DOCSLIB.ORG

The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society LTC Stephen H. Gotowicki, U.S. Army This paper was written in conjunction with a series of strategic seminars conducted between analysts from Egypt and the United States under the auspicies of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University in 1994-1995. It should be published by the National Defense University in the summer of 1997. S.E. Finer1 says that an army is a purposive instrument, rationally conceived to fulfil certain objectives; its central purpose is to fight and win wars in defense of the state.2 Throughout the world, with few exceptions, armies represent professional, highly structured, hierarchal organizations characterized by high levels of discipline and motivation. By virtue of their function and training, armies also acquire highly prized skills and values, such as the capacity for intercommunication, an esprit de corps, and self sufficiency. A military's unique structure facilitates rapid decision making and efficient execution of these decisions. These institutional characteristics provide military organizations with the potential to undertake social action well beyond the defense function. The military also comes to serve as the corporate representation of and defender of a state's nationalism. Military organizations are generally considered to have an organizational structure sufficiently capable to conduct the affairs of state, manage national projects and resolve political chaos. Capabilities not necessarily relished in most civil societies. In Egypt, this capability was demonstrated by the 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy by Gamal abd al-Nasser and elements of the Egyptian military. Upon assuming power, senior military officers served as Egypt's President and Prime Minister. Military officers dominated the cabinet and senior governmental positions. As in Latin America, the Middle East has a long history of military rule. Modern Egypt evolved from the 1952 military putsch. From 1952 until the mid-1970s, the Egyptian military was the strongest institution within the Egyptian polity. Nominally, as Egypt has democratized, the Egyptian military's involvement in matters of national politics has declined as has its direct involvement in matters of state. At the same time, its involvement in Egypt's national life and economy has expanded. As the role of Egypt's military in domestic society is considered, one cannot help but reflect on the possibilities that the Egyptian military could once again become a dominant player in Egyptian politics -- through circumstance or intent. This paper will examine the domestic role of the Egyptian military in national society. It will address the potential of the military as a socializing agent; its expanding involvement in the economy; and its role in domestic politics. It will argue that the Egyptian military, by design and chance, has evolved into an entity that is supportive of national goals, responsible to civilian control and without overt interest in political dominance. Egypt maintains a large and professional army which numbers 440,0003 personnel -- comparable in size to the armies of Syria, Iraq and Iran. In the context of Egypt's peace with Israel, the size of Egypt's military greatly exceeds that of its most likely opponents -- Libya (70,000 personnel) or the Sudan (118,500 personnel).4 Although exceeding Egypt's realistic defensive needs, Egypt probably maintains such a large force in the belief that it provides deterrence, prestige, and credibility to Egypt's putative regional leadership. Also, under Egypt's distressing economic conditions, it would not be smart policy to add several hundred thousand individuals with military training and experience to the unemployment lines. Egypt remains concerned over Israel's military strength and reputed nuclear capabilities which may serve as another reason for maintaining such a large force. With an active military force only about a third the size of Egypt's (136,000), Israel still effectively eclipses Egypt's military capabilities. Despite the peace, a majority of Egypt's ground forces remain permanently stationed between Cairo and the Suez canal.5 Historically, this was a measure to safeguard the Suez canal and Cairo from an Israeli invasion. The continued stationing of these forces in this area may reflect Egypt's continuing concern over the Israeli military, but may also reflect the economic fact that the housing and infrastructure for these forces has long been located in this area. While providing a major source of national employment, Egypt's large military is not without costs -- between 1966 and 1994, Egypt's military expenditures have averaged around 23 percent of Egypt's total government expenditures (excluding the war-time peaks in 1973 and 1974). Figure 1 - Egyptian Military Expenditures as a percentage of Current Government Expenditures 1962-1994. Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Various issues 1965-1995. Beyond the central objective of national defense, the Egyptian armed forces have other important objectives and goals: deterrence, support for Egypt's regional role, military modernization, achieving military self-sufficiency, maintaining a positive image with Egypt's population, effectively employing soldiers idled by a diminished defense requirements in an era of peace, and serving as an engine for Egypt's economic growth and development.6 The Socialization Role of the Military The Egyptian Armed Forces comprise less than 1 percent of Egypt's population of 62.4 million.7 A more meaningful assessment of its potential to influence is to measure its percentage of the labor population of Egypt. The male working age population (15-64 years) of Egypt is 18.6 million.8 The Armed Forces comprise 2.4 percent of this number. Approximately 650,000 males reach military age each year of which approximately 80,0009 are conscripted into the Armed Forces. Of this group, the Armed Forces will annually have an influence on 12.3 per cent of Egyptian males entering the work force -- a not insignificant figure, but still fairly small compared to the Islamic exposure of the Mosque. The service length for conscripts varies with education level. Conscripts who have completed high school serve a two year term of service. Conscripts without high school serve a term of three years. Conscripts live in military barracks and are trained primarily in their particular military specialties with some remedial instruction given in basic skills such as literacy. Conscripts are paid only œE 32 a month (about $10). After about a year they are promoted to the next higher grade and their pay increases to about œE 140 ($40). Conscripts identified as lacking basic skills, are given full-time vocational training, emphasizing skills convertible to civilian employment, for the last six months of their conscripted service. This vocational training appears to be an instrument designed specifically to support national economic development. Reportedly, many of the conscripts leave military service at the end of their term of service and take their newly acquired skills into the civilian economic sector. Egyptian military service is an important socialization agent in Egyptian society. In the military, a new recruit with a traditional background, is placed in an egalitarian enviroment which provides the soldier with the prospect of social mobilitiy through a system of promotion based on merit rather than class/kinship factors. The conscript is also exposed to a work ethic based upon operational goals and objectives. Military life provides the conscript a relatively satisfactory life from a material point of view. The conscript receives a monthly salary, adequate food, medical care, uniforms and living accommodations. From a political perspective, he learns of a world beyond his rural agrarian origins and of a larger political self in a national community. This tends to be a politicizing experience providing the soldier with a sense of "civic" identity and loyalty to the state -- a world view much expanded beyond his previous exclusive reference to family, village and religion. Military service provides a soldier with a sense of citizenship, responsibility, and nationalism -- all especially important in the Middle East where the credibility and legitimacy of a central government usually diminishes rapidly as distance increases from its capital. Coupled with this experience in nationalism is an exposure to modern technolo- gies and life styles. By its nature, an Army constantly looks abroad to compare its strengths to possible enemies and correct deficiencies.10 It is thus more aware of the importance of technology, its own weaknesses, and is willing (even driven) to modernize, acquire and utilize needed technologies. The soldier is exposed to and trained to use technologies that run the gamut from modern weapons, communications, manufacturing, construction and management systems not available in the other sectors of the state. The Egyptian military's socializing influence should continue as long as the Egyptian Armed Forces remain at their present strength levels. Although, as economic pressures rise, it may become increasingly difficult for Egypt to maintain these high force
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Omar-Ashour-English.Pdf
    CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE RULE OF LAW STANFORD UNIVERSITY BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER - STANFORD PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS PAPER SERIES Number 3, November 2012 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT OMAR ASHOUR PROGRAM ON ARAB REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, CDDRL FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY gence within the police force of a cadre of reform- ist officers is also encouraging and may help shift Successful democratic transitions hinge on the the balance of power within the Ministry of Interi- establishment of effective civilian control of the or. These officers have established reformist orga- armed forces and internal security institutions. The nizations, such as the General Coalition of Police transformation of these institutions from instru- Officers and Officers But Honorable, and begun to ments of brutal repression and regime protection push for SSR themselves. The prospects for imple- to professional, regulated, national services – secu- menting these civil society and internal initiatives, rity sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of however, remain uncertain; they focus on admira- this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab ble ends but are less clear on the means of imple- states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is mentation. They also have to reckon with strong an acutely political process affected by an array of elements within the Ministry of Interior – “al-Ad- different actors and dynamics. In a contested and ly’s men” (in reference to Mubarak’s longstanding unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the minister) – who remain firmly opposed to reform.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    1 Introduction Dennis Blair The second volume of Military Engagement relates the stories of how democratic civil-military relations developed in five world regions and fourteen individual countries. This introduction pro- vides some background on those who authored these stories and describes the patterns observed and the lessons that can be drawn from them. The Authors The regional summaries were written by a team of coauthors, almost all having both practical experience in armed forces or defense ministries of their countries and subsequent careers with security think tanks. They also contributed ideas and criticisms of the analysis and recommendations in the companion volume. Juan Emilio Cheyre, while chief of staff of the Chilean army, took the final steps to bring his service out of the Pinochet era. Matthew Rhodes is a professor at the Marshall Center in Germany, an insti- tution at the center of military-military relations among countries around the world. Istvan Gyarmati, who participated in the early brainstorming sessions for the handbook, was deputy defense minister of Hungary during the Hungarian armed forces’ transi- tion from its Warsaw Pact organization to meet NATO standards. Muthiah Alagappa, a general in the Malaysian Army, has become the foremost scholar of Asian civil-military relations subsequent to 1 01-2478-0 ch1.indd 1 5/16/13 6:03 PM 2 Dennis Blair his retirement. Tannous Mouawad served as Lebanon’s military attaché to the United States and the chief of Lebanon’s military intelligence service. Martin Rupiya was an officer in the Zimbabwean National Army and now heads a security affairs think tank in South Africa Each of the regional coauthors recruited additional authors to write the indi- vidual case studies; two of them wrote a case study as well.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Armed Forces in the Arab Uprisings
    The Role of Armed Forces in the Arab Uprisings 9 Derek Lutterbeck I. Introduction1 As popular uprisings, demanding greater political freedoms and in several countries even regime change, swept across much of the Arab world, a crucial role has been played by the armed forces of these countries in confronting the pro-reform movements. Practically all Arab countries can be described as military-based regimes, where the armed forces have been at the core of the political system, even though the status and role of the military has varied significantly from one country to the next. Moreover, powerful military forces, as well as a robust security apparatus more generally, have been seen by many, as one, if not the main, obstacle to political reform and democratization in the region.2 However, military forces have responded quite differently across the region to pro-democracy movements, ranging from openness to protest movements, to internal fracturing, to firm support for the regime in power. These different responses, in turn, have been crucial in determining the outcome of the popular uprisings, and whether authoritarian leaders were eventually overthrown. The aim of this paper is to discuss the role the armed forces have played in six Middle Eastern countries, which have 1 A more extensive study on this topic has been published as Lutterbeck, Derek, 2011: Arab Uprisings and Armed forces: between openness and resistance. DCAF SSR Paper 2. 2 See, e.g., Cook, Steven A., 2007: Ruling But Not Governing. The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2007); Bellin, Eva, 2004: “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance
    SSR PAPER 2 Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance Derek Lutterbeck DCAF DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law SSR PAPER 2 Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces Between Openness and Resistance Derek Lutterbeck DCAF The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre develops and promotes norms and standards, conducts tailored policy research, identifies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector governance, and provides in‐country advisory support and practical assistance programmes. SSR Papers is a flagship DCAF publication series intended to contribute innovative thinking on important themes and approaches relating to security sector reform (SSR) in the broader context of security sector governance (SSG). Papers provide original and provocative analysis on topics that are directly linked to the challenges of a governance‐driven security sector reform agenda. SSR Papers are intended for researchers, policy‐makers and practitioners involved in this field. ISBN 978‐92‐9222‐180‐5 © 2011 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces EDITORS Alan Bryden & Heiner Hänggi PRODUCTION Yury Korobovsky COPY EDITOR Cherry Ekins COVER IMAGE © Suhaib Salem/Reuters The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or
    [Show full text]
  • SFM Research Handbook
    SFM Research Handbook Apr 15, 2020 Introduction 1 Research Handbook for Security Force Monitor1 2 Research methodology 3 3 Tutorials 7 4 Countries 9 5 What data does the Monitor collect? 19 6 Data integrity measures 21 7 Units 25 8 Persons 59 9 Persons Extra 73 10 Incidents 81 11 Sources 97 12 Frequently Asked Questions about WhoWasInCommand 111 13 Unit Records on WhoWasInCommand 117 14 Person records on WhoWasInCommand 127 15 Incident Records on WhoWasInCommand 135 i ii CHAPTER 1 Research Handbook for Security Force Monitor 1.1 About Security Force Monitor The Security Force Monitor works to make police, military and other security forces around the world more transparent and accountable. Human rights researchers, journalists, advocates, litigators and others engaged in making security forces accountable face a common problem – a lack of clear, detailed information on those forces. Often, answering even simple questions can be difficult: • Who is in charge of the specialized anti-riot police unit? • What army unit has jurisdiction over what areas? • Where did this commander previously serve? • When was a particular police unit based in a specific city? There is a vast amount of public information on security forces around the world, but it is unstructured and scattered among a wide variety of sources, making it prohibitively costly for those engaged in public interest work to understand the security forces of a particular country. The Security Force Monitor aims to solve this problem and aid those working to make police, military and other security forces accountable. The Monitor analyzes and compiles public information to provide data on: the command hierarchy, location, areas of operation, commanders and the other linkages between units – all tracked through time.
    [Show full text]
  • A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations Vol. 4, No. 3
    VOL. 4, NO. 3 2013 A JOURNA L O F THE CEN TER F OR C O MPL EX O PER ATIONS About PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, Vol. 4, no. 3 2013 and other partners on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; Editor and developments in training and education to transform America’s security Michael Miklaucic and development Associate Editors Mark D. Ducasse Stefano Santamato Communications Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Editorial Assistant communications to: Megan Cody Editor, PRISM Copy Editors 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Dale Erikson Fort Lesley J. McNair Sara Thannhauser Washington, DC 20319 Nathan White Telephone: (202) 685-3442 Advisory Board FAX: Dr. Gordon Adams (202) 685-3581 Dr. Pauline H. Baker Email: [email protected] Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Ambassador James F. Dobbins Contributions Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians Dr. David Kilcullen from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein address above or by email to [email protected] with “Attention Submissions Dr. Roger B. Myerson Editor” in the subject line. Dr. Moisés Naím This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador Thomas R.
    [Show full text]
  • From Yemen War to Joint Army? WP Egyptian-Saudi Differences Over Arab Military Cooperation
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments From Yemen War to Joint Army? WP Egyptian-Saudi Differences over Arab Military Cooperation Jessica Noll and Stephan Roll S On 25 March 2015 a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states launched air strikes on Yemen to halt the advance of the Houthi movement. A few days later the summit of the Arab League decided to set up a joint Arab army. Nevertheless, the two most important Arab countries support opposing concepts for military cooperation: Egypt proposes institu- tionalised long-term military cooperation to increase its political weight in the region, while Saudi Arabia prefers ad hoc coalitions precisely in order to avoid long-term dependency on other countries, not least Egypt. However, the two events suggest that states in the region are stepping up military cooperation. Germany and the European Union should treat this development with scepticism. Experience shows that such col- laborations tend to exacerbate rather than resolve regional conflicts. At their summit meeting at the Egyptian of the Saudi military operation against the resort of Sharm al-Sheikh on 28 and 29 Houthi movement in Yemen, there is no March 2015, the members of the Arab direct connection between the two events. League agreed to set up joint armed forces. Consequently the Arab League resolution According to the final declaration of the makes no mention of the Yemen conflict. summit, the force should be capable of In fact, the joint army project is an Egyptian rapid intervention to guarantee the national initiative that President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi sovereignty of member states and protect first floated in February 2015 in connection them against territorial threats.
    [Show full text]
  • GUNS and BUTTER in the EGYPTIAN ARMY by Hillel Frisch*
    GUNS AND BUTTER IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMY By Hillel Frisch* This article analyzes the Egyptian army, its mission, development and modernization during the past several decades, and its relationship to the political and general civilian spheres. The article contends that Egypt's armed forces have elements of both modern and post-modern armies, and answers the riddle of how Egypt's army has neither sacrificed quantity or quality of its weapons systems, nor slashed military salaries severely, despite a seemingly shrinking budget. The Egyptian army seems to possess Sa'id, director of Egypt's prestigious al-Ahram the characteristics of a modern army (in the Center for Political and Strategic Studies 1950s' sense, when nationalism and patriotism praises the benefits of U.S. civilian aid unquestionably prevailed in military compared to its military aid, though more establishments) in a post-modern age. While money is earmarked for the latter category.(5) the post-modern army is often seen as being Newspapers devote many articles to praising professionally small, the Egyptian army the army's "civilian" and development- remains rather large. While the post-modern oriented services, as if to defend its army is typified by increasing civilian- contribution to the nation on this more military integration, the Egyptian army has important front.(6) constructed at least 17 military cities to isolate This tension between supporting a the military from the civilian population.(1) large military while coming to grips with the Bernard Boene claims that Western acute, almost insurmountable, social problems militaries in the post-modern age must cope facing Egypt, is a central factor in analyzing with its cadre having professional wives who the mission and political status of the want to integrate into civilian society.(2) But Egyptian armed forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict Analysis of Egypt
    Helpdesk Report Conflict analysis of Egypt Anna Louise Strachan 27. 02. 2017 Question What does the literature indicate about the current conflict dynamics in Egypt (excluding the Sinai Peninsula1), including key actors, proximate and structural causes, dynamics and triggers, and opportunities for peace and institutional resilience? Contents 1. Overview 2. Conflict dynamics and triggers 3. Key actors 4. Proximate causes of conflict 5. Structural causes of conflict 6. External pressures 7. Opportunities for peace and institutional resilience 8. References 1. Overview In 2011 Egypt experienced mass protests culminating in the fall of long serving president, Hosni Mubarak. The country’s first democratically elected President, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi’s, time in power was short-lived. He was deposed by Egypt’s military on 3 July 2013, following anti-government demonstrations (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 31). Abdul Fatah el-Sisi, former head of the armed forces, was elected in June 2014 (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 31). Sisi’s presidency has seen a return to military rule. There has also been a rise in the number of terrorist attacks in Egypt since he came to power in 2014. 1 For a conflict analysis of the Sinai Peninsula see Idris, I. (2017). Conflict analysis of Sinai (K4D Helpdesk Research Report). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.. The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.
    [Show full text]
  • MAX Security Report [email protected] +44 203 540 0434
    MAX Security Report [email protected] +44 203 540 0434 Daily MAX - MENA Region Daily Summary - 15 December 15, 2020 DEC 12:19 UTC The following report reviews current events in the MENA region and their possible effect on business continuity and security. Highlights of the Day Iran: British-Iranian national sentenced to prison in Tehran, per December 14 reports; government crackdown on dissent likely to persist Iran: Police officers, civilians shot by armed robbers in West Azerbaijan’s Mahabad on December 13; highlights risk of collateral damage Qatar: Authorities detain two Australian nationals for five months, per December 14 reports; notable due to rarity of such arrests Tunisia: Clashes recorded between residents along Kebili, Medenine governorate borders on December 14; notable due to scale of local dispute Turkey: US State Department announces sanctions on Turkey over purchase S-400 defense system on December 14; notable as unprecedented Actionable Items Turkey: Authorities will impose nationwide lockdown starting from December 31 until January 4, 2021; adhere to government instructions According to Turkey’s official news agency, the authorities will impose a lockdown across Turkey starting from 21:00 (local time) on December 31 until 05:00 on January 4, 2021. This measure is part of the government’s efforts to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus pandemic. Those operating or residing in Turkey between December 31 and January 4 are advised to adhere to the government’s instructions and take necessary precautions to ensure business continuity due to the slated lockdown. Remain apprised of the authorities’ updates regarding additional restrictions on movement.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining the Reconstruction of Egyptian Morale During the Aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War: an Arab Perspective
    Document created: 1 April 02 Examining the Reconstruction of Egyptian Morale During the Aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War: An Arab Perspective by Lt Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN Introduction If you say the Arabic words Al-Naksah (The Catastrophe) to an Egyptian, you get an immediate reaction that is unmistakable. For Palestinians, the same term referred to as Al-Nakbah, means the partition of Palestine in 1948. However to Egyptians it means only one date June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War. Most historians are aware of the specifics of the military campaign and the events leading to Israel’s surprise attack and destruction of the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects on Egyptian morale and the particular ways in which the nation was able to recover its morale from a sociologic and military perspective. Few Americans have taken time to examine the writings of Egyptian scholars about the 1967 War. Some do not care to study losing side. Also there is the cumbersome task of reading and understanding Arabic. The author will utilize Arabic sources in discussing this topic. A basic understanding of Egyptian history and the Arab-Israeli Wars is necessary for readers to have a full appreciation of the period of time covered in Egyptian history (1967-1973). As the author does not intend to focus on military tactics, this will allow a more thorough examination of socio-political events. The Egyptian armed forces will only be explored as a subsection of society. This paper will explore the emotions of the military, Egypt’s youth, social questioning of the defeat, the effect the war had on popular culture, the reform of the military and finally the effects on the country’s political culture.
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt-United States Relations
    Order Code IB93087 CRS Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web Egypt-United States Relations Updated August 20, 2003 Clyde R. Mark Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CONTENTS SUMMARY MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Egypt-U.S. Relations Historical Background U.S. Interests in Egypt U.S. Policy Toward Egypt Role of Congress in Egyptian-U.S. Relations Issues in Egyptian-U.S. Relations Iraq Arab-Israel Peace Process Relations with Israel Human Rights Saad al-Din Ibrahim Coptic Christians Democracy Economic Issues Economic Reforms Previous Issues EgyptAir Flight 990 Militant Islamic Movement in Egypt Shaikh Umar Abd al-Rahman U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt U.S. Economic Assistance U.S. Military Assistance Military Cooperation U.S.-Egyptian Military Industrial Cooperation “Bright Star” and other Joint Military Operations “Desert Storm” Bases IB93087 08-20-03 Egypt-United States Relations SUMMARY U.S.-Egyptian relations are tied to main- The United States has provided Egypt taining regional stability, improving bilateral with an annual average of over $2 billion in relations focused on Egyptian economic economic and military foreign assistance since development and military cooperation, devel- 1979. The United States will reduce Economic oping Egypt’s democracy, sustaining the Support Funds (ESF) to about $400 million March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and per year by 2008 in keeping with a plan to continuing U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt. reduce aid to Israel. The Administration Experience gained from Egyptian-U.S. joint requested $575 million in economic grants military exercises proved valuable in easing and $1.3 billion in military grants for FY2004 coordination during the February 1991 Desert for Egypt.
    [Show full text]