Report Number – 19/08 Reporting Period: 30 April – 6 May 2008
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Somalia NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) Report Number – 19/08 Reporting Period: 30th April – 6th May 2008 Notes 1. The Security Preparedness and Support (SPAS) Program is a concept of the Somalia Non-Governmental Organisations Consortium whose only concern is the safe provision of humanitarian and development Aid to the people of Somaliland and Somalia, therefore SPAS is an NGO project dedicated to the safety and security of the Somali NGO Consortium members. 2. SPAS is non-governmental. The SPAS Security Report is for the use of the Somalia NGO Consortium. The aim is to provide neutral and transparent information to facilitate security decision-making by Consortium members. SPAS assumes no responsibility for report accuracy, reliability or verification unless stated. 3. This report is the latest update on available security related information in Somalia and Somaliland. Situations may have changed and / or will change. 4. SPAS recommend that the NGO community use all best and available sources of information. 5. Security decision-making and protocols are the responsibility of subscribing NGOs. Security precautions are recommended at all times in accordance with respective organisational procedures. 6. SPAS do not provide security alert levels. The identification and provision of security alert levels/phases/thresholds are the responsibility of each organisation. 7. This report is distributed for the information and benefit of the Somalia NGO Consortium. 1 Somalia NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) TABLE OF CONTENTS Threat Map: 3 Executive summary: 4 – 5 Banadir Region: 6 - 7 Middle Shabelle: 7 Lower Shabelle: 8 Hiran Region: 8 Bay Region: 8 Bakool Region: 8 Galgadud region: 8 Gedo Regions: 9 Lower Juba Region: 9 Middle Juba Region: 10 Mudug Region: 10 Nagal Region: 10 Bari Region: 11 Maroodi Jeeh formerly W.Galbeed Region: 11 Togdheer Region: 11 Adwal Region: 11 Sanaag Region: 11 Sool Region: 11 Common Acronyms: 12 SPAS Contact Information: 12 2 Somalia NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) The sole purpose of the threat map below is to visually represent heightened areas of concern for humanitarian actors. The map represents only the opinion of NGO-SPAS staff and therefore is by no means comprehensive. Service users should acknowledge that this representation is only as good as information received from actors on the ground. Therefore, agencies with specific information regarding the threat in a particular area are encouraged to contact SPAS for the benefit of all humanitarian actors working in Somalia and the Somali people. Low/Variable risk – International & national staff Medium/Variable risk – International & national Heightened/Variable risk – National staff & Intermittent International Staff with conditions Extreme/Variable risk - Essential National Staff only Imminent Threat Unknown status - Insufficient Data Available 3 Somalia NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) Executive Summary The security condition in Somaliland remains calm apart from the electoral related stand off between the government and opposition legislators; Puntland is volatile with constant piracy related criminal activities and open fighting in the South and Central Somalia continued throughout the reporting period. Carjackings, stand off attacks, piracy, banditry, IED attacks, ambushes against AMISOM/ET/TFG troops, demonstrations, food aid looting and assassinations were all reported. The number of IED attacks against ET/TFG/AMISOM has decreased from 8 in the previous reporting period to 7 in this reporting period. Reportedly a US military plane attacked a Dhusamareb town building in a pre-dawn air strike killing 15 people, including the al-Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayro whilst conducting a meeting. The insurgent group’s spokesperson promptly called for revenge attacks. The vengeance attacks will predictably affect the security situation in the entire southern and central Somalia in the foreseeable future. This might lead to direct attacks against humanitarian workers operating in the regions. The aid community is advised to exercise extreme caution whilst in the field during this transition period in the al- Shabaab’s top leadership. The number of incidents against the aid community remains comparatively low to actions against the AMISOM/ET/TFG troops; however, they are significant and highlight the difficulties faced by humanitarian organizations in Somalia. In summary, the following incidents were reported; Three militias were killed after a clash within the premises of an NGO in Awdhegle, Lower Shabelle Region, carjacking of an INGO hired vehicle in Mogadishu’s Dharkenley District, harassment of a female INGO staff in Wajid, 3 food aid trucks looted in Beled Hawo, Gedo region and an INGO convoy attacked in Jilib. The continued inflation rates, food shortage, increasing commodity price is assessed to increase criminal activities against the aid community. Fighting in Mogadishu and its environs after the killing of the al-Shabaab leader in Dhusamareb allegedly resulted to the killing of two TFG troops and three ET troops. There was a reported demonstration with thousands of people highlighting increasing food prices and high inflation rates. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets, hurling stones that smashed the windshields of several cars and buses and looted from businesses. Food prices increase coupled with high inflation rates will be a constant cause for food related security problems in the region in the coming months. Aid community should heighten their security within their warehouses and whilst transporting food aid in convoys. Impunity continued in some parts of Gedo/ Middle/Lower Juba regions, with clan clashes, ICU militants, bandit attacks and sea port control fighting. The aid community should plan their food aid convoys to prevent attacks from bandits in the region. Nevertheless, the meeting called by the newly appointed regional administration for 4 Somalia NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) Gedo region with TFG MPs, traditional leaders, Lingo’s and INGO’s operating in the region to map out for an action plan for working together might impact positively on security in the region in the near future. In Puntland the security situation remains volatile, with increased criminal activities and piracy. The pirates once more attacked a chemical tanker plying the Indian Ocean waters with the intention of hijacking it. The ransom has clearly continued to motivate pirates who are searching for ships to hijack along the Somalia coast. The authorities have reportedly asked the public to assist police through neighbourhood watch groups to curb the growing insecurity. In Somaliland the overall security situation remained calm during the reporting period with the exception of continued stand off between the government and opposition legislators over Presidential term extension. The resignation of the deputy chairman to the NEC highlights the continued disagreements between the two actors. This may have an adverse effect on the security situation noting the grievances raised by the opposition legislators. In conclusion there are doubts over the attendance of much awaited security and reconciliation meeting in Djibouti scheduled for 10th May, 2008 by AOGs. The recent attack of Dhusamareb is raising fears of al-Shabaab attendance as highlighted by their spokesperson; instead they might carry on with their insurgent activities. The recent wave to capture of towns in the southern central Somalia by insurgents and resignation by administrators in Beletweyne is assessed to affect the security situation of the entire region. 5 Somalia NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) Banadir Region: Mogadishu. PRP: RCIED Attack: 29 April 08, 7:00hrs, near former Jaalle Siyad Military Academy, Hodan District: A roadside RCIED constructed from a land mine detonated in close proximity to an ET troop truck (Urel). No casualties were reported. PRP: Attempted Assassination: 29 April 08, morning time, Bondhere District head quarter, Bondhere District: Unidentified armed militia opened fire against a vehicle transporting the Bondheere DC. The DC security guards exchanged small arms fire with unidentified armed men, no casualties were reported as a result of the incident. PRP: Hand Grenade Attack: 29 April 08, 20:30hrs, Suq-ba’ad Market Police sub-office, Yaqshid District: Unidentified young men hurled a hand grenade towards the above mentioned police sub-office. The grenade exploded in an open area without causing any casualties. PRP: AOG Attack: 29 April 08, 17:30hrs, Former Taleh hotel & Teribunka Areas, Hodan District: AOG launched an attack against TFG forces based at the above mentioned location. Both forces exchanged heavy small arms fire, RPG-7s and mortar shells. During the incident 5 civilians were injured (hospital source), no casualties were reported from the combatants. PRP: RCIED Attack: 29 April 08, evening time, Tabeelaha Ja’eylka area, Shibis District: A roadside RCIED constructed from a land mine detonated in close proximity to a vehicle carrying a TFG military officer passing at the above mentioned location. Two civilians by the roadside were wounded as a result of the incident. PRP: Search Operations: 29 April 08, evening time, 1st May & former polytechnic institute areas, Waberi District: A search operation was conducted by TFG police (from Waberi District Police station) at the above mentioned locations. 30 suspects were arrested during