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Conflict and Tension 1894 – 1918

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Conflict and Tension 1894 – 1918 Conflict and tension 1894 – 1918 Wider world depth study Revision workbook Acklam Grange History department 60 minutes 4 questions to answer. Total of 44 marks. Q1. This source supports …….How do you know? 4 marks Q2.How useful are sources B and C ……..12 marks Q3. Write an account of a crisis………8 marks Q4.The main reason for………was….How far do you agree? 16 marks + 4 SPaG Author: Mrs G Galloway Name: Part two Stalemate What you need to know Part two – The First World War: stalemate The Schlieffen plan including: the reasons for the plan, its failure, the Battle of the Marne and its contribution to the stalemate. Military tactics and technology including trench warfare. War of attrition. Key battles: the reasons for, the events and the significance of the Battle of Verdun. Key battles: the reasons for, the events and the significance of the Battle of the Somme. Key battles: the reasons for, the events and the significance of the Battle of Passchendaele. The war on other fronts The Gallipoli campaign and its failure. The events and significance of the war at sea and the Battle of Jutland. The U-boat campaign and convoys Timeline 23rd Aug 1914 Battle of Mons Aug & Sept Germans redirected troops to fight the Russians in the east 1914 Sept 1914 Battle of the Marne 1915 British blockaded Germany’s northern ports Feb 1915 Unrestricted submarine warfare used by Germans May 1915 American ship “Lusitania” torpedoed by German submarine April 1915 The Gallipoli Campaign 1915 First time poison gas used by the Germans 1915 Aeroplanes used as a weapon – now included a machine gun Feb 1916 Battle of Verdun May 1916 Battle of Jutland July – Nov Battle of the Somme – tanks first used here by the British 1916 6th April 1917 USA declare war on Germany July 1917 Battle of Passchendaele Nov – Dec Battle of Cambrai – tanks used successfully here 1917 How did the Schlieffen Plan contribute to a stalemate on the Western Front? What was the Schlieffen Plan? In 1892, France and Russia signed a deal to help each other out if either was attacked (the Franco-Russian Alliance). This posed a problem for Germany – if it went to war with one of these countries, then it would face war with the other. Germany was sandwiched between France and Russia, so war would mean that France could attack from the west and Russia from the East. This is known as “a war on two fronts”. Origins of the Schlieffen Plan Following the signing of the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Germans began working on a plan to deal with a “war on two fronts”. It was called the Schlieffen Plan in honour of its creator, General Count Alfred von Schlieffen, head of the German Army. The plan was simple – but risky. Schlieffen did not want to fight France and Russia at the same time, because this would mean splitting his army in two and sending half to the west and half to the east. Instead, he planned to beat the countries one at a time. He decided that France should be the first country to be attacked. Schlieffen knew that Russia lacked an effective road and railway system, so he assumed it would take several weeks (perhaps three to four months) for Russia to get its troops ready. This would give Germany time to beat France, who he felt would mobilise for war a lot quicker. After defeating France, German forces could then turn around and attack the Russians. Attacking France The plan involved several smaller groups of German soldiers entering France through its more lightly defended northern regions. However, most troops would not march directly into France; instead, they would invade France by marching through the smaller nations of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands first. These three countries lacked large military forces and Belgium and Luxembourg had borders with France that were not well protected. Once the huge force of German troops had successfully entered France, they would sweep south-west and down towards Paris. Schlieffen assumed that the French would not expect an attack through Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and that most French troops would be positioned on the German border. The Schlieffen Plan, therefore, meant the French would be outflanked and surrounded. Schlieffen predicted that Paris could be taken, and the French defeated in around 40 days, giving the Germans plenty of time to turn their forces around and attack the Russians. Problems with the plan The plan had several flaws: • Schlieffen assumed that Russia would take at least six weeks to get its army ready to fight. What if Russia got its army ready quickly – or France took longer than six weeks to defeat? • The plan relied on Germany attacking France through Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, in 1839 Britain had signed the Treaty of London – a treaty to protect Belgium. Schlieffen didn’t think the British would honour this 75 year old deal – but what if they did? And what if Belgium put up more fierce resistance than anticipated? • There was a further issue with Schlieffen’s plan. It actually made a war on two fronts more likely. Schlieffen took it for granted that if Russia and Germany went to war, then France would join in. But what if France stayed out of the war and decided not to help Russia? The plan ensured that France would be attacked, even if it was just Germany and Russia at war. The Schlieffen Plan guaranteed a large-scale conflict. The plan is changed The original Schlieffen Plan was adapted. Not all German generals supported the plan because some felt it was too risky. Schlieffen was replaced in 1906 by General von Moltke. He “downsized” Schlieffen’s plan by reducing the number of troops used in the attack and he removed the Netherlands from the battle plan altogether. The early stages of war When the war began, in August 1914, German troops invaded Belgium and Luxembourg, in line with their own modified Schlieffen Plan. The French had their own war plan (Plan 17) and invaded Alsace and Lorraine, the provinces that Germany had taken from France at the end of the Franco- Prussian War in 1870. The French plan relied on capturing the “lost provinces” quickly and advancing at speed towards Germany’s capital city, Berlin. Meanwhile, 120,000 highly trained British soldiers (known as the BEF – British Expeditionary Force) landed in France to help. However, within weeks, both the Schlieffen Plan and Plan 17 had gone horribly wrong. 1. Why was the Schlieffen Plan created? 2. Make two lists. One list should contain strengths about the plan. The other list should contain the weaknesses. 3. Why did Germany attack Belgium in 1914? 4. Can you suggest reasons why Germany did not think that Britain would get involved in the conflict? Think about Britain’s position in the world at this time. 5. If the Schlieffen Plan failed, what problems do you think Germany would face? Early problems for the Schlieffen Plan The Schlieffen Plan’s success relied on the speedy defeat of Belgium, followed by a quick victory over France. After this, German troops could march eastwards and take on the Russians. But things went wrong very quickly. The Germans had underestimated the Belgians, who put up much fiercer resistance than expected. They had built a series of huge, stone forts equipped with long range, powerful guns to protect the country from attack. This slowed the Germans down, especially at Liège where the combination of the fort and the bravery of Belgian troops delayed the German invasion of France by four or five days. The German advance was also slowed down at the Belgian city of Mons, near to the French border. Here the Germans faced the BEF who pinned down a large number of German troops. The British rifle fire at Mons was so fast that the Germans thought they were being machine-gunned. The Germans had been referring to British troops as a “contemptible little army” but this showed them that the British Army was small but well trained and effective even when outnumbered. The delay in the German advance forced the Germans to abandon their plan of sweeping around Paris to capture it – therefore disregarding one of the key elements of the Schlieffen Plan: the speedy capture of Paris. Also, at times the German Army marched too quickly – and their supplies of food, water and ammunition could not keep up with them. In the hot August sunshine of 1914, the German troops were already exhausted after only a few weeks at war. The Russian surprise The Schlieffen Plan relied on the Russians taking around six weeks to get their armies ready to fight. This six-week period would be enough, the Germans hoped, to beat France before turning their forces on the Russians. But the war against France was going badly – and the Russians only took ten days to get their armies on the march towards Germany and Austria-Hungary. In response to the Russian threat, the German’s ordered around 100,000 soldiers to leave the war in France and take on the Russians. This slowed down the German advance in France because there were now fewer soldiers to fight the French, Belgian and British troops. Germany was now fighting a “war on two fronts”, something that Schlieffen had tried to avoid. 1. Describe what you can see in the cartoon. 2. What can be suggested from the people / items that you have identified? A cartoon entitled “No Thoroughfare” by FH Townsend, a British illustrator and cartoonist, published in Punch magazine 12 August 1914.
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