History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan

Home , 1950 East Pakistan riots, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Ayub Khan (general), Dir (princely state), Elections in Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan

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This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] HISTORY OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN PAKISTAN

HINA ALTAF

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York

2019

ii History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan

Hina Altaf

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satis- faction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date Mark Ungar Thesis Advisor

Date Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis Executive Officer

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii ABSTRACT

History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan by Hina Altaf

Advisor: Mark Ungar

Military interventions in political affairs have hinder the process of democratization within countries like Pakistan. This single case study of Pakistan discusses why the military in- tervened into domestic affairs by discussing political, economic and social conditions within Pa- kistan after partition from India. This study shows that heavy reliance on the military post- parti- tion decreased civilian authority and increased military supremacy. Moreover, this study also shows the shift from direct to indirect military intervention within Pakistan and concludes that the military will continue to influence political affairs indirectly if the elected civilian government threatens its interest.

iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my gratitude and thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Prof. Mark Ungar, Chair of

Department of Political Science, Brooklyn College. His dedication, scholarly and timely advice

and guidance at every stage has helped me to complete this task.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapters Page

Introduction 1

Hypothesis

Methodology

Overview of Chapters

Chapter 1: Ayub Khan Era 7

Chapter 2: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 18

Chapter 3: The Martial Law of Zia Ul Haq 28

Chapter 4: The 1980s and 1990s: Shifts of Power 36

Between Civilian Government and Military

Chapter 5: Military Rule Ends, Democracy Emerges? 48

Chapter 6: Conclusion 59

Bibliography

vi Introduction

Why does the Pakistani military influence politics under democratically elected civilian governments? The aim of this thesis is to study civil-military relationships in the current era by answering the above question in the context of Pakistan. Although prominent scholars such as

Samuel Huntington, Michael Desch and others have engaged in research explaining how to prevent military influence into political and policy making processes; the scholarship has not ex- plained why the military still tends to do so. Despite the fact that direct military interventions into political affairs or coups are now very rare, the indirect influence of the military still exists, and it can overshadow and control the decisions of democratically elected political leaders.

Therefore, a deeper investigative quest of political affairs of Pakistan is necessary because Paki- stan, despite having a civilian democratically elected government, remains under extreme influence of military leadership. What events or situations led to such control? What actions have been taken by the civilian government to limit this interference? The answer to these questions will assist into addressing the main question of this study. As a result, the following section will present a brief history of Pakistan after India’s partition because it helps to understand the steps towards military supremacy rather than development of a democratic state.

Beginning of a New State: Pakistan 1947

After partition of India in 1947, Pakistan was divided into West and East Pakistan. Paki- stan emerged as a newly independent state aimed to develop democratic institutions within the country; however, failed to do so for many reasons. Firstly, the founding fathers of Pakistan aimed to put together a Constitution by establishing a Constituent Assembly. Apparently, the

Constituent Assembly was established, designated with the task of drafting a democratic consti-

1 tution but in practice there was a concentration of power by Jinnah. According to Philip Olden- burg (2010), Jinnah as the first Governor General, concentrated all executive, legislative and political positions, reducing the powers of prime minister and increasing the authority of bureaucracy and military. In addition, Jinnah also rejected the formation of political parties due to the fear that “they will destroy and capture what the Muslim League has achieved” a view which was later adopted by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister that served along Jinnah, who claimed that “those who formed parties are traitors, liars and hypocrites” (Allen McGrath,1996).

In addition to the concentration of power, the early deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan also impacted the process of transition towards democracy. After the death of Jinnah and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad came to power and dismissed the Constituent Assembly, which strengthened the alliance between the military and bureaucracy and strengthened military supremacy.

Along with the concentration of power and early deaths, the ethnic divide hindered the shift towards democratic norms. As mentioned above, Pakistan was divided into West and East

Pakistan. East Pakistan consisted of Bengali speaking population, while West Pakistan consisted of Urdu speaking elite. East Pakistan was constantly pushed to the side lines post-partition by early political leaders. For example, Jinnah announced the national language of Pakistan to be

Urdu, while majority of Pakistan’s population consisted of Bengali’s and non-Bengalis within the nation. The Bengali population lacked representation within the military and political institutions, concentration of power within the hands of elite officials in West Pakistan as well as increasing tensions between West Pakistan elite and Bengali majority in East Pakistan. Therefore, it is not surprising that post-independence West Pakistan’s elite did not strive to construct a con-

2 stitution for the country (Ahsan, 2005). Ahsan (2005) claims that constitution would have “en- tailed for fresh mandate through free and fair general elections,” and the elite did not want to lose its power to East Pakistan. Urdu and Punjab speaking elites feared the majority Bengali speakers in East Pakistan. As a result, East Pakistan gained independence from West Pakistan in

1971 and became the state of Bangladesh. This loss of East Pakistan enabled democratic elections which enabled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to come to power. From this brief history, it is evident that lack of democratic institutions due to early deaths, lack of commitment to construct a constitution and ethnic divide enabled the military to leave its field of national security into in the field of politics.

Why military intervention?

Samuel Finer (1962) arguing that political culture sets the parameters for military interventions, says that a society that lacks effective political culture will leave the military establish- ments or institutions as the only body to govern. Political culture can be defined as underlying rules that determines the success and failure of political system. Finer argues that there are four levels of military interventions that are connected to the six modes of intervention which are “1) the normal constitutional channel, 2) collusion and competition with civilian authority, 3) intimi- dation of civil authority, 4) threats of non-cooperation with civilian authority, 5) lack of defer- ence for civilian authority during violence, and 6) violence against civilian authority” (Finer,

1962).The order of political culture, level of interventions, mode of intervention are intercon- nected and based on the society which can lead to a civilian, indirect limited, indirect complete, dual, direct military or direct, quasi-civilianized regime type. By studying various countries based on the conditions of political culture, Finer concludes that military interventions are an issue of countries that lack political institutions and culture. In other words, countries that are new

3 states will have complications in consolidating a full-fledged democracy because it has not developed political institutions or culture.

Harold Trinkunas (2010) agrees with Finer that not having a supportive political culture will make newly emerging democracies vulnerable to military intervention. Trinkunas claims that when a country transitions toward democracy, the civilian authority must “craft” institutions that will shift power from the military towards civilian institutions by limiting the access of military to areas of state policy in which it plays a dominant role. In order to limit the access of military, it is essential to separate between the activities that civilian and military participates in, and also take into consideration the agency which “orders and oversees the activities.” Having unstable and weak political institutions that ensure civilian supremacy will lead the military to inter- vene into political affairs. Through these political institutions, civilian leaders are able to monitor, “divide and conquer” and sanction to ensure civilian supervision over the military and re- strict the military’s role in interfering in political matters.

In addition to the lack of political institutions, the military also intervenes into politics when elected officials cut military spending and try to shift power away from the military towards themselves. Majeed (2010) notes that there is an increase in military expenditures when the military takes over. The military is provided with new facilities, new hardware is ordered and there is an increase in salaries. Moreover, whenever the civilian leader attempts to reduce the power of the military, for example in the areas of national security and foreign policy, the military tends to create indirect domestic instability. Ghoshal's (2009) study shows that there is a changing pattern in the military interference in politics. Ghoshal refers to this pattern as the

“power without responsibility and accountability” and argues that the military does not directly come to power anymore; yet, the military controls the Establishment secretly and destabilizes

4 elected leaders. Ghoshal asserts that this pattern emerges when elected leaders push to take control over institutions once dominated by the military.

Hypothesis

Based on the brief history and literature review, it is evident that post partition the lack of political leadership and constitution, internal instability and external threat, and heavy reliance upon the military enabled the military to engage and become comfortable in politics. Lack of political culture and inability to craft institutions that secured civilian control allowed the military to become powerful. Moreover, even if the military allows elected leaders to come to office; it overshadows the decision-making process. This overshadowing does not allow political leaders to secure their power by diminishing the power of military. Therefore, I argue that if a democratically elected leader comes to power in Pakistan and tries to increase the control and power of civilian leadership by challenging the influence of military establishment, then the military will use its “power without responsibility and accountability” to decrease the power of civilian leadership by removing them out of office.

Methodology

This study uses the qualitative research method which consists of process tracing and a single case study. Process tracing method or opening the “black box” focuses on related events of an incident to identify the factors to which decision makers respond. When studying civil military relations in Pakistan, process tracing is a useful method as it focuses on history which helps in determining what comes first, conditioning what comes later. In simple words, in this study, process tracing will enable focusing on events and procedures that allowed the military to engage in the sphere of politics and how over time the military became a strong institution within Paki- stan. This study will only engage in a single in-depth case study. According to Bent Flyvberg

5 (2004) and Yanow el at. (2008), a “case study” is defined as a detailed examination of single phenomenon to develop knowledge of processes, make causal inferences, test hypothesis, build and test theories. These theories will assist in proving the hypothesis of the study.

Overview of Chapters

The primary concern of this thesis is to understand why the Pakistani military still has influence over elected political leaders. As a result, each chapter of this study will focus upon the martial law leaders and democratic leaders since 1958. Chapter 1 will focus upon the martial law of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, the events that led to their rise, the political and economic conditions in Pakistan under their rule and finally the collapse of their regime. Chapter 2 discusses the democratic government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the changes made to military establishment as well as political and economic reforms introduced and the reasons to Bhutto’s collapse and failure to maintain democratic institutions within Pakistan. Chapter 3 is regarding the regime of Zia ul Haq and the 11 years of his governance. Finally, Chapter 4 stresses upon the era of Perverz

Musharraf and the transition of power to democratically elected leaders.

6 Chapter 1

Ayub Khan Era

Ayub Khan becoming the Chief Marital Law Administrator was not surprising news, but a well known fact by civilians domestically. During the era of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, he was appointed as the commander of chief in hopes to reduce the tensions between India and

Pakistan regarding the issue of Kashmir. The tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, dates back to partition when it was decided that “contiguous Muslim majority areas would go to

Pakistan.”1 However, India conspired and secured the accession of Kashmir to India. Pakistan protested and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru assured Liaquat Ali Khan that the people of Kashmir will decide their own fate of joining India or Pakistan. According to Ziring (1971)

India and Pakistan were reluctant to reach an agreement on the issue of Kashmir and hence continued with the blame games, while Liaquat Ali Khan was in favor of establishing peace talks with India and willing to agree upon seize fire against India.

This push for peace talks with India resulted in a conspiracy by high ranking Pakistani officers to remove Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and resume war with Kashmir. During this period, Ayub Khan was trying to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan as well as keep the officers from attempting to topple the civilian government. In 1951 the military coup also known as the “Rawalpindi Conspiracy” was unsuccessful resulting to the imprisonment of high military commanders, journalists and poets. Yet, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated during the public meeting in Rawalpindi in 1951.2 The death of Liaquat Ali Khan was followed by a

1“The Foreign Policy of Liaquat Ali Khan.” Retrieved from: https://www.dawn.com/news/881096 (2010) 2 Dryland, Estelle. “Faiz Ahmed Faiz and the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case”. Journal of South Asian Literature 27(2), 1992, pp. 175-185

7 series of political appointments “which could be seen in retrospect to have spelled administrative disaster for Pakistan” (Dryland, 1992). From 1951 to 1958 an Urdu speaking Bengali, Khwaja

Nazimuddin, served in office who was later dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad in 1958 and replaced by East Begali Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra who assumed office from 1953-1955. In the year 1954 Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the First

Constituent Assembly, while the political party Muslim League “suffered almost total defeat in

East Bengal that year retaining a mere two seats” (Dryland, 1992). As a result, the Second Con- stituent Assembly was assembled which consisted mostly West Pakistani Muslim League members. In addition to dominance by West Pakistani political leadership in Constituent Assembly, in

1955, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra was replaced by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali a civil service servant in West Pakistan. Furthermore, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was also replaced by President Iskander Mirza, after making a proposal to Ayub Khan to impose martial law.

According to Dryland (1992) “during the period 1950-1958, Pakistan appointed seven prime ministers and one commander in chief, a record which may be attributable to the political immaturity of Pakistan’s political aspirants.” In addition to the continuous changes in governance, Hasan Rizvi (2013) notes that there was continuous infighting and unrest between the political leadership and government that were formed under the parliamentary system. For example, in March 1958 the Chief Minister Ataur Rehman Khan, of East Pakistan, failed to get his budget plan passed in the provincial assembly and had his ministry dismissed by Governor Gen- eral Fazalul Haq in 1958. Approaching the Prime Minister, Feroze Khan Noon, Rehman asked for the removal of Fazalul Haq. After the removal of Haq, the position of Acting Governor was replaced by a civil servant. The Acting Governor dismissed the ministry of Abu Hussain Sarkar,

8 the leader of Krishak Sramik Party. Within two days “one governor and two Chief Ministers had been dismissed.” In addition the Deputy Speaker of East Pakistan Assembly also passed away pushing for the governance by the army. It can be argued that the continuous shift of power and political restlessness as well as heavy reliance on the military to address internal and external situations led to military supremacy. For example, apart from dealing with the Rawalpindi Conspir- acy of 1951, Ayub Khan was also relied upon to rebuild the Pakistani Army and restore order during the riots and lawlessness in East Pakistan in the years 1953, 1954, 1956, and 1958 (Ziring,

1971). Ayub Khan also restored order during the “persistent clashes with the tribal and paramilitary forces on the North West Frontier” (Ziring, 1971). Apart from political affairs, lack of economic efficiency also led to martial law in 1958.

In 1958, Pakistan was in grip of economic crisis, “facing scarcity of consumer of goods, rising prices, shortage of food, financial indiscipline and large-scale deficit financing by the government ” (Rizvi 2013).Moreover, the government Treasury was empty and foreign exchange reserves were down. The First Five Year plan was not passed until the year 1958. The economic life of Pakistan was based on smuggling, black marketing and hoarding. According to political analysts, main reason why Ayub Khan initiated martial law was because of the security threats from neighboring country India. Ayub Khan claimed that internal unrest will make the country vulnerable and weak to deal with external threats, as a result the army needed to be in power.

Based on the historical events mentioned above, it can be stated that the military came to power because of 1) lack of effective political leadership, 2) the heavy reliance on the military to address internal as well as external threats and 3) the downfall of the economy. It can be argued that if the military can successfully establish law and order as well as maintain economic growth, then democratic institutions and norms are not necessary as the support for the military increases

9 within the population. Therefore, the next section will focus on political and economic affairs under Ayub Khan.

Politics and Economics Under Ayub Khan

Ayub Khan served office for 11 years from 1958 to 1969. Ayub Khan left the military position and became the President of Pakistan under the new constitution of 1962. Under Ayub

Khan the military had to established an alliance with the bureaucracy to govern the country. For example, the President’s cabinet which was reappointed consisted of three Lieutenant Generals, public servants, a businessman, an educationist, diplomat and two lawyers. Ayub Khan also appointed the Secretary General as the Deputy Chief Martial Law administrator. The Chief Martial

Law administrator was assisted by an advisory council which consisted of secretary-general, government of Pakistan, as well as the central secretaries of finance, industries, commerce, economic affairs and works, irrigation and power. Moreover, Pakistan was divided into three zones,

A, B, and C as well as sub-zone with each having assigned martial law administrator and sub- marital law administrator. Main institutions such as the Supreme Courts, High Courts and the lower courts were allowed to function, yet lacked the right to question and challenge the decisions made by the marital law or military courts. Moreover, Ayub’s Public Offices Disqualifica- tion Order and Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order “were used to disqualify politicians from elective officer position for several years” (Dobell, 1969). It can be argued that the emergence of a strong alliance between the military and bureaucracy led to the concentration of power into the hands of few individuals, while the influence of political parties and leaders diminished. Accord- ing to Hasan Rizvi (2013) Ayub Khan also appointed committees that reported upon different issues. For example, Ayub Khan created a political system known as the Basic Democracies. Ac- cording to Ayub, the parliamentary democracy system was considered unsuitable for Pakistan

10 and was against direct election by universal adult franchise because “the voters could not resist the temptation of bribery: only millionaires would dare contest elections” (Dobell, 1969). There- fore, in 1962 Ayub Khan introduced the Basic Democracies political system, an indirect elective system. This new system also insured place for the army and the military which did not exist under the old system becoming a step towards making the military a stronger and independent institution.

The Basic Democracies consisted of five tiers of institutions. Starting with the lowest, this tier was composed of “union councils, one for each groups of villages having an approxi- mate total population of 10,000” (Rizvi, 2013). The union councils were responsible for the development of local agricultural and community, and in charge for the maintenance of the rural law and order. Above the union council tier were the subdistrict council that maintained coordi- nation functions. The next tier consisted of district councils that were chaired by the deputy com- missioners. Above them were the divisional advisory councils and the highest tier consisted of a developmental advisory council for each province. In the 1960 the elected members of the union council voted Ayub Khan as the president and under the 1962 constitution the union created an electoral college by which they elected the president, National Assembly and the provincial assemblies. The Basic Democracies system failed and therefore collapsed in the year 1969. The

Basic Democracies did harm to the Ayub Khan regime rather than any benefit. Ayub Khan also eliminated the influence of politicians from politics through the motion of regulations such as

Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Or- der (EBDO) in 1959. These regulations were applied to all of those politicians that had been engaged in corruption and misconduct.

11 In addition to political reforms Ayub Khan also introduced and engaged in economic reform for prosperity and growth. According to Rizvi (2013) Pakistan’s economic development was “based on principle of maximum encouragement to private enterprise through state subsidies without regard to the income distribution or other consideration of social justice.” This increased the gap between the upper classes and the lower classes and led to unrest between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Rizvi (2013) claims that in 1968 Chief Economics of the Planning Commis- sion stated that “only twenty families control 66 percent of the entire industrial capital, 80 percent of the banking and 97 percent of insurance capital.” During his ten years of rule, Ayub Khan increased the gross fixed investment from 8.5% of GDP in 1958-1959 to 14% in 1968-1969.

However, the political gains and economic growth under Ayub Khan did not last long after his removal from office by military ruler Yahya Khan. It can be argued that lack of consolidation of these political and economic changes led to the downfall of Ayub Khan and left a vacuum of in- effective institutions within Pakistan. Since Pakistan witnessed a brief period of security and growth under the military rule of Ayub Khan, the military became an independent powerful institution and remained credible in the eyes of the public.

Collapse of Ayub Khan Military Regime

In 1968, minor challenges against the military regime of Ayub Khan became major, leading to the collapse of his government and push for liberal democratic institutions in Pakistan. In the previous years Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once an associate of Ayub Khan, created the Pakistan

People’s Party as a response to differences between Bhutto and Ayub on the issue of Kashmir.

Bhutto left politics and toured West Pakistan to gain support for his party by accusing the government of lacking efficiency in dealing with issues such as corruption, nepotism, civil administration and most importantly, freedom for Kashmir. Bhutto’s campaigning increased student

12 demonstrations within Pakistan. Student demonstrations against the Ayub Khan regime took place in Rawalpindi which killed a student and increased support for Bhutto and his political party. During a conference in 1968, two shots were fired at Ayub Khan. As a result Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto and other political leaders were arrested in charges of engaging in events that place the countries security and safety in jeopardy. With the growing pressure of political parties and leaders as well as the signing of Tashkent Declaration and other political crisis, the military also stopped supporting Ayub Khan. The military pressured Ayub Khan to resign from all duties and decided that the transfer of power was necessary. Therefore, in 1969 despite the demonstrations and rise of political parties demanding for democratic elections, the military decided to transfer power to Yahya Khan rather than to political leaders. Yahya Khan being aware of the criticism on Ayub Khan regime introduced new political and economic policies to secure military dominance.

President-General Yahya Khan Regime 1969-1971

Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan without any opposition in 1969. During the beginning of his regime, Yahya Khan followed the footsteps of Ayub Khan as he did not have much political experience. Yahya Khan issued a “Provisional Constitution Order” which claimed that until the enforcement of a new constitution (created in 1973), Pakistan will be governed under the 1962 constitution. The 1962

Constitution entrusted President-military leaders such as Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan with all political powers including executive, legislative, and financial powers under the Presidential system. The National Assembly consisting of 156 members became weaker as compared to the powers of the executive (Rizvi, 2013). Similar to Ayub Khan regime the fundamental rights of the courts, enlisted in the 1962 Constitution, were suspended and lacked the ability of passing

13 any order against the decisions of Chief Martial Law authority. It can be argued that these restrictions upon the executive, legislative and judiciary under the military regimes, strengthened and created an unbreakable military dominance and hegemony and dissolved the chances of democratic institutions to emerge.

Since Yahya Khan did not have political experience, he appointed advisors from Ayub

Khan administrations in new positions. Yahya Khan only relied on few agents and individuals which consisted the Principal Staff and Officer to the President and Chief Martial Law administrator, and three Deputy Chief Martial Law administrators for the “first few months of Martial

Law” as decision makers who controlled the central and provincial administrations (Rivzi,

2013). I argue that the alliance and power within the hands of few military leaders, enabled the military to come out of domestic crisis that emerged during Ayub Khan era and became capable of keeping all institutions under check. The military leaders also secured power by maintaining international support as political parties and politicians were resurfacing and beginning to gain public support.

Changes under Yahya Khan

Like Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan also faced internal challenges to his regime. For example, in 1969 demonstrations were held by Dacca Students against the martial law regulations. During

Ayub Khan era a ban was placed on strikes and demonstrations which Yahya Khan reinforced as a response to Dacca Students protest. Yahya Khan ordered the arrest of these students, but was unsuccessful as the students went underground. The use of force and failure to restore democratic institutions, despite promises made by Yahya Khan, led the country into a civil war. As a result, unlike Ayub Khan who paid less attention to labor problems, Yahya Khan decided to re-

14 store the right to collective bargaining, strike, simplified the method of recognition of trade unions, and “reduced the administrator’s powers of prosecuting a union in a court of law in cases of default and extended legal protection to the offices bears of a union” (Rizvi, 2013). Moreover, in

1970 Yahya Khan also implemented the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance was enforced so that wealth was not concentrated in the hands of few.

Apart from this, in Dacca a new financial institution known as the Equity Participation Fund was established to “supplement the capital resources of small and medium sized enterprises in the private sector in East Pakistan and the less developed areas of West Pakistan” (Rizvi, 2013). In the same year, the Fourth Five Year Plan was launched which focused on making distributions of resources and fruits of economic development. However, the plan came under attack in East Paki- stan as political leaders demanded shortfalls of the Third Five Year Plan to be mended in the new plan. Others wanted the new plan to be passed by the new elected government of 1970.

Yahya Khan implemented and restored new policies, but also engaged in immense cleansing of the administration by enforcing series of martial law regulations that checked for

“growing nepotism, favourtism and corruption in the civil administration” (Rizvi, 2013). In 1969 under the Marital Law Regulation number 58 about 303 Class I civil officers were suspended due to charges of misuse of office in the past eleven years. Yahya Khan merged the states of

Chitral, Swat and Dir with West Pakistan creating it into one unit. The one unit consisted of re- constituting West Pakistan into four provinces of Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan. Yahya

Khan made promises of holding “free and fair elections” and to fulfill that promise he appointed

Justice Abdus Sattar the of Judge Supreme Court of Pakistan as the Chief Election Commis- sioner to prepare “electoral rolls and delimit constituencies” (Rizvi, 2013). Khan issued the Le- gal Framework Order that “provided the guidelines for the general elections and outlined the

15 principles which the military leaders thought the National Assembly must keep in mind while framing the constitution”. Political leaders from West Pakistan started to tour East Pakistan for support during elections, however, East Pakistan criticized these political leaders. Individuals in

East Pakistan accused “West Pakistani political elite and the central government of having un- sympathetic and callous attitude towards East Pakistan” (Rizvi, 2013).

Elections in Pakistan were originally scheduled for October 1970, but were pushed back to December 1970 because of the cyclone in East Pakistan. During these elections two parties swept the poll, the Awami League of East Pakistan and the Pakistan’s People Party. Election results were important to Yahya Khan’s regime as they determined whether the elected government construct a constitution that would be suitable and accepted by Yahya Khan. Despite the elections the political alienation between East and West Pakistan continued to grow. As West Pa- kistan progressed economically and socially; East Pakistan lacked essential resources for development and growth. East Pakistan lacked industry and infrastructure and was continuously neglected by the Yahya Khan administration. As a result, these factors played a vital role in the civil war between West and East Pakistan in which support for a separate nation known as Bang- ladesh was demanded. During this war India also played a vital role in helping liberate East Paki- stan from West Pakistan, which led to the downfall of the Yahya Khan regime and led to the rise of Z.A. Bhutto.

When the transition of political power from political leaders to the Pakistani military hap- pened, it was evident that the military was working to build itself as an independent and dominate institution within Pakistan. To gain support the military passed policies and brought reforms that helped the economy to grow. However, it is important to note that these changes were short term rather long term. For example, the Basic Democracies system introduced by Ayub Khan,

16 was meant to create a link between the government and the people, however, the system failed due lack of communication between officials and corruption within the system. In addition to failure of this system, the war of 1965 with India over Jammu and Kashmir and the lack of ability to resolve student unrest led to the end of Ayub’s regime. As Ayub Khan’s credibility within the military decreased, Yahya Khan’s influence within the armed forces increased. In 1969 Ayub

Khan decided not stand for reelection and Yahya Khan became President and second martial law enforcer. Yahya Khan dissolved the 1962 Constitution and the “One Unit” system which united ethnically aligned provinces. Yahya was criticized by the “Establishment” as he held the first elections based on adult franchise and promised to give East Pakistan more representation. Yet, despite the elections East Pakistan was neither represented nor financially supported by West Pa- kistan leading to war with India. Losing the war with India in 1971 reduced the support for the military and Yahya Khan. The military was looked upon as “a lot of decadent and morally bank- rupt men.”3

3 Paracha, Nadeem. “Smokers’ Corner: Who was Yahya Khan?” Dawn. Retrieved from: https://www.dawn.com/news/1321359. (2017).

17 Chapter 2

The Era of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

The government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto holds significance in the history of Pakistan because it marks the first free and fair democratic election after two martial law regimes. Since Pa- kistan was still emerging as a state without democratic institutions, Bhutto’s ascent raised hopes for democratic governance. There was a wide range belief that if Zulfikar Ali Bhutto successfully restores democracy, then Pakistan will not have to face another martial law administration.

As a result, this chapter focuses on addressing whether Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was able to strength democratic institutions. How did he come to power? What was the political, economic and international/external conditions under his governance? Having an understanding of the political, economic and international/external affairs is important because this thesis argues that political culture of Pakistan has always been about internal political conflict and when this political conflict is coupled with unstable economy and external regional threats, then elected leaders fail to maintain order and power shifts towards the military.

Who was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto?

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto served as the Foreign Minister under the marital law administration of Ayub Khan, after the death of Mohammad Ali, elevating him “to one of the three highest offices in the President’s cabinet” (Ziring, 1971). He also occupied posts in ministries of Com- merce, Industries, Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Affairs, Natural Resources and Reha- bilitation, and Works. Under Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engaged in publicly castigating the

United States for continuous arms shipments made to India, boasting anti-Americanism feelings within the population and shaping of good domestic politics and allowing the Ayub regime to acquire credibility. Many also believed that Ayub Khan would also consider to name Bhutto as his

18 heir. However, difference between Ayub Khan and Bhutto emerged despite the years of service the latter did for the former. The disagreement over the Kashmir issue and the signing of Tash- kent Declaration severed relations between Ayub Khan and Bhutto.

The Kashmir Issue and the Tashkent Declaration

The key to maintaining India-Pakistan relations is the issue of Kashmir. As the Foreign

Minister, Bhutto was very vocal regarding freedom of Kashmir and claimed that “Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning” (Ziring, 1971). In 1947 India and Pakistan engaged in a clash to obtain the control over the territory of Kashmir (part of India) and there was a brief war in 1965. During the war of 1965 India launched the first attack, pushing the Pakistani military to be removed from continuing its offensive of Kashmir and diverting to Lahore and Si- alkot. This allowed India to gain full control of Kashmir. Pakistan did not have much military might due to lack of sophisticated weapons and the United States (Pakistan’s main ally) decided to remain neutral and ordered other countries to not get involved in this war. In 1966 a meeting was held in Tashkent which was mediated by Soviet premier Aleksey Kosygin inviting the In- dian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan to end the war. During this meeting Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was also present. The parties agreed to withdraw armed forces to resume diplomatic relations and to discuss economic affairs. As the discussions between the two parties took place, Bhutto continuously advised President Ayub Khan not to sign the Tashkent Declaration if it intended to push for the acceptance of “anything less than an agreement for the holding of plebiscite in Kashmir” (Ziring, 1971). With the withering of arms support from United States for both, India and Pakistan; India still was receiving arms from the

Soviet’s creating doubts in the mind of Bhutto. Despite all continuous counseling and disap-

19 proval regarding the Tashkent Declaration from Bhutto, Ayub Khan signed the agreement. Ac- cording to Ziring (1971),“when the President revealed he would sign the Tashkent Declaration drafted by the Soviet Union, Bhutto asked that he be permitted to publicly disassociate himself from it. He also insisted on resigning from the cabinet…When the President put his signature to the Tashkent Declaration the Foreign Minister is reported to have looked on dejectedly.” The signing of Tashkent Declaration marked the beginning of difference between Ayub Khan and

Bhutto.

The Rise of Z.A Bhutto

After resigning as the Foreign Minister for Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created a political party of his own known as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967. The members of the party did not consist of elitist or distant groups as compared to other parties but was diverse consisting of individuals belonging to different classes, cultures and academic backgrounds. Bhutto came to power after Yahya Khan faced defeat in the war with India and lost East Pakistan which later became known as Bangladesh. Bhutto had political advantages at this time which led the

PPP to gain a majority in the National Assembly, giving hope to the people that his slogan of

Roti (bread), Kapra (clothing) and Makan (shelter) and their basic problems will be resolved.

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pakistan also considered Yahya Khan’s taking over of powers illegal and unconstitutional. Lastly, the disorder caused by Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan lowered the support for and the influence of the military within Pakistan, especially after losing East Pa- kistan there were large amounts of demonstrations throughout the country.

Politics Under Bhutto

Under Bhutto, the Supreme Courts announced severe punishment to those military generals responsible for the “1971 military debacle” (Rivzi, 2013). Furthermore, changes were made

20 to the administrative set-up of the military high command which consisted of placing the Chief of Army Staff, Navy Staff and Air Staff under the command of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee with the President of Pakistan as the Commander of Chief. In addition, the Chiefs of Army,

Navy and Air were only allowed to serve for three years in a way to prevent the chiefs to develop their own force and will allow the promotions of junior officers. There were also numerous other changes introduced. For example, the 1973 Constitution focused on the pushing the military to its “traditional field” and laid down the roles of the military in the Constitution. Previous Consti- tutions did not have functions of the military defined, however the 1973 Constitution wanted the military to stay out of political affairs.

In 1972, the Federal Security Force (FSF) was created which was assigned the objective of providing assistance to the civil administration and the police for the maintenance of law and order. Once maintaining civilian supremacy, Bhutto mended with the military and stopped the impression of his government as anti-military. Under Bhutto’s government more resources were allocated towards the military as compared to previous governments. Furthermore, the military was called upon by the civil government for the maintenance of law and order seven times under the Bhutto administration.

The military during the Bhutto era respected civilian supremacy and kept out of politics.

According to Rizvi, the “General Tikka Khan, Chief of Army Staff stressed professionalism and loyalty to the constitution and the civilian authority established thereunder” (Rizvi, 2013). Civil- military relations came under conflict when a small group of Army and Air force officers re- sented the governments politics and decided to seize power, but were arrested before the plan was launched. During the Bhutto era the military extended invaluable services to the civil gov-

21 ernment by assisting in maintenance of law and order, nation-building activities as well as playing an active role in rescue operations. For example, Rizvi (2013) claims that the military con- structed about 350 miles of roads in Marri and Bugti, marking development in these “neglected areas of Baluchistan.” In 1974 the civilian government called upon the Army to assist in check- ing the smuggling of food grain to India and Afghanistan. Moreover, Bhutto’s administration failed to fulfill the promises that were made during elections. He made few infrastructural addi- tions such as construction of schools and universities, a new health policy, and labor policy, but faced heavy criticism from the Right and Left wing. The Right judged his polices to be on the basis of orthodox Marxist doctrine while the Left consider his policies as Islamic socialism.

In addition to these criticisms, other factors such as Bhutto’s use of martial law regulations limited the Fundamental Rights of many institutions. Moreover, PPP officials misused their positions as local administrators by appointing and dismissing people through use of force. Fur- thermore, there was also increase in rivalries between political parties and the PPP. One event that gave Bhutto administration a great blow was the dismissal of Mengal cabinet in Baluchistan in 1973 which did a great deal of damage to the plans of institution building.

The 2nd Islamic Summit Conference

The Islamic Summit of 1974 in Lahore can be considered as the landmark achievement of the Bhutto government as it placed Pakistan at the center of the world and ended its isolation from the world community. It was the peak of conflicts between the Arab countries and Israel, the Arabs imposing an oil embargo and the wound of losing large territory to India was fresh. As a result, Bhutto took advantage of the internal and international events to once again boast the image of Pakistan as well as respond to the increasing security threats imposed by India. There- fore, in 1974 Pakistan hosted the Lahore Summit to discuss the situations of Middle East in the

22 wake of the Arab Israel War of October 1973 and the oil embargo imposed by the Arabs. The

Summit was attended by head of states, ministers and dignitaries from Muslim countries. The

Summit was addressed by Prime Minister Bhutto and the delegates decided to support Jordan,

Syria, Egypt and Palestine to acquire their land back. Moreover, the Palestine issue was also stressed upon and an agreement was made to dissolve relations with countries that had alliance with Israel. Most importantly, for “enhancement of Islamic culture, solidarity and education the

Islamic Solidarity Fund was also established.”4 The Lahore Summit had raised Pakistan’s stature in the Muslim world. Moreover, it also made India realize that despite the division of East Paki- stan; Pakistan did not stand alone and was supported by the wealthiest Muslim countries. Fur- thermore, the summit had also made it possible to acknowledge the status of Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, strengthening the cause of Palestine in the United Na- tions. In addition, the summit also brought “solidarity among the Muslim world and made them aware of the worth of their resources especially of oil, that Jerusalem was important to the Mus- lims and was religiously sacred for the entire Muslim Ummah.”

It can be argued that the attempt at oneness of the Muslim countries had imposed a cer- tain threat to most Western developed countries, causing the goals made at the Lahore Summit to remain unfulfilled. For example, the oil embargo of 1973 that the Arabs had imposed, destabilized the entire global market. Even though the embargo was lifted in 1974, a year later Shah

Faisal was assassinated by his nephew Prince Faisal bin Musaid who had returned from the

United States. In the same year, Shaikh Mujib ur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh and who was also present at the Lahore Summit was assassinated along with his family by the Bangladesh

4 http://historypak.com/lahore-summit-1974/

23 military. Moreover, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was murdered in 1981, Palestinian Libera- tion Organization chairman Yasser Arafat was poisoned in 2004, and Muammar Gaddafi (the last of the leaders present at the Lahore Summit) was assassinated in 2011.

Economy Under Bhutto

During the 1960s, the economic conditions were relatively stable as compared to the

1970s. In the 1960s the economy grew at the average rate of 6.8 percent, while in 1970s the growth rate fell significantly low to 4.8 percent. In 1973 the increase of prices of oil by the

OPEC countries created difficulties for Pakistan because the balance of payments deteriorated and the states treasury did not hold much reserve. Bhutto’s economic policies consisted of nationalization of industries which was conducted in two phases. The first phase was when PPP came to power and decided to bring the financial and physical capital that was owned by corpo- rate elites under state control. In 1972 the government initially took over thirty-one industrial units which fell under ten categories of basic goods. According to Rizvi (2013), “this measure was not as extensive as it appeared to be because these units were confined to capital and inter- mediate goods producing sectors.” Apart from this, State Bank also passed a credit policy by which small landlords, rich peasants and the smaller industrial capitalist were the main benefi- ciaries. However, Bhutto’s first year in office stabilized the economy due to the devaluation of the rupee, but this policy of devaluation was looked down upon because it was argued that the private sector will suffer significantly as it will raise external debt obligations.

Another severe blow to the credibility of Bhutto’s government was when it backed out from nationalizing small industrial unities, resulting a drop in private investment. Furthermore, in 1976 Bhutto decided to nationalize flour mills, cotton ginning and rice husking mills which

24 threatened the livelihood of shopkeepers, traders as well as small industrialists and it also resulted in “PPP having to bear serious political costs.” Yet, Bhutto was successful in increasing the share of the public sector as compared to the private sector. The government was able to reduce the power of the private sector, however, some families were successful in taking advantage of nationalization as connections count for everything in Pakistan. The second phase was neither committed to corporatism nor socialism (core of the PPP party). According to Rizvi (2013), the

“managers of state enterprises used incorporation of enterprises, not in terms of fulfillment of so- cialist’s ideology, but as an instrument through which they could pursue power and prestige.”

The Downfall of Zulfikar Bhutto

It was during the elections of 1977 that Bhutto’s administration ended and a new period of marital law emerged. During the 1977 elections it was widely believed that Bhutto would win due to the divided opposition. However, the opposition parties created an electoral alliance known as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA pointed out the government’s inability to pass effective domestic and foreign policies as well as ensure civil and political liberties.

With the lifting of restrictions on public meetings the PNA gained more public support. How- ever, despite much efforts by PNA, the PPP won the elections, pushing PNA to engage in a mass movement against Bhutto under the charges of election rigging. The mass movement by PNA was for the insurance of holding fresh polls, removal of the Chief Election Commission and for the resignation of Prime Minister Bhutto. The 1977 mass movement was widespread as it en- gulfed urban centers and small towns. The business and trading community that was alienated by

PPP funded the mass movement, while the closure of shops and businesses also did damage to the government. Bhutto in response used the police, the FSF and the army to control the mass movement as well as arrested the top leaders of PNA. An attempt to reach negotiations between

25 the two parties a meeting was arranged by a Saudi delegate, but the political parties could not put their differences to rest.

On April 22, 1977 Bhutto imposed martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore and called upon the army to restore law and order as well as hold trails. Meetings were held between

PNA and the army to give briefings of internal and external affairs in which Bhutto himself used to take part. The PNA attempted to break the alliance between the government and the military.

The PNA demanded the removal of martial law and appealed to the Service Chiefs to not support

Bhutto’s government. The continuous use of the military to control the mass movement and against the opposition parties did not just place the military in a bad position, but also the government. Moreover, the deteriorating image of Bhutto also gave a chance to the military to take over political affairs once again. Therefore, due to the lack of negotiations between Bhutto and

PNA, the military assumed power on July 5, 1977 by removing Bhutto from power. The new martial law regime of Zia ul Haq also placed Bhutto on trial for the murder of Muhammad Ali

Kasuri and the high court ruled Bhutto guilty and sentenced him to death in an unprecedented 4-

3 decision. On April 4, 1979, Bhutto was executed.

The government of Bhutto had come to power in a crucial time, when Pakistan was re- covering from the war with India which led to the independence and creation of Bangladesh.

During this time the Pakistani population was willing to participate in elections that ensured an elected political official to come to power, as the military became incapable of resolving issues.

According to Trinkunas (2010) the beginning process of transitioning towards democracy is crucial as the country’s leader can successfully change and create institutions that can enable shifting of power from the military towards civilian authority. It can be stated that Bhutto was able

26 shift the power away from the military, but his heavy reliance on the military to deal with opposition parties failed to keep the military out of political arena. The consistent reliance on military presented Bhutto to be an unsuitable political leader. Furthermore, the Lahore Summit consisting of all Muslim countries during the Arab Embargo was also alarming to countries such as the

United States and Israel, as their interests were under threat. Scholars like Ayesha Jalal have pre- viously argued that the alliance between the Pakistani military and the United States has done more damage than good to Pakistan as it has dissolved political institutions and have left political leaders powerless. In the past, United States providing financial support to the Pakistani military has enabled the United States to have influence and presence in the region. It can be stated that the ousting of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from office was due to the alliance between the United States and the Pakistani military, and Pakistani military with opposition parties. Due to this alliance, murder cases against Bhutto were taken to the Supreme Court. In simple words, when Bhutto was in power, not only were the interests of Pakistani military under threat, but also of powerful foreign countries such as the United States.

27 Chapter 3

The Martial Law of Zia Ul Haq

The previous chapter focusing on governance under Bhutto demonstrates how the domestic politics as well as international politics and lack of economic growth played a vital role to remove Bhutto out of office and in prison for murder charges. It is important to note that Bhutto’s governance was a key turning point after two martial law regimes. Bhutto as Prime Minister was a symbol of hope for democracy which eventually did not turn into reality after his death and with Zia ul Haq declaring martial law. Even though Zia ul Haq promised for the shift of power to civilian leaders through fair and free elections, these words remained words and were not placed into practice. This chapter focuses on politics, economics and the collapse of Soviet Union that took place during the Zia ul Haq and how decisions of Zia ul Haq had an impact till present.

In 1977 Zia ul Haq declared martial law, suspended the Constitution of 1973 and became the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Like previous martial laws, the federal and provincial cabinets as well as the national and provincial assemblies were dissolved. The prime minister and leaders of opposition parties were arrested, while the President of Pakistan was allowed to continue as the head of state and the Chief Justice of provincial High courts were given the position of governors for their provinces. The Military Council was placed with the rights of serv- ing as the highest decision making body. Like under Ayub, Pakistan was once again divided into five martial law zones each governed by a martial law administrator. Upon taking office, Zia ul

Haq declared that within 90 days democratic rule will be reinforced in Pakistan. However, the elections were pushed back as the release of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought masses to his demonstrations, announcing that it will not be an easy win for military backed political parties such as the Pakistan National Alliance party (PNA).

28 On the other hand, Bhutto challenged the military and PNA, pushing the military to open cases against Bhutto which included a murder case that Bhutto was announced as co-conspirator of. Rizvi notes that the “martial law authorities issued several White Papers spread over 2,771 pages describing how Bhutto rigged the March 1977 elections, how he and his family under- mined the governmental institutions and procedures and obtained or extended to others illegal favors” (Rizvi, 2013). Bhutto’s murder case was stretched out till 1978 and Bhutto was given death sentence by the Supreme Court. The elections were pushed to 1979 and the military made changes to the electoral system, but these changes received great amount of criticism from political parties. Some political parties also refused to register. As a result, the military decided to hold nonparty elections in which PPP members were successful in gaining most seats. In response to these results, the military decided to postpone the elections for the second time, claiming that it was not a suitable time for elections. In the year 1985 General Zia ul Haq held general elections as promised and withdrew martial law. However, despite the elections that brought Prime Minis- ter Muhammad Khan Junejo to power, Zia ul Haq still had influence over the civilian government. In 1988 Zia ul Haq dismissed his hand-picked Prime Minister due to the tensions between

Zia and Junejo over the Ojhri blast and the Afghanistan issue in which Junejo “stepped out of line”(Talbot,1998).

Politics under Zia ul Haq

Zia ul Haq emphasized mostly upon Islamization and did not abrogate the 1973 Constitu- tion. Zia allowed President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry to remain in office and continue as the head of state. However, President Chaudhry resigned in 1978 and Haq became the CMLA. During the beginning of his regime, Zia ul Haq imposed restrictions upon political activities which caused political demonstrations against the military regime. For example, Rizvi(2013) argues that “the

29 most vocal critics have been lawyers, journalists and the political parties constituting the Move- ment for the Restoration of Democracy” was set up in 1981 by the PPP members consisting of various other political parties as well. Apart from this, Zia ul Haq also “put forward a proposal for a constitutional guarantee that would enable the military to share decision making power with the political elite at the national level.” Zia ul Haq also decided to create the National Security

Council (NSC) which consisted for 11 members provided with the powers of direct role in the constitutional and political setup. The members of the NSC were chosen by the President, in this case Zia ul Haq, and therefore was dominated mostly by the top military brass giving them the ability to veto any political decisions made by political leaders as well as serve as key decision makers by imposing state of emergency. The NSC was later abolished. The martial law administration also appointed military officers to the positions of civil service jobs. These military officers “were assigned to the civil administration and to semi-government and autonomous corpo- rations” (Rizvi, 2013).These military officers were also given access to elite groups of the Cen- tral Superior Services. Military officers were also given positions in the District Management

Group and the Foreign Service of Pakistan, causing anger among civilians taking competitive examination for these positions. It is evident that like Ayub and Yahya, Zia ul Haq wanted to keep political power within the hands of few military officials. During the Zia ul Haq era the military became one of the strongest institution within Pakistan as it gained financial support from the

United States during the Afghan-Soviet war.

Zia ul Haq and the Afghanistan War

Zia ul Haq is known for playing a vital role during the Afghanistan-Soviet war. Accord- ing to Talbot (1998) there were many factors that explain as to why Zia engaged in this war and scholars have presented this war through different aspects. For example, Talbot (1998) claims

30 that most scholars claim that Zia supported the Afghanistan cause to secure military and economic aid from the West, especially the United States. On the other hand, Zia engaged into the

Afghanistan war due to ideological spectrum to “support the mujahideen as a jihad which might eventually spread the Islamic revolution to the Central Asian republics” (Talbot, 1998). Talbot

(1998) argues that these explanations fail to take into consideration the relations between Af- ghanistan and Pakistan, and Pakistan and India. The relations between Afghanistan-Pakistan were troubled due to the Pushtunistan issue and to decrease the dominance of the India over Pa- kistan, it was necessary to gain arms support and build alliance with the West. It is important to note that Pakistan did not have any “fears of the Soviet invasion” and it did not warrant attention as compared to the existing threat from India. Furthermore, Indira Gandhi did not refuse the So- viet invasion after coming to office. This invasion helped India to secure “the growing Indo-So- viet trade links and Indian reliance on Soviet weapons,” but also pushed Pakistan to ally with

United States as India avoided to normalize relations with Pakistan. For example, Talbot (1998) claims that in the “autumn of 1981, Zia offered a “no war” pact with India and proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, but India disagreed and pointed out the hypocrisy of Pakistan for purchasing “F-16 fighters, weapons and aid package from the Reagan administration.” Since

Pakistan was an ally to the United States in war against Soviet’s, Zia ul Haq became unstoppa- ble. According to Jaffrelot (2000) Zia ul Haq received “$3.2 billion dollars from Washington over a period of six years” and he managed to “escape American pressures in favor of a return to democracy and the defense of human rights.” Zia ul Haq also engaged in launching nuclear programs and made a lot of profit from Afghanistan war. Jaffrelot (2000) asserts that “in 1981, military expenditure represented 6.9 percent of Gross National Product and 29.1 percent of the total budget.”

31 Islamization

Zia ul Haq, once in power, argued that the reason behind partition was to create a nation for Muslims who were underrepresented and a minority within India. Zia ul Haq claims that per- vious political civilian leaders failed to create an Islamic country and enforce Sharia Law. As a result, Islamization was one of the goal that Zia ul Haq and has administration aimed to achieve.

The process of Islamization began in 1979 was a feature of Zia’s regime that became the most recognizable. Zia applied the Hanafi interpretations to Islamic law which led to tensions between the Shia and Sunni sects within Pakistan. Differences between the Shia and Sunni emerged over the issues such as zakat (charity), marriage and divorce, inheritance, wills and punishments. The tensions between Shia and Sunni intensified not because of the differences within sects inter- nally, but also due to the Khomeini revolution in Iran. The Islamization program faced many difficulties especially due to the zakat policies which was an important step towards Pakistan becoming an Islamic welfare society, but instead the money was being directed towards fake zakat committees. Furthermore, in 1981 the Ramadan Ordinance was put in place which made “eating, drinking, and smoking in public a crime liable to an Rs. 500 fine or two months imprisonment”

(Talbot,1998). In addition, Talbot (1998) notes that ulama’s also wanted the marital law administrators to impose a dress code for women and pass a law making men having beards as compul- sory. The Islamization program also covered areas such as judicial reform, implementation of the

Islamic Penal Code, economic and educational activity.

Beginning with the judiciary in 1981 Zia ul Haq diminished the powers of the judiciary through the imposition of the Provisional Constitution Order which “required all judges to take a new oath of allegiance” (Talbot, 1998). Before this order, in 1979 the Presidential Order was passed by which Shariat benches for four provincial High Courts were established, empowered

32 with the role of striking down law that was unsuitable to Islam. However, due to lack of efficacy and performance these Shariat courts were replaced by Federal Shariat Courts, appointing ulama as judges, in 1981. The appointing of ulama in courts led to passing of bad laws which weakened and gave the judiciary a negative reputation regarding punishments for adultery as well as political parties. There were many courts combining the Qazi and the Federal, however, there was very little justice. According to Talbot (1998) cases were brought into courts, yet the courts took forever to resolve them “because of the number of frivolous petitions and lack of understanding of the new Islamic laws.” Most strikingly, Shia’s were not allowed to serve as a judge to the Fed- eral Shariat Court, “a state of affairs which led the community to refuse to accept any of its judg- ment” (Talbot, 1998).

One of the tasks of the Federal Shariat Court was to make decisions regarding appeals made by lower courts according to the Hudood Ordinance of 1979 which issued punishments according to the Quran and the Sunnah. Crimes that were subject to the Islamic Penal Code consisted murder, adultery, perjury and intoxication and the punishments for these crimes were severe, but “strict Islamic rules of evidence were required, which greatly reduced the likelihood of conviction” (Talbot, 1998). Yet, punishment for theft led to many uprisings of human rights activists and doctors as it involved the amputation of the hands of the criminals, violating the rights of individuals. Moreover, verdicts on adultery cases also caused many controversies as the punishment consisted of either stoning to death or 100 lashes in public, while the punishment for cases of rape were not severe as it only included imprisonment. The Woman’s Action Forum

(WAF) considered these court penalties as “brutal” and “degrading” as well as discriminatory, since most of the “female rape victims were doubly punished, but saw their violators go free”

(Talbot, 1998).

33 The Downfall of Zia ul Haq

In 1980s, militant Shia, feminist and opposition parties became to the streets to demon- strate against Zia’s Islamization policies and regulations. According to Jaffrelot (2000), “in 1981 eleven parties came together to launch the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

There were few parties such as the Muslim League and Jamaat-i Islami that did not participate in this alliance as well as groups like the Pashtun and Baluchi separatists. Yet, the MRD became popular in Sind because Pakistan People’s Party was behind the organization of this movement and Bhutto, the founder of PPP martyred by Zia, became the symbol. In order to control the dis- turbances produced by this movement, “three divisions of soldiers” were necessary and “in the course of three weeks of repression alone, the governor of Sind recorded 189 deaths and nearly

2000 prisoners” (Jaffrelot, 2000). To secure his position in office and acquire popular legitimacy,

Zia assured the country that elections will take place before March 1985 and also organized a

“referendum asking Pakistanis whether they approved of his policy of Islamization and his continued wish to transfer power to the representatives of the people” (Jaffrelot, 2000). However,

MRD boycotted the elections and also denounced the legislative elections announced about Zia.

Nonetheless, electors were enthusiastic about the ballot. The National and regional assemblies for election of 1985 consisted mostly of property owners, representatives of business community and men that were financially capable of participating in elections without the support of political party. During the first parliamentary session, Zia appointed himself as President of Pakistan and appointed a native of Sind Province, (a Sindi), Muhammad Khan Junejo, as the Prime Minis- ter in hopes of weakening and breaking the MRD alliance. On December 1985, martial law was lifted and political parties resurfaced. Muslim League became the party of the government, in order words, party of Junejo, while Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in 1986 and was arrested

34 for holding demonstrations for free elections. Apart from this, Zia dismissed Prime Minister

Junejo in 1988 as the 8th amendment of the Constitution gave him the right to dismiss any government. Zia removed Junejo and “pronounced dissolution of the assembly” (Jaffrelot, 2000).

Zia justified the dismissal of Prime Minister and dissolution of the assembly in terms of needing to control issues and troubles that emerged in Karachi that has fallen under the direct control to

Mohajirs. Jaffrelot (2000), claims that this pretext was used again and again in years to come and that “authoritarian repression had reached its limit.” In 1988, Zia and a US ambassador were killed in a plane crash, enabling the return to multiparty parliamentary democracy. After Zia’s death, Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg, announced to withdraw military from politics and allowed Ghulam Ishaq Khan to serve as an interim President until next elections.

35 Chapter 4

The 1980s and 1990s: Shifts in Power Between Civilian Government and Marital Law

After the death of Zia ul Haq in an aircraft crash in 1988, political parties once again came forward to participate in elections. During the 1988, the PPP, now led by a daughter of

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, became the first woman Prime Minister in Pakistan. Yet this victory of Benazir Bhutto was short - the late 1980s and 1990s in Pakistan is known as the era which experienced power shifts between elected leaders and military and vice versa. This instability between politicians and the military, diminished the chances of democratic norms and institutions to take roots and nourish. Therefore, the political culture of Pakistan remained unsuitable and alien to democratic practice. After the assassination of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul Haq’s takeover of the office, the chances for democracy decreased; however, the death of Zia raised hopes for economic growth, independent judiciary and free and fair politics, but these goals were not fulfilled. Being in politics for most part of Pakistani history, the military supremacy upon elected civilian leaders was beyond the capacity of elected leaders to reduce or break.

The military had become an institution that was politically, economically and socially strong, an operating state within a state. This chapter focuses on back and forth shift of power between

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during the 80’s and 90’s discussing ethnic, political and economic challenges encountered by both.

Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990)

Belonging to a charismatic family and due to the legacy of her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

Benazir Bhutto gained significant amount of support and sympathy from civilians. Being the

36 daughter of “a former Prime Minister who many had thought was hanged unjustly,”5in 1988,

Benazir Bhutto became the first woman Prime Minister of a modern Muslim State. She was ad- mired by many as the woman that refused to surrender to the autocratic rule of Zia, even after the cruel harassment and imprisonment during the early 1980s. Being elected the Prime Minister, the first challenge Benazir had to confront was the task of restoring democracy, which was “made extraordinarily daunting by the outgoing— and dead— dictator.” Under Zia, Pakistan trans- formed from a government of parliamentary to presidential, focused on process of Islamization and embroiled into the Afghanistan crisis, which was exacerbating day by day. According to Tal- bot (1998), the military had control over matters such “as Afghanistan, defense expenditure and service conditions, the Army exerted a veto on government policy.” Even though Benazir Bhutto became a Prime Minister, the PPP did poorly during the elections as it “failed to capture more than 92 out of 207 National Assembly seats” (Talbot, 1998). Despite having received more seats in Punjab than the opposition party of Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI), a coalition of Nawaz

Sharif and Junejo Muslim League along with eight other parties was created and the military ma- nipulated the provincial elections in Punjab insuring more seats for IJI than PPP. This manipula- tion allowed Nawaz Sharif to become the Chief Minister of Punjab.

According to Dawn, the lack of strong parliamentary base led to the undermining of

Benazir’s government. Benazir Bhutto failed to dissolve the 8th Amendment, placed into practice by Zia which “empowered the president to first nominate the Prime Minister before she/he could be elected by the National Assembly.”6 As a result, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan did not consider her the Prime Minister until Benazir gave full control and authority over to the military

5 “Special Report: Daughter of the East 1988-1990/1993-1996” Dawn The Media Group Re- trieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1366832 6Ibid

37 in key areas such as Finance, Defense and Foreign Affairs, and Afghanistan. Lacking a strong parliamentary, Benazir’s political party PPP created an alliance with the Mohajir Qaumi Move- ment (MQM) to maintain the stability of her government in Sindhi as well as the Awami Na- tional Party(ANP) to “bag the Chief Minister’s post” in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Yet, PPP soon broke its alliance with both MQM and ANP as Benazir failed to maintain alliance and MQM was “seduced by Nawaz Sharif and its common benefactors.”

The break of alliance between MQM and PPP led to violence in Hyderabad, marked by large-scale targeted shootings and bombings. In 1988, there was a massacre in which Sindhi Mo- hajirs were targeted in Hyderabad. About two hundred civilians were killed during the targeting of Mohajir immigrant community. Even though it was not declared who carried out the acts, officials claimed that “unidentified gunmen sprayed bullets at crowd.”7Mohajir community blamed the Sindhi nationalists to have targeted and carried out attacks against their community while similar statements were made by the Sindhi community. As a response, the authorities sent in troops to enforce curfew in Hyderabad and in some parts of Karachi. In 1988, the PPP and MQM signed the Karachi Declaration which aimed to construct peace, love and rights in hopes to reunite the rural and urban populations of Sindhi. Yet in 1989, target killings emerged in mohajir localities by masked gunmen in Karachi. While addressing a crowd in Karachi, MQM leader

Altaf Hussain claimed that these attacks were as an attempt to spark riots “by elements who feared that MQM might unite all oppressed classes in the country and challenge their system of

7 “Ethnic Rioting in Karachi Kills 46 and Injuries 50” Retrieved from https://www.ny- times.com/1988/10/02/world/ethnic-rioting-in-karachi-kills-46-and-injures-50.html

38 exploitation” (Talbot, 1998). The MQM joined the rival party of PPP, IJI “in condemning the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi during an adjournment motion in the National As- sembly” (Talbot, 1998). In response to these attacks, Benazir Bhutto described the events in Sin- dhi as “mini insurgency, and blamed the crisis on the legacy of the previous eleven years, declaring; “the tree of martial law does not let anything grow in its shade. It will take some time for this situation to change” (Talbot, 1998).

In 1990, relations between the PPP and MQM became hostile, as the leader of latter party, Altaf Hussain was out of country for treat of kidney problems, when the Pucca Qila Inci- dent took place in Hyderabad. During the incident, Sindhi police entered the Pucca Qila, a mohajir locality in Hyderabad, to retrieve illegal weapons. In this raid, the Sindhi police opened fire, killing about forty people and wounding fifty. The MQM accused the Sindhi police for carrying out acts of discrimination and that women holding Quran over their heads were pleading the police to stop the massacre. Yet, the Sindhi police claimed that their actions were taken in defense as MQM supporters opened fire. According to Talbot (1998), “whatever the truth of the matter, the event and the wave of violence which followed in Karachi, including the Qayyum bus massacre on 31 May, was cited by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as part of his justification for the dismissal of the Bhutto government.”

Benazir Bhutto’s Removal by ‘Night Jackals’?

Since the elections in 1988, Benazir has faced challenges from President and the Chief of the Army Staff. By creating an alliance, the President and the Army Staff crippled Benazir from running an efficient government. Benazir had her hands tied on issues regarding Afghanistan, lack of power over policy of nuclear programs and most importantly, continuous plans by intelli-

39 gent agencies to overthrow her government. For example, one such attempt was made on Octo- ber 6, 1989, a meeting between ‘night jackals’8in Rawalpindi. This meeting consisted of leading

ISI officers, Major Aamer and Brig. Imitate, opposition National Assembly and Sindhi PPP members. The surprising part about this meeting was not the discussions regarding the over throw of Benazir Bhutto’s government, but the fact that Benazir somehow was informed about this meeting and therefore “a trap was set to record the conspirators in the hope that Punjab Chief

Minister Nawaz Sharif might himself be implicated.” However, Nawaz Sharif did not attend this meeting and ill relations between the government and the ISI emerged. It is important to mention that this secret meeting was held as a reaction to the removal of ISI head by Benazir’s government, after the failed ISI backed the Afghan Mujahadin assault on Jalalabad, earlier that year.

Furthermore, Benazir Bhutto also formed a committee that would investigate the intelligence agencies (Talbot, 1998). Rather than strengthening and establishing civilian control, Benazir

Bhutto created enemies such as the President and the military through her actions. As a result, in addition to the instability in Sindh and the continuous blows from opposition party IJI, President

Ghulam Ishaq Khan by using the powers given to him by the Eighth Amendment removed

Benazir Bhutto out of office and dissolved the National Assembly as well as the Frontier and

Sindh Provincial Assemblies. The President asserted that Benazir Bhutto’s removal was because of corruption, her being part of political ‘horse-trading’ and her inability to maintain law and order. According to Talbot (1998), Benazir Bhutto’s “demise owed far more to the fact that it had stepped on the Army’s toes than to the charges the President raised against it.” Even though the

8 Talbot, Ian. “Does the Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy?” pp 324-325. Retrieved from Christopher Jaffrelot (2002) “Pakistan Nationalism without a Nation?”

40 provincial assemblies were dissolved, the national and provincial elections were scheduled to be held as per according to the constitution.

Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993)

After the dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a temporary caretaker Prime Min- ister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi came to office until elections took place. During this time, Benazir

Bhutto’s husband Asif Ali Zardari was arrested for the kidnapping of Murtaza Hussain Bukhari, while there were corruption cases still pending against Benazir Bhutto herself. The elections at this time did not reflect any intention for the institutionalization of democracy within Pakistan as politicians paid more attention as how to concentrate power, rather than find any solutions to issues such as ethnicity and center province relations. After the removal from office, Benazir

Bhutto made public statements insulting Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi by referring to him as “a clique of usurpers, thieves, thugs, robbers and looters” (Talbot, 1998). On November

7, 1990, Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister, however similar challenges laid ahead of him as his predecessors. Known to have close relations with the Zia regime, Nawaz Sharif was charged with corruption, lack of effort made towards Islamization and failure to deal with crisis in Sindh. However, Nawaz Sharif made a lot of economic reforms as compared to the governance of Benazir Bhutto. According to I.A Rehman, the priorities of Nawaz Sharif were some- what different from previous governments. Sharif was focused and prioritized “free enterprise, fulfillment of nuclear ambitions, and assertion of power in himself.”9Once in power, he announced the lifting of controls over foreign currency that entered the country to ensure foreign

9“Special Report: Going nuclear 1990-1993/1997-1999” Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1369428

41 investment. Moreover, other economic reforms made by Sharif included tax holidays for few individuals as well as privatization of nationalized and other units such as PIA and WAPDA which increased the popularity of the Prime Minister.

Nawaz Sharif also introduced “a number of populist measures to address poverty and social inequality” (Talbot, 1998). For example, he announced a fixed monthly minimum wage of

Rs. 1,500 for unskilled workers in 1992 and in 1991 he “announced that 3.75 lakh acres of land in the Sukkur and Ghulam Muhammad Barrage areas of Sindh would be distributed to landless haris, each having 15 acres” (Talbot, 1998). In the year 1993, Nawaz Sharif also announced the

“Yellow Taxi Scheme” which was an attempt to modernize taxi service within Pakistan and aid- ing jobless youth with self-employment. About 40,000 households benefited from the loans that were promised to the unemployed for self-employment and with those loans 95,000 taxis, buses, coaches and trucks were sanctioned.10Soon after coming to power, Nawaz Sharif also revived the

Islamization effort, first introduced by Zia ul Haq, by the introduction of Shariat Enforcement

Act.

Although he was doing exceptionally well with economic reforms, the Prime Minister had become enemies with the President and the Chief of Army Staff. Sharif disapproved the

President’s appointment over the selection of a new army chief after the death of General Asif

Nawaz Janjua and the retirement of General Baig (Jaffrelot, 2002). As a result, Nawaz Sharif tried to elude the President’s supervision by proposing a 12th Amendment in 1991. This Amend- ment attempted to authorize the Prime Minister to take control of the administration of a province. The IJI did not support Sharif as it feared President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and tensions

10Christopher, Jafflerot. A History of Pakistan and its Origins.

42 emerged between the President and Prime Minister as the latter failed to confirm whether he supported the reelection of the former. Like Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif also failed to address the mohajir issues in Karachi, giving the President and the military to develop control over civilian rule. In 1992, a government initiated military operation known as “Operation Clean Up” carried out in Karachi, after the split in the MQM party into MQM (Haqiqi) and MQM (Altaf). The aim of this operation was to crack down terrorist and criminals in Sindh. During this clean up, the military found “arms dumps and torture chambers for which they held the MQM responsible”

(Jaffrelot, 2002). The army discovered 17 torture cells which were run by MQM, “used to punish MQM dissidents and opponents… and that 60 people had been arrested since the internecine fighting erupted.”11 It is important to question from where did the MQM party get weapons from? Who financed the MQM party, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif or the military? An article in the Frontier Post dating back to July 8th 1992, by Ahmad Bashir claims that “Altaf Hussain and his MQM compatriots are not the only terrorists… but those who patronized and protected them are terrorists, Ghulam Ishaq Khan above all.” Bashir continues stating that Nawaz Sharif was also not unaware of the events taking place in Karachi but to secure his coalition government, he decided to look the other way. According to Bashir, Benazir Bhutto’s government tried to stop the MQM, however, she was forced to “withdraw registered cases against the MQM” and when she did not oblige her government was overthrown. Benazir Bhutto had tape recordings of the torture halls that were created by the MQM and these tapes were sent to President Ghulam Ishaq

Khan, the Chief of Army and journalists which led to the Pucca Qila Incident. Journalists have also claimed that Nawaz Sharif, when he was a chief minister of Punjab during Benazir’s regime, gave Hyderabad MQM about five crore (million) as a gift.

11 “17 MQM torture cells unearthed” Frontier Post, Tuesday June 23 1992

43 In 1993, Nawaz Sharif was dismissed from the position of Prime Minister and National

Assembly was dissolved by President Ishaq Khan. According to Jaffrelot (2002), Nawaz Sharif

“appealed to the Supreme Court against the President’s decision… the judges ruled in his favor declaring the removal as unconstitutional.” Apart from this Nawaz Sharif also made an appeal to the High Court of Lahore for the restoration of the government of Punjab which was also ruled in his favor. However, this restoration of power was short lived as the “army corps commanders met urgently on 1 July to resolve the crisis— a sign that it was they who had the upper hand in political life” (Jaffrelot, 2002). In 1993, both President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif were called upon to resign.

The Return of Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996)

The elections of 1993, the daughter of the East returned back to power as Prime Minister stronger and powerful. A setback for her during the elections was that she only won 86 seats out of 202 and therefore, once again she had to create alliance with the Muslim League that was led by Junejo and MQM. Her position as Prime Minster became secure and efficient and when her party, PPP was able to elect one of their seniors, Farooq Lehar as President in 1993. Having

Leghari as the President was fruitful for Benazir as he did as he was told. For example, Jaffrelot

(2002) claims that President Leghari dismissed the NFWP government and substituted it with

PPP. Having more power than before, one would believe that the transition towards democracy would be smooth, yet, political corruption and criminalization once again were at peak and the

Prime Minister failed to address these issues. For example, Benazir’s husband Asif Ali Zardari was the minister of investments but is well known as ‘Mr. Ten Percent’ for the commission he pocketed. Apart from this, Benazir’s brother, Murtaza Bhutto, who returned from exile in Syria was also assassinated as he wanted to join politics against Benazir and her husband; who he

44 strongly disliked, with the support of their mother. Supporters of Murtaza Bhutto blame Zardari for the murder of his brother in law.

Jaffrelot (2002), claims that as the Afghanistan war approached, the rates of corruption and criminalization went to its peak. He asserts that under the protection of politicians “contra- band in arms and opium often flourished” and in return the politicians asked for services from the gangs. These gangs became handy during election time at polling stations. Apart from this,

Benazir’s second term also witnessed the rise of small Islamic groups of Sunni and Shia’s as there was a decline of Islamic parties in the electoral and also as response to Zia’s Islamization.

Tahrik i Nifaz-i Shariah Muhammadi (TNSM), a Sunni group established in 1989, demanded for civil law to be replaced by Sharia. The movement by TNSM was subdued but led to forty deaths and secured the judicial powers of the mullahs in NWFP. Conflicts between the Sunni and

Shia’s took its peak in Jhang district as the Sunni’s were supported by Saudi Arabia and Shia’s by Iran as an attempt to create Islamic leadership on Pakistan soil. However, this movement was also suppressed as there was an attack on the Iranian Cultural Center in 1997.

Benazir’s second removal from Prime Minister office was not due to the interference by the military rather it was the alienation of President Legahari by Prime Minister. For example, in

1994, Benazir Bhutto wanted to appoint eleven High Court judges which consisted of three women, whose nomination was not based on merit. The Supreme Court considered these nomi- nations as illegal but Benazir ignored the Supreme Court order and carried on. In response to

Benazir’s actions, “lawyers in Karachi and Lahore boycotted these ‘political judges’ and Presi- dent Leghari sided with the Supreme Court decision (Jaffrelot, 2002). Apart from this incident,

Jaffrelot (2002) claims that three other incidents created ill relations between the President and

Prime Minister which consisted of 1) the purchase of luxurious villa in Surrey, 2) the murder of

45 her brother, Murtaza Bhutto and 3) the attempts to buy votes in Punjab from deputies to place the government of her choice in place. Henceforth, in 1996, President Leghari dismissed Prime

Minister Bhutto and dissolved the National Assembly and this time the “Supreme Court ratified her dismissal.”

The Second Term of Nawaz Sharif (1996-1999)

Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister for the second time in 1997 and gained back the support of the military. The military helped Sharif win the 1997 elections with a record of three- fourth majority. Once in office, Sharif invested all his energies of resolving issues with India, especially conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. For example, in 1998, Sharif announced that he will sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) only if India decided to sign the deal.

Early that year, India had tested five nuclear weapons, known as the Pohkran II operation and rather than testing its own nuclear weapons, Pakistan wanted to reach an agreement. However, In- dia decided not to sign the deal and Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon on May 28, 1998 and second one on May 30, 1998. Both India and Pakistan faced economic sanctions and condemna- tion from the international community. This led the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed

Lahore Declaration in 1999. The purpose of this declaration was to secure the national interests of both nations, which was the creation of an environment of peace and security. Furthermore, the prime ministers also agreed that “their governments shall intensify efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir”.12 Both governments also decided to refrain from interference and intervention in each other’s internal affairs. However, with the beginning

12 Naqvi, Jawed. Revisiting the Kargil Conflict. Dawn. Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/480266 (2009)

46 of war in Kargil, Kashmir; the agreement between both countries dissolved. In 1999, the relations between Sharif and the Army, Navy and Air Force deteriorated, as he was not informed of the plans to attack Kargil and the Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf made the decision to attack alone. On October 1999, the relations between Sharif and the military worsened as he tried to remove the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf.

Furthermore, Sharif also denied the landing of General Musharraf’s plane as he suspected a military coup, but the Army dismissed Sharif from power on the orders of Musharraf and securely landed his plane in Karachi. Sharif was placed under house arrest by the military and was tried in

Antiterrorism Court for crimes such as kidnapping, attempted murder, hijacking, terrorism and corruption. The Court passed the verdict of life sentence to Sharif, but with an agreement with

Saudi Arabia, the military exiled Sharif from the country for the next 10 years. The political power once again shifted to the military, which ruled Pakistan for ten years.

This chapter presents the history of political, economic and social affairs in Pakistan under the governments of elected civilian leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Both of these leaders served as prime ministers of Pakistan for two terms, however, both were ousted from office because they threatened the military interests. Once in power, Bhutto tried to reduce the power of military by attempting to make changes to the Constitution. Yet, the military supported her opposition party leader, Nawaz Sharif to become the prime minister and removed Bhutto from power. With the support of military, relations between Sharif and military became stable, but with economic and political reforms Sharif was aiming to bring, the military and the “Estab- lishment” considered its interests under threat. For example, peace talks with India over Kashmir would have reduced the importance of military within society and therefore, it can be stated that

47 to stay powerful and relevant the military attacked Kargil. If relations with India had become stabilized, then threat to national security would disappear, making the military weak and most importantly stop foreign financial aid. To stay relevant in political affairs and powerful, external threat was necessary.

48 Chapter 5

Military Rule Ends, Democracy Emerges?

In 1999, Nawaz Sharif’s second run as the Prime Minister came to an end through a bloodless coup. Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf came to power and became the President of Pakistan. His rule started in 1999 and ended in 2008. Almost ten years of military rule made it very difficult for Pakistan to develop the political and economic environment that enables democracy to take roots within a country. Apart from that, the international relations that Pakistan developed with the United States, during the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, increased the military’s power and role like never before within Pakistan. As discussed in the preceding chapter on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, factors such as struggle to diminish military power, lack of ability to create political and economic stability as well as international interference, allowed the military to legitimize their existence not only in politics but also in the decision-making process. This chapter discusses the years from 1999 to 2017; focusing on the military leadership of General Pervez Musharraf and the democratic rule of President

Asif Ali Zardari and lastly the third term of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. This chapter will also focus on discussing how the military has adopted a new way of using their power to influence politics behind the curtains.

Pervez Musharraf: The Rise and the Fall

Pervez Musharraf’s military rule from 1999-2008 can be described as a “brand of life- style-liberalism mixed with a different brand of dictatorial politics.” 13 It was also “unfashiona-

13“Special Report: The military strikes back 1999-2008.” Dawn. Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1372376

49 ble” and looked down upon by other states in the international arena, as the era of military interventions had come to an end, putting Musharraf’s position into trouble. The United States also placed automatic coup related sanctions on Pakistan under the “section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act.” Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare a martial law after dismissing the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Musharraf chose the title of

Chief Executive instead of being a martial law administrator. As a Chief Executive, Musharraf had a considerable amount of support from westernized elites, radical groups of civil society and

NGOs as well as from new Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali who was elected in an election controlled by military. All these factors enabled Musharraf to create a government consisting of a carefully selected political elite and a group of bureaucrats and technocrats. Since the judiciary has the history of endorsing and working with military rules, the higher judiciary gave Musharraf “three years after his coup to hold elections.” In 2002, Musharraf fulfilled the promise and held elections by which “pro-military alliance won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing.” As a response to the elections, 18 of Pakistan’s political parties formed an Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) but Musharraf was able to neu- tralize the effectiveness of this alliance through court’s verdict in his favor. In the same year,

Pervez Musharraf also made changes to the Constitution to strength his position by announcing himself the Chief of Army and the President of Pakistan simultaneously. In 2003, Musharraf created an agreement with Islamic opposition parties, bringing the constitutional changes in front of the Parliament and assuring that Musharraf will resign from his military rank or position in 2005.

In 2004, the government created the National Security Council (NSC) that legitimized the military’s role and enabled it to supervise the civilian cabinet. The aim of this Council was to institu- tionalize the governance role of the army. Apart from this change, Musharraf also bend the rules

50 and bring his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, to the position of Prime Minister. This particular action marginalized opposition parties and signaled that Musharraf is not complied to follow the rules as agreed upon.

The 9/11 Attacks and Musharraf’s Secure Dominance

Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought profits for the Zia ul Haq administration, the 9/11 attacks in 2001, saved the Musharraf administration from the downfall in the era of un- wanted coup. When Musharraf came to power, the United States placed a sanction that stopped its financial assistance to Pakistan; however, after 9/11 the United States considered Pakistan as a vital ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition and maintained that “Musharraf’s government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” 14 Moreover, the Congress removed restrictions and allowed large scale United States financial aid to Pakistan. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “the Bush Administration also refrained from expressing any strong public criticisms of Pakistan’s internal practices,” yet argued that it is necessary to strengthen civilian political institutions. Due to this alliance with the United States, Musharraf became a powerful leader whose military dictatorship was legitimized because of the “continuous waivers of coup related aid restrictions,” hindering the process of democratization in Paki- stan. Even if the democratic political institutions were strengthened, Pakistan’s political parties and civil society became destabilized and weak as military influence became profound. Accord- ing to Pakistani Political Analyst Najam Sethi, “Musharraf’s major policy shifts after 9/11 have come through compulsion by external pressure or events and that, while the direction of Paki- stan’s policy change has been appropriate, the momentum of change is too slow and awkward

14 The 9/11 Commission Report (2004)

51 and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass.”15 This support from the United States, made Musharraf powerful, but he was a marginal satisfier” that did only minimum of what was expected of him. Therefore, many political analysts and corresponds claimed that it is essential that the “country’s secular political parties”16 be allowed to emerge and function into the system so that the country can become stabilized and endure democracy. Similar to the Zia ul Haq era, foreign aid from Western country’s legitimized military rule and diminished the chances of democratic institutions to take root in Pakistan. Despite the fact, that the United States claims that it will help restore democratic institutions so that Pakistan can thrive economically and become a moderate Muslim State, by negotiating with the military. However, I argue that United States financial assistance enables it to monitor political developments by using the military as its imple- mentor and as a result “Pakistan’s fragile democratic institutions continuously remain under threat from the authoritarian influences of the country’s powerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures.”

Lack of Social Reforms Under Musharraf

Unlike the preceding military coups, Musharraf faced challenges from ethnic groups within Pakistan. In 2005, there was an increased unrest between the military and tribal groups of

Baluchistan due to the rape of women by the army in the regions. The Baluchistan Liberation

Army (BLA) attacked various infrastructures, projects and staffs and the local tribal leaders demanded for political autonomy as well as control over the regions natural resources. However,

15 Sethi, Najam. “Happy Birthday Pakistan,” Friday Times (Lahore), 2004. 16 Sehti. Najam. “What the Country Needs” Friday Times (Lahore), 2003.

52 Musharraf objected to the political autonomy of Baluchi people and engaged in a counter-insurgency paramilitary operation leading to an increase in human rights violations and humanitarian crisis.

In addition to tension with tribal groups, Musharraf also started to lose the support of

NGOs, trade unions and human rights activists. Women and minority groups lacked equality within the political system and women had difficulty of voting as well as not being granted to run for office due to oppression from social and religious conservatives. The tide of shift towards democracy in the international realm took its toll in Pakistan, as small institutions started to address numerous human rights violations such as “forced disappearances,” torture and discrimination against women and religious minorities. NGOs were allowed to publish critical material and trade unions were allowed to exist but not to engage in strikes or collective bargaining. As the international politics changed so did domestic politics within Pakistan that posed a threat to

Musharraf’s rule which led to his dismissal in 2008. Apart from human rights violations of

NGOs and activists, the military placed censorships on most material published by the media. If the media broadcasted anything that questioned the authority of armed forces, then the media outlets and journalists were harassed by the military officials, suppressed by blasphemy law or shutdown. In 2002, foreign press corps were attacked by angry mob and Indian journalists were not granted visas. In the same year, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and murdered by Islamic fundamentalists. Apart from Islamic fundamentalists, journalists suffered from physical attacks from hired thugs and police. In 2003, Shaheen Sehbai, an editor, was pressured to resign because he published an article against the intelligence agencies. In 2005, journalists lacked the ability to report the crisis taking place in the tribal areas near the Afghanistan borders as the vehicles of reporters were fired upon killing two and injuring two journalists. The

53 continuous tribal area troubles, human rights violations and the lack of freedom of press decreased the support for Musharraf’s regime. I argue that these events encouraged these groups to create an alliance that became essential during the Lawyers Movement that brought an end to

Musharraf’s military coup in 2008.

The Lawyers Movement, Ending Musharraf’s Coup

In 2005, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was sworn into office under the Musharraf Pro- visional Council Order. While in office, Chaudhry worked to expand the role of Pakistan’s judiciary and addressed cases regarding public interest and cases requesting to check government power and authority. In 2006, the Chief Justice subpoenaed representatives of Inter-Services In- telligence Agency for connections to the global war on terror. Musharraf took these reforms as a challenge to his authority and therefore, suspended the Chief Justice due to his growing support for his reforms and placed the Chief Justice under house arrest as Chaudhry refused to resign.

The continuing media coverage of Chief Justices dismissal and house arrest; in major cities lawyers engaged in protests while Supreme Court judges publicly supported the Chief Justice. When the media showed the Chief Justice being “dragged by his hair from a police man”17, public support came from the provinces of Punjab and Sindh as well as professionals, students, NGOs and other civil society groups turning it into a mass movement. In 2007, Musharraf announced a martial law, suspended the Constitution and parliament. The judges faced suspension as they refused to take the new oath and the media outlets were taken off air as they refused to stop the broadcasting stories of the protest. The public that engaged in protests, were beaten and arrested. As the domestic and international pressure increased, Musharraf resigned in the summer of 2008.

17“The History and Continuing Influence of Pakistan’s Lawyers’ Movement.” Retrieved from https://muftah.org/the-history-and-continuing-influence-of-pakistans-lawyers- movement-by-ehsan-zaffar/#.WSHnv1KZOYV

54 The Democratic Governance of Asif Ali Zardari

In 2008, the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf came to an end, paving the way for free and fair elections that brought President Asif Ali Zardari to office. However, in the struggle for the balance of power post Musharraf era; the actions of elected political officials have backfired, which prove that if not directly, then indirectly the military still runs the show.

For example, in his first six months in office, President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister

Yousaf Raza Gillani pushed to reduce the power of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency of

Pakistan which has been involved in politics for many years. Zardari pushed to “bring the ISI under the supervision of the Interior Ministry,” 18 yet they backtracked in doing so. It must have been seen by the military as an attempt to curtail their power. Instead the army General Ashfaq

Kayani, ex ISI head, claimed that he supports the civilian led democracy, but rejected Zardari’s decision of giving control of ISI to Interior Ministry. General Kayani argued that “the military should be allowed to run its own affairs without the interference of the civilian government” and replaced the ISI director general with his associate, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. This decision of making Pasha the director created tensions between President Zardari and the military. In the aftermaths of the 2008 Mumbai attacks which killed 173 people; Zardari was incapable of convincing Pasha to work with investigators in New Delhi. This lack of ability to shift power away from the military and ISI shows that establishing control over the military is difficult, as the interests of the military become threatened and therefore the military takes any measure to keep its interests secured. The Zardari government pushed continuously, to establish moni- toring and check over military Establishment. For example, the “Memogate” Scandal of 2011,

18 “ISI political wing disbanded: FM Quershi.” Dawn. Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/956938

55 challenged the governance of Zardari as the military accused him of delivering a memo through the Pakistani Ambassador Hussain Haqqani to United States Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff

Admiral Mullen. The memo delivered by Haqqani to Mullen presented the fears of a military coup post the killing of Osama bin Laden. According to the memo, Zardari claimed that “the Pa- kistan army being unable to bear the humiliation of the Bin Laden raid carried out by the Ameri- can forces, can lead to military coup” and therefore, the assistance of Obama Administration was needed to end Chief of Staff General Kayani’s and ISI Chief General Pasha’s “brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus.” 19The memo promised to punish political officials that were responsible for harboring Osama bin Laden as well as gave the Unit- ed States the permission to carry out operations to capture and kill al Qaeda and Taliban officials.

According to Jafftrelot (2015), the memo was supposed to remain a secret, but Mansoor

Ijaz an intermediary of Haqqani published the memo in the Financial Times in 2011. The military accused Haqqani, a close ally of Zardari, of drafting the memo and urging Ijaz to present it to Mullen. Haqqani and Zardari both deny involvement in the drafting of the memo and political analysts claim that it is a conspiracy against them by the military. Dawn, newspapers political commentator, Cyril Almedia, asserted that “the boys (the army establishment) are up to their tricks again.” 20 The memo case was taken to the Supreme Court which led to the Haqqani’s resignation and exile to the United States as he claimed his life is under threat and that he does not want to go back to Pakistan to encounter a mob. In addition, President Zardari’s power also

19 Rogin, Josh. Exclusive: Secret Pakistani-U.S. Memo Offering Overthrow of Military Leader- ship Revealed.” (2011). Retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/17/exclusive-secret- pakistani-u-s-memo-offering-overthrow-of-military-leadership-revealed/ 20 “Memogate’ Scandal Reveals Civil-Military Splits. Dawn. Retrieved from : https://www.dawn.com/news/674146

56 weakened as corruption charges emerged against him; allowing the military to continuously practice its control over economic and foreign policy and indirectly political affairs.

The Return of Nawaz Sharif

In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to power after free and fair elections that were conducted nationwide. Nawaz Sharif came to office with a plan to create good relations with neighboring rival country India, ensure economic growth and to stabilize democracy within

Pakistan. As a step towards good relations with India, Sharif went to the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi and in 2014 engaged in talks regarding the control over terrorism and

“resume the stalled peace process.” Dawn newspaper notes that there was growth in trade between the two countries since the peace talks and it was predicted that in 2015 it will touch the

$5billion dollar mark. However, in 2014 the decision by Nawaz Sharif “to put General Mushar- raf, a prior military dictator, on trial for suspending the constitution” 21led to tensions between the civil-military relations. Just few days after Sharif’s decision to trail Musharraf; opposition party leader Imran Khan took to the streets claiming that the elections that brought Sharif to office were rigged. These staged protests delayed the scheduled visits by China’s leader regarding

China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project and weakened the government urging Na- waz Sharif to depend on the army chief “to stave off the threat of a coup.” 22 The military was not willing to allow their former general to be humiliated by Sharif’s government; yet the support for Sharif’s decision gained a lot of support from parliament and opposition parties also stood by Sharif which had negative effect on civil-military relations.

21 Hussain, Zahid.The Unmaking of Nawaz Sharif. Dawn. (2017) Retrieved from: https://www.dawn.com/news/1349557 22Husain, Irfan. Fourth Time Lucky? Dawn. (2016) Retrieved from: https://www.dawn.com/news/1285702

57 Despite the successful peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2014, the year of 2015 once again witnessed the rivalry between these two countries. Political analysts argue that for years the military has been justifying its control over foreign and national policy by claiming that

India is still an enemy and these peace talks between Sharif-Modi were challenging the interests of the military. As a result, attacks were initiated by the Pakistan military on Indian army bases in Kashmir causing tensions between the two countries. In response to these attacks, India’s

Prime Minister Modi decided not to take part in the 19th SAARC summit hosted by Pakistan in

Islamabad. Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi also avoided engaging in talks with Prime Minis- ter Sharif regarding Kashmir Issue. In addition, these attacks on Indian army bases also led to a showdown between India and Pakistan at the United Nations General Assembly over Kashmir in

2016. Pakistan argued that it still wants to build peace with India, but “it is not possible by resolving the Kashmir issue.” 23On the other hand, India accused Pakistan of being a terrorist state and for “nurturing, peddling and exporting terrorism.” India’s Foreign Minister Sawraj claimed that all of allegations made by Sharif regarding human rights violations in Kashmir are baseless and Jammu and Kashmir will remain a part of India.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif changed the Chief of Army three times, but each time “he picked dark horse for the coveted post, hoping to tilt the balance of power towards his civilian government.” In 2017, Sharif was ousted from office after being charged of corruption that was accused against him by the Panama Papers scandal that claimed Sharif to have offshore businesses and capital under his children name. Sharif was not ousted by the military, but by the Su- preme Court, which claimed Sharif to be a dishonest leader. Yet, political analysts also assert

23 “India Pulls Out of Pakistan-hosted 19th Saarc Summit. Dawn. Retrieved from: https://www.dawn.com/news/1286460

58 that even though military did not have a direct interference; senior and middle rankers in the military intelligence agencies were feeding the media with anti-Sharif material. The Panama Papers scandal is important because it unfolded during the unresolved major problems between the civil-military. Most importantly, the joint investigation team (JIT) investigating the case against

Sharif consisted mostly of members of ISI and Military Intelligence(MI). It can be argued from these events that the military used to the scandal to destabilize the government in the sense of

Ghosal’s “power without no responsibility and accountability.”

59 Chapter 6

Conclusion

This research aimed to address why the Pakistani military intervenes into political affairs.

In order to do so, the method of process tracing was used which allowed to focus on the political, economic and social factors that enabled the military to engage into politics from 1947 till present. The research attempted to test the statements of S.E Finer and Harold Trinkunas that due to lack of political culture (political institutions) within the country can enable the military to engage into politics and become the most powerful institution. This research also addresses

Ghoshal’s statement of “power without responsibility and accountability” which claims that the military’s pattern of involvement into political affairs has changed. In simple words, rather than openly and directly conducting military interventions like in the past; the military indirect influences political decisions within Pakistan through institutions such as NAB, ISI and etc.

After partition from India, Pakistan, being a newly independent state, had weak leadership, lacked blueprints for democratic state and was constantly insecure about its national security from India and Afghanistan. These factors weakened the position of politicians within Paki- stan as the military became politically and economically dominate. As chapter 1 discusses the constant use of military for political developments and dispute settlement enabled the military to develop the understanding and skill of politics, a field that is non-professional to them. Once in power, chapter 1 and chapter 3 discuss Ayub Khan’s and Zia Ul Haq’s political and economic changes in Pakistan. These military leaders not only eliminated and rejected democratic system of governance, but also made changes to the Constitution to ensure the military supremacy by consuming the powers of legislative, executive and judiciary, for their present and the future.

Both Khan and Haq were able to bring economic development into Pakistan, however, it is

60 proven that these developments were for short period of time and this economic stability did not help in building effective political institutions. Instead the military, became a dominant institution and figure because of the financial support from the national budget as well as foreign. Pa- kistan did witness a brief period of rule by democratically elected leaders such as Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as discussed in chapter 2 and 4. However, these political leaders not only failed to diminish the influence of military into political affairs but also failed to work towards strengthening democratic roots within Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did successfully reduce the power of military and made an attempt to reunite political leaders from different Islamic countries to become a powerful entity within South East Asia. Yet, the opening of murder cases and protests by opposition parties enabled the continuous use of military to suppress these internal disputes. In addition, the disapproval of United States to the commitments made by Islamic countries leadership during the Lahore Summit also threatened not just the interests of United

States but also Israel. As a result, the United States also indirectly gave the approval to remove these political leaders that were present at the Summit through the use of military.

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif also failed to strengthen democratic norms and values in Pakistan and instead used all their energies to diminish the powers of military, resulting in the exile of both leaders. The year 1990-1998 Pakistan witnessed the back and forth political power change between Bhutto and Sharif, which one can argue was enough to build democratic political institutions. Yet, these leaders used their power of political office and the military to debase opposition political leaders. As a result, chapter 5 discusses the return of military in 1998. In

1998, General Perverz Musharraf came to power and announced military coup. Musharraf announced military coup at the time when it was considered “unfashionable” and did not have foreign financial support like previous military leaders. But the events of 9/11 made the Pakistani

61 military and presence of Musharraf in politics an asset. However, the open attack on supreme court judge and suspension of Constitution in 2007, reduced public support of Musharraf in Paki- stan. The Lawyers Movement of 2007, ensured the removal of Musharraf and power transitioned to democratically elected leader Asif Ali Zardari in 2008. It can be argued that despite emergence of stable and effectively operating political institutions within Pakistan; the questioning of military actions creates troubles for the elected leaders. If not directly, the military indirectly diminished the power and influence of elected leaders by supporting opposition leaders and their protests. The military helped opposition parties open the Memogate Scandal against Zardari, while removed Sharif on the bases of Panama Papers.

The indirect influence of military in politics is as dangerous as its direct involvement.

This indirect overshadow of politics disables the leadership from operating and performing political duties, hindering the process of political and economic development. Despite having a transition towards democracy, it is evident that the norms and values of this system have not fully been nourished and they will not if the military has indirect influence. Political journalists and analysts in Pakistan have argued that in order for democracy to survive, tensions between civilian government and the military have to be reduced either by working together on national security and political issues or working independently without interfering into each other’s realm.

Yet, military independence can be costly as it enables “military professionalism” resulting into direct military interventions. Political leaders and military can work together, but these agencies require accountability of each other which leads to tensions. Therefore, I argue that political leaderships resist from engaging into issues and matters that diminish or question the status of the military. A country like Pakistan that has had continuous military interventions and coups throughout its history, should resist challenging the authority of the military. Instead, political

62 leadership should invest all energies into strengthening political institutions that ensure democracy and enforce economic development. With such development and advancement, changes in society will occur, naturally shifting the power paradigms within the country. Taking Zardari and

Sharif leadership into consideration; the leaders challenged the military decisions and actions threatening military interests. Therefore, the military indirectly created tensions during their terms in office by supporting opposition parties. It was essential for these leaders to invest their attention to matters of strengthening institutions that could have helped in reducing military dominance, rather than challenging it. As a result, countries that have had military interventions or coups should understand that military is a powerful institution and only with the gradual political and economic development can democracy strengthen its root and end indirect military influence.

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