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Restd Restd 2 Post Visit Report Roundtable Talk 2 RESTD POST VISIT REPORT ROUNDTABLE TALK THE PAKISTAN DILEMMA: WHY THE WORLD SHOULD CARE (11 JUNE 2012) General 1. Dr. Claude Rakisitis, an Australian journalist visited NDU on 11 June 2012 to participate in the roundtable talk on “The Pakistan Dilemma: Why the world should care”, arranged by ISSRA. The roundtable comprised two presentations, one from Pakistani side and one by Australian journalist, followed by an interactive session. The Pakistan’s perspective was presented by Dr. Rifaat Hussain. The topic of his presentation was ‘Pakistan’s role in the global war against terror: regional and global implications’. Dr. Rakisitis gave brief presentation on his book entitled, ‘The Pakistan Dilemma: Why the World Should Care’. 2. In addition to ISSRA faculty, the event was also attended by renowned scholars and practitioners from various backgrounds including the Think Tanks, Distinguished Visiting Fellows (DVFs), and Faculty Advisors (FAs), representative from Inter-Service Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff Headquarters, Higher Education Commission and faculty members of the National Defence University. The Former DG ISI Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha also participated in the roundtable as the Distinguished Visiting Fellow. Call on the President NDU at his Office 3. President NDU welcomed the Guest in his office and after pleasantries following issues came under discussion:- a. While highlighting the state of Pak - US relations, President NDU stressed that though he relations are not comfortable but the good thing is that relations are intact and both are talking to each other to resolve the issues. Regarding anti-Americanism in Pakistan, he indicated that it is more due to frustration and not because of RESTD 3 RESTD ideological factors. President NDU asked Dr. Claude if Common Wealth platform can play a role in improvement of relations. His reply was in negative. He rather pointed out that the platform is just a talk show as UK at the moment is not a power to wrecken with. Even Queen plays a role only in UK but not in Australia. b. Dr. Claude also explained that questions are being raised about the logic for existence of NATO when USSR is no more existing. Even its role beyond 2014 is now questioned. It is assumed that US would soon lose interest in NATO due to its weak economy and more interest in Asia. c. While talking about US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta’s statement about giving a bigger role to India in Afghanistan, President NDU pointed out that such statements do not help in improvement of relations. d. President NDU also asked Dr. Claude if Australia is willing to play any role in Asia to which Dr. Claude replied that some possibility does exist for Kashmir issue but at the moment there is no such appetite in Canberra. Opening Remarks by DG ISSRA 4. The proceedings of the roundtable were opened with the recitation from the Holy Quran, followed by the welcome address by Major General Ziauddin Najam, DG ISSRA. In his welcome address, DG ISSRA highlighted the importance of the topic and introduced the two dignitaries. He indicated that generally whenever we read about Pakistan it starts with the phase that ‘Pakistan is going through critical time’, this is pessimist and narrow view of the situation actually, Pakistan is passing through a transitional phase, which is critical for Pakistan’s security. However, we need to view the situation in wider perspective. 5. He also said that change is evident in society; it is reasserting itself to revert to its ideological moorings. There is clear-cut push in society and a fight back to it. The society is in conflict between the forces who believed in the ideology of Pakistan and the obscurantist forces. The emerging period of RESTD 4 RESTD realization is clearly discernable by the fiercely independent judiciary, independent and powerful media, strong and vibrant civil society and most importantly the bright new generation. There is a strong desire at large, to root out corruption from society. The anger and frustration among the people is harbinger of change. Pakistan has shown defiance and strong resistance which has surprised the world. There is a need to carryout a deep but dispassionate catharsis of the emerging situation to evolve a way forward. Initiation by Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain 6. After the introductory remarks, Dr Rifaat initiated the discussion on Pakistan’s role in the global war against terrorism. The gist of his talk includes:- a. When 9/11 happened, Pakistan was as much caught by surprise as the rest of the world. The country was least prepared to deal with the aftermath of this catastrophic event. Pakistan became a pivotal state because of its geographical contiguity to landlocked Afghanistan and its very close links with the Taliban regime in Kabul. Pakistan’s support was seen as critical to the success of the GWOT. b. United States made following demands to Pakistan:- (1) Stop al Qaeda operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistic support for bin Laden. (2) Blanket over flight and landing rights. (3) Access to Pakistan’s naval bases, air bases and borders. (4) Immediate intelligence and immigration information. (5) Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends or allies. (6) Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. (7) Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan RESTD 5 RESTD and the Taliban continue to harbor him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist us in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network. c. The Pakistani perspective about the war against terrorism is as following:- (1) The sources of Afghan insurgency lie primarily within Afghanistan and not in the FATA area. (2) There is no military solution to the insurgency/war in Afghanistan. (3) United States must negotiate with the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan can play the role of a facilitator but is unable to break a deal. (4) The US strategic failure in Afghanistan will have disastrous consequences for Pakistan’s internal security. d. Pakistan took following important measures in the war against terror:- (1) Sharing of intelligence on terrorist activity with the United States and its allies. (2) Ban on Jihadi organizations such as LET, JEM, TNFJM, SSP, and TNSM. (3) Strengthening of the anti-terrorist law and the setting up of anti- terrorist courts with military’s participation. (4) Condemnation at the highest level of acts of international terrorism performed by groups with societal links and roots in Pakistan, ban on display and carrying of weapons, freezing of the financial assets of the banned Jihadi groups. (5) Freezing of bank accounts of more than 50 organizations suspected of links with sectarianism or international terrorism. (6) The decision was also made to incorporate the anti-terrorism recommendations of the inter-governmental Financial Action RESTD 6 RESTD Task Force on Money Laundering in Pakistani banking laws to arrest and trail those involved in terrorist activity; hunting down remnants of “al-Qaeda” network in Pakistan; banned “hate speech” during Friday prayers and set up special anti-terrorist task force. e. Since September 2001, Islamabad has captured 689 Al-Qaeda operatives and handed over 369 to United States. Those captured by Pakistani authorities have included many prominent Al-Qaeda figures such as Abu Zubayda, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Abu Faraj al- Libbi. In addition, Pakistan has paid heavy price in ‘War on Terror’. It has cost the country more than 37,000 civilian lives, nearly 6,300 security forces, and $78 billion in financial losses. The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center reports that there was an average of more than 26 terrorist attacks each week in Pakistan in 2011; only Afghanistan and Iraq suffered a higher number of incidents. The costs for Pakistan are not only financial but also entail developmental losses, negative international image, threats to internal cohesion of the state and society and expenditure in blood and treasure. f. In this context, Pakistan has an option to evolve a comprehensive counterinsurgency security strategy to deal with the rising menace of terrorism while turning inward and focus on the rising threat of armed militancy within the country. Pakistan can also reverse country’s drift into extremism by strengthening liberal and progressive forces. It should be ready to pay the necessary price for establishing the writ of the Pakistani state. Moreover, it is equally important to resolve the crisis of governance afflicting the country. g. While highlighting the salient of the Tora Bora Report entitled ‘Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and why it Matters Today”, he explained that the report was presented to the United States Senate’s committee on Foreign Relations chaired by John F. Kerry on November 30, 2009. The report pinpointed the failure of RESTD 7 RESTD American commanders who refused to commit the necessary U.S. soldiers and Marines in Tora Bora which allowed Mullah Mohammed Omar and other Taliban leaders to escape. Hence, it was American strategic failure which allowed Al Qaeda and other individuals to find refuge in Pakistan. h. The blow back effects on Pakistan were worst to witness. The armed revolt and insurgency broke out in FATA resulted in the rise of TTP. Security forces came under the suicide attacks, Jahadi culture flourished and informal violence was galvanized. The anti terror measures caused serious human and material costs on Pakistan.
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