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Ahmad, K. Neologisms to describe neologisms: Philosophers of and terminological . In (Ed.) Peter Sandrini. TKE ’99:Proc. 5 th Int. Congress on Terminology & , 23-27 August 1999 . TermNet: Vienna. pp 54-73.

Neologisms to describe neologisms: Philosophers of science and terminological innovation

Khurshid Ahmad Department of Computing School of Electronic Engineering, Information & Mathematics University of Surrey GUILDFORD, Surrey UK

Abstract Philosophers of science study how science works, or should work. In the different branches of science they study, they frequently encounter modern terminology, and, perhaps less frequently, neologisms. A corpus of texts, comprising of science, has been analysed to evaluate whether or not, and how extensively, the community indulges in neologism and relexicalising in their own right. Some of this lexical innovation is inevitable, in that philosophy of science is in itself a specialist discipline. However, sometimes this lexical innovation appears to be a part of a permanent revolution; the extensive use of terms with the suffix ism is a case in point.

Defining Philosophy of Science Philosophy of science is defined as ‘primarily the study of how science works, or should work. The study of how it [science] does is normally taken as a fair guide as to how it should’ (Lacey 1986:215): the study of how science works is often called - ‘study of method’.

Bechtel (1988) has rephrased the definition of philosophy of science by suggesting that the field is devoted to analysing the character of scientific investigations, and that sometimes the term science of science is used to describe these investigations - ‘a reflexive endeavour, using the very skills that are employed in the race’s most systematic - science’ (1988:1-2). Despite the grand term science of science , it is not clear whether philosophy of science has ‘settled’ as a discipline in its own right. For O’Hear, philosophy of should tell us ‘how far [science] can genuinely claim to present us with more and more true knowledge about the of the world’ (1989:3). Papineau (1996) divides philosophy of science into: ‘ of science dealing with the justification of claims to scientific knowledge […] and the of science that investigates philosophically puzzling features of the world described by science’.

Given that science has its own branches, including social , physical sciences and biological sciences, it is inevitable that there would be specialisation in philosophy of science itself. This notion of science of science has been used to explore the foundations of subjects ranging from the generic subject areas like , law, , to the specialised areas of physical and biological

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sciences. One of the purposes of this specialisation of philosophy of science - manifesting as philosophy of language , philosophy of social sciences , and the more recent philosophy of , is usually to defend the subject area as whole or one or more sub-disciplines in the subject area. A good example here is Margaret Boden’s Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (1990), a collection of key papers in the discipline, a brilliant tour de force of original articles published at different times in different journals, written by luminaries of modern computing science including Alan Turing, Warren McCoulloch, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon and others. What Boden has in mind is this: this range of authors, whose writings can be interpreted as being sympathetic to the cause of artificially intelligent computers, embrace significantly different (neurobiological, mathematical, linguistic) and this should convince the reader that AI is not philosophically ‘bogus’ and that ‘[cognitive] science can provide new ideas enabling new ways of asking philosophical questions’ (Burden 1990:19).

Verschuuren (1986) has been concerned that ‘in different countries’ the terms ‘’ and ‘theoretical biology’ are used interchangeably. For Verschuuren, philosophy of biology is the philosophical approach to theoretical biology, comprising ‘ philosophy of nature , PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY and philosophy of bio-’ in contrast to the logical approach to theoretical biology which deals with ‘methodology, bio-mathematics and information theory’ (1986:3-5).

20 th century feminist literature also shows considerable interest in the evolution of science and philosophy of science with specific reference to the role of women in this evolution. Contemporary feminist theory, ‘a sustained ’ into the ways in which the conventional disciplines had been shaped by their ‘historic exclusion (or misrepresentation) of the lives and experiences of women’, now extends to a feminist critique of science and by implication to the science of science . Evelyn Keller and her colleagues have argued that ‘modern science evolved out of a conceptual structuring of the world - e.g. of mind and nature - that incorporated particular and historically specific of gender’ and as such it is evident ‘in the cultures and practices of contemporary natural science’ (Kelly and Longino 1996:2-3). Elizabeth Lloyd criticises ‘current “purist” philosophy of science which contributes to that political power by reinforcing of the insulation of scientific endeavours from social [gender-political] influences’ (1993:153).

The various and varied definitions of philosophy of science may suggest that perhaps the discipline is emerging and hence there is argumentation about how to define the subject itself. Recall that Papineau has suggested that philosophy of science comprises epistemology of science and metaphysics of science. Philosophers of science do not, as a rule, ask epistemological and metaphysical questions about science in discrete quantas. Indeed for some, epistemology is the key, and will posit that logic has a central role to play in explaining how science works, or should work. The counter argument to those of the logic-bent is this: scientists, despite their occasional yearning for solitude, are social animals and the way to study science is to study the way scientists work, or should work. But how are these epistemological, metaphysical or logical preferences articulated? For us, the surface form of such preferences manifests itself in the terminology of the philosophers of science.

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Each discipline has its own terminology. Emergent disciplines borrow from their older counterparts. Hybrid disciplines, like bio -chemistry, mathematical biology, genetic engineering, started life with wholesale borrowings from their parent subjects. Using neologisms or relexicalising extant terms is quite risky in a pragmatic sense as most learned papers are published in the parent-discipline journals and the subject itself is taught within one of the two parent disciplines. For pure pragmatic occasions, emergent/hybrid scientists do mind their terminology.

So, coming back to the surface form of the presentation - terminology - in philosophy of science, we ask the question how has the terminology of philosophy of science developed?

Indexing Philosophy of Science and isms

We begin our investigation with a set of texts in the philosophy of science published over the last 30 years or so. Specifically, we will look at the index pages of these texts. Naive though it may sound, the index pages of key publications of any discipline are sometimes indicative of the current fashions in terminology of the discipline. Index pages are compiled usually by the authors who include terms with which they are comfortable with and terms that express their own preferences. An index page is not an exhaustive list of all the terms used in a given text, rather it is a set of terms perhaps related to important concepts. More importantly, it shows the author’s allegiance to one school in a discipine as opposed to others. Nine texts were selected for this analysis. The selection criteria is given below:

First, these texts cover three decades (1966-1997), and, secondly, reflect different schools of thought within philosophy of science:

Hempel, Carl 1966 Philosophy of Natural Science . Ryan, Alan 1970 The Philosophy of the Social Sciences . Holton, Gerald 1973 Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought Feyerabend, Paul 1975/93 . Verschuuren, Geert 1986 Investigating the Life Sciences: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science . Bechtel, William 1988 Philosophy of Science: An Overview for Cognitive Science . O’Hear, Anthony 1989 An Intro. to the Philosophy of Science . Kelly, Evelyn & Longino, 1996 and Science Helen E. Gower, Barry 1997

Table1: Keywords used in major texts in philosophy of science published over the last 30 years

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Hempel, Ray Gower Feyerabend Verschuuren Bechtel O’Hear Kelly & Holton 1966 1970 1997 1975/1993 1986 1988 1989 Longino 1973 1996 epistemology - √ - √ √ √ - √ - essentialism - - √ √ - - - - - ethics - - - - √ √ - - - existentialism - √ - - - √ - - √ idealism - - - √ - - - - - indeterminism - √ - - - - √ - - ------logic (logical) √ √ √ √ √ - - - metaphysics - √ - √ √ √ √ - - methodology - √ - √ √ √ - - - ontology - - - - √ √ - - - operationism √ +lism - - operationalism - - - - - √ - - √ √ - √ - - - √ - (Neo-) (logical) - - √ - - √ √ & (irr-) - - - - - realism - ‘realism’ - (naive) - - - - (rationalistic) (Reduction) √ - - √ Reduction √ √ - relativism - - √ - - - - √ - supervenience ------√ - - - - - - √ - √ - - pragmaticism √ - - - √ - - - - √ - - √ - - √ - - physicalism ------√ - - ------√ - -

Table 1 shows that terms used in the indexes of most of these texts include epistemology and logic. Hempel, O’Hear and Gower do not include epistemology in their indexes; O’Hear and Kelly and Longino avoid logic, though O’Hear has chapters on ‘induction’ and ‘falsification’, with an implied discussion of logic, and Hempel talks about ‘theories and theoretical explanation’ and ‘concept formation’. Positivism , or related terms like pragmaticism and naturalism , are used by all authors except the feminist critique of philosophy (of science) by Kelly and Longino. The term ‘paradigm’ appears to be a favourite of philosophers of social sciences, of biology and those with a cognitive orientation (cf. Bechtel).

Naturalism , which predates positivism but to which it is now closely related, has been used in ethics (cf. prescriptive naturalism); , pioneered by C S Pierce who was impressed by positivism , is loosely related to conventionalism , attributed to Henri Poincare and instrumentalism , attributed to Popper and to Toulmin. Pragmaticism is a specialised term for pragmatism. These terms are defined in Table 2 below:

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Table 2. Selected terms used in the philosophy of science and their elaborations and as defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1973, Oxford Univ. Press). The etymological history is based on the OED.

TERM ELABORATION First reported in: Naturalism The system of thought holding that all phenomena can be explained 1750 in terms of natural causes and laws without attributing moral, spiritual or supernatural significance Realism The scholastic doctrine, opposed to nominalism, that universals 1817 exist independently of being thought. The modern philosophical doctrine that objects exist independently of their being perceived, opposed to idealism. Positivism A doctrine contending that sense perceptions are the only 1854 admissible basis of human knowledge and precise thought. After Comte’s Physicalism The doctrine that all phenomena can be described in spatio- 1869 temporal terms, and consequently that any descriptive scientific statement can, in principle, be reduced to an empirically verifiable physical statement Relativism A theory that conceptions of and moral values are not absolute 1885 but are relative to persons or groups holding them. Pragmatism The doctrine that the meaning of an idea lies in its observable 1898 practical consequences. The related subordinate term pragmaticism was used initially by C S Pierce to refer to a specific theory of meaning concerning the meaning of concepts affecting the intellect, especially scientific concepts rather than senses or emotions.

Auguste Comte is reported to have first argued the philosophical relevance of positivism ; about 50 years after Comte, the used this term as a headword in . Another 25-30 years later, Bridgman used the related terms operationalism/operationism , followed by Schiltz’s discussion of consistent/logical . Carnap argued for physicalism which, for some authors, is related to positivism. is, perhaps, a 20 th century compound. Figure 1 attempts to chart the impact of Comte in the development of naturalism and pragmatism , and related areas. The specialisation of these various doctrines or theories is either notated as a single term conventionalism/instrumentalism , related to the ‘superordinate’ pragmatism , or as a compound term logical positivism, legal positivism and so on.

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Physicalism (, c.1932)

Logical Positivism Consistent/logical Operationalism/ Legal Positivism (Vienna Circle, late 19 th Empiricism Operationism century) (Moritz Schiltz, c.1949) (P Bridgman, c.1927)

Positivism Related (, 1798-1857) Related Emotive Term Term Conventionalism Naturalism a feature of (H Poincare, 1900)

Prescriptive Naturalism Reductionism / Pragmatism Pragmaticism Naturalism Reductivism (C S Pierce) (R M Hare, c.1952)

Evaluative Instrumentalism Naturalism (, c.1934) (S Tomlinson, c.1953)

Figure 1: The dominant role of the term positivism in philosophy and latterly in philosophy of science. Dates and the names of the originators were mostly taken from Lacey (1986).

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It appears that philosophers of science like using the ism ; a suffix used extensively in nominalising verbs especially to form nouns of actions. According to Quirk et. al. (1985:1548, §I.32), ism is one of the noun suffixes which when attached to its noun base makes it ‘largely non-count abstract, or aggregate nouns of status or activity’; ism is used in conjunction with ‘doctrine of’ or ‘practice of’, for example, idealism and instrumentalism respectively (the suffix ist to the noun bases denotes adherents and practitioners).

The suffix -ism (and the related -ist ) plays a significant role in the manner in which philosophers of science view the enterprise of science itself. Despite their divergence of views about the nature and function of science, Philosophers of science attempt to elucidate the nature of scientific theories and the ways in which scientists prefer one theory over others. Giere regards scientific theories as ‘similar to the more ordinary sorts of representations studied by cognitive sciences’ and has argued that ‘philosophers picture scientists as evaluating theories by appeal to some vaguely perceived principle of rational evaluation’ (1988:6-7). Giere has proposed a 2x2 ‘table’ which will help us to view theories as ‘some sort of representation’ and the selection of a particular theory as the best available ‘would be a matter of individual judgment’ (1988:5). In this context, philosophers of science like Popper are realists in that Popper appears to argue that ‘when a theory is accepted, most elements of the theory are taken as representations […] aspects of the world’ (Giere 1988:7), but anti- realists, like , would focus on ‘some non-representational virtue, such as “problem solving effectiveness”’ ( ibid. ). The principle of judging a theory may be rational, much like the way Popper and Laudan advocate. However, sociologists of science are, according to Giere, by and large, anti-realists and naturalistic in judging a theory. The contingency table due to Giere involves columns comprising the polarity realism/anti-realism and rows which comprise the rational/natural dichotomy. The fourth cell, natural realism (yet another compound in philosophy of science), reflects the attitudes of the biologist/philosopher (see Table 3).

Table 3: Giere’s 2x2 ‘contingency table’ showing the respective positions of the key philosophers of science.

Representation Realist Anti-Realist Judgment Rational Popper Laudan Natural Churchland Kuhn

Whether or not one believes that philosophy of science is a branch of cognitive science, table 3 is a good example of how terms can be used in the classification of abstract objects, like the theories of philosophers of science. The above classification shows that whilst some sociologists of science and cognitive scientists acknowledge the dominant position of positivism (cf. realism and rationalism ), others are equally keen to suggest other radically differing views, like the natural anti-realist!

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Term evolution in philosophy of science: the case for realism, anti- realism, non-realism and fundamentalism Philosophy of science, ‘deals with the justification of claims to scientific knowledge’ and ‘investigate philosophically puzzling features of the world described by science’ (Papineau 1996); philosophy of biology deals with the ‘philosophy of nature, […] biology, and […] bioethics’ (Verschuren 1986); philosophy of science is a kind of ‘cognitive science’ (Bechtel 1988, Giere 1988). Philosophy of science, the science of science (Bechtel 1988) or just methodology (Lacey 1986) in late 20 th century management parlance, helps in auditing the enterprise of science, which leads to a post-hoc evaluation of science. This auditing and evaluation involves the examination of concept systems, at a meta-level of ontological systems or frameworks and at the instantional level of terminology systems and terminology collections. The ontology and terminology here refers to the ontology and terminology of the given science which is being audited and being subsequently evaluated. Philosophers of science are fluent in the ontology and terminology of the science they examine. For instance, while examining quantum theory , they would have no problems in grappling with an ontology that exposes oxymorons like ‘uncertainty in measurement’ or ‘wave-particle nature of matter’ and a terminology that instantiates these oxymoronic concepts including ‘uncertainty principle’, ‘complementarity’, ‘electron diffraction’, and ‘wave momentum’. Philosophers of science describe 20 th century physics as a science that describes (?) ‘an observable world of microscopic particles’ (Papineau 1996)! So what of the ontology and terminology of the philosophy of science itself?

We have seen that many terms used as keywords in philosophy of science texts are terms that entered the English language during the 19 th century (cf. Table 2), possibly under the influence of philosophers and their associated texts. Indeed, some of these terms are widely used in other disciplines and in general language itself. For example, philosophers of science stress the point that when they use the term realism , what they mean (and sometimes elaborate in their own idiosyncratic way) is . Perhaps this stress is cautionary in nature, lest we confuse realism as used in the description and criticism of the visual arts 1.

Some philosophers of science have argued that in their subject one cannot create or invent the various objects or concepts that constitute their ‘proper ontological domain’ (Bhaskar 1991). And, perhaps without an ontological domain, it may not be possible to have a ‘proper’ terminology either. However, as we have shown in an example in the previous section, vigorous reinterpretation of terms continues apace. Inthis context, let us now look at the term ‘realism’.

On Realism - the discussions that support scientific realism , or against this stance or doctrine, for example, in literature on scepticism and idealism are ‘beset by terminological confusion’ (Papineau 1996:2). This stance or doctrine suggests that ‘putative’ knowledge involves an independence thesis , ‘our judgments answer for their truth to a world which exists independently of our awareness of it’, and a knowledge thesis which posits that ‘by and large, we can know which of these

1 Mayer’s Dictionary of Art Terms and Techniques (1993) tells us that there are four sense of the term ‘realism’: depiction of human figures […] without distortion or stylisations; realism; 19 th century art movement; and Socialist realism or state- inspired realism.

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judgments are true’ ( ibid. ). But those who take a sceptical stance, and are known variously as the followers of related stances or doctrines like , fictionalism, instrumentalism , accept the independence thesis but reject the knowledge thesis. Those of idealistic persuasion, currently labelled as the followers of or , accept the knowledge thesis but reject the independence thesis. Papineau sums up the above discussion nicely in a 2x3 contingency-like table, much like an auditor’s report reviewing the performance of an enterprise (20 th century physics) and has attempted to evaluate its success or failure.

Table 4: Papineau’s attitude to scientific theorising.

Thesis Realism Scepticism Idealism Independence Accept Accept Reject Knowledge Accept Reject Accept

On Anti-Realism - Recall here that for Giere (1988), philosophers of science can either be realists (cf. Karl Popper) or anti-realists (cf. Larry Laudan) and can also decide to take a ‘rationalistic’ or naturalistic stance: Popper and Laudan are both rationalists, but Churchland, whilst being a realist, is naturalistic. So what of idealists and sceptics: are they anti-realist? Well, not quite according to Papineau, who attributes the term to Michael Dunnet. The ‘logically refined anti-realist’ (Norris 1997:158) who appears to reject that ‘our judgments answer for their truth which exists independently of our awareness of it’ ( independence thesis ) but accepts that ‘by and large, we can known which of the judgments [we make] are true ( knowledge thesis ). This stance makes Dunnet and those of similar opinions as idealists, the followers of idealism . But there are anti-realists of another kind: for van Fraassen (1996/1976), scientific realists insist that ‘the aim of science is to give us a literally true story of what the world is like ; and the proper form of acceptance of a theory is to believe that it is true’ (1996:82). However, as an anti-realist, van Fraassen argues that ‘all anti-realism is a position according to which aims of science will be well served without giving such a literally true story, and acceptance of a theory may properly involve something less (or other) than belief that it is true’ ( ibid. ). The author holds that ‘the language of science should be literally construed, but its theories need not be true to be good’ (van Fraassen 1996:83). Papineau calls this sceptical audit and evaluation of science, anti-realism US style and contrasts such anti-realism with that of anti-realism à la Dummett and suggests that van Fraassen is a constructive empiricist (1996:5).

On non-realism - ‘Anti-realists’ (like Niels Bohr) are ‘the enemies of realism’ (like ) and subscribe to either idealism or instrumentalism, phenomenology or conventionalism, empiricism or constructivism and so forth (Fine 1996/1984:36). Fine himself has problems with realism: ‘arguments in favour of realism are not sound, and they do not provide rational support for belief in realism’ ( ibid .:25). Fine suggests that developments in physics, ranging from Einstein’s general theory of relativity (‘a magnificent organising tool’) to Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s rejection of ‘unobservables’ in their respective formulations of quantum mechanics, th and through to the late 20 century ‘discovery’ of the ΨJ quark, point to a ‘fundamentally non-realist attitude’ to in science (1996:34). We have

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another term here to add to our collection of realisms: first there was realism , then two kinds of anti-realism and now Arthur Fine has given us non-realism as well.

Writing Philosophy of Science

Fine elaborates on ‘non-realism’ by arguing that ‘realism is dead’ and that we should find a ‘suitable successor’ for the deceased. ‘Non-realism’ is in some ways in the ‘third alternative’, a position which mediates between ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’. With so many isms abounding in philosophy of science literature, Fine desists from naming his position; ‘but it would be a shame to appropriate another “ism” on its behalf, for then it would be one of the many contenders for ontological allegiance’ (1996:38). That is good, another ism will certainly confuse a novice of philosophy of science like the author of this paper, for instance, so what is the third alternative then?: ‘Let me introduce the acronym NOA [natural onotological attitude] (pronounced “Noah ”)’, which suggests that Fine is for ‘common-sense epistemology’ (ibid. ) and those who take up this third way will be called NOAers’ (pronounced knower[s]. ibid. ). Cartwright has attacked realism in her How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983, Oxford: Clarendon Press), but now she says she was ‘deluded about the enemy: it is not realism but fundamentalism ’ (Cartwright 1996:314). So what is fundamentalism then? ‘It is a tendency to think that all must belong to one grand scheme, and, moreover, that this is a scheme in which the in the first category have a special and privileged status. They are exemplary of the way nature is supposed to work. The others must be made to conform to them.’ (ibid:316).

Perhaps Cartwright’s view is one of studied and thorough criticism of science, particularly the grandiose scientific schemes labelled ‘universal laws’ and ‘universal constants’ and that physicists, like (political/religious) fundamentalists of the late 20 th century, want ‘true laws’ and, true to their demagogic nature, actual or perceived, ‘the [the fundamentalists] want their favourite laws to be in force. Perhaps the author uses a populist metaphor to make a poignant statement. However, fundamentalism is in itself used indiscriminately sometimes for ‘villains’ who commit what appear to be premeditated acts of violence , claiming they are acting for and on behalf of the economically, politically or militarily oppressed, which is apt here for exposing the hegemony of ideas of a few very well motivated souls. However, given the obscuring effect of ad-hoc terminology, the confusion generated by the irrational use of terms, one has to be careful in using a term as emotionally loaded as fundamentalism and fundamentalists. As recent history has shown, one person’s fundamentalism may be another’s level-headed philosophy! And once-fundamentalist bandits can easily become everyone’s favourite statesperson.

Evidence from a Philosophy of Science corpus of texts

Corpus development In order to examine the patterns of usage of terms, their frequency, collocational behaviour, ways in which the terms are elaborated, a small collection of texts was collated - the Surrey PhilSci Corpus . This corpus contains 102 texts, divided into seven text types, comprising 60,000 words. The breakdown of the Surrey PhilSci Corpus is given below (Table 5):

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Table 5: Surrey PhilSci Corpus

Text Type No. Comment Books 30 Mainly extracts from books (29) Journal Papers 39 Brochures 15 Course descriptions, conference announcements Theses 2 Full thesis Lecture Notes 2 Advertisements 2 Announcement of new journals Popular Science 6 Newsletters

All the texts were available on the World Wide Web at the time of writing; we have kept the website addresses but have deleted the texts. Just under three-quarters of the texts were published during the 1990s and the rest between 1989 and 1955, with three texts published respectively on 1925 (Schlick), 1927 (Bridgman) and 1949 (Bohr).

Table 6a shows that the first 20 words in our PhilSci Corpus, comprising 32.53% (25.8% + 6.73%) are all closed class words or grammatical words including determiners ( a, the, this, that ), prepositions ( in, of ), pronouns ( we ), and conjunctions (and, not ). The frequency of the first 20 words, in percentage terms, is similar terms is similar to that of almost the same set of tokens as found in the British National Corpus or the Brown Corpus. The only exception here in Philosophy of Science texts is the absence of personal pronouns (me, he, she, us) in the top 20 most frequent words.

Table 6a: The 20 most frequent words in the PhilSci Corpus

Rank Token Frequency % Rank Token Frequency % 1 the 35897 5.943% 11 it 5287 0.875% 2 of 28848 4.776% 12 this 4891 0.810% 3 to 15756 2.608% 13 for 4772 0.790% 4 and 14517 2.403% 14 are 4295 0.711% 5 a 13799 2.284% 15 by 3943 0.653% 6 in 13111 2.171% 16 not 3864 0.640% 7 is 11822 1.957% 17 which 3772 0.624% 8 that 10604 1.755% 18 or 3336 0.552% 9 as 6070 1.005% 19 i 3321 0.550% 10 be 5410 0.896% 20 we 3166 0.524% 155834 25.8% 40647 6.73%

The philosophy of science signature manifests itself in the next 100 or so most frequent words: terms like theory , and variants theories and theoretical appear once for every 150 words used: the frequency of occurrence of the three keywords is 0.63% (0.39% + 0.14% + 0.10%) (see Table 6b). In fact, theory and its variants put together occur more than the conjunction or in our Corpus. The terms science and scientific put together have a similar frequency (0.38% + 0.24%).

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Table 6b: Single terms used in the PhilSci Corpus

Rank Token Frequency % Rank Token Frequency % 27 theory 2362 0.39% 102 theoretical 620 0.10% 29 science 2310 0.38% 104 truth 606 0.10% 41 scientific 1464 0.24% 106 paradigm 592 0.10% 53 physical 1175 0.19% 109 beliefs 576 0.10% 58 knowledge 1139 0.19% 112 terms 567 0.09% 61 philosophy 1130 0.19% 116 system 548 0.09% 66 language 1012 0.17% 117 physics 547 0.09% 71 theories 873 0.14% 124 conceptual 500 0.08% 72 nature 691 0.11% 127 concepts 493 0.08% 98 concept 7 0.10% 132 mind 479 0.08% 12163 2.12% 5528 0.92%

An examination of the 100 most frequently occurring tokens in the Surrey Corpus shows that there are 18 non-closed class tokens or terms and proper nouns. These tokens have been arranged in groups of 10 together with their cumulative frequency (Table 7):

Table 7: The 100 most frequently occurring tokens in our corpus. the,of,to,and,a,in,is,that,as,be 25.80% it,this,for,are,by,not,which,or,i,we 6.73% with,an,on,s,but,have, theory ,from, science ,can 4.37% if, sellars ,one,there,they,at,such,he,will,what 2.81% scientific ,all,was,so,about,has,his,these,some,other 2.30% between,new, physical ,only,no,more,may, knowledge ,their,our 1.92% philosophy ,its,would,any, sense,language ,then,p,t,than 1.72% theories ,do,does,different, first ,when,also, view,back,way 1.32% been,must,them,how,should, two ,my,even, nature ,those 1.19% see,e, time ,us,given,you,because, concept ,however,into 1.07% TOTAL 49.22%

These 100 most frequent tokens comprise the nine most frequent terms used in our corpus (for example, theory, science , ….) A look at the next 100 most frequently used tokens shows an approximate three-fold increase in the number of open class words, including nouns and adjectives ; note the presence of the terms physics, laws, system(s), structure, evolution showing the two key sciences discussed in the philosophy of science and allied fields’ literature, physics and biology . The three most frequently quoted philosophers of science are Popper, Feyerabend and Kuhn (see Table 8).

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Table 8: The second 100 most frequently occurring tokens. like, theoretical ,could, truth ,non, world ,same,had,who, paradigm 1.00% were, problem ,possible, beliefs ,most, life ,terms,point,university ,image 0.95% being, system,physics ,fact ,out,use,o,say, general ,conceptual 0.88% example,true ,concepts, d, form ,very, change,case ,through, mind 0.81% natural,level,process ,certain, history,laws,states ,rather,thought,cannot 0.77% both, kind,mental,question,press ,many,make, objects,empirical ,thus 0.75% state,popper ,here, selection ,now,well,c,just, argument,philosophical 0.72% structure ,g, order ,me, social,experience,problems ,something, part,account 0.69% evolution ,whether, biological ,r,why,might,without,since, feyerabend, think 0.66% ,systems,model ,b, work,human,processes,properties,kuhn ,made 0.65% TOTAL 7.87%

Term formation in philosophy of science and the use of -isms. The suffix -ism is popular in philosophy of science. Let us look at the way this suffix is used in English language. -ism is a suffix used initially to form nouns of action from verbs (to baptise → baptism). The OED lists three major uses of this suffix currently:

Table 9: Major uses of isms in English 1 (a) Forming a simple noun of action, naming agonise →→→ agonism; baptise →→→ baptism; the process, or the completed action, or its organ →→→ organism; syllogise →→→ syllogism results (b) Expressing the action or conduct of a class hero(ic) →→→ heroism; patriot(s) →→→ patriotism; of persons scoundrel(s) →→→ scoundrelism 2 (a) Forming the name of a system of theory or Aryan →→→ Aryanism; practice Brahman(s) →→→ Brahmanism (b) More of the nature of class names or agonise →→→ agnosticism; descriptive terms for doctrines or principles jingoistic →→→ jingoism 3 Forming a term denoting a peculiarity, American →→→ Americanism; especially of language Oriental →→→ Orientialism

What of the isms in our corpus? Certainly, they are not as frequently used as theory(ies), science or concept(s) , but there is still a plentiful supply of isms . For instance, David Papineau’s book Philosophical Naturalism (1993) contains over 88,000 words distributed over six chapters, in which he cites no less than 28 different isms : physicalism 8.3 times for every thousand words Papineau writes, about 0.083%; functionalism , 4.8 times per thousand words; closely followed by realism (3.4 times per thousand words), scepticism (2.9 times), dualism (2.4 times) and naturalism (1.1 times). There are only two occurrences of the term paradigm . All told, Papineau uses 28 clearly identifiable isms .

There are over 200 different isms used in our philosophy of science corpus. Terms ending in ism were used over 2,000 times in the c.600,000 word corpus. Most of these formations are intended to be the descriptions of doctrines or principles (item 2a in Table 8); formations described in items 1 and 3 (in Table 8) are not found frequently in our Philosophy of science corpus, although we do find terms like organism , syllogism . The 10 most frequently occurring isms are shown in Table 9a below. The usual ‘suspects’, realism, , dualism are present here:

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Table 9a: 10 most frequent isms in the PhilSci Corpus realism 262 0.04231% materialism 120 0.01938% empiricism 116 0.01873% 90 0.01453% behaviorism 82 0.01324% physicalism 81 0.01308% determinism 69 0.01114% functionalism 67 0.01082% relativism 65 0.01050% dualism 56 0.00904%

The next ten ism -suffixed terms include positivism , naturalism , phenomenonalism and so on.

Table 9b: The next 10 most frequent isms in the PhilSci Corpus positivism 53 0.00856% naturalism 50 0.00807% rationalism 49 0.00791% scepticism 46 0.00743% darwinism 43 0.00694% reductionism 40 0.00646% 32 0.00517% phenomenalism 32 0.00517% 31 0.00501% epiphenomenalism 27 0.00436% reliabilism 24 0.00388%

Amongst the isms used only once in the 600,000+ word corpus are formations like:

absolutism, cladism davidsonianism, interpretativism, popperism, ,

Their lower frequency indicates that these maybe ‘on-the-fly’ terminology used by the various writers in our philosophy of science corpus. However, there is a small probability that some of these may be accepted and used as a term if only larger number of people start using these terms.

Afterword

The terminological profusion in philosophy of science may point to two things: First, that the subject is rapidly growing and the researchers and their peers have to coin new terminology or relexicalise existing words/terms to talk about exciting new concepts and related artefacts. Second, and perhaps a related point may be that the precision and clarity expected in other research endeavours is deemed by the philosophers of science to be a sign of pedantry.

One can agree with a degree of terminological laxity in booming subjects like computing science - each day heralds a new software system , a new item of hardware or genetic engineering - each day brings in a new ethical dilemma, yesterday it may

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be test tube babies and today it may be genetically modified food . But philosophy of science attempts to tell us about science works, and more importantly, should work. In this context, one would expect the philosophers of science to keep their own terminology to the necessary minimum so that we can examine the work of the observed scientists. One is not encouraged by the attitude of philosophers of science like Papineau. In the Introduction of his excellent description of Philosophical Naturalism the author begins by noting that different philosophers mean different things by the term naturalist , but soon enough, only a few lines later, suggest that ‘substantial philosophical issues’ should be discussed by researchers and only then one should ‘worry about the terminology afterwards’. This statement does not sit easily with his introduction to The Philosophy of Science where he says that ‘[p]eople can of course define their terms as they wish, but there is much scope for misunderstanding here’ (1996:4). Indeed. Papineau has used the word term/terminology 17 times (and terminological three times) in his c.90,000 word book on Philosophical Naturalism. A concordance of Papineau’s usage of ‘terminology’ in various contexts, (Table 10 below) shows that terminology does matter even when he says that it does not matter; perhaps, one should qualify the above statement by noting that perhaps it may not matter to Papineau, but the for a novice or a busy reader terminology does matter.

Table 10: A concordance of ‘terminology’ and related words in Papineau’s Philosophical Naturalism. CHAPTER Sentenc CITATION e # INTRODUCTION 13 I suspect that the main reason for the terminological unclarity is that nearly everybody nowadays wants to be a " naturalist " , but the aspirants to the term nevertheless disagree widely on substantial questions of philosophical doctrine INTRODUCTION 17 The moral is that we should address the substantial philosophical issues first , and worry about the terminology afterwards . CHAPTER 1 160 Moreover , physicalism allows that such special terminology isn ' t just a shorthand for complex physical properties : for in those cases where type identity fails , special categories cannot even in principle be specified in physical CHAPTER 1 163 Nevertheless , physicalists will say , such special terminology is still just a way of describing complexes of physical stuff , and does not require us to recognize any non - physical substance . CHAPTER 1 592 The terminology normally used in this connection is that of " realization " : having certain neurones firing realizes m y desire to raise my arm , even though the two properties CHAPTER 2 201 In general davidson is sceptical as to whether any serious laws can be framed using psychological terminology . CHAPTER 3 166 What matters to my story is that mental states should be the products of selection processes , not what terminology we use to specify this . CHAPTER 5 220 The theory that certainty and hence subjective warrants are required is a different theory , but still a theory , in the terminology I am using , of the same concept of knowledge . CHAPTER 5 1186 This terminology derives from Dummett , who introduced the term " anti - realist " for theories of meaning according to which truth is not - transcendent . CHAPTER 6 1577 However , in my terminology , and in contemporary British usage , van Fraassen is not an anti - realist , but rather a pessimistic realist , that is , a sceptic .

Acknowledgment The author gratefully acknowledges the support of EU-sponsored projects INTERVAL (ESPRIT Project No. LRE-4002) and ACE (ESPRIT Project No. 22271).

References

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