Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col John B. Sams, Jr.

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Director and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published q u arterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi- cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If re- produced. the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line. JOURNAL Winter 1990. Vol. IV. No. 4 AfRP 50 2

Editorial Col Keith W. Geiger 2

A Troubling Past: Air Force Fighter Acquisition since 1945 Dr Richard P. Hallion 4

Space Control in the Post-Cold War Era Capt John W. Power, USAF 24

The Air Force in the Twenty-first Century: Challenge and Response Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF 34

Editorial \laj Michael A. Kirtland 52

A Real Hog War: The A-10 in Low-Intensity Conflict Capt Robert H. Brown. USAF 54

Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He Knew Lt Col Richard H. Estes. USAF 68

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 80 Notams Notices of Interest 90 Index 91 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL “We Never Dreamed ...”

ARSH reality begins to illuminate the We debate grand concepts of deterrence truth of the situation more re- theory, argue about structure, and develop Hlentlessly than a brilliant desert sun. Thecompetitive strategies. Important activities— Situation: Operation Desert Shield. The perhaps very important—but still only harsh Reality: potential combat, destruc- preparatory ones. We underwrite mar- tion, suffering, and death. The Truth: this vellous technological advances, we pro- is not abstract; it’s real, and it’s personal. mote good citizenship, and we are an in- If combat comes, there are only two ways strument in achieving social change and to go: suffer and win, or suffer and lose. In social equality. Positive accomplishments, either case you fight, and in either case those, but peripheral fallout. None of them you suffer. That’s war’s reality, the down- are the Real Reason for us. All of us are and-dirty meaning of “gone for a soldier.” here to fight. A reporter for a domestic regional news- It is all too possible to put in time at the paper interviews the hometown troops de- supply depot, laboratory, maintenance ployed to Saudi Arabia for the Great Ad- shop, staff desk, or even flight line, yet venture. One 27-year-old with 10 years’ lose sight of what it’s all about. It's been service tells him. “We were just riding the almost 20 years since the US military, as a clock before, but you’ve got to pay your whole, centered its daily attention on dues here. We joined and we know that, fighting and what it means—almost 20 but we never dreamed this would happen. years since most of those people in uni- We never dreamed we might have to go to form wondered if the next posting, or even war.” the next TDY, would take them to meet Where was this man for those 10 years? the Beast. That’s time enough for the focus Did he evade all the mission orientations, on fighting to diffuse, time enough for ignore the bull sessions, tune out the war memories to be locked away, time enough stories of the old heads? Perhaps, perhaps for new troops to come on board without not. He’s simply a young man coming to the focus at all. grips with a reality that for one reason or “We never dreamed__ ” Lives are dis- another never sufficiently surfaced in the rupted. routines are in turmoil, plans are lull of peacetime routine, a reality that on hold, and troops are learning—once those old combat vets did not make—or again—about deprivation and discomfort. were restrained from making—sufficiently But combat’s reality has yet to become clear to him. fully manifest. Perhaps it won’t this time, How easy it is to lose sight of a military but somewhere, sometime, it will blast it- force’s raison d’etre: it exists, ultimately, self into crystal clarity in an awful mo- to fight. We can cloak our purpose in slo- ment of realization. Ultimately, militaries gans such as Learn a Trade, Save for Col- and their people exist to fight. lege, Be All That You Can Be, or Aim “We never dreamed__ ” But shouldn t High—Go Air Force. Nice, but incidental. we have? KWG

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- spawned a hobby that grew slowly during the spondence should be addressed to the Editor, 1960s. It exploded in the 1970s as other com- Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, panies entered the field. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the As Colonel Lee noted, the early 1980s right to edit the material for overall length. marked the beginning of commercial computer war games. They have evolved rapidly, and those that appeared even a couple of years ago MORE COMMENT ON PROMOTIONS cannot match today's standards for graphics As an Air Force officer who is concerned about and sophistication. the development, character, and values of our Commercially produced war games are an future Air Force officers, I was both disap- easy way for anyone to begin thinking about the pointed and offended by the editor’s decision uses and misuses of the genre. If you have a to print such an outdated, bigoted, narrow- personal computer (PC), it’s also an exciting minded, and damaging essay under the title of way as well. The advent of compact disk read- “How to Get Promoted” (Spring 1990). Colonel only memory (CD ROM) for PCs is promising Geiger's decision to print this poorly written another major change for computer war games. and inane essay in the Airpower Journal is Maj Gregory G. Wilmoth inexcusable. Tucson. Arizona Anonymous L'SAF Academy, Colorado Lt Col David Lee's article on war gaming was quite interesting. However, regarding the exam- Editor’s Note: Contrary to our usual policy, we ple of war games and the Japanese attack on have printed our only anonymous letter for two Pearl Harbor. I wonder why the Japanese didn’t reasons. First, we want your comment s on Ai r- attempt to sink the US vessels in deep ocean power Journal’s content—but only if you feel waters where ships could not easily be re- confident enough to identify yourself. Second, floated and repaired? The Japanese decision to the letter points up many of the issues ivhich sink American ships in shallow harbor waters we hope have been the subject of discussion made salvage operations possible and allowed among you; the US Navy to quickly rebuild its ships. • Is the promotion essay outdated, or are Michael J. Miller there current, substitute social conventions to Wright-Patterson APB, Ohio be observed? • Is the essay bigoted, or is it unsettling? • Is the essay narrow-minded, or has it pur- GNAT GNOTES sued a specific theme within a broad spectrum? If we had only listened to our instincts and not • Have the essay and the subsequent com- our worries, the Vietnam War would have ments enabl ed us to learn something? ended much earlier and with a different out- come. "Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat” (Summer 1990) vividly points that out. My hat WAR GAMING is off to the author for presenting the facts so I was interested in Lt Col David B. Lee’s article well. Thanks! "War Gaming: Thinking for the Future” (Sum- MSgt Russell K. Choate, USAF mer 1990). Commercial board war games go Abilene, Texas back further than computer games. Their his- tory in the US dates to the late 1950s when the Avalon-Hill Company came out with a game called "Tactics.” That company's products continued on page 79

3 A TROUBLING PAST Air Force Fighter Acquisition since 1945*

Dr Richar d P. H allion

INCE 1945 the United States Air Aircraft acquisition is inextricably Force has acquired nearly 27,000 caught up in the interplay and tension be- fighter aircraft, while the Soviet tween doctrine and operational thought Union has procured over 50,000. (the requirements pull) on one hand and AsS a general rule. American fighters have technology (the technology push) on the proven superior to their Soviet counter- other. Both are inherently dynamic pro- parts in a variety of wars and incidents, cesses responsive to external influences but American defense planners and fighter and pressures. If they do not proceed in designers should examine fighter acquisi- roughly consistent and synchronous part- tion in the broader context of Air Force planning and missions from 1945 to the present. There are aspects of American ‘This paper is based on a lecture presented by the author at the Triangle Universities' Security Seminar on Changing fighter development that raise some dis- Technologies and New Weapons Systems. Quail Roost Con- turbing questions regarding the planning ference Center. Durham. N.C.. 2-3 February 1990. I wish to thank professors I B. Holley. Ir.. and Alex Roland for solicit- and forecasting process by which aircraft ing my participation. Also. 1 wish to acknowledge with ap- were conceptualized, acquired, and placed preciation the assistance and comments of Chris Bowie of in service. In fact, one can argue that it the Secretary of the Air Force's Action Group: Lt Col Price Bingham, Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Re- was not until the harsh demands and ex- search, and Education (AL1CADRE); Lt Col Donald Baucom. perience of the Vietnam War that Air Strategic Defense Initiative Organization: Maj Brian Hoey. Force decision makers developed a realis- AFSC Commander's Action Group: Michael Gorn. AFSC His- tory Office: Jack Neufeld. Air Staff History Office: and tic appreciation for the kind of future William Heimdahl and Sheldon Goldberg of the Office of Air fighters that the service required. Force History. nership, the dominance or decline of one Following is a list of the generations, typi- is necessarily injurious to the other. Two cal aircraft in each generation, and some great and related technological transforma- of the defining characteristics of these tions occurred within aeronautics at mid- aircraft. century: the turbojet revolution and the 1. High subsonic (1943-50): Me 262. transonic and supersonic breakthroughs. Meteor, P-80, Vampire, Yak-15, MiG-9, Between 1939 and 1945 the speed of Saab J-21, F-84 straightwing, F9F straight- fighter aircraft rose from 350 to 550 miles wing. Ouragan, Venom. Little aero- per hour (mph). Slightly over a decade dynamic difference from the last genera- later, the speed of fighter aircraft had tion of propeller-driven fighters. First- and almost tripled, from 550 mph to nearly second-generation turbojets; wood, fabric, 1,500 mph. Indeed, by the end of 1958 the and all-metal construction: optical gun- basic speed and operating altitude of to- sights; straight wing and straight tail. Me- day’s modern fighter had been mapped chanical control systems. Primitive ejec- out. Approximately a quarter century after tion seats. Mach 0.75-0.85. the turbojet revolution and high-speed 2. Transonic (1947-55): F-86, F-84 breakthrough occurred, twro other roughly sweptwing, F9F sweptwing, MiG-15/17, synchronous transformations arose to pro- foundly affect future aircraft development: Hunter, Mystere IV. Second-generation turbojets; radar gunsights; swept wings; a materials revolution that resulted in the introduction of synthetic composite struc- generally have adjustable horizontal sta- tural materials, and an avionics and com- bilizers. Early hydromechanical flight con- puter technology revolution that affected trol systems. Mach 0.90-1.05. aircraft all the way from their conceptual- 3. Early supersonic (1953-60): MiG-19, ization through design and on to perfor- F-100, F-8. Swept wings, all-moving tails, mance and operations.1 radar gunsights, introduction of air-to-air Arguably, there have been six genera- missile armament. Third-generation turbo- tions of fighter aircraft since 1939, the jet engines. Early stability augmentation “birth date’’ of the first jet airplane. Like- technology. Generally adaptable for both wise, there have been six generations of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. turbine fighter engines in this time span.* Mach 1.3. 4. Supersonic (limited purpose) (1955- 'These have been (1) early centrifugal-flow and axial-flow 70): F-104, early model MiG-21, EE (BAC) demonstrator and production engines, such as the Derwent Lightning, early model Mirage III. Super- and |umo 004: (2) mature subsonic centrifugal and axial-flow production engines, such as the Nene and 147, sometimes sonic aerodynamics, especially area rul- with afterburning: (3) transonic axial-flow engines, such as ing; fourth-generation turbojets; radar for the |57 and Avon; (4) supersonic axial-flow engines, such as search and fire control. Overreliance on the j79 and J58: (5) afterburning turbofans, such as the TF30; and (6) high thrust-to-weight ratio afterburning turbofans, air-to-air missiles based on unrealistic ex- such as the F100. pectations. Mach 2.0. 6 AJRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

5. Supersonic (muitiroiej (1958-80): and testing have replaced unanticipated F-105, F-4, late-model MiG-21, late-model aerodynamic and propulsion difficulties Mirage III, F-5, F - l l l , Mirage V, Su-24, as the leading causes of delay, cost excur- MiG-23/27, jaguar, Mirage Fl, Kfir. Re- sions, and frustration in flight-test fined supersonic aerodynamic design, in- programs.2 cluding canards and variable geometry wings: fourth- and fifth-generation en- gines; stability augmentation: mixed-gun air-to-air missile (AAM) armament; terrain-following radar for low-level high- The Postwar Years speed flight; radar search and fire control; From 1945 to mid-1950 both the Air infrared sensors; heads up displays (HUD); Force and the Navy were forces in laser ranging and targeting; wide range of transition—from wartime expansion to air-to-surface missiles, bombs, and peacetime contraction, from the era of the rockets, including precision-guided muni- propeller-driven airplane to the era of the tions. Mach 1.4-2.5. jet, from the era of conventional war to a 6. Supersonic multirole, high efficiency perceived era of atomic warfare. There (1974-present): F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, was precious little evidence in fighter ac- Mirage 2000, Tornado, MiG-29, Su-27. quisition programs of any interest in the Combined the characteristics of the fifth- kind of swing-role air-to-air and air-to- generation fighters with advances in pro- ground tactical fighter-bomber missions pulsion, radar (multiple target track-while- that had proven so valuable—and so scan, look-down/shoot-down), sensor, and necessary—in the Second World War, a electronic flight control technology to gen- mere half decade or so in the past. Indeed, erate highly maneuverable, highly agile the period 1945-50 witnessed the dises- aircraft that can be swing-roled for air-to- tablishment of American tactical air power air and air-to-ground missions. Fifth- or in both the Navy and the Air Force, which sixth-generation gas-turbine engines: en- displeased some of the veteran tactical air gine thrust-to-weight ratios in excess of commanders of the Second World War. Lt one; ability to attain supersonic speeds Gen Elwood R. Quesada, the Air Force’s without afterburning; sustained high-G consummate master of tactical air support, flight, and controllability below 70 knots left the service in part because of what he at angles of attack exceeding 70 degrees. considered the tacit breaking of a 1945 High degree of energy efficiency. Mix of Army Air Forces (AAF) promise to Gen cannon and missile armament, coupled Dwight D. Eisenhower that the Army with diverse air-to-ground weaponry. would always be able to call upon strong Mach 1.8-2.5. tactical air support assets even if the AAF One measure that can be used in eval- were made a separate air force.3 uating the change in fighter aircraft tech- The de facto basing of the post-World nology over time is component cost as a War II Air Force on science and technol- percentage of aircraft cost. Since 1945 air- ogy. rather than on a realistic appreciation frame costs have decreased from roughly of what the nature of future war, dates 66 to 47 percent. Avionics costs have in- back to the moment that Theodore von creased from 6 percent to over 20 percent. Karman’s handpicked scientific advisory Engine costs have held steady, at approx- panel issued—at Gen Henry H. (“Hap”) imately 25 percent. As might be expected, Arnold’s specific request—the Toward the “long pole in the tent” of modern air- New Horizons report of 1945. From the ex- craft acquisition is avionics. Modern ecutive summary onward, this report em- fighters have daunting avionics needs; the phasized speed. It stated that enemy de- F-15A has 60,000 lines of software code; fenses would be so well protected by the avionics-intensive F-15E has 2.4 mil- surface-to-air missiles that “only aircraft lion. Difficulties in avionics development or missiles moving at extreme speeds will A TROUBLING PAST 7

be able to penetrate enemy territory pro- Air Force. When prosecuting air strikes tected by such defenses.”4 It was not the deep into North Korean territory, the Navy last time that the effectiveness of speed or had to rely on the Air Force’s F-86 for pro- missiles would be exaggerated, nor was tection. Korea gave the Navy a much the Air Force alone in such mispercep- greater appreciation of the fighter and at- tions. As prescient in many ways as the tack aircraft that it needed to do its job. In- von Karman study wras, it must be recog- deed, one is struck by how pragmatic nized for what it was: a scientific and Navy fighter- and attack-acquisition be- technological think piece remarkably and came. Out of the Korean experience came regretfully detached from realistic doctri- what were arguably the two finest Ameri- nal underpinnings. In this regard, it may can fighter aircraft developed in midcen- be fair to ask whether it accomplished tury: the Vought F8U-1 (F-8) Crusader and more harm than good in its influence on the McDonnell F4H-1 (F-4) Phantom II. “planning.” Both were designed to address shortfalls The crucible of Korean and Vietnam that were revealed in Korea. In a way, the combat drastically altered the subsequent F-8 and F-4 represented two sides of a development of American fighter aircraft, doctrinal divide opening up in the fighter first for the Navy and subsequently for the world—the perceived “old” era of close-in maneuvering dogfighting and the fore- casted “new” era of beyond visual range The YF-22 is the Lockheed-Boeing-General Dynamics (BVR) missile shots against relatively be- representative to the advanced tactical fighter program. The nign targets. In fact, of course, this latter ongoing debate over the nature o f future fighters, the changing international environment, and domestic budgetary view was seriously flawed, as Vietnam pressures will all play critical roles in determining whether would subsequently indicate.5 either the YF-22 or the Northrop-McDonnell Douglas YF-23 If the Korean conflict had given the actually enters service. Navy a better vision of its future, such was sult was the F-104. Instead of fulfilling the realistic spectrum of air combat, the Mach 2+ F-104 overemphasized rate of climb and brute speed. Both were values consis- tent with the Mach 2 + supersonic future that the Air Force saw for itself, with the prevailing doctrinal belief that speed would obviate any need for classic dog- fighting. While these were good attributes for an interceptor, they were not enough for a satisfactory air superiority fighter.6

The Century Series: From MiG Alley to Blind Alley

t Today the survivors of the century se- ries are—for the most part—in museums, display parks, or mounted as “gate guard- ians” at various Air Force bases: the rest were scrapped or, too often, planted them- Avionics costs for the modem fighter, such as this F-J5E. selves in smoking holes. If the F-104 rep- have continued to escalate since the end o f World War II. resented a questionable response to the Korean War experience, the other Air Force fighters of the 1950s could be con- not realiy the case with the Air Force. Like sidered questionable products of the inter- the Navy, the Air Force’s missions in play of existing military thought, air Korea had been primarily “air to mud.” power assumptions, and the innate high- Sixtv-four percent of Air Force missions speed animus of the post-World War II had been for interdiction or close air sup- years. Air Force planners generally con- port. with only 20 percent going toward sidered the Korean War an exception that air superiority—chiefly the much- was not typical of the future. Despite the heralded Sabre-versus-MiG war over the occasional sharp clashes between Strategic Yalu River. Air Force pilots, too, marveled Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air at the fast-climbing MiG-15, sometimes Command (TAC) over control of the future too much. The necessity for newer fighter- direction of the Air Force—clashes that bombers to replace the obsolete F-51 Mus- SAC clearly won—there was general una- tang and the aging F-80 Shooting Star nimity that the future threat was primarily drove development of the F-84 and F-86 intercontinental atomic warfare, despite series. It ensured that the service’s first what was happening in Indochina, supersonic fighter, the F-100, would be a Malaya. Algeria, and elsewhere.7 swing-role air-to-air and air-to-ground air- In this “new” world, the fighter was en- plane in the tradition of the fighters of the visioned as primarily an interceptor, much Second World War. The encounters with as it had been in the 1930s. At that time, the MiG-15 in Korea caused a strong out- the apocalyptic vision of the strategic cry among Air Force fighter pilots for a bomber encouraged intensive interceptor cheap, lightweight, maneuverable, high- development. Sedate “pursuit-curve’ tac- performance fighter to confront future tics by tightly controlled interceptor for- Soviet fighters. The effort to develop such mations would be required to confront a fighter got seriously off track, for the re- marauding bombers. (This thinking cost a

8 A TROUBLING PAST 9

The "fly by wire" F-16 is capable o ffulfilling both air-to-air strike airplanes and constraining their de- and air-to-ground missions—a versatility that proved sign accordingly. (The F-105 is the classic immensely popular with airforces throughout the world. example.) Thus, by the end of the Eisenhower era, the Air Force’s peacetime number of Royal Air Force fighter pilots conceptualization of the fighter’s future their lives when they tried it in 1940.) Yet. role was completelv out of sync with its in the war that followed, virtually all of previous wartime r ord in every air war these interceptors—the Spitfire. Hurri- since the fighter had first appeared in cane. Bf 109. P-38, and P-47, for example— 1915. With the exception of the F-lOOs, were called upon to function as swing-role which owed enough to the swing-role F-86 air-to-air and air-to-ground fighters. After in origin that they avoided either of the Korea, the threat of the hydrogen-bomb- two following extremes, the Air Force’s armed bomber triggered Air Force interest century-series fight; rs were either inter- in developing pursuit-curve-flying inter- ceptors (F-101B, F-102, F-104A, F-106) or. ceptors with sophisticated fire control sys- on the other hand, ..ucieor-strike aircraft tems data-linked to ground tracking, com- (F-101A/C, F-104C, F-105). Not sur- mand, and control facilities. The prisingly, then, top-end speed—preferably miniaturization of the atomic bomb and its as close to Mach 2 as possible—continued incorporation into weapons that could be to predominate as the primary perfor- easily carried by a fighter-class airplane mance design consideration.8 worked its own unhealthy magic. Now the The value of the century-series aircraft fighter could itself serve as an atomic- to American defense in the 1950s and delivery system. This was by no means early 1960s is open to serious question. undesirable or indefensible; in fact, it The Air Force acquired a total of 5,525 made good sense. But what did not make century-series “fighters.” In reality, the sense was the next stage: developing air- number of fighter aircraft actually avail- craft called “fighters” but narrowly con- able for what could be considered tradi- ceptualizing them as primarily nuclear- tional air-to-air and air-to-ground missions 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

(for example, air superiority dogfighting ing regarding the development of fighter and battlefield air support) was consider- aircraft in the period between Korea and ably smaller than the above total implies. Vietnam. Of particular interest is the In fact, only 2,839 of the above could be failure of the Air Force to devote any great even remotely considered “classic" amount of interest in practical vertical fighters in the World War I, the World War and/or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) II, or the present-day sense. Of this num- fighter aircraft. Aside from a few far- ber, 201 were the tactical fighter versions fetched, speed-dominated studies in the of the F-101 and F-104, and 685 were the late 1950s and early 1960s, this subject F-105, overtly intended for deep nuclear has traditionally languished. Another area strike, and were not really suitable (except open to criticism is the service’s laggard in a defensive emergency) for air-to-air approach to munitions development— combat. Thus, at any point up to the Air particularly that of air-to-air missiles, Force’s procurement of the Navy’s F4H-1 despite an interest in such weapons that Phantom II, which was imposed by the predated Korea. In Vietnam the Air Force Department of Defense (DOD), one can depended on the Navy-developed Side- state that the only meaningful, genuine winder and Sparrow, both of which— swing-role fighter capability that the Air despite their own problems—significantly Force possessed was in its many squad- outperformed the Air Force’s own Falcon. rons of F-lOOs. And of this total of 1,953 Getting the Air Force to consider Side- aircraft, it fell to the 1,274 F-lOODs—fully winder at all, in fact, had required the mature fighter-bombers “ designed from personal intervention of Assistant Secre- the ground up” for TAC—to really serve as tary of the Air Force Trevor Gardner to ob- the Air Force’s tactical fighter cutting edge tain a comparative flight-test evaluation; pending acquisition of the Phantom in the Sidewinder-firing F-86s subsequently mid-1960s. These 1,274 aircraft repre- made a spectacular debut in the 1958 Tai- sented but 23 percent of the century-series wan Strait crisis. Beyond the scope of this aircraft the Air Force procured as fighters essay but worthy of comment are the num- from 1952 through 1964. The economic ber of other munitions that were Navy- implications of the century-series aircraft derived and Air Force-employed in South- for tactical forces are interesting. If, for ex- east Asia: Shrike, Standard antiradiation ample, the Air Force had procured only missile (ARM). Bullpup, Walleye, and the the F-102 and F-106 as interceptors, the Mk 82 Snakeye drag-retarded bomb, to money otherwise saved would have gone a mention a few.9 long way. For just the flyaway price—$1.3 billion—of the 650 F-101B and F-104A air- craft (not including their substantial research,' development, test, and The McNamara Era evaluation—RDT&E—costs), the Air Force Secretary of Defense Robert S. could have more than doubled F-100D McNamara has come under a great deal of production. The service could have pro- criticism for his stewardship of the De- cured over 1,622 additional F-lOODs or partment of Defense during the admin- had a substantial funding base with which istrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon to develop a meaningful multimission B. Johnson. Unfortunately, there is much successor—one not so single-mission com- to criticize, but there is much, too, that de- promised as the F-105, which was the “of- serves a closer look, particularly his pol- ficial” F-100 fighter-bomber replacement icies affecting subsequent American until the Kennedy administration forced fighter aircraft. McNamara greatly the F-4 on the service at the expense of strengthened the Office of the Secretary of further F-105 production. Defense (consequently diminishing the There are several other issues worth not- role of the service secretaries and the mili- A TROUBLING PAST 11

The A-IO. whatever its merits, was not the 1970s—80s tary chiefs of staff). High on his agenda equivalent o f the fearsom e P-47 Thunderbolt o f World War was improving coordination and coopera- 11. tion between the services, in part by delet- ing or combining duplicative programs and development efforts. He directed the acquisition of the F-4 and A-7 by the Air Force and the development of a tactical fighter experimental (TFX), which became the F-lll. McNamara has been justly crit- icized for the latter decision, but the Secretary o f Defense Robert S. McNamara's enforcement o f interservice commonality o f aircraft worked in the case o f former—supplying the Air Force with the F-4 but not in the case o f the P-111. variants of the F-4 and A-7—is worthy of 12 A/HPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

To furnish an inexpensive multipurpose fighterfor America's allies, the Department o f Defense authorized extensive foreign sales o f the swing-role F-5 lightweight fighter, still one o f the most prolific and important warplanes in international service.

much more praise than it has received. In- deed. his initiatives restructured Air Force fighter forces to meet the kind of real- world needs that the United States faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. To understand McNamara’s com- monality approach, one must make a dis- tinction between usage by a service of an aircraft initially developed for another service and the joint sim ultaneous d e- velopment of a single aircraft type for dual-service use. The F-4 and A-7 are ex- amples of the former, while the TFX/F-111 is an example of the latter. As a rule, the former category—taking an existing air- craft and modifying it for the needs of an- other service—has a much greater success

To its slu>ck. the Air Force found itself in the early 1960s without a frontline fighter o f its own to replace the aging F-100. The result tvas the acquisition o f Na\y-developed F-4 Phantom lls {here shown en route to a target in Vietnam in 1966. one without benefit of cam ouflage). A TROUBLING PAST 13

Although losing the Air Force fly-off competition to the sions. It has become fashionable in some YF-16. a modified version o f the YF-17 would find new life quarters since the time of the F-lll to crit- as the Navy's FIA-J8. icize McNamara’s naive belief in the F-lll. It must be noted, however, that many senior Air Force officers were at that rate than the latter. Further, there is a cor- time confident, optimistic, and even exu- ollary that one can add concerning joint- berant over the anticipated benefits that service use: it is possible to take an aircraft they believed would accrue from this intended for shipboard service and modify joint-service, multipurpose. horse- it successfully for operation from land. designed-by-a-committee airplane.10 However, it is extremely difficult to take a If McNamara erred with the F-lll, his land-based aircraft and modify it for oper- instincts with the F-4 and A-7 were abso- ation from a ship without undertaking ex- lutely correct. Tactical Air Command had tensive revision and redesign of the air- wished to replace the F-100 with the plane. Failure to heed this dictum was one F-105. But after President Kennedy took of the most serious errors that prevented office in 1961, McNamara directed the the attainment of McNamara’s com- study of several replacement candidates monality goal with the TFX/F-111. for the F-100: the A4D attack bomber, the Justified on the grounds of saving ap- F-4. and the F-105. In part, he was re- proximately Si billion, the TFX/F-111 pro- sponding to the Army’s increasing dis- gram eventually generated a loss of about comfort that the “tactical fighters” de- the same amount. Though much has been ployed by the Air Force—such as the written of the civilian-versus-military na- massive F-105—were largely aircraft in- ture of decision making on the program, tended primarily for nuclear strike and, as the critical point too often ignored in dis- such, were unsuited to furnishing the kind cussions of the TFX/F-111 experience was of battlefield air support that the Army the basic incompatibility of developing a sought. Additionally, however, there was single common airframe to undertake a rising climate of dissatisfaction with the widely differing Air Force and Navy mis- Air Force’s fighter procurement strategy 14 A/RPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 within a newly created Systems Analysis fleeted his continued belief that the Air Office in DOD headed by Dr Alain Force needed to strengthen its close-air- Enthoven. The results of this activity, to- support (CAS) commitment to the Army gether with a cost-effectiveness study that and that this could best be accomplished supported F-4 acquisition, encouraged by equipping the service with numbers of McNamara's excellent decision in late specialized attack aircraft. It was also, in 1961 directing the Air Force to procure the its own way, a “replace the F-100” issue, Phantom. Eventually, the Air Force since the aging low-payload F-100 was the acquired 2,675 Phantoms for its own use, Air Force’s primary air-to-ground CAS air- with extensive foreign sales as well. plane at the time. For a while, the light- Further, the F-4 acquisition enabled weight Northrop N-156F (the F-5) loomed McNamara to achieve his goal of expand- as a possible candidate. By the fall of ing the Air Force tactical fighter wing 1965, however, TAC and Air Staff spokes- structure from 18 to 24 wings.11 men had convinced—though it had not McNamara’s decision on the Air Force been a difficult sell—both Gen John version of the Navy’s A-7 attack airplane McConnell (the Air Force chief of staff) followed his decision on the F-4 and re- and Harold Brown (the secretary of the Air Force) that (1) the A-7 rather than the F-5 was a better airplane for the battlefield support role because of its much better payload, and (2) a special cannon-armed ,4 flashy hut limited-utility interceptor and nuclear-strike airplane, the F-104 proved disappointing both as a version of the F-4. dubbed the tactical conventional homh-dropper and as a dogfighter. strike fighter (TSF), should be acquired to complement the all-missile F-4s already introduced into service. Brown and McConnell bought off on the conclusions. Seeing the mix of F-4s, A-7s, TSFs, and F-llls as an ideal future force structure, they recommended implementation to McNamara in early November 1965. The secretary of defense approved the A-7 immediately but balked at the TSF on grounds of cost and time delays, initially disapproving it before eventually recon- sidering and authorizing go-ahead eight months later, in mid-July 1966. The TSF became the F-4E, the most versatile and successful of the entire Phantom family.12

Vietnam Although a wide range of Air Force fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft oper- ated over North Vietnam, the only two that really flew consistently against the MiG-17, -19, and -21s were the F-4C. D. and Es, and the F-105s. While the F-4s flew offensive fighter sweeps, F-105s fought no-less-deadly defensive air com- A TROUBLING PAST 15

Originally designed to serve as a nuclear weapons strike rated in combat in a much briefer span of aircraft, the F-105. flown with courage and elan, was used in time than developing and fielding a new a number o f diverse roles in Southeast Asia and took fighter force. Following Korea, the air fearsome losses. combat “lessons learned’’ from F-86s versus MiG-15s had been distilled into an influential fighter primer entitled “ No Guts, No Glory!” by Frederick C. (“Boots”) bats. Overall, of the 135 MiG kills by Air Blesse.15 Sadly, however, the lessons had Force fighters. F-105s shot down 27 (all largely been ignored. Writing in 1968 Gen MiG-17s) and F-4s shot down a total of Bruce K. Holloway, himself a noted fighter 107 MiGs; there was one shared kill. ace, stated that Thirty-five Air Force F-4s and 21 F-105s fell to MiGs. Air Force fighter crews thus between 1954 and 1962, the USAF training destroyed 2.41 MiGs per fighter loss; in curriculum for fighter pilots included little, contrast. Navy and Marine fighter crews if any. air-to-air combat. This omission was destroyed 5.6 MiGs per friendly fighter partly a result of doctrine, which then re- loss. The 8:1 ratio of World War II and the garded tactical fighters primarily as a means for delivering nuclear ordnance [emphasis 10:1 ratio of Korea were things of the past: added|. It was partly a reflection of concern an exchange rate of 2.41 to 1 clearly neces- for flying safety. In any event, as late as Oc- sitated changes in tactics, training, and tober 1963, it was reported that only four of acquisition.13 30 pilots in one fighter squadron had ever The Vietnamese experience, and the shot aerial gunnery.16 lesson the Israeli Air Force offered in 1967 of just how deadly a traditionally oriented This revitalized fighter training, emphasiz- fighter force could be, elicited two re- ing air combat maneuvering and stressing sponses from the Air Force and Navy.14 the continuity of the fighter experience The first response was a total change in from the days of Oswald Boelcke and fighter weapons training. The so-called Edward Mannock of the First World War, fighter weapons schools of the Navy and was in place in time for the renewed and Air Force, which emphasized air combat intensified air war that broke out in hassling in the tradition of the Second 1972.17 World War and Korea, were revitalized. The second response to the disturbingly The results of training could be incorpo- low victory/loss rate in Vietnam was a 16 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

could to turn this unsuitable plane into a fighter, were able to convince Congress to cancel the program and allow the service to procure its own fighter unencumbered by the dubious requirement for com- monality. The result was the F-14A Tom- cat, which first flew at the end of 1970. Production deliveries began in May 1972, two months before the first flight of an Air Force sixth-generation equivalent, the F-15A Eagle.18 The evolution of the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 is intertwined. All stemmed from Air Force research and development, and all were largely products of what some termed the Fighter Mafia, a small, key group of individuals dedicated to breaking the traditional post-1945 dogmas that had afflicted fighter development, particularly after the Korean War. There were four key individuals in this mafia: Charles (“Chuck”) Myers, a former test pilot and America's first combat-worthy swing-role jet fighter, the P-80, was a typical first-generation jet warplane, blending Lockheed salesman turned private con- the established aerodynamics o f the subsonic propeller-driven sultant: Maj (subsequently Col) John R. airplane with the revolutionary jet engine. Boyd, Pierre Sprey of the Systems Anal- ysis Office within DOD; and Col Everest clamor for better fighter aircraft, par- Riccioni. One "outsider” deserves more ticularly highly maneuverable airplanes attention for his part in reasserting the pri- having excellent acceleration, agility, vis- macy of the air superiority fighter within ibility, an internal gun system, and a the Air Force: Maj Gen Arthur C. Agan, thrust-to-weight ratio exceeding one. Viet- the Air Staff’s director of plans. Agan, a nam, it may be said, provided the impetus former World War II fighter pilot, triggered for the sixth-generation superfighters of the first interest in a new high- the late 1970s and 1980s: the F-14, F-15, performance air combat fighter in the tra- F-16, and F/A-18. So, too, did the threat of dition of those of the Second World War. a new generation of Soviet fighters, par- He established a prestigious study group ticularly after the 1967 Tushino air show, of fighter aces and pilots to examine the where a wide range of prototype fighters future of Air Force fighter development. In was displayed before Western observers. May 19&5, armed with their report, Agan While many of these remained in the pro- sold Gen John P. McConnell, then the totype stage, others did spawn operational chief of staff, on the notion of acquiring a derivatives in the same fifth-generation new air superiority fighter. From the work category as the F-4. of these five men sprang the F-15 and the F-XX—which inspired the so-called light- weight fighter (LWF) technology demon- The Road to the Present stration program between the General Dy- namics YF-16 and Northrop YF-17, and The first of the sixth-generation fighters, which ultimately resulted in the F-16 and the F-14, was born of the abortive F-lll F/A-18 fighters.19 experience. The Navy and the Grumman It is interesting to note that there was a Corporation, having done the best they “bubble-up” quality to the development of A TROUBLING PAST 17 these advanced airplanes arising largely could trade off speed, thrust, weight, and from the midlevel defense and military drag loadings to achieve “energy bureaucracies. Proponents had to battle maneuverability.”20 the aerospace engineering community's Boyd’s thinking found increasingly notions that future fighters should merely strong support within the Air Staff. By the extrapolate the kind of “bigger, faster, mid-1960s, men who had flown fighters as heavier, more complex” thinking that had junior officers in the Second World War governed so much of the century series. and who were uncomfortable with the This thinking had resulted in a proposed overspecialization of the fighter into an in- future experimental fighter, the F-X. a terceptor on one hand and an attack air- 60.000+ pound. Mach 2.7 aircraft with a plane on the other were shifting more and thrust-to-vveight ratio of 0.75. It was this more into positions of command. Air proposal that Boyd “summarily rejected” Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen Bruce K. in October 1966 after joining the Tactical Holloway, a distinguished fighter ace. Division of the Air Staff Directorate of Re- wrote in 1968 (by which time Boyd and quirements. A graduate engineer, fighter his colleagues had succeeded in refor- pilot, and fighter tactics instructor, Boyd mulating the gestating F-X) that argued persuasively that control and propulsion technology advances in [after] 1953. air superiority, so far as fighter place could enable the development of aircraft were concerned, was again limited lighter, energy-efficient fighters that largely to the defense of the U.S. against en- emy bombers. Our tactical fighters were de- signed primarily for nuclear war where pen- etration was more important than maneu- The F-100 was the last o f the “Century Series“ of supersonic verability, ordnance load-carrying ability jet fighters that had a genuine swing-role air-to-air and more important than armament, alert status air-to-ground ability until the introduction o f the F-4. more important than sustained sortie rates. 18 AJRPOWER JOL/RNAL WINTER 1990

The tactical fighter became less and less an result is usually as diametrically extreme air superiority system, more and more what as the one replaced. In the case of the once was called an attack aircraft. F-15, which followed two decades of Since the beginning of jet aviation, it is building aircraft to a fighter formula that only in the last three years that real recogni- had led inexorably to the F-lll, the result tion has been given to the need for a true air superiority fighter in the types of war most was a profound emphasis on air-to-air likely to occur. With the exception of the F-4 combat performance only. In the F-15 Sys- we do not even now have a first-line tactical tem Program Office (SPO) at Wright- fighter that was designed primarily for air-to- Patterson AFB, partisans worked under a air combat and only secondarily for the re- banner that read “Not a pound for air-to- connaissance. interdiction, and close air sup- ground!’’22 This, of course, ultimately port roles of tactical aviation. We now see proved as farfetched as ignoring the air-to- quite clearly the need for one [emphasis air mission would have. With the excep- added|.2’ tion of a few specialized interceptors, vir- The airplane he was referring to, of course, was the recast F-X, which had An F-86 test-fires “Mighty Mouse" rockets from a been under development since 1966, and retractable launching pod beneath its fuselage. The Air Force took a less-than-aggressive approach in pursuing which in October 1968 would become the air-to-air missile (AAM) technology in the 1950s and early F-15. Whenever a notion is discredited 1960s and eventually relied heavily on Navy-developed and replaced with another one, the initial AAMs during the Vietnam War. A TROUBLING PAST 19

The F-86 gained dominance over MiCs in the skies o f Korea. radars, and the lightweight high-thrust af- Later variants proved effective in an interdiction role. terburning turbofan engines. The F-15 completed its maiden flight in July 1972; tually all air superiority fighter aircraft it entered squadron service in November that have fought in wars since the First 1974, achieving initial operational ca- World War have been called upon to drop pability (IOC) with TAC the following bombs and attack ground targets. How- September.23 ever. it is important to note that while air Given how suitable the F-15 would ul- superiority fighters have been successfully timately prove to be for both the air supe- modified as bomb droppers, there are no riority and air-to-ground roles, it is some- cases of “going the other way”—taking a what ironic that in 1968 (fearful that the dedicated ground attacker and making it Mach 2 + F-15 would turn out to be just into a decent fighter. If the Air Force another big, fast sled) Boyd, Sprey, and “erred” in stressing the F-15’s counterair the others began arguing for a highly agile, mission, it was better that it emphasize single-engine, and less-than-Mach 2 “aus- air-to-air performance, for that was the tere” fighter, the so-called F-XX. They side that traditionally had to dominate in were unsuccessful in getting the Air Staff the development of a decent fighter- to redirect the F-15 program again—a wise bomber. (Eventually, the Air Force did decision on the part of the Air Force. In- proceed with a competitive evaluation of stead, the climate of thought that they pro- F-15 and F-16 variants for the interdiction posed with the F-XX germinated at the role, leading to the F-15E.) Several key fac- end of the summer of 1971 in the so-called tors enabled the creation of the F-15, par- lightweight fighter program. The LWF pro- ticularly electronic stability augmentation gram received a significant boost by a dra- systems that were, in effect, first- matic redirection of defense acquisition in generation fly-by-wire flight control sys- June 1970, when then-president Richard tems, smaller and more capable air-to-air M. Nixon’s “Blue Ribbon Defense Panel” 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

recommended ending so-called total pack- siles with a cheaper swing-fighter carrying age procurement and returning to compet- Sidewinders that could assist in winning itive prototyping, something that had been the air battle, and then fight airland war. It abandoned since the late 1950s.24 is the F-16’s multimission capabilities that Ultimately this interest spawned a com- subsequently resulted in orders for 3,000 petitive fly-off between the General Dy- of this type aircraft, placing it among the namics YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17, most successful of postwar jet fighters. and out of this fly-off came both the F-16 What was it that made these latter and F-18 airplanes. Although ostensibly machines—particularly the F-15, F-16, intended for technology demonstration, and F/A-18—so desirable and successful there was little doubt that the “winning” compared to their predecessors? First and aircraft would have an excellent chance foremost, it was the climate of hard, prag- for full-scale production. In mid-January matic thought from which they sprang—a 1975, the Air Force declared the YF-16 the thought rooted in the combat experiences winner, awarding a contract for full-scale of Europe, the Pacific, MiG Alley, North development. The first F-16A, which was Vietnam, and the Middle East—coupled a slightly larger and more refined aircraft with insightful appreciation of how future than the YF-16 demonstrator, flew in De- warfare was likely to evolve and what con- cember 1976. The Air Force activated its temporary and future technology could re- first F-16 squadron in January 1979, alistically offer. As for the airplanes them- roughly a decade from the time the fighter selves, they were successful because they mafia initially called for its development. offered a package of attributes rather than Widespread foreign sales followed. (The overemphasizing any one quality such as YF-16/YF-17 competition was a win-win speed. The advantages that these aircraft situation for both contestants, for the los- possessed reflected the shrewd applica- ing YF-17 was subsequently adopted, in tion of available technology. These advan- greatly modified form, as the basis for the tages included extraordinary agility, su- McDonnell Douglas F/A-18. Mirroring perlative handling qualities, sophisticated pilot opinion of the F-15 and F-16. naval user-friendly avionics, greatly improved aviators generally were enthusiastic over reliability and maintainability, intensive its performance.)25 incorporation of human-factor considera- Unlike the F-15, the F-16 was a true fly- tions, enhanced flight safety, and unprece- by-wire aircraft, using three computers dented weapons accuracy. In addition, constantly "voting” on each other's per- they had the ability to be configured for formance to maintain control of what was both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions basically an unstable airplane. The F-16 and to carry a variety of weapons. Finally, thus possessed superlative maneuver- they had an innate ability to be adapted ability. really making it a six-and-one-half- for a variety of other roles. All were generation airplane, demonstrating per- qualities previously lacking in the fighters formance only now being approached by the Air Force had procured for its own use foreign designs such as the Soviet MiG-29, since Korea, and even the Navy-derived the European fighter aircraft (EFA), Israeli workhorse, the F-4, had proven deficient Lavi, French Rafale, and Swedish Gripen. in most of them. The sixth-generation air- It is worth noting that going beyond the craft were so clearly superior to their fifth- original air superiority intentions of its generation predecessors that there was a parents, the Air Force acquired the F-16 as pronounced bias away from anything asso- a dual-role air-to-air and air-to-ground ciated with the uncien regime (presixth- fighter-bomber. By acquiring it. the Air generation aircraft). This was dramatically Force intended to complement the more affirmed a half decade ago by the failure of expensive and capable F-15 carrying a mix Northrop to sell the otherwise generally of medium- and short-range air-to-air mis- excellent F-20 Tigershark. a derivation of A TROUBLING PAST 21

the F-5 that incorporated a great deal of (hopefully) they have thought out, and— sixth-generation advances.26 yes—appreciate national political and Aircraft design has always involved the economic nuances. In the last analysis, integration of diverse technologies— failure to realistically address these factors aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, con- brought forth the disappointments of the trols, avionics—to synergisticallv achieve 1950s and early 1960s. Addressing them capabilities. The sixth generation of spawned the remarkably successful sixth- fighters accomplish this at levels pre- generation fighters. viously unattainable and point the way for Today. Air Force decision makers grap- future development as well—a seventh ple with the development of the seventh- generation (of which the YF-22 and YF-23 generation advanced tactical fighter (ATF). are the first) stressing greater reliance on which incorporates the services' and in- built-in low observables, electronic flight dustry’s best current answers to such ge- control systems, avionics, weapons inte- neric questions as how much maneu- gration and management, integrated fire verability is enough; is sustained and flight controls, reliability and main- supersonic cruise necessary; how much tainability, modular design approaches, “stealth” is desirable; is there a role for sophisticated seventh-generation propul- ‘‘supermaneuverability”; what is the ideal sion. possible sensor fusion, improved weapon, sensor, and avionics mix for pilot displays including "pilot associate” next-generation fighter and attack aircraft; technology, and the like. In the fighter fu- and should future fighters be specialized ture, however, such glamorous technology or multirole aircraft. They should not au- must not dominate planning and manage- tomatically assume that the ATF or any ment factors, for as the history of other subsequent Air Force fighter will be post-1945 Air Force fighter development the newest heir of a long line of successful clearly reveals, what is more important is fighters. Rather, they traverse a dangerous how well planners anticipate future war- mire, hopefully cognizant that all too fre- fighting environments, understand the quently, the path of post-World War II Air systems acquisition process and what it Force fighter development has been can accomplish for them, comprehend the fraught with pitfalls and littered with the state of technology to meet the needs that detritus of mediocrity. □

Notes 1 See I B. Holley. |r. USAF. Retired. ''Of Saber Charges, tion. 1980). For Ihe electronic revolution, see Paul E. Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft: The Search for Doctrine," Ceru/.zi, Beyond the Limits Flight Enters Ihe Computer Age Atr University Hevieiv 34. no. 6 (September-October 1983): (Cambridge. Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2-11; Richard P Hallion. "Girding for War Perspectives on Press, 1989). Research. Development. Acquisition, and the Decisionmak- 2. This is my own classification system, and it is at odds ing Environment of the 1980s.“ Air University Review 37. with an earlier and broader one that < lassifies the evolution no 6 (September-October 1986|: 46-61. Richard P. Hallion, of fighters after 1945 into four generations, with the fourth Doctrine. Technology, and Air Warfare: A Late Twentieth- being the generation of Ihe F-16 and its equivalents. I believe Century Perspective." Airpower /ournof 1, no. 2 (Fall 1987): that the six-generation scheme is more precise and categori- 16-27. and Robert F. Futrell's Ideas. Concepts. Dot trine: cal than the four-generation notion. USAF Technical Order Basu: Thinking in the United States Air Force. 1907-1964. 2 00-25-30. Technical Manual: Unit Costs of Aircraft. Guided vols. (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 19891: Robert Missiles, and Engines (Tinker AFB, Okla.: Air Logistics Schlaifer and S. D. Heron. Development of Aircraft Engines Center/MMEDT. 15 May 1983), 7-9: M. Lipow. "Number of ond Fuels (Boston. Harvard University Press, 1950); Edward Faults per Line of Code." IEEE Transactions on Software En- W. Constant II. The Origins of the Turbu/et Revolution (Bal- gineering 8. no. 4 (July 1982). passim. I wish to acknowledge timore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1980). The super- information received from Charles E. ("Pete") Adolph, dep- sonic revolution is a fruitful subject for inquiry: useful works uty director. Defense Research & Engineering (Test and Eval- are Alex Roland. Model Research: A History of the National uation). particularly his draft study (with Phillip Montgom- Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 1915-1958 (Wash- ery). "Cost-Effective Testing of Software-Intensive Systems." ington. D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administra- See speech by Cen Bernard P Randolph, commander, AFSC. tion. 1985). and John V. Becker. The High-Speed Frontier: before the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Sym- Case Histories of Four NACA Programs. 1920-1950 (Wash- posium. Los Angeles. Calif.. 23 January 1990. I wish to that a ington. D C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administra- Maj Brian Hoey for making this available to me. 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

3. The best and most reliable source of information is Mar- 7. Bruce K. Holloway, “Air Superiority in Tactical Air celle Size Knaack's Post-World War Two Fighters, 1945- Warfare,” Air University Review 19. no. 3 (March-April 1973, vol. 1 of the Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft 1968): 8-9; and Futrell. Ideas, vol. 1. 243-496. As a perusal and Missile Systems (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force of Futrell clearly indicates, there were clashes throughout History. 1978), which contains a wealth of factual data that the post-Korean period between strategic proponents (typ- can be profitably exploited by researchers. Not surprisingly, ified by SAC) and tactical ones (by TAC). Though some TAC the Rand Corporation researchers have issued a number of spokesmen, such as Gen O. P. Wevland, argued vigorously monographs offering interesting perspectives on post-World for a doctrine confronting the needs of limited war. during War II fighter development, Some of the best are L. L. the 1950s, the fighter acquisition policy of the Air Force lohnson. The Century Series Fighters: A Study in Research turned more and more away from such concerns and toward and Development. RM-2549 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand such systems as the abortive F-108 Mach 3+ bomber Corp.. 20 May 1960); Thomas A. Marschak, 7’he Hole of Proj­ interceptor. ect Histories in the Study of H&D, P-2850 (Santa Monica. 8. lames E. Johnson, Full Circle: The Tactics of Air Fight- Calif.: Rand Corp., January 1964); William L. Stanley and ing, 1914-1964 (New York: Ballantine Books. 1964). 103; Michael D. Miller. Measuring Technological Change in Jet Holloway, 8. The century-series data is taken from Knaack. Fighter Aircraft, R-2249-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.; Rand 9. For information on the Harrier, see John W. Fozard. The Corp., September 1979); Michael Rich and Edmund Dews Jet V/STOL Harrier (Kingston-upon-Thames. England: British with C. L. Batten. Jr.. Improving the Military Acquisition Aerospace Aircraft Group, July 1978), a case study for the Process: Lessons from HAND Research, R-3373-AF/RC (Santa American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics aircraft Monica, Calif,: Rand Corp., February 1986); and M. B. design seminar offered by one of the plane's designers. Rothman, Aerospace Weapon System Acquisition Arthur K. Marmor, The Search for New USAF Weapons, Milestones: A Data Base. N-2599-ACQ (Santa Monica. Calif.: 1958-1959 (Washington. D.C.: USAF Historical Division Li- Rand Corp., October 1987); see John T. Greenwood. “The aison Office, April 1961). 49-50; this is a previously classi- Emergence of the Postwar Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953," fied manuscript, but these portions were declassified at my and David Alan Rosenberg, “American Postwar Air Doctrine request by Dr Sheldon Goldberg of the Office of Air Force and Organization: The Navy Experience." in Air Power in History, copy in history file at Headquarters Air Force Sys- Warfare, ed. Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart (Wash- tems Command: memorandum. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the ington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 215-78. The secretary of defense, subject: Status of Guided Missile Proj- best monographic source is Herman S. Wolk's Planning and ects. 15 March 1950. reprinted as Document 13 in Wolfe, Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947 (Washington. 213-18; for an analysis of gun and missile effectiveness in D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1984). See memorandum. Southeast Asia, see R. Frank Futrell et al.. Aces and Aerial Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal to the service secre- Victories: The United States A ir Force in Southeast Asia, taries. subject: [Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint 1965-1973 (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History, Chiefs of Staff|. 21 April 1948: and President Harry S. Tru- 1976). 155-60: and John B. Nichols and Barrett Tillman's man to Secretary of [Defense James V. Forrestal. letter, sub- more analytical On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over ject: [Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Vietnam (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1987). 75- Staff), 21 April 1948, both reprinted as Document 7 in The 79. which, despite its title, offers an excellent perspective on United States Air Force Basic Documents on Roles and Mis- both the Air Force and naval air war in Southeast Asia. See sions. ed, Richard I. Wolfe (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air the memoir by Ron Westrum and Howard A. Wilcox entitled Force History, 1987), 151-66. This episode is also discussed "Sidewinder." American Heritage of Invention & Technol­ in John Schlight's "Elwood R. Quesada: TacAir Comes of ogy 2 (Fall 1989): 56-63: and Rothman. 178-80; see also Age.” in Makers of the United States Air Force, ed. John L. Gerald K. Hendricks, “The Emphasis on Limited War—and Frisbee (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987). Its Impact on Research and Development in the USAF," stu- 198-203. For Quesada's own perspective on the significance dent report no. 82. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, of tactical—that is. battlefield—air power, see his "Tactical Washington, D.C.. 1 April 1988, 38-42. copy in the history Air Power." Air University Quarterly Review 1, no. 4 (Spring file at Headquarters Air Force Systems Command; Jacob Van 1948): passim. Staaveren. Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 4. Theodore von Karman. Where We Stand: A Report Pre­ (Washington. D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, pared for the AAF Scientific Advisory Group, August 1945 November 1962). 38. copy in the history file at Headquarters (Wright Field, Ohio: Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Air Force Systems Command. May 1946), iv; see also 8, 38. See also Michael H. Corn's Har- 10. Robert S. McNamara. The Essence of Security: Reflec­ nessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for tions in Office (New York: Harper & Row. 1968), 92-93; the Air Force. 1944-1986 (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air George M. Watson. "Man in the Middle: Eugene Zuckert as Force History, 19881. 11-50. Secretary of the Air Force." Air Power History 36. no. 2 5. The best lessons-learned source on Navy operations in (Summer 1989): 20-29. The best sources are the congres- Korea is the six Interim Evaluation Reports prepared for the sional hearings themselves, notably the 10-volume Senate commander in chief of the US Pacific Fleet. 1950-1953. Committee on Government Operations. TFX Contract Inves- Copies of these are in the Naval Historical Center, Wash- tigation (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, ington Navy Yard, and the Naval Aviation History Office, 1963-1964): the 3-volume Senate Committee on Government Washington Navy Yard Annex. Operations, TFX Contract Investigation (Second Series) 6. See USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, USAF (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1970); and Tactical Operations: World War II and Korea with Statistical the summary report of the Senate Committee on Government rabies (Washington. D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Operations. TFX Contract Investigation, Report No. 91-1496 Office, 1962, 162; see also Robert F. Futrell, The United (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970). The States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Of- best book source is Robert F. Coulam. Illusions of Choice: fice of Air Force History, 1983). 690. I have benefited from T h e F - l 11 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform discussions with Maj Gen Tom Collins. USAF. Retired, the (Princeton. N.|.: Princeton LIniversity Press. 1977). which su- first Air Force pilot to flight-test the MiG-15. The best case perseded Robert ). Art's earlier The TFX Decision: study on the F-104 is in Marschak. 82-91; see also Kriaack, McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little. Brown and Co.. 175-89. for the Air Force acquisition history of this airplane. 1968); see also Richard P. Hallion. The Evolution of Com­ A TROUBLING PAST 23

monality in Fighter and Attack Aircraft Development and come to grips with the challenge of future air combat. See Usage (Edwards AFB. Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center William L. Hamilton and Andrew M. Skow. "Operational History Office. November 1985): a shorter version of this Utility Survey: Supermaneuverability,” Technical Report study appeared as The Commonality Chimera: loint Sendee 84-04 (Torrance. Calif.: Eidetics International, September Development of Fighter and Attack Aircraft and Its Implica­ 1984); and Andrew Skow. Advanced Fighter Agility Metrics tions for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (Edwards AFB. (Torrance. Calif.: Eidetics International. July 1985); I have Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center History Office. 17 Decem- benefited from discussions with Skow; Col John Taylor, ber 1985). USAF. Retired; and Col |im Manly, USAF. Retired, of the 11. McNamara’s role in building Air Force tactical Eidetics staff. The "design requirements" side was well cap- forces—including acquiring the A-7 and the F-4. and ex- tured in a General Dynamics presentation of 1981; see Her- panding the Air Force wing structure—is detailed in an ex- bert F. Rogers. "Expectations for the Future: Military Air- cellent dissertation. Maj (subsequently Brig Gen) Richard G. craft" (Paper presented at the International Aerospace Head's 'Decision-Making on the A-7 Attack Aircraft Pro- Symposium. Paris. France. 3 June 1981). gram” (PhD diss.. Syracuse University. 1971). passim. Glenn 21. Holloway. 8. E. Bugos's more narrowly focused dissertation, "Testing the 22. Private recollection of Col William J. ("Pete”) Knight. F-4 Phantom II: Engineering Practice in the Development of USAF. Retired, who worked in the F-15 System Project Of- American Military Aircraft. 1954—1969” (PhD diss.. Univer- fice at Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio. sity of Pennsylvania. 19881. is also of use. 23. Neufeld, 44-63; Rothman, 60-61; Tom Lennon and 12. Head. 215-16. 252-90. Jim Wray. Bringing the F-15 to Operational Readiness 13. Futrell et at.. Aces. 155-60: Nichols and Tillman. (Langley AFB, Va.: 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. June 1977). 75-79. I have refined their figures slightly to incorporate ad- 24. Neufeld, 64-65; Rothman. 62-63. ditional data reflecting the air-to-air war. 25. Deborah L. Gable. “Acquisition of the F-16 Fighting 14 |ohn F. Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base Defense. Falcon (1972-1980)." Report 87-0900 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: 1914—1973 (Washington. D C.: Office of Air Force History. Air Command and Staff College, 1987), is a useful survey, 1988). 311-17: in the first two days. Israeli Air Force pilots copy in the history files at Headquarters Air Force Systems shot down 58 aircraft in dogfights, but this paled beside the Command; Rothman. 62-65. Like the F-15. the F-16 proved estimated 451 Arab aircraft destroyed on the ground. infinitely more tractable than its century-series forebears. 15. Frederick C. Blesse. “No Guts. No Glory!" reprinted by Further. I have benefited from conversations regarding the the Headquarters 57th Tactical Training Wing, Tactical Air F-16's flight control system with three noted test pilots who Command, in the USAF Fighter Weapons Review. 1977. 26- shepherded the plane from its YF-16 phase into full-scale de- 30. 55. velopment and on into operational service: Phillip 16. Holloway. 9. Oestricher; Col Robert C. Ettinger, USAF. Retired: and Col 17. Nichols and Tillman. 85-86: Futrell et al.. Aces. 124- David Milam. USAF. See also Spangenberg's VFAX/ACF pro- 25. 154. gram memorandum. All aircraft tend to have quirks and 18. Rothman. 58-59. 1 also wish to acknowledge discus- faults of one sort or another. Unfortunately, the very earliest sions I have had with George Spangenberg. former chief de- production models of the F/A-18 have experienced signifi- signer of Naval Air Systems Command, and. in particular, cant problems with structural cracks, and this condition may two memos that he sent to me: memorandum for record, sub- limit the service lives of some 61 airplanes. See Barbara ject: Multi-Service Aircraft Procurements. 30 August 1974: Amouyal and Robert Holzer, “Structural Flaws Halve Life of and memorandum for record, subject: The VFAX/ACF Early F/A-18 Hornets," Defense News. 20 November 1989, 3. Program—A Review, 21 October 1974. Somewhat balancing this is that as a combat airplane, the 19. Rothman. 60. 62; Knaack. 334—35; |acob Neufeld, The Hornet has been very impressive to its flight and ground F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 (Wash- crews from performance, reliability, and maintainability ington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. November 1974), 6- standpoints. The Navy is planning to procure a total of 1.157 19 The Neufeld work is a classified study at the SECRET Hornets. level, but a "sanitized" version exists and thus the references 26. See General Randolph's speech cited in note 2; see cited in this paper to the Neufeld work are to unclassified Robert P. Lyons, Jr., "The Search for an Advanced Fighter: A material. I wish to thank Bill Heimdahl of the Office of Air History from the XF-108 to the Advanced Tactical Fighter." Force History for making the sanitized version available. Report 86-1575 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff 20. Neufeld, 18; W. B Herbst, "Dynamics of Air Combat," College, 1986), 38^19. Also, 1 have benefited from conversa- AfAA lournal of Aircraft 20. no 7 (July 1983): 594-98: and tions at Edwards Air Force Base on the F-15E, F-16XL, and Klaus Huenecke. Modern Combat Aircraft Design (An- F-20 aircraft with Col Mart Bushnelt, USAF; Col Ed Thomas, napolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987). 202-8. The cock- USAF; Col Jim Doolittle, USAF; Brig Gen Charles ("Chuck") pit perspective is thoroughly presented in Robert L Shaw's Yeager. USAF. Retired: and Col Pete Knight, USAF, Retired. Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering (Annapolis. Md.: There are two other programs that should be mentioned in 1 Naval Institute Press. 1985); particularly useful is the discus- passing: the Marine/McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II i sion on pages 387-417 regarding fighter aircraft perform- VSTOL, and the Air Force/Lockheed F-117 "stealth" fighter. ! ance. For an interesting "speed is life" counterpoint to some Both of these were special-purpose airplanes developed to ! of this, see Mike Straight. Being Fast." USAF Fighter meet particular service needs. Though largely beyond the l Weapons Review, Spring 1989. 4-7. This persistent interest scope of this paper, it is worth noting that botli have been I in the dogfight arena, coupled with Boyd's continuing cham- successful programs, and both point to demonstrable future pioning of highly agile fighters able to transit from low- to fighter needs: STOL and perhaps vertical-takeoff-and- high-energy states, has led to the creation of a new field of landing (VTOL) performance, and reducing observable inquiry—"agility metrics," which is the search for meaning- signatures. ful air combat measures of merit to help designers and pilots SPACE CONTROL IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

HE LAST 10 years saw an advance- tion with the USSR continues to diminish. ment of a US military presence in At first blush, this outbreak of peace space unlike any peacetime expan- would seem to spell the end of any expan- sion of a new theater of operations. sion of a military role in space. If no space- The creation of the Air Force Space Com-faring nation is an enemy, why should the mand (AFSPACECOM) and the US SpaceUnited States bother with a space military? Command (USSPACECOM). together with The answer is that, as the superpowers T loosen their sway over the other countries the visions of the Strategic Defense Initia- tive (SDI), gave the impression that the of the world, the number of nations with United States intended to pursue a mili- the potential to create crises—with or tary presence in space with the same vigor without nuclear weapons—increases. that it used to strengthen strategic offen- Furthermore, for most of the space age, sive forces in the 1950s and 1960s. At the space systems merely augmented ter- close of the eighties, however, the tensions restrial systems and operations. Over the between the East and West that caused past 10 years, however, the situation has such a buildup began to crumble with the reversed, and many terrestrial systems Berlin wall. The likelihood of large-scale now augment or serve as backups for space combat in Europe and strategic confronta- CAPT jOHN W. POWER, USAF

24

26 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 tions. weather, navigation, and reconnais- gistics of accessing space are comparable sance. This trend holds true not only for to the function of a merchant fleet. More- military systems but also for large com- over, weapons for denying access to space mercial industries. Thus, the rapidly are analogous to submarines and surface changing world order and the dependence ships that strike against other ocean ves- of US military and industrial assets on sels. This analogy is also implicit in the space systems justify the need for a US basic principles of the US space program space control capability. contained in AFM 1-6, Military Space During the eighties, the subject of space Doctrine: control devolved into a discussion of space weapons, whether simple anti- [The United States] rejects any claims to sov- satellite (ASAT) weapons or the complex ereignty by any nation over space or over ce- systems of SDL Such weapons, however, lestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and re- jects any limitations on the fundamental make up only one of the components for right to acquire data from space. real space control. That is, space control entails both free access to space and the [The United States) considers the space sys- ability to deny this access to a potential tems of any nation to be national property enemy. Further, one must remember that with the right of passage through and opera- tion in space without interference. Purpose- control does not necessarily imply deter- ful interference with space systems shall be rence. The latter is a political rather than a viewed as an infringement upon sovereign military concept. To assure true space con- rights.2 trol. the United States must secure access to space before it develops weapons to Terms such as right of passage bring to deny access to others. mind the right of passage in international waters, just as referring to spacecraft as na- tional property is in keeping with current Establishing Access tenets of international law on the high seas. to Space But AFM 1-6 fails to adequately address In On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doc- the duality of space control (in fact, the trine, Lt Col David Lupton outlines what term space control does not appear in the he considers the five pillars of space document). Rather, the manual speaks power: logistics, personnel, reconnais- somewhat haphazardly about a duality of sance and surveillance, weapons, and or- programs: military (i.e., national security) ganization of forces.1 Interestingly, he and civilian. The portion dealing with the places logistics first. Indeed, since logistics national security aspects of the space pro- includes'the launch systems for getting gram and what should be done turns into a into space, this ranking makes sense. After laundry list of technological programs all, space-control weapons that lack the (e.g., those dealing with survivability and means to access space are little more than endurance) and systems being developed small-scale doomsday weapons. The abil- or already fielded (e.g.. ASAT. early warn- ity to deny access to space is of little con- ing). Although the manual states that “the sequence to a country that has no access Air Force must continue to prepare for itself. quick reaction launch and short-time re- generation and turn-around for space launches from more survivable facilities.” Air Force Doctrine on Access to Space one must note that this comment on The type of force needed to access space is launch capability appears in the section on different from the one needed to deny ac- future activities.3 Thus, Air Force doctrine cess. Lupton illustrates this difference by considers the capability for space access, using a naval analogy. For example, the lo- including launchers and logistics support. SPACE CONTROL 27

The centerpiece o f US space efforts fo r over a decade, the The launch structure must be capable of re- space shuttle represents the vague demarcation between constituting degraded or destroyed spacecraft military and civilian space efforts. By relying on the space on demand. To this end. then, operational re- shuttle, we may have done serious harm to our military's quirements must drive the design and de- ability to access space in wartime. velopment of space systems, launch vehicles and launch priorities.15 Gen Crosbie E. Saint, commander in chief of US Army in Europe, is also aware of de- to be of secondary importance—it can be ficiencies in our wartime launch capability added later. and worries that the Soviets could replace all of their satellites in two or three months, assuming they have spares on Military Views on Access to Space hand.'5 Nevertheless, General Saint be- At least two senior commanders recognize lieves that ASATs are more important to the two facets of space control, if not their the US than is launch capability: relative importance. Gen John L. The contemporary NATO commander wants Piotrowski. commander in chief of to see the entire battlefield. And he fully ap- USSPACECOM, points out that the current preciates that the side which controls space US space infrastructure is not adequate for may well prove to be the victor. From my war fighting.4 He also emphasizes that the forward-deployed observation post, I see an needs of battlefield commanders demand effective ASAT system as the key to the con- that US launch capabilities have speed trol of space and also conceivably as the key and flexibility: to victory.7

SPACE CONTROL 29

Similarly. General Piotrovvski em- Ironically, the House Armed Services phasizes weaponry rather than launch Committee has fully funded the new capability: ASAT development effort currently headed by the Army and even added $20 Even worse, our current space force is one- dimensional. It has no offensive capability. million for laser research. Nevertheless, We lack an anti-satellite system to deny the the committee banned use of the Navy's enemy the combat support he desires from mid-infrared advanced chemical laser space.8 (MIRACL) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in tests against space tar- Furthermore, General Piotrowski’s recent gets." Unless the world political situation article in US Naval Institute Proceedings changes and the Soviets resume ASAT reveals his preference for denial of access testing. Congress is unlikely to allow any- as a means of space control. He argues that thing other than lab testing of possible the US needs the ASAT because the So- ASAT components. viets will use space as a force multiplier to Second, current budget constraints will increase the cost-effectiveness of forces likely prevent the approval of any new constrained by shrinking budgets.9 Yet, he weapon system. Changes in Europe and at- does not advocate that the US use space as tempts by Department of Defense (DOD) a force multiplier by enhancing its space- officials to cut $180 billion from the Five support infrastructure. Like Air Force Year Defense Program (FYDP) during FY doctrine, both commanders emphasize the 1992 through FY 1994 will probably slow offensive aspect of space control—the down or scrap the development of major ASAT. weapon systems that already have strong Problems with ASATs constituencies.12 Defense spending, which Although ASAT weapons are an integral jart of space control, they probably should lot have first priority for several reasons, •urst, the last 15 years have seen consider- ible resistance to ASAT weapons, and here is no reason to think it will lessen, jarticularly with the easing of East-West ensions. For example, the congressional )an on ASAT testing prevented tests of the M 5 miniature homing vehicle (MHV) \SAT:

The Secretary of Defense may not carry out a test of the Space Defense System (anti- satellite weapon) involving the miniature homing vehicle against an object in space un- til the President certifies to Congress that the Soviet Union has conducted, after the date of the enactment of this act, a test against an ob- ject in space of a dedicated antisatellite weapon.10

Although the Air Force has about 54 Titan II missiles (left) on hand for future spare launches, it has no comprehensive plan for accessing space in an emergency. Other heavy-lift vehicles, such as the Titan IIIC (right), are available fo r talelhle launches during peacetime, hut they require a long lead lime and can be launched from only two sites in the US. 30 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 peaked in 1986 at 6.5 percent of the gross States continues to justify the ASAT on national product (GNP) has slipped to 6 the grounds of its deterrent value, then our percent of the GNP.13 first priority should be the development of Third, because of reliability problems a responsive and survivable launch ca- with their satellites, the Soviets have to pability, which we will need to pursue a launch more of them during a given year space war of attrition. Such a war de- than does the United States. Consequently, mands much more than simply denying the Soviets have a greater surge or recon- access to space; we must be able to reach stitution ability in launch vehicles.14 The space and quickly replace damaged or de- point of an attrition strategy is to reduce stroyed systems. The bottom line is that enemy forces to prevent mission accom- the US must be able to accomplish its plishment and to prevent reduction of mission. one’s own forces. If I destroy 10 enemy sat- Military Launch Systems. Having access ellites but mv enemy launches 10 more to space is also essential for the effective and accomplishes his mission, then I lose. monitoring of incidents short of war. Con- The US does not have the wartime launch trolling a crisis may require that space sur- capacity to make an ASAT attrition strat- veillance and reconnaissance assets be egy credible. changed or moved rapidly by means of in- Fourth, an ASAT war of attrition pro- expensive, quick-reaction systems. Alter- duces considerable collateral damage. De- natively, the US could maintain enough bris in a space war would act just like systems in orbit for constant global shrapnel in a terrestrial conflict. But coverage or modify orbiting assets for mul- shrapnel on earth falls to the ground in a tiple orbit changes. Although these mea- few seconds, whereas debris in space con- sures satisfy the need for flexibility while tinues in orbit—usually a very unpredict- monitoring a crisis, they do not address able one—until it hits something or falls the problem of rapid replacement if the into the atmosphere. A high-speed colli- crisis escalates. That scenario calls for an sion in space only serves to create more adequate launch capability and accom- shrapnel. Hence. Carl von Clausewitz’s panying logistics support. The Air Force is “fog of war" takes on a deadly significance already studying these matters through its in space. The Soviets inadvertently dem- responsive replacement vehicle and its onstrated this fact during their ASAT test- tactical satellite (TACSAT) programs.16 ing in the seventies, which was respon- The Army and Navy are also looking into sible for 9 percent of the space objects the use of small, quickly launched satel- currently tracked by the US military.15 lites for communications and reconnais- Conceivably, then, more US satellites sance.17 Furthermore, the British Defence could b.e destroyed by collateral damage Ministry is studying a proposal to use than by direct Soviet attack. rings of two-pound satellites (Nanosats) for communications with deployed troops.18 Help in establishing a responsive launch capability may also come from US indus- The Need for Access to Space try and research groups. Despite these formidable obstacles, mili- Commercial Launch Systems. Orbital tary leaders should judge future systems Science Corporation (OSC) of Fairfax, Vir- by how well they will contribute to war ginia, produces the Pegasus and Taurus fighting. If new systems such as the ASAT launchers. Fifty feet long and 50 inches in are truly needed to carry out national diameter, the delta-wing Pegasus uses security policy, then the services should solid propellant and resembles an over- promote them. But USSPACECOM and grown cruise missile. Currently launched AFSPACECOM should have a methodical from the National Aeronautical and Space approach to space control. If the United Administration's B-52 at Edwards A1B, SPACE CONTROL 31 California, the Pegasus is designed to put a ably, predeployment of the system with an 500-pound payload in a 300-nautical-mile inventory of standard satellite packages polar orbit. Assuming that the booster sec- could reduce this time even further. tions are already mated, launch time from The rail gun is another source of quick- arrival of the payload is six days.19 At least launch capability. The advanced applica- two launches of the Pegasus are scheduled tions group at Lawrence Livermore Na- for 1990.20 Still in the concept phase is tional Laboratory in California is planning OSC's Taurus, essentially a ground- to launch a small projectile in a 200- launched Pegasus, minus the wing and kilometer suborbital flight in January 1991 control fins, mounted atop a Peacekeeper using a rail gun known as a hydrogen gas first stage. This launch vehicle could put coil gun. The Livermore group is one of 3,000 pounds in low polar orbit or 3,700 three organizations in the US exploring the pounds in low earth orbit (due east). The use of coil guns to boost small payloads proposed timeline for a Taurus mission is into orbit. A full-scale, gas-powered coil 19 days from analysis of mission require- gun would cost about $467 million, would ments to postflight activities.21 Conceiv- be three-quarters of a mile long, and could put a 4,000-kilogram payload into orbit. Because coil guns subject their payloads to high G forces, these devices are suitable Our senior military leadership argues that an ASAT system is for launching only raw materials or necessary fo r space control, but it may do more harm than machinery.22 good. We should explore other defensive means and establish a quick, reliable relaunch capability. In addition to quick-reaction boosters, 32 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

the commercial space industry is explor- weapons could help blunt an enemy ing the use of small, simple satellites like ASAT attack yet pose no threat to other the Air Force’s TACSAT. For example, Or- nations. Kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) seem bital Science Corporation has requested best suited for this purpose. These self- Federal Communications Commission ap- gui ded mi ssi l es have a li mited range and a proval to orbit 20 small satellites (330 discriminating kill mechanism (i.e., direct pounds each) in 600-mile orbits to provide transfer of kinetic energy by collision). In short message transmission and position contrast, a nuclear or high-explosive pro- data.2J And Hughes Aircraft Company jectile has a less discriminating kill mech- wishes to launch a 250-pound, remote- anism and, therefore, greater potential as sensing, commercial satellite known as a an offensive weapon. Similarly, directed sea wide field sensor (SeaWiFS) into a energy weapons such as lasers and particle 700-kilometer polar orbit to monitor beams are quite discriminating but per- oceans for fishing and environmental haps more powerful than necessary for interests.-4 this purpose. Furthermore, their long Such efforts are a good start, but they range makes them easily adaptable to an need to be tied to a clear, cohesive plan for offensive role. space control. If this launch capability is High-value, low-orbit reconnaissance portrayed as nothing more than a desirable satellites are logical choices for KKV pro- augmentation to terrestrial operations, it tection. As with naval vessels, the US has little chance of surviving a climate of would establish a keep-out zone encom- economic austerity. passing protected satellites and warn other space-faring nations against interfering with these satellites. Thus, a KKV attack Defensive Weapons on unauthorized spacecraft would con- After establishing an operational launch stitute a defense of national property capability, the United States must protect rather than an offensive threat to other its space assets with defensive weapons— satellites. but not ASATs. Whereas most arguments advocating ASATs are couched in the lan- guage of deterrence (i.e., offense as de- Denying Access to Space fense). defensive weapons in the military sense of the term are for protection rather Only after establishing an effective than retaliation. In AFM 1-6, the United launch capability and a system for defend- States asserts that it “will pursue activities ing satellites should the United States turn in space in support of its right of self- its efforts to denying adversaries access to defense.1’25 Certainly, there is precedent space by means of offensive weapons (e.g., for this assertion. Returning to our naval ASATs). One must question, however, analogy, a carrier task force projects naval whether this objective would best be air power but dedicates quite a bit of this served by a ground-based ASAT—the type capability to protecting itself. Indeed, US currently being pursued. These systems F-I4s shot down Libyan MiGs over the are restricted in that the targets must come Mediterranean in defense of a US carrier. to them. Even the miniature homing vehi- Self-defense on the high seas is an ac- cle developed by the Air Force to be fired cepted principle of international law. The from an F-15—although theoretically de- same principle should hold true for space ployable to any air base—had to launch in systems. a specific window against selected targets. Systems developed to defend high-value Such ASAT systems have the operational space assets are both politically feasible characteristics of coastal artillery: they are and militarily useful. If they are designed quite deadly, but only if the enemy comes with little or no offensive capability, these close enough. SPACE CONTROL 33 More probably, the best way to deny ac- Conclusion cess to space is by using space-based weapons. Lupton described the use of a Clearly, current space doctrine and pub- space cruiser armed with either kinetic- lic pronouncements of military com- energy or directed-energy weapons and manders indicate that space control operated like a warship.26 In fact, both should be a high priority for US armed types of weapons would be useful. The forces. Indeed, it stands to reason that kinetic-energy weapons—the KKVs— some form of space control is necessary to would protect the cruiser, while the ensure that the US can quickly react to directed-energy weapon—either a laser or changing world events. Political and a neutral particle beam—would fire on en- budgetary constraints in the post-cold war emy satellites. The long-range feature of era. however, may preclude development directed-energy weapons makes them well of the offensive aspects of space control suited for warfare in space, where vast dis- systems until a more tangible threat tances between spacecraft would be the emerges. But the Air Force should not norm. Granted, such a cruiser would be abandon its plans for space control in the difficult to field in the short term. This ar- face of such constraints against ASAT sys- ticle, however, assumes a methodical tems. Rather, it should rearrange its pri- buildup of space capability. Therefore, orities to facilitate the development of when the time came to consider building operational launch systems and active de- such a vehicle, after the launch and defen- fense systems for high-value space plat- sive systems were in place, the step would forms, thereby establishing a foundation be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. for further operations in space. □

Notes I Lt Col David E. Lupton. On Space Warfare: A S p a ce 15. Nicholas L. Johnson. "Artificial Satellite Break-Ups Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, (Part 2): Soviet Anti-Satellite Programme." Journal of the June 19881. 127 British Interplanetary Society 30. no. 8 (August 1983): 357. 2. AFM 1-6. Military Space Doctrine. 15 October 1982. 2. 16. Neil Munro. "Air Force Eyes New Generation of Small. 3. Ibid.. 9. Multirole Satellites." Defense News 4. no. 48 (27 November 4. Gen John L. Piotrowski, "The Right Space Tools." Mili- 1989) : 3. 26. tary Forum 5. no. 5 (March 1989): 46 17. Vincent Kiernan. “Military Plans Tacsat System." 5. Ibid.. 48. Space News. 13 November 1989, 45. 6. Cen Crosbie E. Sainl. "CINCUSAREUR Places High Pri- 18. loan Wisner-Carlson, "British Study Novel Plan for ority on ASAT." Armed Forces Journal International 127. no. Softball-Sized Tactical Satellites," Space News 1. no. 9 2 (September 1989): 40. (12-18 March 1990): 6. 7. Ibid. 19. Orbital Science Corporation. Pegasus Payload Users 8. Piotrowski. 47. Guide (Fairfax. Va.: OSC, December 1988), 1. 17, 23. 9. Gen John L. Piotrowski. "A loint Effort." US Naval In- 20 Lon Rains, "Changes Prompt DARPA Request for Third stitute Proceedings 116. no. 2 (February 1990): 33-34. Airborne Pegasus Test." Space News 1, no. 2 (22-28 Januarv 10. Text of law quoted in Les AuCoin. "ASATs and Ameri- 1990) : 28. can Security Don't M ix." Defense Science 7. no. 6 (June 21. Orbital Science Corporation. Taurus Standard Small 1988|: 37 Launch Vehicle." briefing to the Defense Advance Research II Patricia A. Cilmartin. "Defense Dept, to Launch Design Projects Agency. September 1989, 3. 19, 22, 24. Competition for New Anlisatellite Weapon for the 1990s," 22. Lon Rains. "Livermore Plans Gun Launch Test,” Space Aviation Week Fr Space Technology 131. no, 4 (24 July 1989): News 1. no. 7 (26 February-4 March 1990): 3. 21. 30 23. Daniel J. Marcus, "Orbital Enters Small Satellite Mar- 12. Susan Dentzer. "The Peace Outbreak Sparks a War ket." Space News 1, no. 9 (12-18 March 1990): 19. on Defense Spending." U.S. News Sr W o rld Report 107. no. 24. James R Asker. "Hughes May Build Lightsat to Gather 22 (4 December 1989|: 52. Ocean Data." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology 131, no. 16 13. Ibid . 51 (16 October 1989): 24. 14. William J. Durch. Anti-Satellite Weapons. Arms Con- 25. AFM 1-6. 2. trol Options, and the Military Use of Space (Cambridge, 26. Lupton. 141. Mass.: President and Fellows of Harvard College. 1984). 7. THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE Lt Col Phillip S. Meil ing er , USAF

Y THE year 2000, the United States military will be completely new. The fundamental assump- tions that have governed its size, composition, and focus have been un- hinged in a staggeringly short period of time. The perception of a diminished mili- taryB threat, combined with economic im- THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 35

peratives occasioned by record budget def- mine the capabilities that aerospace icits. will produce enormous changes. weapons would need to meet such threats Whom, when, where, and how the military within the designated limits, (4) outline will fight (if, indeed, it is necessary to fight the type of force structure that would most at all) have become basic questions. It is effectively execute those capabilities, and essential that our military and civilian (5) examine the support infrastructure leaders consider this situation with open, needed to complement that force structure. flexible minds. The world will always be a This approach, though necessarily broad, dangerous place in which to live; such is is intended to generate thought on some human nature. Thus, the US has a vital in- fundamental issues regarding our Air terest in minimizing the dangers and risks Force. that it faces. The world is changing, and we must change along with it. Specifically, the US Air Force must adjust to meet the Threats challenges of a far different environment. By employing the following process, we Attempting to predict what will happen can clarify our vision of the future Air in Europe is practically useless because Force: (1) project the likely threats to US changes there are occurring rapidly and interests (as defined by our civilian unexpectedly. Nonetheless, any discussion leaders), (2) note the probable constraints of US security must address the situation on the use of our military forces that on the Continent. Because of the Soviet would deal with those threats, (3) deter- Union’s enormous store of thermonuclear 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 weapons and delivery vehicles, the USSR certainly not disappear; it may even inten- remains the major military threat to US in- sify in the economic arena. Under the right terests for the foreseeable future. Although stimuli, the Soviet economy could develop the military aspects of this threat should markedly. Indeed, a reformed Soviet econ- continue to diminish as perestroika pro- omy based increasingly on capitalist prin- gresses and the Soviets cut their forces, ciples could turn the USSR into a major they will remain potentially dangerous competitor. Even under optimistic sce- adversaries, capable of inflicting massive narios, though, the Soviet Union will not damage on the US and its allies. Indeed, become an economic giant for some time, ignoring their impressive military ca- but the country has great natural resources pabilities would be irresponsible. How- and a large population. Further, the quan- ever, the number of Soviet troops and tity and quality of Soviet military forces at- equipment confronting the North Atlantic test to the competence of the USSR’s in- Treaty Organization (NATO) should drop dustrial leaders and engineers. dramatically. Fragmentation of the War- Therefore, although the Soviet threat saw Pact will also serve to lessen tension. should decrease in military terms, at some Further, the captive nations of Eastern Eu- point in the future it may take the form of rope have always been questionable allies an economic rivalry that could eventually for the Soviets, and this centrifugal ten- lead to a renewal of the military threat. dency is continuing. In fact, it is now al- most impossible to imagine any of the Although ideologically hosed revolution supported by Eastern European countries participating outside sponsors may decrease in the future, the US military in an attack on the West. must remain prepared to deal with the ongoing threat posed Competition between East and West will by insurgency and rebellion. THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37

Such was the pattern of mercantilism and Related to the issue of nationalism and conflict in the sixteenth through nine- the quest for self-determination is the dan- teenth centuries.1 Furthermore, once the ger from people whose rising expectations Soviet Union rids itself of apathetic and le- have been frustrated. The information rev- thargic allies, its streamlined and efficient olution has permitted people all over the bureaucracy could cultivate a more power- globe to see the freedom, vitality, and— ful economy. In other words, when the So- especially—the affluence of democracy viet Union returns from wandering in the and capitalism. Millions of East Europeans woods, it may be an even more formidable have crossed their borders in recent adversary than it is today.2 We should also months merely to buy food and other keep in mind that the world’s fastest- goods unavailable in their own countries. growing economies are in Asia. Japan, Governments are bending to provide these South Korea, Taiwan, and other Pacific na- benefits to their people, but antiquated tions offer strenuous economic challenges and debilitating bureaucracies prevent true to the US. Thus, conditions are right for reform. Of course, even well-intentioned the development of economic and military governments are discovering that pros- rivalries in this region as well. perity is not a tap to be turned on and off The Soviet Union is not the only threat at will. The Western democracies, for ex- to the United States. Nationalism is an un- ample, suffer periodic and severe bouts of predictable and potentially violent force recession, inflation, and unemployment, that can easily lead to war in a variety of thus demonstrating that economics is in- locations. Nationalist aspirations of the deed the dismal science. But the peoples Serbian minority living in the Austro- of the world seem unwilling to wait for Hungarian Empire precipitated an as- sassination in the Balkans which in turn led to the First World War. Numerous eth- nic minorities remain scattered among the nations of Eastern and Southeastern Eu- rope. Clearly, their nationalist urges have not spent themselves, as indicated by events in the Baltic region and along the Soviet southern rim. Even though these movements talk loudly of democracy and freedom, we would do well to remember that the Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity proclaimed by the French Revolution led to 20 years of bloody wars that engulfed all of Europe. Moreover, the nations of Eastern Europe have often been in bitter conflict with one another for centuries. The Soviet empire and, to some extent, NATO have contained such squabbles for the past four decades; but old disputes, still smoldering, may relight once fresh air is allowed to sweep in.3

We can expect drug trafficking—including state-sponsored involvement, such as this loading o f cocaine in Central America—to be a threat for years to come. The United States must decide whether its response to this problem should include the use o f military force. 38 AJRPOWEfl IOURNAL WINTER 1990

gradual and incremental change. They nei- Drugs are big business, lucrative not only ther understand nor appreciate the va- for drug lords but also for countless garies and complexities of markets and farmers, processors, transporters, and dis- monetarism. Governments, therefore, may tributors as well. Andean drug traffickers find it increasingly difficult to keep the lid are extremely well financed, well on restive populations who, like Oliver organized, and well armed. The Bolivian, Twist, want more. Colombian, and Peruvian governments are Religious fanaticism is also an unpre- having a difficult time trying to bring these dictable and dangerous force. Weakened ruffians to heel or—in some instances— by war and the death of Khomeini, Iran’s deciding whether or not they should bring Islamic fundamentalism seems to be tem- them to heel. The US, although anxious to porarily in check, but it is not ex- do something active and constructive, has tinguished. In addition, the festering not yet formulated a coherent strategy to wounds of religious wars in Lebanon and deal with this threat, but the use of mili- Northern Ireland show little sign of heal- tary force could be an option.4 The drug ing soon. Finally, liberation theology in war could actually become a war in the Latin America also has within it the poten- usual sense of the word. We can also ex- tial for violent conflict. For centuries, peo- pect the more “traditional” forms of terror- ple have fought and died over religious be- ism involving hijackings, bombings, and liefs; apparently, they will continue to do assassinations to continue. As in the past, so. the US will be a favored target. Insurgencies have been the major source All of these threats have proven volatile of third-world conflict since World War II. and dangerous over the past century, and Conceivably, though, the theoretical basis the drug problem continues to grow. The for many of these insurgencies has been ir- potential for conflagrations affecting revocably shattered. Leaders in Moscow American interests is great, given the fact and Beijing have declared by their actions, that technology is making third-world if not their words, that Marxism/Leninism/ countries and insurgent/terrorist groups in- Maoism is not the salvation originally creasingly formidable adversaries. The thought. As Communist countries turn in- proliferation of high-tech conventional creasingly towards a more capitalist brand weapons—as well as nuclear, biological, of socialism, Communist insurgencies and chemical weapons—will soon make worldwide may begin to lose both cred- far more nations and groups a potential ibility and direction. The stunning elec- threat to the US.5 For example, the chemi- tions in Nicaragua may be the harbinger of cal weapons and delivery capability of future trends. As have-nots battle haves, Iraq, combined with Saddam Hussein's the world will always experience revolu- demonstrated willingness to use these tions, but. such conflicts may lose their weapons, have caused widespread con- ideological color. If the United States no cern. US forces deploying to the Persian longer believes itself threatened by a Gulf region for Operation Desert Shield are monolithic communism bent on world therefore equipped with chemical warfare domination, it will be less inclined to in- protective clothing and equipment. tervene in third-world conflicts. The over- In sum, the varied threats facing the throw of governments, even those friendly United States mandate that we develop a to the US, will not seem as menacing if we similar variety of responses. First and fore- realize that the Kremlin has played no most, we must continue to deter nuclear role. We cannot concern ourselves with war, since such a conflict would threaten every tree that falls in the forest. our very existence. This deterrence entails Terrorism, especially that related to the maintaining not only a credible nuclear narcotics trade, is an increasing threat. strike force, but also a sophisticated recon- Certainly, the drug problem is an issue of naissance and surveillance system to great concern to the American public. monitor arms-limitation agreements and THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 39 potential trouble spots. Second, we must Limits on the Use be capable of fighting in intense, localized conflicts generated by a civil war or by of Force border disputes occurring in an area vital More than likely, the Congress—and, ul- to American interests. Third, we must timately, the American public—will im- have the ability to launch a short-notice re- pose limits on military actions designed to taliatory, rescue, or punitive raid in reac- respond to the threats mentioned above. tion to a terrorist attack against the US or These constraints will be based both on its citizens anywhere in the world. Thus, tradition and our recent experience. an increasingly diverse, multithreat world Due to the lessening of the Soviet threat, is being grafted onto the relatively stable we can anticipate significant cuts in the and predictable bipolar environment of the defense budget over the next several years. postwar era. bringing both new hope and The American people are not militaristic new dangers. and have traditionally mistrusted large armies and entangling alliances. As a consequence, pressures will increase to cut defense spending and decrease over- seas deployments/commitments. There- fore, our ability to project military power Aerial-refueling capability, always a key part o f American from American soil—or from international air pow er, will becom e even m ore important as the number waters—will become increasingly impor- of our forward-deployed troops diminishes and we revert to power projection from the CONUS. tant. Further, we can no longer expect to 40 AIRPOWER IOURNAL WINTER 1990 maintain expensive and contentious bases mentally impatient with long wars and has overseas. Relatedly, the straitened a low threshold of pain regarding casualty economies of our allies will dictate severe figures. The loss of 58,000 Americans dur- cuts in their defense budgets as well. Dis- ing the Vietnam War caused one of the armament talks and superpower initiatives greatest societal rifts in our history. will accelerate the pressure for demobili- The “American way of war’’ is to rely on zation among our allies, on whose military technology, preferably in copious quan- strength we depend to augment ours in the tities, in order to save blood and to end event of a European crisis. wars quickly. The War Powers Resolution The United States will not start a war of 1973 certainly reinforces this and will react with a major military re- predisposition. sponse only if vital interests are directly 4. If we apply air power in lieu of threatened. Panamanian dictator Manuel ground forces, we must do it with preci- Noriega's declaration of war and subse- sion and minimal collateral damage. Even quent attacks on American citizens are the after 10 years of war in Vietnam, the Air types of actions that will produce US ac- Force took great pains to minimize civilian tivity. Moreover, the US will be reluctant casualties during the climactic Linebacker to respond to a low-level threat to a friend II strikes of 1972. This same concern or ally. We would prefer to let countries caused several pilots participating in the take care of their own problems, although Libyan strike of 1986 not to release their we may supply arms and economic aid ordnance because they were uncertain (which will generally be of the “human- whether it would hit the designated itarian" variety). This type of response is targets.7 not surprising: the American public has 5. Civilian leaders will maintain ex- not recovered from the Vietnam experi- tremely close control over military opera- ence, and our isolationist impulse has al- tions. Instant global communications have ways been strong. Indeed, recent events in- allowed the passing of near-real-time in- dicate its resurgence. If, however, Soviet formation from the field to Washington. involvement is obvious or if the area con- Thus, most of our recent presidents have cerned is vital, we may act but will do so been unable to resist the temptation to be- under the following constraints: come personally involved in military oper- ations, even down to the tactical level. 1. If possible, we will seldom provide Tales of presidential intervention in the conventional—therefore, highly visible— Cuban blockade, the Vietnam War, the ground troops. Instead, we will use special Mayaguez incident, and the Iranian rescue operations forces. Large-scale operations, attempt are well known.8 Given the high like those in Panama and the Persian Gulf stakes involved with world opinion and region, will be an exception. the sensitivity of political relations, the 2. The draft will not be reintroduced, perceived need for such tight civilian con- especially to fight the types of low-level trol will not diminish. conflicts that the future will likely bring. It is one thing to have volunteers and profes- sional soldiers, sailors, and airmen fight- ing in covert operations overseas. It is quite another thing to send conscripts to fight in foreign wars. Once again the spec- ter of Vietnam casts its shadow. Thus, we Military Capabilities can expect limits on the manpower avail- able to wage future conflicts. In order to confront threats, yet remain 3. If our ground troops are used, there within domestically imposed limits, future will be great pressure to extract them US Air Force weapons systems will re- quickly.fi The American public is monu- quire certain capabilities. THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 41

Long Range As mentioned earlier, we can no longer rely on overseas bases and supply depots. Quite possibly, future air strikes will have to originate from American soil or from in- ternational waters. Any bases remaining overseas will be encumbered with re- straints imposed by the host countries. NATO bases, for example, have tradi- tionally been limited to NATO activity: the US was not permitted to refuel at Euro- pean airfields during the airlift to Israel in 1973, and the use of British bases in the 1986 Libyan strike caused a furor in Parlia- ment. The use of European bases during

High-technology weapons, such as the surface-to-air missiles shown here, have helped to establish the US's military superiority. Unfortunately, as this technology becomes cheaper and more readily available to smaller nations and insurgent forces, it increases the lethality o f the threat they represent. 42 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

Operation Desert Shield is an exception, The rollback o f forces from Europe puts increased based primarily on the vital importance of responsibility on our airlift assets. Operation Desert Shield the Persian Gulf and its oil. Clearly, we has clearly demonstrated the importance of effective airlift in must take into account the trade-off reacting to crises around the world. between military utility and political liability. Consequently, the airlift of forces and supplies from the US to threatened areas we will turn to airlift to demonstrate our will assume greater importance. Numerous resolve and to move national resources. examples in the past several decades un- In addition, most Air Force combat air- derscore airlift’s decisive impact in both craft require an air refueling capability to peace and war: the Hump operation over reach targets or destinations anywhere in the Himalayas during World War II, the the world in a matter of hours, without Berlin airlift, the siege of Khe Sanh, the re- having to rely on forward bases.9 Thus, the supply of Israel in 1973, and the Falklands establishment of additional bases in our War, to name a lew. During crises, airlift overseas territories seems logical. For ex- delivers with a timeliness that is impos- ample, the freedom of action provided by sible for surface transportation to match. our bases on Guam greatly simplifies mili- As overseas support depots are removed, tary planning. THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43 High Tech the first assistant secretary of the Air Force The battlefields of the future at all levels of for space punctuates this trend. conflict will be increasingly dominated by technology. Indeed, battlefield lethality Stealth has increased to the point that cheap but effective weapons—such as the Stinger Electronic defenses, part of the high-tech environment described above, are driving and tube launched, optically tracked, wire aircraft ever closer to the ground, thus to command (TOW) missiles—may restore some degree stripping them of their the infantry to dominance after a 100-year unique ability to operate in the third di- hiatus. If so, the antidote to infantry domi- mension. To overcome this trend, the Air nance (including guerrilla actions) may be Force may add passive defensive measures more technology. Complexity and sophis- as an essential ingredient of all aircraft (re- tication are growing at an exponential rate connaissance and airlift included) that at- and should continue to do so for the fore- tempt to penetrate a combat zone. Stealth seeable future. technology is enormously expensive and complex but seems to offer equally enor- Intelligence mous dividends. Although not invisible, stealth aircraft present problems to enemy The rapid pace of world events necessi- defenses that, in the aggregate, seem insur- tates a continuous inflow of information at mountable. If an enemy detects stealth air- both the strategic and tactical levels. We craft, he probably cannot track them; even must be able to monitor and perhaps pre- if he can track them, he probably cannot dict the actions of potential adversaries engage them in a timely fashion. Conse- with a high degree of accuracy. (We must quently, stealth aircraft will suffer less at- not overlook human intelligence, because trition, will require fewer support aircraft in some areas and situations electronic (escorts, jammers, suppressors, etc.), will sensors and devices are simply inade- be more fuel efficient (since they can af- quate.) Furthermore, the ability to verify ford to fly slower and higher, thus allow- arms control agreements will lead to re- ing greater range and payload), and will duced tensions worldwide. In this sense, achieve tactical surprise (which enhances aerospace power in the form of sur- their destructive ability by catching enemy veillance and reconnaissance satellites can equipment and personnel in the open).10 be considered a force-protection asset. Coupled with these intelligence require- ments is the need for secure, reliable com- munications. Our military and civilian Speed leaders must be able to react quickly and Nonstealth aircraft operating over the le- then rapidly transmit their directions and thal battlefield must be able to penetrate, intentions to all levels of command. Thus, perform their mission, and egress at the sophisticated command, control, com- highest possible speed in order to decrease munications, and intelligence (C3I) appa- their exposure to interception and destruc- ratus will become crucial. The latter will tion. The absence of adequate speed over help to ensure civilian control over mili- the modern, automated battlefield is one of tary operations and lessen the chance of the main factors working against the A-10 events escalating beyond intended limits. and any potential follow-on “mudfighter.” The importance of intelligence also strongly suggests an expanded role for the Air Force in space. Though at first reluc- Payload tant to move into “the final frontier," the The fewer the aircraft needed to carry out Air Force has now decided to advance a particular mission, the better.11 There- briskly into this arena. The appointment of fore, they must carry as much ordnance/ 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

up unit costs dramatically. No doubt, the Air Force will extend the service life of its fleet by upgrading existing airframes rather than procuring completely new weapons systems. The B-52, for instance, is still via- ble after 30 years; the F-16 and its variants may have to last just as long. Similarly, multirole aircraft (such as the various models of the F-15) that are especially effi- cient in the areas of maintenance and lo- gistics will become more desirable. Cost- effectiveness will also demand increased reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) of all types. UAVs may be anath- ema to many pilots, but manned aircraft are simply not necessary for all missions, especially those that are exceptionally long or dangerous.12 The Israelis have used UAVs to great effect, saving money, lives, and resources. By the same token, standoff weapons should grow in importance. Dur- ing the Iran-Iraq War, both combatants in- Instant, worldwide communication lias been a mixed creased their use of missiles as a way of re- blessing fo r the military. Although it facilitates the job o f ducing the risk to valuable combat aircraft field commanders, it tempts civilian officials to manage and aircrews. Thus, it seems logical to events that were formerly left to their military counterparts. continue the development of highly capa- ble air launched cruise missiles (ALCM), especially stealthy ones. In short, a cargo/fuel/reconnaissance equipment as manned penetrator may be neither neces- possible. However, aircraft may become so sary nor desirable in many future valuable (thus, so few in number) that few scenarios. missions are worth their risk. Precision Force Structure Again, if aircraft are to survive future bat- To meet future challenges and con- tlefields, they must perform their mission straints, the Air Force will require a the first time, without a return sortie or smaller—yet more capable—force that em- even a return pass over the target. A11 - phasizes range, secrecy, speed, power, pre- weather/nighttime capability, exceptional cision, and cost-effectiveness. Weapons radar/communications equipment, and systems that meet these criteria, in order of smart—even brilliant—munitions will be a importance, are as follows: must. Munitions are particularly impor- • ICBM-centered deterrent forces tant: a highly sophisticated weapons car- • Reconnaissance systems (both space- rier is wasted if tasked to deliver inaccu- and land-based, including secure and reli- rate, World War II-vintage iron bombs. able communications that connect all lev- els of command) • Air superiority fighters Reduced Force Size • Tankers The number of aircraft that we can afford • Long-range bombers (whether they to field will decline because the incredible need either a penetration or standoff ca- capabilities demanded of them will drive pability bears further study) THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 45

• Airlift forces (both inter- and intratheater) • UAVs and standoff weapons • Medium-range strike forces The Air Force should take advantage of the opportunity presented by our defense reorientation by reorganizing its opera- tional units to maximize efficiency and combat effectiveness. For ease of mainte- nance and logistics, the Air Force is pres- ently arranged in wings of homogeneous aircraft: F-16s, A-lOs, C-130s. and so forth.

Commanders in future conflicts will need to "see" the entire battlefield, regardless o f the location. Airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft (below) give us that capability in the air. Whether at the tactical conventional level or the strategic nuclear level, effective command and control o fforces is a necessity. 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

(There are minor exceptions, such as com- challenge to the Air Force will be to estab- posite wings of bombers and tankers.) Yet, lish an organizational structure and an when the Air Force must fight, it generally active/reserve mix that allow it not only to does not do so in such standardized group- respond quickly and effectively to likely ings.13 Rather, planners often construct threats, but also to expand rapidly to meet force packages consisting of reconnais- contingencies. sance, strike, escort, jammer, tanker, and We should organize this structure so defense suppressor aircraft. Under the that incremental mobilization would present system, the personnel in these provide combat forces—together with their force packages ot diverse aircraft may not corresponding support forces—thereby have trained together until the actual oper- guaranteeing a “fightable” force, no matter ational mission. The commanders of such what degree of mobilization is attained. forces may not, therefore, have a thorough One portion of the reserves would remain knowledge of the capabilities and limita- at the highest state of readiness. Another tions of the aircraft under their new com- part would maintain a low capability in mand, since they have not led them before. the assigned weapons system or support This situation invites confusion and ineffi- function. Personnel would attend ground ciency on just those occasions when the schools and take part in reorientation fog of war is already thickest. flights periodically, but in the event of a crisis, they would need a short but inten- The future Air Force might benefit sive refresher course to bring them up to greatly if operational units were formed an operational level of performance. The into force packages consisting of the remainder of the reserves would be inac- various aircraft types needed for a typical tive. After training and an initial tour in strike mission. These units would live to- their specialty, personnel would return to gether, train together, and fight together. In civilian life, and the Air Force would not truth, such composite air units were the attempt to keep them current. In the event standard in World War II. The Ninth Air of mobilization, however, these people Force in the European theater, for exam- could be activated. Like rated supplement ple. was composed of medium bombers, pilots who have been out of the cockpit for attack aircraft, air superiority fighters, five years or more, they would require fighter-bombers, night fighters, reconnais- thorough requalification training (though sance aircraft, transports, and gliders. The this training would be far less time- efficiency and effectiveness achieved by consuming and costly than starting from the diverse Ninth Air Force in 1944-45 are scratch). Overall, this system would allow well known. We can re-create this type of the Air Force to maintain a smaller but teamwork and effectiveness, even if on a highly capable force that is tailored to smaller scale. Also of importance, the con- meet mid- and long-term commitments in solidation bf existing units into these new composite wings might generate savings in an effective manner. money and manpower in the long term. The Air Force might also have to make other fundamental changes to its organiza- Support Infrastructure tion and composition. Because of dimin- ished threats and increased strategic warn- Based on this need for long-term exper- ing time, we no longer need to maintain tise, the Air Force should study the issue the entire Air Force at today’s standards of of longer careers. Given the expense in- readiness; in fact, such a posture might be volved in retirement after 20 years, cou- economically impossible. Rather, we pled with the cost of more frequent re- should rely much more heavily on the re- training to accommodate the present serves and establish different levels of retirement policy, the service might be bet- readiness within that component. The ter off allowing a greater number of se- THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 47

Despite decreased tensions, the Soviet Union is still, after 30 years of service would not be potentially, our most capable opponent. For that reason, the acceptable to most officers). This mind-set US should maintain its ability to react at a moment's notice that equates professional worth with high and deliver nuclear retaliatory weapons anywhere in the world. rank must change. The solution may lie in awarding pay increases for longevity and creating jobs that emphasize individual responsibility (therefore yielding high satisfaction). lected personnel to remain on active duty Along this line, the Air Force has an out- beyond the 30-year point. Strangely, the standing reputation for training its person- Air Force has seemed intent on forcibly nel. Civilian industry considers the Air retiring some of its most capable people Force a training ground for pilots, engi- at the peak of their managerial and execu- neers, and technicians of all types. The tive abilities—indeed, just when they are service need not feel uncomfortable about most desirable to civilian industry. But if this situation, especially if it can call upon it is to fight in an environment of in- the product of its training at a later date, as creasing technological complexity, the Air described above. However, the Air Force’s Force needs experienced people. In part, efforts at educating its officers have not en- the problem is psychological. To compete joyed the same success. with industry, the services have had to People need a better education if they entice people with promises of “upward are to cope in a world that is becoming in- mobility” and career progression to high creasingly complex. Thus, the Air Force rank (the prospect of retiring as a major should encourage more of its officers to 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 earn advanced degrees and grant them sab- Air Force and the nation would benefit baticals to work at civilian institutions and from an increasingly well-educated officer think tanks. Such a policy would provide corps whose longevity would in turn the senior officer corps with a broad pur- provide needed expertise and wisdom for view of the international environment and the decades ahead. create a rare opportunity for reflection and Professional military education (PME) introspection. One criticism of this idea is also needs rethinking. For some time, ob- that it will induce the officer corps to servers have commented on defects in the think more of civilian management and Air Force PME program—specifically, that administration than of war fighting—the it tends to emphasize the principles of real purpose of military forces. Perhaps, management and administration to the but this tendency would be outweighed by detriment of war-fighting skills. In other the benefits gained from an officer corps words, PME is designed to help run a that is constantly in touch with its philo- peacetime Air Force rather than educate sophical roots and is reminded of its place warriors to fight and win future wars.14 within and beneath our country’s civilian leadership structure. Another argument against the idea of advanced education is that the Air Force would not realize an As air defenses become more sophisticated, stealth equitable return on its investment, in technology acquires increasing importance, not only for terms of either time or money. If career fighter and bom ber aircraft, but fo r airlift and lengths are increased, however, both the reconnaissance assets as well. THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 49

This focus must change. Although the Air 2. Extend the service life of existing sys- Force will always need highly trained tems and move forward with R&D of next- technical experts, it will also need broadly generation systems. This alternative pre- educated generalists because most real- supposes a reduced threat of major wai in world problems are seldom simple or uni- the near term, a gamble that could prove dimensional. (That’s why they call them costly. But advanced systems would be ’ generals” and not “specifics.”) available in the long term (20 years hence) Traditional command structures are also when the threat facing the US may in- subject to change. Despite the fact that crease. Of course, this option assumes the only 28 percent of Air Force officers are availability of funding for modernization pilots, most senior commanders come in the near term and midterm, as well as from this group. As mentioned previously, for significant R&D expenditures. On the however, the number of aircraft and air- other hand, if development and procure- crews will decrease as aircraft production ment are reduced or terminated, we will costs increase. Will this tendency reduce lose a significant amount of production ca- the number of command billets for pilots? pability, and the defense industry will The issue involved here is fundamental suffer. and defines the very nature of the Air Because neither of these options will sit Force culture. As technology and comfortably with Air Force leaders, we economics move us increasingly into may wish to pursue other possibilities. space, will the technician at the computer The key point, however, is that R&D is vi- terminal replace the person at the throttle tal to our country’s security. Technology is as the backbone of the service? one of America’s greatest strengths. We Last, research and development (R&D) cannot allow short-term budget cutting to will play a major role in the support struc- result in the loss of our technological edge. ture of the future Air Force. Our policy in Competitors around the globe are waiting the past has been to offset our numerical anxiously for us to slacken our develop- inferiority with technological superiority. mental pace so they can overtake and In the main, this practice has served us eventually surpass us in this crucial arena. well. If we are to maintain our technologi- cal lead and continue to modernize ex- isting forces, the proportion of the Air Force budget spent on procurement versus Conclusion that spent on R&D becomes crucial. Below The severity of the threats facing the are two possible options: United States is likely to diminish in the 1. Continue with the modernization of years ahead; however, the frequency, di- Air Force systems and reduce R&D. Al- versity. and technological complexity of though this proposal would ensure max- lesser conflicts may actually increase. imum capability in the short term and These events could occur at a time when midterm, it presents some problems. First, US military budgets and forces are de- the force would be at optimal strength creasing significantly and when the Amer- when the threat of major hostilities is low. ican public is becoming preoccupied with Second, reduced R&D would extend the al- domestic concerns. To respond effectively ready lengthy weapon-development cycle, to these varied and contradictory inputs, resulting in fewer weapons at higher cost. the Air Force of the future must become an Third, reduced R&D spending would lead instrument of both power protection and to an inevitable loss in the industrial base power projection, capable of performing as defense contractors turn to other proj- anywhere at any time. US air power must ects.15 This situation could have severe dominate space as well as the atmosphere; global repercussions for the American de- it must be technologically superior to the fense infrastructure. systems of our potential enemies; and we 50 A/RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

must apply the highest standards in main- not be as large as it has been in the past taining it and training our personnel to use three decades, but it must maximize the it. Characteristically, R&D, training hours, unique characteristics of air power: flex- and spare parts are cut during fiscally aus- ibility, speed, range, precision, and tere times. We must not allow this to hap- punch. □ pen. The Air Force of the year 2010 may

Notes 1 The dearest explanation of this phenomenon is in Paul is threatened by an isolated ballistic missile attack. Despite Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: international law and moral dictates, several countries have Random House. 1987). For another interesting view, see Ed- allegedly employed chemical weapons since World War II: ward N. Luttwak. “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Egypt against Yemen: Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissi- Logic of Conflict. Grammar of Commerce," The National In- dents inside Iraq: the Soviets in Afghanistan and against dis- terest. Summer 1990. 17-23. sidents in Georgia: Vietnam in Cambodia: and Cuba in An- 2. On a more ethereal note, commercialization of space gola. For an overview, see Michael Ledeen. "The Curious will intensify. The destruction of the Challenger space shut- Case of Chemical Warfare,” Commentary. July 1989. 37—41. tle dealt this process a severe blow, but the enterprise is re- The United States employed chemical defoliants in Vietnam, covering. Further, we can expect the Soviets to continue their but they were not directed against personnel. Mir and shuttle programs. The final frontier could become 6. Within hours of the start of the Panamanian operation. the most important of all commercial markets in the decades Sen Robert Dole stated that American troops would not be ahead. One analyst predicts that by the year 2000, space will "occupation forces" and that as soon as they were able to yield up to $50 billion annually in revenue, most of that "launch democracy" in Panama they would be brought coming from communication satellites. "Commercial Space: home. Leadership in the High Frontier," Aviation Week 6- Space 7. For information on the US's attempts to limit collateral Technology. 13 November 1989. 50S. See also “Space Avail- damage, see Charles H. Bogino, "Psychological Warfare Re- able: U.S. Industry Edges into the Space Race." Scientific portedly Saves Lives." Baltimore Sun. 8 january 1990. 1. American, 28 October 1989. 4. Even though civilian casualties and damage were extremely 3. One school of thought maintains that democracies do light, given the magnitude of the operation in Panama, some not fight democracies. Therefore, if the Communist bloc be- observers still criticized the US for using heavy artillery. comes more liberal, tensions with the West will lessen corre- They argued that these weapons produced "indiscriminate spondingly. A similar argument is that economic liberaliza- fire" and caused needless damage. Edward N. Luttwak. "Just tion in Eastern Europe will lead to interdependence with Cause—A Military Score Sheet." Washington Post. 31 De- Western Europe, which in turn will lead to decreased ten- cember 1989. C4. sions. These theories may be beguiling and overly facile. For 8. Stephen T. Hosmer. Constraints on U.S. Strategy in a good discussion, see Owen Harris. "Is the Cold War Really Third World Conflicts. Rand Report R-3208 (Santa Monica. Over?" National Review. 10 November 1989. 40 45; and Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1985). 48-53. The Grenada and Samuel P. Huntington. "No Exit: The Errors of Endism." The Panama operations are exceptions. Presidents Reagan and National Interest, no. 17 (Fall 1989): 3-10. Bush left operational matters largely in the hands of their 4. Michael |. Dziedzic, "The Transnational Drug Trade and military subordinates. Regional Security.” Survival. November-December 1989. 9. We are overcoming the incompatibility that exists be- 533-48. We must handle the military option in the drug war tween Air Force aircraft that employ the boom and receptacle very carefully. The Colombians, for example, believe that the system and Navy aircraft that use the probe and drogue. drug trade is more a police problem than a military one and Plans call for the entire KC-10A fleet to have both systems in- were outraged by a proposed US naval presence off their stalled. Robert Salvy and Greg Willis. "In-Flight Refueling: coast. Even before Operation Just Cause in Panama. Latin Greater Flexibility for Air Power," International Defense Re- America's receptiveness to US military involvement was view, November 1989. 1509-11. doubtful; that tendency has certainly increased. Eugene 10. Jasper Welch. "Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft Robinson. "Latins Leery of Any U.S. Military," Washington and Cruise Missiles," International Security 14. no. 2 (Fall Post, 9 January 1990. 16. 1989): 47-63. For an excellent discussion of stealth technol- 5. Twenty-seven nations currently have short- and ogy's impact on Soviet air defenses, see John W. R. Leping- intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are operational; five well, "Soviet Strategic Air Defenses and the Stealth Chal- more countries are developing them. Duncan Lennox. "The lenge." International Security 14. no. 2 (Fall 1989): 64—100. Global Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles." lane's Defence He concludes that stealth presents insurmountable technical Weekly, 23 December 1989. 1384—85. See also Barbara Starr. problems for Soviet air defenses. "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: A Basis for Control." Interna­ 11. This maxim would seem to violate the principle of tional Defense Review. March 1990. 265—67. The possibility mass; however, the experiences of the Royal Air Force of a rogue launch of a nuclear, biological, or chemical ballis- Bomber Command during World War II may be instructive. tic missile at the United States—or. for that matter, at anyone The British discovered early in their night-bombing offensive else—might be the strongest case to support continued de- that German night fighters tended to "bag their limit" each velopment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SD1). Such a time they intercepted a British attack, regardless of the num- defensive system might never be able to stop an all-out attack ber of bombers involved. Therefore, Bomber Command by the Soviet Union, but it could protect against isolated launched mass strikes to decrease their frequency of vul- launches. This scenario brings to mind the Reagan dream of nerability. By late 1943, however, as a result of German ad- sharing SDI technology with the world to ensure that no one vances in radar and electronic warfare, the British decided THE AIR FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 51

that it was safer to launch numerous small attacks rather than intertheater airlifters, airborne warning and control system a single large one. This tactic reduced losses significantly. Sir (AWACS) aircraft, tankers, and Strategic Air Command's nu- Charles Webster and Noble Frankland. The Strategic Air Of­ clear bombers. fensive against Germany. 1939-19-15 (London: Her Majesty's 14. For a comparison of the war colleges—the senior Stationery Office. 1961). 3:124-29. schools in the services' PME structure—see Williamson Mur- 12. As one "Pentagon source” allegedly put it, "If it isn't ray. "Grading the War Colleges." The National Interest, no. 6 launched from underneath an airplane wing, forget about Air (Winter 1986-1987): 12-19. Force support." John G. Roos. "'Harpy' Antiradiation Attack 15. Numerous articles on this subject appear regularly in Drone Again Seeks Elusive Pentagon Champion." Armed newspapers, magazines, and journals, but the best overall Forces /oumal International. January 1990. 79. view is in James Blackwell et al.. Deterrence in Decay: The 13. The Air Force's global responsibilities will still require Future of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (Washington. D.C.: the concentration of certain air assets in a central pool to en- Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 1989). sure that they are used most effectively. These assets include

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By calling (202) 783-3238, you can order a subscription to the Airpower Journal ISSN: 0897-0823, stock number 708-007-00000-5, and charge your subscription to your MasterCard or Visa card. Subscriptions are $9.50 annually ($11.90 for international mail). If you prefer, you can mail your order to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Payment by check, money order, or credit card is acceptable. If you pay by credit card, be sure to include your card number and type (MasterCard or Visa), expiration date, and your signature for authorization. EDITORIAL Defending the Faith

OME months ago in the pages of the crews, and aerial port squadrons are vis- Air Force Times, an article challenged ible testimony of our worldwide airlift ca- theS need for a separate Air Force. A num- pabilities. We may not have done a suffi- ber of officers responded by writing to the cient job of explaining why we need large Times in defense of their service. The re- tactical air forces even though the threat in sult of this point of controversy—and of Europe appears to be diminishing, but numerous other problems the Air Force there they were in the Saudi Arabian des- has had in recent years—is that it has ert, the first forces deployed to meet the caused others to adopt the belief held by sudden threat and ready to fight, if some that the Air Force has done a very necessary. poor job of understanding the purpose for The wav that we explain the reason for its existence and of explaining that pur- our existence needs to be addressed. We pose to others. The accusation is that, as a need to do a better job of educating our of- group. Air Force officers—regardless of ficers in basic and operational doctrine. rank—tend not to understand doctrine, We must get our heads up, out of the cock- strategy, or operational art but prefer to re- pit, and learn how to employ air forces at main immersed at the tactical level. As a the theater level and in coordination with result, these critics question the reason for land and naval forces, as well as with our existence. other air forces. Development of air strate- The answer to that question is eminently gists must become an Air Force priority. In defendable but too complex to be printed the meantime, however, airmen in the air in this brief editorial. The point is that the and on the ground are making a statement current events in the Persian Gulf have to the nation. They are demonstrating with given the Air Force the opportunity to an- their actions what they have not ade- swer its critics in a way that no amount of quately explained in words. Air power is speechmaking or letter writing can. We ready for immediate response. It is flexible have seen in this crisis the largest airlift of and prepared to meet whatever threat troops arid materiel in the history of air arises. It is—contrary to the opinion of power. Our airlift forces have operated some critics—sustainable and prepared to around the clock to position air and land meet short- and long-term threats. forces so that they are ready to aid an The next time someone suggests that we American ally faced with a serious mili- don’t need an Air Force, hand him a pic- tary threat. We may not have provided ture of an aircraft in the desert and say, enough congressional testimony to justify “Sleep well tonight. Your Air Force is the C-17, but our airlift aircrews, ground awake!’’ MAK

52 Fall 1990 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Lt Col Bruce L. Ullman, USAF for his article Officer Professional Development for Lieutenants

Congratulations to Lt Col Bruce L. I liman for If you would like to compete for the Ira C. his selection as the Ira C. Faker Award winner Faker Award, submit an article of feature for the best eligible article from the Fall 1990 length to the Airpower lournal, Walker Hall, issue of the Airpower Journal. Colonel Ullman Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for receives a $500 cash award for his contribu- the best eligible article in each issue and is tion to the Air Force's professional dialogue. open to all US military personnel below the The award honors Gen Ira C. Faker and is rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- made possible through the support of the ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winches- equivalent. ter. Massachusetts.

53 A REAL HOG WAR THE A -10 IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Capt Robert H. Brown, USAF

FLIGHT got the call at 0600 that Each aircraft in the four-ship formation of they were to stay home and rest. A-lOs was hauling two laser guided bombs At the same time, the remainder (LGB), two infrared (IR) Maverick missiles, of the squadron, except for the and two cans of cluster bomb units planning cell, was boarding a single C-130,(CBU-87), as well as 1,150 rounds of 30- as were all the maintainers and gunmm ammo, a Pave Penny laser detector loaders. They took with them all the partspod. and 480 self-defense flares in the andD ammo they needed to deploy and stay ALE-40 infrared countermeasures system. in business for the next two weeks. Later Two air refuelings later. Popper Flight that day, as the sun faded beyond the off- coasted into the objective country. shore oil rigs in the gulf, D (call sign “Pop- In the meantime, a special forces laser per”) Flight was leveling off at 21.000 feet. team lay dug in on a hill two kilometers A REAL HOC WAR 55

from the target. An MC-130 Combat Talon out for the recovery field 100 nautical had “infilled” them the night before, and miles across the border to the southwest. now all they had to do was wait. At pre- Popper Lead was about to earn his flight cisely H-hour minus two minutes. Popper pay. Lead and his wingman, in their blacked- As if the fire hose of tracers weren’t out A-lOs, silently departed the initial enough, an SA-14 surface-to-air missile point, wings level, at 10,000 feet. Exactly (SAM) suddenly rose toward Popper Two one minute later the ground laser team from near the gun pit. Lead instinctively squeezed the triggers on their laser desig- yelled for flares, and they came out just in mators. and the cue “diamond” appeared time. The threat was getting too hot for the as advertised in the heads up display AC-130 to hack the fight in its ultimately (HUD) of both A-lOs. When the cue over- predictable orbit, so it offset to the east laid the computed aiming reference, the and called in the A-lOs to silence the gun. Hog drivers pickled their LGBs. B-17 style, The special forces team was still pinned without ever rolling in. The following 27 down. Popper Lead rolled in from the seconds seemed like an eternity, but at south to suppress the gun pit. taking ad- H-hour straight up, the two bombs found vantage of his low altitude safety and tar- their mark. Two 37-mm gun pits at op- geting enhancement (LASTE) gun solution. posite ends of the long mountain airstrip He fired a rock-steady 30-mm burst for two disappeared in a blinding flash as the spe- and one-half seconds from 9,000 feet cial forces team moved toward the place away, pumping flares as he pulled off. As where the hostages were being held. Lead’s bullets hit their target. Popper Two In the meantime, as Popper Three and rolled in from the west for a high 45- Four escorted an AC-130H Spectre gun- degree dive delivery, releasing both cans ship into its orbit, Popper Lead and Two, of CBU-87. The LASTE continuously com- now rid of the LGBs and established in a puted impact point (CCIP) found its mark, high-cover orbit, engaged their autopilots and the gun pit was swallowed up this and clipped their night vision goggles time in a rippling cascade of brilliant, blue (NVG) into place. They would now get a white fire. Now back to work. slight breather as they conserved fuel and Popper Lead and his wingman climbed watched Three and Four do their “ tag back to their high-cover orbit, clearing the team” act with the Spectre down below. way for the AC-130 to move back into The special forces team, having rescued position. The Spectre crew could sense the the hostages, was now pinned down i.i a urgency in the special forces team leader’s firefight. The AC-130 stood off and desig- voice over the secure FM radio net. The nated the bunkered command post and guerrilla troops had closed to within 25 barracks w'ith its laser, allowing the two meters of the friendly position on the A-lOs to demolish the targets with IR southeast side of the compound, and the Mavericks and LGBs. Three and Four held team was taking heavy automatic weapons in a position to cover the gunship as it put fire. But the gunship’s sensors were al- down a withering stream of pinpoint fire ready trained on the enemy location. Sec- around the perimeter of the compound. onds later, the staccato report of the guer- Just as Popper Three, low on fuel, called rillas’ AK-47s was drowned out by a “bingo" and commenced the swapout with precise hail of 20-mm fire from the Lead, Two saw 37-mm tracers coming out AC-130. of the north gun pit. Lead called the gun- The special forces team was already ship to withdraw w'hile Three rolled in hurrying to the pickup point when Popper from out of the dark for one last pass to Lead heard Hitman Flight’s two-ship for- take out the gun pit with CBU-87, but the mation of A-lOs checking in with the in- fuze malfunctioned and the intact cannis- bound Pave Low III MH-53J helicopters. ter hit long. Three and Four then bugged Popper Two had just called bingo minus 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 one, so Lead started a maximum-range ing at all those Army forts in the States climb cruise toward the recovery base as was about to pay off, Popper Lead thought, he briefed Hitman on the swapout. Hit- as he set his HUD flight-path marker just man's task was to join with the gunship to short of the runway and slowed to protect the helicopters during the crucial minimum-run landing airspeed. Both air- pickup and exfiltration of the special craft stopped within 2,000 feet. When they forces team and rescued hostages to finally shut down and went to the intel- friendly territory. Twenty minutes later as Popper ap- proached the recovery strip (across the border in a neighboring country), he and his wingman went to 100-percent oxygen. The A-1E Skyraider was legendary for its special operations and close air support roles in Vietnam. Eventually forced They’d had a long night, and it wasn’t over out o f service by the high-intensity threat, it is an example of yet—they would have to land on the nar- the versatile fighter aircraft needed in today's environment row 4,000-foot strip. The short-field train- o f low-intensity conflict. A HEAL HOG WAR 57

workhorse o f an aircraft, the A-10 is available for duty was going to be a Hog war if ever there was irldwide because o f its air-refuelable capability. one. This hypothetical scenario could very well occur in contingency operations of short duration involving both special and igence tent for debriefing, the operations conventional forces—the type of armed Dfficer told them the latest news. Their conflict in which the United States is most mission had been successful, but resist- likely to find itself in the foreseeable fu- ince at some of the other objectives had ture. James R. Locher III, assistant secre- seen much stiffer than predicted. When tary of defense for special operations and the sun came up, the operation was likely LIC, remarked that ‘‘as we enter the 1990s, o continue for at least several more hours, Third World instability looms as a global f not days. For now, they and their A-lOs problem, creating threats of terrorism, in- were the only show in town. Furthermore, surgency, regional warfare, violence en- le said that the squadron was already gendered by narcotics trafficking and other jeing tasked for a wide variety of mis- forms of unconventional conflict.’’1 In- sions, such as escort for helicopter and deed, the secretary predicted that the fixed-wing airlift, combat search and res- budget for special operations to confront cue (CSAR), hunter-killer suppression of these threats will increase roughly 6 to 8 enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations percent each year over the next five years, with AC-130s. interdiction, antihelicopter despite projections that overall spending operations, and emergency close air sup- on defense will decrease during the same port (CAS), if necessary. The operations of- time period.2 tficer went on to say that what had started The A-10 is a near-perfect aircraft for taut strictly as a special operation was combatting such third-world conflicts. No Iquickly evolving into a classic low- other aircraft in the US inventory could jintensity conflict (LIC). It looked like this successfully fly the entire sortie described above. I do not claim that the A-10 is bet- ter suited for delivering LGBs than an F-lll equipped with Pave Tack or that it is a better interdiction platform than an F-15E or F-16. The A-10 can, however , de- liver precision standoff weapons to sup- press defenses or destroy hardened targets. Additionally, it can loiter for long periods of time to support an AC-130 gunship; provide emergency surgical CAS for en- gaged troops; escort airlifters to protect craft designed for special operations and them from hand-held SAMs and anti conventional airlift are more likely than aircraft fire: recover to a short, unim- ever to encounter these threats, as well as proved airstrip; and conduct virtually self- fire from heavy caliber antiaircraft artillery sustained operations out of that airstrip for (AAA). A-lOs employed in an escort role weeks, if necessary. The A-10 stands alone would greatly enhance the survivability of in its ability to perform all of these mis- conventional fixed-wing airlifters and heli- sions and more. The current and future ca- copters. That is, A-lOs can employ as a pabilities of the A-10 could make it pivotal dedicated escort to the force, fly ahead to to the success of future special operations sanitize ingress/egress routes, or perform and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC) landing-zone preparation as required. missions. With its heavy external-load capacity and GAU-8 30-mm cannon, the A-10 can use decisive ordnance to eliminate threats or Force Survival draw fire ahead of the force and steer it clear. Moreover, the A-lO’s relatively slow The proliferation of infrared SAMs airspeed makes it uniquely capable of es- throughout the third world means that air- corting even slow helicopters. These escort

\*4 & “ The C-130 (above) is one o f the most successful aircraft ever to enter the Air Force inventory. A single Hercules can airlift the maintenance personnel and equipment necessary to support six A-10 aircraft in austere conditions for a month The AC-130 gunship model (left) can work closely with A-lOs in a mutually supportive role to produce effective combat air pow er in low-intensity conflict. 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 tactics might normally be counterproduc- electro-optical AGM-65 Mavericks, cluster tive for special operations aircraft in some munitions. LGBs, and the GAU-8 30-mm purely covert scenarios, where additional cannon. The new LASTE system (already aircraft would risk highlighting or expos- purchased and being fielded) will allow ing the mission. However, in situations re- A-10 pilots not only to improve their ca- quiring a forced entry or on “Day Three,” pability to safely employ low-altitude ter- where a special operation has evolved into rain masking, but also to deliver even free- a broader conflict, an armed A-10 escort fall munitions with pinpoint accuracy could prove crucial to force survival and from high, standoff altitudes. Further, the mission success. system allows precise employment of the This concept is not new. A-10 pilots aircraft’s gun at ranges as great as two nau- have flown airlift escort for years, having tical miles.4 Thus, the A-lO’s maneu- inherited it from the A-l drivers. The verability, firepower, and IRCM suite make A-10's infrared countermeasures (1RCM), it an excellent platform for supporting air- though, are new. The 480-flare ALE-40 lift and helicopters in the SEAD/escort system currently installed on the A-10 can role. give airlifters an effective, sustained IR A-lOs employed in the SEAD mission screen against hand-held IR SAMs for long offer immense support to AC-130 gun- periods of time—whether en route, during ships. Confined to a circular, predictable an airdrop or a pickup, over a target, or orbit, the gunships are vulnerable to during takeoff and landing. In fact, the A-10 can put out a flare every three sec- onds for 24 minutes!3 In addition, it can A-10 aircraft can work in concert with special operations engage AAA threats and destroy them with helicopters on raids and other contingencies short o f war, a variety of standoff weapons: IR and providing close air support, defense suppression, and escort. A REAL HOG WAR 61 medium-caliber AAA such as 23-mm and in a target area, particularly if the scenario 37-mm guns. (Actually, the AC-130S are forces the gunship to operate during less vulnerable to the guns they know daylight. But the A-10, now armed with about and can target with their onboard AIM-9M air-to-air missiles, is well weapons than to the unknown guns out- equipped to defend itself, the AC-130, and side their orbit that can take unobserved other assets against helicopter threats. "belly” shots.) When A-lOs are in a high- cover "stinger” orbit above them, the gun- ships have at their disposal immediate, re- Firepower active firepower from long, standoff ranges to take out these threats. If the threats In addition to providing a dedicated and around the target itself are too “hot,” the potent defense against potential threats, AC-130 can stand off and, if necessary, the A-lO’s firepower complements the cur- designate the enemy weapons with its rent (and even future) AC-130 weapons laser, so the A-lOs can come in and take suite by offering an effective, proven ca- them down. Once the threat is knocked pability to destroy hard targets. The out, the Spectre can move back in and sur- AC-130 cannot destroy bunkers, hardened vive. This tag-team concept is not merely fuel-supply areas, ammunition storage hypothetical. Tactical Air Command areas, bridges, heavy tanks, and fortified (TAC) successfully directed a test of these buildings, but the gunship's versatile sen- tactics in 1987,5 and. since then, opera- sors can pinpoint and designate such tar- tional A-10 units have employed them in gets, allowing the A-10 to take them out training with AC-130s. quickly and economically. In essence, the Last, the advent of armed helicopters in AC-130 acts as a forward air controller the 1990s poses a new threat to the AC-130 (FAC), marking the target with gunfire 62 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 and/or laser, while the A-10 rolls in for the any A-10 crew chief or specialist will con kill with the appropriate munitions: LGBs, firm, the Hog is simple, reliable, and eas> free-fall bombs, Maverick missiles, Rock- to maintain, even under austere field con- eye CBUs, combined effects munitions, or ditions. While I was assigned to the 74th 30-mm munitions, as required. The advent Tactical Fighter Squadron at England AFB, of LASTE-equipped A-lOs will make the Louisiana, we deployed to a bare base in AC-130/A-10 hunter-killer combination the Central American region in 1987 with even more formidable. six A-lOs and only those parts we could In situations where collateral damage carry on one C-130. We flew a total of 509 must be kept to a minimum and where sorties with those same six jets in 44 flying AAA/IR SAM threats create an unaccept- days. able risk for the AC-130, the gunship again The ruggedness of the A-10 airframe is can stand off to acquire and designate for legendary. The A-lO’s systems redundancy the constantly maneuvering A-10 while it and “hardness” allow it to withstand bat- employs its 30-mm cannon. The A-10 can tle damage that would cripple any other orbit high above the threat envelope and aircraft. Although operations during an in- then roll in to strafe from high dive angles tense war in Europe would require the Hog to reduce ricochets and minimize the to fly into the heart of the threat envelope weapon-impact “footprint.” Loading the (and spend a lot of time there), in a lesser A-lO’s cannon only with target practice conflict the A-10 could stand off above rounds will reduce collateral damage even and beyond the threat much of the time further (since no rounds explode) but still and avoid getting hit in the first place. produce effective firepower against troops The A-10 can also operate from unim- and trucks. proved runways inaccessible to other The ultimate result of employing A-lOs fighters. Foreign object damage, insuffi- in concert with AC-130s is a force package cient runway length, lack of arresting ca- whose weapons effectiveness, mutual sup- bles, or unavailability of other support port. and survivability are greatly en- equipment do not deter the Hog. A-lOs hanced. (Such benefits are also evident in routinely deploy to short Army airfields the joint air attack team—JAAT—concept, and have even operated from dry lake whereby fixed-wing CAS aircraft integrate beds, taking fuel and ammunition from a in the target area with attack helicopters.) C-130 equipped with fuel bladders and 30- Furthermore, the A-lO’s slow airspeed, mm automatic loading systems. This maneuverability, range, and loiter time ability—together with its maintenance make it eminently suitable to work with turnaround time, payload, range, and loi- the AC-130S, whether the mission is spe- ter time—makes the A-10 ideally suited for cial oper3 tions. CAS interdiction, or armed the bare-base operations likely to be re- reconnaissance. quired in many contingency or covert operations. In addition to the missions already dis- Operational Flexibility cussed, the A-10 demonstrated during the TAC testing of 1987 that it could resupply Like other fighter aircraft in the US in- special forces teams in remote locations. In ventory, the A-10 is air refuelable and ca- that test, A-lOs loaded with supply con- pable of rapid deployment worldwide on tainers paradropped them to ground forces very short notice. However, unlike many in the field.6 other aircraft, the A-10 requires a very Furthermore, the fact that the A-10 has a small logistics support package. A single low political profile is a subtle, yet impor- C-130 can put six A-lOs, maintenance tant, attribute that should make the aircraft troops, tools, support equipment, and attractive to special operations and LIC spare parts “in country” for four weeks. At planners. It is “ low tech,” can t carry A HEAL HOC WAR 63

The internally mounted GAU-8 JO-mm Gatling gun is the most notable feature o f the A-JO. providing it with immense firepower. nukes, and is quiet (ever hear two A-lOs fly overhead at 10,000 feet?). As men- tioned, it can operate at out-of-the-way for- ward bases and is fully combat capable (thanks to the GAU-8), despite the fact that no bombs hang on the wings for TV cam- era crews to film. When a distinctly Amer- ican show of force is necessary, however, the A-10 is ideally suited to this task be- cause it is unique to the US inventory. Last, in an era of shrinking defense budgets, single-mission aircraft may no longer be affordable. Although a war in central Europe would find the A-10 per- forming close air support exclusively, LIC opens up an entirely new spectrum of via- ble A-10 missions. Not only can it perform CAS, but also it can support special opera- tions by flying armed reconnaissance, in- terdiction, SEAD. CSAR, FAC, antihelicop- ter operations, resupply, and fixed-wing/ helicopter escort missions. In the LIC en- vironment, then, the A-10 is truly a multi- 64 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

mission airplane, and it is bought and paid HUD that overlays the target. The A-10 pi- for. lot can use that cue to aim the aircraft’s gun, iron bombs, or Maverick missiles. In fact, when employed with the Pave Penny, the IR Maverick gives the A-10 an excel- Night Capability lent nighttime standoff weapon for de- Speaking strictly in terms of current air- stroying hard targets up to several miles craft capabilities, the concern most often away.7 voiced in discussions about an expanded Perhaps the least known, yet most dra- role for the A-10 in special operations and matic, capability of the Pave Penny- LIC is its alleged lack of any night ca- equipped A-10 is its ability to deliver pability whatsoever. In point of fact, how- LGBs from high-altitude, level flight (or ever, A-10s have conducted reduced-threat from a conventional dive). The A-lO’s CAS training at night for as long as the air- Pave Penny/LGB combination actually plane has been in existence. Admittedly, makes the Hog a “smart” delivery plat- though, in order to acquire targets at night, form, allowing it to drop 500- or 2,000- the A-10 must rely either on illumination/ pound bombs from high altitudes with marking devices—airborne flares, “ logs” pinpoint accuracy, without ever pointing (ground-illumination markers), or artillery- at the ground. In a special operations/LIC marking rounds (e.g., 40-mm misch metal context, this system could be especially or 105-mm white phosphorus [WP])—or effective in covert interdiction and strikes on the target-cueing ability of the Pave against hard targets. Penny laser detector. Although the A-10 can indeed work at Illumination flares work well but don’t night, it currently has no night vision ca- last long and can highlight the employing pability. Pave Penny gives A-10 pilots a aircraft. Worse, they can easily give away good target cue, but they still cannot see the position of a covert mission; thus, they the target except under flares or in the IR may often be unsuitable for special opera- Maverick video display. For delivering tions. Logs don’t give away the employing LGBs, IR Mavericks, or bullets in an inter- aircraft, and they allow an adequate aim- diction or SEAD scenario, the Pave Penny ing reference on the ground, but they are alone might suffice, as testing has shown.8 hard to see and difficult to place accu- But if the aircraft is to provide truly effec- rately. The 40-mm misch-metal rounds tive CAS for troops in contact, as well as fired by the AC-130 can be used to “spar- escort and night CSAR. it must have an kle" the target, marking it for A-10 acquisi- effective night vision device. There is no tion. The 105-mm WP rounds can be used substitute for the situational awareness in conjunction with a laser spot to identify gained by being able to see what is going the target. For example, the gunship puts on in battle. Furthermore, this asset would down a WP round to point the A-10 to- simplify coordination with the other ward the general vicinity of the target. The players, especially in terms of radio com- AC-130 (or ground/helicopter laser team) munications. This benefit was graphically then lases the target, and the A-lO’s Pave demonstrated in Operation Just Cause, Penny acquires the laser spot. The pilot which employed night vision devices places the Maverick boresight over the extensively.9 Pave Penny diamond in the heads up dis- Only in recent years have suitable night play and thus acquires the target. vision systems or devices become avail- Of all these target acquisition/cueing able for fighter aircraft. The low-altitude methods, the Pave Penny is currently the navigation and targeting infrared for night most accurate, compatible system for the (LANTIRN) navigation pod currently em- A-10 in night employment. This system ployed by the F-15E and some F-16Cs is detects the laser and presents a cue in the ideal for strike, interdiction, and bat- A HEAL HOG WAH 65

tlefield air interdiction (BAI) missions. It Bv itself, visual information from the FLIR may also prove viable for the air support in the HUD would just not suffice in many role envisioned for the A-16 follow-on cases. CAS aircraft. However, for A-lOs support- The ideal system would be a head- ing the unique spectrum of special steerable FLIRVlow-light-level television operations/LIC missions, a forward looking integrated in the pilot’s helmet (e.g., the infrared radar (FLIR)—for example, LAN- Falcon Eye system used in the A-16 CAS TIRN. Pathfinder, or LANA (low-altitude demonstrator). A simple turn of the head night attack)—alone would be unsuitable would allow the pilot to see at night in al- for two reasons. First, it would require most any direction, thus providing the very expensive modifications to the air- needed employment flexibility and situa- craft. Second, in terms of mission require- tional awareness. Once again, however, be- ments, it is incompatible with the fluid na- cause such a system would require exten- ture of many of the missions discussed sive modifications to the aircraft, it would here. A-10 pilots must be able to look probably be too costly. around in all directions to see the helicop- Helmet-mounted night vision goggles ters they are escorting, to deconflict with utilizing low-light intensifiers offer an- the gunship, or to see the target and friend- other alternative. They allow the pilot to lies and then plan the roll-in accordingly. “look around" in any direction, and they are about one-tenth as expensive as the Easy to maintain, the A-10 can operate in forw ard locations FLIR options.10 However, NVGs have had against a wide variety o f targets, thanks to the assortment of serious drawbacks in the past. Originally munitions it can carry—including the Maverick missile designed for surface forces and subse- shown here. quently modified for airlift and helicop-

ft 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 ters, they were very cumbersome and lim- more, the addition of a simple, effective ited both the field of view and visual night vision system would substantially acuity. Furthermore, NVGs were simply improve the quality of that support. To- incompatible with fighter aircraft because ward that end. Tactical Air Command is they were not stressed for high-G loading conducting an A/OA-10 technology dem- and were not safe to wear in an ejection. onstration program to examine the integra- However, NVGs now in production resolve tion of various FLIR options with LASTE, or minimize these problems and are spe- as well as various NVG options and other cifically designed for fighter aircraft. They systems improvements. We need to take offer a wide field of view and improved this technology demonstration one step visual acuity; are lightweight, streamlined further, however. TAC should conduct a (fitting underneath the visor), safe for ejec- follow-on tactics development and evalua- tion, and stressed for high-G loads; further- tion with joint special operations forces to more, they adapt to the current-issue evaluate how well an A-10 equipped with helmet and clip on and off like an oxygen LASTE, NVGs, and/or FLIR can support mask. These NVGs require no aircraft these forces in a broad range of missions. modifications other than those to cockpit In the meantime, the tactics and tech- lighting. However, cockpit lighting has im- niques verified by TAC’s 1987 test, men- proved to the point that these modifica- tioned previously, have been incorporated tions are simple, cheap, and quick (taking into the A-10 tactics volume of Multi- no more than one day). The total cost is command Manual (MCM) 3-1, Tactical well under $40,000 per aircraft." This new Employment.12 A-10 units should train generation of NVGs can provide the A-10 with these tactics in joint exercises. with a simple, cost-effective night vision LIC is the real war facing the United capability that would allow the aircraft to States today. In the A-10, the Air Force support special operations and LIC mis- possesses a low-cost, multimission aircraft sions 24 hours a day. of unequalled versatility. When measured by the vital enhancements it will offer to force survival, firepower, and operational Conclusion flexibility in low-intensity conflicts, the Clearly, the A-10 can support US forces A-10 stands alone. It is uniquely suited to on the low-intensity battlefield. Further- fight in this environment. □

Notes t. Barbara Starr. "Crucial Role for US Special Forces." 7. Spick, 33. /one's Defence Weekly, 16 December 1989, 1335. 8. Reynolds, 38 (information extracted is unclassified). 2. “Growing Role for SOLIC." lane's Defence Weekly. 12 9. Maj Harold Tiahrt II. 1st Special Operations Wing/DOX. May 1990. 915. Hurlburt Field, Fla., interview with author during Air Force 3. TO 1A-10A-34-1-1. Non-Nuclear Weapons Delivery Special Operations Command Tactics Conference. Hurlburt Manual. 1 )une 1984. 1-56. Field. Fla.. 27 March 1990. 4. Mike Spick. A-10 Thunderbolt II (London: Ian Allan 10. Capt Mark Ronco. A-10 Technology Demonstrator Pro- Ltd.. 1987). 87. gram project manager, 57th Fighter Weapons Wing/DT. Nellis 5. See Capt Scott A. Reynolds. A-10 Special Operations AFB. Nev.. interview with author. 10 October 1990. Support Tactics Development and Evaluation Final Report 11. Larry G. Hoppe, Night Vision Corp., Hurlburt Field. (U). TAC Project no. 87W-003F (Nellis AFB. Nev.: Tactical Fla., interview with author. 28 March 1990. Air Command. February 1988). (Secret) Information extracted 12. MCM 3-1. Tactical Employment (U). 1 May 1990. is unclassified. (Secret) No information is extracted. 6. Ibid.. 16 (information extracted is unclassified). Basis of Issue

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FORMS 134 A. RON AND ROMT REQUEST

67 GIULIO DOUHET

More on Target Than He Knew

Lt Col Richar d H. Estes, USAF

T WAS like leaning on a giant door emy? What are his capabilities? Will the that would not give—an isometric ex- next war be limited or general? Is it even ercise which lasted for over 40 years. possible to conduct a general war without Such was the cold war. Pressing destroying the world? Is the expected en- Iagainst the unyielding door on which the emy the one we will actually fight? Any- seemingly unmovable Russian bear was one claiming to have precise answers to leaning from the other side produced over these questions is uninformed; experts— a generation of frustration—and stability. aware of the world’s volatility—are the Now the door has flung open, and the least certain of all. But Gen Giulio Douhet, United States and its allies find them- the maverick Italian air strategist, gone selves falling through, landing with a now for 60 years, had much to say about thud, and looking up with a sheepish these matters. Although some of his spe- smile. As we get up and dust ourselves off. cific recommendations were wrong, his saying, “Darn right-about time.” we find general theories may provide a blueprint ourselves in unfamiliar surroundings. for the future. On the other side of the door we do not find an orderly society, rid of oppression and waiting for a little democratic touch- The Strategy of Douhet up paint, but something akin to Alice’s YVonderland. Indeed, the situation is so As early as 1921, General Douhet sug- dreamlike and confusing that it may call gested that the solution to the next war— for a whole new way of thinking. Gone, at whenever and wherever it came—was not least for a while, is an enemy we could to conduct it like the last one but to use count on, as well as the world stability high technology to win it before the oppo- brought about by this superpower standoff. nent can respond: ‘‘Victory smiles upon Putting aside purely diplomatic consid- those who anticipate the changes in the erations that will certainly provide endless character of war, not upon those who wait entertainment for the US State Depart- to adapt themselves after the changes oc- ment, how does our military prepare itself cur.”1 Contemporary military planners ig- for the coming era? How should we allo- nore these words—Douhet’s greatest con- cate and arm our forces? In order to pro- tribution to war-fighting strategy—at their duce a plan for the future, we must con- own peril. Indeed, we should use them as sider such questions, many of them the basis for our plan for the 1990s and seemingly unanswerable: Who is the en- beyond.

68 attacker took one minute to cross the ter- rain to the entrenched soldier, Douhet rea- soned that two attackers could overrun the position. However, if the defender had a weapon that could shoot 100 rounds per minute, the enemy would have to send 100 victims and one victor to take the de- fended ground. And if the trench were protected by barbed wire that prolonged the trip across no-man’s-land to five min- utes, 500 bodies would litter the battlefield before the last attacker took out the de- fense.3 Thus was born the concept of the force multiplier in military planning, ac- companied by the demise of the ground of- fensive (at least according to Douhet). Douhet’s calculations seemed precise to a fault, leaving no place for errant bullets or—as Paul Fussell points out in his book Douhet was a product of World War I on the misery of war—“natural forces like and witnessed all of the carnage that re- wind and weather and psychological dis- sulted when outdated tactics and strategy ruptions of purpose like boredom, terror, went up against high-technology weapons. and self-destructiveness.”4 In other words, Selected in 1912 to lead Italy’s first avia- Clausewitz’s “fog of war.” Such naivete tion battalion,2 he saw firsthand how inef- shows up again in Douhet’s bombing fective the land battle had become in total plans; nevertheless, the foregoing illustra- war between modern powers. He was con- tion demonstrates the effect of technology vinced that high technology—machine on warfare. Moreover, his conclusion that guns, poison gas, and aircraft—made war- defense had the^pper hand was essen- fare between large land armies obsolete. tially correct: as many as 60,000 troops in Further, he was certain that the technology a single battle were killed in ill-advised of land warfare favored the defense. charges, and, as a result, World War I For instance, if a World War I soldier in bogged down into what he called “crystall- a defensive position (e.g., a trench) had a ization of the lines,”5 sending the conflict gun that fired one shot per minute and the into a stalemate.

69 70 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

Thus, Douhet announced the end of the Command of the Air era when surrogate armies roamed Europe Douhet believed that, with the advent of (or anywhere else] and fought wars for technology, the army and navy had be- their countries. Technology had converted come “organs of indirect attrition of na- land wars into defensive struggles, which tional resistance.’’ The air arm, on the were destined to become stalemated, ob- other hand, could act directly to break na- viating any possibility of clear-cut victory. tional resistance at the very source. But All future wars would be either total or not just any air force would do. Douhet re- general and would involve entire nations. jected the idea of an auxiliary air arm of That is, the dirty work could not be left the army or navy or a collection of solely to the soldiers (some of whom at "knights-errant” flying fighters. Rather, he times in history had been mercenaries)— called for a fleet of massive, self-defending civilians, too, would be involved in the bombers that would dominate not only the next war. Most important, Douhet sug- gested that by giving the air force complete independence from the other services and by making the airplane the preeminent Douhet. who saw the carnage o f the World War I battlefield, weapon system in the military arsenal, air overstated his case by saying that air power would make power could become the instrument of vic- land arm ies mere auxiliary forces. Nevertheless, he still has tory in the next war.6 much to teach us. GIULIO DOUHET 71 enemy, but also the military budget of regardless of the methods—and inevitable, Italy—or any other country that would lis- warring nations should get it over with as ten to his ideas. He wanted an air force soon as possible. He was convinced that that could win not just air battles but total the populace under attack would give up command of the air. This command of the quickly: “The time would soon come air would have a debilitating effect on the when, to put an end to horror and suffer- capability of land and sea forces, which ing. the people themselves, driven by the would be relegated to a secondary role in instinct of self-preservation, would rise up future conflicts. The army and navy would and demand an end to the war.”10 remain part of an "indivisible whole” of the three armed services but would no longer be a significant factor in success- No Defense fully resolving a war.7 With the ascen- Douhet did not favor expenditures for any dance of the air force, “the history of the kind of defense against an air attack, re- war ... presents no more interest.”8 marking that ‘‘viewed in its true light, aerial warfare admits of no defense, only offense.”" Writing before the advent of .4 Giant Bomber Fleet radar, he maintained that such a defense In keeping with his vision, Douhet sug- was untenable since any given country has gested that countries maintain modest ar- more countervalue targets than it can de- mies and navies and devote most of their fend. Specifically, because no country attention—and money—to air power, spe- could determine whether an attack were cifically bombers. Immediately after com- imminent, it would have to defend all pos- mencement of hostilities, these aircraft sible targets. Even if detection of an attack would be used against countervalue tar- were possible, the enemy’s selected target gets: population centers, transportation would remain unknown. nodes, manufacturing sites, and important Given this attitude (a little surprising in buildings, both public and private. The at- light of Douhet’s vision in other areas of tendant devastation would cause the peo- technology), his answer to defense was to ple (as opposed to the military) to lose the knock out the opponent’s air force before will to fight, and the war would end he has a chance to use it; this tactic was quickly.9 his only concession to counterforce target- The earlier the air attack the better, ac- ing. (To Douhet. using planes against an cording to Douhet. He reasoned that wait- opponent’s army was useless. Aircraft ing for an official declaration of war could might kill two-thirds of the enemy troops, be disastrous because the opponent him- but the other third might still be willing to self might seize the opportunity for a first fight. Furthermore, the effort would not strike. He suggested using for the attack a stop the opponent’s war-generation ca- combination of high-explosive, incendiary, pability or, more important, affect the and chemical weapons, with emphasis on average citizen.)12 Although some of his the latter two. The explosives would be fleet of self-protected flying fortresses disruptive, the incendiaries would set fires would be lost, he felt that most would and do the real damage, and the gas bombs reach their targets. After taking out the op- (delivered last) would enhance the incen- posing air force, one’s own air force would diaries’ effectiveness by keeping fire have air superiority and could then fly to fighters away. To be sure, this combination any target unscathed. of weapons was quite nasty, and using them probably violated principles of gen- tlemanly fighting—but an early termina- Few Fighters tion of hostilities would save lives. Douhet With regard to fighter aircraft, Douhet ar- argued that since war is amoral— gued that—if they were used at all— 72 AIBPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

fighters should protect the bombers. Cer- top of the incendiaries, as Douhet sug- tainly, they should not be employed in a gested. Had they done so, and if London or futile defense of the homeland, and they some other city had burned to the ground would be completely wasted in engage- with no chance to rebuild—or if the land ments with other fighters because only a victory in Germany and the atomic bomb few enemy planes are destroyed, no land in Japan had not overshadowed the devas- is captured, and the enemy’s will is un- tation of Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo affected. All glory—no results.13 (which conformed somewhat to Douhet’s Douhet was equally opposed to using vision)—perhaps the outcome would have what he called auxiliary air forces with the been different. To this extent, Douhet’s army and the navy. Aircraft employed by theory did not get a full airing. But other surface forces would be wasted since, to examples from World War II show that air his way of thinking, the latter’s efforts power did not win the war by itself. could never be decisive. A country would The B-17, B-24, and several other air- be better served by using its resources to craft were exactly the types of platforms build more bombers. He did. however, that Douhet had envisioned to win com- favor limited use of reconnaissance aircraft mand of the air. They were relatively accu- for target selection and escort for rate, long-range bombers and were heavily bombers.14 fortified with turret machine guns for self- Like his computations for machine guns, defense. Further, they were produced in Douhet used exact calculations to deter- large numbers in a short period of time. mine the effect of individual bombing at- But both the Allies and the Axis produced tacks. He suggested that 10 aircraft carry- equally large numbers of fighters and de- ing two tons of bombs each could destroy veloped radar and accurate antiaircraft everything within a radius of 250 meters, weapons. Therefore, bombers alone were which he called a “bombing unit.’’ (Sim- unable to fly undetected and unopposed to ilarly, he used “fighter units” for protec- targets deep within enemy territory. tion of his bombers.)15 By determining the But the air war in World War II became number of bombing units required to de- so large, consumed so many resources, and stroy a given target, he was able to size his was effective in so many places (fighter de- force. Thus, Douhet attempted to make an fense in the Battle of Britain, airlift in exact science out of the very imprecise Burma over “the Hump,” naval air in the task of killing people. Marianas, and the bomber campaign against Germany, to name a very few) that Douhet’s insistence on an independent air force was vindicated. Indeed, the air force The Efficacy of Douhet is a separate military service in most na- At first glance, events since Douhet’s tions today. Contrary to Douhet’s sense of time seem to disprove his theories about priorities, however, the US Air Force re- air power. Take, for example, the German mains firmly committed to the support of blitz during the Battle of Britain. The ground forces in all of its missions, with Germans poured so many bombs on the exception of strategic nuclear opera- London, Coventry, and other targets in tions.16 The attitude of our military is that, 1940 and 1941 that if any people had rea- with few exceptions, wars will still be ter- son to lose their will to fight, the British minated on the ground. certainly did. Instead, the bombing Some point out that Japan's quick sur- strengthened their resolve and made he- render following the destruction of roes out of the Royal Air Force fighter pi- Hiroshima and Nagasaki verifies Douhet’s lots who defended their country. theory about undermining the national However, we must note that the Ger- will. For example, in 1953 Bernard Brodie mans did not use chemical weapons on wrote that, because of the ability of atomic G1UL10 DOUHET 73

Although Douhet anticipated the role o f bombers in future Douhet for the 1990s wars, he did not foresee advances in defenses against aerial attack. In short. Douhet had the same problem as today's Today, there are two schools of thought planners—predicting the future with complete accuracy. on the sizing and generation of our mili- tary forces. The first, heard around the de- fense establishment, is that our erstwhile weapons to quickly destroy the fighting enemy, the Soviet Union, may have spirit of an entire nation, Douhet was changed its intentions, but it can still de- probably more correct than ever (certainly, stroy us. Therefore, we must plan accord- though, he should not be credited with an- ingly. The second, a product of those peo- ticipating nuclear weapons).17 Others ar- ple who think that our economic problems gue. however, that the superpowers’ abil- overshadow the military situation, is that ity to launch under attack and retaliate we should relax because the Warsaw Pact before being hit precludes the possibility has folded its collective tent and left town. of establishing command of the air (except On the one hand, these views may be against nonnuclear countries; even then, complementary—perhaps we can draw there is no assurance that a third party down our military and still maintain a with nuclear weapons would not credible deterrent. On the other hand, intervene). either—or both—may be a prescription for So where do we go from here? We have suicide. seen that airplanes alone, although very effective, won’t win the big war—unless it Nukes and Uncertainty is nuclear. Nuclear powers have stale- mated each other, making the prospect of a Since 1945, at least one fact has become nuclear exchange—much less Douhet’s clear: no one knows what is going to hap- general war—remote. What then? The an- pen on the world scene tomorrow, much swer lies in “anticipating the changes in less next year or 10 years from now. We the character of war.” can also be reasonably assured that world 74 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

World War II disproved Doidtet's theory that massive raids on cities and industry would undermine the enemy's morale and lead to his surrender. Nuclear warfare, though, has given new life to his conjectures. CIULIO DOUHET 75

Douhet's vision o f huge bomber formations, self-supporting deployment of weapons in sufficient num- and overwhelming in their power, seemed to materialize in bers to maintain some sort of worldwide World War II. The bomber played a significant role in the defeat o f Japan and Germany but was not solely responsible. balance seems a prudent course of action Today, we must consider all o f our technological options and and vital to our national policy. Although not rely on any particular one as the only solution. Douhet never mentioned the concept of deterrence per se, the principle is reminis- cent of his own precepts, with a twist. peace is not forthcoming and that most That is, the advantage belongs to both countries will need some kind of military sides—not just one. Beyond the nuclear capability. Had they been polled 10 years foundation, we need to stop in our tracks ago, many people would have said that the and review every bit of past thinking to world would eventually be destroyed by find the best answers to the questions nuclear weapons. Today, however, those posed earlier. same people feel that these weapons, by The number of possible scenarios in virtue of their very existence, lessen the such a review precludes a comprehensive chance of general war and therefore are a examination, but citing a few will demon- stabilizing factor in international relations. strate the difficulty of planning for them. Although there are no guarantees, this con- First, Gorbachev could be deposed, either cept has held true since 1945, and our trig- through the political process or a military ger finger hasn’t even itched since the coup, and a hard-liner could come to Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Thus, con- power. This action might reverse the tinuation of nuclear modernization and clamor for independence that has swept 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

Eastern Europe and has moved to the Stealth technology provides one way o f preparing for Soviet republics. Second. Eastern Europe, multiple and changing threats. Capable o f performing in the maximum-threat environment because o f its radar-evading chafing under the rule of ill-chosen capabilities, the stealth aircraft is valuable in other areas of popular leaders, could find itself in civil the spectrum o f conflict as well. war from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Third, Soviet republics could take the Lithuanian model to the extreme and elect open revolt. Thus. Gorbachev or his suc- cessor could find himself running, as Last, the US and USSR could become al- George Will said, “the Duchy of Moscow” lies in a war in the Middle East or in one (but perhaps with a finger still on the nu- against nuclear-armed terrorist nations, or clear trigger). Fourth, the two Germanys, African nations engaged in border and moving inexorably toward reunification, food wars. Which scenarios are likely? We could withdraw from NATO—shattering just don’t know. One man in power at the that organization—and become a real or right place can make all of the difference— perceived threat to the rest of Europe. witness Stalin, Ceausescu. Noriega, Castro, Fifth, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact coun- and Hitler. Therefore, the US must use the tries could join NATO or some new al- most complicated of all force-structuring liance while the USSR festers in civil war. strategies: hedging. G1UUO DOUHET 77

W' av' s. Means, and Ends In the event of such a buildup, having By hedging, we mean the management of the most modern systems on the produc- risk to our national interests. Any strategy tion line would require only a surge, rather is a balancing of desired outcomes (ends) than a retooling, when time may be of the against ways and means to accomplish essence. In a drawdown like the one we those ends. Risk is the mismatch between are in now, Congress must fund the most any of the three elements. When military advanced systems available (including suf- planners seek to minimize risk, they must ficient modern airlift and sea lift). Sad- address several matters: perceived threat, dling a reduced force structure with sys- possible scenarios, available technology, tems from the last war would be a fatal direction of planning influence (top down mistake. Not only must we modernize, but or bottom up), mission, and money also we must reshape our thinking. That is available. how the United States should hedge. Traditionally, the US has used the per- Douhet would be proud. ceived threat as the basis for military plan- ning. When possible threats outnumber any conceivable mix of forces, we use a To the Future with Douhet “level of effort’’ approach—assigning available forces to perform at a certain We have spent the past 40 years trying level, regardless of the threat. Defense of to envision what a war in central Europe the continental US is an example. All of would be like. Perhaps we should stop the other factors weigh in at some point in thinking of that location as the most likely the planning process, but the second most place for the next war. Relatively speaking, notable element (in addition to threat) is we may be at the same point in modern the monetary one. warfare that Douhet found himself in We would like to have enough forces to World War I. That is, just as nineteenth- meet the threat with minimum risk, but century weaponry was no match for the the available dollars usually do not allow machine gun, perhaps twentieth-century that luxury. One does not need a Phi Beta combat aircraft are no longer any competi- Kappa key to realize that reductions to the tion for modern-day defenses—at least in a defense budget are in the offing. The per- maximum-threat environment. Like ception, accurate or not. is that the threat Douhet, we should redirect our attention has gone south, so the military needs and look for the next leaps in technology, fewer bucks. With that as a given, avail- some of which are already here: long-range able finances must not be used to sustain standoff weapons, accurate tactical ballis- an artificial troop level that was never tic missiles (heretofore anathema to Air enough in the first place to match up with Force planners), drone aircraft, and stealth Warsaw Pact forces. That is, the fact that technology. We should, however, continue the US is morally opposed to using its to include aircraft in plans that we draw troops as cannon fodder obviates any pos- up to counter sophisticated threats, regard- sibility that we can ever outnumber the less of the risk. But we should realize that forces of a country that is less scrupulous they will most likely be used to dominate about its troops. Consequently, we are left a limited war. We should have no aversion to hedge our bets and apply money where to using B-2s (which would still be ear- it will most likely have some effect. Spe- marked for our nuclear forces) in a con- cifically. we can invest in superior tech- ventional role against Libya or F-117s nology and readiness for the next war. Our against Panama. Because we frequently people must be happy, well equipped, have air superiority in a limited war and flexible (ready to go anywhere since they because such high-tech aircraft are highly may not be prepositioned), and prepared survivable, the chances of losing them are for the buildup when and if it occurs. remote. Furthermore, these aircraft could 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 also survive the higher threat presented by must not neglect the other two legs of the a war in central Europe—at least until the triad. We need to keep thinking, because next leap in defensive technology comes technological advancements in one leg of along. Employment of these platforms the triad may make one of the others ob- could very likely lead to an early cessation solete. For instance, perhaps a dyad of of hostilities and the saving of lives, much stealth bombers and submarine-launched as Douhet envisioned. missiles—or some other combination—is Finally, we must continue to pursue the ticket for tomorrow. technological improvements in the nuclear The world changes. The military that triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles, does not change with it or that is guilty of manned bombers, and submarine- outmoded thinking can no longer be effec- launched ballistic missiles) since it is our tive. Although Douhet’s theories have not insurance policy against major war. For borne up in a number of critical areas, he the moment, our focus should be on the was right on target with a statement that Trident D-5 missile, which will provide still speaks clearly to us: “Those nations undetected hard-target kill. But as technol- who are caught unprepared for the coming ogy moves forward, it seems almost a fore- war will find, when war breaks out, not gone conclusion that some day the oceans only that it is too late for them to get ready will become transparent to defenses, and for it, but that they cannot even get the we must plan for that contingency. We drift of it.”18 □

Notes 1. Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air. trans. Dino 9. Ibid.. 57-58. Ferrari (1942; new imprint. Washington. D.C.; Office of Air 10. Ibid., 58. Force History. 1983), 30. 11. Ibid.. 55. 2. Lt Col William H. Tomlinson. "The Father of Airpower 12. Ibid.. 188. Doctrine." Military Review. September 1966. 28. 13. Ibid.. 41-46. 3. Douhet. 158. 14. Ibid.. 121. 4. Paul Fussell. W artime; Understanding and Behavior in 15. Ibid.. 35-41. the Second World War (New York; Oxford University Press. 16. See. for instance. Gen Robert D. Russ, "The Air Force, 1989). 15. the Army, and the Battlefield of the 1990s." Defense 88. July- 5. Douhet. 159. August 1988, 12-17. 6. Ibid.. 34. 17. Dr Bernard Brodie, “The Heritage of Douhet," Air Uni- 7. Ibid.. 187-88. 198. versity Quarterly Review. Summer 1953, 69. 8. Ibid.. 394. 18. Douhet. 30. RICOCHETS 79

Ricochets How did Thailand overcome the problem, continued from page 3 and how can the Philippines benefit from the Thai lesson? A backer of the Young Military Of- ficers Group was Prem Tinsulanond, a Thai C2C Diego M. Wendt’s article “ Using a army commander. With the young revisionists' Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat” reflected many support, Prem became Thailand's new prime of the reasons that US strategy in counterin- minister. Prem promoted the advancement of surgency warfare failed in Vietnam. After democracy in the hinterlands. It was the begin- spending the better part of a decade in the ning of the end for the Communist Party of western Pacific, I can immediately think of two Thailand (CPT). Instead of setting his primary recent problems involving Communist sights on the Communist rebels, Prem targeted insurgency—the Philippines and Thailand. A the underlying causes of the rebellion. Instead few years ago, while I was TDY to Mindanao, of an army that sought only to “search and de- the Philippines, a hotel receptionist told my stroy” Communists, the Thai army concen- group that her husband had been murdered trated on development of the rural countryside. four years earlier. When queried about who had National development became the army's done it, she replied, “NPA [New People’s number-one priority. This, coupled with mass Army], the military, what’s the difference?” mobilization—a tool used by the Communists While the current situation may have improved in the past—was the key to their demise. In- somewhat under President Corazon Aquino, stead of just army units, local militias were the Philippines may want to take a chapter formed to provide civic action projects, road- from Thailand’s success in dealing with Com- building projects, and agricultural projects, as munist insurgency. well as provide protection for these new re- Although the reasons for each insurgency are sources. An active psychological-warfare cam- similar, the outcomes have been quite different. paign was instituted throughout the country. Communist roots in the Philippines can be Communist defections became a flood, the CPT traced to the Hukbalahaps, who fought the Jap- lost popular support in the countryside, and anese during World War II before taking up their movement failed. arms against the Philippine government. The Perhaps an in-depth study by the New Communist insurgency in Thailand had its Armed Forces of the Philippines into the Thai roots even before the coup that toppled the ab- solution to their Communist insurgency, cou- solute monarchy in 1932. The earlier establish- pled with an effective land-reform program, ment of commercial agricultural operations in will bring an end to the New People’s Army, both Thailand and the Philippines created a the National Democratic Front, and the Com- population of heavily indebted, landless peas- munist Party of the Philippines. Most of all. let ants that became a cradle for insurgency. us hope that it brings peace and prosperity to a Another similarity between the Thai and land that has never had much of either. Philippine situations was the military estab- lishments in both countries. Upper-echelon MSgt Stephen G. Southerland, USAF military officers got promoted as "favors” from Scott AFB, Illinois the central government. Front-line officers and noncommissioned officers, who bore the brunt of the Communist rebellion, suffered stagnant careers because of favoritism. This caused the MORE KUDOS FOR OUR AUTHORS formation of the Young Military Officers Group in Thailand in 1973, similar to the formation of I enjoy high-tech military thriller books. Tom the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) Clancy and Dale Brown are among my favorite in the Philippines. Both groups were concerned authors. Lately, I’ve found many articles in the that corruption and political favoritism would Airpower Journal, such as “Air and Space ultimately result in success for the Commu- Forces: The One Endures as the Other nists. In Thailand, three years of upheaval try- Emerges" (Spring 1990), that satisfy my reading ing to establish a parliamentary democracy led taste. I just want to say thanks to all of you who to mob violence in 1976 and a return to mili- have contributed to the publication. tary rule. The government’s situation in Thai- TSgt Alan D. Paylor, USAF land was ideal for Communist adventurism. Zweibriicken AB. Germany net assessment

Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz by job done, often in the face of serious diffi- David R. Mets. Novato, California 94949: Pre- culties. Contemporary service leaders and sidio Press, 1988, 448 pages. $22.50. junior officers could benefit from an examina- tion of Spaatz’s career. This type of personal as- David Mets, with the sponsorship of the sessment is especially valuable today, when the Aerospace Education Foundation and the Air USAF faces challenges to its doctrine and force Force Historical Foundation, has written a wel- structure. Indeed, these challenges may rival come and valuable addition to the literature of those encountered in the interwar years when air power. Master of Airpower is a well-written the Air Service/Air Corps struggled to establish and readable study of the evolution of Ameri- an organizational identity and gain adequate can air power as it developed as part of the funding from Congress. The primary problem Army and emerged as an independent US Air with using Carl Spaatz as a role model is that, Force in 1947. Mets uses the experiences of like many of the founding fathers of the Air Gen Carl Spaatz, a major actor in the growth of Force, he was an outspoken maverick and defi- American air power, to trace the development nitely not a spit-and-polish military officer. He of US aerial combat capabilities and concepts was a doer who aggressively attacked problems from their origins within a limited support arm and sometimes made mistakes (which would of the Army, through the frustration of creating likely kill the career of a modern USAF officer). a combat force in World War I and the chal- He was respected for his skills and allowed to lenges of the interwar years, to the maturation overcome his mistakes to rise to the top of his of the US Army Air Forces during World War profession. Thus, Spaatz effectively led large II. The reader is treated to a well-guided tour of combat forces in war and served as the first the growth of theory, doctrine, and organization chief of staff of the independent US Air Force. of American land-based air power. Although This story of Gen Carl Spaatz is an important some areas are given rather brief treatment, one and is recommended reading for all mem- such as the formation of an independent USAF, bers of the USAF. as well as anyone interested the work serves as a solid survey of doctrinal in air power. David Mets has produced an ad- and organizational history. mirable study of the roots of modern air power The book is a bit less satisfying in its stated doctrine. Members of the modern Air Force can purpose of studying an important man—Carl better understand the present by understanding Spaatz. This reader constantly wanted to know the origins of basic organizational perspectives. more about Spaatz—his opinions, emotions, The insights to be gained from Master of Air- and struggles with difficult issues. Mets does power, together with the steadily growing col- an exceptional job of placing Spaatz in the con- lection of books on the evolution of air power text of his times and of explaining the rationale and on great air leaders, allow today’s leaders— for some of Spaatz’s key decisions and posi- and tomorrow’s—to take a step towards better tions on evolving doctrinal issues. However, leadership and victor)' in any conflict. By heed- Spaatz himself remains somewhat two- ing these insights, we ensure that we "know dimensional and a bit of an enigma. A stronger ourselves”—one of Sun Tzu’s key prerequisites development of Spaatz's personal views and for victory. concerns on such controversial events as the pre-Normandy bombing campaign, the bombing Lt Col Jerome V. Martin, USAF of Dresden, and the decision to drop the atomic USAF Academy. Colorado bomb could have added much more depth to the personality of a truly great air leader. Spaatz does emerge from this study as an in- teresting role model for air leaders. Although Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Un­ often pictured as a doctrinal conceptualizer, conventional Warfare, 1918-1988 by Philip Spaatz appears in this book as—above all else— A. Towle. London: Brassey's Defence Pub- a strong, pragmatic leader who always gets the lishers, 1989, 212 pages, $53.95.

80 NET ASSESSMENT 81

The notion may surprise some people, but wide visibility, features particularly important professional historians do have a certain value. for aerial reconnaissance. Military operators tend to be pragmatists— • From the insurgent point of view, an effec- relying on direct experience, taking each task as tive counterair campaign can be waged by it comes, and priding themselves in having using selective ground attacks on air bases to their feet on the ground. Although this trait is destroy aircraft and kill pilots. important for confronting the often brutal com- • If guerrillas enjoy air superiority, as they plexities of warfare, it can be limiting— did in Yugoslavia in 1944, the combination of prompting them to miss the forest for the trees. air power and mobile guerrilla tactics can dev- Historians, by contrast, can analyze a wide vari- astate conventional defenses. ety of such experiences and synthesize the • Insurgents should make government air lessons learned into useful conclusions for fu- strikes appear indiscriminate and excessive in ture action. their use of force, even if they are not. Insur- So it is with Philip Towle’s book. Towle, a gency, after all, is a war of perceptions. historian and fellow at Queen’s College. Cambridge University, takes us on a well- This last point suggests perhaps the most im- written, succinct, historical tour of the French, portant lesson: for the government side, fire- British, American, and (briefly) Soviet experi- power must be used judiciously at the right ences with air power in guerrilla warfare. He time and place and in the right amount. The show's how aircraft were used in imperial polic- use of massive firepower to handle insurgent ing in India, Africa, and the Middle East; in problems is very tempting, yet this tactic can supporting resistance movements during World quickly reach a point of diminishing returns. War II; and in fighting the multitude of insur- Bombing the Iraqis in the 1920s, for example, gencies that infected international relations af- had a tremendous psychological impact, but ter 1945. ranging from Greece to Afghanistan. only until the novelty wore off. In the long run, The portrait is fascinating; the author weaves a the liberal use of firepower tends to create more good tale. The reader sees both the successful guerrillas than it kills. As British and American uses of air power, as with the British in Iraq experiences show, it also can lead to interna- (1920s) and Malaya (1950s), and its failures, in- tional criticism and loss of public support. cluding the French and American experiences This thought is not a new' one, and much has in Vietnam. The history is good, but the lessons are even been said in recent literature on low-intensity more compelling. To some readers, these conflict about the relatively greater importance lessons may be disappointing. People who love of the “administrative function” of air power— airplanes want their weapon systems to be fast, airlift and mobility. Towde points out, how'ever, sophisticated, heavily armed, and manned. The that even these aspects have their limitations, record shows, however, that this desire often as shown in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu. Raw' blinds us to practical alternatives for handling firepower may take second place, but it is still a real problems. Based on his review of air critical element at key moments. Time and power’s 70-year history with unconventional again, the destructive capabilities of air power conflicts. Towle hazards conclusions about air- have provided the margin of strength necessary craft in insurgencies from the point of view of for friendly forces to corner and defeat guer- rillas or to extricate friendlies from untenable both government and insurgents. Some situations. examples; As always, the real solution in conflicts of this nature is to meet the opponent’s political • From a government point of view, air grievances. This doesn’t mean being co-opted power can be the great equalizer against highly by the opposition. Rather, it involves (1) under- mobile guerrilla units, but it cannot defeat an standing why people take up arms and (2) miti- insurgency by itself, particularly one supported gating the cause. Towle points out that the flex- by the majority of the population. ibility and versatility of air power directly serve • Insurgency is a test of endurance. For this this end by enhancing a friendly presence reason, cheap or obsolete aircraft often have throughout the area of concern. Further, appro- been more durable and useful than expensive, priate cooperation between component services sophisticated ones. can prove useful in this endeavor. For example, • The ideal counterinsurgency aircraft is one ground-force control of discrete air force with a slow stalling speed and a cockpit with units—which appears to violate the Air Force’s 82 A/RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 doctrine of centralized control—is often the op­ Force—all at the same time—on five different timum arrangement when guerrillas alone are radios. Thirty-three pages later, this FAC mis­ the opponents and there is no significant air-to- sion is accomplished, as an exhausted Harrison air threat or little conflict in selecting target is wearily dragged from the cockpit by his crew priorities. chief. Just another day—Harrison’s 69th—of the Towle’s book is important for the profes­ year-long tour. sional officer in understanding how to use air This outstanding first-person experience con­ power. It is well indexed and has a good bibli­ trasts in perspective to the two other popular ography. Also quite interesting is the appendix, Vietnam-era books about forward air control­ which describes 75 aircraft types used in guer­ lers. Bat-21, by William C. Anderson, was writ­ rilla war since World War I. Towle’s volume ten from the viewpoint of a downed airman de­ should he part of the library of any officer hop­ pending on a FAC for survival and rescue. ing to divine the role of the Air Force in the Christopher Robbins, neither a FAC nor a pilot, twenty-first century. wrote The Ravens, based upon a collection of pilot experiences from Raven FACs, but he Lt Col Richard L. Davis, USAF really wasn't there. Marshall Harrison, Washington, D C. however, lived the role and told the story from the actual, lonely perspective of the airborne forward air controller. Air-to-ground war stories don’t get much bet­ ter than this one. The account follows a famil­ iar path, beginning with stateside checkout as A Lonely Kind of War: Forward Air Controller, an instant fighter pilot in the AT-33 and his Vietnam by Marshall Harrison. Novato, Cal­ FAC upgrade in the OV-10. The tour continues ifornia 94949: Presidio Press, 1989, 285 with “snake” (jungle survival) school at Clark pages, $18.95. Air Base, the Philippines, and FAC “U,” his in­ Yes. Read this one. A Lonely Kind of War is a country checkout. Next, we witness the visceral brisk, assimilating account of Harrison’s daring, experience of a journeyman FAC, crowned by dirty, respectable tour of duty as a forward air his tactical air support of the war in Cambodia controller (FAC) in Vietnam during 1969. Based that wasn't supposed to be going on “over the upon my own experience—same time, same fence.” country—Harrison kept the faith with the FAC Harrison keeps his view of the mission clear. brethren. By changing a few names, tinkering a It boils down to short rounds versus haircuts. tad with some geographical places, and not crit­ The FAC’s ultimate goal in close air support is icizing the fighter pilots too badly, he tells the accurately controlling fighters to drop ordnance real story without pointing fingers at actual on the bad guys, in close proximity to—but personalities. never “short" on—the good guys. FACs learn to The book commences with the statement channel attention on the mission and not sweat ‘‘The radio came alive with the flight leader’s the small stuff. When you spend your tour voice just as I saw them.” In a no-kidding, sweating with the Army, living in and flying there-I-was way, you are thrust into a vivid from the dusty, muddy forward echelon, en­ slice of combat life. With Harrison grappling trusted with the singularly independent re­ the controls of his OV-10 and skimming the sponsibility of controlling dozens of trees at 140 knots, you begin to realize he is the multimillion-dollar fighters that are dropping central player in a genuine “goat rope” of a bombs in close proximity to fellow Americans, troops-in-contact air strike. He twists and gy­ it seems grossly out of proportion to be told to rates above a foreboding jungle, while dodging get a haircut by some rear-echelon headquarters monsoons and tracers from an unseen enemy. weenie. He listens to the crackling, screaming voice of Some of the characters may seem a bit stereo­ the pinned-down US Army patrol leader. He typed, but that’s just the way men behave dur­ commands the 500-knot fighter-bombers while ing a war: some guys become John Wayne, surgically stitching rounds from an anxious ar­ some don’t cut the program, and others just tillery battery. He diplomatically placates the manifest their own personalities. But all be­ prickly old fart of an airborne brigade com­ come vivid characters. Harrison makes it easy mander. And he orders more ‘‘tactical air” from to visualize the crusty US Army brigade com­ his own base-camp radio link to the Air mander, cowboying around in his helicopter, NET ASSESSMENT 83

microleading a platoon and every echelon in One Day in a Long War: May 10, 1972, Air between. You can also picture the fast-track War, North Vietnam by Jeffrey Ethell and academy type who can’t overcome his fears. Alfred Price. New York 10022: Random Harrison packs him off to join the ranks of the House, 1989, 217 pages, $18.95. air-conditioned staff pukes in Saigon. Not forgotten are Harrison's own frustrations. He was initially humbled during his in-country One Day in a Long War is an airman’s book. checkout by the frenzied pace of forward air Recapitulating the events that happened in the combat. Later, in a shockingly personal epi­ air war over North Vietnam on 10 May 1972— sode, he recalls survival procedures in his des­ the opening day of Linebacker 1—this book sup­ peration after being shot down. Finally, we see plies the tension and excitement that is missing that it was hard to live with flying the “big from the official Air Force study (The Tale of lie”—supporting the CIA’s out-country war in Two Bridges: The Battle for the Skies over Cambodia without the open support of the North Vietnam). The difference between the American people. But, like a good soldier he sa­ two books is the fact that One Day is based pri­ luted, said, “Yes sir,” and did the job. marily on recorded cockpit conversations, di­ Harrison’s experience is appropriately woven aries, and interviews. with the acid wit of combat humor, including Writing this book in a journalistic rather than the incident about the unfortunate pilot at an academic style makes it a "quick read." One jungle-survival school who, while sleeping, got Day is a chronological narrative of the events bit on the lip by a Hershey-bar-loving rat. Al­ occurring on 10 May—from midnight to though deadly serious, he draws chuckles over midnight—as viewed from the cockpit. This the assault on the cobra that commandeered the perspective gives it the excitement missing urgently needed bunker during a rocket attack. from the USAF publication, which was written And his experiences with some of the Aussie from a more detached viewpoint. Also adding pilots who served combat FAC tours flying to the book’s interest are the observations from USAF light aircraft are uproarious. About the French journalists and the British consul gen­ only thing he left out was the Air Ground Oper­ eral, which provide the picture as seen from the ations School at Hurlburt Field. Florida. Like ground in North Vietnam. the rest of us who were bored with a ground One Day is one of those rare books that can be appreciated by both the general reader as school about how to FAC with the Army, he well as the experienced airman. On one level, it probably slept through it too. is a very basic book, taking pains to explain Other than savoring the daring exploits of the things to the general reader, such as the reason FAC, why read the book? What does the con­ that the Paul Doumer Bridge presented a tough temporary Air Force officer need to know about target and the differences between the various FACs? The FAC force is dying. It took about 20 types of aircraft ordnance (electro-optically years to exhaust all their combat experience. guided bombs and laser guided bombs). With Guys who stayed in the tactical air control sys­ this help from the authors, the person ignorant tem rarely got promoted to lieutenant colonel, of air combat operations quickly "learns the much less colonel. No new dedicated FAC air­ lingo” and is able to follow the movement of craft have entered the service since the OV-10 the narrative without feeling overwhelmed by (the OA-10 was reroled). The same thing hap­ technical terms. pened after World War II and Korea, which is On another level, from the standpoint of the why we began Vietnam performing forward air air tactician or the aircrew member, the cockpit control in O-ls. Will we need the airborne FAC chatter is invaluable in studying what works again? Maybe. Even if sensors and snooping and what does not in air combat. The descrip­ platforms become extremely sophisticated, get­ tions presented are of dogfights as seen from ting current target information cranked through the cockpit, which are much different than the the intelligence “fusion" process will always be third-person accounts usually found in official frustratingly slow. Nothing can replace the hu­ histories. One comes away from this experience man "eyes of the fist" above the battlefield. The with the definite feeling that the aircrews were FAC experience is worth keeping alive; Har­ shortchanged by the reliance on air-to-air mis­ rison tells it like it really was. siles to the exclusion of aircraft cannon. The conclusion presented by the authors is that, Lt Col Dion W. Johnson, USAF had the fighters been provided with cannon, Camp H. M. Smith. Hawaii their kill ratio would have been much higher in 84 AIHPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

encounters too close for the use of missiles or High Honor: Recollections by Men and Women in those instances when the missiles turned out of World War II Aviation by Stuart Leuthner to be “duds” (particularly significant in light of and Oliver Jensen. Blue Ridge Summit, Penn­ the statistic showing a reliability rate for the sylvania 17294: Smithsonian Institution missiles that ranges as low as 15 percent). Press, 1989, 402 pages, $19.95. The authors succeed remarkably well in striking a balance between the Air Force and Navy flight operations on that day. In fact, one Although 45 years have passed since the end of the primary points made by the authors is of the Second World War, interest in this con­ that the Navy initiated training at its “Top flict seems to be stronger than ever—witness Gun" school just prior to Linebacker, but its the steady stream of books on the subject. With worth could not be assessed until large-scale so many new titles to choose from, it is natural air-to-air combat resumed—which it did in this to ask what makes High Honor by Stuart Leut­ operation. Their conclusion was that Top Gun hner and Oliver Jensen particularly deserving did prove its worth, in terms of both lives and of the reader’s time and energy. The best an­ aircraft saved. swer is that few books have so comprehen­ For this reader, the book had three high sively captured the rich variety of American points. One, of course, was to be able to read military aviation in World War II. Here the the thoughts of the crews as they engaged in air reader comes as close to experiencing it first­ combat. One can remember all the stock footage hand as one can without actually having been of air combat scenes in years of official Air there. Force news films, but with this book the reader In their own words, 28 men and women tell t an better experience the fear and anticipation their stories—a little about their lives before the in the cockpit. Another high point was the in­ war. their role in aviation during the war, and formal decision by some of the pilots to “alter” the effect that their wartime experience had on their egress plan from Hanoi in order to fly over them after the war. The planes they flew repre­ the “Hanoi Hilton” and cut loose with sonic sent virtually every conceivable kind of booms over the prison in order to let the POWs aircraft—fighters, bombers, naval aircraft, and know they were not forgotten. (But it was dis­ even transports and gliders. appointing to learn that the POWs did not hear Twenty-two of the 28 are aviators—pilots, the "sonics” over the din of battle.) Finally, one navigators, bombardiers, gunners—but to paint of the most emotionally moving highlights was a more complete picture, Leuthner and Jensen the chapter devoted to Capt Roger Locher’s 23 have also included the experience of a number days on the ground in North Vietnam evading of aviation support people whose essential role the enemy forces, and Gen John Vogt's human­ has often been overlooked. These include an itarian decision to pull 119 aircraft from their aircraft carrier landing-signal officer, a crew combat missions to rescue Captain Locher. A chief, a flight surgeon, and an aircraft assem­ common theme in these latter tw'o points is the bler. For the most part, the recollections are in strong sense of solidarity the reader senses be­ chronological order. They are also helpfully tween the members of that exclusive club of grouped by branch of service and type of flying. aircrew members—in particular, the esprit de Leuthner and Jensen have succeeded admira­ corps among aircrews as a factor in maintaining bly in accomplishing their stated goal: "to ex­ morale. In fact, the supreme importance that amine not the war itself but the memories of a General Vogt placed on morale was the guiding handful of flyers who survived.” These memo­ factor in his decision. ries prove fascinating indeed. From Gerrit This book makes an outstanding contribution Roelofs we learn the intricacies of landing a tor­ to the history of air power bv making available pedo plane on a tiny escort carrier rolling in to the reader a primary historical source—the heavy seas. Baldwin Smith, a carrier landing- participants’ thoughts while engaged in com­ signal officer, exemplifies the combination of bat. But its greatest value is its ability to leave athletic and acting ability needed to project the reader with a taste of what it felt like to be landing instructions to pilots across hundreds an aircrew member in “the most concentrated of yards of ocean. Kenneth Carlson, a B-17 nav­ skv action ever fought over North Vietnam"— igator, describes the sense of unreality he felt one day in a long war. the first time he saw a plane shot down—“no sense of feeling or sound ... not really seeing Ronald Callahan the real thing." Later, while he was lying Placerville, California wounded in a hospital bed, his crew took a di­ NET ASSESSMENT 85 rect hit with no survivors. He attributes his sur­ flection. Nevertheless, the book should not be vival and their deaths to “the roll of the dice." relegated simply to an academic realm. The Compared with the ground war, life in the air subject it ably addresses is one crucial to all could at times be comparatively easy. Robert commissioned and noncommissioned officers Ramer, a B-29 pilot, mentions how important it (although Hartle intentionally directs it toward was to plug in the plane’s food warmer so the combat officers rather than “supporting special­ crew could eat dinner after completing their ists”). What the text may lack in easy read­ bomb run. Contrast the warm and comfortable ability, it compensates for in its thought- life of a B-29 crew with the hair-raising lot of a provoking value. In essence it is not a book to fighter pilot. Edwards Park describes the thrill be read, so much as one to be studied. of flying his tricky P-39 Airacobra Iron Dog. a Hartle begins with a fine synthesis and plane “as rotten as she was sexy,” to its very thoughtful analysis of previous studies perti­ limits. Realizing there was a limited future in nent to his own. He foregoes the use of poten­ flying like this, he decided one day he “might tially confusing classical ethical categories and as well get killed in combat instead of just terminology. Further, the author’s masterful use ‘augering in’ for fun.” of case studies draws the reader into direct ap­ Many common threads run through these rec­ plication of the concepts he discusses. He ollections. among them a sense of high adven­ wisely follows each with a “discussion," rather ture and a feeling that these were once-in- than a solution. (In his introduction he quotes a a-lifetime experiences. One is also struck by the work of fiction: ‘‘‘War is not a series of case youth of these men and women, by their sense studies that can be scrutinized with objec­ of purpose, and by their unawareness of their tivity’” (3).) His analyses are perceptive. Rather own mortality. Readers who flew in World War than allowing us to flee to a relativism offering II will find at least a piece of their experience situational excuses for its variations, Hartle at­ here. For those of us who did not, High Honor tempts to provoke the reflective development of is about as close as we will ever get to being a "consistent” military ethic. “Can we justifi­ there. ably violate the laws of war in order to achieve Maj James C. Ruehrmund, Jr.. USAFR specific ends?" he asks. If we do, "such situa­ Richmond. Virginia tions, repeated with terrible frequency, corrode the soul and warp moral sensibilities” (3). If he is correct, all the more reason to understand and embrace our American PME. Hartle readily acknowledges that in a plu­ Moral Issues in Military Decision Making by ralistic environment such as our own nation, Anthony E. Hartle. Lawrence, Kansas 66045: “any discussion of social or national values . . . University Press of Kansas, 1989. 180 pages, will suffer from oversimplification” (86). Nev­ $25.00. ertheless, he offers an argument for a funda­ Hartle is well qualified to write on this mentally shared American value system. It subject—no armchair ethicist is he. In addition includes several values thoroughly woven to holding a PhD and serving on the faculty of into the fabric of our national morality— the United States Military Academy at West commitment to freedom, equality, democracy, Point. Colonel Hartle distinguished himself in and individualism. By individualism , he refers Southeast Asia, where he was wounded and to the value placed by Americans on personal decorated for valor. As he acknowledges at the freedom, autonomy, and human worth itself. outset of the work, it is especially in war that However, it is not the American value system members of the military encounter the severest alone which molds PME. As he traces the “threat to consistent moral behavior” (1). various factors, he queries, "Given such dispa­ The author persuasively argues the need for a rate influences, can the resulting ethic be one "workable guide” which systematically clar­ that makes logical sense? If the ethic is to be ifies the rather abstract professional military practically useful in providing moral guidance ethic (PME). Satisfying this need is the ex­ for action, its provisions must not contradict pressed goal of the volume, and Hartle does a one another” (29). convincing job of reaching it. Hartle sees three primary influences as the The book is systematic in its approach. How­ factors which have shaped the American pro­ ever. it is not suited to casual reading. Its mea­ fessional military ethic. They are the ‘‘func­ sured content is better suited to the classroom tional requirements of military service, the in or to individual (uninterrupted) reading and re­ ternational laws of war, and the core values of 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 American society ” He cites three essential vilian control of the military, and the impor­ functions of professional ethics in general: to tance rightfully placed upon the "welfare of the "protect society from exploitation, enhance the individual soldier" (51). image of the professional, and ... articulate a Hartle emphasizes the moral responsibility of warrant for certain actions morally impermis­ every military officer. He claims that each one sible for a nonprofessional” (27). He contrasts must be willing—and able—to serve, should the function of the Uniform Code of Military the need arise, as a “corrective within the chain justice, which "defines honorable conduct in a of command.” Without suggesting that every negative sense by establishing what members of order should be challenged or postponed, he the military will not do" with the PME, which states that it is “precisely because of human fal­ "emphasizes ideals and positive aspects of con­ libility [that] the moral judgment of each indi­ duct" (52). vidual military officer must act as a check on Hartle isolates two underlying moral princi­ the military system” (116). ples: (1) people deserve respect and (2) human He realistically assesses the situation when suffering ought to be minimized. He contends he states that "not all young soldiers or young that the former has priority, since the latter "in­ officers give serious thought to the professional vokes utilitarian considerations" (71). He cites ethics they are taught. Most simply accept that a reference in a US Air Force pamphlet (AFP ‘the rules' are such and either attempt to abide 110—31, International Law—The Conduct of bv them or choose to violate them for reasons of Armed Conflict and A ir Operations) to the their own.” The problem is exacerbated when "‘principle of humanity, which forbids the in­ “those who make the military a career begin to fliction of suffering, injury or destruction not identify themselves in terms of their role, actually necessary for the accomplishment of which makes their objective analysis even more legitimate military purposes'" (72) and argues difficult and less frequent.” Despite having the that comprehending the proper relationship of rules ingrained in his own psyche during his these principles to the PME is essential, since years as a student at West Point. Hartle encoun­ the specific, codified ‘‘laws of war are in­ tered in Southeast Asia "numerous morally am­ complete, and will probably remain so” (77). biguous situations" in which the "answers Hartle points out that although each branch provided by the code as [he] understood it were of the service has various expressions of the sometimes incompatible with intuitions of con­ basic PME and although all affirm our national science.” In this situation, a "justification of commitment to the laws of war, "because the the code itself became necessary” (36). Readers American PME is uncodified beyond [its ele­ of this book may profit from Hartle’s dilemma mentary expressions in various military pub­ without having to undergo it themselves. lications) the exact content of the ethic will be A major contention of Hartle’s work is that a subject of dispute within any group of mili­ the military profession is "partially [rather tary professionals” (53). Nevertheless, as a com­ than] fully differentiated.” In essence, this mon bond between the services, “the oath and means that military officers are not exempt the commission provide the foundation for the from the common American values and utterly traditional idealistic code of the United States free to operate with independent standards and armed forces—the code I have been calling the norms, disregarding broader societal values. professional military ethic" (44). His discussion of Duty. Honor, Country in­ The military professional, in the preparation for cludes some timely reflections on the actions of and conduct of war, appropriately takes actions that would be morally impermissible outside the Lt Col Oliver North and Adm John Poindexter. role. The function of the military would not be He notes that while "the political arena in possible otherwise. Because of their special re­ which the two men operated is considerably re­ sponsibility to society, however, military profes­ moved from the normal range of activity of a sionals must consider and weigh the significance military officer ... they were still presumably of their actions in terms of the general moral prin­ committed to the PME" (48). In a different con­ ciples which derive from the basic values of so­ text. he points out that "equating duty with ciety. (118) obedience to orders is a common but serious failing of the officers corps” (121). Beyond "The American soldier in his or her function as these three foundational values—Duty, Honor, the defender of a free society” bears great re­ Country—he also mentions other traditional sponsibility, and a careful reading of this vol­ values, including professional competence, ci­ ume could be invaluable in better equipping NET ASSESSMENT 87 the career officer to more conscientiously cause, most assuredly, “understanding the na­ “wield such authority” (119). ture of the professional military ethic and the A valuable addition to officer training is Har- normative context in which it is applied can tle's discussion of noblesse oblige—the idea make our military leaders more capable and that obligations to act honorably accompany a more reliable” (154). Still, even as we ponder position of responsibility. He cites the example its message, we remain all too aware that “the of the Israeli war hero Nahum Arieli. who or­ PME and actual behavior are two separate areas dered a retreat when his position was overrun of consideration” (45). by a much larger Arab force. Only a covering Chaplain, Capt, Robert C. Stroud, USAF fire would allow any of the men to survive. His RAF Greenham Common. United Kingdom order: "All enlisted men are to withdraw: the officers will cover the retreat” (18). One interesting historic insight is that “if we consider the rationale for the restraints im­ Brats: Children of the American Military posed by the customs of warfare in the distant Speak Out by Mary R. Truscott. New York past ... we will indeed find little evidence of 10016: E. P. Dutton. 1989, 256 pages, $18.95. mercy or concern for human welfare. We do Those of us in uniform are well aware of the find considerable expediency and self- demands which the military system places interest.” In contrast, he argues that the con­ upon us. A casual reading of back issues of the temporary “codified laws of war can be traced Air Force Times reveals a number of them to underlying moral principles, though non- clearly—frequent moves, long hours, family moral considerations are not to be ignored” separations, low pay, inadequate housing, poor (59). promotion opportunities, and low status. What Of particular interest to Air Force readers is is not readily apparent, however, are the prob­ the fact that "the incompleteness of the laws of lems of a large subset of military members— war as a result of new means of conducting dependents. Mary Truscott's Brats is an attempt warfare is particularly evident with respect to to allow these “disenfranchised” members to air warfare and aerial bombardment.” This sit­ tell their own stories about life in military uation only promises to grow worse, as in our families. nuclear age “technological advances have been Interviewing 40 former dependents (23 from so rapid and so dramatic that the slow process officers’ families and 17 from enlisted families), of achieving consensus through usage has not Truscott—a third-generation military brat— jegun to keep pace” (65). Thus, we have all the sought a means to test her own experience more reason to strive to instill within every against that of other people. What she found military officer the maturest possible military was a unique culture identified not only by fre­ ethic. After all. “since no set of rules or laws quent moves, but also by a military ethos can provide specific guidance for every even­ shaped by the career of the military parent. The tuality, the spirit of the law' may be the decid­ book, divided into 12 chapters, thematically ing factor in those cases in which the letter of portrays the impact of this culture upon mili­ the law is not specific or not applicable” (56). tary children. Hartle offers a helpful and concise epilog, The chapters, which follow the ebb and flow summarizing his most important contentions. of the careers of the dependents’ fathers, speak Using a similar technique to set a clearer course to the rituals and traditions which distinctly set at the beginning of the book could aid readers the military culture apart from other American in more effectively organizing the material in cultures. The showing of the ID card, standing their minds as it is presented. For those who at attention for the national anthem, or dealing desire to pursue the subject further, he offers a with the different ways that officer and enlisted comprehensive bibliography. children treated each other, were part of a col­ While we long for moral absolutes which will lective, ritual process that resulted in the evolu­ “simplify the moral universe" (119). we live in tion of a distinct worldview. Children living on a world where decisions are rarely clear-cut base participated in an isolated, conservative and "certainty in moral judgment is seldom at­ experience whereby military dependents were tained" (83). This truth makes Hartle’s volume separated from their civilian counterparts, not all the more crucial. only by gate guards but also by the whims of a Moral Issues in Military' Decision Making is a military bureaucracy, a caste system, and a worthwhile book for all officers to read be­ rigorously disciplined family life. 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1990 Some of the best chapters deal with the Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield effects of frequent migration on military fam­ Air Attack, 1911-1945 by Richard P. Hal- ilies. The process of breaking with the past, ad­ lion. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania justing to new surroundings, making new 17294: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989, friends, and being consistently the new kid on 323 pages, $24.95. the block is causally connected—according to Truscott and some of her respondents—to both The debate over close air support/battlefield healthy, adaptive behavior and dysfunctional- air interdiction (CAS/BAI) seems endless. Each ism. The fact that other families on base had watershed (e.g., the 1943 publication of Field gone or were going through the same experi­ Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of ence significantly helped dependents through Air Power, and the 1948 Key West agreements) these various stages. Networks of military fam­ has simply ushered in a new round in the dis- ilies were formed to sustain people in like cussion. Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, in the circumstances. foreword to Strike from the Sky, says that As to dysfunctional behavior, many depend­ "there is no shortage of evidence" to inform ents whom Truscott interviewed find it ex­ this debate (xii). So why can’t everyone agree? tremely difficult to make long-term commit­ Why is there so much heat and so little light in ments, stay in one place long, keep in touch discussions about CAS/BAI? with old friends, or adjust to people with dif­ Although a great deal of evidence exists, ferent backgrounds. Yet, it is not clear whether much of the most important material isn’t these effects are very different from those widely available. For example, one of the best caused by life in modern societies where a high examinations of theater air power in all its roles degree of geographic and occupational mobility is Wing Comdr John C. Slessor’s Air Power and is the norm. Because of the increased mobility Armies (1936). One of the best studies of actual in America since World War II, more than battlefield air operations is Gen Omar Bradley’s likely this transient culture was unique to mili­ Effect of Air Power on M ilitary Operations, tary life prior to 1940. Undoubtedly, however, Western Europe (1945). Don't try to find these transiency wedded to a very insular institution titles at your local bookstore: they’ve been out forms an environment much different from the of print for 40 years. (Any reader who doubts one that most Americans experience. the contemporary value of these books should The book is not without its flaws—mainly read them. If you’re still not convinced, com­ omissions. Enamored with the idea that mili- pare them with the venerable TAC Manual 2-1, tary brats were spawned from a homogeneous Tactical Air Operations, which is still officially milieu, Truscott fails to ask whether or not the “current.”) experience was different for minority families. As Hallion points out, “Researchers have de­ Similarly, she purposely stays away from voted far more attention to the air superiority tough, controversial questions about alcoholism war and to strategic bomber operations than and abuse. Certainly, if these problems were as they have to other topics” (129): consequently, pervasive as she indicates in her introduction this focus has created a big void in the study of (alcoholism was three times as prevalent in the CAS/BAI. Hallion has taken a tremendous military than in other populations), they are stride toward filling in this gap by covering the subjects that must be dealt with, regardless of subject so thoroughly that his book is bound to whether the respondents were reluctant to talk be a favorite reference for students of the his­ about them. tory of air power as well as for professionals Serious interdisciplinary efforts are being studying theater air operations. Strike from the Sky is an outstanding accomplishment. made to study the isolated effects that migra- The first half of the book covers two cam­ tion, prolonged parental absence, and abusive paigns of the First World War and several cam­ behavior have on families in uniform. Only paigns in smaller wars prior to World War II. now, though, are scholars beginning to study The Rif war (involving Rif is—Berber tribes) in the total culture engendered by military social- Morocco and the Nomonhan incident (between welfare systems. Brats addresses these timely Japan and the Soviet Union in 1939) are useful issues in laymen’s terms and for that reason is examples of effective, well-integrated air opera­ important reading for policymakers and mili- tions. A chapter covering the Spanish civil war tary members alike. is particularly effective at dispelling miscon­ Capt Mark R. G randstaff, USAF ceptions about that war. A follow-up chapter, Washington, D.C. "The Spanish Legacy: Lessons Read and Mis­ NET ASSESSMENT 89 read," is probably the most valuable part of the forces to support surface operations (and why), book. It shows how several nations developed is also presented clearly. diverse doctrines based on experiences from Altogether, Strike from the Sky stands alone the Spanish civil war—doctrines which were in its potential to inform the current phase of tested in the fixe of World War II. the CAS/BAI debate with relevant historical ex­ The second half of the book covers several amples. Hallion's focus on events up to 1945 campaigns of World War II in a variety of the­ may trouble people who think that current aters. Two major trends evident in these cam­ technology and political circumstances are paigns are (1) the emergence of increasingly so­ unique. Although circumstances are always phisticated organizations for applying air unique, they are never unprecedented, and one power to the battlefield and (2) the need for air of this book's major accomplishments is superiority to permit effective battlefield air providing contemporary readers with a wealth support. Bracketing the historical analysis that of precedents in a single reference—a feat not makes up the bulk of this book are an introduc­ duplicated by other sources. tion and an epilogue by the author, as well as Certainly, Hallion does not imply that he has Air Vice-Marshal Mason’s insightful foreword. simple, clear, ironclad answers. Reflecting on Hallion has done a remarkable job of distill­ the lessons that several nations drew from the ing what happened and why, using an impres­ Spanish civil war (which became the doctrines sive array of sources in six languages. The that World War II would test), he writes, source notes are a gold mine for future re­ It is this aspect of the Spanish Civil War that is searchers. They acquaint interested readers most interesting: intelligent, well-informed critics with major works, such as those of Slessor and could reach often diametrically opposite conclu­ Bradley, and highlight the most informative sions, or, interpreting data correctly, nevertheless materials on specific areas of study. Among the reach a flawed conclusion— It might be said that most fascinating of the primary sources are at­ critics took away from the Spanish war what they tache reports from the Spanish civil war. wished to believe, and they searched its lessons The historical analysis is so comprehensive carefully to selectively acquire supporting data for and balanced that it provides fuel for a variety their own particular viewpoint. (110) of arguments. Hallion’s epilogue contains 13 So don’t expect discussions of battlefield air conclusions; I arrived at several others from my support to end soon or to reach many bomb- own reading. My conclusions (e.g.. the value of proof conclusions. As Strike from the Sky using multiple methods to solve problems in shows, CAS/BAI has been a hot topic since battlefield air support, the tremendous cost of World War I. But we can hope that the debate fratricide, and the advantages of simple com­ will be more informed because any reader of mand and control solutions) are supported by this book will better understand CAS/BAI in several examples, just as Hallion’s are. practice and theory. Another quality of Strike from the Sky is con- If you are interested in air power, command text: CAS and BAI are not simply ends in them- and control, joint operations, doctrine, or mili- selves. Hallion writes from a battle-and- tary history, read Strike from the Sky. Better campaign perspective, reaching down to the yet, get your own copy so you can underline weapons, tactics, and engagements that create and highlight, as well as scribble notes and success, and demonstrating that air-attack cam- dog-ear the book without feeling guilty. All li- paigns are operational-level efforts that may de- braries serving military audiences should ob- cide strategic issues. The importance of doc- tain this book, but don’t expect it to gather dust trine, which determines how to best use air on the shelves. Lt Col Charles M. WestenhofT, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama notams

Notices of upcom ing conferences, sem inars, tegic operations or in operationally related spe- and other professional events of a noncommer­ cialties is highly desirable. The division can cial nature should be sent to the Editor, Air- sponsor a few highly qualified applicants with power Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, M ax­ the appropriate background for a master’s de- well AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right gree through the Air Force Institute of Technol- to edit m aterial for length and editorial ogy (AFIT), with a follow-on assignment to the content. Military Studies Division. Applicants should have three to seven years of commissioned service, an outstanding military record, and im- peccable military bearing and appearance. In- terested individuals should consult chapter 8 of Air University Review Index AFR 36-20, Officer Assignments, for applica- The Air University Press has published a com- tion procedures or write Capt Bob Angwin, plete index of the Air University Review (1947- Headquarters USAFA/CWIS, USAF Academy 87). This reference work contains an author in- CO 80840-5421 or call DSN 259-3257/3248. dex, a title index, and a cross-referenced sub- ject index. Any Air Force or other government Naval History Symposium organization, college or university library, or The History Department of the United States similar organization with a need for this index Naval Academy will sponsor its 10th Naval can be placed on distribution. Requests for dis- History Symposium at Annapolis from 11-13 tribution and other inquiries should be ad- September 1991. Individuals who wish to pro­ dressed to Maj M. A. Kirtland, AUCADRE/RI, pose a paper or a topic for panel discussion Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL should submit an abstract of approximately 250 36112-5532. Major Kirtland can also be con- words to Dr Jack Sweetman, History Depart­ tacted at DSN 875-6629 or (205) 293-6629. ment, US Naval Academy, Annapolis MD 21402-5044. Deadline for proposals is 1 March Army Aviation Convention 1991. The Army Aviation Association of America will hold its annual convention from 10-14 Uniformed Services Medical School Training April in Saint Louis, Missouri. For more 1991 The Uniformed Services University of the information, contact AAAA, Richmondville 49 Health Sciences is seeking students for its med- Avenue. Westport CT 06880-2000 or call (203) 226-8184. ical training and graduate medical-education programs. Medical students are commissioned as ensigns or second lieutenants and draw full USAFA Instructor Opportunities military pay and benefits. There is no tuition, The Military Studies Division at the United and all books and equipment are provided. At States Air Force Academy is seeking highly graduation, students are promoted to naval qualified captains for instructor duty in the lieutenant or captain and have a seven-year summer of 1991 and beyond. This duty in- service obligation. Both civilians and military volves motivating and teaching cadets in personnel with a college degree may apply for university-level courses that stress air power, the four-year medical program. Applicants the art of war, military theory, doctrine, and must be no older than 27 (or 33 with prior mili- force employment. Since its inception in 1980, tary experience) when they enter school. The the curriculum in professional military studies university also has a graduate program in basic has evolved into one of the most interesting medical sciences open to civilians and military. and demanding areas of study at the academy. Civilians are not commissioned into the mili- A master’s degree is required of all applicants. tary. Graduate students serve as teaching and Preferred degrees for military studies instruc- research assistants. For more information, con- tors are in history, military history, political tact the Office of Admissions, Attn: PAC, Uni- science, and international relations, or in area formed Services University, 4301 Jones Bridge studies of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or Road, Bethesda MD 20814-4799 or call (202) the Middle East. Experience in tactical or stra- 295-3106.

90 A1RPOWER JOURNAL Volume IV AUTHOR INDEX

Brown, Capt Robert H. "Real Hog War. A: The A-10 Kirtland. Maj Michael A. "Defending the Faith" in Low-Intensity Conflict," no. 4 (Winter 1990): (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 52. 54-66. ------. "Facing the Challenge Ahead” (editorial). Chipman. Dr Donald D. "Transformation of Soviet no. 3 (Fall 1990): 2. Maritime Air Operations. The: Implications for US ------. “ Now T hat W e ’ve Won World War 111" Maritime Strategy." no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66—74. (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2. Cully. Capt George W. "Kind of Deja Vu, A: Some Kropf. Maj Roger F. "US Air Force in Korea. The: Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense," Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47—60. Power." no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30-^46. DeLoughrv. Lt Col James P. “United States and the Lee. Lt Col David B. "War Gaming: Thinking for the Lavi. The," no. 3 (Fall 1990): 34-44. Future.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 40-51. Estes. Lt Col Richard H. "Giulio Douhet: More on McPeak, Gen Merrill A. "For the Composite Wing." Target Than He Knew.” no. 4 (Winter 1990): no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. 66-78. Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. “Air Force in the Twenty- Feege, Lt Edward H., Jr. "NATO Air Operations after first Century. The: Challenge and Response.” no. 4 Arms Control." no. 2 (Summer 1990): 20-39. (Winter 1990): 34-51. Ferguson. Lt Gen Thomas R., Jr., and Terrence J. Noyes, Harry F. III. “Air and Space Forces: The One Hertz. "Requirements Planning," no. 2 (Summer Endures as the Other Emerges," no. 1 (Spring 1990): 4-18. 1990): 62-71. Geiger. Col Keith W. “Scoping the Game” (editorial), Power, Capt John W. “Space Control in the Post-Cold no. 2 (Summer 1990): 2. War Era,” no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24-33. ------. “We Never Dreamed ...” (editorial), no. 4 Smith, Maj Gen Dale O. "How to Get Promoted," no. (Winter 1990): 2. 1 (Spring 1990): 4-7. Hallion. Dr Richard P. "Battlefield Air Support: A Ullman. Lt Col Bruce L. "Officer Professional De- Retrospective Assessment." no. 1 (Spring 1990): velopment for Lieutenants." no. 3 (Fall 1990): 8-28. 14-31. ------. "Troubling Past. A: Air Force Fighter Ac- Wendt. C2C Diego M. “Using a Sledgehammer to Kill quisition since 1945." no. 4 (Winter 1990): 4-23. a Gnat: The Air Force's Failure to Comprehend In- Hertz. Terrence J., and Lt Gen Thomas R. Ferguson. surgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Jr. "Requirements Planning.” no. 2 (Summer Thunder," no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. 1990): 4-18. Westermann. Capt Edward B. “Air Rescue Service: A Jennings. Lt Col Frank W. "Doctrinal Conflict over Direction for the Twenty-first Century?" no. 3 (hall the Word Aerospace." no. 3 (Fall 1990): 46-58. 1990): 60-71.

TITLE INDEX

“Air Force in the Twenty-first Century. The: Chal- "P'or the Composite Wing," Gen Merrill A. McPeak. lenge and Response." Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. no. 4 (Winter 1990): 34-51. "Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He Knew." Lt "Air Rescue Service: A Direction for the Twenty-first Col Richard H. Estes, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 68-78. Century?" Capt Edward B. Westermann. no. 3 (F’all "How to Get Promoted," Maj Gen Dale O. Smith, no. 1990): 60-71. 1 (Spring 1990): 4-7. "Air and Space Forces: The One Endures as the Other "Kind of D6jH Vu, A: Some Historical Perspectives on Emerges." Harry F. N'oves 111. no. 1 (Spring 1990): Cruise Missile Defense," Capt George W. Cully, no. 62-71. 1 (Spring 1990): 47-60. "Battlefield Air Support: A Retrospective Assess- "NATO Air Operations after Arms Control.” Lt ment, Dr Richard P. Hallion. no. 1 (Spring 1990): Edward H. Feege. Jr., no. 2 (Summer 1990): 20-39. 8-28. "Now That We’ve Won World War 111" (editorial). "Defending the Faith" (editorial). Maj Michael A. Maj Michael A. Kirtland. no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2. Kirtland. no. 4 (Winter 1990): 52. "Officer Professional Development for Lieutenants." "Doctrinal Conflict over the Word Aerospace," Lt Col Lt Col Bruce L. Ullman, no. 3 (P’all 1990): 14—31. Frank W. Jennings, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 46-58. "Real Hog War, A: The A-10 in Low-Intensity Con- "Pacing the Challenge Ahead." Maj Michael A. Kirt- flict.” Capt Robert H. Brown, no. 4 (Winter 1990): land. no. 3 (Fall 1990): 2. 54-66.

91 92 AIRPOWER IOURNAL WINTER 1990

"Requirements Planning,” Lt Gen Thomas R. Fer- "United States and the Lavi, The," Lt Col James P. guson, Jr.. and Terrence J. Hertz, no. 2 (Summer DeLoughry, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 34-44. 1990): 4-18. "US Air Force in Korea, The: Problems that Hindered "Scoping the Game” (editorial), Col Keith W. Geiger, the Effectiveness of Air Power," Maj Roger F. no. 2 (Summer 1990): 2. Kropf. no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30—46. "Space Control in the Post-Cold War Era,” Capt John "Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat: The Air VV. Power, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24-33. Force's Failure to Comprehend Insurgent Doctrine ‘Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations, during Operation Rolling Thunder,” C2C Diego M. The: Implications for US Maritime Strategy,” Dr Wendt, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. Donald D. Chipman, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66-74. “War Gaming: Thinking for the Future." Lt Col David "Troubling Past, A: Air Force Fighter Acquisition B. Lee, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 40-51. since 1945," Dr Richard P. Hallion, no. 4 (Winter "We Never Dreamed ..." (editorial), Col Keith W. 1990): 4-23. Geiger, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 2.

SUBJECT INDEX Aircraft ------. "Troubling Past, A: Air Force Fighter Ac- Brown. Capt Robert H. "Real Hog War, A: The A-10 quisition since 1945," no. 4 (Winter 1990): 4-23. in Low-lntensitv Conflict,” no. 4 (Winter 1990): Jennings, Lt Col Frank W. “Doctrinal Conflict over 54-66. the Word Aerospace,” no. 3 (Fall 1990): 46—58. Hallion. Dr Richard P. "Troubling Past, A: Air Force Kropf, Maj Roger F. "US Air Force in Korea. The: Fighter Acquisition since 1945," no. 4 (Winter Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air 1990): 4-23. Power,” no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30-46. Wendt. C2C Diego M. “Using a Sledgehammer to Kill Air Defense a Gnat: The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend In- Cully, Capt George W. "Kind of Deja Vu, A: Some surgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense,” Thunder.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47-60. Westermann. Capt Edward B. "Air Rescue Service: A Air Force Organization Direction for the Twenty-first Century?” no. 3 (Fall 1990): 60-71. Kirtland. Maj Michael A. "Facing the Challenge Ahead" (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1990): 2. Arms Control McPeak. Gen Merrill A. "For the Composite Wing," Feege. Lt Edward H., Jr. “NATO Air Operations after no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. Arms Control," no. 2 (Summer 1990): 20-39. Meilinger. Lt Col Phillip S. "Air Force in the Twenty- Aviation Technology first Century. The: Challenge and Response,” no. 4 DeLoughrv, Lt Col James P. “United States and the (Winter 1990): 34-51. Lavi. The." no. 3 (Fall 1990): 34^4. Westermann. Capt Edward B. “Air Rescue Service: A Direction for the Twenty-first Century?” no. 3 (Fall 1990): 60-71. Budget/Planning Process Ferguson, Lt Gen Thomas R., Jr., and Terrence J. Air Power Hertz. "Requirements Planning." no. 2 (Summer Estes. Lt Col Richard H. "Giulio Douhet: More on 1990): 4-18. Target Than He Knew," no. 4 (Winter 1990): Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. "Air Force in the Twenty- 68-78. first Century, The: Challenge and Response," no. 4 Kirtland. Maj Michael A. "Defending the Faith" (Winter 1990): 34-51. (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 52. McPeak. Gen Merrill A. "For the Composite Wing,” Close Air Support no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. Hallion. Dr Richard P. "Battlefield Air Support: A Noyes. Harry F. III. "Air and Space Forces: The One Retrospective Assessment," no. 1 (Spring 1990): Endures as the Other Emerges," no. 1 (Spring 8-28. 1990): 62-71. Kropf, Maj Roger F. "US Air Force in Korea, The: Air Power History Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Cully. Capt George W. "Kind of Deja Vu. A: Some Power,” no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30^16. Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense." no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47-60. Cold War Estes. Lt Col Richard H. "Giulio Douhet: More on Kirtland, Maj Michael A. "Now That We've Won Target Than He Knew," no. 4 (Winter 1990): World War III" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2. 68-78. Hallion. Dr Richard P. "Battlefield Air Support: A Command and Control Retrospective Assessment." no. 1 (Spring 1990): McPeak. Gen Merrill A. “For the Composite Wing." 8-28. no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. INDEX 93

Doctrine Kropf. Maj Roger F. “US Air Force in Korea. The: Estes. Lt Col Richard H. "Giulio Douhet: More on Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Target Than He Knew.” no. 4 (Winter 1990): Power,” no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30—46. 68-78. Wendt. C2C Diego M. “Using a Sledgehammer to Kill Hallion, Dr Richard P. "Battlefield Air Support: A a Gnat: The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend In- Retrospective Assessment." no. 1 (Spring 1990): surgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling 8-28. Thunder." no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. ------. "Troubling Past, A: Air Force Fighter Ac- International Relations quisition since 1945," no. 4 (Winter 1990): 4—23. (ennings. Lt Col Frank W. "Doctrinal Conflict over DeLoughry, Lt Col James P. “United States and the the Word Aerospace," no. 3 (Fall 1990): 46-58. Lavi, The.” no. 3 (Fall 1990): 34-^14. McPeak. Gen Merrill A. "For the Composite Wing." Interservice Conflict no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. Jennings. Lt Col Frank W. "Doctrinal Conflict over Meilinger. Lt Col Phillip S. "Air Force in the Twenty- the Word Aerospace,” no. 3 (Fall 1990): 46-58. first Centurv, The: Challenge and Response," no. 4 Kirtland. Maj Michael A. "Defending the Faith" (Winter 1990): 34-51. (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 52. Noyes. Ham- F. III. “Air and Space Forces: The One Endures as the Other Emerges." no. 1 (Spring Joint Operations 1990): 62-71. Kropf. Maj Roger F. “US Air Force in Korea. The: Power. Capt John W. "Space Control in the Post-Cold Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air War Era." no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24—33. Power,” no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30—46. Wendt. C2C Diego M. "Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat: The Air Force's Failure to Comprehend In- Korean War surgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Kropf, Maj Roger F. "US Air Force in Korea. The: Thunder.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Douhet Power," no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30—46. Estes. Lt Col Richard H. “Giulio Douhet: More on Logistics Target Than He Knew.” no. 4 (Winter 1990): Ferguson, Lt Gen Thomas R., Jr., and Terrence J. 68-78. Hertz. "Requirements Planning," no. 2 (Summer Editorial 1990): 4-18. Geiger. Col Keith W. "Scoping the Game." no. 2 Power, Capt John W. "Space Control in the Post-Cold (Summer 1990): 2. War Era.” no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24-33. ------. “We Never Dreamed ...” no. 4 (Winter Management/Organization 1990): 2. Ullman, Lt Col Bruce L. “Officer Professional De- Kirtland, Maj Michael A. "Defending the Faith." no. velopment for Lieutenants," no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4 (Winter 1990): 52. 14-31. ------. "Facing the Challenge Ahead," no. 3 (Fall 1990): 2. Military Education ------. “Now That We’ve Won World War 111." Ullman, Lt Col Bruce L. "O fficer Professional De- no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2. velopment for Lieutenants," no. 3 (Fall 1990): Fighter Operations 14-31. Brown. Capt Robert H. “Real Hog War. A: The A-10 Military Thought in Low-Intensity Conflict," no. 4 (Winter 1990): Estes. Lt Col Richard H. "Giulio Douhet: More on 54—66. Target Than He Knew," no. 4 (Winter 1990): 68- Fighter Techniques 78. Kirtland, Maj Michael A. "Now That We’ve Won Brown. Capt Robert H “Real Hog War. A: The A-10 World War 111" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2. in Low-Intensity Conflict," no. 4 (Winter 1990): Meilinger. Lt Col Phillip S. “Air Force in the Twenty- 54-66. first Century. The: Challenge and Response." no. 4 Foreign Military Forces (Winter 1990): 34-51. Chipman. Dr Donald D. “Transformation of Soviet Missile Operations Maritime Air Operations. The: Implications for US Cully. Capt George W. "Kind of Deja Vu, A: Some Maritime Strategy." no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66-74. Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense." Helicopter Operations no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47-60. Westermann, Capt Edward B. “Air Rescue Service: A Morale Direction for the Twentv-first Centurv?" no. 3 (Fall 1990|: 60-71. Smith, Maj Gen Dale O. "How to Get Promoted." no. 1 (Spring 1990): 4-7. Interdiction NATO Hallion. Dr Richard P. "Battlefield Air Support: A Retrospective Assessment." no. 1 (Spring 1990): Feege. Lt Edward H.. Jr. "NATO Air Operations after 8-28. Arms Control," no. 2 (Summer 1990): 20-39. 94 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL WINTER 1990

National Security Policy Reserve Forces DeLoughry, Lt Col lames P. “United States and the Kirtland, Maj Michael A. “Facing the Challenge Lavi. The." no. 3 (Fall 1990): 34-44. Ahead” (editorial), no. 3 (Fall 1990): 2. Kirtland, Maj Michael A. “Now That We’ve Won Soviet Air Power World War 111” (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1990): 2. Meilinger, Lt Col Phillip S. “Air Force in the Twenty- Chipman, Dr Donald D. “Transformation of Soviet first Century. The: Challenge and Response.” no. 4 Maritime Air Operations. The: Implications for US Maritime Strategy.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66-74. (Winter 1990): 34-51. Naval Operations Soviet Military Chipman, Dr Donald D. "Transformation of Soviet Chipman, Dr Donald D. “Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations, The: Implications for US Maritime Air Operations. The: Implications for US Maritime Strategy ” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66-74. Maritime Strategy.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66-74. Space Operations Personnel Issues Noyes, Harry F. III. "Air and Space Forces: The One Geiger. Col Keith W. “Scoping the Game” (editorial), Endures as the Other Emerges," no. 1 (Spring no. 2 (Summer 1990): 2. 1990): 62-71. Ullman, Lt Col Bruce L. “Officer Professional De- Power. Capt John W. “Space Control in the Post-Cold velopment for Lieutenants." no. 3 (Fall 1990): War Era," no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24-33. 14-31. Space Technology Preparedness Power, Capt John W. “Space Control in the Post-Cold Geiger. Col ICeith W. “ We Never Dreamed ...” War Era." no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24-33. (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 2. Kirtland. Maj Michael A. “Defending the Faith” Strategy (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 52. Chipman. Dr Donald D. “Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations. The: Implications for US Procurement Maritime Strategy," no. 2 (Summer 1990): 66-74. ferguson, Lt Gen Thomas R., Jr., and Terrence J. Tactical Air Power Hertz. "Requirements Planning.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 4-18. Brown. Capt Robert H. “Real Hog War, A: The A-10 Hallion, Dr Richard P. "Troubling Past. A: Air Force in Low-Intensity Conflict," no. 4 (Winter 1990): Fighter Acquisition since 1945,” no. 4 (Winter 54-66. 1990): 4-23. Feege, Lt Edward H., )r. "NATO Air Operations after Arms Control,” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 20-39. Professionalism Hallion, Dr Richard P. “Battlefield Air Support: A Geiger. Col Keith W. “ We Never Dreamed ...” Retrospective Assessment." no. 1 (Spring 1990): (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 2. 8-28. Smith. Maj Gen Dale O. "How to Get Promoted,” no. Kropf, Maj Roger F. "U S Air Force in Korea, The. 1 (Spring 1990): 4-7. Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power,” no. 1 (Spring 1990): 30-46. Ullman, Lt Col Bruce L. "Officer Professional De- Power, Capt |ohn W. “Space Control in the Post-Cold velopment for Lieutenants." no. 3 (Fall 1990)- 14-31. War Era,” no. 4 (Winter 1990): 24-33. Wendt. C2C Diego M. “Using a Sledgehammer to Kill Public Affairs a Gnat: The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend In- surgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Jennings. Lt Col Frank W. “Doctrinal Conflict over Thunder," no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. the Word Aerospace,” no. 3 (Fall 1990): 46-58. Vietnam War Recruiting/Retention Wendt, C2C Diego M. “Using a Sledgehammer to Kill Geiger. Col Keith W. “ We Never Dreamed ...” a Gnat: The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend In- (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1990): 2. surgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Thunder.” no. 2 (Summer 1990): 52-64. Rescue and Recovery War Gaming Westermann. Capt Edward B. "A ir Rescue Service: A Direction for the Twenty-first Century?" no. 3 (Fall Lee, Lt Col David B. "War Gaming: Thinking for the 1990): 60-71. Future." no. 2 (Summer 1990): 40-51. World War II Research and Development Cully, Capt George W. “Kind of Dejd Vu, A: Some DeLoughry. Lt Col James P. “United States and the Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense." Lavi. The," no. 3 (Fall 1990): 34-44. no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47-60. contributors

Headquarters US Air Force, the Pen- tagon. He was a C-130 instructor pi- lot in both Europe and the Pacific and deputy head of the history de- partment at the US Air Force Acad- emy. Among his recent publications is Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General (Bloomington. Jnd.: Indiana University Press, 1989). Colonel Meilinger is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Command and Staff College, and National Defense University.

Capt John W. Power (USAFA; MS, Air F'orce Institute of Technology: Richard P. Hallion (PhD. University MBA. University of Montana| is a of Maryland), of the Secretary of the space systems test manager at the Air Air Force's Action Group, was se- Force Operational Test and Evalua- lected as the Charles A. Lindbergh tion Center. Kirtland AFB. New Mex- Visiting Professor of Aerospace His- ico. At Malmstrom AFB. Montana, tory for 1990-91 at the Smithsonian he commanded both an evaluator Institution Previous assignments in- crew and a missile crew. Captain clude executive historian. Director- Power is a graduate of Squadron ate of Advanced Programs. Air Force Officer School. Systems Command. Andrews AFB. Maryland; curator. National Air and Space Museum. Smithsonian Institu- tion; and director, Special Staff Of- fice. Aeronautical Systems Division. Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio. He was also the Harold Keith fohnson Visit- ing Professor for 1987-88 at the Mili- tary History Institute. US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks. Pennsyl- vania. The author of 13 books on aerospace and military topics. Dr Hallion is a previous contributor to the Airpower /ournal. Capt Robert H. Brown (BA. Wake Forest University) is the officer in charge of the Fighter Weapons Re- view'at the USAF Fighter Weapons School (FWS), Nellis AFB. Nevada, and also serves as a flying and aca- demic instructor at the FWS. Pre- viously. he served as an A-10 in- structor pilot, standardization and evaluation flight examiner, and squadron weapons officer with the 23d Tactical Fighter Wing, England AFB. Louisiana. While assigned to LI Col Phillip S. Meilinger (USAFA; England AFB. he received the Risner MA. University of Colorado; PhD, Award as the outstanding FWS grad- University of Michigan) is an air op- uate in the tactical air force for 1986. erations staff officer. Doctrine Divi- Captain Brown is a graduate of the sion, Deputy Directorate for War- USAF Fighter Weapons School and fighting Concepts Development. Squadron Officer School.

95 Lt Col Richard H. Estes (BA. North Carolina Methodist College; MA. University of South Carolina) is chief. Strategy and Policy Division. (-5 (Plans and Policy), Headquarters NORAD. Peterson AFB, Colorado. His previous tours, among others, in- clude commander of the 37th Flying Training Squadron. Columbus AFB. Mississippi; F-15 instructor pilot and flight commander, Eglin AFB, Flor- ida; and fighter operations at the Air Staff in Washington. D.C. Colonel Estes, who has published in the Air University Review, is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Com- mand and Staff College, Air War Col- lege, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

96 HOARD OF AUVISKKS

Cal Kenneth |. Alnwick, IISAF. Retired, Kupos Associates l.l Col Donald K. Biiucom, IISAF, Retired Brig («eo |ames l„ Cole, |r„ IISAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Stuff for Operations. Military Airlift Command Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., IISAF, Retired Maj (ien I. B. Holley, |r„ IJSAFR, Retired. Duke University Dr Richard II. Kohn, Chief. Office of Air Torce History

The A irpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superin- tendent of Documents, IJS Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The CiPC) stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Fditor, Air- power Journal. Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5532. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are DSN 875-5322 and commercial (205) 293-5322. The Warrior

I’ve known fear and heard the battle’s sound; I’ve fought and spilled blood on hallowed ground. On silver wings, I’ve flown through the air, and daily I’ve trod where few will dare. To some I’m a hero and freedom’s defender; to others I’m a monger of what war can render. Both love and hate at times I’ve known, * and until time of war I’m no one’s own. So few understand my perspective and place, for better than any I know war’s ugly face . I loathe battle and the destruction it brings, but I know of war, there are worse things To fight and win conflicts has not been my best, for to find and keep peace has been my real quest Capt John C. Orndorff