Helpdesk Report Conflict analysis of Egypt Anna Louise Strachan 27. 02. 2017 Question What does the literature indicate about the current conflict dynamics in Egypt (excluding the Sinai Peninsula1), including key actors, proximate and structural causes, dynamics and triggers, and opportunities for peace and institutional resilience? Contents 1. Overview 2. Conflict dynamics and triggers 3. Key actors 4. Proximate causes of conflict 5. Structural causes of conflict 6. External pressures 7. Opportunities for peace and institutional resilience 8. References 1. Overview In 2011 Egypt experienced mass protests culminating in the fall of long serving president, Hosni Mubarak. The country’s first democratically elected President, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi’s, time in power was short-lived. He was deposed by Egypt’s military on 3 July 2013, following anti-government demonstrations (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 31). Abdul Fatah el-Sisi, former head of the armed forces, was elected in June 2014 (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 31). Sisi’s presidency has seen a return to military rule. There has also been a rise in the number of terrorist attacks in Egypt since he came to power in 2014. 1 For a conflict analysis of the Sinai Peninsula see Idris, I. (2017). Conflict analysis of Sinai (K4D Helpdesk Research Report). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.. The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists. Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please contact [email protected]. Key actors in Egypt, include the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF), trade unions, the currently banned Muslim Brotherhood, other Salafist parties, and both Salafist and non-Salafist extremist groups. Conflict in Egypt mainly manifests itself in the form of popular unrest and terrorist attacks. Proximate drivers of conflict in Egypt include: • Repressive political system: The authoritarian nature of the Sisi regime, and widespread repression in Egypt, have the potential to spark a populist backlash. • Military control over the judiciary: Military control over the judiciary has increased significantly, resulting in an increase in military trials of civilians. This has contributed to the atmosphere of repression in Egypt. • Migration: Egypt is a source, transit and destination country for migrants. The main risks facing migrants are detention by the security forces and being kidnapped and extorted by people smugglers. Moreover, the presence of a significant number of Syrian refugees has put significant economic pressure on the communities in which they live. Structural drivers of conflict include: • Economy: Egypt’s faltering economy dominates the literature. Challenges include rising inflation, a weak Egyptian pound and high levels of unemployment. They have the potential to lead to widespread unrest, having already resulted in nationwide protests. • Environmental factors: Climate change is affecting both water and food security in Egypt. This increases the risk of popular protests. In addition to the above, Egypt faces a number of external pressures. These include tensions with Sudan over the disputed Hala’ib triangle, trans-boundary water issues, and the impact of the conflict in Libya. The literature does not identify any significant opportunities for peace or institutional resilience in Egypt. It does however provide some policy recommendations. Much of the English language literature on conflict in Egypt consists of opinion pieces produced by European and North American think tanks. There are also a small number of peer-reviewed journal articles, discussing Egypt post-Arab Spring. Gender is largely addressed in the context of sexual violence and in the context of unemployment. 2. Conflict dynamics and triggers Conflict in Egypt principally manifests itself in the form of violent extremism and popular protests. The rise of IS2 and other extremist groups in Egypt has meant that terrorist attacks occur frequently.3 While the majority of these occur in the Sinai Peninsula,4 there are groups that also 2 Islamic State, also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/Da’esh 3 For details of incidents see for example: https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/ 2 operate in the rest of Egypt, most notably in Cairo (see Key actors section below). The rise in violent extremism in Egypt can be attributed to both the proximate and structural drivers of conflict discussed below. An ACLED conflict trends report suggests that levels of violence in 2016 were down on those of the previous year. However, it notes that there were ‘multiple, discrete, political contentions across Egypt’ (p. 8). According to the report ‘the continued consolidation of political authority by the Sisi regime coupled with a reserved approach to non-violent resistance suggests that 2017 will see a continuation of low- level protest activity that remains undeveloped’ (ACLED, 2016, p. 8). The report also finds that 2016 saw a move away from protests organised by religious groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, towards protests organised by labour and trade unions (ACLED, 2016, p. 8). According to an article published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there were 1,117 reported labour protests in 2015, and a further 493 protests from January to April 2016 (Acconcia, 2016). 3. Key actors Key actors in Egypt include the military government, trade unions, Salafist parties and extremist groups. Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) governed Egypt following the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Following the removal from power of Morsi in 2013, the military governed again. In June 2014, Sisi, former head of the armed forces, was elected as President winning 96 per cent of the vote (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016b, pp. 11 – 12). The military has subsequently consolidated its control over almost all aspects of the state apparatus in Egypt. Trade Unions While popular protests have reduced under the current government, due to state repression, trade unions remain active and strikes and labour protests continue (Acconcia, 2016). Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) The EFITU is an umbrella organisation for non-governmental labour unions (Acconcia, 2016). It was reportedly one of the most important opposition forces during the 2011 protests in Egypt (Acconcia, 2016). According to an article published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘despite capitalizing on the labor movement’s opposition to Morsi to propel him to power, Sisi’s presidency continued a policy of state capitalism, neglecting the protesters’ requests for social justice’ (Acconcia, 2016). While the government’s targeting of the EFITU has reportedly stopped it becoming a more structured organisation, the EFITU has support at the local level, and continues to organize new strikes (Acconcia, 2016) 4 See Idris, I. (2017). Conflict analysis of Sinai (K4D Helpdesk Research Report no. 49). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. 3 Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) The ETUF is the government-run labour union syndicate (Acconcia, 2016). In 2015, the ETUF issued a document declaring its intention to oppose and marginalize the EFITU (Acconcia, 2016). Salafist parties All Salafist parties in Egypt share some common goals. For example, they all seek the implementation of Sharia law to protect Egypt’s ‘Islamic identity’ from westernisation and secularisation (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, they all also reportedly address the major ‘social realities’ in Egypt, rejecting the corruption, dictatorship, and social inequality that led to the 2011 revolution. They reportedly also engage with the widespread popular demand for popular sovereignty, in the sense of regular elections and a separation of powers to prevent autocratic rule. They have therefore started to engage with ‘some’ democratic principles, thereby setting themselves apart from ‘conventional notions of politically quietsist and militant Salafists known for their anti-democratic outlook’ (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 5). Muslim Brotherhood The fall of Morsi’s government was followed by a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian government declared them a terrorist organisation in December 2013, and in August 2014 the organisation’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was banned by an Egyptian court (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 32). After its fall from power, the Muslim Brotherhood has been unable to re-enter the political system (Lynch, 2016, p. 31). Despite increasing elite criticism of Sisi’s regime, it has been unable to ‘reassure a hostile Egyptian public or to establish new political alliances’ (Lynch, 2016, p. 31). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood remains internally divided over its political strategy and over key ideological questions about violence and political participation (Lynch, 2016, p. 31). Hizb al-Nur Founded in May 2011, this is the largest Salafist party, although the extent of their support is unclear. Its stronghold is in Alexandria, but it is active in all of Egypt’s governorates (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 2). For Hizb al-Nur citizenship is linked to a person’s ‘quality and quantity of creed.’ Despite the fact that Hizb al- Nur states that non-Muslims would be granted the ‘same rights and same duties’ as Muslims, their view on citizenship means that there is no equality before the law for all individuals, especially not for non-Muslims (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, pp. 5-6). Moreover, Hizb al-Nur takes a fairly rigid approach to the implementation of Sharia law, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is more flexible on this (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p.