DOCSLIB.ORG

Examining the Philosophical Baggage of Biological Research

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Examining the Philosophical Baggage of Biological Research University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 5-2003 Dangerous Habits: Examining the Philosophical Baggage of Biological Research Massimo Pigliucci University of Tennessee - Knoxville Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Pigliucci, Massimo, "Dangerous Habits: Examining the Philosophical Baggage of Biological Research. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2003. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2188 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Massimo Pigliucci entitled "Dangerous Habits: Examining the Philosophical Baggage of Biological Research." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy. Jonathan Kaplan, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Kathy Bohstedt, John Nolt, Daniel Simberloff Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Massimo Pigliucci entitled “Dangerous Habits: examining the philosophical baggage of biological research.” I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a Major in Philosophy. Jonathan Kaplan Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Kathy Bohstedt John Nolt Daniel Simberloff Acceptance for the Council: Anne Mayhew Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies (Original signatured are on file with official student records.) Dangerous Habits: Examining the Philosophical Baggage of Biological Research A dissertation presented for the Doctor of Philosophy degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Massimo Pigliucci May 2003 Acknowledgments None of this would have been possible without the help of many people, and I wish to single out a few for explicit thanks. First and foremost, my wife, Melissa Brenneman, to whom I solemnly promised that this was the last degree I would ever sought in my life. Then my advisor, colleague, and friend, Jonathan Kaplan. The colleagues who served on my committee, Kathy Bohstedt, John Nolt, and Dan Simberloff. My other philosophy teachers, Richard Aquila, Shari Clough, Sheldon Cohen, and Betsy Postow. And finally the members of my bio-lab, who have been very patient with me throughout this project: Josh Banta, Jeff Dole, and Norris Muth. ii Abstract Science is about conceptualizing the natural world in a way that can be understood by human beings while at the same time reflecting as much as possible what we can empirically infer about how the world actually is. Among the crucial tools that allow scientists to formulate hypotheses and to contribute to a progressive understanding of nature are the use of imagery and metaphors on the one hand, and the ability to assume certain starting points on which to build new avenues of inquiry on the other hand. The premise of this work is that, in the words of philosopher of science Daniel Dennett, “There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.” The purpose here is precisely to examine some of this philosophical baggage, and to see where such analysis may lead us. Obviously, it is not possible for a single project to take on science as a whole, or even an entire discipline such as physics, or ecology. Therefore, the core of this work is constituted by a series of eight case studies drawn from the field of evolutionary biology, with which I am particularly familiar as a practicing biologist. The hope is that combining expertise in both philosophy and science in one person, the resulting insights might be useful for the practicing scientist as well as because of their value as philosophical inquires. The dissertation is a combination of conceptual analysis and science criticism applied to specific questions in organismal biology, largely of an evolutionary nature, with the eight case studies grouped into three broad categories: I- Unexamined Baggage, II-Bad Habits, and III-Good and bad metaphors. iii Table of Contents Introduction. p. 1 Part I -- Unexamined baggage: p. 9 Chapter 1: Are ecology and evolutionary biology soft sciences? p. 12 Chapter 2: Genes “for” phenotypes: a Modern History view. p. 34 Chapter 3: On the concept of biological race and its applicability to humans. p. 73 Chapter 4: Species as family resemblance concepts: the (dis-)solution of the species problem? p. 92 Part II -- Bad habits: p. 109 Chapter 5: On hypothesis testing: a brief guide for the skeptic. p. 112 Chapter 6: Genotype-environment interactions and our understanding of the biological bases of human cognitive abilities. p. 135 Part III -- Metaphors: good and bad ones: p. 155 Chapter 7: Against the selfish gene. p. 157 Chapter 8: The fall and rise of Dr. Pangloss: adaptationism and the Spandrels paper 20+ years later. p. 174 Conclusion. p. 187 Literature Cited. p. 195 Vita. p. 233 iv List of Tables: Table 2.1, A checklist for genes “for.” p. 71 Table 4.1, Some of the major species concepts proposed so far, somedefinitions, and some relevant references. p. 96 Table 4.2, Some of the major themes dominating philosophical discussions of the species concepts. p. 98 v List of Figures: Figure 1.1, Two models of hypothesis testing. p. 25 Figure 2.1, The pennant / vestigial (and their heterozygote) reaction norms in Drosophila melanogsater. p. 55 Figure 4.1, The idea of “game” as a family resemblance, or cluster, concept. p. 103 Figure 4.2, The idea of “species” as a family resemblance, or cluster, concept. p. 104 Figure 5.1, The structure of hypothesis testing in a hypothetical experiment. p. 117 Figure 6.1, A hypothetical population with three genotypes characterized by distinct reaction norms along an environmental gradient. p. 146 Figure 6.2, Effect of nature (quality and stimulation properties of the environment) on “intelligence” (ability to avoid mistakes in mazes) in genetically distinct laboratory lines of rats. p. 151 vi List of Text Boxes: Box 1.1, A list of problems and conceptual issues common to psychological and evo-eco research, from a subset in Meehl (1978). p. 18 Box 1.2, Platt’s (1964) complains about bad practice in natural sciences. p. 22 Box 8.1, The object of the attack: according to Gould and Lewontin, the adaptationist program is characterized by the telling of stories involving natural selection, which account for the presence and particular forms of traits by reference to their hypothesized adaptive significance. p. 175 Box 8.2, Alternatives to adaptationism. p. 177 Box 8.3, On constraints vs. selection: which is the correct null hypothesis? p. 178 vii "There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination." —Daniel Dennett (Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995, p. 21) Introduction Science is about conceptualizing the natural world in a way that can be understood by human beings while at the same time reflecting as much as possible what we can empirically infer about how the world actually is. Conceptualization itself is a complex phenomenon that has been at the center of both philosophical (e.g., Margolis and Laurence 1999) and scientific (Fedlman 2000; Wolford et al. 2000) investigation. Be that as it may, among the crucial tools that allow scientists to formulate hypotheses and to contribute to a progressive understanding of nature (Kitcher 1995) are the use of imagery and metaphors on the one hand, and the ability to assume certain starting points on which to build new avenues of inquiry on the other hand. Assumptions, as well as visual and verbal metaphors, are an inescapable part not only of doing science, but of functioning as cognitive animals, and there is no suggestion to be found in this dissertation that we should avoid using such tools in either science or everyday life. However, it is one of the tasks of philosophy to continuously examine the soundness of the assumptions and metaphors that are used by other disciplines (Berlin 1979; Prawitz 1997), in order to provide a level of critical analysis often neglected by practitioners within a given field, too busy solving more specific problems to engage in meta-analyses. The premise of this work is that, in the words of philosopher of science Daniel 1 Dennett (1995), “There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.” The purpose here is precisely to examine some of this philosophical baggage, and to see where such analysis may lead us. Obviously, it is not possible for a single project to take on science as a whole, or even an entire discipline such as physics, or ecology. Therefore, the core of what follows is constituted by a series of eight case studies drawn from the field of evolutionary biology, with which I am particularly familiar as a practicing biologist. The hope is that combining expertise in both philosophy and science in one person, the resulting insights might be useful for the practicing scientist as well as because of their value as philosophical inquires.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Transformations of Lamarckism Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology Gerd B
    Transformations of Lamarckism Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology Gerd B. M ü ller, G ü nter P. Wagner, and Werner Callebaut, editors The Evolution of Cognition , edited by Cecilia Heyes and Ludwig Huber, 2000 Origination of Organismal Form: Beyond the Gene in Development and Evolutionary Biology , edited by Gerd B. M ü ller and Stuart A. Newman, 2003 Environment, Development, and Evolution: Toward a Synthesis , edited by Brian K. Hall, Roy D. Pearson, and Gerd B. M ü ller, 2004 Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach , edited by D. Kimbrough Oller and Ulrike Griebel, 2004 Modularity: Understanding the Development and Evolution of Natural Complex Systems , edited by Werner Callebaut and Diego Rasskin-Gutman, 2005 Compositional Evolution: The Impact of Sex, Symbiosis, and Modularity on the Gradualist Framework of Evolution , by Richard A. Watson, 2006 Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment , by Robert G. B. Reid, 2007 Modeling Biology: Structure, Behaviors, Evolution , edited by Manfred D. Laubichler and Gerd B. M ü ller, 2007 Evolution of Communicative Flexibility: Complexity, Creativity, and Adaptability in Human and Animal Communication , edited by Kimbrough D. Oller and Ulrike Griebel, 2008 Functions in Biological and Artifi cial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives , edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes, 2009 Cognitive Biology: Evolutionary and Developmental Perspectives on Mind, Brain, and Behavior , edited by Luca Tommasi, Mary A. Peterson, and Lynn Nadel, 2009 Innovation in Cultural Systems: Contributions from Evolutionary Anthropology , edited by Michael J. O ’ Brien and Stephen J. Shennan, 2010 The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited , edited by Brett Calcott and Kim Sterelny, 2011 Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology , edited by Snait B.
    [Show full text]
  • Comment Fundamentalism and Science
    SISSA – International School for Advanced Studies Journal of Science Communication ISSN 1824 – 2049 http://jcom.sissa.it/ Comment Fundamentalism and science Massimo Pigliucci The many facets of fundamentalism. There has been much talk about fundamentalism of late. While most people's thought on the topic go to the 9/11 attacks against the United States, or to the ongoing war in Iraq, fundamentalism is affecting science and its relationship to society in a way that may have dire long-term consequences. Of course, religious fundamentalism has always had a history of antagonism with science, and – before the birth of modern science – with philosophy, the age-old vehicle of the human attempt to exercise critical thinking and rationality to solve problems and pursue knowledge. “Fundamentalism” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences 1 as “A movement that asserts the primacy of religious values in social and political life and calls for a return to a 'fundamental' or pure form of religion.” In its broadest sense, however, fundamentalism is a form of ideological intransigence which is not limited to religion, but includes political positions as well (for example, in the case of some extreme forms of “environmentalism”). In the United States, the main version of the modern conflict between science and religious fundamentalism is epitomized by the infamous Scopes trial that occurred in 1925 in Tennessee, when the teaching of evolution was challenged for the first time 2,3. That battle is still being fought, for example in Dover, Pennsylvania, where at the time of this writing a court of law is considering the legitimacy of teaching “intelligent design” (a form of creationism) in public schools.
    [Show full text]
  • Alan Robert Templeton
    Alan Robert Templeton Charles Rebstock Professor of Biology Professor of Genetics & Biomedical Engineering Department of Biology, Campus Box 1137 Washington University St. Louis, Missouri 63130-4899, USA (phone 314-935-6868; fax 314-935-4432; e-mail [email protected]) EDUCATION A.B. (Zoology) Washington University 1969 M.A. (Statistics) University of Michigan 1972 Ph.D. (Human Genetics) University of Michigan 1972 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 1972-1974. Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows of the University of Michigan. 1974. Visiting Scholar, Department of Genetics, University of Hawaii. 1974-1977. Assistant Professor, Department of Zoology, University of Texas at Austin. 1976. Visiting Assistant Professor, Dept. de Biologia, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil. 1977-1981. Associate Professor, Departments of Biology and Genetics, Washington University. 1981-present. Professor, Departments of Biology and Genetics, Washington University. 1983-1987. Genetics Study Section, NIH (also served as an ad hoc reviewer several times). 1984-1992: 1996-1997. Head, Evolutionary and Population Biology Program, Washington University. 1985. Visiting Professor, Department of Human Genetics, University of Michigan. 1986. Distinguished Visiting Scientist, Museum of Zoology, University of Michigan. 1986-present. Research Associate of the Missouri Botanical Garden. 1992. Elected Visiting Fellow, Merton College, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom. 2000. Visiting Professor, Technion Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel 2001-present. Charles Rebstock Professor of Biology 2001-present. Professor of Biomedical Engineering, School of Engineering, Washington University 2002-present. Visiting Professor, Rappaport Institute, Medical School of the Technion, Israel. 2007-2010. Senior Research Associate, The Institute of Evolution, University of Haifa, Israel. 2009-present. Professor, Division of Statistical Genomics, Washington University 2010-present.
    [Show full text]
  • A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws Andrew Michael Winters University of South Florida, [email protected]
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 3-20-2015 A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws Andrew Michael Winters University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons Scholar Commons Citation Winters, Andrew Michael, "A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws" (2015). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5603 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws by Andrew Michael Winters A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Douglas Jesseph, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Alexander Levine, Ph.D. Roger Ariew, Ph.D. Otávio Bueno, Ph.D. John Carroll, Ph.D. Eric Winsberg, Ph.D. Date of Approval: March 20th, 2015 Keywords: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Naturalism, Ontology Copyright © 2015, Andrew Michael Winters DEDICATION For Amie ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you to my co-chairs, Doug Jesseph and Alex Levine, for providing amazing support in all aspects of my tenure at USF. I greatly appreciate the numerous conversations with my committee members, Roger Ariew, Otávio Bueno, John Carroll, and Eric Winsberg, which resulted in a (hopefully) more refined and clearer dissertation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Spice of Life the Variety of Life: a Survey and a Celebration of All the Creatures Snakes in the Grass That Have Ever Lived by Colin Tudge
    book reviews think that’s a false dichotomy.” She quotes, ating input from new methodologies, this is as this there is much to take issue with. In my but seems far less at home with, Sarah Hrdy’s heroism. Since the author took 10 years over own areas of special interest I found almost flat statement: “I did not come into science the job, he must have been daunted by how more to question and argue with than to and primatology because of a love for non- much the ground changed beneath his feet as agree with; and Tudge inevitably can only human primates. I was first attracted to prob- he progressed. When the world around you afford space for a thin overview of the real lems and to things I wanted to understand … is bursting with new kinds of information issues that excite us today. Indeed, for animal There is really no one way of doing science … that are just beginning to shed fresh light on phylogeny, the book only sparsely applies we need people to stress theory as much as a key question, it is a brave man who decides the information that is now emerging observation.” One of Jahme’s subjects, read- to write about the answer! So why has Colin from ‘evolutionary developmental biology’ ing the section about herself, murmured: Tudge done it? (which is revealing underlying similarities “Oh dear. This is half right and all wrong.” To Tudge’s answer is twofold: to help put tax- between diverse species in the structure of me that sums up the book, including some onomy back at the centre of biology (and the genes that control pattern formation and amazing scientific slip-ups.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy of Science -----Paulk
    PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -----PAULK. FEYERABEND----- However, it has also a quite decisive role in building the new science and in defending new theories against their well-entrenched predecessors. For example, this philosophy plays a most important part in the arguments about the Copernican system, in the development of optics, and in the Philosophy ofScience: A Subject with construction of a new and non-Aristotelian dynamics. Almost every work of Galileo is a mixture of philosophical, mathematical, and physical prin~ a Great Past ciples which collaborate intimately without giving the impression of in­ coherence. This is the heroic time of the scientific philosophy. The new philosophy is not content just to mirror a science that develops independ­ ently of it; nor is it so distant as to deal just with alternative philosophies. It plays an essential role in building up the new science that was to replace 1. While it should be possible, in a free society, to introduce, to ex­ the earlier doctrines.1 pound, to make propaganda for any subject, however absurd and however 3. Now it is interesting to see how this active and critical philosophy is immoral, to publish books and articles, to give lectures on any topic, it gradually replaced by a more conservative creed, how the new creed gener­ must also be possible to examine what is being expounded by reference, ates technical problems of its own which are in no way related to specific not to the internal standards of the subject (which may be but the method scientific problems (Hurne), and how there arises a special subject that according to which a particular madness is being pursued), but to stan­ codifies science without acting back on it (Kant).
    [Show full text]
  • PDF Download Starting with Science Strategies for Introducing Young Children to Inquiry 1St Edition Ebook
    STARTING WITH SCIENCE STRATEGIES FOR INTRODUCING YOUNG CHILDREN TO INQUIRY 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Marcia Talhelm Edson | 9781571108074 | | | | | Starting with Science Strategies for Introducing Young Children to Inquiry 1st edition PDF Book The presentation of the material is as good as the material utilizing star trek analogies, ancient wisdom and literature and so much more. Using Multivariate Statistics. Michael Gramling examines the impact of policy on practice in early childhood education. Part of a series on. Schauble and colleagues , for example, found that fifth grade students designed better experiments after instruction about the purpose of experimentation. For example, some suggest that learning about NoS enables children to understand the tentative and developmental NoS and science as a human activity, which makes science more interesting for children to learn Abd-El-Khalick a ; Driver et al. Research on teaching and learning of nature of science. The authors begin with theory in a cultural context as a foundation. What makes professional development effective? Frequently, the term NoS is utilised when considering matters about science. This book is a documentary account of a young intern who worked in the Reggio system in Italy and how she brought this pedagogy home to her school in St. Taking Science to School answers such questions as:. The content of the inquiries in science in the professional development programme was based on the different strands of the primary science curriculum, namely Living Things, Energy and Forces, Materials and Environmental Awareness and Care DES Exit interview. Begin to address the necessity of understanding other usually peer positions before they can discuss or comment on those positions.
    [Show full text]
  • THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST 11 III II I, 11 1 1 Ni1 the DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST
    THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST 11 III II I, 11 1 1 ni1 THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin AAKAR THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin Harvard University Press, 1985 Aakar Books for South Asia, 2009 Reprinted by arrangement with Harvard University Press, USA for sale only in the Indian Subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan & Sri Lanka) All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission of the publisher First Published in India, 2009 ISBN 978-81-89833-77-0 (Pb) Published by AAKAR BOOKS 28 E Pocket IV, Mayur Vihar Phase I, Delhi-110 091 Phone : 011-2279 5505 Telefax : 011-2279 5641 [email protected]; www.aakarbooks.com Printed at S.N. Printers, Delhi-110 032 To Frederick Engels, who got it wrong a lot of the time but who got it right where it counted ,, " I 1 1■ 1-0 ■44 pH III lye II I! Preface THIS Bow( has come into existence for both theoretical andpractical reasons. Despite the extraordinary successes of mechanistic reduction- ist molecular biology, there has been a growing discontent in the last twenty years with simple Cartesian reductionism as the universal way to truth. In psychology and anthropology, and especially in ecology, evolution, neurobiology, and developmental biology, where the Carte- sian program has failed to give satisfaction, we hear more and more calls for an alternative epistemological stance. Holistic, structuralist, hierarchical, and systems theories are all offered as alternative modes of explaining the world, as ways out of the cul-de-sacs into which re- ductionism has led us.
    [Show full text]
  • From Fox Keller, Back to Leibniz and on to Darwin
    Leibnizian Analysis in Metaphysics, Mathematics, Physics, Geology and Biology: From Fox Keller, back to Leibniz and on to Darwin Emily R. Grosholz I. Introduction The world of classical physics proposed a view of nature where systems behaved like machines: they were reducible to their parts, governed by universal laws (which were moreover time-reversal invariant), and thus representable by an axiomatized discourse where predictable events could be deduced, given the correct boundary conditions. Thus, the philosophers of science of the early and mid-twentieth century happily offered the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation (and Prediction). It fit Newton’s Principia, Book I, Proposition XI pretty well. However, it doesn’t really account for Book III, the development of the theory and practice of differential equations, the n-body problem, electro-magnetic phenomena, thermodynamics, atoms, galaxies or the expanding universe, limitations that even Thomas Kuhn, author of the revolutionary book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (University of Chicago Press, 1962) played down. But the philosophers did notice that the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation wasn’t a very good fit for biology, as after Darwin it struggled to account for natural history with its attendant one-way temporality, the emergence of novelty, and the intentionality and nested downwards complexity of living things, that seemed so stubbornly un-machine-like. The discovery of DNA and the rise of a new kind of machine, the computer, briefly encouraged philosophers (and scientists) to think that biology might finally look like a real science, populated by tiny robots that lend themselves to axioms and predictions; but, alas.
    [Show full text]
  • ”What Is It Like to Be a Robot?” Review of David Mcfarland's Guilty Robots, Happy Dogs
    :KDW,V,W/LNHWR%HD5RERW" *XLOW\5RERWV+DSS\'RJV7KH4XHVWLRQRI$OLHQ0LQGVE\'DYLG0F)DUODQG 5HYLHZE\'DQLHO&'HQQHWW %LR6FLHQFH9RO1R 6HSWHPEHU SS 3XEOLVKHGE\University of California PressRQEHKDOIRIWKHAmerican Institute of Biological Sciences 6WDEOH85/http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/bio.2009.59.8.14 . $FFHVVHG Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press and American Institute of Biological Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to BioScience. http://www.jstor.org Fall Focus on Books learn to appreciate some of the advances respect, that they go back to Harvard out the terrain using what you already and controversies in evolutionary de- Press and propose to use the current know to interpret what you find. For- velopmental biology while reading Greg version of their book as the seed for a tunately, David McFarland has chosen Wray. Then again, there is no essay on community-wide, online, open-ended the second option in Guilty Robots, the role of phenotypic plasticity in evo- effort. Of course, it would also be nice if Happy Dogs: The Question of Alien lution, a topic that has acquired central it were open access, but that’s another Minds, and there is much food for status during the past two decades; after story.
    [Show full text]
  • Diptera: Syrphidae), Based on Integrative Taxonomy and Aegean Palaeogeography
    Contributions to Zoology, 87 (4) 197-225 (2018) Disentangling a cryptic species complex and defining new species within the Eumerus minotaurus group (Diptera: Syrphidae), based on integrative taxonomy and Aegean palaeogeography Antonia Chroni1,4,5, Ana Grković2, Jelena Ačanski3, Ante Vujić2, Snežana Radenković2, Nevena Veličković2, Mihajla Djan2, Theodora Petanidou1 1 University of the Aegean, Department of Geography, University Hill, 81100, Mytilene, Greece 2 University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Sciences, Department of Biology and Ecology, Trg Dositeja Obradovića 2, 21000, Novi Sad, Serbia 3 Laboratory for Biosystems Research, BioSense Institute – Research Institute for Information Technologies in Biosystems, University of Novi Sad, Dr. Zorana Đinđića 1, 21000, Novi Sad, Serbia 4 Institute for Genomics and Evolutionary Medicine; Department of Biology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA 5 E-mail: [email protected] Keywords: Aegean, DNA sequences, hoverflies, mid- Discussion ............................................................................. 211 Aegean Trench, wing geometric morphometry Taxonomic and molecular implications ...........................212 Mitochondrial dating, biogeographic history and divergence time estimates ................................................213 Abstract Acknowledgments .................................................................215 References .............................................................................215 This study provides an overview of the Eumerus minotaurus
    [Show full text]
  • The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon
    The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. —Allen Wood1 1. Introduction to the Problems Even prior to a characterization of self-deception, it’s easy to see that it’s widespread. This is puzzling, because self-deception seems paradoxical. Here are three apparent problems. First, self-deception seems to involve a conceptual contradiction; in order to deceive, one must believe the contrary of the deception one is perpetrating, but if one believes the contrary, it seems impossible for that very self to believe the deception.2 Second, a view of the mind has become widely accepted that makes rationality constitutive and exhaustive of the mental; this is the interpretive view of the mental put forth by Donald Davidson and followers.3 According to this view, the idea of attributing irrational beliefs to agents makes little sense, for we cannot make sense of what someone’s beliefs are unless they are rational. But self-deception is highly irrational.4 Third, a brief survey of other cognitive mechanisms (such as vision) reveals that most are well suited for giving us reliable information about ourselves and our environment. Self- deception, however, undermines knowledge of ourselves and the world. If having good information brings fitness benefits to organisms, how is it that self-deception was not weeded out by natural selection? Otherwise put, why does self-deception exist? (For convenience, I shall refer to these as puzzles 1, 2, and 3.) Puzzles such as these make self-deception an intriguing explanatory target.
    [Show full text]