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In the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend Durham E-Theses Pluralism and the 'Problem of Reality' in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend KIDD, IAN,JAMES How to cite: KIDD, IAN,JAMES (2010) Pluralism and the 'Problem of Reality' in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/864/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Kidd Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend Abstract Feyerabend’s later philosophy was a sustained defence of cultural and epistemic diversity. After Against Method (1975) Feyerabend argued that his rejection of methodological monism challenged the presumed unity and superiority of scientific knowledge and practices. His later philosophy was therefore dedicated to a reassessment of the merits of a wide range of ‘non-scientific’ traditions present throughout non-Western indigenous cultures. Feyerabend drew upon the resources of anthropology and environmental and development studies to argue that the cognitive and practical merits of a variety of indigenous medical, environmental, and classificatory systems had been denied or disregarded. The consequence of these reassessments was epistemic pluralism. Western scientific and cultural practices represent many but by no means all of these and attempts to assert their cross-cultural value have resulted in enormous environmental, social, and intellectual destruction. Feyerabend here drew upon John Stuart Mill’s claim that both human wellbeing and the growth of knowledge are best served by a diversity of forms of life and modes of inquiry. Such diversity is threatened by the cognitive and cultural authority of the Western sciences and Feyerabend therefore insisted that moral and political concerns are an essential component of the philosophy of science. Throughout the thesis I argue that the later Feyerabend anticipated many subsequent themes in the philosophy of science, such as pluralism, values in science, and political and postcolonial philosophies of science. The irreducibly pluralistic character of the sciences arises from the diverse values and concerns of human beings, on the one hand, and the complexity of the natural world, on the other, and this claim is developed at length in Feyerabend’s final book Conquest of Abundance (1999). Feyerabend’s work served to unify these contemporary philosophical and political concerns and also to demonstrate their continuity with the older ‘post-positivist’ philosophies of science. I conclude that the later Feyerabend presented an optimistic and humane vision of global cultural and epistemic diversity and of the role of the Western sciences in the modern world, rather than lapsing into the ‘anti-science’ polemics and ‘cultural relativism’ with which his work has come to be associated. 1 Kidd Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend Ian James Kidd PhD Thesis Department of Philosophy Durham University 2010 2 Kidd Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 1 Contents ............................................................................................................................ 3 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 8 Preface............................................................................................................................. 11 A Note on Terminology .................................................................................................. 12 Chapter One .................................................................................................................... 13 Ch1 The ‘Early’ and ‘Later’ Feyerabend ........................................................................ 13 1.1. Whatever happened to Paul Feyerabend? ............................................................ 13 1.2. Four charges ......................................................................................................... 14 1.2.1. Charge 1: Against Method and the ‘schism’ ..................................................... 16 1.2.2. Charge 2: Cultural relativism and ‘anti-science’ ............................................... 18 1.2.3. Charge 3: The unity of the later Feyerabend ..................................................... 20 1.2.4. Charge 4: Sincerity ............................................................................................ 25 1.3. A synoptic view .................................................................................................... 26 1.4. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 27 Ch2 Methodological Monism ......................................................................................... 29 2.1. The myth of method ............................................................................................. 29 2.2. Against Method .................................................................................................... 32 2.3. Feyerabend’s normative philosophy of science ................................................... 34 2.4. Science in a Free Society ..................................................................................... 38 2.5. ‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’ ................................................................. 39 2.6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 42 Ch3 Defending Epistemic Pluralism ............................................................................... 43 3.1. Feyerabend’s epistemic pluralism ........................................................................ 43 3.2. Chang’ epistemic pluralism .................................................................................. 44 3.3. Harding’s epistemic pluralism ............................................................................. 47 3 Kidd Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend 3.4. History, pluralism, and humane concerns ............................................................ 51 3.5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 55 Ch4 Exceptionalism, Triumphalism, and the Contingency of Science .......................... 56 4.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 56 4.2. The presumption of the omnicompetence of science ........................................... 58 4.3. The contingency of science .................................................................................. 64 4.4. Exceptionalism and triumphalism ........................................................................ 71 4.5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 75 Ch5 Cultural Pluralism and Human Wellbeing .............................................................. 76 5.1. Feyerabend’s debts to John Stuart Mill ................................................................ 76 5.2. What did Feyerabend take from On Liberty ? ....................................................... 78 5.3. The value of cultural diversity ............................................................................. 82 5.4. Pluralism and convergentism ............................................................................... 88 Ch6 Cultural Diversity and the Scientific Worldview .................................................... 91 6.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 91 6.2. Ethics, cultural diversity, and ‘the good life’ ....................................................... 92 6.3. Kekes’ pluralistic conception of ‘the good life’ ................................................. 102 6.4. Cultural diversity and modernity........................................................................ 105 6.5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 111 Ch7 Feyerabend’s Political Philosophy of Science ...................................................... 113 7.1. Feyerabend’s early political philosophy ............................................................ 113 7.2. Science, choice, and hegemony.......................................................................... 119 7.3.
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