Walter Runciman and the Decline of the Liberal Party

Historians remain divided about the contribution that biography can make to their craft. Those who believe that the study of individuals is important because the decisions of those individuals affect the course of events and that the replacement of one key player in the historical mosaic can significantly change the way in which history evolves are matched by others who argue that biography inevitably exaggerates the role and significance of the individual and distorts the reality of the historical narrative. By David Dutton.1

26 Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 Walter Runciman and the Decline of the Liberal Party

etween someone like parliament alongside his own father seafaring family. Two of his great- Thomas Carlyle, who and even of having preceded him grandfathers fought as midshipmen Bwrote that ‘history is the there. A governmental colleague at Trafalgar, while his father, also essence of innumerable biogra- offered a very fair assessment of him called Walter, rose from humble phies’, and the committed Marxist in 1912. ‘Runciman,’ he wrote, ‘is beginnings to own a major ship- who views the individual as a help- able, honest, hard-working, coura- ping company in the north-east. less cork bobbing up and down on geous, but while a good speaker, The traditional Liberal commit- the remorseless tides of economic just lacks that touch of genius which ment to free trade was part of the determinism, there can be no meet- Churchill has got, and that charm young Walter’s thinking as a pros- ing of minds.2 But somewhere which Lloyd George abounds in. He perous businessman. So too was his between these competing views will enjoy and deserve high office, support for temperance as a lifelong there may perhaps be an accept- but never I think the highest.’3 So it Wesleyian Methodist. Throughout ance that the career of an individual turned out. Runciman never held his political career, contemporaries can offer a revealing prism through one of the great offices of state; his pointed to the continuing impor- which to study important historical most senior appointment was as tance of Runciman’s background themes and problems. President of the Board of Trade, in the world of business and com- The political biography of Wal- where he played an important role merce. A Cabinet colleague dur- ter Runciman, first Viscount Run- in shifting British policy away from ing the First World War found him ciman of Doxford, offers such an free trade in the early 1930s. His- ‘lucid, concise and courageous … opportunity. Runciman’s career tory best remembers him for a job ambitious and a little cocksure. A was certainly a long one. First he performed when not holding hardworking, very capable man elected to the House of Commons government office, travelling to of business….’5 Many years later, in 1899 as Britain became involved Czechoslovakia in the summer of the journalist Colin Coote wrote in the Boer War, he finally retired 1938 in an ultimately unsuccessful approvingly of a ‘shrewdly practi- from his last Cabinet post at the out- attempt to broker a peaceful set- cal business man … whose politics break of the Second World War 40 tlement of the crisis between the were more pragmatic than dog- years later. But political longevity Czechoslovak government and the matic’.6 Even Neville Chamber- does not in itself confer significance, Sudeten Germans, before Prime lain, in announcing to the House and it has to be conceded that Run- Minister took of Commons Runciman’s appoint- ciman was never a politician of the the problem into his own hands in ment as ‘independent mediator’ absolutely first rank. ‘Who were the direct negotiations with Adolf Hit- in the Czechoslovakian crisis of first married couple to sit together ler. Briefly, at least in the opinion of 1938, suggested he would be play- in the House of Commons?’ may be Chamberlain’s Minister of Health, ing the part ‘of a man who goes a good pub quiz question, but the Walter Elliot, Runciman became down to assist in settling a strike’.7 answer – Walter and Hilda Runci- the second most powerful man in Walter But this practical man of business man – does not necessarily endow the world. Unfortunately, Elliot Runciman, struck many as stiff and cold in those concerned with overwhelm- had to add that the most powerful 1st Viscount personality. The Tory MP, Cuth- ing historical importance, even was Adolf Hitler.4 Runciman bert Headlam, always found him if Walter can also claim the unu- Runciman’s background helped of Doxford ‘friendly and pleasant’ but never ‘a sual distinction of having sat in determine his politics. His was a (1870–1949) popular character – clever, etc., but

Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 27 walter runciman and the decline of the lacking the human touch’. He had more plausible propositions, claim- For all that, Labour Party for eventual fusion to heard that , who ing that at the very moment of the have taken place – if it hadn’t been enjoyed inventing pseudonyms for Liberal Party’s greatest electoral Runciman’s for the intervention of the First his political colleagues, preferred success, its overwhelming vic- World War. In practical terms, this ‘the old Pirate’ [Runciman’s father] tory of 1906, the die was already career does community of purpose manifested to the ‘Alabaster Statesman’.8 Simi- cast. ‘The Liberal Party which itself in an electoral pact whereby larly, Lloyd George is said to have came back to Westminster with offer an in many constituencies Liberal remarked that Runciman ‘would an overwhelming majority was’, and Labour candidates gave way make a thermometer drop, even at he claimed, ‘already doomed. It excellent to one another in order to avoid a distance’.9 This sense of separation was like an army protected at all splitting the ‘progressive’ vote. Far from his fellow men was underlined points except for one vital posi- opportunity from being replaced by Labour, the by Runciman’s somewhat dated tion on its flank. With the election to investi- Liberals were well positioned to style of dress. Like Chamberlain, of fifty-three Labour representa- contain the Labour threat and ulti- he favoured the winged collar long tives, the death of Liberalism was gate one of mately swallow it up.12 after it had gone out of fashion. pronounced; it was no longer the How then does the career of For all that, Runciman’s career Left.’10 In other words, in an elec- the most Walter Runciman throw light on does offer an excellent opportunity toral structure in which the logi- this highly polarised debate? A con- to investigate one of the most con- cal state of affairs was a struggle contentious sensus has grown up among histo- tentious historical controversies of between a party of the right and a rians in recent years that the picture the first half of the twentieth cen- party of the left, the Liberals were historical of Liberal–Labour relations varied tury, the decline of the British Lib- about to forfeit their claim to be enormously in different parts of eral Party. Ever since 1936, when the that of the left. The beginnings of controver- the country. Dangerfield’s blan- Cambridge historian George Dan- the Labour Party with its claim to ket gloom is unjustified; but so gerfield published his celebrated, be the party of the British work- sies of the too is the view of Clarke, derived seductive, persuasive, but sadly very ing class was bound in time to lead from the rather atypical circum- wrong study, The Strange Death of to the eclipse of Liberalism. Simi- first half of stances of Lancashire, that all was Liberal England, this issue has fasci- larly, Henry Pelling has written of well in a revitalised and progres- nated students of British politics. the growth of a sort of undogmatic the twenti- sive Liberal Party. Certainly, Run- Runciman’s political life encapsu- ‘Labourism’ in the period before ciman’s experience fits neither of lated the Liberal Party’s disastrous 1914, a feeling that ‘the Labour eth century, these extreme interpretations. It evolution. At the time of his first Party and not the Liberal, was the was not easy for a young MP, even appointment to government office, party for working men to belong the decline one seen as ‘unquestionably the best as Parliamentary Secretary to the to’.11 Another way of looking at the of the British speaker among young Liberals’,13 Local Government Board in Decem- problem is to suggest that Liberals to stand out after 1906 in the array ber 1905, the Liberal Party which would struggle to survive in a situ- Liberal Party. of talent making up what has been Runciman represented stood on the ation where voting was going to described as ‘the most able and bril- verge of the greatest triumph of its be increasingly determined by the liant [government] in British his- entire history. The following month question of class. tory’.14 Nonetheless, Runciman the party secured a landslide gen- But against this pessimistic view made steady progress. Promoted to eral election victory. The Liberals later historians saw in Edward- the position of Financial Secretary won 400 seats in the new House of ian Britain a very much brighter to the Treasury in January 1907, he Commons. Their major opponents, political outlook for the Liberals. entered the Cabinet as President the Conservative/Unionist Party, Their most distinguished spokes- of the Board of Education in April secured just 157. As the two minor man is probably Peter Clarke. Bas- 1908, moved to the Board of Agri- parties, Labour and the Irish Nation- ing his analysis on a detailed study culture and Fisheries in October alists, were unlikely to support the of the politics of Lancashire, Clarke 1911 and became President of the Unionists on any significant vote, argued that voting behaviour had Board of Trade at the outbreak of the Liberal government enjoyed an indeed come to be largely deter- war in August 1914. But it is Run- effective parliamentary majority mined by the question of class by ciman’s career as a constituency of 356. Yet, by the time of Runci- 1914. He believes, however, that the MP which is particularly revealing man’s death in 1949, the Liberal Party Liberal Party had adapted perfectly of the condition of the Edward- seemed to be on a remorseless road to well to this development. Indeed, ian Liberal Party. After losing his political extinction. Two years later, by taking on board the ideas of the seat at Oldham to the Conserva- in the disastrous general election of so-called ‘New Liberalism’ – that tive, , in the 1951, it was reduced to just six MPs, government would have to inter- general election of 1900, Runciman an apparently irrelevant appendage vene far more actively in the soci- secured his return to the Commons to the political system. ety and economy of the twentieth in a by-election in Dewsbury, West This article will consider a num- century than had been the norm Yorkshire, in 1902 and he retained ber of issues that have been key in the Victorian era – the Liberal this seat until the general election to the debate on Liberal decline, Party had entrenched itself as the of 1918. Dewsbury was a predomi- through the prism of Runciman’s party of social reform and of the nantly working-class constituency career. The first is the health of the British working class. Clarke sug- which numbered around 3,000 Edwardian Liberal Party. Char- gests, in fact, that there was enough miners and 6,000 woollen textile acteristically, the debate has been common ground between Edward- workers in its electorate. Runci- polarised. At one end of the scale ian Liberalism and the social demo- man fought a total of six contests in there is Dangerfield, in one of his cratic wing of the newly emerging Dewsbury. If we take the first five

28 Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party of these contests fought before the of hostilities badly divided, with member of an embryonic anti-war outbreak of the First World War – the mainstream party led by H. H. group within the Cabinet in the Runciman’s initial victory in 1902, Asquith reduced to a parliamen- summer of 1914, but any doubts he the general election of 1906, the by- tary rump of under thirty MPs by may have felt were quickly over- election necessitated by his eleva- the ‘coupon’ general election of come, perhaps as a result of a lunch tion to the Cabinet in 1908, and the 1918. As Trevor Wilson memorably with his mentor and friend, the two general elections of 1910 – it put it, the war was like a ‘rampant Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, emerges that only in 1910 did Run- omnibus’ which, out of control, on 1 August. For him, the need to ciman not face a Labour opponent. mounted the pavement and ran maintain the free movement of Little evidence is thus offered of the over an unsuspecting pedestrian.17 British ships in the Channel may two parties coming together in a The pedestrian, of course, was the have been enough to convert him process of gradual fusion. The local British Liberal Party. It may have to the necessity of the government’s picture was one of conflict rather had its problems before 1914, but it stance. Thereafter Runciman was than cooperation. Local Liberal did not face mortal danger. But the clear that the war had to be fought, activists felt so well established that war was different. It was an une- though he was evidently shaken they saw no need to seek an elec- qual contest which the party had by the mounting casualty lists and toral pact or make way for a Labour no chance of winning. But defining was never fully persuaded by the candidate and had resisted pressure the nature of the challenge posed doctrine of ‘the knock-out blow’ to do so prior to selecting Runci- by the war has proved altogether associated with Lloyd George. man. Furthermore, faced in 1910 more difficult. The most seduc- Runciman did have one consist- with straight fights against Con- tive definition relates to the realm ent ally in the trials and tribula- servative opponents, Runciman of ideology. According to Kenneth tions besetting the wartime party. adopted the traditional stance of a Morgan, it was the Liberals’ prin- This was Reginald McKenna, who nineteenth-century Liberal, attack- ciples ‘which the very fact of total became Chancellor of the Excheq- ing his opponents as representa- war with the unbridled collectiv- uer in succession to Lloyd George tives of the privileged landowning ism and the “jingo” passions which when the latter moved to the classes and equating the interests of it unleashed, appeared to under- newly created Ministry of Muni- wealthy businessmen such as him- mine’.18 Modern warfare, it has tions in May 1915. Runciman and self with those of ordinary work- been argued, destroyed liberalism’s McKenna, suggests one historian, ing-class voters against the landed faith in man’s essential rational- ‘became a pairing referred to histo- classes who, in Joseph Chamber- ity. Its waging demanded a degree riographically almost to the point lain’s famous words, ‘toil not, nei- That the of government intervention in and of hyphenation’.20 Even so, it would ther do they spin’. Liberal meetings control over the life and liberties of be wrong to present the two men in Dewsbury were dominated by Liberals the individual citizen which many as the champions of an outdated discussion of traditional Liberal were badly Liberals could not contemplate. political creed which had no place issues – free trade, the powers of The party’s problems are said to in the context of the world’s first the House of Lords, licensing and – perhaps have come to a head over the issue total war. Indeed, Runciman had temperance. ‘Liberal gatherings’, of conscription. Could true Liberals already shown his willingness to writes Martin Pugh, ‘usually had a fatally – ride roughshod over the fundamen- intervene and employ the pow- distinctly old-fashioned ring.’15 The tal human liberty of leaving it to ers of the state during his spell at socio-economic issues which are divided dur- the individual to decide for himself the Ministry of Agriculture. Fur- said to have dominated the politics whether he fought – and quite pos- thermore, he heaped praise on his of the New Liberalism are nota- ing the war sibly died – for his country? Con- colleague’s budget of September ble largely for their absence. But scription thus posed, in Morgan’s 1915, even though that budget has the most striking feature must be is beyond words, ‘a symbolic divide between often been presented as marking Runciman’s electoral success. In a whole-hearted commitment to the deathknell of the Liberal Party’s Dewsbury, what was still largely a question. all-out war, whatever the sacrifice, once unshakeable commitment to middle-class party proved remark- and a respect for the historic cause the sacred principle of free trade.21 ably effective in attracting the But whether of individual liberty’.19 Runciman and McKenna working-class vote. ‘Runciman’s But does this analysis reflect divided from their colleagues, not victories’, concludes Pugh, ‘sprang these divi- what actually happened to the Lib- on ideological grounds, but over from the unexhausted seam of eral Party between 1914 and 1918? the very practical issue of how best nineteenth-century Liberalism.’16 sions took That the Liberals were badly – to win the war. They became asso- The conclusion that Liberalism perhaps fatally – divided during ciated with the idea of ‘business as was not confronted by an existen- place along the war is beyond question. But usual’, not because they opposed tial crisis in the years before 1914 clearly whether these divisions took place greater governmental interven- has propelled many historians to along clearly defined ideological tion in the running of the national the period of the First World War defined lines is altogether more problem- economy per se, but because they itself in the quest for explanations atic. For one thing, the lines of believed that excessive intervention of the party’s decline. The evidence ideological division were markedly inconsist- could only damage the prospects of for such an approach seems compel- ent. Leading individual Liberals ultimate victory. They argued that ling. The party which entered the lines is alto- found themselves united with one Britain had to be able to pay its way war as the party of government, another on one issue, but irrec- through the war, not just because with nearly nine years of continu- gether more oncilably separated on the next. national bankruptcy would under- ous and often distinguished admin- This was certainly the case with mine any concept of military vic- istration behind it, was by the close problematic. Runciman. He has been listed as a tory, but because the maintenance

Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 29 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party of the country’s industrial strength to control inflation in food prices by Runciman was put under tremen- would enable Britain to supply artificially fixing the price of basic dous pressure to reconsider his res- money and war materials to its con- foodstuffs was not the response of a ignation. Asquith’s wife Margot tinental allies. If everything was laissez-faire zealot, but the reasoned wrote in characteristically silly thrown into the war effort – includ- calculation of a minister who under- terms: ‘How can you find it in your ing all available manpower, as stood the problems that would arise heart to desert Henry when Puffin most Conservatives and an increas- for a country as dependent as Britain has been such a friend of your little ing number of Liberals demanded was on imported food. If suppliers boy’s!’32 Runciman was never likely – disaster was almost bound to reacted to capped prices by seek- to be swayed by being reminded ensue.22 Runciman’s position was ing a better return for their goods that his son and Asquith’s young- easy to vilify. H. A. Gwynne of the in other markets around the world, est had been childhood playmates. Morning Post variously described Britain might starve.27 But when it was agreed that discus- him as one of ‘the Pacifist Group Even the debate over conscrip- sions could take place as to the size of the Cabinet’ and, with echoes of tion needs to be seen in the same which it was desirable for the army the Boer War, as one of the ‘pro- practical terms. Runciman did not to attain, he and McKenna had lit- Germans in the Cabinet’.23 Neither base his opposition on any funda- tle choice but to withdraw their indictment was fair. Runciman’s mental rejection of the state’s right resignations. Their argument was ideas might or might not have made to compel a man to fight for his not about the rights and wrongs of military victory more likely. But country. It is true that, after exten- forcing men to fight, but about the his thinking was rational and intel- ‘­McKenna sive Cabinet debates at the end of tipping point after which it would lectually defensible. Runciman and 1915, Runciman, McKenna and be counter-productive to put more those who thought like him took and I the , John Simon, men into uniform if this led to a their inspiration from the way in reached a decision to resign. The shortage of labour for the domestic which Britain had waged successful declared three men went to see Prime Min- economy and a consequent loss of wars in earlier centuries. The ‘Brit- ister Asquith on 28 December and industrial production. In the event, ish Way in Warfare’ was based on that the lat- tendered their resignations. It was, therefore, only John Simon went an all-powerful navy and strictly Runciman admitted to his wife, ‘a ahead and resigned on the point of limited intervention in continen- est proposals most unpleasant interview, ending principle that military compulsion tal land wars. It was an argument with not even a handshake’.28 But in was wrong. Runciman and McK- Runciman had put forward in 1911 were mixed an important diary entry, Asquith’s enna stayed at their posts. at the time of an earlier war scare. daughter-in-law discussed the Over the following year debate ‘What I have been most anxious up with the men’s motivation: continued to rage inside the gov- about,’ he then wrote to a Cabinet ernment over the best way to fight colleague, questions of McKenna – not on principle, but the war and Lloyd George emerged unlimited because as Chancellor he says as the champion of those who were has been that this week which is he cannot possibly undertake to committed to doing everything critical should not pass without recruiting finance it – Runciman for the they could to secure outright vic- the French knowing that what- same motives.29 tory, at whatever the cost. To the ever support we may have to give … and we Conservative, , her, it cannot be by six divisions, A well-placed Cabinet colleague Lloyd George wrote in January 1916: or four, or one on the Continent. regarded the confirmed this analysis: The sea is our natural element We must win through even and the sooner they realise that avoidance His great argument with [Run- though we win in rags. The we are not going to land troops ciman and McKenna] was that notion of keeping up our trade the better will be the chances of of industrial they could not resign for a rea- as if there were no war is fatal. preserving Europe’s peace.24 son that they could not name, The single eye always triumphs and financial for the real reason of their res- in the end. Thus Germany fights From the outbreak of war in August ignations is not any question – her trade gone and her people 1914, therefore, Runciman’s man- collapse as of principle or even the fact of rationed on potatoes. I implore agement of the Board of Trade was compulsion but simply on the you not to give assent to the designed to ensure that the coun- so important number of men who are taken, McKenna–Runciman position. try’s ‘wealth production could con- i.e. the size of the Army.30 If you desert us on this point … tinue with minimal disruption’.25 that we could Britain will be beaten.33 When he and McKenna insisted that Runciman himself offered yet fur- British merchant ships should con- not consent ther corroboration in a letter to his Lloyd George’s position, like Run- tinue to be allowed to carry trade wife: ciman’s, was entirely plausible. But between neutral countries rather to giving the it is important not to misrepresent than be restricted to carrying goods military the McKenna and I declared that the the nature of the division between to and from Britain, this represented latest proposals were mixed up them. no abstract defence of the principle compulsory with the questions of unlimited By the end of 1916 another crisis of free trade, but rather a desire to recruiting … and we regarded had arisen. In what approximated maximise the country’s foreign cur- powers for the avoidance of industrial and to a palace coup, Lloyd George rency earnings in order to support financial collapse as so important replaced Asquith as prime minister, the balance of payments.26 Similarly, which they that we could not consent to giv- and Runciman, a committed mem- Runciman’s opposition to propos- ing the military the compulsory ber of the Asquith camp and advis- als that the government should seek asked.’ powers for which they asked.31 ing Asquith to stand firm against

30 Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party

Lloyd George’s demand for a radi- death, there was no one who It is clear But Asquith would not play the cal restructuring of the machinery could take his place, and could part that Asquithians, Runciman of wartime government, found put the party before persons and that Runci- included, had mapped out for him. himself out of office. In a reshaped personalities. Gulland, the Chief In March 1917, Runciman recorded Asquith administration he might Whip in 1916 did nothing.35 man hoped that McKenna ‘says that we must go have been promoted to the Admi- on propping up our distinguished ralty. As it was, his exclusion would More generally, this approach to be part of jelly – the late PM to wit! – We last almost fifteen years. Just as accepts that the Liberal Party was must do our best to screw him up importantly, this episode left many badly damaged by the war, but a more vigor- to an emphatic speech on Ireland.’38 Liberals – Runciman included – argues that the fissures did not have Asquith was constrained by the with a lasting detestation of Lloyd to be either permanent or cata- ous opposi- belief, probably correct, that overt George for the way he was per- strophic for the party. After all, opposition to the new government ceived to have behaved. The reac- the Labour Party also split over tion to the would be castigated as a failure tion of Runciman’s father was no the conduct of the war, but it came Lloyd George to support the war effort. In fact, doubt shared by the son: ‘No coup back together again and advanced the celebrated of could be brought about in the way rapidly within the political sys- government, 9 May 1918 was the only occasion it has without sowing seeds of bitter tem in the immediate post-war when Asquith and the Asquith- feeling. It could have been avoided years. The Asquith–Lloyd George which he ian whips gave their backing to a but for the attitude of one man and rupture, by contrast, was not tem- division against the government. his co-operators.’ Asquith’s politi- porary. Two separate Liberal par- described as By this time Runciman seems to cal demise had been ‘brought about ties existed until 1923 when they have become completely disillu- mainly by the man he had been a nominally came together again in ‘a directorate sioned with both of the potential benefactor to’.34 defence of free trade. Even after Liberal leaders. Convinced that The crisis of 1916 leads to a third 1923, though, reunion was paper- of the French Lloyd George would escape from theme upon which historians have thin, deep-rooted animosities what could have been a damag- focused in their quest for explana- remained, and the party’s decline revolution ing parliamentary debate – ‘there tions of the Liberal Party’s decline, continued apace. During those were so many ways in which inac- where Runciman’s experience is seven years between 1916 and 1923 type’, than curate statements could plausibly be again instructive. This relates to the Labour Party advanced dra- explained’ – he nonetheless hoped individuals, personal animosi- matically, moving from the periph- Asquith was that Asquith would renounce his ties, chance, bad luck, miscalcu- ery of the political stage to its very own claims to the premiership and lations and misjudgements – in centre, and forming its first gov- prepared to promise ‘general support to an other words contingencies which ernment in January 1924. This was administration with a Conservative need not have happened and which no coincidence. Labour willingly provide. at its head while it waged war effec- do not reflect the sort of deep filled a void opened up by the Lib- tively’.39 In the event Runciman, and longstanding problems said eral Party. And, once the Liberals who should have wound up the to be contained in the challenge had fallen into the third-party trap, debate for the Opposition, ‘looked of the Labour Party and the sup- they would find it very difficult miserable, and never rose’.40 posed crisis of identity and doc- to escape from it. How, then, does The general election of Decem- trine occasioned by the First World Runciman’s career after 1916 illu- ber 1918, held only a month after War. The classic exposition of this minate this issue? the armistice, was a disaster for the approach was perhaps offered by His commitment to Asquith independent Liberal Party. It served Lloyd George himself. Looking was soon shaken. It is clear that to intensify Liberal divisions and back from the vantage point of the Runciman hoped to be part of a accentuate personal animosities. mid-1930s, by which time he was more vigorous opposition to the Victory was secured by a coalition increasingly prone to reminisce Lloyd George government, which of Conservatives and Lloyd George about the past, the great Welsh- he described as ‘a directorate of Liberals in which the former were man attributed the downfall of the the French revolution type’, than by far the dominant element. Only Liberal Party to an oyster. As his Asquith was prepared to provide.36 28 independent Liberals of the secretary and mistress, Frances Ste- Just weeks after the change of gov- party still headed by Asquith were venson, recorded: ernment, Runciman was clear returned to parliament. The key about what should now happen: factor was the so-called ‘coupon’, He went on to explain that the letter of endorsement signed by Percy Illingworth [the party’s I am much impressed with the Lloyd George and the Tory leader, chief whip] died of typhoid anxiety of the country to have , which served almost caused by a bad oyster [in 1915]. some responsible men acting as as a passport back to Westminster, Had he lived, he would never their watch-dogs, for, when we and Lloyd George’s ready accept- have allowed the rift between went out there was some rejoicing ance of a bargain struck with the D[avid] & Asquith to take place. over the prospect of the opposi- Conservatives, whereby only 150 He would have brought them tion becoming once more efficient Liberal candidates received it. Most together, patched the quarrel as well as responsible. We must not of the leading independent Liberals, up, cursed them and saved the fail in this duty and we should be including Asquith and Runciman, Liberal Party. He would have failing if we cease to be vigilant, went down to defeat. Indeed, Run- held up to the light the intrigue and equally failing if we did not ciman came bottom of the poll in of McKenna and Runciman, give the country the impression Dewsbury, despite the efforts of the whom he knew well. After his that they can rely on us.37 Asquithian whip, J. W. Gulland, to

Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 31 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party secure the withdrawal of his Labour bouncing back, but Runciman and Runciman’s Commons. When this move failed, opponent.41 those who thought like him stood eleven Liberal MPs, with Runci- Runciman’s outlook on poli- very self-consciously in the way outlook on man as their chairman, formed the tics over the following decade was of reconciliation, as long as Lloyd so-called ‘Radical Group’, effec- determined by one factor above all George remained in front-line poli- politics over tively disowning Lloyd George’s others – a deeply personal detesta- tics. At the meeting of the National authority. The group announced tion of Lloyd George. The two men Liberal Federation General Com- the following that it stood for ‘free land, free had been developing a dislike for mittee in Leamington in 1920, for trade and free people’ and that it one another before the outbreak of example, it was noted that leading decade was proposed to ‘carry out the policy war, with Runciman declaring that Asquithians, including Runciman, foreshadowed by Cobden’.49 It the Welshman ‘would snatch at any deliberately avoided giving Lloyd determined amounted to a party within the opportunities of stabbing me if he Georgeites a hearing.45 Yet the Lib- party, but any ties of doctrine got the chance’.42 Their hatred now erals needed Lloyd George, not by one factor seemed less important than per- knew no limits. Arguably, this sort least because Asquith, as Runciman above all oth- sonal animosities. Hatred of Lloyd of personal animosity destroyed any himself recognised, was no longer George appeared to be the new hope of a Liberal recovery in these an effective leader. Rather than face ers – a deeply group’s primary motivation. crucial post-war years. While Lib- the inevitable, however, Runci- Illness finally forced Asquith’s erals such as Runciman should have man strove to persuade the former personal resignation in 1926 and the party been focusing their attention on the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, as a whole turned to Lloyd George mortal danger which the Labour to fill the leadership vacuum, even detesta- as his successor, not least because Party now posed, they seemed more though the latter was now almost it was now desperately short of intent on fighting Lloyd George. blind and most reluctant to re-enter tion of Lloyd money, something which only When the need was to devise the political arena. ‘He shudders at Lloyd George could supply via his policies to appeal to the newly continuous responsibility’, admit- George. ill-gained ‘Political Fund’. Once expanded electorate, they turned in ted Runciman, ‘but we must go again, the malcontents responded on themselves in order, it seemed, on impressing him with what the by setting up a new organisation. to engage in a mutually destructive Methodists describe as the “Call” – Runciman now emerged as chair- civil war to the death. In the words which he dare not shrink.’46 man of the ‘Liberal Council’ and of Jonathan Wallace, Runciman’s When Asquith and Lloyd effectively its parliamentary leader. only biographer, by 1930 ‘Runci- George did put past differences The new body stood for a pure and man had become an embittered behind them, at least to the extent uncorrupted form of Liberalism. Its malcontent who could never be rec- of combining to oppose the tariff aim was to shift the balance within onciled to Lloyd George, no matter proposals of the new Conserva- the parliamentary Liberal Party and what the latter did.’43 tive prime minister, Stanley Bald- it hoped to field candidates in oppo- In the wake of the disastrous win, in 1923, Runciman remained sition to Lloyd Georgeites at the 1918 general election defeat, The unreconciled and probably irrec- next general election. When Lloyd Times declared that Runciman was, oncilable. Though he wrote to George turned up at the meeting of even out of parliament, ‘without Lloyd George of his ‘great joy … the National Liberal Federation in doubt, the rising hope of the Radi- to become united with you and June 1926, Runciman, ‘there at the cals’. 44 Though it is not clear from those Liberals who have stood loy- beginning, sulked and went away – the context precisely what mean- ally by you,’ it seems unlikely that a foolish exhibition’.50 ing the newspaper intended to these words reflected his true senti- But Lloyd George now gave convey by the word ‘radical’, Run- ments.47 If they did, his mood soon fresh life to the party, helping ciman had, in practice, forfeited changed. Less than a year later, he to devise a range of new policies any claims to radicalism in the sense suggested that ‘the personal diffi- designed above all else to counter of a progressive, root-and-branch culties are acuter than ever and can the mounting scourge of unem- approach to current politics. The never be solved so long as LG insists ployment. The last years of the image he cultivated now was that on pushing himself as leader or decade witnessed a mini-Liberal of a traditional Gladstonian Lib- deputy leader’48. renaissance, with a number of by- eral of the nineteenth century. His Like many Liberals of this era, election gains. Few could have speeches in 1919 concentrated on Runciman struggled to secure his anticipated that these would be the need for sound finance and the own return to parliament. Defeated the party’s last such gains until the abolition of government controls. in Edinburgh South (1920), Ber- famous Torrington contest of 1958. Runciman was far from being the wick-upon-Tweed (1922) and Still, however, Runciman held first – or indeed the last – politician Brighton (1923), he finally returned aloof – ostentatiously so. Quite to drift to the right as his career to the Commons at the general simply, if Lloyd George visited a progressed. But there was another election of 1924 as MP for Swansea by-election constituency, Runci- factor at work. His aim was to pro- West. Asquith had secured his own man stayed away. The latter set out ject himself as a pillar of ortho- return for Paisley at a by-election his reasoning: doxy and rectitude in contrast to in February 1920, but was defeated the dangerous ambition and innate again in 1924. He now went to So far as the methods of these corruption of Lloyd George. Many the Lords as the Earl of Oxford elections are concerned, I thor- Liberals, particularly among the and Asquith, while retaining the oughly detest them. Their lavish rank and file at constituency level, party leadership. But Runciman expenditure, their loudspeakers recognised the need for reunion if tried to resist the election of Lloyd and the deplorable bad taste and the party was to have any chance of George as sessional chairman in the gross inaccuracies of their land,

32 Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party

industrial and mining news dis- warm for him by his wife, Hilda, his business interests, becoming a gust me … The country wants who had captured it in a by-elec- director of the , Midland Liberalism, not LG, and I am tion in March 1928. The 1929 gen- and Scottish Railway in Decem- distressed when I see Liberalism eral election did see a partial Liberal ber 1929 and Deputy Chairman of suffer because he is allowed to recovery, enough to leave the party the Royal Mail Group the follow- dominate it.51 holding the balance in the new par- ing November. Indeed, in February liament. But underlying divisions 1931 he announced his intention to By this stage Runciman had remained and, over the next two step down from the Commons at published a short book, which years, the Liberals were reduced the next general election. Archibald amounted to a personal manifesto, to a parliamentary rabble, unable Sinclair noted that he was now setting out a political creed which to unite behind Lloyd George and ‘wholly occupied with his business was in sharp contrast to the radi- seldom capable of even sending all interests and only appears in the cal interventionism being offered their MPs into the same division House of Commons very occasion- by Lloyd George. In Liberalism As I lobby of the House of Commons. ally to emphasise by vote or speech See It Runciman wrote, ‘the aver- The veneer of unity displayed by some difference with his Liberal age non-political citizen wants what the party during the election cam- colleagues’.57 is in fact a Gladstonian policy. But paign soon disappeared. It was Yet Runciman still had an at present he does not feel that he not long before Runciman and his important role to play in the Lib- can get it from the Liberal Party.’52 colleagues in the Liberal Council eral Party’s fortunes during the This made it very difficult to see reverted to a policy of independ- 1930s. The collapse of the Labour how he could ever be reconciled to ence from the party leadership. ‘I government, its replacement by an the party while it remained led by Runciman’s can no longer be comfortable in all-party ‘National’ administra- Lloyd George. ‘No-one is likely the Liberal Party,’ he admitted in tion and the prospect that he might to misunderstand my position,’ attitude November, but it was not imme- yet return to high office caused he insisted, ‘for they know that I diately clear where else he could him to reverse his earlier inclina- opposed his Chairmanship of the towards turn. If, as seemed likely, the Con- tion to retire from political life. Parliamentary Party and oppose it servatives moved towards protec- This is a period that many histo- still; that I decline to go to bye-elec- Wales’s most tion, ‘a Free Trader like me can see rians of the party’s decline once tions which are dominated by him, nothing but disaster’.55 But, while neglected, largely out of the belief and that I have stated plainly that I famous son he remained determined not to fol- that there was nothing more to say. could not undertake to enter a Cabi- low Lloyd George, Runciman soon They considered that the Liberal net with him as Prime Minister.’53 may have recognised that there was much to Party was doomed by 1930 and that Such, however, was Lloyd support in the new Labour govern- little was to be gained by poring George’s momentum that, as the been a factor ment, not least the presence at the over its death throes. So, for exam- general election of 1929 approached, in his deci- Exchequer of Philip Snowden, a ple, Trevor Wilson’s classic study, almost all Liberals saw the need to committed exponent of free trade The Downfall of the Liberal Party, line up behind him, at least for the sion to leave and sound Gladstonian finance. treated the party’s travails after the sake of public appearance. Even This dual motivation carried its 1931 general election as little more Runciman gave the leader’s ambi- Swansea and own complications, for Lloyd than a postscript to the main story. tious plans to reduce unemploy- George too, if not as consistently More recently, however, it has been ment to normal proportions within secure elec- as Runciman, understood the need argued that there was still a chance a single year his public endorse- to keep the Labour government in of a Liberal revival, perhaps not ment. Election posters appeared in tion instead office. The next few months saw to the glory days of earlier years, the press, carrying pictures of the Runciman abstain on the govern- but at least sufficient to restore its party’s united leadership, includ- in the St Ives ment’s Coal Bill in December 1929, credentials as a significant parlia- ing Lloyd George, Herbert Samuel, when the official Liberal stance mentary force. The Labour Party Viscount Grey, Lord Reading, Sir division of was one of opposition, and abstain was badly damaged by the 1931 John Simon, Lord Beauchamp and again the following February on a general election, reduced to just Runciman. But the latter’s real , a Liberal amendment which tried to fifty-two MPs. Surely the Liber- intentions were probably contained delete protection quota arrange- als could have taken advantage of in a letter sent to him by the like- seat conveni- ments. Negotiations seem to have this situation. To do so, however, minded Harcourt Johnstone who taken place between Alec Beech- they needed one thing above all wrote: ‘Our real business over the ently kept man (who eventually succeeded else – unity. This was conspicuous next three months is to get ourselves Runciman as MP for St Ives in only by its absence, and Runci- returned to Parliament and specifi- warm for him 1937) and Prime Minister Ramsay man was at the heart of a new and, cally to get a majority – or strong by his wife, MacDonald about the possibility of as it turned out, permanent party minority – returned which will be a formal breach with Lloyd George. division.58 Though the entire Lib- hostile to LG. To do this we may Hilda, who MacDonald, ‘very appreciative eral Party began by supporting the have to improvise a little our natu- of the line … you [Runciman] all-party National Government set ral inclinations.’54 had captured and Donald [Maclean] took over up in August 1931 to deal with the Runciman’s attitude towards the Coal Bill … would, of course, country’s economic crisis, two Lib- Wales’s most famous son may have it in a by- like us to follow up the break with eral groupings soon emerged – the been a factor in his decision to some pronouncement about sup- mainstream party now headed by leave Swansea and secure election election in porting him’.56 The moment, how- Herbert Samuel and a group of so- instead in the St Ives division of ever, passed and Runciman turned called Liberal Nationals led by John Cornwall, a seat conveniently kept March 1928. his attention increasingly towards Simon. The key difference between

Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 33 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party them was the readiness of the Lib- Board of Trade to the impeccably associated with an organisation of eral Nationals to abandon the once free-trade Runciman. But Runci- which Simon ‘calls himself leader’.69 sacred principle of free trade in the man’s thinking on this matter was As a Liberal National, Runciman fight to save the national economy. evolving and he had already told insisted that he remained as true a In practice, this involved becoming his constituents that he was ready Liberal as he had ever been. As late electoral and parliamentary allies of to back any moves necessary to as March 1938 he was still calling the Tories. restore the trade balance.63 Once for ‘pure, simple, strong Liberal- To begin with, Runciman’s in government, Runciman was ism in order to save [the] country position was unclear. Though it quickly won over to the argument from disaster’.70 But, if Runciman was hard to regard him any longer in favour of tariffs, though he was remained more of a ‘Liberal’ than as a loyal member of the main- successful in persuading Cham- did most Liberal Nationals, this stream party, he had not been act- berlain to accept a more moderate did not prevent him becoming an ing in association with Simon. In Once in gov- scheme than the latter would ide- object of Liberal hostility in the particular, he had not followed suit ernment, ally have liked – an achievement south-west, where his interven- when, on 26 June, Simon, Robert for which he incurred the lasting tion in the general election of 1935 Hutchison and Ernest Brown had Runciman animosity of all-out imperial pref- was widely held responsible for the formally resigned the Liberal whip. erentialists such as Leo Amery.64 defeat of in Bodmin. A statement issued to the press on was quickly According to David Wrench, the Over time, the Liberal Nationals as 25 October 1931 read: ‘Mr Runci- Runciman–Chamberlain agree- a whole became indistinguishable man is not to be included in any won over to ment created the essential ‘com- from Conservatives and they were group. He is a Liberal supporting promise that enabled the National in the latter’s pockets long before the National Government.’59 This, the argu- Government to dominate British they finally amalgamated with of course, was a description that politics for the rest of the decade’.65 them in 1968. Moreover, the Lib- fitted almost all Liberal candidates ment in Runciman hoped to use British eral–Liberal National split proved at the election held a few days later. tariffs as a bargaining counter in catastrophic for the Liberal Party, He had not been included in the favour of tar- negotiations with other countries destroying any possibility of a Lib- emergency Cabinet of ten set up in that had also introduced tariffs, in eral revival for at least a generation. August, in which the Liberal rep- iffs, though order to move towards all-round At a stroke, half the Liberal Party’s resentatives were Samuel and the reductions and, ultimately, the res- remaining parliamentary strength Marquess of Reading, when this he was suc- toration of a free-trade system. As had been lost and, in most cases, the Nonconformist Wesleyan had com- late as 1937, the Tory backbencher, sitting Liberal MP (now a Liberal mented rather unpleasantly, ‘So far cessful in , was still describ- National) succeeded in taking his as I am concerned, it is clear that ing him, along with the American local party organisation with him the Jews had no place in the Cabi- persuading Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, as into the new group. In many con- net for a Gentile.’60 Samuel tried to Chamberlain ‘the only true begotten Cobdenites stituencies where Liberalism had convince Runciman that he had in left on earth’.66 managed to survive through all the fact secured the agreement of Mac- to accept a As the mainstream Liberals challenges and crises of the second Donald and Baldwin to the offer of under Samuel resigned from the and third decades of the century, it the non-Cabinet post of War Sec- more moder- government in September 1932 in now all but disappeared, while Lib- retary, ‘should you be prepared to opposition to the tariff arrange- eral voters were often left confused take it’. But Samuel’s suggestion ate scheme ments reached at the Ottawa Impe- as to which side of the divide repre- that this plan had been thwarted by rial Conference, while Runciman sented the authentic Liberal creed. difficulty in contacting Runciman than the lat- remained in office, he had little Notwithstanding unrealistic did not help matters, especially alternative but to associate himself hopes that he might yet be ele- when the post was finally offered ter would with the Liberal National group, vated to the Treasury, Runciman to the almost forgotten figure of though anomalously he retained retained the office of President of Lord Crewe.61 At the same time, ideally have offices within the Samuelite party the Board of Trade until the reshuf- Runciman was wary of finding for some years and was re-elected fle occasioned by Neville Chamber- himself part of a small opposition liked – an vice-president of the Liberal Coun- lain’s accession to the premiership Liberal grouping which included cil in June 1934. Indeed, he was in May 1937. Arguing that he was Lloyd George, telling Samuel, ‘my achievement one of two Liberal Nationals (the busily engaged in ongoing matters opinion is no less strongly against other being Simon) on an infor- at the Board of Trade, he angrily LG & his machinations than it has for which he mal six-man steering group, which rejected the prime minister’s offer ever been’.62 When the Cabinet was eventually became a General Pur- of the non-departmental post of enlarged to normal proportions incurred the poses Committee of the Cabinet, Lord Privy Seal.71 Somewhat sur- after the general election in Octo- lasting ani- and which confirmed the reality of prisingly, he was brought back into ber, he had the chance to return to ‘National Government’.67 But Run- the government in October 1938 government after an absence of fif- mosity of all- ciman was no friend of the Lib- in the wake of the Munich crisis as teen years. The Labour prime min- eral National leader, John Simon, Lord President of the Council. The ister of the National Government, out imperial and, by the end of 1934, was tell- outgoing minister, Lord Hailsham, Ramsay MacDonald, was obliged ing the prime minister that Simon sixty-six years old and in poor to accept the Conservative, Neville preferential- was the government’s ‘weakest health, must have been somewhat Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the link’.68 Indeed, when Runciman surprised to have been asked by Exchequer, but he sought to bal- ists such as became president of the Liberal Chamberlain to make way for a ance the appointment of this com- National Council in 1937, his wife successor who was sixty-eight and mitted tariff reformer by giving the Leo Amery noted how ‘distasteful’ it was to be also now ailing.72 At all events, the

34 Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party appointment was not a success. An a mutineer whenever mutiny is Campbell- 12 P. F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New extended leave of absence to restore possible’.76 Runciman emerged as a Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971), passim. his health proved unavailing. Run- committed Asquithian, especially Bannerman’s For an important recent contribution ciman resigned at the outbreak of during the internecine struggles of to this debate, see I. Packer, ‘Con- war in September 1939, admitting the First World War, but became own descrip- tested Ground: Trends in British By- that ‘my nerves are all to pieces’.73 disillusioned with Asquith several Elections, 1911–1914’, Contemporary years before the latter’s retirement. tion of Runci- British History, 25, 1 (2011), pp. 157–73. ~ He clearly despised Lloyd George 13 Manchester Guardian, 15 Nov. 1949. and did everything he could to man, written 14 A. Salter, Personality in Politics (Lon- What then does the career of Wal- destroy him, and he ended his polit- don, 1948), p. 113. ter Runciman reveal about the ical career in a new party headed by in 1901, was 15 M. Pugh, ‘Yorkshire and the New destruction of the British Liberal John Simon, whom he also disliked Liberalism’, Journal of Modern History, Party? Conclusions based on the and sought to undermine. No one, prophetic. 50, 3 (1978), p. D1153. This section experience of one man must nec- of course, could argue that Walter He was, he draws heavily from Professor Pugh’s essarily be tentative and qualified. Runciman caused the decline of the important article. But the evidence of Runciman Liberal Party. But internal divi- suggested, ‘a 16 Ibid., p. D1155. as a Dewsbury MP does not sug- sions and disputes surely did play 17 T. Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal gest that Liberalism faced a mor- an important part; and to this prob- pugnacious, Party 1914–1935 (London, 1966), p. 18. tal threat from the rising Labour lem Runciman made a significant 18 K. O. Morgan, The Age of Lloyd George: Party in the years before the First contribution. sectional The Liberal Party and British Politics, World War. But neither was it 1890–1929 (London, 1978), p. 58. transmogrifying into a social dem- After thirty-five years teaching in Liv- partisan who 19 Ibid. ocratic progressivism. Traditional erpool, David Dutton punctuates his 20 M. Farr, Reginald McKenna: Financier nineteenth-century Liberalism retirement in South-West Scotland with will be, as Among Statesmen, 1863–1916 (Abing- was still thriving in this constitu- submissions to the Journal of Liberal don, 2008), p. 76. ency. His experience as a govern- History. in the past, 21 Runciman to McKenna, c. 23 Sept. ment minister in the first half of 1915, cited D. French, British Strat- the First World War argues against 1 Earlier versions of this paper were a mutineer egy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London, the idea that this conflict posed an presented at Elshieshields Tower, 1986), p. 124. insuperable ideological challenge home of the Revd Dr Ann Shukman, whenever 22 French, British Strategy, pp. 120–1. to the party’s very existence. On grand-daughter of Walter Runci- 23 K. Wilson (ed.), The Rasp of War: The the other hand, both in the ongo- man, and at Manchester Metropoli- mutiny is Letters of H. A. Gwynne to The Count- ing disputes of the 1920s around the tan University. ess of Bathurst 1914–1918 (London, personality of 2 A. Partington (ed.), Oxford Dictionary possible’. 1988), pp. 169, 196. and in the final split between Liber- of Quotations (Oxford, 1996), p. 180. 24 Runciman to L. Harcourt, 4 Sept. als and Liberal Nationals a decade 3 E. David (ed.), Inside Asquith’s Cabinet 1911, cited D. French, British Economic later, Runciman’s career suggests (London, 1977), p. 122. and Strategic Planning 1905–1915 (Lon- that the Liberal Party indulged in 4 N. Rose (ed.), Baffy: The Diaries of don, 1982), p. 33. a case of political suicide – a party Blanche Dugdale 1936–1947 (London, 25 J. Wallace, ‘The Political Career of so engrossed by its own internal 1973), p. 93. Walter Runciman’, Ph.D. thesis (Uni- quarrels that it failed to focus on the 5 David (ed.), Asquith’s Cabinet, p. 230. versity of Newcastle, 1995), p. 184. bigger question of its very survival. 6 C. Coote, Editorial (London, 1965), p. 26 French, British Economic Planning, p. 104. Liberalism as a political philosophy 159. 27 Ibid., p. 99. is all about the rights of the individ- 7 House of Commons Debates, 5th 28 University of Newcastle, Runciman ual. But there perhaps existed a fun- Series, vol. 338, cols. 2956–8. MSS 303, Runciman to H. Runci- damental conflict between this and 8 S. Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics man 28 Dec. 1915. Extracts from the the need for a political party to seek in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The papers of Walter Runciman are cited out those common beliefs that bind Headlam Diaries 1935–1951 (Cam- by kind permission of the Viscount individuals together, submerging bridge, 1999), pp. 607–8. See also M. Runciman of Doxford. points of difference in the interests and E. Brock (eds.), H. H. Asquith: 29 , Diaries 1915– of the wider organisation. The evi- Letters to Venetia Stanley (pb. edn, 1918 (London, 1968), p. 117. dence suggests that Runciman was Oxford, 1985), p. 409. 30 J. J. Norwich (ed.), The no team player. He had no confi- 9 H. Nogueres, Munich: The Phoney Diaries 1915–1951 (London, 2005), p. dence in Sir Henry Campbell-Ban- Peace (London, 1965), p. 77. 23, reporting the opinion of Edwin nerman, the first party leader he 10 G. Dangerfield,The Strange Death of Montagu. nominally served on entering par- Liberal England (London, 1936), p. 10. 31 Runciman to H. Runciman, 28 Dec. liament in 1899.74 He supported the It needs to be noted that Dangerfield 1915, cited Wallace, ‘Runciman’, p. 229. Boer War, which Campbell-Ban- can only reach the figure of fifty- 32 C. Asquith, Diaries, p. 123. Anthony nerman opposed, and, only a year three by including the batch of so- Asquith, son of H. H. Asquith by his after entering the Commons, was called Lib–Lab MPs who continued second wife Margot, was invariably describing his leader as ‘insuffer- to take the Liberal whip. LRC (soon called ‘Puffin’ because of the shape of able’.75 Campbell-Bannerman’s own to be Labour Party) strength is usu- his nose. description of Runciman, written ally recorded as thirty MPs. 33 Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd in 1901, was prophetic. He was, he 11 H. Pelling, Popular Politics and Soci- George MSS, D/16/7/4, Lloyd suggested, ‘a pugnacious, sectional ety in Late Victorian Britain (London, George to Chamberlain, 8 Jan. 1916. partisan who will be, as in the past, 1968), p. 118. 34 Elshieshields Tower, papers of Walter

Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014 35 walter runciman and the decline of the liberal party

Runciman, sr, Sir W. Runciman to wife, 9 Dec. 1916. Extracts Liberal Democrat History Group online from the papers of Walter Run- Email ciman, sr, are cited by kind per- Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest way mission of the Revd Dr Ann to find out what we’re doing. Fill in the form at: http://bit.ly/LDHGemail. Shukman. 35 A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: Website A Diary by See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of our activities and publications, guides to archive sources, (London, 1971), p. 320. research resources, and a growing number of pages on the history of the party. 36 Runciman to Emmott, 3 Jan. 1917, cited J. Turner, British Facebook page Politics and the Great War (New News of the latest meeting and publications, and a discussion forum: Haven, CT, 1992), p. 186. www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup. 37 Runciman to Asquith, 29 Jan. 1917, cited Wallace, ‘Runciman’, Twitter p. 243. A daily posting of Liberal events on this day in history. Follow us at: LibHistoryToday. 38 Runciman to H. Runciman, 3 Mar. 1917, cited Turner, British Politics, p. 188. Dec. 1923. Wrench, ‘Very Peculiar’, p. 63. 64 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson 39 W. Buckler to Col House, 9 May 48 Runciman to Herbert Glad- 56 Beechman to Runciman, 18 (eds.), The Empire at Bay (Lon- 1918, and Runciman to H. Run- stone, 21 Nov. 1924, cited Wal- Dec. 1929, cited Wallace, ‘Run- don, 1988), pp. 232, 253, 265, 295, ciman, 1 May 1918, cited Turner, lace, ‘Runciman’, p. 273. ciman’, p. 314. 396. British Politics, pp. 298–9. 49 , 25 Nov. 1924. 57 Sinclair to H. A. L. Fisher, 20 65 Wrench, ‘Very Peculiar’, p. 82. 40 Maurice Hankey diary 9 May 50 D. Dutton (ed.), Odyssey of an Mar. 1931, cited Wilson, Down- 66 R. Cockett (ed.), My Dear Max: 1918, cited S. Roskill, Hankey: Edwardian Liberal: the Politi- fall, p. 364. The Letters of Brendan Bracken to Man of Secrets, vol. 1, (London, cal Diary of Richard Durning Holt 58 This argument is developed in Lord Beaverbrook 1925–1958 (Lon- 1970), p. 545. (Gloucester, 1989), p. 90. D. Dutton, ‘1932: A Neglected don, 1990), p. 39. 41 B. Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel: 51 Runciman to I. Foot, 3 Oct. Date in the History of the 67 D. Dutton, Liberals in Schism: A A Political Life (Oxford, 1992), 1928, cited J. Campbell, Lloyd Decline of the British Liberal History of the National Liberal Party pp. 232–3. George: The Goat in the Wilderness, Party’, Twentieth Century British (London, 2008), p. 73. 42 Runciman MSS 303, Runciman 1922–1931 (London, 1977), p. 215. History 14, 1 (2003). 68 National Archives, PRO 30/69, to H. Runciman, 14 Aug. 1911. 52 W. Runciman, Liberalism As I See 59 Statement to Central News, MacDonald diary, 4 Dec. 1934. 43 Wallace, ‘Runciman’, p. 320. It (London, 1927), p. 4. London 25 Oct. 1931, cited Wal- 69 Hilda Runciman diary, 24–25 44 The Times, 1 Jan. 1919. 53 Runciman to Harcourt John- lace, ‘Runciman’, p. 335. June 1937, cited Wallace, ‘Run- 45 J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory stone, 28 Feb. 1929, cited D. 60 Runciman MSS 245, Runciman ciman’, p. 389. Politics: The Political Diaries of Wrench, ‘“Very Peculiar Cir- to G. Collins, 1 Sept. 1931 (draft). 70 R. Douglas, Liberals: The History Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford 1910– cumstances”: Walter Runciman 61 Runciman MSS 215, Samuel to of the Liberal and Liberal Demo- 1935 (London, 1984), pp. 138–9. and the National Government, Runciman, 29 Aug. 1931. crat Parties (London, 2005), pp. 46 Runciman to A. Murray, 22 1931–3’, Twentieth Century British 62 Runciman to H. Runciman, 17 239–40. Sept. 1921, cited K. Robbins, Sir History, 11, 1 (2000), p. 63. Sept. 1931, cited Wrench, ‘Very 71 Runciman to L. Hore-Belisha, Edward Grey (London, 1971), pp. 54 Johnstone to Runciman, 26 Feb. Peculiar’, p. 65. 31 May 1937, cited R. Minney, 356–57. 1929, cited Campbell, Goat, p. 230. 63 G. Tregidga, The Liberal Party in The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha 47 Lloyd George MSS, G/17/4/1, 55 Runciman to W. Fitzherbert South West Britain since 1918 (Exe- (London, 1960), pp. 137–8. Runciman to Lloyd George, 8 Wright, 28 Nov. 1929, cited ter, 2000), pp. 63–4. 72 Chamberlain to Hailsham, 21 Oct. 1938, cited C. Cooper, ‘Conservatism, Imperialism and : The Political Unlocking Liberalism – Career of Douglas Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham 1922–38’, Life after the Coalition Ph.D. thesis (University of Liv- erpool, 2012), p. 351. 73 Runciman to H. Runciman, 24 A new book of essays setting a post-2015 course for the Liberal Democrats. Aug. 1939, cited Wallace, ‘Run- ciman’, p. 406. 74 Technically, Campbell-Banner- Contributors include David Steel, Robert Brown, Ross Finnie, Graham man was only leader of the party Watson, Prateek Buch, Nigel Lindsay, and the authors of The Spirit Level. in the House of Commons at this date. Foreword by Charles Kennedy. 75 Runciman to C. Trevelyan, 27 Sept. 1900, cited Wallace, ‘Run- This 228-page book can be bought at the Glasgow Liberal Democrat ciman’, p. 34. 76 Campbell-Bannerman to H. conference for £9.50, or can be ordered by post for £11 (cheques payable Gladstone, 30 Oct. 1901, cited to ‘Liberal Futures’) from Nigel Lindsay, 4 Church Road, Bo’ness, West ibid., p. 39. Lothian, EH51 0EL.

36 Journal of Liberal History 84 Autumn 2014