Critical Thinking Vs. Critical Consciousness
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Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
NOU^S 38:2 (2004) 197–232 Would ‘‘Direct Realism’’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? MARC LANGE University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of interest in the ‘‘Humean’’ problem of induction. For several decades following the recognized failure of Strawsonian ‘‘ordinary-language’’ dissolutions and of Wesley Salmon’s elaboration of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction, work on the problem of induction languished. Attention turned instead toward con- firmation theory, as philosophers sensibly tried to understand precisely what it is that a justification of induction should aim to justify. Now, however, in light of Bayesian confirmation theory and other developments in epistemology, several philosophers have begun to reconsider the classical problem of induction. In section 2, I shall review a few of these developments. Though some of them will turn out to be unilluminating, others will profitably suggest that we not meet inductive scepticism by trying to justify some alleged general principle of ampliative reasoning. Accordingly, in section 3, I shall examine how the problem of induction arises in the context of one particular ‘‘inductive leap’’: the confirmation, most famously by Henrietta Leavitt and Harlow Shapley about a century ago, that a period-luminosity relation governs all Cepheid variable stars. This is a good example for the inductive sceptic’s purposes, since it is difficult to see how the sparse background knowledge available at the time could have entitled stellar astronomers to regard their observations as justifying this grand inductive generalization. I shall argue that the observation reports that confirmed the Cepheid period- luminosity law were themselves ‘‘thick’’ with expectations regarding as yet unknown laws of nature. -
Philosophy of Science -----Paulk
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -----PAULK. FEYERABEND----- However, it has also a quite decisive role in building the new science and in defending new theories against their well-entrenched predecessors. For example, this philosophy plays a most important part in the arguments about the Copernican system, in the development of optics, and in the Philosophy ofScience: A Subject with construction of a new and non-Aristotelian dynamics. Almost every work of Galileo is a mixture of philosophical, mathematical, and physical prin~ a Great Past ciples which collaborate intimately without giving the impression of in coherence. This is the heroic time of the scientific philosophy. The new philosophy is not content just to mirror a science that develops independ ently of it; nor is it so distant as to deal just with alternative philosophies. It plays an essential role in building up the new science that was to replace 1. While it should be possible, in a free society, to introduce, to ex the earlier doctrines.1 pound, to make propaganda for any subject, however absurd and however 3. Now it is interesting to see how this active and critical philosophy is immoral, to publish books and articles, to give lectures on any topic, it gradually replaced by a more conservative creed, how the new creed gener must also be possible to examine what is being expounded by reference, ates technical problems of its own which are in no way related to specific not to the internal standards of the subject (which may be but the method scientific problems (Hurne), and how there arises a special subject that according to which a particular madness is being pursued), but to stan codifies science without acting back on it (Kant). -
PDF Download Starting with Science Strategies for Introducing Young Children to Inquiry 1St Edition Ebook
STARTING WITH SCIENCE STRATEGIES FOR INTRODUCING YOUNG CHILDREN TO INQUIRY 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Marcia Talhelm Edson | 9781571108074 | | | | | Starting with Science Strategies for Introducing Young Children to Inquiry 1st edition PDF Book The presentation of the material is as good as the material utilizing star trek analogies, ancient wisdom and literature and so much more. Using Multivariate Statistics. Michael Gramling examines the impact of policy on practice in early childhood education. Part of a series on. Schauble and colleagues , for example, found that fifth grade students designed better experiments after instruction about the purpose of experimentation. For example, some suggest that learning about NoS enables children to understand the tentative and developmental NoS and science as a human activity, which makes science more interesting for children to learn Abd-El-Khalick a ; Driver et al. Research on teaching and learning of nature of science. The authors begin with theory in a cultural context as a foundation. What makes professional development effective? Frequently, the term NoS is utilised when considering matters about science. This book is a documentary account of a young intern who worked in the Reggio system in Italy and how she brought this pedagogy home to her school in St. Taking Science to School answers such questions as:. The content of the inquiries in science in the professional development programme was based on the different strands of the primary science curriculum, namely Living Things, Energy and Forces, Materials and Environmental Awareness and Care DES Exit interview. Begin to address the necessity of understanding other usually peer positions before they can discuss or comment on those positions. -
In the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend
Durham E-Theses Pluralism and the 'Problem of Reality' in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend KIDD, IAN,JAMES How to cite: KIDD, IAN,JAMES (2010) Pluralism and the 'Problem of Reality' in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/864/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Kidd Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend Abstract Feyerabend’s later philosophy was a sustained defence of cultural and epistemic diversity. After Against Method (1975) Feyerabend argued that his rejection of methodological monism challenged the presumed unity and superiority of scientific knowledge and practices. His later philosophy was therefore dedicated to a reassessment of the merits of a wide range of ‘non-scientific’ traditions present throughout non-Western indigenous cultures. -
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method Fourth Edition Paul Feyerabend VERSO London • New York Analytical Index Being a Sketch of the Main Argument Introdnction 1 Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives. 1 7 This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes. 2 13 For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and/or well-established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counterinductively. 3 17 The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory, and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual. 4 ~ There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for improving every single theory. Nor is political interference rejected. It may be needed to overcome the chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to the status quo. xxx ANAL YTICAL INDEX 5 33 No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof ofprogress. -
CURRICULUM VITAE January, 2018 DANIEL GARBER
CURRICULUM VITAE January, 2018 DANIEL GARBER Position: A. Watson Armour III University Professor of Philosophy Address: Department of Philosophy 1879 Hall Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006 Address (September 2017-July 2018) Institut d’études avancées 17, quai d’Anjou 75004 Paris France Telephone: 609-258-4307 (voice) 609-258-1502 (FAX) 609-258-4289 (Departmental office) Email: [email protected] Erdös number: 16 EDUCATIONAL RECORD Harvard University, 1967-1975 A.B. in Philosophy, 197l A.M. in Philosophy, 1974 Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1975 TEACHING EXPERIENCE Princeton University 2002- Professor of Philosophy and Associated Faculty, Program in the History of Science 2005-12 Chair, Department of Philosophy 2008-09 Old Dominion Professor 2009- Associated Faculty, Department of Politics 2009-16 Stuart Professor of Philosophy Garber -2- 2016- A. Watson Armour III University Professor of Philosophy University of Chicago 1995-2002 Lawrence Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor in Philosophy, the Committee on Conceptual and Historical Studies of Science, the Morris Fishbein Center for Study of History of Science and Medicine and the College 1986-2002 Professor 1982-86 Associate Professor (with tenure) 1975-82 Assistant Professor 1998-2002 Chairman, Committee on Conceptual and Historical Studies of Science (formerly Conceptual Foundations of Science) 2001 Acting Chairman, Department of Philosophy 1995-98 Associate Provost for Education and Research 1994-95 Chairman, Conceptual Foundations of Science 1987-94 Chairman, Department of Philosophy Harvard College 1972-75 Teaching Assistant and Tutor University of Minnesota, Spring 1979, Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy Johns Hopkins University, 1980-1981, Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy Princeton University 1982-1983 Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1985-1986, Member École Normale Supérieure (Lettres) (Lyon, France), November 2000, Professeur invitée. -
Kuhnian Incommensurability Between Two Paradigms of Contemporary Linguistics
Kuhnian Incommensurability Between Two Paradigms of Contemporary Linguistics Philip Smith Ph.D. Thesis School of English Literature, Language and Linguistics The University of Sheffield March 2011 Slowly we are learning, We at least know this much, That we have to unlearn Much that we were taught, And are growing chary Of emphatic dogmas; Love like matter is much Odder than we thought. From 'Heavy Date' by W.H.Auden I must review my disbelief in angels. Brian Patten - Angel Wings Abstract This dissertation proposes a theory of reference for the language of scien- tific theories. This theory of reference looks at the nature of postulation in scientific theories, and shows that mental posits are metaphorical in na- ture. It is a hybrid of internalist and extensive reference theories. This, allied with the competing epistemological assumptions of competing schools of ltngutsttcs, can account for the existence of incommensurability across two paradigms of ltngutsttcs, The relationship between transformational generative grammar and socio- linguistics is vexed. Both claim the same object of study, but with radi- cally different methods and aims. This dissertation shows that the meta- phorical nature of the posits used in each leads to incommensurable vo- cabularies. Thomas Kuhn's notions of paradigms and incommensurability are used to elucidate this relationship. Chapter one proposes and explains the theory of reference. Chapter two defines the major areas of the thesis. Chapter three explores the history of linguists claiming that a particular area of linguistics instantiates a Kuhnian paradigm, and looks at arguments concerning the possibilities for studying language scientifically. Chapter four explores the epistemological bases of TGG and sociolinguistics, starting from Chomsky's claims to do 'Cartesian linguistics', and concludes that opposing epistemological com- mitments lead to incommensurability. -
The Epistemology of Testimony
Pergamon Stud. His. Phil. Sci., Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1-31, 1998 0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0039-3681/98 $19.004-0.00 The Epistemology of Testimony Peter Lipton * 1. Introduction Is there anything you know entirely off your own bat? Your knowledge depends pervasively on the word of others. Knowledge of events before you were born or outside your immediate neighborhood are the obvious cases, but your epistemic dependence on testimony goes far deeper that this. Mundane beliefs-such as that the earth is round or that you think with your brain-almost invariably depend on testimony, and even quite personal facts-such as your birthday or the identity of your biological parents--can only be known with the help of others. Science is no refuge from the ubiquity of testimony. At least most of the theories that a scientist accepts, she accepts because of what others say. The same goes for almost all the data, since she didn’t perform those experiments herself. Even in those experiments she did perform, she relied on testimony hand over fist: just think of all those labels on the chemicals. Even her personal observations may have depended on testimony, if observation is theory-laden, since those theories with which it is laden were themselves accepted on testimony. Even if observation were not theory-laden, the testimony-ladenness of knowledge should be beyond dispute. We live in a sea of assertions and little if any of our knowledge would exist without it. If the role of testimony in knowledge is so vast, why is its role in the history of epistemology so slight? Why doesn’t the philosophical canon sparkle with titles such as Meditations on Testimony, A Treatise Concerning Human Testimony, and Language, Truth and Testimony? The answer is unclear. -
Towards a Vibrant & Broad African
Library.Anarhija.Net Towards a Vibrant & Broad African-Based Anarchism Ashanti Alston Ashanti Alston Towards a Vibrant & Broad African-Based Anarchism 2003 Retrieved on 17 August 2015 from http://www.newformulation.org/3alston.htm lib.anarhija.net 2003 Contents Wole Soyinka’s Anarchism ................. 3 African Anarchism: The History of a Movement . 10 Conclusion .......................... 14 Notes ............................. 16 2 I am always on the search for cutting edge, challenging think- ing within anarchism and other fields of revolutionary theory: the search for how to get beyond ’stuck.’ As a Black anarchist I have looked for writings specifically related to the problems and chal- lenges that I face, and that my people face here in the United States, and that can help us organize for self-determination and destroy the very basis upon which all oppressive systems operate. Of the activist ”isms,” anarchism, at least in theory, promotes the kind of openness and risk-taking that actually encourages the constant re- generation necessary to meet new revolutionary challenges. The price to pay, often, is getting ”uncomfortable,” being ”jarred,” even in terms of what one understood as the anti-authoritarian or anar- chist canon. The two works reviewed here, Post-Colonial African Theory and Practice: Wole Soyinka’s Anarchism and African Anarchism: The His- tory of a Movement, come from authors trapped in vicious post- colonial hells. They have ”stretched their necks” to see andun- derstand differently in order to just ”breathe” and fight back. The stretching and openness to new information, new insights, is what keeps anarchism and other radical perspectives fresh and evolving to meet our planetary needs. -
The Idea of a Religious Social Science
The Idea Of A Religious Social Science Professor Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast University of Tehran Distributed by Alhoda International Publication and Distribution No 766 Vali-e-Asr Ave. Tehran, Iran Tel: 0098 21 88897661 www.alhoda.ir email: [email protected] Copywright 2009 by Alhoda All rights reserved First edition 2009 ISBN 978-964-439-064-7 2 Contents Preface Chapter 1: Science: Positivist and Post-positivist Views Introduction 1.1. Positivist Account of Science 1.2. Post-positivist Challenges 1.2.1. Integration of Science and Metaphysics 1.2.2. Extent of Metaphysics’ Impact on Science 1.2.3. Integration of Theory and Observation 1.2.4. Integration of Fact and Value 1.2.5. Non-linear Progress of Science 1.2.6. Impact of Science on Metaphysics Chapter 2: Religion 2.1. Encyclopedic Theory of Religion 2.2. Functional Theory of Religion 2.3. Theory of Selectivity of Religion 2.3.1. Distinctive Nature of Religious Knowledge 2.3.2. Characteristics of Religion and Religious Knowledge Chapter 3: Meaninglessness and Meaningfulness in Religious Science Introduction 3.1. Epistemological Monism and Religious Science 3.1.1. Logical Positivism: Meaninglessness of Religious Science 3.1.2. The Significance of Positivists’ View 3.1.3. Pragmatism: Meaninglessness of Religious Science 3.1.4. The Significance of Pragmatists’ View 3.2. Pluralism and Religious Science 3.2.1. Contrastive Pluralism: Meaninglessness of Religious Science 3.2.2. Significance of Contrastive Pluralism 3.2.3 Overlap Pluralism: Meaningfulness of Religious Science Chapter 4: True and False in Religious Science Introduction 4.1. The Inferential Approach and its Critique 4.1.1. -
Rigid Strings and Flaky Snowflakes
Language and Cognition http://journals.cambridge.org/LCO Additional services for Language and Cognition: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Rigid strings and aky snowakes GEOFFREY SAMPSON Language and Cognition / FirstView Article / June 2015, pp 1 - 17 DOI: 10.1017/langcog.2015.10, Published online: 23 June 2015 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1866980815000101 How to cite this article: GEOFFREY SAMPSON Rigid strings and aky snowakes. Language and Cognition, Available on CJO 2015 doi:10.1017/langcog.2015.10 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/LCO, IP address: 78.143.198.117 on 05 Jul 2015 Language and Cognition (2015), Page 1 of 17 . doi:10.1017/langcog.2015.10 © UK Cognitive Linguistics Association, 2015 Rigid strings and fl aky snowfl akes GEOFFREY SAMPSON University of South Africa ( Received 26 February 2015 – Revised 15 April 2015 – Accepted 15 April 2015 ) Christina Behme, Evaluating Cartesian Linguistics: from historical antecedents to computational modeling (Potsdam Linguistic Investigations, vol. 12). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014. 1. A philosopher contemplates Chomsky Christina Behme, although now living in Canada, was born and educated in the former East Germany, where compulsory classes in dialectical materialism perhaps immunized her against accepting spurious intellectual authority just because those around her defer to it. A philosopher with particular interest in language, CB (as I shall refer to her) in this book takes apart the “Chomsky phenomenon” from a philosophical point of view. 1 CB’s initial concern, as her title indicates, is Chomsky’s claim (in Cartesian Linguistics , Chomsky, 1966 , and elsewhere) to be using the data of linguistics to revive Descartes’ rationalist account of human cognition, long out of favour in the English-speaking world. -
WHAT's WRONG with the SOCIAL SCIENCES? the Perils of the Postmodern
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SOCIAL SCIENCES? The Perils of the Postmodern Michael A. Faia College of William & Mary 1993 For Caitlin, Josephine, Gusty, and Pancho Et si je connais, moi, une fleur unique au monde, qui n'existe nulle part, sauf dans ma planète, et qu'un petit mouton peut anéantir d'un seul coup, comme ça, un matin, sans se rendre compte de ce qu'il fait, ce n'est pas important ça! —Antoine de Saint-Exupéry iii Table of Contents Introduction Chapter 1: WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SOCIAL SCIENCES? 1 (1) The dialectics of disenchantment 2 (1.1) Predictability, vulcanology, seismology, and (especially) meteorology 6 (1.2) Molecular mysteries and habits of the quark 8 (1.3) Rosaldo revisited: How would the catcher in the rye have felt? 12 (2) The trouble with feminist theory 13 (3) Titles and tribulations 17 (4) Solicitous gatekeepers, #1 25 (5) Itching and scratching: a Lazarsfeldian digression through an SPSS 27 hologram (6) Transcending the transcendentalists 30 (7) What do you presuppose, and when did you presuppose it? The Sisyphus of the social sciences 33 (8) The meaning of politics and the politics of meaning 38 Chapter 2: MICHEL FOUCAULT, MACHINES WHO THINK, AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 57 (1) “Man the machine—man the impersonal engine” 57 (2) Good, bad, or ugly? 67 (3) Mitigating circumstances 70 iv (4) In conclusion: Oodles of Boodles 74 (5) Why Foucault needed Lindroth, and why Lindroth needed Foucault 75 Chapter 3: IN PRAISE OF THE NULL HYPOTHESIS: THE MYTH OF “THE VALUE-FREE MYTH” 83 (1) The nature and extent of bias in scientific research 83 (2) Quashing the indictment: Can a Comtean rule a country? 85 (2.1) Positions 86 (2.2) Correctives 87 (2.3) Motives: A series of acts contrary ..