Postwar Thailand: Indochinese Domino Or Chinese Checker?
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SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIES Vol. XXIII No. 5 (Thailand) POSTWAR THAILAND: INDOCHINESE DOMINO OR CHINESE CHECKER? by Brewster Grace October 1975 The American withdrawal from Indochina left ruling junta, many more are active in the political Thailand disoriented, exposed, and compromised. wings and able to obstruct and undermine civilian For decades, hardline, corrupt, anticommunist Thai government. Inevitably, new Thai foreign policy military generals had been building their political initiatives in postwar Southeast Asia will be powers and financial fortunes from the American accompanied at home by far more public debate and war effort and Thailand's communist phobia. outcry, and the opposition's barely concealed efforts Suddenly, in April 1975, Asia's image of an at sabotage. American umbrella was gone-crushed in the massive retreat from Saigon to Guam to Camp The second salient fact of Thai political life is the Pendleton-and Thailand found itself on the losing continued but substantially reduced American team. presence, influence, and political will. It was, after all, only two years ago that Thailand reached secret A logical choice for Thai officials in April seemed understandings and agreements with American clear enough: make new friends with former generals and ambassadors. Yet, in spite of postwar enemies and expect little from former friends. The United States pronouncements of a new posture Thais are finding, however, that making friends is toward Asia and asserted intentions of gearing its almost as difficult as fighting enemies, especially involvement to Thailand's invitation and desires, when the potential new friends, the Vietnamese, the long legacy of American paternalism as well as have been Thailand's enemy on many occasions important American strategic and economic through many centuries. Historically, Thai mistrust interests in Thailand still remain. of the Vietnamese is enormous. Continued American involvement is increasingly at odds with the newly surfacing though long-held Today Thailand faces the crucial problem of com- Thai nationalist perceptions of their nation as pletely remodeling its foreign policy. The country democratic, peaceful, and independent. Perhaps no must transform itself from an armed camp used as single event demonstrated this more clearly than the an airbase for United States bombers to a nation Thai anti-American outburst after the United States with peaceful and friendly interests and intentions military, despite Thailand's declared opposition, with all its Southeast Asian neighbors, rich, poor, used U-Tapao airbase for the Mayaguez operation capitalist or revolutionary. in the Gulf of Siam. The present could not be a worse time in which to Ironically, the person charged with transforming undertake this transformation; two crucial facts of Thailand from an American client to an indepen- Thai political life will tend to complicate their dip- dent nation in this difficult time is Kukrit Pramoj, lomatic efforts. The first is that in early 1975 Thai- for years a good friend of the Americans and for long land once again opted for parliamentary democracy, jokingly chided as being a kind of plenipotentiary letting loose conflicting interest groups in an in- for the United States Central Intelligence Agency creasingly complex political process. Leftist, (CIA) in Thailand. A literary man of sharp wit, he nationalist, pro-American, and capitalist elements has always embraced a hearty nationalism and an are now all equally active in national politics. And astute political cunning and cynicism, as well as an while the student rebellion of 1973 removed the ability to talk himself in, out, or around any situa- three most onerous military leaders who formed the tion. Copyright @ 1975, American Universities Field Staff, Inc. There may be other politicians better suited to 8-9,000. Moreover, many of these are not ethnic lead the country toward internal economic stability. Thais. There is room for argument, however, that But few appear to have political skill matching the insurgency is based at least as much on economic Kukrit, who must moderate between Thai military and social grievances due to neglect as actual infil- and American strategic interests, confront a strong tration and support from North Vietnam through revolutionary and potentially aggressive regime in Laos. Hanoi, and maneuver between emerging and con- flicting Russian and Chinese interests throughout To Hanoi and Bangkok, the quantitative differ- Southeast Asia. And he must do all this in the face of ence in the proxy war is of small consequence. Of impervious and growing domestic political passions, critical importance is how the generals and themselves often actively influenced by these Americans who ruled Thailand and the dedicated external forces. Kukrit Pramoj is at the forefront of revolutionaries in Hanoi over the past two decades Thailand's effort to build new relations within post- have viewed the seriousness of these threats in terms war Indochina. Whether he can achieve domestic of national security. Both sides regard the qualita- stability and security and also deal with, use, and tive, strategic difference as significant. In Hanoi, of balance political friends and foes at home, as well as course, the American bombings created such havoc Thailand's near and small neighbors and its more that one might wonder whether the Vietnamese will distant and powerful would-be enemies and would- ever trust the Thai again. In Bangkok, a decade of be friends, remains to be seen. Success or failure in staunchly pro-American military political leaders achieving rapprochement and understanding with reacted with paranoic conviction that every all of these may well determine whether peace in communist gain in Indochina and every weapon Southeast Asia is really at hand. Today Thailand supplied to the Thai Communist Party brought the most heavily feels the brunt not of peace but of the Thai domino to the brink of collapse. The funda- war's end. mental questions now facing postwar Hanoi and Bangkok are whether Bangkok can trust Hanoi not Hanoi: Animosity or Rapprochement? to support the North and Northeast Thai insur- gency, and whether Hanoi can trust Bangkok to Perhaps the most critical need for Thailand, and extricate Thailand from American influence so that Kukrit's most difficult challenge in postwar South- Indochina no longer feels threatened by United east Asia, is to make peace with North Vietnam. States belligerence via Thailand. Without this Hanoi and Bangkok have been at war by proxy for a reciprocal trust the two countries will not be able to decade: Hanoi via communist insurgents in Thai- move in the direction of establishing peaceful and land and Bangkok via collaboration with the productive relations. Americans throughout Indochina. It is unlikely that peace will come easily between the two, but with the At least a year before the collapse of Saigon, the dramatic end of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and North Vietnamese began making overtures of recon- Khmer wars of liberation, the opportunity may have ciliation. Their message was simple: with the come for Hanoi and Bangkok to forget their differ- removal of American bases, Hanoi and Bangkok ences and reach a new understanding. could sit down to resolve all outstanding difficulties. Without question, the actors and the action in this But at the time Thailand's domestic political situa- proxy war have been extremely unbalanced. The tion was too unstable to allow it to respond. United States financed Thailand to supply volun- Although the military dictatorships of the 1960s had teers to fight in South Vietnam and Laos and built been toppled by the 1973 student rebellion, the care- airbases for its destructive bombing operations taker civilian government of Sanya Dhammasak throughout Indochina. Hanoi, on the other hand, was too weak to challenge the vested interests the has provided military supplies and training to the Thai military had in continuation of the American communist insurgency in North and Northeast military establishment. Thailand. Two events in March and April of 1975 drastically The insurgency is not only undeniable but it also changed the possibilities. First, a national election appears to be growing in strength. Most estimates in Thailand brought Kukrit Pramoj to power (albeit place the number of active insurgents at about not until his brother Seni's cabinet collapsed a very short time after the national election) and revolu- Furthermore, reading the best intentions into tionaries prevailed in Cambodia and South Kukrit's withdrawal plans, he added that "The Vietnam, bringing an end to these two Indochina [Thai] people.. are resolutely struggling for United wars and shattering American credibility. States withdrawal from their countries and for Hanoi and Kukrit acted as might be expected. United States noninterference in their internal Kukrit announced on his election that American affairs." And finally, to declare the mission's objec- withdrawal from Thailand would take place within a tive, he stated that " . conditions are now favorable year. And the Vietnamese revolutionary govern- for negotiations to normalize the relations between ments proclaimed their interests in sending missions the democratic Republic of Vietnam and Thai- to Bangkok to discuss diplomatic rapprochement land." between the two Vietnams and Thailand. In retrospect it seems that conditions were not favorable. Vietnamese expected to stay for a few Kukrit's announcement came first, but his days and go home with promises of a turn to the motive, or perhaps the mix of several motives, may better in Thai-Vietnamese affairs. Instead, they have been more complex than the Vietnamese re- spent more than a week closeted in discussion and sponse suggests. His demand for total withdrawal left without so much as a joint communique'. Thai could have been a political ploy to mollify a bur- Foreign Minister Chatichai's optimistic interpreta- geoning, anti-American, largely student left wing. tion of the mission was that 30 years of animosity He may have wanted to strengthen his bargaining cannot be overcome in a few days.