History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 5-2019 History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan Hina Altaf The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3194 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] HISTORY OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN PAKISTAN by HINA ALTAF A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York 2019 © 2019 HINA ALTAF All Rights Reserved ii History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan by Hina Altaf This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satis- faction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. Date Mark Ungar Thesis Advisor Date Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis Executive Officer THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan by Hina Altaf Advisor: Mark Ungar Military interventions in political affairs have hinder the process of democratization within countries like Pakistan. This single case study of Pakistan discusses why the military in- tervened into domestic affairs by discussing political, economic and social conditions within Pa- kistan after partition from India. This study shows that heavy reliance on the military post- parti- tion decreased civilian authority and increased military supremacy. Moreover, this study also shows the shift from direct to indirect military intervention within Pakistan and concludes that the military will continue to influence political affairs indirectly if the elected civilian govern- ment threatens its interest. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I want to express my gratitude and thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Prof. Mark Ungar, Chair of Department of Political Science, Brooklyn College. His dedication, scholarly and timely advice and guidance at every stage has helped me to complete this task. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapters Page Introduction 1 Hypothesis Methodology Overview of Chapters Chapter 1: Ayub Khan Era 7 Chapter 2: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 18 Chapter 3: The Martial Law of Zia Ul Haq 28 Chapter 4: The 1980s and 1990s: Shifts of Power 36 Between Civilian Government and Military Chapter 5: Military Rule Ends, Democracy Emerges? 48 Chapter 6: Conclusion 59 Bibliography vi Introduction Why does the Pakistani military influence politics under democratically elected civilian governments? The aim of this thesis is to study civil-military relationships in the current era by answering the above question in the context of Pakistan. Although prominent scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Michael Desch and others have engaged in research explaining how to pre- vent military influence into political and policy making processes; the scholarship has not ex- plained why the military still tends to do so. Despite the fact that direct military interventions into political affairs or coups are now very rare, the indirect influence of the military still exists, and it can overshadow and control the decisions of democratically elected political leaders. Therefore, a deeper investigative quest of political affairs of Pakistan is necessary because Paki- stan, despite having a civilian democratically elected government, remains under extreme influ- ence of military leadership. What events or situations led to such control? What actions have been taken by the civilian government to limit this interference? The answer to these questions will assist into addressing the main question of this study. As a result, the following section will present a brief history of Pakistan after India’s partition because it helps to understand the steps towards military supremacy rather than development of a democratic state. Beginning of a New State: Pakistan 1947 After partition of India in 1947, Pakistan was divided into West and East Pakistan. Paki- stan emerged as a newly independent state aimed to develop democratic institutions within the country; however, failed to do so for many reasons. Firstly, the founding fathers of Pakistan aimed to put together a Constitution by establishing a Constituent Assembly. Apparently, the Constituent Assembly was established, designated with the task of drafting a democratic consti- 1 tution but in practice there was a concentration of power by Jinnah. According to Philip Olden- burg (2010), Jinnah as the first Governor General, concentrated all executive, legislative and po- litical positions, reducing the powers of prime minister and increasing the authority of bureau- cracy and military. In addition, Jinnah also rejected the formation of political parties due to the fear that “they will destroy and capture what the Muslim League has achieved” a view which was later adopted by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister that served along Jinnah, who claimed that “those who formed parties are traitors, liars and hypocrites” (Allen McGrath,1996). In addition to the concentration of power, the early deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan also impacted the process of transition towards democracy. After the death of Jinnah and the assassi- nation of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad came to power and dismissed the Constituent Assembly, which strengthened the alliance between the military and bureaucracy and strengthened military supremacy. Along with the concentration of power and early deaths, the ethnic divide hindered the shift towards democratic norms. As mentioned above, Pakistan was divided into West and East Pakistan. East Pakistan consisted of Bengali speaking population, while West Pakistan consisted of Urdu speaking elite. East Pakistan was constantly pushed to the side lines post-partition by early political leaders. For example, Jinnah announced the national language of Pakistan to be Urdu, while majority of Pakistan’s population consisted of Bengali’s and non-Bengalis within the nation. The Bengali population lacked representation within the military and political institu- tions, concentration of power within the hands of elite officials in West Pakistan as well as in- creasing tensions between West Pakistan elite and Bengali majority in East Pakistan. Therefore, it is not surprising that post-independence West Pakistan’s elite did not strive to construct a con- 2 stitution for the country (Ahsan, 2005). Ahsan (2005) claims that constitution would have “en- tailed for fresh mandate through free and fair general elections,” and the elite did not want to lose its power to East Pakistan. Urdu and Punjab speaking elites feared the majority Bengali speakers in East Pakistan. As a result, East Pakistan gained independence from West Pakistan in 1971 and became the state of Bangladesh. This loss of East Pakistan enabled democratic elec- tions which enabled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to come to power. From this brief history, it is evident that lack of democratic institutions due to early deaths, lack of commitment to construct a consti- tution and ethnic divide enabled the military to leave its field of national security into in the field of politics. Why military intervention? Samuel Finer (1962) arguing that political culture sets the parameters for military inter- ventions, says that a society that lacks effective political culture will leave the military establish- ments or institutions as the only body to govern. Political culture can be defined as underlying rules that determines the success and failure of political system. Finer argues that there are four levels of military interventions that are connected to the six modes of intervention which are “1) the normal constitutional channel, 2) collusion and competition with civilian authority, 3) intimi- dation of civil authority, 4) threats of non-cooperation with civilian authority, 5) lack of defer- ence for civilian authority during violence, and 6) violence against civilian authority” (Finer, 1962).The order of political culture, level of interventions, mode of intervention are intercon- nected and based on the society which can lead to a civilian, indirect limited, indirect complete, dual, direct military or direct, quasi-civilianized regime type. By studying various countries based on the conditions of political culture, Finer concludes that military interventions are an is- sue of countries that lack political institutions and culture. In other words, countries that are new 3 states will have complications in consolidating a full-fledged democracy because it has not de- veloped political institutions or culture. Harold Trinkunas (2010) agrees with Finer that not having a supportive political culture will make newly emerging democracies vulnerable to military intervention. Trinkunas claims that when a country transitions toward democracy, the civilian authority must “craft” institutions that will shift power from the military towards civilian institutions by limiting the access of mili- tary to areas of state policy in which it plays a dominant role. In order to limit the access of mili- tary, it is essential to separate between the activities that civilian and military participates in, and also take into consideration the agency