted to set up what they called the World People's Front under their control. (111).

This document quotes from a 1966 resolution of the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) central committee.

It is necessary to set up a broad united international front against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen - of course, such a front should not include the Soviet Union. (112).

China's willingness to receive Pol Pot thus probably had more

to do with Sino-Soviet rivalry - that is, with "cementing ties

to a South East Asian communist Party that could be expected

to be anti-Soviet" - than with fostering the development

of a rift between the WPK and the VWP.

Pol Pot's return to Kampuchea apparently had considerable

impact on the WPK. In September 1966, at a meeting of the WPK

central committee, the name of the Kampuchean party was

changed to the Communist Party of Kampuchea.(CPK). Pol

Pot had been thinking of this for somé time: he is reported to

have outlined the question of the party's name when he was in

Hanoi the year before.^115^ This change was of great

symbolic importance: it raised the Kampuchean party 20 semantically to the level of the CCP, and gave it a status superior to that of the Vietnamese party.if the

Vietnamese were offended - indeed, if they were informed - they made no public response. By this time, according to CPK sources, the CPK leadership had recognised that there was a

"fundamental contradiction" between the Kampuchean and

Vietnamese revolutions. Sometime in 1966, having

"discerned the true nature of the Vietnamese"the CPK apparently decided

that it could have only state relations and other official relations with Vietnam. (119).

The decision to discontinue party relations does not seem to have elicited any response from the Vietnamese communists.

If the CPK really made this decision at this time, the VWP was almost certainly not informed: there is no mention of this development in any available Vietnamese document,* - retrospective or otherwise - and the VWP evidently had a good idea of what was going on in Kampuchea. One Vietnamese publication notes:

In 1966, back from a visit to China, Pol Pot issued eleven documents purporting to change the party's political line, substituting Marxism - Leninism with Mao Zedong thought and considering ... Vietnam no longer as ' friends and allies but as enemies. (120).

Information which was provided by a "well-placed"Viet

Cong defector in 1973 indicates that the Vietnamese were quite concerned about the state of relations with the CPK in 1966.

In that year, partially in reaction to what they perceived to be close relations between the CPK and the CCP and partially (122) to exercise a restraining hand on the CPK, the Vietnamese

formed a special unit called "P36"/^^ This unit, which was 21 reportedly answerable to Le Duc Tho, aimed to

help develop (CPK) cadre, exploit propoganda themes, and give other assistant to the Cambodian party. (124) .

Most of the Khmer trainees who studied under Vietnamese direction were actually from Kampuchea Krom, in the delta region of South Vietnam.*125* According to Hem Samrin,

100s, 1000s of cadres studied with us. They were sent back to South Vietnam after three or four years training. (126) .

It seems that the Vietnamese, frightened of endangering their relationship with Sihanouk, were not keen for their trainees to get directly involved in the Kampuchean struggle.

According to Vorn Vet's confession, shortly after Pol Pot's return the CPK

raised the line of ... preparing for armed struggle in the countryside. (127).

This claim is substantiated by contemporary evidence. In 1966 the Kampuchean communists were distributing leaflets which proclaimed that

the aim of the revolution is the liberation of the people from the capitalists and the feudalists. To succeed it is necessary to use force. (128).

Pol Pot had evidently decided to actively seek out opportunities to stir up the Khmer peasantry against the Sihanouk regime - a

f clear rejection of the recommendations put forward by the VWP when he was in Hanoi.

In Serge Thion's opinion, the determining influence behind these changes was

the version of which was vulgarised and "linbiaoized" by the Cultural Revolution in a late paroxysm of the Stalinist vulgate. (129).

It is true that the cultural revolution was beginning as Pol 22

Pot left Beijing. However, according to Kham Teuan, who attended a 9-day series of lectures given by Pol Pot in

Ratanakiri shortly after the party secretary's return, Pol Pot was more interested in stressing the importance of self reliance than in talking about the cultural revolution. Teuan recalled that Pol Pot only mentioned China once, and that was in a fairly dismissive way:

China is a big country, but it is not only us who are struggling. All over South East Asia people are taking responsibility. (130).

The main conclusion Pol Pot had drawn from his experiences abroad was that the Khmer revolutionaries would have to rely on their own resources. Indeed, the Annotated Party History maintains that one of the main "lessons" of this period for the CPK was that "it is (often) better to learn nothing from foreign experiences".

The acceleration of the Kampuchean revolutionary struggle can be explained in terms of events which were taking place within Kampuchea, rather than in terms of foreign influences.

In the 1966 elections, as a result of Sihanouk's decision not to nominate candidates, political power went to the right wing, (132) and on the 22nd of October 1966 Lon Nol became prince minister.

Ieng Sary has asserted that this development forced the CPK onto the defensive:

In 1966 everything changed. The non-endorsement of election candidates by Sihanouk opened the door to the guns of the CIA, with the blessing of the extreme right wing Assembly, Then, an actual civil was was begun against us. We had to answer their guns with our guns. (133).

The Phnom Penh government certainly stepped up its repression of the Kampuchean left after this election, but this repression really only weakened those leftists who were engaged in peaceful political struggle,thus strengthening the hand of those who were committed to the destruction of the

Sihanouk regime. However, as 1967 began, rural discontent was on the upswing in Kampuchea. This was to provide the

Khmer Communists with an unprecedented opportunity to embark on their own, independent revolution.

It is possible to draw a number of conclusions from this examination of the period 1963-1966. To begin with, it was clearly diverging interests which caused alienation between the leadership groups of the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties to develop during this period: by 1966 the

Khmer revolutionaries understood that their own interests were no longer compatible with those of their Vietnamese counterparts.

They were becoming aware that if there was ever to be a revolution in Kampuchea, they would have to take matters into their own hands.

However, the notion put forward by the leaders of

Democratic Kampuchea and accepted by a number of scholars, that by 1966 the two parties were already fundamentally and violently opposed to one another, is unfounded. Although the

Vietnamese would not have been pleased about the WPK leaders' removal from Phnom Penh (the most appropriate arena for anyone involved in peaceful political struggle), assertions that this departure was a deliberately calculated anti-Vietnamese move are based on flimsy evidence. Throughout this period, contacts and co-operation between the two groups continued: as long as the Kampucheans were not successfully organising an effective armed rebellion against the Sihanouk regime, the VWP was prepared to maintain this contact. Retrospective depictions 2¿

of this period as one of bitter feuding and treachery simply

indicate that during the 1970's these two parties - like any

enemies recalling a period of former friendship - could not

avoid reading sinister meanings into what was generally quite

innocent behaviour on each other's part.

Allegations that a third party - China - was seeking to widen the gap between the CPK and the VWP also appear to be

groundless. If the Chinese communists were really playing a

role, it was an indirect one: by the time Pol Pot left Beijing he had begun to see China as a potential counterweight to

Vietnamese communist influence within the Kampuchean party.

Since assuming the leadership of the Party in 1963 Pol Pot had been forced to be very careful in his dealings with the VWP:

the Kampuchean party secretary was aware that if the policies

he pursued alarmed the Vietnamese communists, there would be a

reduction in the important support which they provided. The

realisation that China might possibly be an alternative source

of such support encouraged the CPK leader to pursue independent

policies with increased confidence. By 1966 Pol Pot had

apparently decided that in principle, the Kampuchean armed

struggle should go ahead. Although preparations for this

struggle became more concerted after Pol Pot's return, the CPK

was not ‘quite ready to "fly in the face of history". Open

rebellion, which would be a flagrant display of the Kampuchean

communist leaders' contempt for the policies recommended by

their Vietnamese brethren, was not something to be entered into

lightly. ^One must also remenber that in 1966 Pol Pot had not

yet attained the tight control over the Kampuchean party which

he so jealously protected as the leader of Democratic Kampuchea

However, during the period 1967-1969 the Khmer peasantry

finally forced the Kampuchean communists' hand. CHAPTER 2

1967-1969 In March 1967 the peasantry of the Samlaut area in the north western Kampuchean province of Battambang rose in rebellion. This revolt marked the beginning of the most extensive outbreak of rural violence in Kampuchea since 1954.

Prince Sihanouk said of these uprisings:

I have read somewhere that the fighting resulted in 10,000 deaths. (1)

This conflict, which Kirk has described as a "prelude in microcosm" of the civil war which was to spread across (2 ) Kampuchea three years later, was to be the first real baptism of fire for the CPK.

Meanwhile, the Chinese were embarking on their "Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution". The fervent cult of

Maoism which was generated at this time stressed the ideal of revolutionary purity: for a time, Beijing's commitment to insurgencies in South East Asia hardened, and the involvement of overseas Chinese communities was sought. (3 ) Just as the first Samlaut rebellion was beginning in 1967, echoes of the cultural revolution reached urban centres in Kampuchea, where approximately five per cent of the national population were ( 4 ) ethnic Chinese. Copies of Mao's Little Red Book were widely distributed, and the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association played a leading role in anti-Sihanouk agitation which took i place in various schools (especially the private ones, two- (5) thirds of which were Chinese) and universities. Alarmed by these developments, Sihanouk banned all "Friendship Associations" and accused the Chinese of supplying material for subversive propaganda. ' He also asserted that China was playing a role in the rural insurrection, remarking that

China indeed has the intention of promoting every manoeuvre which could bring about the fall of this country. (7) . 26

At one stage, the Prince claimed to have evidence that the

Khmer insurgents were reliant on China for material and ideological support.' 1

A number of scholars have accepted the view that the

Chinese were behind the rural rebellions.^ It has been asserted that a deliberate decision by the CPK central committee to declare "open war" against the Sihanouk regime led to the outbreak of rural violence in 1 9 6 7 , and that it was Chinese influence - particularly the inspiration provided by the

Cultural Revolution - which pushed the CPK centre "over the edge into active revolution". This argument necessarily involves acceptance of the theory that, by early 1967, the leaders of the CPK were agreed that it was time to defy the

VWP openly: that the Khmer communists felt they were ready to launch their own revolution.

However, this interpretation contains a number of weaknesses. It has already been seen that there is little substance to the view that Pol Pot was influenced by the

Cultural Revolution during his visit to Beijing, and it is unlikely that the CPK was fully aware of the events and ideological issues which were unfolding in China in 1967: Mao's ( it) works were difficult to obtain in the jungle. In fact, as

Kiernan *has noted, it is more likely that the CPK leaders saw the Cultural Revolution as a threat to their own control of the (13) Kampuchean revolutionary movement. Moreover, although one

CPK defector has claimed that "the events at Samlaut were ( 14 ) prepared in advance", most Kampuchean party documents recognise that the CPK centre was not involved in the first, at least, of these rebellions. One document maintains that, in fact, the Samlaut uprising of 1967 was a spontaneous reaction to 27

nationwide contradictions, as well as the untenable state of the contradictions in that area itself. (15) .

A brief examination of the events which led to the outbreak of the first Samlaut rebellion will support this assertion.

As a result of the economic "reforms" implemented in 1963, the price offered to rice producers had dropped considerably by

1967.^^ Consquently, many Khmer peasants either decided not to grow any more rice than they needed for their personal use, or to sell their produce to Chinese merchants who then sold it to Vietnamese insurgents operating in South Vietnam or eastern

Kampuchea: the Viet Cong were prepared to pay in American (17) dollars at international rates. With the aim of bringing this illicit trade to an end, Lon Nol had instituted a rice collection system known as "ramassage du paddy" shortly after becoming prime minister in 1966. Under this system, rice was bought from the peasantry - forcibly if necessary - at the fixed government rate.

If anybody was likely to resort to rebellion in the face of Lon Nol's ramassage, it was the peasants of Battambang province, to whom Trawney might have been referring when he wrote that there were regions in South East Asia where the position of the peasantry was like

that of a man standing permanently up to his neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him. (19).

This region was exceptional in that it contained larger land­ holdings and higher degrees of tenancy than elsewhere in

Kampuchea.Kiernan reports that, during the mid 1960's, as

a result of huge influxes of refugees from "Kampuchea Krom" - (21) the Mekong delta region in South Vietnam - and the

distribution of land titles to government cronies, "several 2 c

thousand" peasants in this area were dispossessed and forced to

pay rent for land they regarded as their own.' ' A succession of bad seasons did not help to ease the peasants' plight: in

1966 the Mekong river rose higher than usual, thus considerably (23) reducing the rice harvest.

The 1967 Samlaut rebellion actually broke out shortly after

Sihanouk had been absent from Kampuchea for two months, during which time Lon Nol had been relatively free to put his policies ( 24 ) into practice. On the 2nd of April villagers in the

Samlaut area, enraged at their mistreatment by a military detail collecting rice, murdered two of their tormentors. On the same day, two hundred people marched on a nearby government-sponsored youth agricultural settlement, putting its inhabitants to

flight and setting the buildings on fire. Over the next four

days the rebels burnt two bridges, attacked a number of other (25) military patrols and burnt down several houses in the region.

Although the actions of these peasants must clearly be seen

as a desperate response to treatment which they considered to be

particularly unjust - coming as it did in the midst of very

difficult circumstances - there is sufficient evidence to

suggest that leftist agitators played a co-ordinating role in

this uprising. Leaflets had begun circulating in this area

late in 1966: these attacked Sihanouk and Lon Nol as "men of f straw" who had "sold out their country", condemned the

ramassage, and appealed to villagers to join the revolutionary

struggle. 7 However, it has been established that these

leaflets were distributed by former Issarak resistance cadres

in the region, who were acting without the approval - indeed, (27) the knowledge - of the CPK central committee. 1 in fact, the

"centre" was apparently surprised by the developments in 29

Samlaut. As Pol Pot has acknowledged, V At that time the Party Central Committee had not yet decided on a nationwide armed insurrection. (28) .

These developments were evidently a pleasant surprise, however:

It was remarkable that they used knives, swords and hatchets as weapons and relied on revolutionary violence. (29).

Pol Pot has claimed that the CPK ordered that "Battambang... should temporarily postpone its plan".^^) Although it is unlikely that the CPK centre was really able to control the actions of local cadres and peasants to this extent, this assertion is worth careful examination. The decision to put the insurrection on hold was allegedly made so that the central committee could

examine and sum up the state of these contradictions and the possibility of the use of arms. (31).

Two stark alternatives confronted the Kampuchean party leaders in 1967. They could go beyond preparing for armed struggle and become actively involved in these peasant uprisings, or they could continue to attach priority to the preservation of amicable relations with the VWP. The fact that the Khmer peasantry had been unwilling to wait for CPK leadership meant that this decision could no longer be deferred. Pol Pot*s growing < eagerness to pursue an "independent, self reliant" revolutionary struggle evidently won out, for the CPK apparently decided that the party should henceforth "launch (32) both political and armed attacks".

The CPK has claimed that, as a result of the 1967 uprisings, ( 33 ) the Vietnamese communists were "panic stricken" and that later in the year, when the rebellion appeared to have been put (34) down, "they were delighted and felt a bit relieved". The Vietnamese certainly had reason to be concerned. The Samlaut rebellion took place at a time when the NLF, faced with half a million U.S. troops, was especially vulnerable to American (35) rearguard moves via Kampuchea. In fact, it came just a few weeks after the largest American operation of the war -

Operation Junction City - had forced COSVN, the VWP headquarters in the south, out of Vietnam and into Kampuchea. The possibility of American moves against this and other bases in

Kampuchea was obviously a major concern for Vietnamese strategists. Sihanouk's value to the VWP was increasingly recited to h's highly publicised opposition to.American violations of Kampuchean territory, which contributed to the deterrence of such moves. At that stage, any shift in the

Prince's position would have been a costly blow to the

Vietnamese war effort.

In April 1967 the Vietnamese communists must have felt that their fears of the possible effects of an armed Kampuchean uprising had been completely justified. On the 7th of April

Sihanouk broadcast a warning to the VWP: referring to the insurgents as "Khmer-Viet Minh", or as "Khmer Rouge",

Sihanouk proclaimed that

they came to attack not with their hands, but with rifles given them by their Viet Minh masters. (37).

Warning that "we shall be unfriendly to those who become unfriendly to us", the Prince mentioned the possibility of circumstances leading to a "deterioration of Cambodia's (39) relations with certain socialist countries". Although

there may be some merit to Carney's argument that Sihanouk was merely trying to undercut popular support for the rebellion by

"tarring it with the Vietnamese brush", the VWP could not 31 help but be alarmed by Sihanouk's rhetoric.

Sihanouk was also able to use the Samlaut uprising as an opportunity to act against certain leftist elements within

Phnom Penh. In the same broadcast, he claimed that captured rebels had

confessed that they acted on the orders of their big leaders in Phnom Penh. This confession indicated that their big leaders are certain high personalities residing in Phnom Penh. (41).

On the 22nd of April the Prince charged five prominent leftist figures - , Hou Youn, Hu Nim, and So (42) Nem - with responsibility for the rebellion. The first three, who Sihanouk said shared the most blame, were arguably ^ the most popular politicians in Kampuchea: they had been successful in the National Assembly elections in 1966, despite (43) the manoeuvering of the right. All five were ordered to appear before a military tribunal. However, within a few days Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan vanished from their homes and fled to the maquis. Hu Nim followed them in October that ( 44 ) year. ' At the time, it was widely believed that all three men had been secretly executed by Sihanouk's security forces.

When rumours that they were still alive began to circulate Ui) some time later, they were dubbed the "three ghosts"! It was « not just these men who joined the maquis at this time, however.

According to Kiernan,

dozens of others on the left ... and at least 100 teachers, students, professors and workers left to join the mushrooming resistance. (46) . (47) In the minds of these people, "the revolution was on the way",

The Vietnamese communists thus lost their influence over

those Kampuchean leftists who had hitherto been prepared to

accept the VWP line that the Kampuchean struggle should be 32 pursued through peaceful political means. By fleeing to the maquis, these Khmers were effectively accepting the position of the CPK centre: that the Kampuchean movement should develop the armed struggle by "basically adhering to the tradition of self-reliance",^^ rather than relying on other, more powerful communist parties.

The CPK's Annotated Party History claims that the CPK

played the role of leader in the revolutionary struggle, that is to say, conducting politics with support of arms ... since 1968.. (49) (my emphasis)

In 1980 Son Sen - the leader of the Revolutionary Army of

Kampuchea (RAK).»told Ben Kiernan:

I have been a soldier since the very beginning. I have been a soldier since 1968. (50).

The "very beginning" of the CPK's policy of concerted armed struggle actually took place on the 25th of February 1968, when the party launched a nationwide uprising: this insurrection . (51) has been described as "Kampuchea's Tet Offensive". The

Kampuchean communists have themselves described the way this conflict developed:

Beginning with the example of Battambang, the revolutionary movement with politics supported by arms expanded brilliantly from province * to province. (52).

This version has been borne out by one independent historian, (53) whose work is based on Kampuchean government sources. In fact, Sihanouk himself referred to the "blow of 25th February" as a "concerted operation", remarking-that "the same movement, (54) the same tactics" were employed all over the country.

The CPK dates the founding of the RAK to these attacks: 33

our party's secret defense forces, which were transformed into armed guerrilla forces ... thus became our precursory revolutionary army and started fighting the enemy in 1968. (55).

According to Sihanouk, however, the Khmer Rouge were not conducting the revolutionary struggle on their own. In a

March 1968 speech the Prince claimed that recently captured rebels had included some trained as cadres in Hanoi and one ethnic Vietnamese sapper.Unfortunately, he ordered these ( 57 ) agents shot without the benefit of a trial, which makes this contention difficult to prove. Although Sihanouk also cited Vietnamese aid to hill tribes in revolt in Ratanakiri ( 58 ) province, there is no evidence to substantiate claims that the NLF was lending support to the insurgency in the far north ( 59 ) east: Ieng Sary is reported to have told a 1972 meeting in Albania that CPK forces actually clashed with the Viet

Cong in this area during 1968.^^

The CPK has denied that the Vietnamese communists supported the Kampuchean insurrection in any way:

In the armed struggle from 1968 to the beginning of 1970, the Vietnamese did not help the Kampucheans' revolution at all. (61).

In fact, the CPK reportedly sent to Hanoi in 1968, to seek the support of the former Issaraks living there.v 1 When

f the "Hanoi Khmers" - under strict instructions from the VWP - refused to co-operate, Keo Meas apparently reacted angrily, accusing Son Ngoc Minh of "becoming fat in safety while the f 6 3 ) party faithful were being liquidated".

CPK documents claim that "to have no outside support was no problem" . The handicaps imposed by the lack of equipment and weaponry were, with difficulty, overcome by relying on the party's resources: 34

Where did our revolutionary army get the weapons? We got them from the enemy or we repaired them and made them ourselves under the leadership of the party. (65).

According to Pol Pot, speaking in 1977, "despite all these

shortcomings we continued to advance".

One VWP history published in 1980 notes that in January

1968 the "soldiers and people of Laos launched a campaign in (67) northern Laos", but fails to mention the campaign which was

launched in Kampuchea in the same month. Another Vietnamese document, which at least concedes that this conflict took place, remarks that, although "a large number of Kampuchean

communists laid down their lives", this struggle had little

chance of success, because "the population as a whole followed

Sihanouk " . ^

Despite this retrospective nonchalance, the Vietnamese

communists were extremely concerned about this uprising at the

time, seeking to use their influence within the Kampuchea party

to reduce its effectiveness. Nguyen Van Linh was sent to

Kampuchea to persuade the CPK leaders against continuing the

armed struggle. VWP leaders apparently viewed the 1968

campaign as a deliberate effort to destroy the anti-U.S. united

front in Indochina and thus sabotage the Vietnamese communists'

war strategy. Nguyen Co Thach alleged in two 1978 interviews « that the CPK's "hard line" against Sihanouk from 1967 on was

aimed at dividing the Prince from Vietnam.

Notwithstanding claims that the 1968 uprisings were

entirely successful because, this time,"we (the CPK) started f 71 ) the attacks", the Phnom Penh regime managed to impede the

development of this direct challenge to its authority by (72) capturing a large base camp in Battambang late in 1968.

However, rural dissidence continued to flare up over the next 35

few years - as did the use of terror by the Kampuchean

revolutionary forces: in June 1969 rebels executed a number ( 73 \ of centrally appointed officials around the nation. To the

CPK this period marked a particularly significant step in the progress of the Kampuchean revolution:

without that test, without the war from 1968-69 to 1970, we could have been in danger. Because without 1968-69 we would have had no experience of independence - mastery. We could have again fallen into the ways of the period of the struggle against the French. (74).

This last remark clearly refers to the policy of co-operation with the Vietnamese communists.

In 1969, according to the CPK's Black Paper,

the struggle between Kampuchea and Vietnam reached its highest pitch: "Friendship" and "solidarity" were only empty words. (75) .

If the tension between the leadership groups of the two parties was close to degenerating into open hostility, this feeling had

not yet permeated down to the lower levels of the Kampuchean

party. At this time, according to one CPK cadre, the VWP was

considered to be

a friend, but an unreliable one. Vietnam was not considered an enemy. (76).

Nor was anti-Vietnamese feeling spread evenly throughout the

various CPK zones. Regional party organs were, after all,

virtually independent, raising their own armies and formulating (77) their own policies. In the Eastern Zone bordering South

Vietnam, the Vietnamese communists seem to have had some success

in impressing their views on the local leadership, which

delayed attacks on government forces for several months, only ( 78 ) joining the rebellion in August 1968. In fact, during 1968

and 1969, Eastern zone cadres attended study sessions in NLF 36

(79) zones in South Vietnam. In 1969 So Phim - the CPK leader of the Eastern zone - conducted lectures which emphasized the importance of co-operating with the Vietnamese, displaying portraits of Ho Chi Minh. The differences which would separate the Eastern zone leadership from the party centre until

1978 had begun to emerge. By 1968, the National Assembly in

Phnom Penh was almost entirely dominated by conservative elements.

Fearing that the growth in the power of the right wing posed a threat to his personal authority, Sihanouk had formed a "Counter ( 81 ) Government" soon after the elections in 1966. This loose collection cf left wing politicians did not last long and so

Sihanouk began to use such groups as the Royal Socialist Khmer (82) Youth (RSKY) to harass the government outside the Assembly.v '

Alarmed by internal and external developments, and frustrated by Sihanouk*s reluctance to allow others to share in the running of the country, Lon Nol evidently decided that the road to power lay in limiting the power of the Chief of State.

This issue lay at the centre of the 27th Congress of the

Sangkum in June 1969. When Lon Nol was asked to form a cabinet, the general replied:

Only as premier, and not merely as a secretary to Prince Sihanouk. (83).

After extensive negotiations, Sihanouk bowed to conservative pressure. Lon Nol was granted the right to select ministers who would report to him directly, rather than to Sihanouk.

This was a very real coup for the prince*s conservative opponents. The new government quickly set about reducing

Sihanouk's power even further. Late in 1969 Sirik Matak -

Lon Nol's deputy premier - despatched a memorandum to all

Kampuchean diplomatic missions abroad, instructing them to Í 85 ) report only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 37

In 1969 Kampuchean foreign policy took what the VWP must « have seen as a dangerous step: the United States recognised

Kampuchea's frontiers in mid 1969, and diplomatic relations between the two countries were re-established.Sihanouk also seemed to be distancing himself from the Vietnamese communists. In November 1968 the Prince had asked the

International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954, to look into allegations of Vietnamese (87) infringements of Kampuchean territorial integrity. 7

Although the drift of Kampuchean events in 1968-69 was probably fairly clear to the Vietnamese communists, there is no concrete evidence that they lost confidence in Sihanouk, or re-assessed their attitude toward the CPK and its tactics. In recent times the Vietnamese have claimed that the VWP central committee, foreseeing that "the situation in Kampuchea could become complicated",v 7 provided

specific guidance regarding our actions should the U.S. imperialists expand the war to Kampuchea. (89).

According to a 1969 Viet Cong document, however, the basic assumptions which determined VWP policy toward Kampuchea had not changed:

The Cambodian government still maintains diplomatic relations with us, because it knows that we have achieved great victories. Cambodia will always be our neighbour. Therefore it cannot break off relations with us. (90).

As late as February 1970, Lao Dong party leader Le Duan reaffirmed that DRV policy was to respect Kampuchea's (91) sovereignty and territorial integrity.

On the other hand, the Kampuchean communists have claimed that the CPK centre, observing the political developments taking place in Phnom Penh, deduced that Sihanouk's reign was coming to 38

an end. In fact,^

the Central Committee of the CPK grasped the situation well and perfectly knew that the U.S. and Lon Nol were going to make a coup d'etat. (92).

According to this version, the CPK began to soften its

attitude towards Sihanouk, criticising those who had "joined

the maquis and attacked Samdech Norodom Sihanouk".

Deciding that Sihanouk should, for the moment, be treated as

an observer rather than a participant, the Kampuchean

communists then began to focus their attacks on "the U.S. (94) imperialists and the traitor Lon Nol". According to the

Black Paper, this new policy was introduced so that, after Lon

Nol had staged his coup, the CPK leaders would find it

relatively easy to convince Sihanouk to join them in forming

a "National United Front". Although the CPK was in a better

position than the VWP to know what was going on in Phnom Penh,

such expressions of retrospective wisdom should be treated

with caution. However, it is interesting that the CPK have

claimed that they were prepared to use this insight for the

betterment of CPK-VWP relations.

Towards the end of 1969 a CPK delegation led by Pol Pot

went to Hanoi, where they apparently met with a Vietnamese

delegation composed of Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap, (95 ) and Nguyen Duy Trinh. The CPK has asserted that, at these

meetings, the Kampuchean delegation sought to convince the VWP

leaders that an anti-Sihanouk coup was imminent, and that this

would be a favourable development for the Kampuchean revolution,

since Sihanouk would then join with the communists against the

extreme right and the United States.The purpose of this

line of argument was, according to Porter, to show that the 39

VWP should begin planning for this eventuality by supporting (97) the Khmer party's armed struggle. The Vietnamese, however, were not prepared to concede that Sihanouk would be overthrown.

The Black Paper contends that during the meetings in

Hanoi the Vietnamese communists, with the assistance of Son Ngoc

Minh, sought to persuade the Pol Pot group to abandon the armed (98 ) struggle. The VWP also tried to convince the CPK to establish relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union (GPSU). In response to the VWP's offer to arrange a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to the DRV, the CPK leaders

allegedly replied that, although they "did not oppose" the (99) Soviet Union, it "would be better to postpone it". ' Again,

it is unclear whether this is an accurate version of events:

Thiounn Mumm has said that "even before 1970... we had contacts with the Soviets". However, the versions put forward by

the CPK and the VWP both indicate that the two parties could

find little to agree about. During the meeting in Hanoi,

according to a VWP document,

the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique ... demanded that the South Vietnamese liberation armed forces withdraw from their Kampuchean bases. (101).

The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea have alleged that, by the

time these meetings broke down, all pretences of friendship < had been abandoned. In fact the Khmer delegates claimed to be

in fear for their lives:

The Vietnamese used open threats against the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and all the members of the delegation of the CPK were unanimous ... that they could easily (have resorted) to assassination. (102).

While the CPK delegation was in North Vietnam, Sihanouk

arrived in Hanoi, to attend Ho Chi Minh's funeral. During this

visit the VWP leaders continued their efforts to cultivate 40

Sihanouk.Neither the Vietnamese communists nor Sihanouk would have imagined that, within a few months, Sihanouk would no longer be Kampuchea's Chief of State.

Once again, it is possible to explain increasing tension between the CPK and the VWP during the late 1960's without reference to the Chinese. Towards the end of 1967 the CPK leaders finally and irrevocably decided that if they were to exert any control over the Kampuchean revolutionary struggle, they would have to pursue a policy of active, armed opposition to the Sihanouk regime. The Kampuchean revolution, as it developed from January 1968 onwards, was not in accordance with the Vietnamese communists' wishes. Over the following seven years, the Kampuchean party leaders were to be alone in the belief that their struggle against Sihanouk was separate from the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese communists, along with the

Americans and Sihanouk himself, continued to feel that the two were inextricably linked.

After 1967, with the departure of so many moderate leftist figures from Phnom Penh, the VWP no longer had any real allies on the Kampuchean Left. The Vietnamese would henceforth have to rely on Sihanouk alone to protect their interests in Kampuchea.

Unfortunately, it was becoming apparent by the end of 1969 that the Prince could no longer be relied upon to safeguard these interests. The Vietnamese communists' refusal to agree to the

Kampucheans' demands that they modify their policy on Kampuchea and re-introduce substantial support for the CPK should not be attributed to an ignorance of developments in Kampuchea, however. If Kampuchea did indeed become a battleground in the future, the Vietnamese communist leaders hoped that their own military intervention would tip the scales within the

Kampuchean party towards more orthodox communist leadership. CHAPTER 3 On the 18th of March 1970, Sihanouk's conservative opponents took advantage of the Prince's absence from the country: the National Assembly voted to depose Sihanouk as

Head of State, and the was declared under the presidency of Lon Nol.^^ Although it is likely that Lon Nol and his co-conspirators carried out this coup with at least a . . . (2 ) "legitimate expectation" that the United States would support their new regime, there is little evidence to substantiate

Sihanouk's claims that the Americans were directly involved in (3) the plot against him. Indeed, given Sihanouk's shifts of policy towards a more pro-American position during 1969, the

American government would have seen little reason to remove him.

Lon Nol's coup had a dramatic, polarising effect within

Kampuchea. Less than a week later, the first peasant demonstrations against the new regime took place: the Prince still enjoyed an almost divine status in the eyes of many (4) Kampuchean peasants - a status which Lon Nol could not usurp.

One historian has shown that these demonstrations were not entirely spontaneous, however; that the Khmer Rouge played an important co-ordinating role.^ On the other hand, many urban

Kampucheans - including a number of leftist intellectuals^ -

supported the coup. In fact, mainly as a result of voluntary

enlistments, the Khmer Republic's armed forces increased from (7) 35,000 to 150,000 during 1970.v '

According to a 1971 COSVN directive, the coup

created conditions for the Cambodian revolutionary movement to leap forward and strengthen the unity of the peoples of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in their struggles. (8) .

The Vietnamese communists have also asserted that, in 1970, the

VWP leadership - immediately realising that the "U.S. puppet forces" could now be defeated on the "Kampuchean battlefield"^

- quickly began to make "all-out efforts" to build up the

Kampuchean revolutionary movement. It is certainly true that Sihanouk's deposition marked an important change in

Vietnamese communist policy towards Kampuchea. VWP leaders only altered their policy because circumstances left them little choice, however. As the CPK has pointed out, Sihanouk's fall left the VWP with "no more cards to play" in Kampuchea:

Lon Nol was clearly not going to be as co-operative as Sihanouk had been. In fact, within days of the coup the new Phnom Penh regime cut Vietnamese communist access to Sihanoukville, which the NLF had been using as a supply port. At the same time, declaring that he would oust all Vietnamese communist troops from Kampuchean soil,Lon Nol launched what have been described as

"futile" attacks against Viet Cong sanctuaries in the region (12) bordering South Vietnam. Then, on the 30th of April,

U.S. president Nixon announced that American and South Vietnamese troops were to move against these sanctuaries, claiming that (13) COSVN itself would be destroyed that night. In response to the combined offensive which followed this announcement, ( 14) Vietnamese communist troops moved further into Kampuchea.

(Years later, the CPK claimed that "ten thousand Viet Congs (15) took refuge in Kampuchea ). Faced with these developments, the VWP had no choice but to pursue a policy of active opposition to the new Phnom Penh regime. Any objections that the VWP might previously have had to the revolutionary activities of the CPK were thus removed.

The coup immediately provided the possibility of VWP support for the CPK. The Kampuchean leaders undoubtedly welcomed this prospect. Captured documents indicate that the 43

Kampuchean revolutionary movement was struggling to maintain ' (1 6 ) its numbers by 1970, ' despite Pol Pot's claims that the

Khmer forces included "4,000 regular fighters and 50,000 (17) guerrilla fighters" at the time of Lon Nol's coup.

Although VWP assertions that the Khmer Rouge numbered "only a (18) few hundred" 1 in 1970 must be treated with caution, it is unlikely that there were more than 3,000 effectives within ( 19 ) the movement at this time. One CIA report comments that these forces were "widely scattered, poorly equipped and poorly co-ordinated."^2^ This has led Becker to comment that

Pol Pot was probably keen to maintain a good relationship with the Vietnamese communists "long enough to build up his own strength."^21^

Thus, in April 1970 it seemed that a coincidence of interests might succeed in effecting a firm alliance between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese movements. When one considers that it was differing policies towards Prince Sihanouk which had caused the rift between the two parties to develop during the 1960's, it seems ironic that, in 1970, the success of any new alliance between the CPK and the VWP largely depended on

Sihanouk's co-operation. Both the CPK and the VWP saw the value in obtaining Sihanouk's support: the Prince's standing amongst the Khmer peasantry promised to be particularly useful in developing the revolutionary struggle against Lon Nol.

On the 19th of March - the day after the coup - Sihanouk flew into Beijing. Coincidentally, Pol Pot's delegation was already there, fresh from its rather tense encounter with the

VWP in Hanoi. Then, on the 21st of March, the VW P 's Pham Van

(22) Dong arrived. VWP and CPK sources differ as to the details of the negotiations which took place between these various LL groups over the following few weeks. According to the

Vietnamese,

Acting upon a suggestion by the Vietnamese Party, the leaders of the Kampuchean Party, up to then grim enemies of Sihanouk, finally came out in support of the Prince. (23).

On the other hand, the CPK's Black Paper claims that, through the Chinese premier, the Kampucheans advised Sihanouk to (24) "adopt an offensive position and not a defensive one" and to

stand in the framework of a National United Front in order to gather the national forces. (25).

This was Sihanouk's only alternative, because

the democratic forces were already under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. (26).

In any case, the net result of these negotiations was clear.

Following a declaration of "unreserved support" by Hou Youn,

Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan - representing the Kampuchean (27) leftists - and with the encouragement of the VWP, Sihanouk (28) "raised his banner of anti-U.S. struggle", drawing up a program of resistance to the Lon Nol regime. In the words of the Kampuchean communists' Black Paper, the Prince proclaimed

the dissolution of ... Lon Nol's government and assembly, the founding of the National United Front, the Government of National Union, the National Liberation Army (and) the socialist construction (of) Kampuchea. (29).

Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea"

(RGUNK) was to be the official ruling body of the new united front - commonly referred to as FUNK, its French acronym

(Front Unifie National Khmer). Rather than surrender the low profile which they had enjoyed for some years, the true 45

leaders of the CPK chose Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim and

Thiounn Mumm to represent them in this organisation.^30^

An "Indochinese People's Conference" - attended by

Sihanouk and the leaders of the DRV, the NLF and the Pathet

Lao - met on the 24th and 25th of April. According to the VWP,

this meeting was

very successful and signified a new developmental step in the history of the militant solidarity of the people of the three countries. (31).

Although the leaders of the DRV and NLF delegations - Pham Van

Dong and Nguyen Huu Tho - failed to mention the role of the (32) pre-1970 Kampuchea struggle at this conference, the VWP

evidently recognised that a good relationship with the CPK was

to be encouraged. At an NLF conference on the 9th of April,

it was noted that

the Party of our friendly country (Kampuchea) has good experience in struggling and is closely co-ordinating with our Party to destroy the enemy. (33).

In mid-April, COSVN issued a directive that regional VWP

committees should activate groups to lend assistance to the

Kampuchean movement. Such groups were to

contact local organisations and friendly units for military help or for (armed propaganda) when necessary. (34).

As the year progressed, CPK forces were equipped with arms and

ammunition from North Vietnam.

However, relations between the two parties were not as

warm during 1970 as they appeared to be on the surface. It is

likely that VWP attitudes provoked a certain amount of

resentment amongst the CPK leadership. Although the Vietnamese

recognised that Kampuchea was the "most vulnerable point of the (35) U.S. and their puppets" in the new "unified anti-U.S. ( 36 ) theatre", they continued to insist that South Vietnam should be treated as

the main war theatre with the decisive bearing on the common victory. (37)

Shawcross remarks that, although the Vietnamese communists had

"finally embraced the cause of Khmer communism", there was no reason for the CPK to expect that they intended it to "serve any interests save their own". ' Indeed, the CPK's retrospective accounts of the negotiations which took place between the two parties at this time are particularly cynical about VWP motives and intentions. The Black Paper claims that, when the Pol Pot group stopped at Hanoi on their way home from Beijing, the North Vietnamese leaders greeted them ( 39 ) with "delirious joy and extremely warm embraces".

Remarking that this welcome was a "sudden change of 180°"^^ from the one they had received the previous year, this document asserts that, in their dealings with the CPK delegation the VWP leaders were motivated by nothing more than a desire to

control the Kampuchean people like they did during the fighting against the French colonialists. (41).

Although Pol Pot agreed to have Vietnamese communist troops fighting alongside the Khmer Rouge, he was eager to preserve* the essential independence of the Khmer movement.

During his stay in North Vietnam, he rejected Le Duan's proposals for a mixed military command for the Kampuchean struggle, pointing out that he could not make such a decision (42) without consulting the CPK central committee. According to CPK sources, the Vietnamese - who were "very unsatisfied(sic) with Pol Pot's responses - then resorted to deceit, hoping to trick the Kampuchean party secretary into agreeing to their n proposals. When a telegram from Pol Pot arrived from CPK deputy secretary , the Vietnamese allegedly chose not to pass on the first half of its text, which expressed concern that the Vietnamese proposals might pose a threat to the (43) "independence and sovereignty" of the CPK. The Black Paper also claims that the Vietnamese leaders

deliberately told lies according to which Comrade Ieng Sary (had) already come to an agreement with the Vietnamese proposals and that he was only waiting for the decision of the Comrade secretary. (44).

Pol Pot was apparently not convinced: he "perfectly understood" (45) that the Vietnamese were lying.

Of course, it is quite possible that there is little truth to these allegations: indeed, such accounts may have been written in an attempt to explain certain contradictions which arose within the Kampuchean party leadership at this time.

However, there can be little doubt that the CPK leaders were genuinely concerned that the Vietnamese communists posed a threat to their control of the Khmer movement. Despite CPK claims that the support the party received from the Vietnamese (45) was only of "secondary significance", it was primarily the

VWP which was responsible for the rapid development of the revolution in Kampuchea in 1970. As Carney notes, the t Vietnamese "got a war underway in less than two weeks."

During 1970 Vietnamese communist troops stretched across

Kampuchea, playing a leading role in the war against Lon Nol by taking charge of a great deal of territory. At the same

time, in accordance with an NLF directive that new "revolutionary

administrations" be formed in liberated areas, Vietnamese troops

established local political and military organs in regions under (49) their control. The VWP has claimed that its only intention was to

firmly establish (the Kampucheans') revolutionary power and considerably strengthen their armed forces. (50) .

However, Vietnamese policies seemed to be designed to counteract the influence of the CPK centre within the

Kampuchean revolutionary movement. A massive propoganda campaign which the VWP launched in rural Kampuchea shortly after the coup stressed the theme of loyalty to Sihanouk.

Ponchaud has recorded that

the Vietnamese wore badges representing the deposed prince, whom they swore to return to power. (51).

In what one observer has described as an "attempt to limit the ( 52) power of the domestic leadership of the CPK", Hanoi helped to train and equip a force known as the Khmer Rumdoah (Khmer

Liberators) or Khmer Blanc (White Khmer), to distinguish them from CPK troops, who were by now being referred to as Khmer

Krahom (Red Khmer) . The Khmer Rumdoah were apparently centred in the Eastern Zone, where they were commanded by (54) Chau Chakrey, a former monk. This group had a royalist, pro-FUNK platform, and were in favour of full co-operation with the VWP. A circular issued by one Vietnemese regional committee stressed that all members

' must be patriotic workers who follow Sihanouk and the Cambodian Reunification Front. (55).

Moreover, trainees were to be indoctrinated on the

role and mission of the Front and the five-point declaration of Sihanouk. (56).

Perhaps in response to the emergence of the Khmer Rumdoah, the

CPK has alleged that, at this time, the VWP actually began to organise a secret "parallel state power" in Kampuchea -

"particularly in the Eastern Zone for they had their agents ¿9

(57) there". The Vietnamese also hoped to influence the Khmer

V Revolution through the KPRP exiles who had been in North Vietnam since 1954. More than a thousand of these "Khmer Viet Minh" - eight hundred of whom were now nominal CPK members - returned home from Hanoi along the Ho Chi Minh trail in 1970. ' The

CPK apparently did not object to the return of this group: one of these veterans has said that "the parties of Vietnam and of (59) Kampuchea decided to repatriate us". (my emphasis). This may have been because the CPK was interested in isolating them from their Vietnamese "masters". In any case, these "Hanoi

Khmers" received a less than friendly welcome on their return, as will be seen.

VWP documents maintain that during the early 1970's the

Kampuchean and Vietnamese revolutionaries enjoyed extremely close relations, and that the Khmer population welcomed the

Vietnamese communists as saviours. Indeed,

Khmer mothers (were) just as affectionate and attached to Vietnamese troops as Vietnamese mothers. (60).

However, various sources agree that this was not, in fact, the case.

Fearing that when the revolution had been won the results would be credited to the VWP and Sihanouk, the CPK leadership

quickly came to resent the part being played by the Vietnamese

communists. In his memoirs, Sihanouk describes an incident

which apparently took place in 1970. Certain leftist members

of RGUNK, while visiting Hanoi, talked among themselves about

Vietnamese hypocrisy, and the need for' Kampucheans to beware

of

North Vietnam's desire for hegemony after (the) foreseeable joint victory over the Yankee aggressors and the traitor Lon Nol. (61). These words were apparently reported to General Giap, who

complained to Sihanouk that

anti-Vietnamese remarks, made here in Hanoi, hurt us deeply, since every day our soldiers ... fight and die ... to save and liberate your country. (62) .

Relations between lower level Vietnamese and Kampuchean cadres were not always easy either. Early in 1970 it was reported

that in Takeo province VWP-CPK feuding had delayed the (63) installation of a new civil administration,v ] and by June

it was being reported that in Kratie province clashes were

taking place over whether Sihanouk's portrait should be

displayed. Furthermore, seven members of a CPK district

committee who had accepted Sihanouk badges from the Vietnamese were reportedly shot at about this time. There is probably

some truth in the explanation which one U.S. intelligence

report offered for this behaviour:

The Khmers have always hated and feared outsiders, especially those who attempted to impose their political and social mores upon them. The problem is compounded by the fact that Vietnamese cadres must often rely on interpreters to state their case, a situation which leads to confusion and misunderstanding. (66).

However, it was soon to become clear that the Khmer

revolutionaries' hostility towards their Vietnamese counter­

parts was being fuelled by a desire to assume total control

of the Kampuchean revolution.

The VWP responded to this growing hostility by instructing

cadres to treat their Kampuchean brethren with sensitivity.

One Vietnamese circular stressed that

we must avoid the impression that (regional) organisations are initiated by the South Vietnam Liberation Army or the "Viet Cong". We must make them realise that they are masters of their country. (67). 51

According to another Vietnamese document, punishment of

"wicked enemy personnel" was to be carried out by the Khmer

revolutionaries themselves, and Vietnamese cadres should

"avoid showing up during the performance". ' A VWP document which apparently emanated from a meeting between Vietnamese

communist leaders and their CPK counterparts in October 1970 directed that Kampuchean cadres and soldiers should be told

that

when the liberation of the country is achieved, they will participate in the unified Khmer government. (69) .

The VWP also acknowledged that it would be advisable to

tell the ... people that the Cambodian revolution is led by the revolutionary party of Cambodia. (70) .

CPK cadres and leaders alike must have resented such

condescension. In another, even clearer expression of

assumed superiority, the VWP instructed its cadres to

absolutely avoid manifesting pride in coming from a larger country. (71).

In November further negotiations took place between the (72 ) leadership groups of the two parties. According to the

CPK, these talks were requested by the Vietnamese, who were

keen to discuss the differences which were hampering the (73) development of true "solidarity and co-operation". The I VWP was represented by Nguyen Van Linh - then party secretary

for South Vietnam - and Tran Nam Trung, while the Kampuchean (74) delegation included Pol Pot and Nuon Chea. The CPK

leaders reportedly requested that the VWP discontinue its

"undermining activities", and Pol Pot apparently refused

Vietnamese offers of further aid, pointing out that the (75) Kampuchean movement was "totally self sufficient". In

1978 the CPK claimed that the Vietnamese were responsible for a crude attempt to poison the Kampuchean leaders at this (76) meeting. Although this account undoubtedly reflects

tension which existed at the time, it is clear that the real purpose behind this last allegation was to justify the executions of Koy Thuon and Ney Sarann, which were carried out (77) in 1977: according to the Black Paper, these two men were ( 78 ) involved in the plot to assassinate Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.

By 1971 it had become clear that the VWP leaders were responding to Kampuchean demands for greater independence with what Ponchaud has described as their "customary political (79) realism". As one CIA report noted at the time,

The Vietnamese communists have apparently acceded to Khmer demands for autonomy. (80).

The same despatch observed that the Vietnamese communists (81) were "attempting to maintain as low a profile as possible".

Meanwhile, the CPK was busy building up its own strength. In

1971 the CIA observed that the Khmer communists were attempting (82) to complement the FUNK infrastructure with one of their own.

A report supplied by a CPK "rallier" indicates that a great

deal of secrecy surrounded the development of this CPK

infrastructure. This defector recalled that for every

"patriotic" association run by the Front, there was a

"democratic" association run by the CPK:

The associations which have the word "patriotic" in them are always overt ... Those with "democratic" are usually run by the party and are covert. The people usually do not see the party even when they are looking right at it; they see only the front. (83) .

In July 1971 the CPK convened a Party Congress. The

central committee was expanded, but no "Hanoi Khmers" were

elected. Delegates were warned of the need to resist the influence of the'Vietnamese communists: Vorn Vet reportedly urged members not to allow the VWP to "draw the population (85) over". In fact, the CPK later claimed that this congress approved a definition of Vietnam as the "acute enemy".it was also explained to delegates that the party should begin to implement "war communism" or the "National Democratic

Revolution" in areas under its control. This was to involve a strict policy of population control, the evacuation of urban centres, collectivisation of property and land, and the (87) expulsion of ethnic Vietnamese. '

Meanwhile, the CPK centre was extending its influence over the various regional party organs : Ta Mok1s South

Western zone began to become a firm stronghold for the party (8 8 ) leadership at about this time. ^However, some regions - particularly the Eastern and North Western zones - retained their autonomy, remaining on good terms with the VWP. 1

Consequently, although the instructions issued at the 1971 congress were passed on to all zones, the results were uneven.

Indeed, the "National Democratic Revolution" was not implemented in the Eastern zone until many years later. Nevertheless, the Eastern zone delegates to the 1971 conference did support the resolution to expel ethnic Vietnamese from CPK zones. < Moreover, they apparently also approved of a proposal that the (91) Issarak returnees be purged. However, this did not prevent the party leadership from alleging - several years later - that

Eastern zone leader So Phim had always preferred these (92) "Vietnamese in Khmer bodies" to regulär CPK cadres. To the Kampuchean party leadership, it seemed that the returnees (93) "had not come to help, but to replace or destroy". As (94) one veteran puts it, they were looked upon as a "fifth column". f ■/

By early 1972 these northern regroupées, along with the Khmer Rumdoah, had come to be referred to as a "third force" by the CPK: the first and second "forces" were, respectively, the (95) CPK itself and the Lon Nol regime.v These veterans had apparently been warned that they would find the situation in Kampuchea "delicate" before they left Hanoi: Son Ngoc Minh reportedly advised them not to "made any demands at all", but to "be happy with whatever tasks (they) were given".In

fact, despite assertions that the Hanoi Khmers played a ( 97) "leading role" within the CPK during 1970 and 1971, most of them were assigned to fairly unimportant positions within the movement: many were assigned dangerous combat roles, regardless of their experience or training.

According to Li Yang Due - one of these returnees - the campaign to minimise the influence of this group became more overt after the 1971 conference. 1 At a rally in 1972, Hou Youn reportedly said that the "third force" - which was "not a force of the people's revolution" - was to be "pulverised completely". Those few veterans who had been given administrative tasks were progressively reassigned to military duties, where they were often given suicidal missions. Others were secretly executed by the CPK's State Security apparatus ().^^^ Li Yang Due was one of the many who were arrested in the middle of the night, and charged with being a

"revisionist, a man of the "3rd force', and a servant of Vietnam". ^ By the end of 1971 approximately half of these veterans were dead. A few, realising their danger, managed to

escape to the north west, where they survived until the nationwide purges which began in 1976. In the Eastern zone, Hanoi Khmers generally remained unharmed until 1974, when this 55 region began to exhibit the patterns which were by then firmly established in areas like the South West.^^^

Meanwhile, the CPK was beginning a terror campaign against those Khmers who supported the Vietnamese communists. On one occasion, when a group of Vietnamese communist troops left a town, the Khmer Rouge

came and threw grenades into the houses of those who had sheltered the Vietnamese. In some cases they killed the entire families, in some cases the head of the family. (104).

CPK verbal attacks on Sihanouk greatly increased friction between the Khmer Krahom and Khmer Rumdeah rank and file, and fighting between the two factions grew to be fairly common.

More significantly, the CPK began to attack the Vietnamese communists themselves during 1972. A CIA report has described an anti-Vietnamese demonstration which took place in Kompong

Cham in mid-1972. Villagers marched around, brandishing machetes and shouting,

We all agree to die together in order to get the VC/NVA out of Cambodia. (106).

According to an eyewitness, "the demonstrators were not locals".

They had apparently been "educated in Red Khmer ideas".

Sporadic firefights between CPK and Viet Cong forces were reported in "many areas of the country" during 1972.^^^ As f a protective measure COSVN instructed its troops in Kampuchea to travel together in large groups. When challenged at CPK checkpoints,

they were not to react against the Kampuchean communists but were to await the liaison teams who would then take the necessary actions. (109) .

As one VWP document puts it, the Vietnamese communists by now had a 56

clear feeling that the attitude of the Kapipucheans ' revolutionary leadership had changed. (110).

Indeed, by the end of 1972 the VWP had come to accept that it had lost any influence it might once have had on the CPK.

Meanwhile, VWP priorities were beginning to shift to home battlefields. Following the triumph over Lon Nol's forces in II, the Vietnamese communists turned back to concentrate on the war in South Vietnam. The number of

Vietnamese communist troops in Kampuchea soon fell to below ( 112) 8 , 000.

An examination of CPK rhetoric towards the end of 1972 reveals that the party was by now eager to project an independent image. Quinn reports that the "Khmer Krahom" began publicly disavowing Sihanouk's leadership at this time, saying that he had "deserted the revolution", and was "taking

1,000 riels a month from the party's coffers" in order to lead a luxurious life in Beijing.At about the same time,

Hou Youn is reported to have declared that, although the VWP

"acted as if it wanted to take over the Cambodians", the

Kampuchea communists had "turned right around and were able to act as (their) own masters". According to one report, the

Khmer communist party

proclaimed its existence ... and its rights of leadership through all vicissitudes of the struggle (115) in September 1972. An anniversary ceremony was evidently held, and a flag which had as its emblem "a hammer and sickle in the centre of a blood red field" was displayed.Various CPK slogans emerged, proclaiming the sovereignty and self reliance of the Kampuchean party. One such slogan stated:

only the Communist Party of Kampuchea can lead the revolution to definitive victory. (117). 57

In 1973 Ith Sarip maintained that the CPK had recently

"bragged" that

it is absolutely not under the guidance of the Vietnamese communist party; it is equal to all ... communist parties and independent. (118) .

By October 1972, North Vietnamese and American negotiators in Paris had reached an agreement on terms for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. Until mid-1972 the United States had insisted that, before any agreement could be finalised, the DRV would have to guarantee that the revolutionary forces in Kampuchea would also observe the ceasefire. According to Porter, the Vietnamese delegation rejected this proviso as "neither possible nor required under the terms of the agreement However, it is clear that the

VWP relayed the Americans' demands to the Kampuchean party leadership. In fact, according to the Black Paper, the

Vietnamese were quite eager for the CPK to enter into negotiations with Lon Nol: they allegedly sought to "frighten" the Khmer revolutionaries into arranging a ceasefire with the ( 122) Phnom Penh regime, by painting a gloomy picture of the prospects for revolution in Kampuchea and emphasizing the threat posed by

the new effectives enlisted by the Lon Nol army, the air and naval pieces, etc., of the latter. (123).

The Vietnamese communists stressed that "according to their data... the enemy was powerful". Early in 1972 the VWP apparently increased the pressure: Pham Hung, an important party figure, was giVen the job of convincing the Kampuchean communists to consider a ceasefire.Later that year, in

response to CPK protests that they "had nobody to carry out negotiations", the Vietnamese allegedly replied that V in our opinion, the Kampuchean comrades must negotiate. If the Kampuchean comrades have no cadres to carry out negotiations with the U.S., we can do it (in) their place. (126).

To the CPK, this offer clearly displayed that "Vietnamese (12 7) impudence" was "boundless". ' The VWP also passed on

Kissinger's threats to bomb the Khmer Rouge into submission if negotiations were rejected: the American secretary of state reportedly asked Le Duc Tho to

inform the Kampuchean side that if Kampuchea did not ceasefire, the Ü.S. strategic and tactical planes would destroy Kampuchea within 72 hours. (128).

To the CPK leaders, it seemed as if it was the Vietnamese who were making these threats. The Black Paper asks:

Did Kissinger really talk like this? Probably. But anyway, the Vietnamese were involved in the affair. (129).

To Wilfred Burchett, such insinuations reflected

the low level and rabid anti-Vietnamese prejudice of the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary leadership (rather) than any realities of the situation. (130) .

However, given the steady deterioration of VWP-CPK relations which had been taking place over the previous ten years, it was

inevitable that the Kampuchean communists would interpret

the actions of their Vietnamese counterparts in this way.

According to their own account, the Kampuchean revolutionary

leaders repeatedly refused to bow to VWP demands that they

negotiate with Lon Nol and the Americans.^131^ Even Sihanouk, who had begun to make tentative references to the possibility (132) of a negotiated peace during 1972, returned to a harder (133) line after meeting with "in-country leaders". The CPK

leadership was apparently keen to generate support for their

stance amongst the Khmer peasantry and lower level party cadres. Late in 1972, Kuong Lumphon attended a mass meeting of

revolutionary forces somewhere in rural Kampuchea. At various

stages during this rally the crowd chanted "Reject I Reject I

Reject!" in response to the speaker's shouts of "Reject the imperialist negotiations ! " ^

The Khmer revolutionaries were apparently unanimous that they would not submit to Kissinger's threats:

our party, people and revolutionary army were not frightened. For the sake of the nation's honour, the nation's independence, we had to carry on the struggle. (135).

One writer has claimed that this obstinacy was

certaily due ... to the influence of Peking's perverse opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war. (136).

However, the Vietnamese have themselves made a point of

highlighting the Chinese communists' eagerness to promote a

ceasefire on Vietnam: this would please the Americans and

thus assist their own campaign for rapprochement with the United

States.According to one Vietnamese document, Zou Enlai

actually said that

It would be best for Vietnam and the whole of Indochina to relax for some time ... in this period of relaxation the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea will carry out a policy of peace and neutrality. (138). < It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Chinese were really

involved in some Machiavellian plot to widen the rift between

the two parties by secretly discouraging the CPK from

negotiating. In any case, the Kampuchean's refusal to discuss

a ceasefire can be explained without reference to the Chinese.

In response to VWP attempts to convince the CPK that to

continue the struggle against Lon Nol without Vietnamese

communist support would be a foolhardy venture doomed to 60 failure, the Khmer communists replied that they "analysed the situation differently". In fact, according to one CPK account, the Kampuchean revolutionary forces were in an extremely good position by the end of 1972: since 1970, the proportion of people living in areas under CPK control had allegedly "increased from 70% to 80% of the whole population"

By the end of 1972 the CPK leadership believed that "the political situation in the whole (of) South East Asia" showed

it was in Kampuchea where the revolutionary situation was best ... If the map was coloured, black colour would be in every place, except in Kampuchea where red colour would dominate. (141).

It is certainly true that, by this time, the government in

Phnom Penh was foundering: the only thing preventing the total economic collapse of the Lon Nol regime - already weakened by corruption and public discontent- was American aid.

Serge Thion believes that this was sufficient reason for the

Khmer revolutionaries' refusal to negotiate:

The CPK thought, not without reason, that the Lon Nol regime was collapsing from within and did not have long to go. Why give up on a sure thing? (143).

The Americans, who still believed the CPK to be a creature of North Vietnam, refused to accept the line put forward by the

Vietnamese negotiators in Paris - that the VWP was unable to deliver a ceasefire for Kampuchea: even several months after the signing of the Paris Accords, in January 1973, the United

States was making it clear that

there would be no final agreement on (post war) economic assistance to the DRV unless DRV performance on Cambodia is satisfactory. (144).

Perhaps Shawcross best describes the false perception which those in the West had of the Khmer Rouge: 61

All through the war diplomats and journalists at Phnom Penh dinners and cocktail parties spoke of "les autres" only in the vaguest terms. They were thought of as shadowy, insubstantial, inconsequential, wraiths almost, inhabiting that unknown, fearsome world "out there", where the bombs that shook the glasses actually fell. It was not until well after the war that the idea that the Khmer Rouge could in any way differ from actually be independent of, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong was entertained. (145).

What Western diplomats completely failed to understand was that, by 1973, the leverage which the Vietnamese had once possessed within the Kampuchean revolutionary movement had virtually ceased to exist. As Thiounn Mumm puts it, by this stage the

Vietnamese communists and

the group of pro-Vietnamese traitors who were in the CPK and in GRUNK couldn't do anything? they couldn't hold us back. (146) .

The fact that the ceasefire agreement on Vietnam went ahead despite the refusal of the CPK to be involved was largely due to another misguided assumption widely held by Western policy makers: it was believed that without Vietnamese communist support, the Kampuchean struggle would soon collapse in the

face of superior American firepower.^ * 7 ) According to one

CPK source, f the world's people believed that we would certainly be "flattened" as, from afar, they looked at tiny Kampuchea fighting without negotiations, compromise or retreat, (148).

As will be seen, the United States Air Force did its best to

"flatten" Kampuchea during 1973. 62

With the deposition of Sihanouk in 1970, the interests of

the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties momentarily converged. However, after years of being put on the "back burner" by the VWP, the CPK leaders' animosity towards the

Vietnamese communists was fairly deeply entrenched. Although

the Khmer revolutionaries accepted logistic support from the

VWP, the Vietnamese communists' superior attitudes and their repeated Insistence on attaching priority to the revolutionary struggle in Vietnam - which had virtually been taken for granted by the leaders of the KPRP during the 1950's - quickly provoked expressions of resentment on the part of the CPK

leadership. Furthermore, by 1970 the Pol Pot group had built up a small but nonetheless significant revolutionary force:

the CPK leaders had been leading the Kampuchean struggle on

their own for a number of years. Naturally enough, they were

unwilling to hand over the leadership and direction of their

revolution to the Vietnamese. In response to VWP attempts to

regain the influence they had once had within the Kampuchean

movement, the CPK resorted to what have been described as (149) "extremely vicious measures". It has been asserted that

the "Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique" sought to minimise the

influence of the Vietnamese and those they perceived to be

their agénts in order to "make the Kampuchean Communist Party

dependent on Peking".^ 50^ However, the Kampuchean party

leaders were clearly more interested in consolidating their

own control of the party organisation. In any case, if the

Chinese were playing a role in the widening of the rift

between these two parties at this time, it was in the same

indirect way described in the conclusion to the previous

chapter: there is little evidence for direct Chinese 63 involvement during this period. As Ith Sarin reported, as * far as the CPK was concerned, the Chinese were simply a

"counterweight to the Vietnamese danger".

It will be seen that over the next few years, the CPK leaders began to purge all of those Khmers who they felt posed a threat to their own position within the revolutionary movement. Anti-Vietnamese attitudes came to constitute a means of consolidating this position at the expense of those who could be portrayed as pro-Vietnamese.

By the time the negotiations in Paris ended, it had become clear that VWP interests were once again at ocUfs with those of the Kampuchean party. The VWP was once again exhorting the Kampuchean revolutionaries to scale down their struggle in order to suit what were essentially Vietnamese interests. Thus, as 1972 drew to a close, any hopes of a lasting Khmer-Vietnamese communist alliance had been dashed.

It is quite fitting that Son Ngoc Minh - the man who personified the belief that Kampuchean and Vietnamese communists

should work together towards a set of common goals - died at the end of 1972.(152) CHAPTER 4

1973-1975 6t

On the 27th of January 1973 the were signed by representatives of the United States and the D R V . ^

The Vietnamese communists have maintained that their struggle was not compromised by the terms of this agreement: one VWP document claims that, despite "all kinds of pressure" exerted by the U.S., the Vietnamese negotiators "made no concession

( 2 ) on matters of principle". On the other hand, the CPK has asserted that the North Vietnamese simply "snatched up the baits (3) launched (sic) by the imperialists" and that, by negotiating with the Americans, the Vietnamese communists betrayed the (4) Kampuchean's revolutionary cause as well as their own.

By mid 1973 the only Vietnamese communist forces remaining in Kampuchea were those stationed in sanctuaries adjacent to the Vietnamese border: apart from a small group of liaison cadres, there was no longer any VWP personnel involved in the

Kampuchean revolutionary struggle. (5 ) The withdrawal of

Vietnamese communists from Kampuchea - which, as stated above, had begun in 1972 - accelerated during the early months of

1973. 1 One observer comments that this was

an earnest sign of Hanoi's willingness to abide by the Paris agreement - at least in Cambodia - and perhaps also to decelerate the Khmer insurgents' military progress: from North Vietnam's perspective the premature fall of Phnom Penh could 1 have created an onerous responsibility in the governing of Cambodia or the establishment of effective control over the Khmer insurgent movement. (7) .

Friction between the "Khmer Krahom" on the one hand and the

Vietnamese communists and their Khmer allies on the other,

heightened by CPK disgust at the VW P 's willingness to agree to

a ceasefire, may also have contributed to the Vietnamese

decision to speed up this process of withdrawal. Norodom

Sihanouk has claimed that the Vietnamese departed in 1973 65 because the CPK 4emanded that they do so:

immediately after the signing of the... peace agreement the Khmer Rouge ordered the Viet Minh and Viet Cong stationed in Kampuchea out of the country ... In this way the Khmer Rouge hoped to punish the Viets, whose government betrayed the common cause. (8) .

Etcheson accepts this view, commenting that the Vietnamese were unlikely to forget this "grave insult". However, the fact that North Vietnamese* troops and the Viet Cong actually remained in their sanctuaries in Kampuchea's north eastern provinces and along the South Vietnamese border after 1973 suggests that the VWP's reduced support was more probably attributable to the Vietnamese communists'

overall Indochina plan ... Their primary interest clearly was the war in Vietnam; in Cambodia, their central concern was to maintain the level of security required for holding their bases and supply routes. (10) .

Of course, it is impossible to determine exactly what was going on in the minds of the VWP leaders. It should simply be noted that from the time of the Paris Peace Agreement onward, although the CPK still depended on North Vietnamese logistics to some extent, the Kampuchean communists were largely on their own. Free to pursue their own initiatives, they now accelerated their efforts to bring their revolution to a successful conclusion.

Another factor added to the CPK leaders' sense of urgency.

The signing of the Paris Accords left the Khmer insurgents to fight on alone, and consequently the full strength of the USAF was turned on Kampuchea: President Nixon was intent on forcing the CPK into accepting a ceasefire, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina. As one Khmer 66 communist bitterly observed,

the Vietnamese signed their own agreement with the Americans and the B52's which (had) bombed Vietnam were all sent to pulverise Cambodia. (12).

The statistics concerning this bombing campaign, which lasted from February to August 1973, are staggering. More than

250,000 tons of bombs were dropped from American B52's and (13) Lon Nol's T-28's: it has been noted that this was nearly twice the tonnage dropped on Japan throughout the entire Second (14 ) World War. Vast areas of the Kampuchean countryside were destroyed, and the number of innocent Khmer peasants who lost their lives is unknown.

Chandler comments that these bombings provided the CPK with the

psychological ingredients of a violent, vengeful and unrelenting social revolution. (15).

The Party now saw the struggle in "apocalyptic terms" : everything would henceforth be sacrificed to the revolution.

The destruction of so many villages and the deaths and dislocation of so many people enabled the CPK to speed up its (17) program for the communisation of Kampuchea. U.S. intelligence officer Kenneth Quinn noted that

« in early 1973 ... the Khmer Krahom entered the new harsh phase of their campaign in which all rules were strictly enforced and unpopular programs carried out. (18) .

Quinn observed that this campaign involved the establishment of

agricultural co-operatives, the redistribution of material (19) possessions and the abolition of debt. These measures were

often implemented with brutality. One Kampuchean who managed

to escape from a CPK zone reported that the Khmer communists

"killed people who did not follow their instructions or ideology". The Khmer Rouge apparently preferred to eliminate older people, making it clear that they hoped to (21) build "a new society with young people".

The founding of co-operatives was essentially a tactical response to the war. Thiounn Prasith has recalled that the new

system enabled the Kampuchean communists to co-ordinate work hours to the American bombs:

It helped our people organise their hours of agricultural production. If there was bombing in the day, they all worked at night and vice versa. (22).

Becker has described the co-operatives as

fortresses that locked up the people, the harv á l and all material possessions for the/exclusive use of the party and the revolution. (23) .

Nobody was permitted to leave or enter these co-operatives without permission, and in many cases entire villages were (24 ) relocated. The Black Paper has claimed that the CPK’s

tight control of population movement helped to minimise the

casualties inflicted by the bombings:

The U.S. planes did not succeed in causing big damages (sic) to... Kampuchea, for the latter was constantly on the move. (25) .

Bitterness over the bombings reinforced CPK animosity

towards the VWP. As Shawcross points out, the 1973 holocaust

confirmed the CPK leaders' conviction that

survival, let alone victory, could be guaranteed only by absolute independence from the Vietnamese. (26).

Etcheson observes that the Kampuchean communists' hostility 127) towards their Vietnamese brethren was "catalysed to near rage"

by the 1973 bombing campaign. The leaders of the CPK believed

that, if the Vietnamese communists had not signed the Paris

Accords, Kampuchea would never have had to endure the holocaust ( 28) of 1973. Sihanouk expressed Khmer resentment at a banquet kVv given invhonour in July 1973, when he stated:

While in the whole world and even in Indochina the peoples enjoy peace... the Khmer people are plunged more than ever in the hell of war. (29). (my emphasis)

The strict rules of the new co-operatives ensured that trade with the Vietnamese communists came to an end. Thiounn Prasith asserts that this was exactly what was intended:

The Vietnamese were the biggest problem in 1973. They would buy the rice. So we abolished money. If the people did not need money, if they lived in a co-operative where everything was provided for them by the state, they would not sell rice to the Vietnamese. (30).

Years later, Le Duc Tho himself acknowledged the damage wrought by the Kampuchean communists' new policies :

After 1973 the Vietnamese forces were faced with obstacles created by the Cambodian communists to their moving about and purchasing foodstuffs. (31) .

In fact, the Kampuchean communists apparently felt that any form of co-operation with the Vietnamese was now impossible, because

in the bosom of the party there would be no unanimity. All the more among the people who hated the Vietnamese (32).

However, the CPK evidently continued to accept Vietnamese financial aid during this period.

In Í973 the CPK began to conduct direct attacks on

Vietnamese arms depots, hospitals and base camps situated in (33) Kampuchea’s border regions. These activities led Quinn to conclude at the time that the primary goal of the Khmer Krahom (34) was to drive the Vietnamese communists out of Kampuchea.

The CPK politburo sought to explain away these attacks as incidents which stemmed from misunderstanding and unruly conduct by lower level soldiers. Although it is unlikely that they were convinced, the VWP leaders, who were unwilling to pick a quarrel with the Pol Pot group because sancturaries in Kampuchea Í 36 ) were still needed, apparently did not protest at the time.v

In 1981, however, the Vietnamese no longer had any reason to keep quiet: one VWP document published in that year recalled that in 1973 Pol Pot

provoked armed conflicts in Kampot province, murdering hundreds of Vietnamese cadres, combatants and wounded soldiers. (37).

Meanwhile, the Khmer communists accelerated the liquidation of all ethnic Vietnamese and Hanoi-trained Khmers serving in the

Kampuchean revolutionary army and the administrative structure of the Party. ’ They also embarked on a concerted campaign to eliminate all reference to Sihanouk, thereby undermining his popularity amongst the peasantry and eliminating the influence of his supporters - particularly the Khmer Rumdoah - within the (39 ) revolutionary movement. According to the CPK leaders themselves,

the Party took the position of strength, attacking finally and chasing absolutely the third force which was the obstacle. (40).

Local Khmer Krahom cadres ordered peasants to "support Khieu (41) Samphan and no others": rather than emerge from the

shadows themselves, the core CPK leaders were deliberately « promoting the idea that the popular Samphan was the leader of

the revolutionary movement. CPK propoganda teams went as far

as equating Sihanouk with Lon Nol and the North Vietnamese as (42 ) enemies of the revolution. In December 1973 the Khmer

Krahom in reportedly "dropped the masquerade

of supporting Sihanouk" and publicly identified themselves as ( 43} members of the CPK, while in Prey Veng a Khmer Krahom unit

demanded that the local Khmer Rumdoah terminate their policy of co-operating with the Viet Cong:

the Khmer Rumdoah refused, the discussion grew heated, and a firefight ensued. (44).

By September 1973 news of these conflicts within the Kampuchean revolutionary movement had finally seeped through to the West.

On the 9th of September the New York Times reported that

the conflict is apparently the result of a serious split among the Cambodian communists, the United States analysts now believe. (45).

Earlier in the year, the CPK leaders had still been keen to use Sihanouk's standing in the international arena to their own advantage. In February the Prince made a highly publicised

"secret" trip to the "liberated zones" of Kampuchea via the

Ho Chi Minh trail. He visited Angkor Wat and attended a mass meeting at Phnom Kulen, along with a number of CPK (47) leaders. However, the Pol Pot group was careful to ensure that Sihanouk's visit had little impact on the peasantry and lower level revolutionaries: it has been reported that CPK forces encircled Phnom Kulen and turned away many cadres who were on their way to the meeting. By the end of 1973 Pol

Pot had apparently decided that Sihanouk was no longer any use at all : the November announcement that all RGUNK ministries were (49) to be transfered from Beijing to Kampuchea was, in effect, a symbolic declaration that the Prince no longer had a role to play.

As has already been seen, considerable political power had for some time rested with the Party committees in each of the

Kampuchean revolutionary zones. This regional autonomy meant that local Khmer Rouge commanders had amassed a certain amount of personal authority which they were unwilling to surrender.

During the period 1973-1975 the Pol Pot group made significant 71 progress in consolidating their control of the CPK at the expense of these regional figures: this process was not to be completed to Pol Pot's satisfaction until 1978, with the fall of So Phim. Anti-Vietnamese propoganda proved to be an important tool in this undertaking : the Party centre sought to discredit those figures whom they did not consider to be sufficiently loyal by implying that they were

crooks, corrupt persons ... traitors to the revolution and ... puppets ready to obey the least Vietnamese orders. (51).

Although it is probably quite true that the CPK leaders were anxious to purge from the Party all figures who they considered to be members of a Vietnamese "fifth column" (or, at the very least, potential members of such a column), it is quite clear that the Pol Pot group often fabricated allegations of complicity with the Vietnamese communists in order to justify the elimination of any figures they considered to be a threat to their own control of the movement.

In the Eastern Zone, according to the Black Paper, the (52) party leaders were almost all "infiltrated agents" of

Vietnam. It is certainly true that, in 1973, even some ethnic

Vietnamese still held posts in the Eastern Zone branch of the (53 ) Party. The zone leadership also still included a number

« of Vietnamese-trained Issarak veterans: So Phim, the regional (54) party chief, was one such figure. Furthermore, many cadres (55) were married to Vietnamese women. Such people were naturally loathe to treat the Vietnamese communists as enemies. Before the 1975 victory, the CPK centre did not feel confident enough to confront this group directly. Although "disappearances" arranged by Santebal began to occur in this area in mid 1975, the Eastern zone leadership was largely left to pursue its own 72 independent policies. In fact, trade with the Vietnamese communists continued in this region until Pol Pot implemented his first purges of Eastern Zone cadres in 1977. ’ In that year, the CPK centre began asserting that So Phim and his comrades had been assisting the Vietnamese communists in their efforts to "topple the Communist Party of Kampuchea and * / co \ sieze power" for many years. Hu Nim was forced to confess that So Phim "did not agree with the (Central) committee ( 59 ) about the policy towards Vietnam", and that:

Brother Phim also did not agree concerning foreign aid. According to this view, we must accept aid from every country. He stressed (that we should) gather forces to oppose the Communist Party of Kampuchea. (60).

Kiernan reports that clashes occurred between Eastern and

South Western zone forces in November 1973. This conflict was apparently caused by demands made by the South Western zone leadership that the Eastern Zone abandon its policy of co-operation with the Vietnamese. By this stage Chou Chet - the chairman in the south west - had lost control of his region: Chou Chet had consistently favoured the policy of solidarity with the VWP.v 1 By early 1974 the military commander of this zone, - a staunch supporter of Pol Pot had effectively assumed the leadership of this region. He t thereupon proceeded to purge all lower level cadres whose Í 6 3 ) loyalty he suspected.1 1 Meanwhile, - another Pol

Pot supporter - was emerging as the new leader of the Northern

Zone.Koy Thuon, the moderate, pro-Vietnamese figure whom (65) he replaced, was executed in 1977. By the time the Lon

Nol regime surrendered in April 1975, the CPK central committee was, as a result of these manoeuvres, in a much more powerful position than it had been at the beginning of the civil war. In September 1974 the CPK leaders made a formal declaration of the "independence and sovereignty" of their party by issuing the History of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.v ' There were a number of differences between this document, which seems to have been written by Ieng Sary, and the history which had been produced by the Eastern Zone's Military Political Service during the previous year.v 1 The 1974 document carefully avoided mentioning any contacts or co-operation which had taken place between the CPK and the VWP in the past. In fact, the pre-1960 struggle was dismissed as "very weak",' * and a new founding date was chosen for the party. It was now asserted that the CPK had held its first congress in I960. 1

Thiounn Mumm recalled that

we took the 1960 date in order to disconnect ourselves from the ICP. (70).

Almost ten years of close co-operation between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties was thus erased from official memory.

The CPK made a number of other, more public declarations of independence at about this time. Thiounn Prasith published an article in one western journal, declaring that the Khmer resistance was certainly not

* an incoherent rebel movement in fief to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. (71).

The fact that the CPK was in complete control of the Kampuchean revolutionary movement was clearly signalled in April 1974, when Khieu Samphan embarked on an eleven nation tour, thus breaking Sihanouk's monopoly over diplomatic representation abroad. ( 12 ) Samphan's delegation consisted entirely of CPK ( ) members. 73 During his visit to Beijing, where he was greeted (74) by Mao himself, v Khieu Samphan declared that

in this war we have made great sacrifices. And for what have we made these sacrifices? It is not so that we can be dominated ... but so that we may be truly independent. We are not the slaves or the satellites of anybody. (75).

Kirk asserts that the fact that Khieu Samphan itinerary included Hanoi indicated that the emergence of the CPK as the real power within the Kampuchea movement had the full support of the Vietnamese communists.v ' However, it is more likely that the VWP had simply been forced to accept that the emergence of the CPK was by then a "fait accompli".

By mid 1974 the Phonom Penh regime was in serious trouble.

In 1973, by cutting supply routes at the same time as large (77) numbers of refugees streamed into government centres, the

CPK had triggered severe inflation in the areas under Lon Nol's control. Prices were estimated to have risen by 275 per cent in 1973 and an additional 40 per cent in the first quarter of ( 78 ) 1974. However, it was the Fulbright - Aiken amendment, passed by the U.S. congress in July 1973, which had sealed

Lon Nol's fate. This piece of legislation ruled that

no funds ... may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in or over or from off the shores of North « Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. (79).

Without American support, the economically exhausted Lon Nol regime was doomed.

These developments caused the VWP politburo considerable alarm. According to Sheldon Simon, the Vietnamese communists were not enthusiastic about a military collapse in Kampuchea before a political or military settlement in Vietnam, because they believed this would drain North Vietnamese administrative resources and enhance tendencies towards political independence on the part of the Khmer Rouge. (80).

Nevertheless, the Kampuchean insurgents managed to complete the encirclement of Phnom Penh on the 10th of April 1975. Seven days (81) later, the revolutionary army marched into the city: 1 the

Kampuchean civil war was over.

The CPK has claimed that without this victory, the

Vietnamese communists would never have defeated the Thieu regime. According to the Black Paper, the Vietnamese - observing the Kampucheans' victory - decided to mobilise

all their forces in North Vietnam to launch attacks in South Vietnam. Without the victory in Kampuchea, it would (have been) difficult for them to liberate Saigon. (82).

Of course, the VWP sees it differently:

In March 1975 attacks by the Vietnam People's Army against the Nguyen Van Thieu forces ... led to the disintegration of the whole U.S. military set up in Indochina. The Khmer Rouge forces switched to the offensive and Phnom Penh was liberated on April 17, 1975. (83) .

One thing is clear, however: in April 1975, when the CPK and the VWP were swept to power, the relationship between these two parties assumed a different form. From this point onwards, f the conflict between the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and the

Socialist Republic of Vietnam was to focus on the question of national boundaries, rather than revolutionary tactics.

It has been seen that, prior to 1973, the increasing friction between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties was largely caused by a divergence of party interests.

The developments which took place early in 1973 brought this process to its natural completion: whereas the Kampuchean communists* interests haá been in conflict with those of their

Vietnamese counterparts for some time, from mid 1973 onwards the Pol Pot group clearly felt that it was in their interests to pursue explicitly anti-Vietnamese policies. The CPK leaders' campaign to eliminate those "unreliable" Party leaders and cadres who could be accused of being pro-Vietnamese

- as well as their willingness to re-write history in order to show that the halcyon days of friendship and mutual co-operation between the two parties had, in fact, never taken place - were both designed to strengthen the Pol Pot group's stranglehold over the Kampuchean party and people. CONCLUSION 77

In 1975, according to the Black Paper, the VWP leaders

had their faces cadaverous and livid, for ... Kampuchea won victory before Vietnam, (and) their plan to take possession of Kampuchea automatically fell in. (1)

Thiounn Mumm has claimed that, as soon as their own victory was complete, the Vietnamese communists began "making preparations to make it possible for Vietnam to eat up Í 2 ) Kampuchea." Although such allegations are, at the very least, distortions of the truth, it was not long until the animosity between the leadership groups of the two parties found its ultimate expression. By early 1977 Pierre Rousset was able to record that

tensions between Vietnam and Kampuchea have led to a border conflict which has on several occasions resulted in military confrontations. (3)

This conflict escalated towards the end of 1977. Then, early in 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale offensive against

Kampuchea. ' ' Within three years of their "final" victory, the CPK leaders had been forced to return to the jungle.

Since then, they have committed themselves to the struggle to rid Kampuchea of the Vietnamese invaders and their Khmer allies ih Phnom Penh.

Although detailed conclusions have been made at the end of each of the preceding chapters, it would be appropriate to make a few brief comments at this stage. There are a number of theories as to why the Kampuchean communists distanced themselves from the VWP during the period 1963-1975. As has been seen, the close co-operation which developed between Beijing and the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea after 1975 has led the Vietnamese 78

communists - as well as a number of Western scholars - to

assert that the Chinese were seeking to drive a wedge between these two parties prior to 1975. Unfortunately, there is little concrete evidence to support this theory. Others have sought to explain the CPK-VWP rift by examining the CPK leaders* back-

(5 ) grounds, the ideological influences to which these figures were subjected during their formative political years' , and the traditional, ingrained hostility which many Khmers feel ( 7 \ towards their Vietnamese neighbours. ' 7 Although such factors may have played a part, these arguments tend to suggest that the breakdown of relations was somehow inevitable. This paper has shown that it is not necessary to resort to such speculative arguments. Relations between the CPK and VWP simply broke down because the interests of these two revolutionary organisations came into conflict. This only happened because, at various stages during the period discussed, external forces led the leaders of these two parties to modify their policies and tactics. In other words, even given the rise of the extremist Pol Pot group within the Communist Party of Kampuchea, this split was not inevitable. FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea 1930 - 1970" in D.£. Chandler and B.Kiernan (eds) Revoluti on — d- ^ -s- ■^£~berma't;h- ^ Kampnchea :.eighfc essaysfrMono/rranh Serias No. 25,. ïale University Southeast Asia Studies,, I 983J/ p 5.9

2. Porter notes that this instruction was in keeping with

general Comintern policy. See ibid., p. 58.

3. Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, (London; Verso,

1985), p. 13. As Kiernan notes, however, there were

a few individual Khmers involved in the movement

during this period.

4. ICP circular quoted in Pierre Rousset, "Cambodia:

Background to the Revolution"

Journal of Contemporary Asia, 7 (1977), p. 520.

5. Gareth Porter, "Vietnam in Kampuchea: Aims and Options"

Indochina Issues (May 1981), p. 3.

The issue of federation was formally considered at the

8th plenum of the ICP central committee in 1940. See Bern

Kiernan & .Chanihou Bouna, Peasants and Politics ira Kamnuche

1942-1981. (London; Zed Press, 1982), p. 18.

6. Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of

'* Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against

Kampuchea. (Phnom Penh; Ministry Foreign Affairs,

1978), p. 1.

7. See Nayan Chanda "The Bloody Border"

Far Eastern Economic Review, 100, 16 (April 21, 1978,

p. 18.

8. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

o p . cit., p . 6 0 . 9. Ibid., p . 64.

10. In fact, by 1948 three of the four Issarak military

zones were led by ICP members. See Kiernan,

How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 59.

11. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea"

op. cit., pp. 66, 67.

12. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 60.

13. See Jbid., p. 69 ff.

14. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

op. cit., p . 67.

15. Giap quoted in ibid.

16. In particular , Son Ngoc Minh met with Le Due Tho in

March, at Hatien in South Vietnam.

Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 79.

17. Ibid., p. 80.

18. Bernard Fall, The Two . 2nd ed. (New York,

Praeger, 1967), p. 54.

19. VWP document dated 24th June 1952, cited in Stephen Heder,

"Kampuchea's Armed Struggle : The Origins of an

Independent Revolution".

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 11, 1,

(January 1979), p. 2.

20. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea"

p. 68.

21. David Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea

When was the Birthday of the Party?" Pacific Affairs

56, 2 (Summer 1983), p. 291.

22. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 83.

23. Ibid., 84. 24. Ibid. KPRP rhetoric during the early 1950's apparently V demonstrated a commitment to the principle of

internationalism: co-operation between the

revolutionary movements of Indochina was emphasized.

Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea"

op. cit., p. 290 ff.

2 5. Ibid., p . 291.

26. By 1954 ethnic Khmers fighting in the UIF totalled about

3,500 soldiers, plus an unknown number of subdistrict

and village units. The majority of these were

recruited during the period 1952-1954. For further

details see Ben Kiernan, "The Origins of Khmer

Communism", South East Asian Affairs 1981, (Singapore;

Heinemann, 1981), p. 172.

27. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 131.

28. Pol Pot has apparently recalled that, due to Vietnamese

perfidy, the "revolutionary struggle of our people ...

vanished into thin air through the 1954 agreement".

Timothy Carney, "The Unexpected Victory"

(Unpublished Paper, 1981), p. 13.

29. Kiernan gives a detached account of these events in

How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 140 ff. The Vietnamese

f were apparently insistent that the Geneva discussions

should be based on the fact that liberation movements

existed in all three Indochina countries. The with­

drawal of a Viet Minh battalion from Kampuchea in

June 1954 seems to have resulted from a telegram from

Zou Enloi in Geneva, which warned that Vietnamese

attempts to strengten the Kampucheanfs position was

jeopardizing the Conference. 30. Ibid,, p. 142.

31. Ibid., p. 154.

32. Ibid., p . 156 ff.

33. Ibid., p . 162.

34. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 169.

35. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

o p . cit.. p. 71.

36. Ibid., p. 72. Sino-Kampuchean relations also improved

at this time. In 1956 the PRC gave $22.4 million

(U.S.) in aid to Kampuchea.

37. Ibid., p. 73.

38. For details, see Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power,

pp. 180 ff.

39. Ibid., 122.

40. Ibid. Kiernan makes some interesting speculations as to

the impact which these young Khmers1 experiences of

European communism had on their outlook. See also

K. Yoko, "Vietnam, Cambodia and China"

Ampo, 11, 1 (1977), p. 11.

41. Kiernan, ibid., p. 123.

42. Stephen Heder interviewed by Andrea Panaritis (Indochina

Project, 21 September 1984).

43. Khieu Thirith - Ieng Sary's wife - cited in Elizabeth t Becker, When the War was Over, (New York; Simon &

Schuster, 1986), p. 91.

See also Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 123,

4: Kiernan cites an interview with Chea Soth, who

recalled that Saloth Sar emphasized the importance

of "self-reliance, independence and mastery".

44. Kiernan, ibid., p. 157. 45. The KPRP was still officially under the leadership of

Son Ngoc Minh, who had been in Hanoi since 1954.

For practical purposes, the party was led by Tou

Samouth and Sieu Heng. The latter had been secretly

working for the government for some time. See ibid,

p. 171 for details.

46. Ibid., p . 191.

47. Becker, o p . cit.. p. 109.

48. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 190.

49. See Becker, o p . cit.. and Kiernan, ibid., for these two

differing points of view.

50. Kiernan, ibid., p. 198 ff.

51. Ibid., pp . 200, 201.

52. Vo Dong Giang quoted in Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy,

(San Diego; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 60.

53. Heder in Panaritis interview, op. cit.

54. See, for example, Chapter 2 of the Black Paper, which

deals with this period. CHAPTER 1

1. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 203.

2. Pol Pot, speech made in Phnom Penh 28 September 1977.

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, p. FE/5632/C/2

There is sufficient evidence to support Pol Pot's

figure of 90%: see Kiernan, ibid., p. 205 for

details.

3. Serge Thion, "The Ingratitude of the Crocodiles: the

1978 Cambodian Black Paper"

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 12, 4 (1980)p.45.

4. Another CPK document has claimed that the "strategic

and tactical line" of the party was "clearly and

correctly formulated during the 1st Party Congress

in 1960". See the August 1975 edition of

Revolutionary Flag, the CPK's internal magazine.

(Kiernan's draft translation).

5. Pol Pot, 1977 speech, op. cit. p. FE/5632/C/2.

6. Ibid.

7. For a detailed examination of this practice, see Chandler,

"Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea", op. cit.

8. For example, see Stephen Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed

Struggle: Origins of an Independent Revolution".

« Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,11 (1979).

9. Ibid., p. 3.

10. Ibid.

11. Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 19. This document,

prepared and issued by the CPK's Eastern zone

military political service in 1973, was declassified

by the CIA in 1978.

12. Becker, op. cit., p. 113. 13. Ibid.

14. See Pol Pot, 1977 speech, p. FE/5632/C/2: the Kampuchean

party secretary makes a point of emphasizing CPK

activities in urban centres.

15. Timothy Carney "The Unexpected Victory", p. 10.

16. The sole exception to this was Chou Chet. See Kiernan,

How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 242, note 158 for

the full list.

17. Becker, op. cit., p. 230.

18. Little harm came to those on the list who remained in

Phnom Penh. Sien An was jailed later in 1963,

but the rest were not molested. It is also

interesting to note that Khieu Ponnary - Pol Pot's

wife - remained in Phnom Penh, working on the staff

of one of Sihanouk's magazines, until 1965. See

Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 203, 204.

19. "Interview of Comrade Pol Pot to the Delegation of

Yugoslav Journalists" (Phnom Penh; Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, March 1978), p. 7. (Subsequently

Pol Pot, March 1978 interview).

20. Kiernan's interview ith Thiounn Mumm, 4/8/1980.

21. Ibid.

22. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 203.

23. Becker, op. cit., p. 114.

24. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 211.

25. Vorn Vet quoted in ibid.

26. "Cambodia and the Viet Cong", (Unpublished CIA report

dated December 1965), p. 10.

27. See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 221.

28. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op. cit., p. 3. 29. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 232.

30. Thion, o p . cit., p. 46.

31. "Cambodia and the Viet Cong", p. 10.

32. Heder, Panaritis interview.

33. "Abbreviated lesson on the History of the Kampuchean

Revolutionary Movement led by the CPK".

(Undated, unpublished CPK document), Kiernan's

translation, p. 4.

34. Black Paper, p. 26.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 31.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p . 25.

40. Hu Nim's Confession, 1977. Draft translation by

Ben Kiernan, pp. 12, 13.

41. Ibid., p. 29.

42. Ibid.

43. The theme of such allegations is generally that the CPK

was pursuing an anti-VWP line with the encouragement

of the Peoples' Republic of China. These assertions

will be examined in detail at a later stage.

44. Nayan Chanda, "The Bloody Border".

Far Eastern Economic Review, 100, 16 (April 21,

1978), p. 18.

45. It is only logical to presume that the CPK leadership were

doing something in the countryside between 1963 and

1966. All CPK documents consistently agree that some

preparations began soon after 1963. See also Donald

Kirk, "The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Ter^sts?" (Unpublished Paper, 1974), p. 6. 46 Summary of Annotated Party History, p . 19.

47 Pol Pot, 1977 speech p. FE/5631/C2/4.

48 Revolutionary Flag, p. 28.

49 Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 73.

50 Black Paper, p. 37.

51 Revolutionary Flag, pp. 27, 28.

52 Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 22.

53 Ibid., p. 23.

54 "Cambodia and the Viet Cong", p. 10.

55 Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p

56 Norodom Sihanouk, My War with the CIA, (Harmondsworth;

Penguin, 1974), p. 210.

57 Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op, cit.. p. 4.

58 Ibid.

59, Pol Pot, 1977 speech, p. FE/5632/C/3.

60, See Donald Kirk, "Cambodia's Economic Crisis"

Asian Survey, 11 (1971), pp. 243.

61. Ibid.

62. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op. cit., p. 5.

63. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 226.

64. See Ibid. p. 227 for Sihanouk's reaction to this

Campaign.

65. Hedefr, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", o p . ci t . . p. 5.

6 6 . Ibid.

67. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards Kampuchea",

op. cit., p . 70.

68. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 205.

69 . Ibid., p . 206.

70 . Ibid., p . 218. 71. The wording of one VWP document almost seems to be V designed to suggest that the WPK was represented.

See "The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict: A Historical

Record". (Hanoi; Foreign Languages Publishing

House, 1979), p. 7.

72. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 218.

73. See Document 186 in Gareth Porter, (ed.). Vietnam: A

History in Documents. (New York; New American

Library, 1981), pp. 291, 292.

74. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 219.

75. Ibid., p. 210.

76. Black Paper, p. 16.

77. Ibid., p. 23. These figures are clearly exaggerated,

presumably with the intention of supporting

assertions made later in this document: that without

the CPK's willingness to support the Vietnamese

communists by offering them sanctuary, the VWP's

forces would have been destroyed.

78. Ibid., p. 24.

79. According to one CIA document, although the Kampuchean

government was not publicly a "willing accomplice",

Kampuchean border posts were adopting a "laissez

« faire" attitude towards Viet Cong violations of the

Kampuchean frontier. See "Cambodia and the Viet

Cong", pp. 4-9.

80. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 215

81. For example, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim and Hou Youn. See

Ibid., pp. 188-190, for details of the activities

of these men.

82. "Abbreviated lesson on the History of the Kampuchean

Revolutionary Movement", p. 3. 83. Hoang Tui.g - VWP central committee member and political

director of Nan Phan - quoted in Chanda "The Bloody

Border", op. cit., p. 19.

84 . Black Paper/ p. 32.

85. Ibid.

8 6 . Thach in an interview with Cora Weiss, cited in Porter,

"Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards Kampuchea",

op. c i t .. p. 76.

87. Black Paper, p. 32.

88. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

o p. c i t ., p . 76.

89. Pol Pot has acknowledged this himself. See "Interview of

Comrade Pol Pot to the Democratic Kampuchean Press

Agency". (Phnom Penh; Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

April 1978), p. 3.

90. Hoang Tung in Chanda, "The Bloody Border", o p . c i t . . p. 19.

91. Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea”,

op. cit., p. 293.

92. Black Paper, p . 15.

93. Pol Pot apparently kept a very low profile in Beijing.

Sihanouk was certainly not aware of his presence.

For details see Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power,

pp. 222 ff. « 94. Ibid., p. 219.

95. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op. cit., p.7.

96 . Michael Vickery, Kampuchea; Politics, Economics and

Soci e t y . (London; Piritner, 1986), p. 24.

97. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 219.

98. Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 62. 99. The Truth About Vietnam - China Relations Over the

Last 30 Years.

(Hanoi; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979), p. 24.

This document is also condensed in Journal of

Contemporary Asia, 10, 3 (1980).

100. Ibid., p. 23.

101. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 223.

Kiernan cites an interview with Kieu Minh, an

eyewitness.

102. Ibid.

103. This assumption is made quite clear in Chanda,

Brother Enemy, p. 62.

104. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op, cit.. p. 18.

105. For Vietnamese allegations that split occurred in the

early 1960's, see The Truth About Vietnam-China

Relations.

106. I am indebted to Dr. M. Stuart-Fox for this argument.

107. The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations, p. 30.

108. See J.M. Van Der Kroef, Communism in Indochina.

(London; Macmillan, 1981), p. 42.

109.

110. See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 263.

111. The "Truth About Vietnam-China Relations, p . 23.

112. Resolution of the 11th plenum (8th session) of the CCP

central committee, August 1966.

113. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op. cit., p. 8.

114. Timothy Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea. Ç IILaco. V/C} Sewfi. t ^ ' Sfj<2s GrruiJJ. fL ft r 10 6 ' ■ See also Vickery, o p . cit., p. 18. 115. Chea Soth in an interview with Ben Kiernan. See Kiernan,

How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 220.

116. Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea",

o p . cit., p. 293.

117. Black Paper, p. 42.

118. Ibid., p . 44.

119. Ibid., p . 42.

120. "The 3 Previous Congresses of the Peoples Revolutionary

Party of Kampuchea", Vietnam Courier, July 1981, p.7.

121. Carney, "The Unexpected Victory", p. 15.

122. Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 62.

123. Carney, "The Unexpected Victory", p. 15.

124. Ibid.

125. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 224.

126. Hem Samrin in ibid., p. 224.

127. Vorn Vet's confession cited in ibid,, p. 224.

128. 1966 leaflet distributed by communist underground,

quoted in ibid., p. 232.

129. Thion, op. cit., p. 46.

130. Kiernan interview with Kham Teuan in Phnom Penh,

21 January 1986.

131. Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 29.

132. 75%'of the 82 seats were captured by rightist or

conservative elements. See Kiernan, How Pol Pot

Came to Power, p. 231 ff for details.

133. Ieng Sary in Kiernan and Boua (eds.) Peasants and Politics

in Kampuchea, p . 168.

134. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", o p . cit., p. 7.

135. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 393. CHAPTER 2

1 . Sihanouk in Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p.

2 . Kirk cited in ibid., p. 247.

3 . Sihanouk in ibid., p. 250.

4. 250,000 Chinese out of a total population of 6 million,

according to The Economist 11th November 1967.

5. Ben Kiernan, The Samlaut Rebellion and its Aftermatht the Origins of Cambodia* s Liberation Movement, Part. II. (Melbourne;Centre for Sou^east Asiam Studies, Monash University, 19750 P 1 6 . Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, (Harmondsworth;

Penguin, 1978), p. 184.

7. Sihanouk in J Ccrii&A f siK&Joid «?\Jt/

Asian Survey, 9/j

8 . Ibid., p. 60.

9. See Becker, Ponchaud and Van Der Kroef in the works cited.

Heder maintains that the Khmer revolutionaries were

encouraged by "politically ascendent" elements in

China at the time. See Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed

Struggle", p. 10.

10. Becker, o p . cit., p. 121.

11. Ponchaud, op. cit ., p. 185.

12. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 260.

13. Ibid.

14. Ith Sarin, A Report on 9 Months with the Maquis.

(Unpublished Paper, 1973), p. 6.

15. Revolutionary Flag, p. 28. ,In his 1977 speech, Pol Pot

said that the Samlaut uprising was "started by the

people themselves". See Pol Pot, 1977 speech,

op. cit., p. FE/5632/C/3.

16 . For details see Kirk,"Cambodia's Economic Crisis",

o p . cit . , p . 242. 17. Ibid., p. 243.

18. Ibid.

19. Trawney in J.C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant

(New Haven; Yale University Press, 1976), p. 1.

20. Kiernan & Boua, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,

p. 166 ff.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid

25. Ibid

26. Ibid., p. 171.

27. Ibid.

28. Pol Pot, 1977 speech, op. cit., p. FE/5632/C/3.

29. Ibid., p. FE/5632/C2/4.

30. Ibid., p. FE/5632/C/3.

31. Revolutionary Flag, p. 29.

32. Ibid. In 1977 Pol Pot said that "following the

experimental uprising at Samlot (sic)", the CPK

decided that "it was time to begin the phase of

armed struggle". Pol Pot, 1977 speech, op. cit.,

p. FE/5632/C/4.

33. Blaçk Paper, p . 33.

34. Ibid.

35. Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 66.

36. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

op. cit . , p . 78.

37. Excerpts from broadcast text of Sihanouk's recorded

"message to the nation", BBC Summary of World Broad­

casts, p. FE/2447/A3/3 ff. 38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Carney, "The Unexpected Victory", p. 15.

41. See footnote 37.

42. Kiernan and Boua, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,

p. 172.

43. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 232, 233.

44. Vickery, op. cit., p. 19.

45. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 282.

46. Kiernan and Boua, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,

p . 181.

47. Ibid.

48. Revolutionary Flag, p. 30.

49. Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 30.

50. Kiernan interview with Son Sen, 4th August 1980.

51. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 268.

52. Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 31.

53. See Kiernan, The Samlaut Rebellion and its Aftermath.

54. Sihanouk in Ibid., Part II, p. 17.

55. Revolutionary Flag, p. 29.

56. Carney, "The Unexpected Victory", p. 14.

57 . Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 15.

59. Carnev accepts this view. See ibid.

60. See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 275.

61. Black Paper, p. 33.

62 . Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 280.

(Cites airgram from U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh to

U.S. Dept, of State, as well as an interview with

Yos Por). 63. Jbid.

64. Revolutionary Flag, p. 31.

65. Ibid. , d. 30.

66 . Pol Pot, 1977 speech p. FE/5632/C/4.

67. "Vietnam: The anti-U.S. Resistance War for National

Salvation 1954-1975". JPRS, No. 80968: 3 June 1982.

68. "The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict", p. 99.

69. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 267.

70. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

op. cit.. p. 80.

71. Revolutionary Flag, p. 29.

72. Carney, "The Unexpected Victory", p. 14.

73. Ibid.

74. "Abbreviated Lesson", p. 6.

75. Black Paper, p .33.

76. Member of South Western zone quoted in Kiernan,

How Pol Pot Came to Power, p . 278.

77. See ibid., pp. 270 ff for a full examination of the

situation on the various zones and the independent

stance of the Eastern zone.

78. Ibid., pp. 270, 271.

79. Ibid,, p. 279.

80. Ibid,.

81. Ibid., p. 249.

82 «MnGirling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myths. (Singapore?

Institute of SE Asian Studies, f

83. New York Times, 19 March 1970.

84. Ibid.

85. Michael Leifer, "Political Upheaval in Cambodia",

World Today, 26, p. 236. 86. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", op. cit., p. 14.

87. Ibid.

88. "Anti-U.S. Resistance War", p. 124.

89. Ibid., p. 125.

90. Notebook entries August-September 1969 by a COSVN cadre,

in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, No. 88.

(Issued by U.S. mission, Saigon).

91. Van Der Kroef, Communism in SE Asia, p. 54.

92. Black Paper, p. 39.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. See ibid.

97. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

op. cit., p. 82.

98. Black Paper, p. 42.

99. Ibid.

100. Kiernan interviewwith Thiounn Mumm, 4th August 1980.

101. The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations, p. 24.

102. Black Paper, p. 42.

103. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 298.

According to Becker, the Vietnamese were worried by

Sihanouk's recent behaviour, and tried to "assess

his intentions" during this visit. Porter notes

that Sihanouk negotiated with Pham Van Dong over the

transshipment of supplies through Cambodian

territory.

See Becker op. cit. , p. 126 and Porter,' "Vietnamese

Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea", c?p. cit. , p. 81. CHAPTER 3

1. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 300.

2. Ibid., p. 302.

3. For details of Sihanouk's assertions see his

My War with the CIA.

4. See chapter entitled "The 1970 peasant uprisings against

Lon Nol", in Kiernan and Boua, Peasants and Politics

in Kampuchea.

5. See ibid.

6. A number of leftists participated in Lon Nol's government:

for example, Pach Chhoeun, Bunchhan Mul, Keng Vanssak.

See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 303.

7 * Ibid.

8. COSVN directive Jan-Feb. 1971: Document 244 in Porter,

Vietnam: A History in Documents, p. 396.

9. "Anti-U.S. Resistance War", p. 29.

10. Ibid., p. 130.

11. B lack Paper, p. 47.

12. Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents, pp. 390, 391.

13. See Nixon's address of April 30, 1970 in ibid :

Document No. 243.

14. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 304.

15. Black Paper, p. 43.

16. S. Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the

Destruction of Cambodia. (London; Fontana, 1980),

p . 246.

17. Pol Pot, 1977 speech, op. cit., p. FE/5632/C/6.

18. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 246. 19. See information provided in "Cambodia: Can the Vietnamese

Communists Export Insurgency?" (U.S. Bureau of

Intelligence and Research unpublished research study,

September 25, 1970). p. 1.

20. Ibid.

21. Becker, op. cit., p. 149.

22 . Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 298.

23. "Anti-U.S. Resistance War", p. 78.

24. Black Paper, p. 44.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ponchaud, op. cit., p. 188.

28. Pol Pot, 1977 speech, p. FE/2631/C/2,

29. Black Paper, p. 44. According to this source, Sihanouk * s

program was edited by Pol Pot without the Prince's

knowledge.

30. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 304.

31. "Anti-U.S. Resistance War", p. 126.

32. For transcripts of the various speeches made at this

Conference, see Signal Victory of the Militant Unity

of the Three Indochinese Peoples, (Beijing ; Foreign

Languages Press, 1970).

33. Document No. 5 in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes,

No. 88, (Notes of conferences held on 9th and 20th

April 1970) .

34. Document No. 7 in ibid: contents indicate written

15-29 April 1970.

35. Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents, Doc. 244.

36. "Anti-U.S. Resistance War", p. 136.

37. Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents, Doc. 244. 38. Shawcross , op. cit., p. 247.

39. Black Paper, p. 49.

40. Ibid., P- 46.

41. Ibid., P- 56.

42. Ibid., P- 52. 43. Ibid.

44. Jbid., P- 55. 45. Ibid.

46. Nuon Chea and Hou Youn were apparently in favour of the

Vietnamese communists' proposals. See Kiernan,

How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 309.

47. Revolutionary Flag, p. 42.

48. Carney, "The Unexpected Victory", p. 18.

49. Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea",

op. cit., p. 83. NLF directive referred to in

Doc. No. 6, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes,

No. 88.

50. "The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict", p. 9.

51. Ponchaud, o p . cit.. p. 188.

52. Martin Stuart-Fox, The Murderous Revolution.

(Chippendale; APCOL, 1985), p. 28.

53. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power.

54. Stuart-Fox, op. cit., p. 28.

55. Document No. 6 in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes,

No. 88 (April 16, 1970 circular of command

committee of Doan 180)..

56. "Planned Assistance for the Friendly Movement" (undated,

captured document: contents indicate April 1970),p.47

57. Black Paper, p. 57.

58 . Kiernan, "The Origins of Khmer Communism", op. cit., p. 129 59. Li Yang Duc in G. Boudarel "La Liquidation des Communistes

Cambodgiens formes au Vietnam". Problèmes politiques

et sociaux No. 373, (12 Oct. 1979), p. 6. (my

translation).

60. Kampuchea Dossier, Vol. I, (Prague; SRV Information

Service, 1978), p. 54.

61. Sihanouk, My War with the CIA, p. 248.

62. Ibid., p. 249.

63. "Can the Viet Cong Export Insurgency?" p. 5.

64. Ibid.

65. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 318.

Cites Lon Nol's intelligence sources.

66. "Communist Infrastructure in Cambodia" (Unpublished

DIA Intelligence Appraisal, 8 July 1971), p. 10.

67. Doc. 6 in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, No. 88

6 8 . "Planned Assistance for the Friendly Movement", p. 5 0 .

69. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 312.

70. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, No. 88, p. 5 0 .

71. "Planned Assistance for the Friendly Movement", p. 48.

72. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p.

73. Black Paper, p. 59.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. See Black Paper, pp. 60, 61.

77 . Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 419.

7 8 . Black Paper, pp. 60, 61.

79 . Ponchaud, op. cit., p. 42.

80 . "Communist Infrastructure in Cambodia", p. 5.

C 1 Ibid.

? ¿ ♦ "Can the Vietnamese Communists Export Insurgency ?" p. 83. Kuong Lumphon, Report on Communist Party of Cambodia.

(Unpublished report, 8 May 1973), p. 34.

84. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 338.

85. Ibid., p. 328.

86. See ibid for details.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.. p. 375.

89. Ibid.. d p . 386 ff.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 328.

92. See Hu Nim's confession.

93. Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle", p. 19.

94. Li Yang Due in Boudarel, op. cit., p. 6. (my translation).

95. See ibid.

96. Son Ngoc Minh guoted in Becker, o p . cit., p. 149.

97. "Communist Infrastructure in Cambodia", p. 6 •

As Kiernan notes, however, there were exceptions to

this rule: for example, Leav Keo Moni and Mey Pho

were assigned to positions of political responsibility.

99. Li Yang Due in Boudarel, op. cit., p. 6.

100. Kuong Lumphon, o p . cit., p. 14.

101. Stuárt-Fox, op. cit., p. 29.

102. Li Yang Due in Boudarel, OP. cit., p. 5.

103. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 386 ff.

104. Pon in ibid., p. 330.

105. "The Khmer Krahom Program to Create a Communist Society in

Southern Cambodia", (Unpublished, declassified DIA

document, 19 February 1974), p. 9.

106. See Shawcross, op. cit., p. 250. 107. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 335.

108. "Communist Infrastructure in Cambodia", p. 7.

109. Vietnamese communist cited in Shawcross op. cit., p. 250

110. "The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict", p. 10.

111. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 115.

112- Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 337.

113. Kenneth Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer

Krabom Revolution in Southern Cambodia 1970-1974",

U .S. Naval War College Review (Spril 1976), p. 10.

114. Kuong Lumphon, _op. cit., p. 36.

115. Ith Sarin, "A Report on 9 Months with the Maquis", p. 6.

H 6 . Ibid.

117. Extract from Ith Sarin, "Regrets for the Khmer Soul",

in Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea, p.53,

118. Ith Sarin, "A Report on 9 Months with the Maquis", p. 8.

119. Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents, p. 437.

120. Ibid.

121. The Black Paper devotes a large section to these talks.

122. Black Paper, p. 69.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid., p. 71.

126. Ibid., p . 72.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid., p. 74. This assertion is also made in the August

1975 edition of Revolutionary Flag.

1 2 9 ' _I b i d - 130. Wilfred Burchett, China-Cambodia-Vietnam Triangle,

(Chicago; Vanguard, 1981), p. 173.

131. See Black Paper, pp. 170 ff. 132. Carney "Unexpected Victory" p. 31.

133. Ibid.

134. Kuong Lumphon, op. cit. , p. 13.

135. Revolutionary Flag.

136. Burchett, op. cit., p. 171.

137. See The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations, pp. 35, 36.

138. Zou Enlai in ibid., p. 36.

139. Black Paper, p. 69.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid., p. 75.

142. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 347 ff.

143. Thion, op. cit., p. 51.

144. See Document 268 in Porter, Vietnam: A History in

Documents, p. 437.

145. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 236.

146. Kiernan interview with Thiounn Mumm, 4th August 1980.

147. See Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents, p. 437.

148. See Revolutionary Flag,

149. The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations, p. 38.

150. Ibid.

151. Ith Sarin, op. cit., p. 10.

152. Kiernan, "The Origins of Khmer Communism", | p c*iifrT p 179 CHAPTER 4

1. Carney, "Unexpected Victory", p. 31.

2 . The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations, p. 32.

3 . Black Paper, p. 71.

4 . See Ibid., p. 70 ff. , < — 5. There were approximately 5000 Vietnamese troops and cadres

in Kampuchea in mid 1973, according to Kiernan.

See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 358.

6. See Simon in Zc^t l*{P AaJ h\itfer (etís)

i* Indochina. (Toronto, Lexington Books, 1975), p. 216.

7. Sheldon Simon, "The Role of Outsiders in the Cambodian

Conflict", Orbis, 19 (1975), p. 212.

8. Sihanouk quoted in Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of

Democratic Kampuchea. (London; Pinter, 1984), p. 134.

9. Ibid,, p. 135.

10. Simon in Zasloff & Brown, op. cit., p. 200.

11. Shawcross, op. cit., p. 248.

12. "Khmer communist diplomat" quoted in ibid., p. 281.

13. Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea",

op. cit., p. 294. See Shawcross, op. cit., for a

detailed examination of this bombing campaign.

14. Chandler, ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 245.

16. Stuart Fox, op. cit., p. 30.

17. Chandler, o p . cit., p. 295.

18. Kenneth Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime",

U.S. Naval War College Review, p. 34.

19. See Quinn's original despatch, "The Khmer Krahom Program

to create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia",

cited above. 20. Nou Seng quoted in Kirk, "The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries

or Terrorists?" (Unpublished paper, 1974), p. 8.

2 i. Ibid.

22. Thiounn Prasith quoted in Becker, op. cit., p. 163.

23. Ibid.

24. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 323.

25. Black Paper, p. 65.

26. Shawcross, op. cit,, pp 298, 9.

27. Etcheson, pp. cit., p. 133.

28. This assertion is repeatedly made in the Black Paper,

p. 70 ff.

29. Transcript of Sihanouk speech made at a banquet given by

Zou Enlai in Beijing, July 6, 1973. (Beijing:

D.K. Ministry Foreign Affairs Press Release), p. 3.

30. Thiounn Prasith quoted in Becker, op. cit., p. 165.

31. Le Duc Tho quoted in ibid.

32. B lack Paper, p. 64.

33. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 358.

34. Quinn, op. cit., p. 11.

35. Becker, op. cit., p. 72.

36. No available VWP document mentioned these attacks at the

time. According to Becker Thanh Xuan said that the

VWP regarded these problems as "inevitable". See

Becker, op. cit., p. 73.

37. "The Three Previous Congresses of the Peoples

Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea", op, cit., p. 7.

38. Etcheson, op. cit., p. 133.'

39. Quinn, o p . cit ., p. 10.

40. Summary of Annotated Party History, p. 33.

41. Kirk, "The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?"

p. 10 . 42. The Khmer Krahom program, etc.", p. 6.

43. Ibid., p. 5.

4 4. Ibid.

45. Fox Butterfield reporting from Saigon, in New York Times,

9 September 1973.

46. A pictorial account of this trip was published in a 1973

supplementary edition of Peking Review.

47. Ponchaud, op. cit., p. 141.

48. Ibid.

49. Carney, "Unexpected Victory", p. 31.

50. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 420.

51. Pol Pot, interview to Democratic Kampuchean Press Agency,

(April 23, 1978), p. 3.

52. Black Paper, p. 65.

53. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 386.

54 . Jbid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., P- 420. 58. These allegations were made in Hu Nim's Confession,

59. Ibid., P- 46. 60. Ibid.

61. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 342.

62. Ibid., P- 375.

63. Ibid., P- 376 .

64. Ibid., P- 371.

65. Ibid., P- 419. 66. According to Kiernan, this document was distributed to

cadres in Hanoi in September 1974. Ibid., p. 364. 67. Kiernan provides an excellent comparison between these

two documents. See ibid., pp. 364-367.

68. Ibid., p. 364.

69. The 1973 Eastern Zone history refers to the 1960 congress

as the 2nd Congress. According to this document,

the 1st congress was the one which took place in

1951. For a good analysis of the CPK decision to

choose 1960 as the new "birthday" of the Party, see

Chandler, "Revising the Past", op . cit.

70. Kiernan interview with Thiounn Mumm, 4th August 1980.

71. Thiounn Prasith, "The Situation in Cambodia Reviewed",

Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2, p. 119.

72. Simon in Zasloff & Brown, op. cit., p. 202.

73. Ibid.

74. Malcolm Salmon (ed.), The Vietnam-Kampuchea-China Conflicts? motivations, background, significance (Canberra:'. Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studie; A.RFJJ.-, Working Paper No 1, March. 1979) p 26l 75 Simon, op city p 17 76 Kirk, "The Khmer Rouge Revolutionaries or Terrorists ?" p 7

77. Simon in Zasloff & Brown, op. cit., p. 206.

78. Ibid.

79. Transcript of this bill included in Porter, Vietnam:

A History in Documents, p. 438.

80. Simon in Zasloff & Brown, p. 223.

81. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 414.

82. Black Paper, p. 67.

83. "The Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict", p. 15. CONCLUSION

(1) Black Paper, p. 67. (2) Kiernan interview with Thiounn Mumm, 4th August 1980. (3) Pierre Rousset, "Cambodia: Background of the Revolution", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 7 (1977), p. 516.

(4) Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, p. 420.

(5) See Kiernan, The Samalaut Rebellion and its Aftermath, p. 24. Kiernan points out that a number of the CPK leaders were Khmer Krom, who had a traditional hatred of Vietnamese authority.

(6) See Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 119-121.

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Various articles in New York Times and The Economist.