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GUNS and BUTTER in the EGYPTIAN ARMY by Hillel Frisch*

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GUNS and BUTTER in the EGYPTIAN ARMY by Hillel Frisch* GUNS AND BUTTER IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMY By Hillel Frisch* This article analyzes the Egyptian army, its mission, development and modernization during the past several decades, and its relationship to the political and general civilian spheres. The article contends that Egypt's armed forces have elements of both modern and post-modern armies, and answers the riddle of how Egypt's army has neither sacrificed quantity or quality of its weapons systems, nor slashed military salaries severely, despite a seemingly shrinking budget. The Egyptian army seems to possess Sa'id, director of Egypt's prestigious al-Ahram the characteristics of a modern army (in the Center for Political and Strategic Studies 1950s' sense, when nationalism and patriotism praises the benefits of U.S. civilian aid unquestionably prevailed in military compared to its military aid, though more establishments) in a post-modern age. While money is earmarked for the latter category.(5) the post-modern army is often seen as being Newspapers devote many articles to praising professionally small, the Egyptian army the army's "civilian" and development- remains rather large. While the post-modern oriented services, as if to defend its army is typified by increasing civilian- contribution to the nation on this more military integration, the Egyptian army has important front.(6) constructed at least 17 military cities to isolate This tension between supporting a the military from the civilian population.(1) large military while coming to grips with the Bernard Boene claims that Western acute, almost insurmountable, social problems militaries in the post-modern age must cope facing Egypt, is a central factor in analyzing with its cadre having professional wives who the mission and political status of the want to integrate into civilian society.(2) But Egyptian armed forces. There is a clear the sections devoted to women and family in contradiction on this issue. On the one hand, Al-Nasr, the official army journal, depict both the Egyptian military and outside experts wives in the Egyptian military, however agree that the Egyptian armed forces have worldly, who still fill the roles of mothers. In become more professional and modernized short, the ethos and discourse of the Egyptian radically in terms of force, structure, and armed forces resembles the style of the early equipment, while maintaining a force level of and mid-twentieth century. The army about 420,000 men. On the other hand, continues to be the repository of military though, the armed forces' estimated real values and the defender of the state and budget fell by nearly half in the last two nation, forever on guard to protect its decades of the twentieth century.(7) independence and integrity. Meanwhile, U.S. military aid, a hefty $1.3 This first glance, though, does not billion dollars annually which is not included give a complete picture of the situation. Upon in the military budget, fell in real terms by 50 closer examination, the armed forces are percent.(8) shown to be under criticism for being too How can this combination of factors expensive.(3) In al-Ahram, Ahmad Ibrahim be possible? Sophisticated equipment-- Mahmud writes: "Since the mid-1970s Egypt including items needed for new command, has focused on giving complete first priority control, communication, and intelligence to domestic development to confront its systems--means increased operating costs as growing economic problems."(4) In a more well as requiring more and better quality subtle reference to this fact, Abd al-Mun'im commissioned and non-commissioned Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 1 Hillel Frisch officers.(9) U.S. military aid does not cover Similar statements were made these expenses.(10) The army must, in order consistently by Minister of Defense and War to balance the accounts, either sacrifice Production Field Marshal Muhammad quantity for quality or slash military salaries Hussein Tantawi: "Peace does not mean severely. The February 1986 rebellion in the relaxation. The endless development of Central Security Forces to protest low wages military systems and the arms race prove that suggests that salary reduction is not politically survival is only assured by the strongest and feasible.(11) Such a solution is all the more that military strength will always be untenable in the face of rising Islamic necessary. Military strength has grown to be a fundamentalism. How can we solve this prerequisite of peace. Any threat to any Arab apparent riddle, while analyzing the Egyptian or African country is a threat to Egypt's military's mission, force structure, national security."(14) capabilities, and relationship to civil society? This basic position was voiced slightly differently by Major General Muhammad Seif THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES Eddin Galal, commander of the Third Field MISSION Army, upon completion of the Jabal Pharaon exercises in April 1998: "The exercise affirms The Egyptian military's mission, as the to the world the effective role of the Egyptian political leaders and senior officers define it, armed forces, to lighten the path of Egyptian is to defend Egypt and achieve Egyptian diplomacy to impose the peace of the strong national interests. which began on October 6 [the beginning of The stress on defense rather than the 1973 war with Israel]."(15) Even when offense, and peace rather than war, resonates assessing the capabilities of the Egyptian air in almost every public address issued by force, its commander makes clear its basic Egypt's senior politicians and ministers defensive mission when in an interview in including the minister of defense. In a 1999 he concluded: "We cannot be taken November 1995 speech, President Husni lightly; We cannot be beaten."(16) Mubarak stated that "in general, the level of However much these statements stress our armed forces is a source of pride for us deterrence, they equally emphasize that this all, and [they] are capable of deterring any can only be achieved through efforts to danger threatening our national security." enhance offensive capabilities commensurate When asked about criticism from other states with the potential foe's strength. Nor can war that Egypt is expanding its military power, he with Israel be entirely ruled out. In his article replied, "The call to weaken the Egyptian stressing Egypt's commitment to social and army is misleading. We have to maintain a economic development, Mahmud points out military power capable of deterring at the that: same time we work for peace."(12) In October 1996, Mubarak linked the Egyptian military school of Egyptian deterrence with the need to preserve thought, in its strategic assessment, the Arab-Israeli peace process, saying that a believes that there are a cluster of strong Egyptian army helped preserve factors that are likely...to push either regional stability and the chance of reaching in the direction of war or in the peace. According to the official summary of direction of peace....The probabilities the statement, "History has taught us that the of armed conflict breaking out cause behind many wars is the weakness of between Egypt and Israel or not one side and the increase and growth of breaking out depends on the following military power of the other side. This main factors: The fuzziness or lack of prompts the second side to attack, as has information regarding Israeli happened and is happening around us now. intentions...Israeli military capabilities Therefore, peace and stability must exist and their development, the size and under the umbrella of a military force that type of the Israeli armed forces, [and] protects and preserves them."(13) the military alliances and axis which 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army Israel maintains with other YPR-765 armored personnel carriers (APCs) countries...Therefore the transparency from Holland. of [Israeli] intentions and plans...for To counter enemy armor, the military development and the Egyptians have at their disposal vast amounts development of military capabilities of anti-tank missiles that proved their [and] moving forward in the Arab- effectiveness in the 1991 Gulf War. During Israeli settlement will help a great deal 1997 alone, the Egyptian Army received 540 in avoiding the outbreak of armed TOW-2 launchers, French Hot-3 missiles, and conflict in the area and the opposite is 1,000 Hellfire-2 laser-guided anti-tank true.(17) missiles.(21) Both the quality and mobility of the tanks and anti-tank missiles and launchers STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES AND enhance the offensive capabilities of Egyptian BATTLE-READINESS ground forces substantially. The contribution of the United States to this transformation has President Anwar Sadat's prescient decision in been overwhelming. the early 1970s to abandon the Soviet patron The growing influence of U.S.-made for the United States laid the foundation for equipment is evidenced to an even greater the Egyptian army's radical transformation extent by Egypt's air force which, since the "from [an] armed forces consisting of an army early 1980s, has integrated into its force that relied mainly on infantry, a weak air structure 160 F-16 jet fighters, roughly two- force, and an essentially defensive navy, to an thirds' the number of these fighters possessed Egyptian armed forces that now reflect an by Israel. Eight of 21 fighter squadrons are offensive orientation...."(18) The United equipped with these planes capable of States has contributed nearly $28 billion in carrying GBU-15 glide bombs and smart military aid since it first became available in weapons such the AFM-84 Harpoon. Within 1975 in the form of weapon sales, training, the next few years, 220 of its 500 fighters will and mutual exercises with U.S.
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