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Kuhnian Incommensurability Between Two Paradigms of Contemporary Linguistics

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Kuhnian Incommensurability Between Two Paradigms of Contemporary Linguistics Philip Smith Ph.D. Thesis School of English Literature, Language and Linguistics The University of Sheffield March 2011 Slowly we are learning, We at least know this much, That we have to unlearn Much that we were taught, And are growing chary Of emphatic dogmas; Love like matter is much Odder than we thought. From 'Heavy Date' by W.H.Auden I must review my disbelief in angels. Brian Patten - Angel Wings Abstract This dissertation proposes a theory of reference for the language of scien- tific theories. This theory of reference looks at the nature of postulation in scientific theories, and shows that mental posits are metaphorical in na- ture. It is a hybrid of internalist and extensive reference theories. This, allied with the competing epistemological assumptions of competing schools of ltngutsttcs, can account for the existence of incommensurability across two paradigms of ltngutsttcs, The relationship between transformational generative grammar and socio- linguistics is vexed. Both claim the same object of study, but with radi- cally different methods and aims. This dissertation shows that the meta- phorical nature of the posits used in each leads to incommensurable vo- cabularies. Thomas Kuhn's notions of paradigms and incommensurability are used to elucidate this relationship. Chapter one proposes and explains the theory of reference. Chapter two defines the major areas of the thesis. Chapter three explores the history of linguists claiming that a particular area of linguistics instantiates a Kuhnian paradigm, and looks at arguments concerning the possibilities for studying language scientifically. Chapter four explores the epistemological bases of TGG and sociolinguistics, starting from Chomsky's claims to do 'Cartesian linguistics', and concludes that opposing epistemological com- mitments lead to incommensurability. Chapter five demonstrates the inc- ommensurable concepts and vocabulary items, and shows how my theory of reference can account for that incommensurability, while maintaining a certain amount of the traditional natural science - social science distinc- tion. Because postulation is free and metaphorical, terms borrowed from natural languages into scientific theories can end up with overlapping, but incommensurable, references. Incommensurability is shown to be local and surmountable, through 'language-learning' rather than through 'translation' . Table of Contents Abstract Page 1 Acknowledgements 6 Chapter One 7 1.0 Introduction 7 2.0 Structure of the thesis , 8 3.0 Methods and subjects: how does the thesis fit in with the fields of philosophy, lin- guistics and the history of linguistics? 10 3.1 History and philosophy of science (including the history of HPS) 10 3.2 History of linguistics 14 4.0 Other preliminary definitions 19 4.1 TGG and soctolingutsttcs 19 4.2 Kuhn's Philosophy 21 5.0 Theory of reference 27 5.1 Why have a new theory of reference? ,'" 27 5.2 Metaphor and Science; Natural Kinds; Locke 29 5.3 Metaphor and linguistics 34 5.4 What is the link between metaphor, incommensurability and reference? 37 5.5 Issues solved by this theory of reference 44 Chapter two: definitions 46 Part 1: Kuhn 47 1.1 Outline of Kuhn's theory of paradigms 47 1.2 Details of the theory of incommensurability 51 1.2.1 Kuhn and Feyerabend, incommensurability and language 52 1.2.2 Ontology and methodology 58 1.2.3 Local incommensurability 59 1.3 Issues of science: Kuhn on natural science, social science and demarcation 61 1.3.1 Kuhn's analysis of the human-natural science divide : 62 2 1.3.2 Kuhn and demarcation 75 Part two: arguments against, and misunderstandings of, Kuhn's philosophy 80 2.1 Paradigms ·.80 2.2 Synchronic/diachronic diversity 82 2.3 Relativism and irrationality 84 2.4 Criticisms of the concept of incommensurability 94 Part 3: definitions of TGG, sociolinguistics and schools 104 3.1 TGG 105 3.2 Sociolinguistics 110 3.3 Schools, disciplines, topics; paradigms, theories and programmes 114 3.3.1 a paradigm, a 'theory' and a 'programme' 114 3.3.2 'school', 'discipline' and 'topic' 117 Part 4: Rationalism and Empiricism 121 Conclusion 124 Chapter three: linguistics, science and Kuhnian paradigms 126 1.0 Is linguistics scientific? 128 1.1 'Claiming scientiflclty', that is, explaining how their field should properly be consid- ered a science 129 1.1.1 Science from a 'standard' point of view 130 1.1.2 What would a scientific linguistics look like from a Kuhnian point of view? 134 1.2 Attempting to demonstrate that another sub-discipline is not scientific 137 1.2.1 Intuitions 140 1.2.2 Idealisation 146 1.3 Conclusion to section one of chapter three 149 2.0 linguistics and paradigms: the use and abuse of Kuhn's philosophy in linguistics ........ 151 2.1 Introduction to section two 151 2.2 Using Kuhn in the service of their own (sub-) discipline, in order to bestow scientific legitimacy on their work 153 2.2.1 Talking about a revolution but not mentioning Kuhn 159 3 2.3 Claiming that another sub-discipline has misused Kuhn for their own self-serving purposes 163 2.4 Attempting to demonstrate that the other sub-discipline does not followthe Kuhnian model 166 2.5 Attempting to demonstrate that Kuhn's model is wrong, and therefore that it has no bearing on the scientificity of a linguistic (sub-) discipline 174 Conclusion to chapter three l 76 Chapter four: claiming Rationalist and Empiricist forebears 178 1.0 The re-emergence of Rationalism after centuries in the wilderness 180 2.0 Chomsky, Descartes and 'Cartesian linguistics' 190 2.1 Early TGG 192 2.2 Phase Two 195 2.3 The 1970s and 1980s 199 2.4 Minimalism 202 2.5 Conclusion to chapter four, section 2 205 3.0 People who have taken issue with Chomsky 205 3.1 Aarsleff , 208 3.2 Sampson's Position 211 3.3 Figueroa's Position 223 3.4 Yngve's Position 230 3.5 Sampson, Figueroa and Yngve 241 Conclusion to chapter four : 246 Chapter five: incommensurability and its roots, and the solution provided by my theory of reference ,.249 1.0 A review of the arguments from chapters three and four 251 2.0 Incommensurable vocabularies as used in those arguments 255 2.1 Defining the paradigm: mentalism, variation, 1- and Evlanguage. true linguistics, natural science and social science 256 2.1.1 Mind and variation 256 2.1.2 True linguistics 259 4 2.2 Science and methodology 264 2.2.1 Access to competence and performance 264 2.2.2 Ontological priority, form and function of language, directionality 266 2.2.3 Theory choice/data 273 2.3 Epistemology and ontology 275 2.3.1 Language and knowledge of language 275 2.3.2 Sentences and utterances 281 2.4 The way they interlink as per Kuhn's model 289 3.0 How my theory of reference solves all this 292 Conclusion to the thesis 300 Bibliography 302 5 Acknowledgements This dissertation was funded by a three-year studentship from the Univer- sity of Sheffield, without which it would have been impossible, and for which I am very grateful. My supervisor, Dr. Richard Steadman-Jones, has provided me with un- wavering support during four years of research and writing. He seemed to know what I was talking about at the beginning when I wasn't sure myself, steered me towards fertile lines of enquiry, and kept patience during the many changes in focus. The fact that this dissertation exists is largely down to him, and if it's any good, then that's entirely down to him. I am privileged to have a large and supportive family, and to have acquired an equally large and supportive circle of friends in Sheffield, most of whom are in the same doctoral boat, and who are too numerous to list in full. I would like to give special thanks to my mother and step-father, who have supported me in many ways, including financially, in my more 'philosophi- cal' moments. I had the great pleasure of sharing an officewith Lucy Jones for almost the entirety of this PhD. Her example encouraged me to occasionally get up in the morning, and her company was, and remains, a thing of beauty. My partner, Helena Ifill, has written a PhD in the same time, but with more grace and style, and meeting her made moving north the best thing I ever did. The writing of this dissertation has coincided with the loss of far too many members of my family. It is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother Eva Smith, my uncle John Gallini, my grandfather Charles Gallini, and my father in law Gerry Ifill. 6 Chapter One 1.0 Introduction This thesis proposes a theory of reference for the language of scientific theories, and argues that this theory of reference can explain a number of problems in the history and philosophy of linguistics. Specifically, it ar- gues that co-existing (and, I argue, opposing) forms! of linguistics - to be further defined below - can be characterised as 'incommensurable' in Kuhnian terms, and that the problems and misunderstandings engendered by this incommensurability are explicable within the terms of the theory of reference proposed. This thesis addresses various arguments and inconsistencies in positions held by opposing forms of linguistics. By addressing and solving these problems through the application of a new theory of reference to the lan- guage of scientific theories, this thesis aims to advance and in some cases simplify metatheoretical issues in the history and philosophy of linguistics. The forms of linguistics addressed in this thesis are transformational gen- erative grammar (hereafter TOO) and sociolinguistics.
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