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MARKETING THEORY This Page Intentionally Left Blank MARKETING THEORY MARKETING THEORY This page intentionally left blank MARKETING THEORY FOUNDATIONS, CONTROVERSY, STRATEGY, RESOURCEADVANTAGE THEORY SHELBY D. HUNT ROUTLEDGE Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2010 by M.E. Sharpe Published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2010 Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use of operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hunt, Shelby D. Marketing theory : foundations, controversy, strategy, resource-advantage theory / by Shelby D. Hunt. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7656-2363-8 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Marketing. 2. Marketing research. I. Title. HF5415.H869 2009 658.8001—dc22 2009018628 ISBN 13: 9780765623638 (hbk) This book is dedicated to Marguerite and Donald C. Hunt, my parents, who persevered, with extraordinary courage, in times of great adversity. This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS Preface xv PART 1. THE NATURE OF MARKETING AND SCIENCE 1 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Three Contradictions? 3 1.2 Objectives of Monograph 7 1.3 The Nature of Marketing 8 1.3.1 The Scope of Marketing 10 1.3.2 Is Marketing a Science? 17 1.4 The Nature of Science 18 1.5 The Unity of Scientific Method 21 1.5.1 Discovery Versus Justification 23 1.6 Conclusions on Marketing Science 28 1.7 The Three Dichotomies Model: An Evaluation 29 1.7.1 The Positive/Normative Dichotomy in Philosophy of Science 30 1.7.2 Is the Positive/Normative Dichotomy False? 30 1.7.3 Is the Positive/Normative Dichotomy Dangerous? 31 1.7.4 Is the Positive/Normative Dichotomy Unnecessary? 31 1.7.5 Is the Positive/Normative Dichotomy Meaningless? 33 1.7.6 Is the Positive/Normative Dichotomy Useless? 34 1.7.7 Is All of Marketing Thought Normative? 35 1.8 The Three Dichotomies Model as a General Taxonomical Framework for Marketing 39 1.9 Plan of Monograph 40 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 41 Notes 44 2 On the Marketing Discipline 46 2.1 On Marketing as . 46 2.1.1 . A University Discipline 46 2.1.2 . An Applied Discipline 50 vii viii CONTENTS 2.1.3 . A Professional Discipline 52 2.1.4 . A Set of Responsibilities 55 2.1.5 Conclusion on the Nature of the Marketing Discipline 60 2.2 The Defining Marketing Controversy 60 2.2.1 On the 2007 Definition of Marketing 61 2.3 The Defining Marketing Research Controversy 64 2.3.1 Research Questions in Marketing 64 2.3.2 Conclusion on the Nature of Marketing Research 70 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 71 Notes 73 PART 2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKETING THEORY 75 3 On the Morphology of Explanation 77 3.1 Explanations in Marketing 77 3.2 Criteria for Evaluating Explanatory Models 78 3.3 Deductive-Nomological Explanation 79 3.4 Statistical Explanation 81 3.4.1 Theories of Probability 81 3.4.2 Statistical Explanation and the Social Sciences 82 3.4.3 Deductive-Statistical Explanation 83 3.4.4 Inductive-Statistical Explanation 84 3.5 Are Logical Empiricist Models of Explanation Adequate? 88 3.5.1 Is the D-N Model Dead? 88 3.5.2 Is the I-S Model Dead? 90 3.6 The Pattern Model 92 3.7 Functionalist Explanation 94 3.7.1 Uses of the Terms Function and Functional Explanation 95 3.7.2 Preliminary Problems of Functional Explanation 96 3.7.3 The Logic of Functional Explanation 97 3.7.4 Functionalism in the Context of Discovery 100 3.8 Summary and Conclusions 101 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 101 Notes 103 4 Explanation: Issues and Aspects 104 4.1 Explanation, Prediction, and Retrodiction 104 4.1.1 Explanations as Potential Predictions 105 4.1.2 Predictions as Potential Explanations 108 4.1.3 Are Explanations and Predictions Potential Retrodictions? 109 4.2 Causal Explanations 110 4.2.1 The Notion of Causality 110 4.2.2 Evidence for Causation 113 CONTENTS ix 4.3 Explanatory Incompleteness, Explanation Chains, and Infinite Regress 116 4.3.1 Marketing Explanation Chains 116 4.4 Other Forms of Explanatory Incompleteness 117 4.4.1 Enthymemes 118 4.4.2 Partial Explanations 118 4.4.3 Explanation Sketches 118 4.5 The Fundamental Explananda of Marketing 118 4.6 A Product Life Cycle Explanation 120 4.7 A Consumer Behavior Explanation 121 4.7.1 A Reconstruction of the Explanation 122 4.7.2 Structural Analysis of the Explanation 123 4.8 A Price Discrimination Explanation 124 4.9 A Wheel of Retailing Explanation 125 4.9.1 The Wheel of Retailing and Competition for Differential Advantage 126 4.10 Summary and Conclusions 127 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 128 Notes 129 5 On the Morphology of Scientific Laws 130 5.1 Role of Laws in Marketing Research 131 5.2 The First Criterion: Generalized Conditionals 132 5.3 The Second Criterion: Empirical Content 134 5.4 The Third Criterion: Nomic Necessity 136 5.5 The Fourth Criterion: Systematic Integration 138 5.5.1 Role of Empirical Generalizations 142 5.6 Summary 143 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 144 Notes 146 6 Scientific Laws: Issues and Aspects 147 6.1 The Time Issue 147 6.1.1 Equilibrium Laws 148 6.1.2 Laws of Atemporal Coexistence 151 6.1.3 Laws of Succession 152 6.1.4 Process Laws 154 6.2 Axioms, Fundamental Laws, and Derivative Laws 154 6.2.1 Bridge Laws 156 6.3 Extension and Universality 158 6.3.1 Singular Statements 159 6.3.2 Existential Statements 160 6.3.3 Statistical Laws 161 6.3.4 Universal Laws 163 x CONTENTS 6.4 Summary and Conclusions 165 6.5 Problems in Extension: The Psychophysics of Prices 166 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 169 Notes 170 7 On the Morphology of Theory 171 7.1 The Notion of Theory 171 7.2 Misconceptions of Theory 173 7.3 The “Systematically Related” Criterion 175 7.3.1 Formal Language Systems 177 7.3.2 Axiomatic Formal Systems 178 7.3.3 Rules of Interpretation 180 7.3.4 Issues in Formalization 181 7.3.5 The “General Theory of Marketing”: A Partial Formalization 182 7.3.6 The Theory of Buyer Behavior: A Partial Formalization 184 7.4 The “Lawlike Generalizations” Criterion 187 7.5 The “Empirically Testable” Criterion 188 7.5.1 The Nature of Empirical Testing 189 7.5.2 The Empirical Testing Process 190 7.5.3 On Confirmation 193 7.6 Summary 194 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 194 Notes 198 8 Theory: Issues and Aspects 199 8.1 Classificational Schemata 199 8.1.1 Logical Partitioning 200 8.1.2 Grouping Procedures 203 8.1.3 Criteria for Evaluating Classificational Schemata 206 8.2 Positive Versus Normative Theory 210 8.3 Deterministic Versus Stochastic Theory 213 8.3.1 The Nature of Deterministic Theory 214 8.3.2 Uncertainty in Explanation 215 8.3.3 Determinism and Marketing Theory 216 8.4 The Nature of General Theories 217 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 220 Notes 221 PART 3. CONTROVERSY IN MARKETING THEORY 223 9 On Scientific Realism and Marketing Research 225 9.1 Why Relativism Was Rejected 226 9.2 Historical Development of Realism 228 9.2.1 Quantum Mechanics, Realism, and Positivism 229 CONTENTS xi 9.3 Scientific Realism: Four Fundamental Tenets 231 9.4 Implications of Scientific Realism 233 9.4.1 Physics 233 9.4.2 Biology 237 9.4.3 Marketing and the Social Sciences 238 9.5 Scientific Realism and the Success of Science 239 9.5.1 Explaining the Successful Eradication of Smallpox 240 9.6 Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress 243 9.7 Scientific Realism Contrasted with Logical Empiricism 244 9.8 Scientific Realism Contrasted with Constructive Empiricism 246 9.9 Scientific Realism and Critical Realism 247 9.9.1 The Critical Realism of Niiniluoto 247 9.9.2 The Critical Realism of Sayer 249 9.10 Conclusion 251 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 252 Notes 255 10 On Science/Nonscience, Qualitative Methods, and Marketing Research 256 10.1 The Sciences Versus Nonsciences Controversy 256 10.1.1 Relativism and the Nature of Science 257 10.1.2 Revisiting the Nature of Science Arguments 259 10.1.3 Is the Relativist Nature of Science Argument a Straw Man? 261 10.1.4 Weak-Form Relativism 263 10.2 The Positivism Versus Qualitative Methods Controversy 265 10.2.1 Misconceptions About Positivism 267 10.2.2 On Antipositivism: For Reason 275 10.2.3 Paradigm Dominance in Marketing, Management, and Consumer Research 277 10.2.4 The Dominance of Positivism: A Postmodern View 277 10.2.5 Logical Empiricism as the Dominant Paradigm 279 10.2.6 Conclusion: For Reason 282 Questions for Analysis and Discussion 283 Notes 284 11 On Truth and Marketing Research 286 11.1 The Nature of Truth 287 11.2 Truth and Scientific Realism 288 11.2.1 A Scientific Realist Model of Truth 289 11.2.2 Truth Is Not an Entity 292 11.2.3 Consistent with Marketing Science Practice 292 11.2.4 Inconsistent with Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricism, and Falsificationism 293 11.2.5 Not with Certainty 294 xii CONTENTS 11.2.6 Not Equal to Pragmatic Success 295 11.3 Relativistic Truth 296 11.4 Critical Relativism and Truth 298 11.4.1 The Falsity of Realism Argument 298 11.4.2 Reticulational Philosophy and Truth 300 11.4.3 Truth and “Utopianism” 302 11.5 The Philosophers’ Fallacy Revisited 304 11.6 Truth and TRUTH 305 11.6.1 Postmodernism and Dogmatic Skepticism 307 11.6.2.
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