GENTLEMEN's DIPLOMACY: the FOREIGN POLICY of LORD LANSDOWNE, 1845-1927 a Dissertation by FRANK WINFIELD WINTERS IV Submitted T
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GENTLEMEN’S DIPLOMACY: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LORD LANSDOWNE, 1845-1927 A Dissertation by FRANK WINFIELD WINTERS IV Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December 2006 Major Subject: History GENTLEMEN’S DIPLOMACY: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LORD LANSDOWNE, 1845-1927 A Dissertation by FRANK WINFIELD WINTERS IV Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, R. J. Q. Adams Committee Members, James M. Rosenheim Arnold Krammer H. W. Brands David McWhirter Head of Department, Walter L. Buenger December 2006 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT Gentlemen’s Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of Lord Lansdowne, 1845-1927. (December 2006) Frank Winfield Winters IV, B.A., University at Buffalo, State University of New York; M.A., Texas A&M University Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R. J. Q. Adams As British Foreign Secretary from November 1900 to December 1905, Lord Lansdowne operated on a long-held coherent body of principles on which he based his foreign policy. Throughout his political life, in fact, he pressed for the renewal of an enlightened—if informal—‘Concert of Europe’ which he hoped could be implemented worldwide. His ‘policy of the entente,’ which reflected his belief in the efficacy of reasonable and ‘gentlemanly’ diplomacy to settle outstanding disputes, left him ill- suited, however, to manage Britain’s position as a world power during this period of perceived relative decline. If Lansdowne did indeed have some innate talent for diplomacy, he aspired not to be the next Talleyrand, of whom he was reputedly a descendant, but to become an appropriately detached liberal-minded arbiter. He was the true gentleman-diplomat who, as enlightened reason dictated, always wished to play cartes sur table. In these waning years of the supremacy of British power, the marquis believed in an empire forged no longer through fire and sword, but through the example of free institutions, just administration, and the influence of English culture. He certainly believed that foremost iv it was these aspects of Western civilization that brought Pax Britannica to the Khyber Pass. In pursuing his ‘policy of the entente,’ Lansdowne presumed initially at least that his fellow European gentlemen would aid him in the higher mission of preserving civilization, and consequently, although secondarily to the Foreign Secretary, the status quo. This, however, proved not to be the case. Lansdowne was perhaps the right man to administer the empire, in much the same manner he dutifully tried to look after and maintain his great estates and care for his many tenants and servants. He was, however, not the right man to charge with its preservation and defense. Fortunately, his policy proved impossible to carry out fully. He received little cooperation from the leadership of other great powers, and in the end the path of British foreign policy was impossible to guide or engineer in the direction he wished. v For my wife, Susan vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many persons who deserve some mention for making the completion of this work possible. Foremost, I must thank R. J. Q. Adams for his guidance, encouragement, friendship, and superior skills as an editor. It does not go too far to say that I was truly blessed to find myself under his tutelage through these formative years. It must also be said that I owe similar debts of gratitude to the other members of my doctoral committee, namely, Professors James M. Rosenheim, David McWhirter, Arnold Krammer, and H. W. Brands. All were instrumental in the successful completion of my studies. Dr. David Vaught deserves special thanks for the countless hours of assistance and words of wisdom he has given me over the years, while the aid of Professor Lyle McGeoch, the senior Lansdowne scholar in whose footsteps I now walk, was invaluable. My fellow graduate students have been no less important both professionally and personally on this long road and I would be remiss if I did not mention the support I received from Larry Smith and Joseph Duhon. Moreover, I would not have completed this work without the daily support of the staff of the Department of History at Texas A&M University, so I must sincerely thank Judy Mattson, Mary Johnson, Barbara Dawson, Kelly Cook, Jude Swank, and Robyn Konrad for all of their efforts on my behalf. Financial support from the family of Charles Keeble, in the form of a dissertation research fellowship, made much of my research possible, and while on those numerous research trips I received invaluable assistance from the archivists and staff at the Harry Ransom Center in Austin, Texas, the Bodleian Library in Oxford, and the British Library vii in London. I would especially like to thank the late Dr. R. A. H. Smith and Dr. William Frame of the British Library for making my examination of the Lansdowne papers both possible and effortless. Finally, I must thank my family. My mother, father, step-father, brother and sisters all helped to shape my character, and set me on this particular path in life. My mother, in particular, deserves greater thanks than can be expressed adequately. Lastly, but surely a privileged place with regard to acknowledgments, my wife Susan has endured all that I have done in this process, and deserves therefore as much credit for this work as might be thought due the author. viii NOMENCLATURE BD British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 BP Balfour Papers (British Library) GDD III German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, Vol. 3 LP Lansdowne Papers (British Library) PRO FO Foreign Office Private Papers, Lansdowne Papers (Public Record Office, microfilm) ix TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................. iii DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................... vi NOMENCLATURE.................................................................................................. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ix CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 1 II FOUNDATIONS AND PREDISPOSITIONS.................................. 14 Ancestry ............................................................................................ 14 Education........................................................................................... 16 Early Political Career ........................................................................ 22 III FROM PROCONSUL TO CABINET MINISTER: CANADA, INDIA AND THE WAR OFFICE................................. 56 Canada............................................................................................... 56 India................................................................................................... 74 The War Office.................................................................................. 117 IV IN DEFENSE OF EMPIRE: THE FOREIGN OFFICE ................... 130 V THE JAPANESE ALLIANCE.......................................................... 192 VI NATURAL ALLIES AND INVETERATE ENEMIES: AMERICA AND GERMANY.......................................................... 226 VII ENTENTE AND ESTRANGEMENT: THE TRIUMPH AND FAILURE OF THE ‘POLICY OF THE ENTENTE’ ....................... 285 The Anglo-French Entente…………………………………………. 285 Russia………………………………………………………………. 309 x CHAPTER Page Germany……………………………………………………………. 339 A Brief Assessment………………………………………………… 355 VIII OPPOSITION, WAR AND DISSENT, 1906-1927.......................... 365 Opposition ......................................................................................... 365 War .................................................................................................... 369 The Peace Letter................................................................................ 401 The Questions of Formulation and Approval.................................... 419 Last Years.......................................................................................... 429 IX A BRIEF CONCLUSION................................................................. 435 REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 439 VITA ......................................................................................................................... 454 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The symbolic and in many ways real end to Britain’s policy of “splendid isolation” came with Lord Salisbury’s surrender of the Foreign Office portfolio in November 1900. Believing the Prime Minister’s failing health and “masterly inactivity” in the face of Britain’s relative economic and military decline in the world necessitated a change in the direction of British foreign policy, the Cabinet forced Salisbury’s removal.1 Still First Minister, however, Salisbury remained a force in foreign policy decisions for two more years. Reacting to a draft proposal of an Anglo-German alliance put forward in May 1901 by his hand-picked successor at the Foreign Office, Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, the fifth Marquis of Lansdowne,