37 HOWITZER BATTERY, ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY - AUGUST 1914 by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Watson, Section Commander, 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, 1964 to 1966. INTRODUCTION 1. Introduction. [It is alleged that, on Wednesday 19 August 1914, the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, ordered the German Army to walk all over the contemptible little British Army. Therefore, those members of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), who served in France, between 4 August 1914 and 22 November 1914, became renown as “The Old Contemptibles”. From 1924 until its disbandment in 1974, the Old Contemptibles Association was a highly respected British institution.] In late August 1964, 93 Le Cateau Battery, Royal Artillery (RA) of 25 Medium Regiment RA marched into Le Cateau led by their Battery Commander (BC), Major Bill Bayly to be presented with the Freedom of the Town. This was one of the very few Old Contemptibles 50th Anniversary events held in France that year. 2. Aim. The aim of this paper is to give an insight into the actions of 37 Howitzer Battery, Royal Field Artillery (RFA), now 93 Le Cateau Battery RA, when it fought at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August 1914, as related by some of the veterans of 37 Howitzer Battery and XV Field Brigade RFA at Le Cateau during August 1964. 3. Limitation. This paper is primarily written as a colloquial, rather than an academic, history for the benefit of the recently reactivated 93 Le Cateau Battery RA of 5 Regiment RA. Its main source is the “Martin Gale” pamphlet – further details at Para 58 4. Format. This paper is divided into five parts: a. Part 1. - The Artillery Battle on the Right Flank at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August 1914. (Para 5 to 17) b. Part 2. – The Aftermath. (Para 18 to 26) c. Part 3. - The Operational Background of August 1914. (Para 27 to 37) d. Part 4. – Overview of RA in UK circa 1914. (Para 38 to 55) e. Part 5. - Sources. (Para 56 to 59) PART 1 - RIGHT FLANK ARTILLERY BATTLE, LE CATEAU, 26 AUGUST 1914 5. Contents – Part 1. a. Introduction. – Para 6 and 7. b. The Preliminaries. – Para 8 to 10. c. The Attrition Phase. – Para 11 and 12. d. The German Break In. – Para 13 and 14. e. The Recovery of F Sub-section Gun. – Para 15 to 17. BACKGROUND 6. Battle of Le Cateau – Deployment. The intention of the Commander 2 British Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, was to check the momentum of the German follow-up forces and, then, break clean along the ridgeline running South of the Cambrai Road between Cambrai and Le Cateau – see sketch map at Enclosure 1. Hence there were neither any identified Corps or Divisional reserves, nor much depth to the British deployment at Le Cateau. On the right flank, 37 Howitzer Battery, XV and XXVIII Field Brigades were deployed in the open either side of the Roman Road within half a mile South of Quatre Vaux cross roads. It is what the veterans called, “Being The Cheese in the Le Cateau Mouse-trap.” The Battle of Le Cateau took place on Wednesday 26 August 1914, along a 15 mile front along the Cambrai Road between Cambrai and Le Cateau, see sketch map at Enclosure 1: a. 1 German Army. 1 German Army deployed four up, Right to Left: i. Right: 3 and 4 German Corps advancing astride the Roman Road. ii. Centre: 4 German Reserve Corps advancing towards Caudry. iii. Left of Centre: 2 German Cavalry Corps providing an aggressive screen to the West towards Cambrai. b. 2 British Corps. 2 British Corps deployed three up with its HQ at Bertry, Right to Left: i. Right: – 5 Division. West of Le Cateau. ii. Centre: – 3 Division. Area of Caudry. iii. Left: – 4 Division. Area of Haucourt. and mistook the left flank of 1 Cavalry Brigade screen covering the 10 mile gap between the two British Corps, as 1 British Corps securing their right flank. c. 19 Independent Brigade. 19 Independent Brigade were resting in Le Cateau, having covered the withdrawal of General Headquarters (GHQ) BEF to St Quentin, and came under command 2 British Corps early on the morning of the battle. 7. Right Flank, Le Cateau – Ground. The Right Flank Ground - Right to Left, see sketch map at Enclosure 2: a. Right: The low ridge along the right bank of the River Selle. b. Right Centre: The Selle Valley with Le Cateau and Montay built-up areas, the brickworks and wood. c. Centre and Left: A low horseshoe shaped feature with a hillock in its centre North of the main ridgeline – marked as Waldron‟s Post. d. Roads. The Cambrai and Roman Roads cross at Quatre Vaux; there is also with a network of farm-tracks that cross the ridges in cuttings as well as a Sunken Lane South of the Cambrai Road. [Most of these tracks and cuttings have disappeared due to post WW2 deep ploughing.] e. Railways. A single-track branch line, which ran beside the Cambrai Road, has long since disappeared. THE PRELIMINARIES 8. Le Cateau - Artillery Battle – Preliminaries. On Wednesday 26 August 1914, the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 5 Division, Brigadier General John Headlam, planned to support the continuation of 5 Division‟s Retreat from Mons along the Roman Road by supporting a short-check battle-position, North of the main ridgeline and South of the Cambrai Road, near Quatre Vaux. Apparently, a severe thunderstorm prevented him from recceing the ground before last light, Tuesday 25 August 1914. There was neither a 5 Division Artillery Operations Order nor a XV Field Brigade Defensive Fire Fireplan were prepared before the battle. The CRA 5 Division appeared to have delegated command of his three Field Brigades [Currently, Regiments RA] to their respective Commanding Officers (CO) on the understanding that they were to be seen to give their supported infantry their full support in accordance with the then Artillery Training and Doctrine concerning a retreat. However, the CRA started intervening and imposing his demands on his CO. At around 0400 hrs, Brigadier General John Headlam, CRA 5 Division, deployed 37 Howitzer Battery personally straddling a track North East of the hillock, marked as Waldron‟s Post. So they had time to start digging in and dumping some ammunition near their gun-line. Around 0430 hrs, on the own initiative of their BC, 11, 52 and 80 Field Batteries deployed in dead ground South of the hillock. As dawn started breaking at about 0500 hrs, the Staff Captain RA 5 Division, Captain Bartholomew insisted, on behalf of his CRA, that 11, 52 and 80 Field Batteries redeploy forward of the hillock - over ruling all of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Steven‟s objections. All they could do was to a camouflage their gun-shields with corn-stooks. XV and XXVIII Field Brigade and 37 Howitzer Battery were now deployed in an open line either side of the Roman Road, forming “The Cheese in the Le Cateau Mouse-trap.” See sketch map at Enclosure 2. [Fifty-eight of the remaining seventy-four 5 Division Artillery (Div Arty) guns were sandwiched between the Infantry (Inf) Firing Line and Inf Support Line – accepted practice for a disengagement action, if command was delegated to CO level or below. 119 Fd Bty RFA lost two guns at Elouges, Mon 24 Aug 14, when their BC, Maj Ernest Alexander, won the Gunners‟ first VC of WW1. 3 Div Arty deployed only four guns of their seventy-six guns that far forward and 4 Div Arty none!] 9. Le Cateau – A Belated Change of the Aim! Just after first light at 0530 hrs, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Commander 2 British Corps, learnt that 3 Division in the Centre was still occupying its positions and was in no fit state to withdraw promptly. Hence, his famous remark, “If they won‟t march; then they‟ll fight”. The 2 British Corps Aim was changed from Check and Break to Deliberate Defence. This order filtered down the chain of command slowly and often too late. [It also meant that the deployment of the three Right Flank Field Brigades (Fd Bde) RFA did not conform to the current Artillery Training and Doctrine in support of a deliberate defence, as they were sandwiched between the Infantry (Inf) Firing and Support Line battalions (Bn). They should have been deployed behind the Inf Support Line Bn]. Brigadier General Stuart Rolt, Commander 14 Infantry Brigade, informed CO XV Field Brigade that this change of plan meant “No Retirement” and also, added wrongly, that the troops on the East bank of the River Selle were 1 British Corps securing their right flank. In fact, they were elements of 1 Cavalry Brigade screen that were covering the Western half of the 10 km or so gap between the two British corps. III Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery supported 1 Cavalry Brigade. [3 RHA: D and E Batteries RHA – each with six 13 pdr Fd Guns]. See Sketch – 5 Division Artillery deployment at Enclosure 2 and 3. 10. Battle of Le Cateau – Initial Contacts. By 0630 hrs, German Infantry started approaching Le Cateau so 19 Independent Brigade pulled out South West down the Selle valley, instead of along the Roman Road as planned. On the right bank of the River Selle - East of Le Cateau, the 2 Corps Rear-guard, now consisting of: HQ 14 Infantry Brigade (less their commander) and six companies [four coy, 1 DCLI and two coy, 1 E Surrey] side-stepped the German pincer movement around Le Cateau; and headed South taking no further part in the battle. 2 Duke of Wellington‟s Regiment, 13 Infantry Brigade, were deployed in front of 14 Infantry Brigade and were tasked with denying the Quatre Vaux cross roads to the Germans until 0730 hrs as part of the original Check and Break plan. The order to change to Deliberate Defence did not reach them until after they pulled back. All morning the German infantry advances were kept in check by 5 Divisional Artillery shrapnel and Infantry Battalion Machine Gun (MG) fire, as well as the famous “Mad- minute” of aimed shots of the British Regular Infantry. The low railway embankment between the River Selle and Le Cateau wood also interfered with the cohesion of the initial German attacks to the South of Le Cateau. [This branch line has long since been closed and the embankment lost within the subsequent South Western development of Le Cateau.] However, from mid morning onwards, the German Divisional MG teams started establishing firebases in the brickworks, Le Cateau wood and, allegedly, in Le Cateau church towers. [Each BEF Inf Bn and Cav Regt had two MG in their MG Pl/Tp; whereas each German Div had a Div MG Coy of twelve MG.] THE ATTRITION PHASE 11. German Artillery – Effect. As the mist cleared, at about 0600 hrs, the 150mm German Depth Fire artillery, sweep and search harassment, fire started and continued all morning virtually unchecked. The veterans referred to this counter-battery fire as “„hosepiping‟”. Occasionally, German Air Observers, in aircraft, used coloured streamers to signal adjustments to the fall of shot. All forms of tactical communication and resupply were severely hampered by it. Within an hour, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens and his RSM as well as Major Eustace Jones, Battery Commander (BC) 37 Howitzer Battery, and his BSM were all badly wounded in their Command/Observation Post (CP/OP).

Figure 2. GUNNER CASUALTIES, LE CATEAU 1914 The Gunners accepted seeing men being killed and wounded but the sight of wounded and dying horses upset them far more. [The Germans had at minimum one eighteen-gun 150mm Medium (Med) Depth Fire Arty Bn per division – known to the veterans as “5/9s” (5.9 inch How). It is thought that were at least two such German depth fire artillery groups drawn from the three German infantry divisions engaging the British Right Flank, one near the Farm, and the other near the village of Montay; see sketch map at Enclosure 2. The Germans also had a 77 mm Fd Bty in support of each Inf Regt, each of three Bn. Initially, on the Right Flank, 5 Div Arty may have had an advantage of sixteen Fd Guns but, by midday, the Germans are thought to have had an advantage of fifty 5/9s (Med guns).] Around 0900 hrs, the Wagon Lines were moved from behind the hillock over the ridge to Reumont because of the frequent German artillery hose piping. During this move, Battery Quartermaster Serjeant [WW1 spelling] (BQMS) O‟Keefe of 37 Howitzer Battery posted the Battery Captain‟s (BK) Trumpeter, Boy Trumpeter Badgie Waldron, with his and Captain Douglas Reynolds' horses, beside the hillock at Waldron‟s Post to await Captain Douglas Reynolds‟ appearance; see sketch map at Enclosure 2.

12. 37 Howitzer Battery – Mid Morning. At some stage, 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle got fed up of tripping up over his sword and threw it away. About mid-morning, BK 52 Field Battery, Captain William Barber-Starkey strolled past 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line on his way to the CP/OP, as though he were still on The Curragh, and called out, “Hot work today boys!” He was given three cheers by 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line much to the annoyance of Captain Douglas Reynolds, BK 37 Howitzer Battery, who was a rather serious officer. Around noon, 37 Howitzer Battery saw, to their right, BK 80 Field Battery, Captain Archie Higgon lead a successful ammunition resupply of his Battery but this must have alerted the Germans. Shortly afterwards, to their left, BK 52 Field Battery, Captain William Barber-Starkey led a similar gallant attempt to resupply 52 Field Battery but it was halted by German shell-fire. [Martin Gale disputes the assertion that BK 52 Fd Bty was mortally wounded on the gun-line during the afternoon. Instead, they thought that Capt William Barber-Starkey was severely wounded when leading an ammunition resupply detail at midday. He died of his wounds in Le Cateau Hospital, 11 Sep 14.]

THE GERMAN BREAK IN 13. XV Field Brigade RFA – Early Afternoon. By 1300 hrs, the continuing German Depth Fire artillery „hosepiping‟, as well as the German machine-gun fire from the brickworks, Le Cateau wood and, allegedly, Le Cateau church towers, started winning the fire-fight. So 6, 7 and 8 German Infantry Divisions started preparing to over-run 13 and 14 Infantry Brigade of 5 Division either side of the Roman Road; see sketch map at Enclosure 4. About 1345 hrs, when the General Officer Commanding 5 Division, Major General Sir Charles Fergusson, permitted the guns to retire, the CRA decided to abandon the six guns of 52 Field Battery and galloped off to supervise the withdrawal of the eighteen guns of XXVIII Field Brigade from the West side of the Roman Road. Leaving his BMRA, Major Hercules Tailyour, to sort out the recovery of XV Field Brigade Group from the East of the Roman Road. [Three Fd Bty (11, 52, 80) and one How Bty (37). Subsequently, this became the standard establishment for all composite Fd Bde RFA on the Western Front.] After seeing 122 Field Battery suffered heavy casualties withdrawing only two guns because they were deployed in or forward of the Sunken Lane and now under direct German MG and rifle fire, the CRA 5 Division had no option but to abandon the remaining sixteen guns of XXVIII Field Brigade. Meanwhile, Farrier Quartermaster Serjeant (FQMS) Watts recovered four guns of 11 Field Battery from the very far right of the Gun Lines, nearest to Le Cateau, on a call from the senior surviving No1, Serjeant Hopper. At Reumont Wagon Lines, Major Hercules Tailyour, Brigade Major Royal Artillery (BMRA) [Currently, SO2 Arty Ops] 5 Division, placed 52 Field Battery teams on standby to assist then led the 80 Field Battery teams forward, who recovered five guns, with three 37 Howitzer Battery teams led by BQMS O‟Keefe, who recovered two howitzers. [It should be noted that the Roman Road was the direct route between the Gun Lines and the Wagon Lines at Reumont. It was inclusive to 13 Inf Bde and, therefore, also to XXVIII Fd Bde. However, 14 Inf Bde and XV Fd Bde were able to take advantage of the lie of land in their sector to move under better cover along the lanes and tracks between their Gun Lines and Reumont.] 14. Distribution of the Retirement Order. There is still controversy concerning the circulation and distribution of the retirement order to the XV Field Brigade Group Gun Lines on the afternoon of Wednesday 26 August 1914. In accordance with Martin Gale, this paper assumes that Major Hercules Tailyour, BMRA 5 Division, circulated the order to retire verbally. He led 80 Field Battery teams towards their Gun Lines, before passing by and alerting 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line on his way to 52 Field Battery Gun Lines and ending up thoroughly exhausted and collapsing at the XV Field Brigade Group CP/OP. a. 11 Field Battery. FQMS Watts and the 11 Field Battery teams had already left Reumont on the call from the surviving No1, Serjeant Hopper as all the officers were seriously wounded or killed. [Much to Brig Gen John Headlam‟s annoyance and disapproval, Maj Philip Henning, BC 11 Fd Bty is thought to have initiated the phrase, “Cheese in the Le Cateau Mousetrap.”] b. 37 Howitzer Battery. Captain Douglas Reynolds wrote that he first became aware of the retirement order when a Serjeant No1 and then a subaltern [possibly Lieutenant Stanley Custance] reported that a senior officer had just ridden by calling out, “The order is to retire.” [As BMRA, Maj Tailyour would have been wearing a red RA staff officer‟s hatband on his khaki No 2 SD dress hat and an RA staff officer‟s arm brassard. Therefore, he could have been easily mistaken for “a Senior Officer”.] c. 52 Field Battery. Apparently, at about the same time, as Major Hercules Tailyour brought the retirement order forward with the 80 Field Battery teams from Reumont, Lieutenant Robert Rome went to the CP/OP to request BC 52 Field Battery‟s permission for the guns of 52 Field Battery to retire. Major Arthur Nutt refused point blank to give his consent because of Brigadier General Stuart Rolt‟s previous “No Retirement” order – see Para 9 above. Meanwhile, the BMRA arrived at the 52 Field Battery Gun Lines. It is assumed that, on the BMRA‟s authority, 2nd Lieutenant Richard Neve ordered all the remaining ammunition to be fired off and the guns to be disabled before the Gunners pulled back to Reumont. When Major Arthur Nutt and the Field Officers of XV Field Brigade at the CP/OP learnt of this, they were incensed. [The XV Fd Bde Field Officers considered 2Lt Richard Neve‟s actions to be, at minimum, gross disobedience. The Martin Gale team considered this a gross injustice. From his PoW Camp in Germany, Maj Arthur Nutt initiated an unfortunate correspondence about this matter. It would appear that this led to the only award to 52 Bty being Maj Nutt‟s DSO. Maj Gen John Younger was of the opinion that the Svy Sjt 52 Fd Bty, Sjt Campbell (?), should have received some official recognition for running the 52 Fd Bty CP/OP for two to three hours in the mid-morning while both BC and BSM 52 Fd Bty were wounded and unconscious.] d. 80 Field Battery. Major Richard Birley, BC 80 Field Battery, had established his CP/OP near his Gun Line because 80 Field Battery was ordered to be a “Zones” Battery [Superimposed (?)]. He greeted the arrival of the 80 Field Battery teams with the cry of “What the hell are you doing here!” Before there was any chance to reply to him, Major Richard Birley was silenced badly wounded and silenced by a shell burst. [In 1917, Maj Birley was repatriated to UK because of a gangrenous leg wound. On arrival in Switzerland, his leg was amputated.] e. XV Field Brigade RFA. As 37 Howitzer and 52 Field Batteries were “On Task” batteries, their BC‟s Parties were collocated with XV Brigade Main HQ in a CP/OP area amongst 2 Suffolks – near where the Suffolk Memorial was built. [Only the Bde Comd, 14 Inf Bde and one staff officer, on loan from 19 Indep Bde, were collocated with these XV Fd Bde CP/OP staff. The HQ 14 Inf Bde staff were still isolated with the Corps Rear Guard on the far bank of the Selle.] They understood they were under the remit of Commander 14 Infantry Brigade‟s No Retirement order and, therefore, required a written confirmatory order to withdraw. Hence, the CO as well as BC 37 Howitzer and 52 Field Batteries refused to accept the BMRA‟s verbal command to retire. [There was also a Gunner Regimental protocol that commanders did not leave their CP/OP until they had confirmed that all their guns were out of action.] Lieutenant John Younger, Orderly Officer, XV Field Brigade, volunteered to ride back to HQRA 5 Division at Reumont to get a signed statement. He was ordered not to do so by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens, CO XV Field Brigade. Similarly, when 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle made his way with a horse to the CP/OP, as ordered to do so by Captain Douglas Reynolds, the wounded Major Eustace Jones, BC 37 Howitzer Battery, dismissed his offer of evacuation out of hand because E and F Sub-section guns had not moved from the 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line. THE RECOVERY OF F SUB-SECTION GUN, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA

RA Institute Figure 1: THE RESCUE OF F SUB-SECTION SECTION GUN, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA, LE CATEAU 26 AUGUST 1914 by Terrence Cuneo, 1964 Left - E Sub-section: Left - 2Lt Earle. E Sub-section Limber: Sjt Bower, Gnr Fraser, Gnr Robertson and Gnr Turner – none shown E Sub-section Drivers: Lead - Dvr Trelaor; Centre - Dvr Hall; Wheeler - Dvr Prior. Right – F Sub-section Drivers: Right to Left: Dvr Job Drain; Capt Douglas Reynolds; Dvr Ben Cobey; Dvr Fred Luke; F Sub-section Limber: Sjt Jumbo Butterworth, Gnrs Baker and Garlick – one not shown. 15. XV Field Brigade RFA – Mid Afternoon. The increasing stream of wounded and stragglers, heading towards Reumont through the 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line, raised the tension amongst the Gun Numbers. This situation worried, the normally taciturn, Captain Douglas Reynolds seriously, so he grabbed a rifle, and ordered the Gun Line to “Stand Fast!” On learning of the order to retire indirectly, Captain Douglas Reynolds started off on foot towards Reumont Wagon Lines without seeing BQMS O‟Keefe and his teams coming the other way. Fortunately, Captain Douglas Reynolds came across his Trumpeter, Badgie Waldron, all alone and wounded, but still hanging onto their two horses, where BQMS O‟Keefe had posted him earlier that morning beside the hillock - marked as Waldron‟s Post on the sketch-map at Enclosure 4. [At aged 15 years, Boy Trumpeter Badgie Waldron may be the youngest Gunner to be awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM).] Then, BK 37 Howitzer Battery spied two Left Section Gunners, amongst some stragglers. So he and Badgie Waldron escorted these two Gunners back to the 37 Howitzer Battery Gun Line before galloping back to the Wagon Lines at Reumont and commandeering two more teams, one each from 52 and 80 Field Batteries, before recovering a further pair of 37 Howitzer Battery howitzers. While at the Gun Lines, Captain Douglas Reynolds detailed off 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle to take a horse up to the CP/OP and persuade Major Eustace Jones, BC 37 Howitzer Battery, to retire. The BC 37 Howitzer Battery flatly refused to do so until all six 37 Howitzer Battery howitzers had been withdrawn. Meanwhile, Left Section removed the breechblocks and gun-sights from E Sub-section and F Sub-section; then, all those fit enough to do so marched off to Reumont under the command of Lieutenant Stanley Custance, the recently joined Right Section Commander, 37 Howitzer Battery. All the XV Field Brigade, 37 Howitzer Battery and 52 Field Battery command parties refused to withdraw from their CP/OP without sight of a signed retirement order because they felt bound by the Commander 14 Infantry Brigade‟s No Retirement order. Hence, all the XV Field Brigade Field Officers including BC 37 Howitzer Battery, Major Eustace Jones, and BMRA 5 Division were: either captured there, or at the Reumont church first aid post later that evening. XV Field Brigade Group lost 10 guns, nearly three-quarters of their officers and half of their horses but fewer than 20% of their men. So that is how 26 of 36 British guns lost at the Battle of Le Cateau 1914 were sited a couple of hundred yards either side of the Roman Road near Quatre Vaux. See Enclosure 4. [Subsequently, all references to “Cheese in the Le Cateau mousetrap” were deleted from the RA Archives, Woolwich in the 1920s when the official Gunner Historian for World War 1, Major General Sir John Headlam - the erstwhile CRA 5 Division, “sanitised” the WW1 records. He remained „sensitive‟ about the high proportion guns lost under his command at Le Cateau. Having deployed fifty-eight of his seventy-four remaining guns amongst the forward Inf Bn, he continued to be an advocate of deploying guns very far forward in order to boost the infantry‟s morale – see also Para 39. 119 Fd Bty, XXVII Fd Bde RFA, had already lost two guns at Elouges, Mon 24 Aug 14 when Maj Ernest Alexander won the first Gunner VC of WW1. Martin Gale considered CRA 5 Div responsible for the loss of 11 Fd Bty RFA at „Givenchy‟, (probably Battle of La Basse) October 1914 where the Battery was once again deployed too close to the Inf Firing Lines. Hence one of the reason why the Martin Gale team wrote their account – see Para 58. Brig Gen John Headlam was promoted to become MGRA 2 BR Army. At that time, it was an advisory and not a command appointment. Subsequently, he served in the equivalent of the British Defence Liaison Staff, Washington, USA. Both Brig Gen Frederick Wing, CRA 3 Div - who was killed in command of 12 Inf Div at the Battle of Loos 1915, and Brig Gen George Milne, CRA 4 Div – who became FM Lord Milne of Salonika, deployed their guns behind the Inf Support Line, except for four single guns within 3 Div. They covered the vital ground with fire and observation reasonably effectively despite the limitations of their main means of communication which were runners, heliographs and field telephones.] 16. 37 Howitzer Battery – Recovery of F Sub-section Gun – The Preliminaries. 37 Howitzer Battery were unique amongst the other batteries on the Right Flank at Le Cateau because, having just reached safety at Reumont with four of their howitzers, they were the only battery to make a further attempt to recover their remaining guns; see sketch map at Enclosure 3 and 4. For some unexplained reason, 37 Howitzer Battery occupied their Gun Line, before dawn in the dark, in reverse order. [Lack of training at night in Ireland (?)] So during the initial recovery of the guns, as per Battery gun-drill, Driver Job Drain [Lead Driver] led his team, Drivers Ben Cobey [Centre Driver] and Fred Luke [Wheeler Driver], to recover the left hand gun which was not their F Sub-section gun but the A Sub gun! At Reumont, the A Sub gun was transferred to a 52 Field Battery limber to enable Job, Fred and the F Sub-section team to make another attempt to recover their F Sub-section howitzer. So that is why the F Sub- section team were involved a second attempt to recover their F Sub-section gun. The drivers knew exactly what to expect and decided amongst themselves that the momentum of their team had to be maintained to be at all costs. Having gained the CRA‟s permission to attempt to recover the Left Section howitzers, Captain Douglas Reynolds got an immediate and positive response from the Battery when he called for volunteers to attempt the rescue. [Fred Luke implied that Capt Douglas Reynolds assumed that the Left Section Drivers would take part without being asked. These drivers knew better than to argue with or offer suggestions to any of their superiors, particularly Capt Douglas Reynolds. These young Drivers knew exactly what to expect on their return to the Gun Position, so they decided secretly to carry out an unauthorised stunt.] He selected mainly Gunners of Left Section because it was E and F Sub- section guns that required recovering. At the last minute, Captain Douglas Reynolds invited 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle “To come along in case there was any trouble!” 17. 37 Howitzer Battery – Recovery of F Sub-section Gun – Execution. Driver Fred Luke recalled the grim silence as the volunteers set off at a steady trot over the ridge from Reumont for a final time. His team was led 2nd Lieutenant William Morgan and the other by 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle with Captain Douglas Reynolds following close behind. With a 200 yards to go; they broke into a gallop; Driver Fred Luke thought the nearby Germans started cheering them on but with hindsight they may have been calling on them to surrender. Driver Job Drain as the Lead Driver of the F Sub-section team, with Drivers Ben Cobey [Centre Driver] and Fred Luke [Wheeler/Rear Driver], approachedin a C- shaped swerve from the left; bounced the offside limber wheel over the box-trail and halted the limber with its hook, 40 feet behind Job, directly over the gun trail-eye, see Enclosure 4. A superb piece of driving but an unauthorised stunt – used back in the Curragh Camp in Ireland, when the gun-teams would race one another back from the parade-square to the gun-sheds after gun-drill for a sweepstake - providing of course Captain Douglas Reynolds was out of sight! This enabled Serjeant Jumbo Butterworth, Gunners Baker and Garlick to limber the F Sub-section gun up immediately. As they started off, the Germans opened fire killing the Centre Driver, Ben Cobey, who threw his whip in the air as he died. It was caught by Douglas Reynolds, who galloped beside the Centre pair of horses, controlling them with Ben‟s whip. Meanwhile, the E Sub-section team kept to the gun-drill manual and made G-like approach from the left - as they halted and slowly backed the horses and limber towards the E Sub-section gun. The Germans shot and killed the horses. As 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle called out to the E Sub- section team “To clear out!” a shot broke his arm. Instead of doubling back with the others, Gunner Jock Fraser dashed over to the limber to grab his greatcoat. Distracted by Fraser‟s foolhardy action, 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle turned to watch him. As he did so, a second bullet hit him a glancing blow across his forehead and went out thorough his eye. The Germans let all the surviving Gunners escape on foot. Despite, the hectic drama of the rescue, Serjeant Jumbo Butterworth‟s most vivid recollection of the incident was on their return to Reumont when Captain Douglas Reynolds saw the blood-covered Sgt Bower, who had just rescued 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle and Gunner Fraser, was riding on F Sub-section‟s gun-trail. He ordered him to get off the trail immediately and walk! [It is thought that Capt Douglas Reynolds did not mention Sjt Jumbo Butterworth in his report because at least one member of F Sub-section disobeyed Capt Reynolds‟ order to “Stand Fast”. It is also thought that there may have been some antipathy between the BK 37 How Bty and the No1 F Sub-section. Later in WW1, Sjt Jumbo Butterworth was awarded a DCM and given an AER (Wartime) commission. He left the Army after WW1 and became an RSPCA Inspector. See lists at Appendix 2 to Annex A and Appendix 2 to Annex D.] PART 2 - AFTERMATH 18. Contents – Part 2. a. Casualties. – Para 19 to 21. b. Honours and Awards. – Para 22. c. Victoria Crosses. – 37 Howitzer Battery RFA – Para 23 to 25. d. Conclusion. – Para 26. CASUALTIES 19. Le Cateau – Aftermath. Within days, the Germans cleared the battlefield using conscripted local labourers, who buried all the dead in unmarked graves where they were killed. They did their best to record the names of the British casualties. The citizens of Le Cateau appreciated that the 5 Division‟s sacrifice at Le Cateau made their subsequent French victory on the Marne possible. Uniquely they, and not the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, built the Suffolk Memorial near the site of XV Field Brigade Group CP/OP – one side of which is dedicated to and records the names of the fallen Gunners of the Royal Field Artillery, including eight of 37 Howitzer Battery – see list at Table 11, Appendix 2 to Annex A. [Five Gunners, who died of wounds in Le Cateau hospital, are buried in the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) section of the Le Cateau community cemetery including Captain William Barber-Starkey, BK 52 Fd Bty.] 19 year old Driver Ben Cobey has no known grave; therefore his name is recorded on the Retreat from Mons Memorial at La Ferte sous Jouare. [The CWGC Retreat from Mons equivalent to the Menin Gate Memorial at Ypres.] 20. Le Cateau 1914 – Casualties. Initially, GHQ BEF thought that the 2 British Corps suffered about 15000 casualties at Le Cateau. Hence General Sir John French‟s, Commander BEF, immediate efforts to distance himself from Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien‟s decision to stand and fight. Once most of the stragglers were gathered in, it was revised down to 7500 of which 2500 were PoW. It is uncertain how many casualties the Germans suffered at Le Cateau. It must have been a significant number of casualties because they failed to press home their advantage and turn the Retreat from Mons into a rout. [The 1933 German Staff Battlefield Guide indicates that the Germans lost about 9000 killed and severely wounded ie: lost a limb or sight. The British equivalent casualty figure would have been half that at fewer than 2000 killed and severely wounded plus 2500 PoW.] 21. XV Field Brigade – Officers Subsequently. It is thought that the official archive copies of the XV Field Brigade and 37 Howitzer Battery nominal rolls for August 1914; may have been destroyed by incendiaries during WW2. Therefore, the only contemporary nominal records are only for the officers as listed in the RA Blue List 1914 and Kane‟s List of RA Officers, Volume 2 1862 – 1914; see Table 13 at Annex C. Of interest, these sources indicate that of the 23 Officers of XV Field Brigade Group; three were killed in action or died of wounds Le Cateau; six more were captured there and four more were killed later on in the war. Of the Field Officers, only Major Arthur Nutt, BC 52 Field Battery, completed a full career and retired as a Colonel in 1928. Most of the others were had been pensioned off by 1920 - several of them with disability gratuities. In 1916, Major Douglas Reynolds was the last of the “Right Flank, Le Cateau” Captains to die – each one of them was a great loss to our Regiment. Of the 13 subalterns: three were killed in action in World War 1; three became Major Generals and two Brigadiers in World War 2 – see col (e), Table 13 at Annex C. HONOURS AND AWARDS 22. 37 Howitzer Battery – Honours and Awards. Some people thought that award of all three Gunner Victoria Crosses for Le Cateau to 37 Howitzer Battery was unfair; see Annex D for details. The veterans accepted this view stoically and said that Le Cateau was a frontline gunners‟ battle in which all the Gunners fought hard much to the admiration of the supported infantry. The GOC 7 German Infantry Division and some of his senior commanders and staff officers, who fought at Le Cateau, visited Torgau Officers PoW Camp in late 1914 to discuss the battle with the British PoW, also admired their determination. [Torgau Castle (?) on the Elbe]. Or, as Fred Luke said in his typical self- facing way, “We got the VCs because General Headlam watched us from the ridge; saw what we did and was surprised that we ever got back!” Their greatest regret was that poor Ben Cobey was not even Mention in Dispatches let alone being awarded a posthumous VC. [It should be noted that the Military Cross (MC) and Military Medal (MM) were instituted later in WW1, circa 1915/16. In 1964, Martin Gale discovered a copy of Capt Douglas Reynolds‟s Post Battle Report. He made 12 commendations for “Conspicuous Bravery” – Ben Cobey‟s name was not mentioned; see Table 15, Appendix 2 to Annex D. The CRA 5 Div supported seven of these recommendations of which only Sjt Bower did not receive an award. Capt Douglas Reynolds wrote a letter to 2Lt Eric Earle‟s parents stating that he had recommended 2Lt Eric Earle for a VC. 2 Lt Eric Earle‟s sword was acquired as a battlefield souvenir by a German officer; on his death, it was returned to Brig Eric Earle by the German officer‟s family. Brig Eric‟s son, Lt Col D E M Earle, commanded 32 Regt RA in the mid 1960s.]

VICTORIA CROSS RECEIPIENTS, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA

Cigarette Card Figure 3: DRIVER JOB DRAIN VC, 1915 23. Driver Job Drain VC. Job Drain was born in Barking in the East End of London, on 15 October 1895, where a statue has been raised to his memory. He was the Lead Driver of the F Sub-section Recovery Team and left the Army as a Driver Serjeant in 1919. Eventually, he became a bus driver for London Transport and, subsequently, worked for the London Electricity Board. Fred Luke used to meet Job at the annual VC and GC Reunions in London in the 1960s. Sadly, he did not wish to attend any Gunner reunions. The veterans accepted Job‟s decision without any comment whatsoever; this was typical of the tremendous loyalty amongst all ranks of the Old Contemptibles Chums. Whenever the Sergeants Mess of 93 Le Cateau Battery tried to find out any further details, the veterans closed ranks and, without batting an eyelid, simply drank our Sergeants under the table! [No mean feat!] At age 18 years, 10 months and 11 days, Job is still the youngest Gunner recipient of a Victoria Cross.

Gunner Magazine

Figure 4: DRIVER FREDERICK LUKE VC, 1964 24. Driver Frederick Luke VC. Fred was born at West Tytherley, Hampshire, [Near Romsey] 29 September 1895, 17 days before Job Drain. On leaving school, aged 12 years, he worked as under-gardener in a country-house near Romsey, Hampshire. He joined up in January 1913 aged barely 17. [His elder brother, William, who died of his wounds as a Serjeant (No1 4.5” How) at Passchendaele, 1917, was already serving in the RFA.] Fred was the Wheeler Driver of the F Sub-section Recovery Team. He regarded his VC as being awarded to himself on behalf of the Battery and flatly refused to take any advantage from it. Fred kept his medals in a yellow Gold Flake cigarette tin; his VC is now part of the Ashcroft Collection on display in the Imperial War Museum, London. In early December 1915, King George V presented Fred and Job with their Victoria Crosses on parade in a field near Bethune, France. The King warned them not to lose their valuable medals in all this damned mud! [Fred and Job received their medals before their awards were published in the London Gazette. Some years later, when Fred attended a Buckingham Palace Garden Party, King George V greeted Fred with the words, “Well done Luke for not losing your medal in all that damned mud!”] Fred was gassed at the Battle of Loos 1915, recuperated in Glasgow and married there. [Contrary to popular opinion, Fred was only Scots by marriage! His grandson, Barry, who is Scots by birth, and great-grand daughters, Jo and Sue, now live near Taunton, Somerset.] In 1918, Fred returned to the Western Front as Driver Serjeant of D Howitzer Battery, 180 Field Brigade RFA (AER). After he was demobbed at the end of World War 1, it is thought that he became a caretaker, or janitor, of Glasgow Grammar School for Girls. In WW2, Fred served as an RAF Regiment Sergeant and afterwards became a technical storeman for an engineering firm. [By 1939, most other rank Old Contemptibles were at least 40 years old, so were considered too old to be reenlisted for active military duty during WW2.] He was one of nature‟s gentlemen, a small, unassuming man who mixed freely and charmingly with everyone. Fred survived on his state Old Age Pension and was always willing to visit 93 Le Cateau Battery on his terms: a. Being billeted in the Warrant Officers and Sergeants Mess; b. Travelling by standard and not 1st Class rail; c. Met at the station by the duty truck and not by an officer in a staff car. [When Fred Luke died in March 1983, he was the longest surviving Old Contemptible VC.]

RA Institute

Figure 5: CAPTAIN DOUGLAS REYNOLDS VC RFA, 1915 25. Captain Douglas Reynolds VC RFA. Douglas Reynolds, BK 37 Howitzer Battery, was the leader and instigator of the F Sub-section Recovery. He was born in Clifton, Bristol; his parents were Lieutenant Colonel Henry and Mrs Sarah Reynolds. Shortly afterwards, the Reynolds family moved to Cheltenham. So, Douglas was educated at Cheltenham College as well as “The Shop,” Woolwich. He did not seek popularity but was greatly respected for his professionalism. Douglas Reynolds was a rather serious officer who proved to be not only personally very brave but was also the lynch pin of the Battery throughout the Retreat from Mons. He left 37 Howitzer Battery when wounded in mid September 1914. His Victoria Cross citation not only refers to his gallantry at Le Cateau but also to a separate incident at Pisseloup on the Marne a fortnight later, when he led a fighting patrol and silenced a German battery holding up the British advance. Therefore, it is thought that Captain Douglas Reynolds might be the Gunner who has got closest to being awarded a bar to his Victoria Cross. In 1915, he returned to the Western Front as a Battery Commander was gassed and died in Trouville hospital in February 1916. [His only son, also Douglas Reynolds, was born after his father died. In May 1940, he also died of his wounds while serving as a Lieutenant, 2 Irish Guards near the Dunkirk bridgehead. Job Drain‟s and Fred Luke‟s Victoria Crosses are part of the Ashcroft Collection in the Imperial War Museum, London. Douglas Reynolds‟ VC is displayed at the Firepower Museum, Woolwich.] CONCLUSION 26. Conclusion. Initially, General Sir John French, Commander BEF and a cavalryman, thought Le Cateau was a British defeat saved by the intervention of Sordet‟s French Cavalry Corps on the left flank near Cambrai. Today, the Battle of Le Cateau 1914 is recognised as an outstanding British rear-guard action. [Contrary to the recommendation of Gen Sir John French, Comd BEF, FM Lord Kitchener appointed Lt Gen Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien as the new Comd 2 BR Corps. Gen French‟s preferred choice was Lt Gen Sir Herbert Plumer. Hence, Gen French always belittled Gen Smith- Dorrien‟s achievements; see Para 34 below. This antipathy was based upon their opposing views concerning the on-going debate about the future of the cavalry as mounted infantry as well as their views of the “Curragh Mutineers” of Spring 1914 – officers declining to take action against opponents of Irish Home Rule. The following year, FM Lord French succeeded in engineering Gen Smith-Dorrien‟s removal from command of 2 BR Corps shortly before his own dismissal as Comd BEF.] It is hoped that this summary of the disjointed, and sometimes conflicting records, of the Artillery battle on the Right Flank at Le Cateau, 26 August 1914 gives an insight into the gallantry of 37 Howitzer Battery RFA – now 93 Le Cateau Battery RA as well as the distinguished role of all the other Right Flank Gunners who fought so bravely at Le Cateau, 1914. The esprit de corps fostered by Fred Luke, the Martin Gale team and all the 37 Howitzer Battery veterans continues to thrive despite 93 Le Cateau Battery RA being subsumed within J (Sidi Rezegh) Battery RHA in 1983. [The 25 Wake (old 25 Regt RA OCA), including members of the former 93 Le Cateau Bty, meets annually in the RA WO and Sgts Mess, Larkhill under the presidency of Lt Gen Sir Edward Burgess - a former CO 25 Regt RA.] PART 3 - OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND – AUGUST 1914 27. Contents – Part 3. a. Overview – XV Field Brigade Group RFA – Para 28 to 31. b. Sunday 23 August 1914 – Para 32 and 33. c. Monday 24 August 1914 – Para 34. d. Tuesday 25 August 1914 – Para 35 to 37. OVERVIEW – XV FIELD BRIGADE GROUP RFA 28. Preliminaries – August 1914. General Headquarters British Expeditionary Force (GHQ BEF) was based on HQ Aldershot Command. The Corps level of command had only been introduced because of the 1904 Entente Cordiale to reflect the French chain of command. The Corps Headquarters were unestablished and the CRA at Corps HQ [Not CCRA] was the Corps Commander‟s Artillery Advisor and not a Commander in his own right. Therefore the Divisional CRAs acted independently of them. Initially, the BEF contained two corps of four regular divisions; 1, 2 and 3 Divisions were stationed on mainland UK and 5 Division, including 5 Division Artillery, in Ireland. 5 Division Artillery, including 37 Howitzer Battery, disembarked at Le Harve from Dublin on Tuesday 18 August 1914; as well as five independent cavalry brigades – formed into 1 Cavalry Division by 31 August 1914. The sketch map, at Enclosure 5, also illustrates why Emperor William 2 of Germany thought that the BEF was a Contemptible Little Army. In August 1914, seven German Armies faced six French and Belgian ones along the Franco German border; each one of these armies was at least twice as big as the original, 100,000 strong BEF – who revelled in their nickname of The Old Contemptibles – see also Para 1. The German Strategic Schlieffen Plan for the Western Front was for their 1, 2 and 3 German Army‟s to outflank the French forces along the Franco- German border by invading neutral Belgium and heading for the River Seine between Rouen and Paris. The German General Staff overlooked the ability of Britain‟s small all Regular BEF to punch above its weight amongst these large conscripted Continental armies. 1 German Army was taught this lesson firstly by the BEF infantry at Mons on Sunday 23 August 1914 and secondly by the BEF Gunners at Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August 1914. The time bars, see Table 9 at Annex B, indicate some of the challenges faced by 5 Division Artillery, including 37 Howitzer Battery, during August 1914 as they deployed from rural Ireland to the coalfields of the Franco-Belgian frontier. 29. August 1914 - Week 1. War was declared on Tuesday. [At the outbreak of WW1, an officer‟s personal weapon was a sword and not a pistol or a rifle. One of the first actions was for all officers‟ swords to be handed into the Unit Armouries for sharpening and dulling.] Units required a draft of quarter of their wartime establishment to bring them up to full strength. The reinforcements and reservists start arriving at the weekend in accordance with the „War Book‟. [Contingency Plans for Transition to War] When they reported for duty, most reservists were unfit and under-fed. A few were Regulars officers on mid tour UK furlough - 6 months UK leave from their duty station during 5 year overseas secondment; including: Captain Archie Higgon of the Gold Coast Artillery - BK 80 Field Battery who became Acting CO XV Field Brigade by teatime 26 August 1914 and also Lieutenant Stanley Custance, Right Section Commander 37 Howitzer Battery. 30. August 1914 - Week 2. Week 2 was taken up moving from Ireland to France. British SNCOs were particularly adept at loading and unloading their units on and off trains – providing the offices did not interfere. The Army was less well practiced in loading their horses and equipment onto shipping. The shipping was probably made up of small, chartered, 5000- ton coal-burning cargo-ships with a speed of about 5 knots; the voyage from Dublin to Le Havre took three days. Some horses died while embarking at Dublin docks; many others got stressed during the voyage so some also died at sea. 31. August 1914 - Week 3. They landed at Le Havre from Dublin on Tuesday 18 August 1914. Le Harve Dock facilities struggled to cope with their disembarkation. All units took the best part of a day to unload all their equipment and horses before waiting in transit areas on the local downs before moving by rail on one of 144 trains per day [Approximately one every 20 minutes!] to the BEF concentration area between Le Cateau and Avenses on either 19 or 20 August 1914. It is remarkable how well the French railway system coped with the mobilisation and deployment of 1.5 million French servicemen as well as the deployment of the BEF while under the immediate threat of a German invasion. So far, the troops were able to take advantage of the latest early 20th Century transport technology to get them to the front but from here on in, they were reliant upon their own determination and stamina as well as those of their horses for movement and supplies. In much the same as the Wellington‟s Waterloo veterans did 99 years previously 30 miles to the North East of Mons. The remainder of Week 3 was taken up with shaking out in the BEF Concentration Area near Le Cateau and preparing for the Battle of Mons and then starting the Retreat from Mons as may be seen on the sketch map at Enclosure 6. SUNDAY 23 AUGUST 1914 32. Battle of Mons. On Sunday 23 August 1914, 1 German Army were checked by the 2 British Corps screen along the Mons Canal. The BEF made their presence felt that day. The Germans suffered over 15000 casualties to fewer than 4000 British ones. [German casualty returns recorded killed and disabled only; British casualty returns included all types of casualties] There was relatively little artillery involvement because of the short lines of sight and limited fields of fire in what was then the grim industrial landscape of the Franco Belgian Coalfield so unlike the British rural training areas that the troops were accustomed to. However, Major Ernest Alexander, BC 119 Field Battery, XXVII Field Brigade, who won the Gunners‟ first Victoria Cross of World War 1 (WW1) while in close support of 1 Cheshires gallant last-ditch rear-guard action at Elouges that enabled 5 Division on the left flank of 2 British Corps to break clean. 33. Retreat from Mons – Phase 1. That night, the planned main battle of Mons was cancelled because of the unexpected withdrawal of 5 French Army who were deployed to the immediate East, between Maubeuge and Namur fortresses. Both British Corps started pulling back independently. 1 British Corps moved on the East side of the Mormal Forest along the reasonably maintained old Napoleonic Grand Route. While the main-body of 1 German Army pursued 2 British Corps, including 5 Division, along the far rougher old Roman Road to the West of the Mormal Forest. The rapid embodiment of the Territorial Force, now known as the Territorial Army, enabled them to take over the UK Home Defence role from 4 Division. So 4 Division stared arriving from England at the railhead of Solesmes on Monday 24 August 1914, much sooner than expected, and were placed under command of 2 British Corps. MONDAY 24 AUGUST 1914 34. Battle of Le Cateau – Preparations. Now, barely three weeks since war was declared and the start of their second week in France, the Battle of Le Cateau was about to begin. The weather was warm with frequent thundershowers so the troops were drenched. On Monday 24 August 1914, the new Commander 2 British Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien started planning to check the momentum of the German follow-up along the ridgeline South of the Cambrai-Le Cateau road; see sketch map at Enclosure 1. [The original Comd 2 BR Corps, Lt Gen Sir James Grierson - a Gunner and the British Army‟s authority on the German Imperial Army, had died of natural causes at Amiens on Monday 17 August 1914. He always outmanoeuvred Lt Gen Sir Douglas Haig during the pre-war annual Army exercises in England. His portrait hangs in the East Anteroom of the RA Mess, Larkhill.]

TUESDAY 25 AUGUST 1914 35. Tuesday 25 August 1914. On Tuesday 25 August 1914, GHQ BEF moved from Le Cateau - 20 miles to the South - to St Quentin covered by 19 Independent Brigade. The only telecoms link to GHQ BEF was the single telephone in each railway station that had to be shared with the French railway officials who were intent on coordinating all the additional troop trains, bring 4 Division in and elements of the 5 French Army out. [At this stage of the war, the only alternative was the Royal Automobile Club Volunteer Despatch Service made up of a dozen or so peers, with their chauffeur driven Rolls-Royce cars, and a small pool of dispatch-rider motor-cyclist. The existing HF Morse radio sets were cumbersome and best suited to support HQ during static warfare. It also took a significant amount of time to establish a working radio telecommunications network in the field.] On Tuesday 25 August 1915, under Sapper supervision, local French labourers prepared some earthworks and trenches but the siting of some of these defences was compromised because the locals insistence on not disturbing their own unharvested crops. 36. Evening, Tuesday 25 August 1914. All day on Tuesday 25 August 1914, 52 Field Battery was in close support of the 2 British Corps Rear-guard provided by 14 Infantry Brigade. It was the only unit of the rear-guard to make its way to the main battle position successfully. [No mean feat considering that 4 DG, with a strength of 250 sabres, lost over 150 stragglers including most of their echelon in three hours trying to make their way through Le Cateau that night.] By last light, XV Field Brigade, less 52 Field Battery, had established their field brigade leaguer to the East of the Roman Road approximately 200 yards South West of Waldron‟s Post, see sketch map at Enclosure 5. It is thought that 52 Field Battery eventually re-joined XV Field Brigade in their field brigade leaguer during the night. 37. 1 British Corps – Evening Tuesday 25 August 1914. Meanwhile, that evening, at Landrecies - 10 miles North East of Le Cateau, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig, Commander 1 British Corps, was dining with HQ 4 Guards Brigade in the town centre – when a German infantry regiment allegedly dressed in French uniforms and singing a French song, possibly the Marseillaise, bounced the Guards rear-guard on the outskirts of the town. It took The Coldstream Guards four hours of fierce close-quarter night-fighting to defeat this German initiative during which time a reservist, Lance Corporal Wyatt - who only three weeks previously had been a Police Constable on the beat in Barnsley, earned a Victoria Cross. In the meantime, General Haig demanded that 2 British Corps come to the immediate aid of his 1 British Corps. By the time, this message reached HQ 2 British Corps at Bertry, via GHQ BEF at St Quentin; the Battle of Le Cateau had already begun! PART 4 – ROYAL ARTILLERY, UNITED KINGDOM – circa 1914 38. Contents – Part 4. a. Background - General Staff. – Para 39 to 45. b. Background - Adjutant General. – Para 46 to 51. c. Background - Quartermaster General Staff. – Para 52 to Para 54 BACKGROUND - GENERAL STAFF (G) / (G2/G3) 39. Field Artillery Tactics 1914 – Summary. The other major units of 5 Division Artillery were equipped with 18 pounder Field Guns; they were XV Field Brigade at The Curragh, XXVII Field Brigade at Newbridge and XXVIII Field Brigade at Dundalk. The pole-trail and fixed charge system limited the range-coverage of the 18 pounder Field Guns. [Despite the gently undulating nature of the local Cambresis landscape, some 18 pdr Fd Guns were partially crested and limited to a minimum range of 1200 yards.] During pre-war exercises, 18 pounder batteries were sometimes deployed amongst the supported infantry battalions in hull-down, firing-positions rather than the conventional rear-slope, dead-ground, gun- positions. This concept was put to the test in action at Le Cateau by Brigadier General John Headlam. Unlike CRA 3 and 4 Division, as well as contrary to Artillery Training and Doctrine, he deployed fifty- eight of the seventy-four remaining guns of 5 Division Artillery between the Infantry Firing and Support Lines „to bolster the infantry‟s morale.‟ While the supported infantry appreciated the nearby Gunner firepower, they were annoyed by the muzzle-blast from the nearby British guns and loathed the collateral effects of the devastating German 150 mm „Jack Johnson‟s‟. [Universal rounds – HE and Shrapnel] counter-battery fire aimed at the nearby guns instead of the largely ineffectual Whizz- bangs or Pip-Squeaks. [The German 77mm Fd Gun Universal rounds bursting too high.]

Figure 6. BEF INFANTRY, August 1914 40. Field Brigade Command and Control. In August 1914, it would appear that an RFA Field or Howitzer Brigade HQ deployed in the field as a Main and Rear HQ. These HQ did not have the capability to support continuous operations at an intense rate for a prolonged period. There is no indication of an established post of Second in Command, Brigade RFA [Regiment RA]. The Main HQ contained the equivalent of a Tactical HQ and Fire Direction Centre; it was deployed forward and collocated with the supported brigade HQ and not with a supported infantry battalion HQ. It should be noted that HQ XV Field Brigade – Main was isolated throughout the Battle of Le Cateau, 1914 because HQ 14 Infantry Brigade failed to collocate with them. HQ 14 Infantry Brigade remained isolated with the 2 British Corps Rear-guard on the East bank of the River Selle until the late afternoon of Wednesday 26 August 1914. So Brigadier General Stuart Rolt, Commander 14 Infantry Brigade, attempted to command his brigade with one staff officer, on loan from HQ 19 Independent Brigade. Apart from a brief appearance near daybreak, HQ XV Field Brigade did not see him for the remainder of the battle! The Rear HQ/Brigade [Regimental] Office was deployed in the Wagon Lines [Echelon] under the command of the Adjutant. [As yet, no mention of Gunner QM officers at Le Cateau has been found; it is thought that QM were present but, as they were not commissioned officers, they may have been regarded as „Honorary Lieutenants.‟ The QM commission was introduced in 1917. Martin Gale refers only to RSM Goble and BSM Morrow; Warrant Officer status was introduced in 1915. The tactical communication links were heavily reliant on „Runners‟ and heliographs. They were neither robust nor battle worthy and were also of limited value at night. There were no tactical radios; the telephone lines were cut by shellfire and there is no mention of using either heliographs or signalling lamps. By November 1914, on the Western Front, the HQ of Fd Bde RFA reorganized their deployment into a Tactical HQ, Main HQ and Rear HQ.] 41. Battery Command and Control. Similarly, an RFA Field and Howitzer Battery HQ split into a Command/Observation Post (CP/OP) [Current Tac and Bty FDC] at the OP end with a Battery Office in the Wagon Lines [Echelon]. On 26 August 1914, 37 Howitzer and 52 Field Batteries were on „Tasks‟, while 11 and 80 Field Batteries were on „Zones‟. The batteries were deployed appropriately. [A Bty HQ did not appear to have the capability of supporting continuous 24-hour operations for a prolonged period. Batteries were allocated to „Tasks‟ – presumably „Close-support‟ and „Zones‟ – presumably „Superimposed‟. An „On Task‟ Bty CP/OP collocated with its RFA Bde Main HQ and supported Inf Bde HQ. While, an „On Zones‟ Bty CP/OP deployed near and upwind of its Gun Line. During 1915, on the Western Front, RFA Fd Bty command groups were reorganized into an observation post (OP) party led by a subaltern, a supported-arm liaison officer usually a subaltern, a Bty CP at the Gun Line manned alternately by the BC or BK and a subaltern as well as a Bty Office at the Wagon Lines manned alternately by the BC or BK and a subaltern recovering from a day at the OP.] See Battery Deployment Sketch at Enclosure 2. 42. Application of Fire. The Right Flank Batteries deployed before first light and waited for the morning mists to clear to reveal opportunity targets for immediate neutralisation. Maps of Ordnance Survey quality were in short supply and credible battlefield intelligence was almost non-existent at Le Cateau. [Lt Rory Macleod stated that 80 Fd Bty had only three sets of maps on deploying from the BEF Concentration Area; their Guns and Wagon Lines relied on guides for all movement.] So, there was no attempt to coordinate either a Defensive Fire Plan or predict prophylactic Artillery Fire Missions. Fire discipline protocols demanded that, even if a battery Gun Line position located the source of German counter battery fire positively, it required the BC‟s personal permission to engage it. At Le Cateau, the telephone lines as well as the semaphore flag and “runner” links were neutralised by the German artillery „hosepiping‟ [Sweep and Search Harassment] fire. This meant that the senior officer at the Gun Line of the two On Task Batteries had to report to their BC at the CP/OP personally to request permission for their Battery to engage on a counter Battery Target [Current Fire Mission Battery], before returning to their Gun Line to execute it. Table 1: UK IN BARRACKS ROUTINE circa 1914

Ser Timings Event (a) (b) (c) 1 0530 hrs Reveille 2 0600 – 0700 hrs Stables - First Parade 3 0730 hrs Breakfast 4 0800 – 0900 hrs Interior Economy 5 0930 – 1130 hrs Gun drill Parade 6 1130 – 1230 hrs Stables – Morning Parade 7 1300 hrs “Dinner” 8 1400 – 1600 hrs Individual Training/Saturday Sports 9 1600 – 1700 hrs Stables – Last Parade 10 1730 hrs “Teameal” 11 Additional Fatigues, Guards and Pickets

43. Peacetime Training. Table 1 above shows a generic Edwardian era in- barracks daily routine for a UK based field battery. Note, the extensive time spent looking after horses - most junior ranks would be responsible for the care of two horses each. Gun drill was a formal daily drill parade with similar ethos to “square-bashing.” [A concept of generic training capable of being applied to any operational scenario.] Afternoons involved individual trade training and education as well as general lectures given by an officer. The annual firing camp lasted only one week each year. There appeared to be little or no thought given to either training for night operations or fighting in a built up area.

RA Archives

Figure 7: 18 POUNDER FIELD GUN DRILL, 1914 The only training in the dark took place in the winter months to allow the subalterns to go hunting see Para 44 below. Although he was an exceptional horseman, Captain Douglas Reynolds was one of the very few officers who thought that battery gun-drill was more important that riding to hounds. Much to the bewilderment of his fellow officers, Douglas Reynolds refused to participate in any form of social or sporting equitation. He knew the gun- drill manual by heart; trained 37 Howitzer Battery hard in all weathers but not at night! 44. Equitation. There was a marked difference between the attitude of 37 Howitzer Battery to XV Field Brigade regarding foxhunting – [Symptomatic of „Professionalism‟ versus „Panache‟!] The XV Field Brigade officers were encouraged to take every opportunity to ride to hounds providing they fulfilled their duties somehow! It was possible for a Gunner officer stationed on The Curragh to ride out up to six days a week: four with a local hunt and two with the harriers - providing of course he was not posted to 37 Howitzer Battery. During the hunting season, XV Field Brigade officers would hold their gun-drill parades at 0630 hrs wearing greatcoats over their hunting pinks, if necessary by the light of the gun sheds lamps. Before going off following the hounds all-day and returning to give their afternoon training lectures in the evening at 1830 hrs followed by a formal dinner in Mess Dress at 2000 hrs sharp! [Under the Reserve Remount Scheme, officers could claim a grant of £75 to buy their own horses – the cost of a first class hunter in Ireland – they were far more expensive in England! It also entitled these horses to in-barracks stabling providing the officers contributed towards their horses‟ feed and insurance. In Ireland, most Gunner officers bought several hunters each under this scheme. The major disadvantage was that all Reserve Remounts were requisitioned on the declaration of war. An officer had very little choice in which horse he retained as his own military mount.]

BACKGROUND - ADJUTANT GENERAL (A) / ADMINISTRATIVE (G1)

RA Archives Figure 8: FIELD BATTERY RFA, 1919 45. Officers - XV Field Brigade Group. In the field, XV Field Brigade Group consisted of 37 Howitzer Battery and 11, 52 as well as 80 Field Batteries of XV Field Brigade. [Subsequently, this became the standard grouping for all Fd Bde RFA on the Western Front.] The officers of VIII Howitzer and XV Field Brigades messed together in Kildare RA Station Mess so they knew one another extremely well. The XV Field Brigade Group Officers‟ Nominal Roll is Table 8 at Annex A. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens, CO XV Field Brigade had very little influence on the battle as he was badly wounded very early on; it was thought that, at aged 48, he was past his prime. The field officers, in their early 40s, were also starting to feel their age after only five days of intensive campaigning. All the Battery Commanders had all seen active service in both India and Africa and were wounded and captured at Le Cateau. The Captains had seen action in South Africa as mounted infantry in the closing stages of the Boer War and as Gunners in India. They made their presence felt throughout their batteries from the CP/OP through the Gun Lines to the Wagon Lines regardless of the battle. Sadly, Captain Cully Buckle and Captain William Barber-Starkey were both severely wounded by midday and subsequently died of their wounds. While Captain Douglas Reynolds and the newly joined Captain Archie Higgon were outstanding; all of them were dead by February 1916. None of the subalterns had been in action before. All of them were greatly impressed and influenced by the general conduct and example set by each one of the Captains at Le Cateau for the remainder of their military service and continued to remember them with great pride. Table 2: 1915 ESTABLISHMENT SCALE – MANNING - FIELD BATTERY, SIX GUNS

Main Body Rank and File Annex (1) Ser All Ranks Men Horses Ser Rank Men (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 1 Officers 5 5 1 Corporals 7 2 BSM, BQMS, Sjts 11 11 2 Bombardier 11 3 Artificers 9 0 3 Gunners 74 4 Rank and File (1) 168* 150 4 Drivers 71 5 Trumpeters 2 2 5 Batmen 5 6 Sub Total 195 168 6 Sub Total 168* Note. 1. Link

46. XV Field Brigade – Establishment. [In 1914, there was a major reorganisation of the British Army‟s unit establishments. These reforms included the reorganisation of Inf Bn from two flank companies of two platoons each to four rifle companies of four platoons. It is thought that most Inf Bn had little practical experience of this reorganisation in the field prior to the outbreak of WW1. It was also unfamiliar to the reinforcing reservists who made up between 25% and 70% of the unit strength of a BEF Inf Bn. Six-gun Fd Bty RFA were already well established but the 60 pdr Hy Bty RFA were still manned according to a four gun unit establishment.] The RA Archives, Woolwich holds only the 1915 six-gun Field Battery Establishment Table – see Table 2 above and the Western Front Volume of the Regimental History also includes a table ammunition scales for the 1914 in service RHA and RFA artillery equipment. Martin Gale states that 37 Howitzer Battery had 200 men and 170 horses on leaving The Curragh. [During 1915, the How Bde RFA were disbanded and the 4.5 inch How Bty became the fourth gun battery of composite Field Brigades RFA for the remainder of World War 1. 8 How Bde RFA was disbanded circa 1915 when Fd Bde RFA were reorganised into units of three 18 pdr Fd Bty and one 4.5 How Bty. 37 How Bty RFA became the fourth Bty of XXVII Fd Bde and did not join XV Fd Bde RFA. In 1922, it was retitled 37 Fd Bty, 27 Fd Bde RA. In 1938 it was altered to 37 Fd Bty RA, 27 Fd Regt RA, as such, it served in Burma during WW2. Under the 1947 Laws‟ List Retitles, 37 Fd Bty RA, 27 Fd Regt RA became 93 Fd Bty, 25 Fd Regt RA. Circa 1948, 25 Fd Regt RA was posted to Hong Kong with 93 Fd Bty detached to Malaya. As a result of the sudden surge of insurgency activity, 25 Fd Regt RA joined 93 Le Cateau Bty in Malaya. In August 1954, the Battery was still serving in Malaya when it was awarded the honour title Le Cateau.] 47. Other Rank – Overview. The men of 37 Howitzer Battery did not mix readily with the Gunners of XV Field Brigade because of inter-unit rivalry and living in separate lines in The Curragh Camp - 40 miles West of Dublin. The Gunners and the Drivers were separate trade groups and had their own separate career paths until the reorganisation of the Gunners in 1922. The Junior Non Commissioned Officers (JNCO) would be in their mid twenties; the Senior Non Commissioned Officers (SNCO) in their late twenties and thirties. [The Drivers apparent rank ceiling was Driver Serjeant with some limited opportunities for further promotion mainly in the Brigade Ammunition Columns (BAC). In gun batteries, Gunner Serjeants were the preferred choice for BSM and BQMS. This was one of the reasons why both Fred Luke and Job Drain left the Army as Driver Serjeants in 1919. In 1922, the semi- autonomous Corps of RA Drivers was integrated within the mainstream RA.] Each battery had two trumpeters on Boy‟s Service with a minimum age 14; they entered man‟s service on their 18th birthday. According to Jimmy Naylor, who as a Boy Trumpeter sounded “Cease Firing” at the Elouges action, Monday 24 August 1914, the Royal Artillery Boy Trumpeters were stationed at the Boys Battery, Woolwich when war was declared. After petitioning the Battery Commander of the Boys‟ Battery, they all wrote to gain their parents‟ permission to join their affiliated batteries. There was a public and Parliamentary outcry when it was realised that 15 year olds were being killed and wounded in action at Mons. A minimum age of 19 years for overseas service was introduced forthwith for all HM Land Forces. [It would appear that this did edict did not apply to the Royal Navy, as 16 year old RN Boy John Cornwell of HMS Chester won a posthumous VC at the Battle of Jutland, 1916. So in mid September 1914, when 37 How Bty‟s surviving trumpeter, 15 year old Badgie Waldron, reached Soisson - the turning point of the Mons Retreat. He was sent back to the RA Depot, Exeter where he remained until his 19th birthday in the summer of 1918 – when it is thought he was posted to 3 RHA

Table 3: ARMY RECRUIT 1914 – INITIAL ENTRANCE CRITERIA

Ser Criteria Comments (a) (b) (c) 1. “APPARENT” AGE Men: 18 to 38 years Boys: 14 to 18 years 2. HEIGHT Minimum: 5 foot 3inches = 1.60m

3. EYES Sees required distance with either eye

4. HEART and LUNGS Healthy

5. JOINTS and LIMBS Moves independently

6. “FITS” Declares none

48. Recruiting Criteria 1914. For interest, the 1914 Army recruiting criteria are at Table 3 above. No supporting documentation was needed – not even a birth certificate. The amazing fact is that over half of those young men who entered an Army Recruiting Office in 1913 failed to meet these lax criteria! Despite all those who stated that they were 16 or 17 years old but looked 18 being told by the Recruiting Sergeant to come back tomorrow when they were 18! A sad reflection upon the general state of British public health and well being before World War 1. [This is how both Job Drain and Fred Luke were able to enlist when they were both aged barely 17 years old. The Army authorities thought they were aged 20, when they won their Victoria Crosses at Le Cateau, but they were actually both under 19 years old. This discounted any service prior to their 18th birthday towards their pay or gratuities. Appeals could be countered with a threat of a charge of false testimony on enlistment.]

RA Archives Figure 9. 18 POUNDER FIELD GUN DETACHMENT circa 1916 49. Physical Characteristics. The photograph, Figure 9 above, shows a complete a gun sub-section and indicates why, traditionally, a Gunner No1 was a Serjeant and not a Bombardier. In 1914, he was responsible for 16 men and their small arms; 11 horses; a gun, a limber and two General Service (GS) wagons. [In 1915, the manning scale of Fd Bty RFA was increased by 20 men. By 1916, these additional men were integrated within gun detachments.] As compared to an Infantry Section Commander Corporal who, at that time, was responsible for 12 men and 12 rifles. It is not readily apparent that these men are between 5 feet 3 inches and 5 feet 7 inches tall [1m 60 to 1m 70]. Until one starts comparing the height of the rear rank with the diameter of the gun carriage wheels which is 4 feet 6 inches [1m 37]. A typical Gunner would have only weighed around 8.5 stones [55kg]. All the veterans were short wiry men, except for some of the officers and Sjt Jumbo Butterworth, all of whom were less than 6 foot tall. In 1964, they were in their early 70s and they were still pretty fit even though they smoked like chimneys and, if put to the test, could hold their drink impeccably – see Para 23! That said, each one of the veterans, no matter their rank, was always well-turned-out and ready on parade whenever required, as well as behaving with both humour and dignity at all times. It was a privilege to meet each one of them. 50. RA Pay Scale 1914. The 1914 RA Pay Scale is shown in Table 4, column (c) above. There was a flat rate of pay for each rank. There is also no overlap between officer and OR pay scales; a Battery Serjeant Major (BSM) is paid £80 pa - Serial 6(c) and a subaltern £102 pa – serial 5(c). An approximate comparison with current net pay scales is shown in column (e). [Note: The current overlap between officer and OR pay-scales; today, a Warrant Officer Class 2 (Battery Sergeant Major) may be paid £35,000 per annum gross while a 2 Lt is paid £25,000 per annum gross. Of interest, in 1914, Gunner Officers‟ Mess Subscriptions were £6 per month and the Batting Charges a further £1 per month. There was an established scale of one Gunner Groom/Batman (an officer‟s personal servant) for each officer on the established strength of the Battery. Therefore, a Gunner subaltern had only £1 or £2 per month of his military pay to spend on any other personal incidental expenses. In 1913, an MS study concluded that it was highly desirable for an RHA or an RFA officer, but not necessarily an RGA one, to have a private income in the order of £160 pa net - much more than a subaltern‟s Army pay and equivalent to around £15,000 pa net today!]

Table 4: EXTRACT RA PAY SCALES 1914

Ser Rank 1914 Gross Pay (1) 1914 Net (2) Current Net Scale Equivalent Pay Estimate Pay (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 1 Lieutenant Colonel £420 pa £37,300 pa £37,000 pa 2 Major £291 pa £26,300 pa £25,000 pa 3 Captain £211 pa £19,200 pa £20,000 pa 4 Lieutenant £124 pa £11,300 pa £12,000 pa 5 2nd Lieutenant £102 pa £9,300 pa £9,000 pa 6 BSM/BQMS £80 pa £7,300 pa £18,000 pa 7 Serjeant £58 pa £5,300 pa £15,000 pa 8 Corporal £47 pa £4,300 pa £14,000 pa 9 (Lance) Bombardier £40 pa £3,600 pa £8,000 pa 10 Gunner/Driver £20 pa £1,800 pa £4,000 pa Notes: 1. In 1914, £1 equivalent to approximately £91; Income Tax = 6% on over £250 pa; Rations and Accommodation Charge: Nil. 2. Income Tax and Rates approximately 35%; Rations and Accommodation Charge: £15 to £25 per day.

BACKGROUND - QUARTERMASTER GENERAL (Q) / LOGISTICS G4

RA Archives Figure 10: 18 POUNDER QF FIELD GUN Mark 1 AND LIMBER, FRANCE 1914 Range: 6500 yards 51. Guns – Introduction. Both 4.5 inch Howitzer and 18 pounder guns were mounted on a Gun Carriage and towed by a Limber and a team of six Horses with three Drivers - a total weight 1.5 tons and no road brakes! When under any threat, the drivers had to remain mounted for up to 8 hours at a time to stop their horses from bolting. Especially, when it came to an ammunition resupply detail to a gun position under fire. Due to inter-unit rivalry, neither 37 Howitzer Battery nor 52 Field Battery appeared to be aware that their limbers were capable of towing each other‟s guns. [A 4.5” How had different sized gun-trail eye to an 18 pdr Fd Gun.] This became a source of friction between the two batteries when it came to recovering the guns and continued to rankle the 37 Howitzer Battery veterans thereafter.

RA Archives Figure 11: 4.5 inch QF HOWITZER Mark 1 Range: 6000 yards Shell: 35 Ibs Table 5: EXTRACT – RFA AMMUNITION SCALES, 1914

Ser Location 4.5 inch How RPG 18 pdr Fd Gun (a) (b) (c) (d) 1. Limber 12 24 2. Battery Wagon Lines 96 152 3. Brigade Ammunition Column, RFA 48 76 4. Division Ammunition Column, RFA 44 126 5. Division Ammunition Park, RAOC 80 150 6. In-theatre Ammunition Depot, RAOC 520 472 7. Total – In-theatre Ammunition Holdings 800 1000 Note: Ammunition Holdings: HE: 30%; Shrapnel: 70%

52. Equipment and Ammunition – 4.5 inch Howitzer. 37 Howitzer Battery of 8 Howitzer Brigade was equipped with 4.5 inch QF Howitzers, see Figure 11 above, and not the classic British 18 Pounder QF Field Gun. Its distinctive features included a box-trail, a gun- barrel mounted above the recoil recuperator and a high-angle capability. In 1914, it fired a 35 lbs shell to a range of 6000 yards; see ammunition holdings at Table 5 above and illustration at Enclosure 6. It was the predecessor of the World War 2 25 pounder QF Gun/Howitzer. The ammo scale at Table 5 above was designed to support low-intensity colonial campaigns rather high-intensity war-fighting. [Subsequently, the range of the 4.5” How Mk 2 was extended to 7200 yards. Once the momentum of the German invasion of France was checked on the Marne in October 1914 and the Germans started digging in, 18 pdr Shrapnel as well as both 13 pdr HE and Shrapnel rounds proved ineffective against any form of earthworks. Thereafter, HE Graze or Delay became the predominant field artillery ammunition for the remainder of the World War 1. Presumably because they were cheaper and more easily massed-produced as well as minimising complex fuze setting drills in poor weather or indifferent visibility. Table 6: AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE – RIGHT FLANK BATTERIES, LE CATEAU, 26 August 1914

Ser Battery Rounds Comment (a) (b) (c) (d) 1. 11 Fd Bty Not Recorded 2. 37 (How) Bty 550x 4.5inch 35 lbs shell 3. 52 Fd Bty 1100 x 18 pdr Estimate 4. 80 Fd Bty 456 x 18 pdr 5. 122 Fd Bty 600 x 18 pdr Estimate 6. 123 Fd Bty 456 x 18 pdr 7. 124 Fd Bty Not Recorded

53. Ammunition - Comments. Much is made of the fact that 52 Field Battery claimed to have fired an estimated 1100 x 18 pounder rounds on Wednesday 26 August 1914 about double that of the other right flank 18 pounder batteries. Martin Gale claims that this is a misinterpretation of 2nd Lieutenant Richard Neve‟s report, one of the two surviving subalterns, that 52 Battery fired off all the available ammunition on its gun position. In view of Captain William Barber-Starkey‟s gallant failure to resupply 52 Field Battery with three wagon loads (250 rounds) about midday, it is thought the figure was probably no more than 750 rounds. Of interest, 37 Howitzer Battery brought down almost the same weight of fire – 550 x 35lbs, 4.5 inch rounds. See Table 6 above. The Gunners took great pride and satisfaction in the accuracy of their fuse settings under fire throughout the battle, as they often had problems with faulty fuse setting while live firing during practice camp in Ireland. At this stage of the war, the RFA Division and Brigade Ammunition Columns were responsible for the delivery of both artillery and small arms ammunition to their respective formation ammunition points. 54. Logistics – Rations and Fodder. It is interesting to note that despite all prolonged barrages and fire plans throughout World War 1, a great weight of horse fodder than ammunition was shipped from UK to France – 5,438,600 tons of fodder to 5,253,360 tons of ammunition. A field battery‟s daily fodder ration of hay/bran and oats filled one GS Wagon- load and weighed about 2 tons. The logistical resupply system broke down as the Mons Retreat started so both men and horses were on very short rations from Sunday 23 August 1914 for the next three weeks. Attempts were made to pre-dump stores along the line of march with mixed results. They benefitted the local French people and following German forces as much as the BEF troops. As it was harvest-time, the horses barely survived on oat- straw and the men likewise on apples. There was also a severe shortage of drinking water for both men and horses throughout the entire Retreat from Mons because some townships removed the handles from the public water-pumps, as they were concerned about preserving their own water sources from being drained away by excessive demands from both the transiting British and German troops. Both troops and horses had to rely on water from dewponds and shallow streams. Table 7: UK IN-BARRACKS – DAILY RATIONS -1914

Ser Meal Menu (a) (b) (c) 1 Breakfast Porridge Sausage and Mash or Bacon and Beans Bread and (Spoons, Tea – one of) Marmalade (Mug of Tea) 2 “Dinner” (Meat and Offal) Mince or Rissoles, Cabbage or Beans, Potatoes “Duff” (Steamed Pudding) and (Watery) Custard Mug of Tea 3 “Teameal” Bread and (Spoons, Tea – one of) Jam (Mug of Tea) 4 Haversack Rations Bully Beef, Hard-tack Biscuits and (may be) an Apple or Orange (Bottles, water, 1 pint)

55. Rations 1914 - Comments. Whatever one may think of the rations shown at Table 7 above, it is worth noting that many of the reinforcing reservists could not afford this quantity or quality of food at home. Reservists made up approximately a quarter of a unit‟s war establishment. When they reported for duty, the reservists were unfit and under-fed even though would be fighting for their lives within three weeks of reporting for duty - an interesting comparison with the current six-month, pre-operational tour training programmes. PART 5 – SOURCES 56. Contents – Part 5. a. Colloquial. – Para 57. b. Documentary. – Para 58 and 59.

M G Watson Figure 12: VETERANS, LE CATEAU, 1964 Seated – Left to Right: Maj Gen John Younger [Para 57b and 58a]; Parish Priest, Maj Gen Peter Gillett [2Lt 37 Fd Bty, India 1939 and last CO 5 RHA]; Local; Maj Gen Bill Hughes [Representing The Master Gunner]; Brig Eric Earle [Para 57c and 58c]; Local; Maj Gen Reay Mirrlees [Para 57a and 58b]; Comdt Local Airbase; Mayor; Local; Local Comdt; Capt Charles Butterworth [Para 57e], Mr Walters [Para 57h]; Madame Belmont-Norbert [Para 57i]; Maj Hopkins [BC 37, 1917] Some Standing – Left to Right: Maj Oliver Nicholas [BC 93 Des]; WO1 (RSM) Cedric Ramshall [RSM 25; later Chief Yeoman Warder, HM Tower of London]; Roger Fielding [later Lt Col RA]; Lt Col John Fielding [CO 25 and former BC P (Dragon) Bty]; Mrs Katie Fielding Note: Fred Luke [Para 57f], Badgie Waldron [Para 57d] and Sid Spraggon [Para 57g] are probably under the arch at the back having a smoke and chatting to a group of our 93 Bty Gunners and some local mademoiselles. COLLOQUIAL

57. Le Cateau 1914 Veterans. Listed below are some of the veterans who attended the 50th anniversary celebrations at Le Cateau in 1964: a. Major General Reay Mirrlees CB DSO MC: Section Commander, 80 Field Battery, XV Field Brigade and “Martin Gale” team. b. Major General John Younger CB (John): Orderly Officer, XV Field Brigade and “Martin Gale” team. [Equivalent to today‟s Assistant Adjutant] c. Brigadier E G Earle DSO (Eric): Centre Section Commander, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade and Hon Secretary, “Martin Gale” team. d. Major S H G Waldron DCM MBE (Badgie): Battery Captain‟s (BK) Trumpeter, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [Subject to confirmation - during the immediate post WW2 period, Col John Fielding (CO 25 Regt RA) and Badgie had served together in 3RHA as Adjt 3RHA and QM 3RHA respectively.] e. Captain C A Butterworth DCM (Jumbo): No 1, F Sub-section, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [DCM not for Le Cateau. Subsequently, RSPCA Inspector]. f. Serjeant F Luke VC (Fred): Lead Driver, F Sub-section, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [Note: pre 1922 spelling of Sergeant]. [From 1962 to 1982, Fred visited the Battery on at least a dozen separate occasions. He spoke informally to ad hoc groups on many occasions. Therefore, each person who met him treasures their own personal “Fred story.”] g. Mr S Spraggon (Sid): Gunner, 37 Howitzer Battery, VIII Howitzer Brigade detached to XV Field Brigade. [He was more interested in relating his WW2 worldwide exploits as a merchant ship‟s Anti-aircraft Gunner of the Maritime Regiment RA.] h. Mr Walters: Gunner Clerk, the only 52 Field Battery, XV Field Brigade [now 132 Battery (The Bengal Rocket Troop)] veteran present.

i. Madame Belmont-Gorbert OBE. [She sheltered Private Fowler, 11th Hussars (11H), on her smallholding throughout WW1! (Note: In 1922, Private 11H became Trooper 11H.) His comrade, Corporal Hull was sheltered on a neighbouring farm. In 1916, he was betrayed and shot as a spy because he was not wearing full uniform when captured. His hosts were incarcerated for the remainder of the war. In mid Oct 18, during 2nd Battle of Le Cateau, 66 British Infantry Division arrested Pte Fowler as a deserter. Luckily he spotted Maj Drake 11H, his former Tp Comd, who, by then, was 2ic 11H. So Pte Fowler was released from close arrest and served as 11H Officers‟ Mess Steward for the remaining weeks of WW1. After WW1, the Belmont-Gorbert family found difficulty in making ends meet so the War Office paid her 4 years and 2 months Lodging Allowance at 2d (Approximately 1p!) per day totalling £17 for the period late August 1914 to mid October 1918! It is thought that 11H also donated a day‟s pay supplemented by voluntary contributions from the members of the Cavalry Club to help alleviate the Belmont-Gorbert financial difficulties.]

DOCUMENTARY 58. Martin Gale. The “Martin Gale” team – all of whom were subalterns at the battle - included:

Gunner Magazine Figure 13: “MARTIN GALE” - LE CATEAU, 1964 Left: Maj Gen John Younger. Centre: Maj Gen Reay Mirrlees. Right: Brig Eric Earle a. Major General John Younger: Orderly Officer XV Field Brigade, who was captured at the XV Field Brigade CP/OP – (Ser 3, Annexes A and C). b. Major General Reay Mirrlees: Another Section Commander of 80 Field Battery, who was one of the very few XV Field Brigade officers to emerge from the battle virtually unscathed – (Ser 23, Annexes A and C). c. Brigadier Eric Earle: Centre Section Commander 37 Howitzer Battery – (Ser 12, Annex A and C), who threw away his sword; broke an arm, lost an eye, and was recommended for a VC by Captain Douglas Reynolds but awarded a DSO instead. With good reason, see end of Para 15, the Martin Gale team thought that the official accounts did not reflect their own personal experiences of the battle as subalterns. So in 1963, through Gunner magazine, they established contact with a dozen or so veterans, including at least one representative from each of the four XV Field Brigade Group batteries at Le Cateau. [Including: 11 Fd Bty – Capt Hopper DCM; 52 Fd Bty - Sjt Campbell and Sjt Hewitt] The following year, their findings were published in an RAA booklet entitled – “The XV Brigade Group RFA at Le Cateau 26th August 1914” under the pseudonym Martin Gale. [A martingale is a strap, fitted between the noseband and the girth, to prevent a horse from raising its head too high.] This booklet was used as the principal reference for this document coupled with the author‟s recollections of his conversations with the Martin Gale team and the other veterans whom he met at Le Cateau in 1964. 59. External Sources. a. Major A F Becke. The accepted reference work is “The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau” written by Major A F Becke in 1918 and published in 1919. He was a retired Gunner officer and a War Office archivist as well as being an expert on the Battle of Waterloo 1815 and WW1 Orders of Battle and Unit Establishment Tables. He drew on the personal diaries of Brigadier General John Headlam, CRA 5 Division, and the often-sketchy entries from whatever unit “War Diaries” were available in London in 1918. [It is thought that this account may have been written by Maj Becke, at the behest of Maj Gen Sir John Headlam, as part of a lobby campaign to counter the UK Government‟s cap on Army Recruiting that was introduced in March 1918. Publication was overtaken by the unexpected Armistice of 11 November 1918; the book was eventually published in 1919.] b. XV Field Brigade RFA – Field Officers. Meanwhile, in 1918, the following officers did not have any input into Major Becke‟s book because they were still incarcerated in Torgau Officers‟ Prisoner of War (PoW) camp near the Elbe or Clausthal Officers‟ PoW camp in the Harz Mountains: i. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Stevens - CO XV Field Brigade – (Annex C, Ser 1). ii. Major Hercules Tailyour - BMRA 5 Division. iii. All four Right Flank BC, including Major Eustace Jones, BC 37 Howitzer Battery – (Annex C, Ser 9). These PoW had four years to refine their accounts of the battle while “guests” of the Germans. Some of these records are held by the Liddle Archives, Leeds - sadly the RA Archives, Woolwich has none. [His grandson, Brig Robert Tailyour, holds some postcards sent by Maj Hercules Tailyour from Clausthal PoW camp. He was on parole in the Netherlands at the time of the Armistice, 11 November 1918.] c. Colonel Rory McLeod. Colonel Rory McLeod, an 80 Field Battery Section Commander, (Annex C, Ser 22), who did not take part in the Martin Gale project, but wrote a diary throughout World War 1 and, subsequently, tape-recorded his reminiscences for the Imperial War Museum. [Brig Robert Tailyour also holds a copy of Col Rory McLeod‟s WW1 diary.] d. Others. Recent accounts that draw on Major Becke‟s book and the Liddle Archives, include: i. General Sir Martin Farndale‟s - Western Front volume of the Royal Regiment of Artillery Regimental History. [Drafted by Brig Gen Edgar Anstey.] ii. Richard Holmes‟s - Book of the TV series Riding The Retreat iii. Anthony Bird‟s - Gentlemen, We will Stand and Fight. Salisbury 1 February 2015 Acknowledgements: A. “Martin Gale”: Maj Gen W Mirrlees CB DSO MC Maj Gen J E T Younger CB Brig E G Earle DSO B. Le Cateau Veterans: Col R MacLeod DSO MC Maj S F G Waldron DCM MBE Capt C A Butterworth DCM Sjt Frederick Luke VC Gnr Sid Spraggon C. Technical Advice: Lt Col Jim Reid MBE – Ammunition and Equipment Maj Bill Clarke - Equitation Mr Paul Evans, RA Archives, Woolwich Annexes: A. Appendix 1 - Nominal Roll – Officers XV Bde Gp, Aug 14 Appendix 2 – Outline ORBAT - 37 How Battery, 26 Aug 14 B. Timebar – XV Bde Group, August 1914 C. Officers XV Bde Gp - Subsequently D. Appendix 1 - Honours and Awards – XV Bde Group, Le Cateau, Wed 26 Aug 14 Appendix 2 – Capt Reynolds‟ Recommendations to Brig Gen Headlam Enclosures: 1. Sketchmap – Le Cateau Battlefield 2. Sketchmap – Initial Contacts, Right Flank and Battery Deployment 3. Sketch – 5 Div Arty Artillery Situation am Wed 26 Aug 14 4. Sketchmap – Recovery of E and F Sub; and Escape of the Guns, Right Flank 5. Sketchmap – Western Front 6. Sketchmap – Mons Retreat Phase 1 Figures: 1. The Recovery of F Sub-section Gun 2. Gunner Casualties, August 1914 3. Dvr Job Drain VC 4. Dvr Frederick Luke VC 5. Capt Douglas Reynolds VC RFA 6. BEF Infantry, August 1914 7. 18 pdr Gun Drill, 1914 8. Fd Battery, 1919 9. 18 pdr Gun and Limber, France 1914 10. 18 pdr Gun Sub Section, circa 1916 11. 4.5” Howitzer 12. Veterans, Le Cateau, 1964 13. Martin Gale, Le Cateau, 1964 Tables: 1. UK In Barracks Routine circa 1914 2. Establishment Scale – Manning Six Gun Field Battery 1915 3. Army Recruit 1914 – Initial Entrance Criteria 4. Extract RA Pay Scales 1914 5. Ammo Holdings – Six Gun Field Battery, 1914 6. Ammo Expenditure - Right Flank Batteries, Le Cateau 1914 7. In Barracks Rations circa 1914 8. Officers‟ Nominal Roll Aug 14 – Annex A, Appendix 1 9. Outline 37 How Bty, ORBAT Aug 14 – Annex A, Appendix 2 10. Nominal Roll - Left Section Gun Recovery Teams – Annex A, Appendix 2 11. Suffolk Memorial – 37 How Battery Names – Annex A, Appendix 2 12. Timebar August 1914 – Annex B 13. Officers‟ Nominal Roll – Subsequently – Annex C 14. Honours and Awards, XV Field Brigade Group – Annex D 15. Capt Reynold‟s Recommendations for Awards to Brig Gen Headlam – Annex D APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO 37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14 Table 8: NOMINAL ROLL – OFFICERS XV BDE GROUP, AUGUST 1914 (1) References: A. Kane‟s List of RA Officers, Vol 2 (1862-1914) – Marked Copy, RA Archives B. RA Blue List 1914 – Badley Library, Larkhill C. Martin Gale

Ser Appt Rank Forename Surname Age (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 1 CO Lt Col Charles Frederick Stevens 43 2 Adjt Lt Cecil John Farran Leeech 32 3 Orderly Offr Lt John Edward Talbot Younger 26 4 BC 11 Bty Maj Philip Walter Beresford Henning 44 5 BK 11 Bty Capt Henry “Cully” Buckle 34 6 Sect Comd Lt Jack Stanford 26 7 Sect Comd 2Lt Power MacMurrough Maxwell 22 8 Sect Comd 2Lt William Humphrey Coghlan 24 9 BC 37 Bty Maj Eustace Henry Jones 39 10 BK 37 Bty Capt Douglas Reynolds 31 11 Sect Comd Lt Stanley Neville Custance 27 12 Sect Comd 2Lt Eric Greville Earle 22 13 Sect Comd 2Lt William Duthie Morgan 22 14 BC 52 Bty Maj Arthur Charles Rothery Nutt 41 15 BK 52 Bty Capt William Henry Joseph Barber-Starkey 34 16 Sect Comd 2Lt Gerard Henry Broadhurst 22 17 Sect Comd 2Lt Richard Burra Neve 21 18 Sect Comd Lt Robert Cowper Rome 25 19 BC 80 Bty Maj Richard Archibald Birley 41 20 BK 80 Bty Capt Archibald Bellairs Higgon 34 21 Sect Comd 2Lt Arthur George Hewson 23 22 Sect Comd 2Lt Roderick Macleod 22 23 Sect Comd 2Lt William Henry Buchanan Mirrlees 21 Note: 1. It is thought that the original Nominal Rolls of XV Fd Bde Group RFA dated August 1914 were deposited in the RA Section of the War Office archives and were destroyed by German incendiary bombs during WW2.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO 37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14 Table 9: OUTLINE ORDER OF BATTLE 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA, LE CATEAU, 26 AUGUST 1914

Ser Appointment Rank and Name (a) (b) (c) 1 Battery Commander Major Ernest Jones 2 Battery Captain Captain Douglas Reynolds 3 Right Section Commander Lieutenant Stanley Custance 4 Centre Section Commander 2nd Lieutenant Eric Earle 5 Left Section Commander 2nd Lieutenant William Morgan 6 Battery Serjeant Major Battery Serjeant Major Morrow 7 Battery Quartermaster Serjeant Battery Quatermaster Serjeant O‟Keefe 8 A Sub-section Commander Serjeant Rushton 9 B Sub-section Commander Serjeant Varley 10 C Sub-section Commander Serjeant Brown 11 D Sub-section Commander Serjeant Hunter 12 E Sub-section Commander Serjeant Bower 13 F Sub-section Commander Serjeant Butterworth 14 Driver Serjeant Not Known 15 Signals Serjeant Not Known 16 Survey Serjeant Not Known

Table 10: LEFT SECTION, 37 HOWITZER BATTERY, RECOVERY LE CATEAU, pm WEDNESDAY 26 AUGUST 1914 – NOMINAL ROLL

Officer in Charge: Capt D Reynolds RFA Ser Role E Sub-section F-Subsection (a) (b) (c) (d) 1. Section Commander 2Lt E G Earle RFA 2Lt W D Morgan RFA 2. Detachment Commander Sjt Bower Sjt Butterworth 3. Limber Gunner Gnr Fraser Gnr Baker 4. Limber Gunner Gnr Robertson (1) Gnr Garlick 5. Limber Gunner Gnr Turner Nil 6. Lead Driver Dvr Treloar (1) Dvr Drain 7. Centre Driver Dvr Hall Dvr Cobey (1) 8. Wheeler Driver Dvr Prior Dvr Luke Note: 1. Killed

Table 11: SUFFOLK MEMORIAL, LE CATEAU 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA PERSONNEL

Ser Rank and Name Rank and Name (a) (b) (c) 1. Corporal James Staples Gunner [NYK] Ellis 2. Gunner Walter Arthur Cane Gunner John King Robertson 3. Driver Benjamin George Cobey Driver George Treloar 4. Gunner [NYK] Cowley Gunner Ernest Wiggins

ANNEX B TO 37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14 Table 12: TIMEBAR – 37 HOWITZER BATTERY RFA, AUGUST 1914

August Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon 1914 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 XV BDE STATIONED RESERVISTS ARRIVE GP RFA THE CURRAGH CAMP, CO KILDARE, IRELAND Background WAR German Invasion of Belgium and Siege of Liege Fortress Starts DECLARED August Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon 1914 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 XV BDE FINAL DEPART MOVE TO EMBARK SEA PASSAGE GP RFA PREP THE DUBLIN DUBLIN IRELAND TO FRANCE CURRAGH DOCKS Background Siege of Liege Fortress continues until Battle of the [French] Frontiers Starts Sun 16 Aug 14 August Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon 1914 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 XV BDE ETA LA MOVE TO AND HARBOUR BATTLE BATTLE RETREAT GP RFA HARVE LE CATEAU AVENSES AREA PREP OF MONS Background Battle of the [French] Frontiers continues until Mon 24 Aug 14 August Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon 1914 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 XV BDE RETREAT BATTLE RETREAT PASS ST RETREAT FROM MONS GP RFA OF LE QUENTIN CONTINUES CATEAU Background Siege of Maubeuge Fortress continues until Mon 8 Sep 14 ANNEX C TO 37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14 Table 13: OFFICERS XV BDE GROUP, AUGUST 1914 - SUBSEQUENTLY References: A. Kane‟s List of RA Officers, Vol 2 (1862-1914) – Marked Copy, RA Archive Woolwich B. RA Blue Lists dated 1914, 1922 and 1948 C. Martin Gale

Ser Appt Rank and Name 26 Aug 14 Subsequently

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 1 CO Lt Col C F Stevens Wounded; PoW Lt Col DSO 2 Adjt Lt C J F Leech Wounded Lt Col MC 3 Orderly Offr Lt J E T Younger Wounded; PoW Maj Gen CB 4 BC 11 Fd Bty Maj P W B Henning Wounded; PoW Lt Col DSO (Uncfm) 5 BK 11 Fd Bty Capt H Buckle Mortally Capt dow Cologne, Wounded; PoW Germany 1914 6 Sect Comd Lt J Stanford Wounded Maj 7 Sect Comd 2Lt P MacM Maxwell Wounded Maj MC kia France 1917 8 Sect Comd 2Lt W H Coghlan Killed 2Lt kia Le Cateau, France 1914 9 BC 37 How Maj E H Jones Wounded; PoW Lt Col DSO Bty 10 BK 37 How Bty Capt D Reynolds Maj VC LdeH dow France 1916 11 Sect Comd Lt S N Custance Wounded Maj 12 Sect Comd 2Lt E G Earle Wounded Brig DSO 13 Sect Comd 2Lt W D Morgan Maj Gen CB DSO MC 14 BC 52 Fd Bty Maj A C Nutt Wounded; PoW Col DSO 15 BK 52 Fd Bty Capt W H J Barber- Mortally Capt dow Le cateua, Starkey Wounded; PoW France 1914 16 Sect Comd 2Lt G H Broadhurst Wounded Lt kia Ypres, Belgium 1915 17 Sect Comd 2Lt R B Neve Capt RGA? 18 Sect Comd Lt R C Rome Maj MC 19 BC 80 Fd Bty Maj R A Birley Wounded; PoW Maj DSO 20 BK 80 Fd Bty Capt A B Higgon Maj kia Gallipoli, Turkey 1915 21 Sect Comd 2Lt A G Hewson Wounded Brig MC 22 Sect Comd 2Lt R Macleod Wounded Col DSO MC 23 Sect Comd 2Lt W H B Mirrlees Maj Gen CB DSO MC

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO 37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14 Table 14: HONOURS AND AWARDS – XV BDE GROUP, LE CATEAU, Wed 26 Aug 14

Ser Award Recipient Sub Unit (a) (b) (c) (d) 1 VICTORIA CROSS Capt Douglas Reynolds RFA 37 How Bty 2 Dvr Job Drain 37 How Bty 3 Dvr Frederick Luke 37 How Bty 4 DISTINGUISHED Lt Col C F Stevens RFA XV Fd Bde 5 SERVICE ORDER Maj P W B Henning RFA 11 Fd Bty [Unconfirmed] 6 Maj E H Jones RFA 37 How Bty 7 Maj A C R Nutt RFA 52 Fd Bty 8 Maj R A Birley RFA 80 Fd Bty 9 2Lt E G Earle RFA 37 How Bty 10 DISTINGUISHED BSM Morgan 80 Fd Bty 11 CONDUCT MEDAL FQMS Watts 11 Fd Bty 12 Sjt Brown 37 How Bty 13 Sjt Brown 80 Fd Bty 14 Sjt Hopper 11 Fd Bty 15 Sjt Shufflebottom 80 Fd Bty 16 Tptr Waldron 80 Fd Bty 17 A N Other 80 Fd Bty 18 A N Other 80 Fd Bty 19 LEGION d’HONNEUR Capt Douglas Reynolds RFA 37 How Bty

20 CROIX de GUERRE FQMS Watts 11 Fd Bty 21 Gnr Fraser 37 How Bty APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO 37 HOW BDE RFA, AUG 14 Table 15: 37 HOWITZER BATTERY, RFA, LIST OF COMMENDATIONS FOR BRAVERY Reference: A. Report – Capt D Reynolds RFA Dated 23 November 1914

Ser Rank and Name Sub Unit Comment (a) (b) (c) (d) 1 2Lt Earle Centre section Commander. Mentioned and listed; awarded DSO. 2 Sjt Brown C Sub-section Comander/No 1. Mentioned and listed; awarded DCM - not for F Gun recovery. 3 Sjt Bower E Sub-section Comander/No 1. Mentioned and listed; recommended by CRA 5 Div; no award. 4 Gnr Fraser E Sub-section Limber Gunner. Listed; awarded Croix de Guerre. 5 Gnr Turner E Sub-section Limber Gunner. Listed; no award. 6 Gnr Roberton E Sub-section Limber Gunner. Listed; no award. Killed. 7 Dvr Treloar E Sub-section Lead Driver. Mentioned and listed; no award. Killed. 8 Dvr Hall E Sub-section Centre Driver. Mentioned and listed; no award. Missing. 9 Dvr Prior E Sub-section Wheeler Driver. Mentioned and listed; no award. 10 Gnr Baker F Sub-section Limber Gunner. Mentioned and listed; no award. 10 Dvr Drain F Sub-section Lead Driver. Mentioned and listed; awarded VC. 11 Dvr Luke F Sub-section Wheeler Driver. Mentioned and listed; awarded VC. 12 Boy Tptr Waldron Battery Captain‟s Mentioned and listed. Awarded DCM - Trumpeter. not for F Gun recovery Others Involved Directly in F Gun Recovery 13 2Lt Morgan Left Section Commander. Mentioned but not listed. 14 Sjt Butterworth F Sub-section Commander/No 1. Neither mentioned nor listed. 15 Dvr Cobey F Sub-Section Centre Driver. Mentioned but not listed. Killed Definitions: 1. Mentioned = Mentioned in main report. 2. Listed = Named in“ Conspicious Bravery” list.

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ENCLOSURE 4 TO 37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914

ENCLOSURE 5 TO 37 HOW BTY, AUG 1914

ENCLOSURE 6 TO 7 HOW BTY, AUG 1914