TRANSITIONS DIALOGUE SERIES April 2012
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TRANSITIONSPOLICY BRIEF DIALOGUEING SERIES AprilOct 2012ober 2011 THE BEGINNINGSHOW OF ST TRANSITIONABLE IS JORDAN?: KING ABDUL POLITICSLAH’S HALF-HEA AND POLARIZATIONRTED REFORMS & THE CHALLENGEIN EGYPT OF THE AND ARAB TUNISIA SPRING A LETTERTHE BEGINNINGS FROM CO-CONVENERS OF TRANSITION: POLITICS SALMAN AND POLARIZATION SHAIKH AND IN EGYPT SHADI AND TUNISIA HAMID Egypt and Tunisia have both held relatively suc- the Egyptian and Tunisian participants would inter- cessful elections, ushering in parliaments with pop- act, considering the extent to which their fortunes ular mandates. Both countries also saw landslide have diverged. Islamist victories which provoked fear among both Arab liberals and the international community. The Interestingly, until now, there has been little formal Brookings Doha Center (BDC) held its first “Tran- exchange or dialogue between the Muslim Brother- sitions Dialogue” in January 2012, with the hope hood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia, despite be- of providing a venue for addressing the emerging ing the dominant Islamist parties in their respective tensions that complicate and undermine prospects countries. The same goes for leftists and liberals. for successful transitions. With Egypt and Tunisia Participants from one country routinely expressed embarking on a long process of constitution writ- surprise at what those from the other were saying. ing and national dialogue, the Islamist-liberal di- One Egyptian participant noted, for example, that vide is of particular concern, especially in light of if the Al-Nahda representative were in Egypt, he the growing influence and reach of Salafi groups. would be called a liberal. While national debates over identity and the role Throughout the discussions, there was a sense that of religion in public life cannot be ignored, there the political spectrum in each country was anchored are areas of political convergence between various in a very different place. Tunisians were surprised parties – on the economy, foreign affairs, and the when a representative from Egypt’s Muslim Broth- importance of civilian rule for example – that are erhood complained that, during the election cam- just as important, if not more so. paign, his party had been attacked by far-right Sala- fis as being too “liberal.” One Egyptian liberal, who This dialogue, chaired by BDC Director Salman was a candidate for parliament, complained: “I did Shaikh and Research Director Shadi Hamid, was not run a political campaign; I was running a cam- the first of its kind to bring together mainstream paign that depended on me telling voters I’m not Islamists, Salafis, liberals, and leftists along with an atheist.” At the same time, however, a Tunisian U.S. and European officials to exchange ideas, de- leftist observed that the Egyptian Salafi participant velop consensus, and forge new understandings in seemed considerably more moderate than Salafis in a rapidly changing political environment. It also Tunisia, due in part to the former’s decision to com- presented a unique opportunity for Egyptians and mit to working within the democratic process. Tunisians to compare their different transition proc- esses and see what, if any, lessons could be learned. Concerns over ideological polarization were raised repeatedly by both Egyptians and Tunisians. There The program consisted of four sessions focusing was a general consensus that issues of identity on constitution drafting and the role of political had too often distracted from more urgent matters, institutions, economic recovery, the role of inter- namely addressing economic development, unem- national actors, and ideological polarization and ployment, and poverty. It was here that an impor- the role of religion in public life. These discussions tant back-and-forth took place regarding the role were followed by country-specific working groups, that Western countries could play in helping stabi- in which Egyptians and Tunisians discussed imme- lize Arab economies. Despite suspicion of Western diate challenges and lessons learned in their own intentions, nearly all participants agreed that the countries. Each group then shared their observa- United States and Europe had an important role to tions with the other. Many analysts have pointed to play through economic assistance, with an empha- the “Tunisian model” as an example for the region. sis on enhanced trade and investment. A fruitful With this in mind, we were interested to see how discussion ensued between Arab and Western par- 2 THE BEGINNINGS OF TRANSITION: POLITICS AND POLARIZATION IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA THE BEGINNINGS OF TRANSITION: POLITICS AND POLARIZATION IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA ticipants over what role the latter could play in sup- porting democratic reform and economic growth in these two transitioning countries. The Arab uprisings will have a profound impact on policymaking and the future political landscape in the Middle East. With so much at stake, the transi- tion process needs to be skillfully managed in order to lay the foundation for stable and sustainable gov- ernance. Discussions such as this one are an impor- tant step in exploring and better understanding this process. Salman Shaikh Director, Brookings Doha Center Shadi Hamid Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center 3 THE BEGINNINGSTHE BEGINNINGS OF TRANSITION: TRANSITION: POLITICS AND POLARIZATION IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA POLITICS AND POLARIZATION IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA What follows is a summary of the major themes (HCARO) – as a revolutionary, consensus-focused and tentative conclusions that emerged from the guarantor of the transition – was cited as key to the wide-ranging discussions, in each of the four areas success of Tunisia’s process. In Tunisia, political of focus. Taken as a whole, they provide Western legitimacy was concentrated first in the HCARO, policymakers – as well as political actors in Egypt and then in the elected constituent assembly, which and Tunisia – with insights and recommendations claims both legislative and executive authority. for how to grapple with the challenges of transition. While some fear that such a concentration of power in one body will distort the political map, all politi- CONSTITUTION-DRAFTING AND THE ROLE cal forces consider the assembly the primary venue OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS for political action. In short, while there will always be disagreement over outcomes, the process in Tu- Lack of clarity feeds disagreement on the me- nisia is seen as legitimate, therefore increasing the chanics of transition. The absence of a clear and likelihood that the resulting outcomes will be re- credible authority responsible for driving the transi- spected by all. Such a path has proved continually tion can be a significant obstacle to political stabil- elusive in Egypt, with angry disagreements over ity, and can fuel polarization. This lack of clarity the composition of the constituent assembly further has distracted from important debates over the na- complicating the establishment of credible and con- ture of political structures, such as the role of par- sensus driven process. liament and the presidency. In Tunisia, the balance of powers remains unresolved, while in Egypt it has Revolution versus reform. Among the Egyptian rarely been addressed in any great detail. In Egypt, participants in particular, some discussion focused doubts remain over the viability of a process that on a perceived divide between radical and reformist will almost certainly see a president elected before approaches to fulfilling the goals of the revolution. his powers have been defined. Some Egyptian par- Some argued that, in failing to take to the streets, ticipants called on the major political parties to do the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned revolu- more to lead a public discussion and, in the process, tionary forces and had actively fed perceptions of provide a steadier hand and a clearer vision for the the “Tahrir youth” as a destabilizing and extrem- transition. Given the still significant disagreements ist element. Islamist representatives emphasized over the mechanics of the transition – the timing of that while recent protests may have been in good SCAF’s departure, the weighting of presidential and faith, supporting them would have been irresponsi- parliamentary powers, and the drafting of a consti- ble given the potential for increased violence. They tution – political actors should focus not on desired argued that a long-term vision for reform was nec- outcomes, but rather on a process through which essary and that too hasty or too radical an approach such questions can be addressed and resolved. could be detrimental, and did not enjoy widespread popular support. Tunisian participants did not cite Who should guide transitions? As polarized as the problem of continued protests, and argued that Egypt’s politics are, there is growing consensus on the inclusion of the “revolutionary youth” in deci- one important issue – the role of the armed forc- sion making bodies may have played a role in insti- es. The Egyptian participants agreed that SCAF tutionalizing these elements and encouraging them had failed in its management of the transition to avoid a return to the streets. and should renounce all political powers at least by the June 30 deadline that has been set. Many CIVIL-RELIGIOUS DEBATES: HOW TO AD- were suspicious of SCAF’s appetite for power, and DRESS IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION hoped that a more credible opposition leadership that could hold it to account would emerge in the Increased political polarization