Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col John B. Sams, Jr. Editor Col Keith W. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Director and Illustrator The Airpower Journal, published q u arterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi- cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If re- produced. the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line. JOURNAL Winter 1990. Vol. IV. No. 4 AfRP 50 2 Editorial Col Keith W. Geiger 2 A Troubling Past: Air Force Fighter Acquisition since 1945 Dr Richard P. Hallion 4 Space Control in the Post-Cold War Era Capt John W. Power, USAF 24 The Air Force in the Twenty-first Century: Challenge and Response Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF 34 Editorial \laj Michael A. Kirtland 52 A Real Hog War: The A-10 in Low-Intensity Conflict Capt Robert H. Brown. USAF 54 Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He Knew Lt Col Richard H. Estes. USAF 68 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 80 Notams Notices of Interest 90 Index 91 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL “We Never Dreamed ...” ARSH reality begins to illuminate the We debate grand concepts of deterrence truth of the situation more re- theory, argue about structure, and develop Hlentlessly than a brilliant desert sun. Thecompetitive strategies. Important activities— Situation: Operation Desert Shield. The perhaps very important—but still only harsh Reality: potential combat, destruc- preparatory ones. We underwrite mar- tion, suffering, and death. The Truth: this vellous technological advances, we pro- is not abstract; it’s real, and it’s personal. mote good citizenship, and we are an in- If combat comes, there are only two ways strument in achieving social change and to go: suffer and win, or suffer and lose. In social equality. Positive accomplishments, either case you fight, and in either case those, but peripheral fallout. None of them you suffer. That’s war’s reality, the down- are the Real Reason for us. All of us are and-dirty meaning of “gone for a soldier.” here to fight. A reporter for a domestic regional news- It is all too possible to put in time at the paper interviews the hometown troops de- supply depot, laboratory, maintenance ployed to Saudi Arabia for the Great Ad- shop, staff desk, or even flight line, yet venture. One 27-year-old with 10 years’ lose sight of what it’s all about. It's been service tells him. “We were just riding the almost 20 years since the US military, as a clock before, but you’ve got to pay your whole, centered its daily attention on dues here. We joined and we know that, fighting and what it means—almost 20 but we never dreamed this would happen. years since most of those people in uni- We never dreamed we might have to go to form wondered if the next posting, or even war.” the next TDY, would take them to meet Where was this man for those 10 years? the Beast. That’s time enough for the focus Did he evade all the mission orientations, on fighting to diffuse, time enough for ignore the bull sessions, tune out the war memories to be locked away, time enough stories of the old heads? Perhaps, perhaps for new troops to come on board without not. He’s simply a young man coming to the focus at all. grips with a reality that for one reason or “We never dreamed__ ” Lives are dis- another never sufficiently surfaced in the rupted. routines are in turmoil, plans are lull of peacetime routine, a reality that on hold, and troops are learning—once those old combat vets did not make—or again—about deprivation and discomfort. were restrained from making—sufficiently But combat’s reality has yet to become clear to him. fully manifest. Perhaps it won’t this time, How easy it is to lose sight of a military but somewhere, sometime, it will blast it- force’s raison d’etre: it exists, ultimately, self into crystal clarity in an awful mo- to fight. We can cloak our purpose in slo- ment of realization. Ultimately, militaries gans such as Learn a Trade, Save for Col- and their people exist to fight. lege, Be All That You Can Be, or Aim “We never dreamed__ ” But shouldn t High—Go Air Force. Nice, but incidental. we have? KWG 2 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- spawned a hobby that grew slowly during the spondence should be addressed to the Editor, 1960s. It exploded in the 1970s as other com- Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, panies entered the field. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the As Colonel Lee noted, the early 1980s right to edit the material for overall length. marked the beginning of commercial computer war games. They have evolved rapidly, and those that appeared even a couple of years ago MORE COMMENT ON PROMOTIONS cannot match today's standards for graphics As an Air Force officer who is concerned about and sophistication. the development, character, and values of our Commercially produced war games are an future Air Force officers, I was both disap- easy way for anyone to begin thinking about the pointed and offended by the editor’s decision uses and misuses of the genre. If you have a to print such an outdated, bigoted, narrow- personal computer (PC), it’s also an exciting minded, and damaging essay under the title of way as well. The advent of compact disk read- “How to Get Promoted” (Spring 1990). Colonel only memory (CD ROM) for PCs is promising Geiger's decision to print this poorly written another major change for computer war games. and inane essay in the Airpower Journal is Maj Gregory G. Wilmoth inexcusable. Tucson. Arizona Anonymous L'SAF Academy, Colorado Lt Col David Lee's article on war gaming was quite interesting. However, regarding the exam- Editor’s Note: Contrary to our usual policy, we ple of war games and the Japanese attack on have printed our only anonymous letter for two Pearl Harbor. I wonder why the Japanese didn’t reasons. First, we want your comment s on Ai r- attempt to sink the US vessels in deep ocean power Journal’s content—but only if you feel waters where ships could not easily be re- confident enough to identify yourself. Second, floated and repaired? The Japanese decision to the letter points up many of the issues ivhich sink American ships in shallow harbor waters we hope have been the subject of discussion made salvage operations possible and allowed among you; the US Navy to quickly rebuild its ships. • Is the promotion essay outdated, or are Michael J. Miller there current, substitute social conventions to Wright-Patterson APB, Ohio be observed? • Is the essay bigoted, or is it unsettling? • Is the essay narrow-minded, or has it pur- GNAT GNOTES sued a specific theme within a broad spectrum? If we had only listened to our instincts and not • Have the essay and the subsequent com- our worries, the Vietnam War would have ments enabl ed us to learn something? ended much earlier and with a different out- come. "Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat” (Summer 1990) vividly points that out. My hat WAR GAMING is off to the author for presenting the facts so I was interested in Lt Col David B. Lee’s article well. Thanks! "War Gaming: Thinking for the Future” (Sum- MSgt Russell K. Choate, USAF mer 1990). Commercial board war games go Abilene, Texas back further than computer games. Their his- tory in the US dates to the late 1950s when the Avalon-Hill Company came out with a game called "Tactics.” That company's products continued on page 79 3 A TROUBLING PAST Air Force Fighter Acquisition since 1945* Dr Richar d P. H allion INCE 1945 the United States Air Aircraft acquisition is inextricably Force has acquired nearly 27,000 caught up in the interplay and tension be- fighter aircraft, while the Soviet tween doctrine and operational thought Union has procured over 50,000. (the requirements pull) on one hand and AsS a general rule. American fighters have technology (the technology push) on the proven superior to their Soviet counter- other. Both are inherently dynamic pro- parts in a variety of wars and incidents, cesses responsive to external influences but American defense planners and fighter and pressures. If they do not proceed in designers should examine fighter acquisi- roughly consistent and synchronous part- tion in the broader context of Air Force planning and missions from 1945 to the present. There are aspects of American ‘This paper is based on a lecture presented by the author at the Triangle Universities' Security Seminar on Changing fighter development that raise some dis- Technologies and New Weapons Systems.