GUNS AND BUTTER IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMY By Hillel Frisch*
This article analyzes the Egyptian army, its mission, development and modernization during the past several decades, and its relationship to the political and general civilian spheres. The article contends that Egypt's armed forces have elements of both modern and post-modern armies, and answers the riddle of how Egypt's army has neither sacrificed quantity or quality of its weapons systems, nor slashed military salaries severely, despite a seemingly shrinking budget.
The Egyptian army seems to possess Sa'id, director of Egypt's prestigious al-Ahram the characteristics of a modern army (in the Center for Political and Strategic Studies 1950s' sense, when nationalism and patriotism praises the benefits of U.S. civilian aid unquestionably prevailed in military compared to its military aid, though more establishments) in a post-modern age. While money is earmarked for the latter category.(5) the post-modern army is often seen as being Newspapers devote many articles to praising professionally small, the Egyptian army the army's "civilian" and development- remains rather large. While the post-modern oriented services, as if to defend its army is typified by increasing civilian- contribution to the nation on this more military integration, the Egyptian army has important front.(6) constructed at least 17 military cities to isolate This tension between supporting a the military from the civilian population.(1) large military while coming to grips with the Bernard Boene claims that Western acute, almost insurmountable, social problems militaries in the post-modern age must cope facing Egypt, is a central factor in analyzing with its cadre having professional wives who the mission and political status of the want to integrate into civilian society.(2) But Egyptian armed forces. There is a clear the sections devoted to women and family in contradiction on this issue. On the one hand, Al-Nasr, the official army journal, depict both the Egyptian military and outside experts wives in the Egyptian military, however agree that the Egyptian armed forces have worldly, who still fill the roles of mothers. In become more professional and modernized short, the ethos and discourse of the Egyptian radically in terms of force, structure, and armed forces resembles the style of the early equipment, while maintaining a force level of and mid-twentieth century. The army about 420,000 men. On the other hand, continues to be the repository of military though, the armed forces' estimated real values and the defender of the state and budget fell by nearly half in the last two nation, forever on guard to protect its decades of the twentieth century.(7) independence and integrity. Meanwhile, U.S. military aid, a hefty $1.3 This first glance, though, does not billion dollars annually which is not included give a complete picture of the situation. Upon in the military budget, fell in real terms by 50 closer examination, the armed forces are percent.(8) shown to be under criticism for being too How can this combination of factors expensive.(3) In al-Ahram, Ahmad Ibrahim be possible? Sophisticated equipment-- Mahmud writes: "Since the mid-1970s Egypt including items needed for new command, has focused on giving complete first priority control, communication, and intelligence to domestic development to confront its systems--means increased operating costs as growing economic problems."(4) In a more well as requiring more and better quality subtle reference to this fact, Abd al-Mun'im commissioned and non-commissioned
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 1 Hillel Frisch officers.(9) U.S. military aid does not cover Similar statements were made these expenses.(10) The army must, in order consistently by Minister of Defense and War to balance the accounts, either sacrifice Production Field Marshal Muhammad quantity for quality or slash military salaries Hussein Tantawi: "Peace does not mean severely. The February 1986 rebellion in the relaxation. The endless development of Central Security Forces to protest low wages military systems and the arms race prove that suggests that salary reduction is not politically survival is only assured by the strongest and feasible.(11) Such a solution is all the more that military strength will always be untenable in the face of rising Islamic necessary. Military strength has grown to be a fundamentalism. How can we solve this prerequisite of peace. Any threat to any Arab apparent riddle, while analyzing the Egyptian or African country is a threat to Egypt's military's mission, force structure, national security."(14) capabilities, and relationship to civil society? This basic position was voiced slightly differently by Major General Muhammad Seif THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES Eddin Galal, commander of the Third Field MISSION Army, upon completion of the Jabal Pharaon exercises in April 1998: "The exercise affirms The Egyptian military's mission, as the to the world the effective role of the Egyptian political leaders and senior officers define it, armed forces, to lighten the path of Egyptian is to defend Egypt and achieve Egyptian diplomacy to impose the peace of the strong national interests. which began on October 6 [the beginning of The stress on defense rather than the 1973 war with Israel]."(15) Even when offense, and peace rather than war, resonates assessing the capabilities of the Egyptian air in almost every public address issued by force, its commander makes clear its basic Egypt's senior politicians and ministers defensive mission when in an interview in including the minister of defense. In a 1999 he concluded: "We cannot be taken November 1995 speech, President Husni lightly; We cannot be beaten."(16) Mubarak stated that "in general, the level of However much these statements stress our armed forces is a source of pride for us deterrence, they equally emphasize that this all, and [they] are capable of deterring any can only be achieved through efforts to danger threatening our national security." enhance offensive capabilities commensurate When asked about criticism from other states with the potential foe's strength. Nor can war that Egypt is expanding its military power, he with Israel be entirely ruled out. In his article replied, "The call to weaken the Egyptian stressing Egypt's commitment to social and army is misleading. We have to maintain a economic development, Mahmud points out military power capable of deterring at the that: same time we work for peace."(12) In October 1996, Mubarak linked the Egyptian military school of Egyptian deterrence with the need to preserve thought, in its strategic assessment, the Arab-Israeli peace process, saying that a believes that there are a cluster of strong Egyptian army helped preserve factors that are likely...to push either regional stability and the chance of reaching in the direction of war or in the peace. According to the official summary of direction of peace....The probabilities the statement, "History has taught us that the of armed conflict breaking out cause behind many wars is the weakness of between Egypt and Israel or not one side and the increase and growth of breaking out depends on the following military power of the other side. This main factors: The fuzziness or lack of prompts the second side to attack, as has information regarding Israeli happened and is happening around us now. intentions...Israeli military capabilities Therefore, peace and stability must exist and their development, the size and under the umbrella of a military force that type of the Israeli armed forces, [and] protects and preserves them."(13) the military alliances and axis which
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Israel maintains with other YPR-765 armored personnel carriers (APCs) countries...Therefore the transparency from Holland. of [Israeli] intentions and plans...for To counter enemy armor, the military development and the Egyptians have at their disposal vast amounts development of military capabilities of anti-tank missiles that proved their [and] moving forward in the Arab- effectiveness in the 1991 Gulf War. During Israeli settlement will help a great deal 1997 alone, the Egyptian Army received 540 in avoiding the outbreak of armed TOW-2 launchers, French Hot-3 missiles, and conflict in the area and the opposite is 1,000 Hellfire-2 laser-guided anti-tank true.(17) missiles.(21) Both the quality and mobility of the tanks and anti-tank missiles and launchers STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES AND enhance the offensive capabilities of Egyptian BATTLE-READINESS ground forces substantially. The contribution of the United States to this transformation has President Anwar Sadat's prescient decision in been overwhelming. the early 1970s to abandon the Soviet patron The growing influence of U.S.-made for the United States laid the foundation for equipment is evidenced to an even greater the Egyptian army's radical transformation extent by Egypt's air force which, since the "from [an] armed forces consisting of an army early 1980s, has integrated into its force that relied mainly on infantry, a weak air structure 160 F-16 jet fighters, roughly two- force, and an essentially defensive navy, to an thirds' the number of these fighters possessed Egyptian armed forces that now reflect an by Israel. Eight of 21 fighter squadrons are offensive orientation...."(18) The United equipped with these planes capable of States has contributed nearly $28 billion in carrying GBU-15 glide bombs and smart military aid since it first became available in weapons such the AFM-84 Harpoon. Within 1975 in the form of weapon sales, training, the next few years, 220 of its 500 fighters will and mutual exercises with U.S. forces. In be composed of F-16s, the same planes that 1998, Sa'id summarized this relationship: are the mainstay of Israeli Air-Force offensive "The modernization of the Egyptian armed capabilities.(22) forces in the past two decades has in large To enhance combined ground-air measure relied on American military aid."(19) operations, the Egyptians have purchased and The radical transformation of the integrated 36 ultra-advanced AH-64A Apache armed forces is reflected in changes in the attack helicopters all of which will be overall structure of its ground forces. upgraded to the improved D model, equipped Between 1973 and 1983, Egyptian ground with a Long Bow radar that can locate both forces consisted of ten divisions, five of them ground and air targets. Older helicopters such armored or mechanized. By the late 1990s, as the SA-342 Gazelle, and the Naval the Egyptian army had 12 divisions, of which Westland Sea King Mk-47 and SH-2G all but one is armored or mechanized.(20) helicopters make up the rest of the combat Perhaps even more significant is the squadron.(23) As Sa'id notes, this increasingly Westernized and modern transformation could have never have taken equipment these divisions operate. An place without massive U.S. aid and estimated 70 percent of Egypt's active tanks training.(24) are of Western design, including 400 of 512 Despite its emphasis on offensive air planned M-1 A-1 Abrams battle tanks (with a power, Egypt remains committed to "hit/kill ratio" that equals or surpasses any enhancing its air-defense system, where it has main battle tank armament in the world), been traditionally strong. Tradition is equivalent to Israel's Merkava-3. Egypt is also reflected in the fact that Air Defense converting M-60 A1 tanks to A3s, has been Command is an autonomous branch, separate upgrading Russian T-62s, produces and from the air force, reporting directly to the operates 24 SPH 122mm self-propelled guns, minister of defense and war production rather and is in the process of absorbing 600 new than to the commander of the air force or even
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 3 Hillel Frisch to the chief-of-staff.(25) Surface-to-Air relying on the United States as its major Missiles (SAMs), including the 1998 sale of source of equipment and training. The United 1000 Stinger missiles (the world's most States was ready to help partly because it advanced personal anti-aircraft weapons) and wants to maintain a strong, friendly naval advanced warning systems (such as five force between the Persian Gulf and the Grumman Hawkeye planes) have been Mediterranean Sea to secure oil exports and increasingly of American make.(26) trade routes. Egypt completed these According to military expert Shmuel Gordon, transactions in 1996 with the acquisition of "The Egyptian air arm, the pivot of an Arab four modern Oliver Hazard Perry-class war coalition, is completing a long process of frigates and ten Super Sea Sprite helicopters. transformation to Western systems and Egypt plans to overhaul its submarine fleet technologies. It has procured various modern with vessels from the United States, systems, such as aircraft, attack helicopters, Netherlands, or Germany. Due to this long- air-to-air and air-to-ground guided munitions, term restructuring, Egypt's navy has grown C4I systems, early warning systems, and from an inconsequential force to a powerful electronic warfare systems."(27) military presence.(30) Even the Egyptian navy, long the Because U.S. military aid has become Achilles heel in Egypt's military, has seen so important to the military balance in the substantial change. Once again, this Middle East, it is important to take a look at development can be attributed mainly to how the aid has comparatively benefited United States aid. In the past 20 years, the Egypt and its most serious adversary, Israel. navy has undergone significant restructuring. In general, the United States was the only But the new advanced equipment and country that refused to export its most technology from several Western nations also advanced military technologies. This poses a problem. While Egypt's naval forces changed with President Clinton's decision to are significantly more modernized that they sell the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile to the were in the 1970s, the navy's major weakness UAE. The missile, which increases pilot now lies in the poor quality of its personnel. survivability by letting the pilot break away This is primarily due to the difficulty in immediately after launch and engage other effectively training personnel to operate a targets, is the most advanced air-to-air missile large number of different ships from different in the U.S. arsenal. Egypt's requests to countries that operate on different technology purchase the AMRAAM, however, have levels.(28) continuously been rejected by the Pentagon In the 1980s, Egypt's navy began to due to strong Israeli objections. Instead it has replace Soviet ships with more modernized received less advanced but still formidable Western equipment, including British-made weapons such as the flare-resistance air-to-air Ramadan-class missile boats and Spanish- missiles (AIM-9-M), electromagnetic AAM made Descubierta-class missile frigates, and (AIM-7-M), night-vision navigation systems attempted to upgrade older vessels with (Path Finder), laser-designator pods (Sharp Western radar and electronic warfare systems. Shooter), and vehicle-mounted Stinger The purchase of four new Chinese-made Avengers.(31) Romeo-class submarines and American While both Egypt and Israel have supplied state-of-the-art weapons and received a sizable quantity of advanced detection systems, including underwater-to- combat aircraft from the United States, U.S. surface Harpoon missiles was the most defense cooperation with Israel has proven to successful attempt to alleviate this be a greater force multiplier. The United problem.(29) States supported the Arrow anti-ballistic In the 1990s, in response to Israeli missile program through funding about 70 naval upgrades, the Egyptian navy went percent of development costs and providing through a decade-long modernization process $156 million for deployment of a third battery to replace outdated Soviet vessels with of Arrow missiles. In addition, a quick modernized Western ships and technology, channel for sending emergency assistance
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(Air Mark) was set up and Israel was directly that 70 percent of army personnel had attained connected to an early-warning system to at least a secondary education.(38) detect SSM launches with a hotline between Theoretically, the armed forces should the U.S. secretary of defense and the Israeli be able to choose selectively from this pool. defense minister.(32) However, there is some evidence that both the Due to the acquisition of the most readiness to join and the quality of those advanced American aircraft and tanks, such as joining does not fully meet expectations. For the Apache-64A attack helicopters, the F-16 example, in 1996, the Egyptian armed forces Fighting Falcon combat planes, and the M-1 sent two delegations to promote conscription A-1 Abrams battle tanks, it can be argued that amongst Egypt's sizeable expatriate Egypt's weaponry is on par, or nearly on par community--an expensive undertaking which with Israel's military. Nevertheless, Israel's can be justified only if the local educational great advantage over Egypt lies in its ability system was not yielding the quality of soldiers to develop and manufacture weapons and the armed forces thought necessary for an munitions indigenously using the most increasingly sophisticated military.(39) advanced technologies, although financial An article on the military colleges in constraints prevent it from producing large al-Nasr also suggests that the Egyptian quantities of these systems.(33) Egyptian military does not always recruit at the level it analysts are also convinced that the United would like. The 1996 article urged high States maintains a technology gap in Israel's school achievers to consider a military career favor.(34) by arguing that the military colleges in which Westernization of the Egyptian armed they were to be educated and trained, were forces is hardly limited to weapons or force better than civilian counterparts. It provided structure but includes training as well. Joint strong evidence of competition from the exercises with the United States and its allies engineering and computer programs in are important components of such training. Egypt's top universities.(40) From the photos The large-scale "Bright Star" exercises, and the cadets interviewed, though, it is clear initiated in 1981, take place every two years. they are not succeeding in recruiting Egypt's The October 1999 maneuvers involved urban and Westernized elite. While the armed 66,000 military personnel from 11 countries, forces is an avenue for upward mobility in including Egypt, the United State, France, Egypt, the type of people who use this route Britain, Italy, Greece and Kuwait. The are usually less well-educated and more rural commanding officer was a U.S. Army in origin. An analysis on Egyptian education general.(35) in the English-language Al-Ahram Weekly Assuring high-quality manpower is an reported that the average expenditure on rural essential characteristic of modernizing armies. students in the state school system was only Egypt has gone to great lengths to improve 28.5 percent of that expended on urban the quality of its recruits. Radical students.(41) transformation in the quality of officers and soldiers took place even before the October WHO IS THE ENEMY? 1973 war, when an estimated 60 percent of those who fought had been high school or Almost all of Egypt's capabilities, equipment, university students.(36) Ostensibly, Egypt and deployment of forces are concentrated on should not find it difficult to maintain this one front to engage one force only: the Israeli level, and perhaps even improve these figures. Defense Forces. The Egyptians have made Over 250,000 high school students graduate this explicit since the Badr-96 exercises in every year, and roughly half graduate from 1996, in which they specifically named Israel the universities, which also serve as a pool for as the training target.(42) In the early 1990s, recruitment, especially officers. Meanwhile, the target was left unnamed. According to an the armed forces recruit or conscript 80,000 official description, the Badr-96 exercises in youth and young men each year.(37) It was Safajeh took place over the course of ten not surprising that Al-Ahram reported in 1994 days, beginning with a mechanized infantry
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 5 Hillel Frisch battalion landing on a beach supported by Arab Gulf states along these lines in the 1992 navy, air force, and air defense operations. Damascus Protocol failed. As the battalion penetrated the hinterland, it This is not the case for non- was augmented by border guards, shock conventional weapons. Egyptian sources troops, paratroopers and specialized units make almost no mention of non-conventional from the engineering, chemical, and capabilities and stress that Egypt is mainly electronic warfare corps.(43) According to focused on achieving at least deterrence, if not Amos Gilboa, "The Badr-96 exercise held in conventional parity with Israel. There is summer of 1996 reflects both the state of however a danger that U.S. aid frees resources Egyptian battle-readiness and the target for for developing non-conventional weapons. such extensive operations. The exercise was Egypt has chemical warfare plants, is supposed to be a response to an [Israeli] cooperating with North Korea in developing attack on the Egyptian front in which the ballistic missiles, and has purchased from it Egyptian army first engages in a defensive Scud-C missiles with a range of 600 km, battle and then switches to a counterattack, placing most of Israel in their reach.(47) and finally takes over the whole of the Sinai Egypt along with Syria has consistently including limited penetration over the refused to sign the Chemical Weapons international border."(44) Convention as long as Israel refuses to sign Another large-scale operation, the the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.(48) Jabal Pharon exercises, conducted on April 22, 1998, was also focused on improving CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE assault capabilities against Israeli forces. It MILITARY AND THE was carried out by the Third Field Army FUNDAMENTALISTS positioned along the central and southern part of the Suez canal. Air, navy, air defense, According to Phillipe Droz-Vincent, the paratroopers and specialized forces Egyptian military--or at least its higher participated in the exercises. The project echelons and front-line troops--are a focused on fighting in desert, mountainous, privileged elite for good reason: "In Egypt, and coastal areas, a combination of among the centers of power possessed by the topographic features found mainly in the regime, the police and the army are often the Sinai.(45) sole recourse."(49) Egypt's president relied on the army in 1981, when Sadat was DEVELOPING NON-CONVENTIONAL assassinated, and again in 1986, when the WEAPONS poorly paid and poorly armed Central Security Forces (CSF) mutinied. The CSF Egypt's linkage between the arms build-up itself was established in 1977 in the wake of and the Israeli front is even more pronounced the January 1977 food riots--the most serious in its efforts at enhancing its non- popular rebellion against the Egyptian regime conventional capabilities. In the conventional since the army came to power in the 1952 sphere, Egypt can at least partially justify its coup. Mubarak has built up the CSF enhancement of rapid deployment capabilities significantly, hoping it would counterbalance on the need to project power in the Gulf in the military's power.(50) conjunction with other forces. Abdel Munim During the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt Said, has even placed this goal within a witnessed extreme acts of religiously inspired broader Egyptian foreign policy transition that violence. Over 1,000 people were killed stresses geo-economic rather than geo- between 1991 and 1996 alone. The most strategic concerns. He argued that since the infamous, though hardly the bloodiest, event 1991 Gulf war Egypt must project its power was the fundamentalist attack on tourists in in the region to assure Egyptian economic Luxor on November, 1997 in which 58 people interests related to oil, employment and were killed.(51) The army has played only a remittances.(46) An attempt to create a joint minor part in the fight against these Egyptian-Syrian security umbrella for the fundamentalists. For example in the Luxor
6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army incident, its role was limited to the evacuation affirming that those doing so "are neither of 14 wounded to Cairo in army transports Muslims nor Egyptians."(56) from which they were transferred to a military Though the army is kept in the hospital by army helicopters.(52) The fight background, the regime has made sure to against terrorism is not therefore perceived as implicate the army in the struggle against the a task that the armed forces must address fundamentalists by trying such prisoners in directly. Nevertheless, senior military military courts.(57) officials frequently warn that during waves of increasing violence, the armed forces might SOLVING THE PUZZLE--THE become engaged.(53) The Egyptian armed MILITARY AND THE ECONOMY forces' role has thus far mainly concentrated on providing a decisive, deterrent force How then does Egypt solve the problem of situated in the background. improving the quality of personnel and The regime's cautiousness is hardly equipment at a time of declining budgets? puzzling. Involvement in suppressing growing Part of the answer lies with the Islamic fundamentalist violence risks military's ability to find alternative sources of exposing the army to fundamentalist income. As Picard noted already in the 1980s, infiltration as well. President Sadat's assassins the reduction of military budgets in the Arab included a colonel on active service as well as world led to a search for funding through a reserve lieutenant colonel. While Mubarak privileged, often monopolistic, activities in has built up the CSF significantly, hoping it the marketplace. The actors could be military would counterbalance the military's power, he organizations, military-owned companies, or was forced in the wake of the February 1986 senior and retired military personnel engaged riots to dismiss 20,000 of its members, in business with a connection to the armed probably due to Islamist infiltration. The forces.(58) The military justified this role as assassination of a high-level undercover both seeking self-sufficiency (al-iktifa'a al- agent, Major-General Rauf Khayrat, during thati) and the armed force's need to the riots could have only been possible supplement civil institutions in working to through the complicity of high-ranking "institutionalize" (taqnin) the state.(59) Both officers.(54) motivations were considered in keeping with The Egyptian military has gone to the widely accepted tendency to expand the great pains, chiefly through the establishment meaning of national security to include of military cities, to isolate military personnel economic and social welfare. While, in the from civilian society in the hope of stemming West, this often reflected the importance of such infiltration. Journals brought out by the private economic actors within the state at the military attempt to delegitimatize expense of allocations to the military, in fundamentalist ideologies and groups that Egypt, the new more economic-oriented voice them. "The extremists commit Major concept of national security was manipulated Sins in order to Avoid Small Ones" reads the to enhance its privileged role in the state and title of one article by General Muhammad its economy. Shabal, the retired general and Islamic These underpinnings can be examined commentator in Al-Nasr. In the article, he in the relationship between the military and attempted to demonstrate that the arms production, over which the state has an fundamentalists are willing to kill over minor exclusive monopoly. In the words of former matters such as the separation between men Minister of State for Military Production and women in the universities and women's Muhammad al-Ghamwari: "The state will not dress.(55) The article claims that the doctrine permit any sector to own military industry of the extremists in Algeria and Egypt are because of its role in producing military identical. Another article condemned on material for the armed forces."(60) The religious grounds the use of religion in military's monopoly over military production inciting communal hatred against the Copts, is moreover guaranteed by emergency legislation that effectively prevents any
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 7 Hillel Frisch possibility of monitoring the industry by the By far, the most important of the new legislature and the press. In October 1999, areas of activity was land reclamation, or The People's Assembly extended Law no. 49, more specifically, the military's role in the passed in 1974, for another three years,(61) two biggest land reclamation and urban despite the vociferous objections of resettlement projects ever undertaken by the opposition parties. In addition, there is no state. Egypt hopes that the implementation of legislative oversight whatsoever in regards to two huge and highly contested 30-year the military budget. projects, centered around the northern Sinai The government facilitated military and the southernmost reaches of the western expansion in the economic sphere well desert, will let Egypt disperse the country's beyond these limits through the population over 20 percent of its landmass Administration of National Service Projects, compared to five percent at present. created in January 1979.(62) By 1994, this The al-Salam canal, which will feed organization ran 16 factories employing Nile water into the Sinai peninsula, is the 75,000 workers, with 40 percent of its most advanced of the two schemes, with production geared to the civilian market in the 420,000 acres schedule to be reclaimed. Half form of agricultural machines, fodder, cables, the reclaimed land will go to settlement and medications, pumps, and ovens. Companies agro-industry and the remaining half to owned by the military expanded into areas agriculture and flower-growing.(67) The such as water management and the production Egyptian government hopes to increase the of electricity to the chagrin of civil population in the Sinai to three million ministries.(63) inhabitants, an almost ten-fold increase from As Egypt's cities expanded outward, its present level. the military made big profits by selling land An even more ambitious venture is the formerly used for army bases or developed by New or Southern valley project situated in the using soldiers as cheap labor. According to southern reaches of the Western Desert. The Akhbar al-Yawm, by 1994, the army had first stage of the Southern Valley project made one billion Egyptian pounds from land (scheduled for completion in 2017) involves development deals in the Suez area alone. canal construction, massive irrigation, The military has also been accused of agricultural infrastructure, the establishment smuggling through the two free-trade zones of six large-scale cities and four free-trade under its control in Suez and Port Said.(64) zones, at a total estimated cost of 300 billion The army also is paid by the government for Egyptian pounds. About 35 percent of its work to combat illiteracy in the desert investment will involve agriculture, with the periphery, educating the inhabitants of Upper remainder allocated to tourism and industry, Egypt, organizing medical expeditions to the especially the metallurgical and mineral western desert, providing water to nomads, sectors.(68) Water will be carried in the and producing and distributing medicines. Toshke canal from Lake Nasser, to reach the The military's economic mandate has Farafra Oasis, 500 km away. The military will effectively been extended since the early be responsible for planning, canal 1990s. In 1996, the minister of state construction, and earth removal. considered development projects such as the Critics fault the projects for focusing military's manufacturing equipment for water on agriculture in which Egypt has no purification, desalination for waste water significant comparative advantage.(69) Even treatment, and garbage disposal.(65) Three more alarming is the diversion of water that years later the mandate extended to will soon be necessary to meet Egypt's current "productive sections particularly in...high- demands to desert areas characterized by high precision industries, which are difficult for evaporation levels.(70) The project also other than the military production to pushes the lower classes to be relocated, manufacture," in addition to the "basic needs though they can rarely afford or succeed in of man, agriculture, irrigation, land this effort. Critics feel that the Southern reclamation and other pursuits." (66) valley, especially, is far too distant and
8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army inhospitable to make population dispersion belief in the virtues of secrecy that so worthwhile. Doubts about this project's characterized the October 1973 war, Egypt's feasibility can be documented by the slow greatest military achievement in the past pace of progress regarding the more century. hospitable and accessible Sinai. The Egyptian authorities had hoped to increase the Sinai CONCLUSION population in the past 20 years by one million inhabitants, but succeeded in attracting only The Egyptian military's relationship to the one-fifth that amount. Moreover, the political sphere represents a sobering authorities themselves fear that creating large reminder to the social scientist just how urban centers in southern Sinai might difficult the task of theorizing civil-military facilitate fundamentalist activity and thus relations in the Middle East. The differences harm tourism in the area. among Arab armies as institutions and Ostensibly, the military's participation fighting organizations are quite extensive. in the project is justified on strategic grounds. Equally, Egypt's armed forces have Israel's successful assaults through vast elements of both modern and post-modern stretches of wilderness have demonstrated armies. For example, it continues to be large, that desert stretches, which has once been yet it is becoming rapidly more considered an obstacle to invasion, no longer professional.(73) Western armies are act as natural barriers.(71) The collaboration normatively peripheral but sociologically of Sinai beduin with the Israeli administration fused with mainstream society due to reliance when Sinai was under Israeli rule suggested on professional and technological training, that Egypt's security would be enhanced by professional wives and tendencies to live in settling non-beduin Egyptians there. civilian areas. In the Egyptian military, by Incidentally, the Sinai scheme also contrast, there is growing physical demonstrates Egypt's defensive posture since segregation alongside a functional and it would not be inclined to invest such huge economic expansion into civilian roles. amounts for civilian development and At first glance, growing physical resettlement in areas where it intended to segregation and economic role expansion launch a military attack. should be perceived as contradictory trends: Whatever the true motives behind the the first suggesting the modern army of grand national projects may be, there is no yesteryear, while the latter should be seen as a doubt that they offer ideal opportunities for characteristic of the post-modern army. The the military to obtain more funds and expansion of the Egyptian military into strengthen its position within the state. civilian, industrial and technological spheres, Of course, the military's importance as however, has nothing to do with the fiercely a pillar of the regime also means that the individual nature of career choices or role president's oversight of that institution transformation characterizing post-modern remains strong. He supervises the filling of states and their militaries. This is very much a senior positions and ensures that the armed reflection of the previous modern state and forces don't get too much credit for army era, and probably also reflects its earlier achievements. Officers are frequently rotated stages. While this is not quite the status of the and discouraged from interfering in civilian military's involvement in the economy under policy issues, even when these affect the Muhammad Ali, it is not radically different military's interests.(72) In a one-month study either. of primetime coverage by the official A rent-seeking military the size of the television station, the military was mentioned Egyptian army suggests that the Egyptian as a news item only once. In Jordan, by state is a long way from making the transition contrast, the army was deemed newsworthy to the post-modern, globally oriented service- on 14 of 30 days. Coverage of the Egyptian state.(74) Egypt's poor economic prospects military in the official Egyptian press is also might not necessarily reduce the military's scarce. This may be due to the widespread privileges, but at some point it could weigh
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 9 Hillel Frisch heavily against its long-term prospects of the military cities see interview with Field keeping up with the technological advances Marshal Muhammad Husayn Tantawi, Armed amongst Egypt's military competitors. In the Forces Commander-in-Chief and Minister of event of a conventional inter-state war, this Defense, MENA, October 6, 1994 in FBIS- could prove to be crucial, especially against NES-94-195. the potential Israeli foe. 2. Bernard Boene, `Trends in the Political Control of Post-Cold War Armed Forces`, in *Hillel Frisch is Senior Lecturer in the Cohen ed., Democratic Societies and Their Department of Politics, Bar-Ilan University Armed Forces, p. 75-6. and Senior Researcher at the BESA Center 3. Phillipe Droz-Vincent, `Le militaire et le for Strategic Studies. He is the author of politique en Egypte', Monde arabe Maghreb- Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State- Machreq, 162 (juillet-septembre 1999), p. 26. Building in the West Bank and Gaza (Albany, 4. Ahmad Ibrahim Mahmud, Al-Quwat al- NY: SUNY Press, 1998) and many articles on Musallaha wal-Siyasa al-Kharijia lil Misr`, Arab and Palestinian politics. [The Armed Forces and Egypt's Foreign Policy], Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliyya, 139 (January For other MERIA Journal articles on related 2000), pp. 62-69; In a speech at the Third subjects, see: Field Army headquarters, Tantawi placed the Norvell De Atkine, "Why Arab Armies Lose President's interest in social and economic Wars", MJ Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) advancement before Egypt's commitment to
10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army
House of Representatives by the Department 25. John Keegan, `Egypt`, World Armies of State on February 19, 1999. (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1983), p. www.state.gov./www/ global/arms/98- 168. amiex1.html. 26. Hatzofeh, p. 6. 9. For a very thorough and detailed critique of 27. Shmuel Gordon, `The Balance of Air the veracity of existing budget estimates and Forces`, Middle East Military Balance 1999- reports by analyzing operating and operating 2000, eds. Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir costs, see Shawn Pine, The Egyptian Threat (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1999), p. and the Prospects for War in the Middle East 28. Gilboa, `Challenges to the Military in (Shaarei Tikva, Israel: Ariel Center for Policy Egypt`, p. 49. Research, 2000), pp. 31-45. 29. Eli Oren, `The Balance of Naval Forces`, 10. Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Middle East Military Balance: 1999- The Changing Military Balance in the Middle 2000, p. 85. East (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview 30. Ibid., p. 86. Press, 1993), p. 21. 31. Gilboa, `Challenges to the Military in 11. Joseph Kchichian and Jeanne Nazimek, Egypt`, p. 32. `Challenges to the Military in Egypt`, Middle 32. Ibid., p. 54. East Policy, 5, 3 (September 1997): 129. 33. Ibid., p. 31. 12. FBIS-NES 95-087, November 14, 1995. 34. Sa'id, `Limatha al-Hawar al-Istratiji al- 13. FBIS-TAC-96-010. MENA broadcast, Masri al-Amariki?`, p. 115. October 5, 1996. 35. `The armed forces is the supreme school 14. `Egyptian Defense Minister Addresses of nationalism: MENA reports on Progress of People's Assembly Committee`, FBIS-NES- 'Bright Star 99` Exercise` FBIS, 1999-1021. 96-026, February 6, 1996. October 21, 1999. 15. `Egypt: Egyptian Defense Minister 36. Kechichian and Nazimek, `Challenges to Attends Military Exercises`, FBIS-NES-98- the Military in Egypt`, p. 126. 112, MENA broadcast, April 22, 1998. 37. Droz-Vincent, `Le militaire et le politique 16. Mahmud, `Al-Quwat al-Musallaha wal- en Egypte', p. 17. Siyasa al-Kahrijia lil-Misr`, pp. 62-69. 38. Al-Ahram, October 21, 1994 cited in fn. 17. Ibid., p. 84. 13 in Droz-Vincent, p. 18. 18. Amos Gilboa, `Challenges to the Military 39. Al-Nasr, 691 (January 1997), p. 7. in Egypt`,The Middle East Military Balance - 40. Muhammad Nabil, `Tahqiq: Al-Kulliyat 1997. Mark Heller and Yiftach Shapir (eds.) al-
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 11 Hillel Frisch
Perceptions in the Middle East (NY: 65. `Egypt: Mubarak Authorized to Issue UNIDIR: Decrees With Force of Law,' FB-98-105 form 1965), pp. 24-25. MENA broadcast, April 15, 1998. 47. Pine, The Egyptian Threat and the 66. `New State Minister for Military Prospects for War in the Middle East, pp. 27- Production Interviewed`, FBIS-NES-1999- 8. 1020 from Al-Musawwar, October 19, 1999. 48. Ephraim Dubek, Uvechol Zot Shalom: 67. Barbara Smith, `A survey of Egypt: Hehasei Israel-Mitzraim [Peace Nevertheless: Making the desert bloom`, The Economist, Israeli-Egyptian Relations](Tel-Aviv: Yediot March 20, 1999. Ahronot, 1998), pp. 308-309. 68. `New State Minister for Military 49. Droz-Vincent, `Le militaire et le politique Production Interviewed`, FBIS-NES-1999- en Egypte', p. 27. 1020 Al-Musawwar, October 19, 1999. 50. Kekichian and Nazimek, `Challenges to 69. Habib Ayab, `L'eau et les politiques the Military in Egypt`, p. 128. d'amenagement du terrioire en Egypte`, 51. Meir Hatina, `Egypt`, Middle East Monde arab Maghreb-Machrek, 162 Contemporary Survey, 1997, (Tel-Aviv: (October-December 1998), p. 77. Westview and the Dayan Center of Middle 70. Ibid., pp. 72, 77. East and North African Studies, 1999), 71. Ibid., p. 73. volume 22, p. 306. 72. Droz-Vincent, `Le militaire et le politique 52. Al-Nasr, 702 (December 1997), p. 61. en Egypte', p. 25. 53. Droz-Vincent, `Le militaire et le politique 73. Boene, `Trends in the Political Control of en Egypte', p. 24. Post-Cold War Armed Forces`, pp. 74-5. 54. Kekichian and Nazimek, `Challenges to 74. For a devastating but excellent account of the Military in Egypt`, p 128. Egypt's economic malaise, see Timothy 55. Muhammad Shabal, `Al-Mutatarafun Mitchell, `No Factories, no problems: The Yartakibun al-Kaba'ir li-Yamna
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