A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws Andrew Michael Winters University of South Florida, [email protected]
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 3-20-2015 A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws Andrew Michael Winters University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons Scholar Commons Citation Winters, Andrew Michael, "A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws" (2015). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5603 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws by Andrew Michael Winters A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Douglas Jesseph, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Alexander Levine, Ph.D. Roger Ariew, Ph.D. Otávio Bueno, Ph.D. John Carroll, Ph.D. Eric Winsberg, Ph.D. Date of Approval: March 20th, 2015 Keywords: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Naturalism, Ontology Copyright © 2015, Andrew Michael Winters DEDICATION For Amie ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you to my co-chairs, Doug Jesseph and Alex Levine, for providing amazing support in all aspects of my tenure at USF. I greatly appreciate the numerous conversations with my committee members, Roger Ariew, Otávio Bueno, John Carroll, and Eric Winsberg, which resulted in a (hopefully) more refined and clearer dissertation. Many of my past teachers and mentors also contributed to the ideas developed herein: Graeme Forbes, Kathrin Koslicki, Robert McDermott, Bradley Monton, Robert Rupert, and, especially, Michael Tooley (who introduced me to the debate on laws of nature). I appreciate the patience and support of my family while completing the dissertation: Bonnie Ward-Strauss, Rich Strauss, Liz Sale, Mike Sale, Carolyn Reid-Sale, Jim, Joy, and Scott Dawson, Jim and Connie B. Earsley, and Bernice and Conrad Ward. Of course, many friends, colleagues, and teachers helped me think through these issues and made my time as a graduate student that much more enjoyable. There are too many of you to list here, but special thanks to Dan Collette, Anthony Fernandez, Mark Goodwin, Sacha Greer, Dahlia Guzman, Brett Hackett, Emre Keskin, Michael Morris, Erika Oshiro, Candice Shelby, Aaron Spink, Liz Swan, Zach Vereb, Christine Wieseler, and, especially, to Dave Eck for being an awesome officemate. To anyone I left out, coffee is in order! None of this could have been accomplished without the support and care of Amie Winters, thank you. Let’s hope that this is the last one. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iv CHAPTER 1: ATTENUATED METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM ..................................... 1 1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Suspending Judgment ................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Papineau’s Formulation ................................................................................................ 3 1.3 Scientific Concepts ....................................................................................................... 5 1.4 Implications ................................................................................................................... 8 1.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 10 CHAPTER 2: THE PRIMA FACIE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF SUBSTANCE .............................. 11 2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 11 2.1 Neo-Aristotelianism and Substance ............................................................................ 13 2.2 Lowe and Substance ................................................................................................... 18 2.3 Change and Substance ................................................................................................ 19 2.3.1 Summary ...................................................................................................... 27 2.4 Substance: Independent, Fundamental, and Non-Relational? .................................... 28 2.4.1 Summary ...................................................................................................... 39 2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 40 CHAPTER 3: THE UNNATURALNESS OF SUBSTANCE ..................................................... 42 3.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 42 3.1 Quantum Field Theory ................................................................................................ 43 3.1.1 Summary ...................................................................................................... 48 3.2 Extended Synthesis ..................................................................................................... 50 3.2.1 Summary ...................................................................................................... 62 3.3 Potential Objections .................................................................................................... 63 3.3.1 Is Metaphysics Already Naturalized? .......................................................... 64 3.3.2 Is Metaphysics Primary? .............................................................................. 68 3.3.3 Is Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics Naturalizable? ......................................... 73 3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 76 CHAPTER 4: AN ONTOLOGY WITHOUT SUBSTANCE ...................................................... 78 4.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 78 4.1 A Brief History of Process .......................................................................................... 78 4.2 Naturalism and Processes ........................................................................................... 83 4.3 Quantum Field Theory ................................................................................................ 89 4.3.1 Tropes .......................................................................................................... 92 i 4.3.2 Invariant Factors .......................................................................................... 95 4.3.3 Processes ...................................................................................................... 96 4.3.3.1 Summary ..................................................................................... 104 4.4 Development ............................................................................................................. 105 4.4.1 Countable but not Fundamental ................................................................. 106 4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 108 CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURE AS METASTABLE PROCESSES ............................................. 110 5.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 110 5.1 The Structure of Stuff ............................................................................................... 111 5.2 Stable Processes ........................................................................................................ 120 5.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 134 CHAPTER 6: A PROCESS FRAMEWORK FOR ONTIC STRUCTURAL REALISM ......... 135 6.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 135 6.1 Ontic Structural Realism and Naturalized Metaphysics ........................................... 136 6.1.1. Radically Naturalized Metaphysics .......................................................... 137 6.1.2 Regulative Principles ................................................................................. 139 6.1.3 Unification and Modeling .......................................................................... 142 6.1.3.1 Summary ..................................................................................... 151 6.2 Ontic Structural Realism and Process Metaphysics .................................................. 152 6.2.1 Commonalities ........................................................................................... 153 6.2.2 Objections to Ontic Structural Realism ....................................................