37 HOWITZER BATTERY, ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY - AUGUST 1914 by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Watson, Section Commander, 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, 1964 to 1966
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37 HOWITZER BATTERY, ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY - AUGUST 1914 by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Watson, Section Commander, 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, 1964 to 1966. INTRODUCTION 1. Introduction. [It is alleged that, on Wednesday 19 August 1914, the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, ordered the German Army to walk all over the contemptible little British Army. Therefore, those members of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), who served in France, between 4 August 1914 and 22 November 1914, became renown as “The Old Contemptibles”. From 1924 until its disbandment in 1974, the Old Contemptibles Association was a highly respected British institution.] In late August 1964, 93 Le Cateau Battery, Royal Artillery (RA) of 25 Medium Regiment RA marched into Le Cateau led by their Battery Commander (BC), Major Bill Bayly to be presented with the Freedom of the Town. This was one of the very few Old Contemptibles 50th Anniversary events held in France that year. 2. Aim. The aim of this paper is to give an insight into the actions of 37 Howitzer Battery, Royal Field Artillery (RFA), now 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, when it fought at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August 1914, as related by some of the veterans of 37 Howitzer Battery and XV Field Brigade RFA at Le Cateau during August 1964. 3. Limitation. This paper is primarily written as a colloquial, rather than an academic, history for the benefit of the recently reactivated 93 Le Cateau Battery RA of 5 Regiment RA. Its main source is the “Martin Gale” pamphlet – further details at Para 58 4. Format. This paper is divided into five parts: a. Part 1. - The Artillery Battle on the Right Flank at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August 1914. (Para 5 to 17) b. Part 2. – The Aftermath. (Para 18 to 26) c. Part 3. - The Operational Background of August 1914. (Para 27 to 37) d. Part 4. – Overview of RA in UK circa 1914. (Para 38 to 55) e. Part 5. - Sources. (Para 56 to 59) PART 1 - RIGHT FLANK ARTILLERY BATTLE, LE CATEAU, 26 AUGUST 1914 5. Contents – Part 1. a. Introduction. – Para 6 and 7. b. The Preliminaries. – Para 8 to 10. c. The Attrition Phase. – Para 11 and 12. d. The German Break In. – Para 13 and 14. e. The Recovery of F Sub-section Gun. – Para 15 to 17. BACKGROUND 6. Battle of Le Cateau – Deployment. The intention of the Commander 2 British Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, was to check the momentum of the German follow-up forces and, then, break clean along the ridgeline running South of the Cambrai Road between Cambrai and Le Cateau – see sketch map at Enclosure 1. Hence there were neither any identified Corps or Divisional reserves, nor much depth to the British deployment at Le Cateau. On the right flank, 37 Howitzer Battery, XV and XXVIII Field Brigades were deployed in the open either side of the Roman Road within half a mile South of Quatre Vaux cross roads. It is what the veterans called, “Being The Cheese in the Le Cateau Mouse-trap.” The Battle of Le Cateau took place on Wednesday 26 August 1914, along a 15 mile front along the Cambrai Road between Cambrai and Le Cateau, see sketch map at Enclosure 1: a. 1 German Army. 1 German Army deployed four up, Right to Left: i. Right: 3 and 4 German Corps advancing astride the Roman Road. ii. Centre: 4 German Reserve Corps advancing towards Caudry. iii. Left of Centre: 2 German Cavalry Corps providing an aggressive screen to the West towards Cambrai. b. 2 British Corps. 2 British Corps deployed three up with its HQ at Bertry, Right to Left: i. Right: – 5 Division. West of Le Cateau. ii. Centre: – 3 Division. Area of Caudry. iii. Left: – 4 Division. Area of Haucourt. and mistook the left flank of 1 Cavalry Brigade screen covering the 10 mile gap between the two British Corps, as 1 British Corps securing their right flank. c. 19 Independent Brigade. 19 Independent Brigade were resting in Le Cateau, having covered the withdrawal of General Headquarters (GHQ) BEF to St Quentin, and came under command 2 British Corps early on the morning of the battle. 7. Right Flank, Le Cateau – Ground. The Right Flank Ground - Right to Left, see sketch map at Enclosure 2: a. Right: The low ridge along the right bank of the River Selle. b. Right Centre: The Selle Valley with Le Cateau and Montay built-up areas, the brickworks and wood. c. Centre and Left: A low horseshoe shaped feature with a hillock in its centre North of the main ridgeline – marked as Waldron‟s Post. d. Roads. The Cambrai and Roman Roads cross at Quatre Vaux; there is also with a network of farm-tracks that cross the ridges in cuttings as well as a Sunken Lane South of the Cambrai Road. [Most of these tracks and cuttings have disappeared due to post WW2 deep ploughing.] e. Railways. A single-track branch line, which ran beside the Cambrai Road, has long since disappeared. THE PRELIMINARIES 8. Le Cateau - Artillery Battle – Preliminaries. On Wednesday 26 August 1914, the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 5 Division, Brigadier General John Headlam, planned to support the continuation of 5 Division‟s Retreat from Mons along the Roman Road by supporting a short-check battle-position, North of the main ridgeline and South of the Cambrai Road, near Quatre Vaux. Apparently, a severe thunderstorm prevented him from recceing the ground before last light, Tuesday 25 August 1914. There was neither a 5 Division Artillery Operations Order nor a XV Field Brigade Defensive Fire Fireplan were prepared before the battle. The CRA 5 Division appeared to have delegated command of his three Field Brigades [Currently, Regiments RA] to their respective Commanding Officers (CO) on the understanding that they were to be seen to give their supported infantry their full support in accordance with the then Artillery Training and Doctrine concerning a retreat. However, the CRA started intervening and imposing his demands on his CO. At around 0400 hrs, Brigadier General John Headlam, CRA 5 Division, deployed 37 Howitzer Battery personally straddling a track North East of the hillock, marked as Waldron‟s Post. So they had time to start digging in and dumping some ammunition near their gun-line. Around 0430 hrs, on the own initiative of their BC, 11, 52 and 80 Field Batteries deployed in dead ground South of the hillock. As dawn started breaking at about 0500 hrs, the Staff Captain RA 5 Division, Captain Bartholomew insisted, on behalf of his CRA, that 11, 52 and 80 Field Batteries redeploy forward of the hillock - over ruling all of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Steven‟s objections. All they could do was to a camouflage their gun-shields with corn-stooks. XV and XXVIII Field Brigade and 37 Howitzer Battery were now deployed in an open line either side of the Roman Road, forming “The Cheese in the Le Cateau Mouse-trap.” See sketch map at Enclosure 2. [Fifty-eight of the remaining seventy-four 5 Division Artillery (Div Arty) guns were sandwiched between the Infantry (Inf) Firing Line and Inf Support Line – accepted practice for a disengagement action, if command was delegated to CO level or below. 119 Fd Bty RFA lost two guns at Elouges, Mon 24 Aug 14, when their BC, Maj Ernest Alexander, won the Gunners‟ first VC of WW1. 3 Div Arty deployed only four guns of their seventy-six guns that far forward and 4 Div Arty none!] 9. Le Cateau – A Belated Change of the Aim! Just after first light at 0530 hrs, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Commander 2 British Corps, learnt that 3 Division in the Centre was still occupying its positions and was in no fit state to withdraw promptly. Hence, his famous remark, “If they won‟t march; then they‟ll fight”. The 2 British Corps Aim was changed from Check and Break to Deliberate Defence. This order filtered down the chain of command slowly and often too late. [It also meant that the deployment of the three Right Flank Field Brigades (Fd Bde) RFA did not conform to the current Artillery Training and Doctrine in support of a deliberate defence, as they were sandwiched between the Infantry (Inf) Firing and Support Line battalions (Bn). They should have been deployed behind the Inf Support Line Bn]. Brigadier General Stuart Rolt, Commander 14 Infantry Brigade, informed CO XV Field Brigade that this change of plan meant “No Retirement” and also, added wrongly, that the troops on the East bank of the River Selle were 1 British Corps securing their right flank. In fact, they were elements of 1 Cavalry Brigade screen that were covering the Western half of the 10 km or so gap between the two British corps. III Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery supported 1 Cavalry Brigade. [3 RHA: D and E Batteries RHA – each with six 13 pdr Fd Guns]. See Sketch – 5 Division Artillery deployment at Enclosure 2 and 3. 10. Battle of Le Cateau – Initial Contacts. By 0630 hrs, German Infantry started approaching Le Cateau so 19 Independent Brigade pulled out South West down the Selle valley, instead of along the Roman Road as planned. On the right bank of the River Selle - East of Le Cateau, the 2 Corps Rear-guard, now consisting of: HQ 14 Infantry Brigade (less their commander) and six companies [four coy, 1 DCLI and two coy, 1 E Surrey] side-stepped the German pincer movement around Le Cateau; and headed South taking no further part in the battle.