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THE WAR REPORT ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2016 ANNYSSA BELLAL THE ACADEMY A JOINT CENTER OF THE WAR REPORT ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2016 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The War Report 2016 was written by Dr Annyssa Bellal, Strategic Adviser on In- ternational Humanitarian Law and Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy), with the research assistance of Shashaank Bahadur Nagar, LLM 2016, Geneva Academy. The War Report 2016 also builds on the work of the past editions of 2012, 2013 (edited by Stuart Casey-Maslen) and 2014 (edited by Annyssa Bellal). The Geneva Academy would like to thank the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) for its support to the research on this issue. DISCLAIMER This report is the work of the author. The views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Academy. The qualification of any situation of armed violence as an armed conflict under international law should not be read such as to trigger war clauses in insurance contracts and does not in any way affect the need for due diligence by any natural or legal person in their work in any of the situa- tions referred to. Furthermore, facts, matters, or opinions contained in the report are provided by the Geneva Academy without assuming responsibility to any user of the report who may rely on its contents in whole or in part. The designation of armed non-state actors, states, or territories does not imply any judgement by the Geneva Academy regarding the legal status of such actors, states, or territories, or their authorities and institutions, or the delimitation of their boundaries, or the status of any states or territories that border them. March 2017 ISBN: 978 – 2 – 9701003 – 1 – 7 © The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights THE WAR R THEEPOR WART :R AEPORRMEDT: A RMEDCONFLI CONFLICTS CTINS 2016IN 2016 4 C ON T EN T S INTRODUCTION 10 5 S T EN T ON C PART 1 : SUMMARY 14 1. WHAT IS AN ARMED CONFLICT? 15 2. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 18 A. CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 18 B. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 20 C. SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 20 D. SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING A SITUATION OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 21 E. WHEN DOES AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? 21 3. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 22 A. CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 22 B. WHEN DOES A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? 24 C. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 25 D. SUMMARY RULES APPLICABLE IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 26 4. WHICH ARMED CONFLICTS OCCURRED IN 2016? 27 A. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2016 27 B. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2016 29 PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2016 32 SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 33 1. SYRIA: INCREASING FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT 33 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 33 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 36 1. International Armed Conflict 36 a. Syrian Armed Forces 36 2. Non-International Armed Conflicts 36 a. Free Syrian Army 36 b. Haiy’a Tahrir al-Sham (former Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, former Nusra Front) 37 S IN 2016 6 2016 INS c. Islamic State (IS) 37 CT d. Ahrar al-Sham 38 e. YPG-YPJ 38 RMED CONFLI RMED f. Hezbollah 38 A : T C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: INCREASING FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT 39 EPOR D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 40 R 2. NAGORNO-KARABAKH: SEVERE CLASHES IN APRIL 2016 41 THE WAR A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 41 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 42 1. Armenia 42 2. Azerbaijan 42 C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: SEVERE CLASHES IN APRIL 2016 42 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 43 3. MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CYPRUS BY TURKEY: A SETBACK TO REUNIFICATION TALKS 44 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 44 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 45 1. Cyprus 45 2. Turkey 45 C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: SETBACK TO REUNIFICATION TALKS 45 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 46 4. WESTERN SAHARA: THE POLISARIO FRONT’S DECLARATION UNDER ARTICLE 96.3 AP I AND IMPORTANT EU COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION 46 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 47 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 48 1. Morroco 48 2. Polisario Front 48 C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2015-2016: ARTICLE 96.3 API DECLARATION AND IMPORTANT EU COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION 48 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 50 SELECTED NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 51 7 S T 1. AFGHANISTAN: A CONTINUING INCREASE EN T 51 ON IN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES C A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 52 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 53 1. Afghan Forces 53 2. Taliban 53 3. Hezb-e-Islami 53 4. Haqqani Network 54 5. The Islamic State in Afghanistan (Khorasan Branch) 54 C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: A CONTINUING INCREASE IN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 55 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 56 2. COLOMBIA: PEACE DEAL WITH FARC ENDS 60 YEARS OF CONFLICT 58 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 58 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 60 1. Colombian Armed Forces 60 2. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) 61 3. National Liberation Army (ELN) 61 C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: PEACE AGREEMENT WITH FARC 62 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 63 3. EGYPT: THE STRENGTHENING OF THE INSURGENCY OUTSIDE SINAI 64 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 64 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 66 1. Egypt Armed Forces 66 2. Sinai Province 66 C. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: THE STRENGTHENING OF THE INSURGENCY OUTSIDE SINAI 67 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 68 4. IRAQ: MILITARY GAINS AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE 68 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 68 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 70 1. Iraqi Army 70 2. Popular Mobilisation (Hashid Shaabi) 70 S IN 2016 8 2016 INS 3. Islamic State (IS) 71 CT 4. Kurdish Peshmerga 71 5. Islamic Army of Iraq 73 RMED CONFLI RMED 6. Sadr Fighters/ Sadr’s Peace Brigades/ Saraya Al-Salam Shia 73 A : T C. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: MILITARY GAINS AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE 74 EPOR D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 75 R 5. LIBYA: THE AMPLIFICATION OF CHAOS 75 THE WAR A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 76 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 77 1. Libya Dawn 77 2. Libya Shield 77 3. Islamic State (IS) 77 4. Ansar al-Sharia 78 C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: THE AMPLIFICATION OF CHAOS 78 D. WAR CRIMES AND PROSECUTIONS 79 6. MALI: GROUND-BREAKING ICC CASE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 80 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 80 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 83 1. Malian Armed Forces 83 2. AFISMA 83 3. MINUSMA 84 4. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 84 5. Ansar Dine 85 6. Mouvement Pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MOJWA) 85 7. National Movement for the Liberation of Azawd (MNLA) 85 C. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: ICC CASE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AS A WAR CRIME 86 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 86 7. SOUTH SUDAN: MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 87 9 AND IHL VIOLATIONS IN THE SUMMER OF 2016 S T A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 87 EN T B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 88 ON C 1. South Sudan Armed Forces 88 2. Dissident South Sudan Armed Forces 89 C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND IHL VIOLATIONS IN THE SUMMER OF 2016 89 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 90 8. TURKEY IN 2016: GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE COUNTRY 90 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 90 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 92 1. Turkish Armed Forces 92 2. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 92 C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE COUNTRY 93 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 93 9. UKRAINE: A PARALLEL INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA? 94 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 95 1. Eastern Ukraine 96 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS 101 1. Ukraine Armed Forces 101 2. ‘The Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ 101 C. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: A PARALLEL INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA? 102 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 103 10. YEMEN IN 2016: A HEAVY TOLL ON CIVILIANS 104 A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 105 B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 106 1. Yemeni Armed Forces 106 2. Houthi Rebels 106 3. Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) 107 C. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016: A HEAVY TOLL ON CIVILIANS 108 D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS 108 THE WAR R THEEPOR WART :R AEPORRMEDT: A CONFLIRMED CONFLICTS CTINS 2016IN 2016 1010 I N T RODU CT ION This work identifies, describes, and discusses situations of armed violence in 2016 that amounted to armed conflicts in accordance with the definitions recognized 11 under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL). ION The purpose of The War Report is to collect information and data in the public do- CT main and provide legal analysis under the framework of international law. The ex- RODU istence of an armed conflict is important because it has far-reaching implications. T IN First and foremost, IHL governing the conduct of hostilities, which is markedly less restrictive in its prohibitions on the use of lethal force than is the international law of law enforcement, applies only in a situation of armed conflict. Notably, IHL does not prohibit the intentional use of lethal force against a member of the armed forces or a civilian ‘participating directly in hostilities’ (for the duration of such participation, see the ‘Summary rules’ sections in Part I).
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