For the study of Liberal, SDP and Issue 87 / Summer 2015 / £10.00 Liberal Democrat history

Journal of LiberalHI ST O R Y

The Liberal Party and the Great War Tim Farron and Norman Lamb Old heroes for a new leader Leadership candidates’ political heroes Neil Stockley Writing about Charles Charles Kennedy through his tributes and obituaries Michael Steed Did the Great War really kill the Liberal Party? Patrick Jackson John Morley’s resignation in August 1914 Martin Ceadel Gilbert Murray v. E.D. Morel Liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy Liberal Democrat History Group The Liberal Democrats and the coalition government of 2010–15 The Liberal Democrat–Conservative coalition government of 2010–15 was the first peacetime British coalition since the 1930s. Whatever the Liberal Democrats may have achieved in government, their electoral reward was the most catastrophic in the history of the party or its predecessors.

To analyse the impact of the coalition on the Liberal Democrats, and the impact of the Liberal Democrats on the coalition, the Liberal Democrat History Group is organising the following:

Evening meeting: National Liberal Club, Monday 13 July Phil Cowley (Professor of Parliamentary Government, University of Nottingham and co-author of The British General Election of 2010) and Baroness Olly Grender, Paddy Ashdown’s second-in-command on the ‘Wheelhouse Group’ which ran the Liberal Democrat election campaign, will discuss why everything went wrong. See back page for details.

Special issue of the Journal of Liberal History The autumn Journal of Liberal History, due out in September, will be a special issue devoted to the coalition and the Liberal Democrats. In-depth interviews with former Liberal Democrat ministers, including Nick Clegg, will be accompanied by a series of opinion pieces from party members, some with experience from inside the coalition, some from outside.

Conference: Birmingham, Saturday 28 November This one-day conference, organised by the Journal of Liberal History and the University of Birmingham, will examine the key issues the Liberal Democrats faced as partners in the coalition government and the party’s performance during the 2015 general election. The conference will feature opening and concluding addresses and three panel sessions, looking at: • Campaigning – what messages were the Liberal Democrats trying to communicate during their period in office and during the general election; how was this done and how effectively? • Policy and ideological direction – getting Liberal Democrat policy implemented in government, the relationship with the Conservatives and how this played during the election. • Parliamentary strategy – keeping the parliamentary party together, 2010–15; how the Liberal Democrat presence at Westminster was used to reinforce the wider messages the party was seeking to promote to the public and inside the government. Saturday 28 November 2015 (10.00am – 4.00pm); University of Birmingham. Registration £20 (students and unwaged £15). Full details of the agenda and how to register will follow in the autumn Journal of Liberal History, due out in early September.

2 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Journal of Liberal History Issue 87: Summer 2015 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by Special issue: the Liberal Party and the First World War the Liberal Democrat History Group.

ISSN 1479-9642

Editor: Duncan Brack Old Heroes for a New Leader 4 Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl The political heroes of Tim Farron and Norman Lamb Assistant Editor: Siobhan Vitelli Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Writing about Charles 6 Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, Neil Stockley reviews Charles Kennedy’s obituaries and tributes York Membery Did the Great War really kill the Liberal Party? 12 Patrons Michael Steed analyses the impact of war on the Liberal Party Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; Professor John Vincent The long shadow of war 16 Editorial Board Sir Edward Grey and Liberal foreign policy before 1914; by T. G. Otte Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Ian Cawood; Dr Matt Cole; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr David Dutton; Prof. David Gowland; The Liberal Party, the Labour Party and the First 25 Prof. Richard Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; Dr Alison Holmes; Dr J. Graham Jones; Dr Tudor Jones; World War Tony Little; Michael Meadowcroft; Dr Mark Pack; Dr Ian Pat Thane examines why the Liberals suffered and Labour prospered Packer; Dr John Powell; Jaime Reynolds; Prof. Andrew Russell; Dr Iain Sharpe; Dr Michael Steed John Morley’s resignation in August 1914 26 Patrick Jackson examines the arguments Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed Gilbert Murray v. E.D. Morel 34 publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. Liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy; by Martin Ceadel Contributions should be sent to: Duncan Brack (Editor) Letters to the Editor 40 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN Emlyn Hooson and the Falklands war (Michael Meadowcroft); Emlyn Hooson email: [email protected] and the law (Quentin Dodd) All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History. All rights reserved. Lloyd George and Churchill as war leaders 42 Richard Toye compares the two great wartime leaders Advertisements Full page £100; half page £60; quarter page £35. Discounts available for repeat ads or offers to readers Lewis Harcourt’s political journal 1914–16 46 (e.g. discounted book prices). To place ads, please A new source for the Liberal Party and the First World War; by Mike Webb contact the Editor. Report: Among the Fallodonistas 52 Subscriptions/Membership Sir Edward Grey and the outbreak of the First World War; report by Iain Sharpe An annual subscription to the Journal of Liberal History costs £25.00 (£15.00 unwaged rate). This includes membership of the History Group unless you inform Reviews 55 us otherwise. Non-UK subscribers should add £10.00. Brock and Brock (eds.), Margot Asquith’s Great War Diary 1914–1916: The View Institutional rate £60.00, including online access. As from Downing Street, reviewed by David Dutton; Waterhouse, Edwardian well as printed copies, online subscribers can access Requiem: A Life of Sir Edward Grey, reviewed by Chris Cooper online copies of current and past Journals. Online subscriptions are available to individuals at £45.00.

Cheques (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) should be sent to:

Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; Liberal Democrat History Group email: [email protected] The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of topics relating Payment is also possible via our website, to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The www.liberalhistory.org.uk. Group organises discussion meetings and produces the Journal of Liberal History and other Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone occasional publications.

Published by the Liberal Democrat History Group, For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues c/o 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN of the Journal, and archive and other research sources, see our website at: www.liberalhistory.org.uk. Printed by Kall-Kwik, 18 Colville Road, London W3 8BL Subscribers’ code for discounted sales from the History Group online shop: mbr001. July 2015 Chair: Tony Little Honorary President: Lord Wallace of Saltaire

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 3 As we have done in each of the last three Liberal Democrat leadership elections, in 1999, Old Heroes for a New Leader 2006 and 2007, in June the Liberal Democrat History Group asked both candidates for the Liberal Democrat leadership to write a short article on their Tim Farron – William Beveridge, Simon Hughes favourite historical y heroes are two peo- for us today as we seek to build a figure or figures – the ple who exemplify my new consensus. MLiberal beliefs, Sir Wil- I count myself as a Beveridge ones they felt had liam Beveridge and Simon Hughes: Liberal, not so much because of very different individuals, one the individual proposals he put influenced their own a thinker and one a campaigner, forward, but because he looked political beliefs most, but both of them endlessly inspir- beyond what was thought to be ing and motivating. And both of possible towards what he believed and why they had them good men, humble men who was necessary. I want our party to worked for the causes they believed recapture his spirit of ambition, his proved important and in rather than for their own inspired and inspiring confidence relevant. self-advancement. that government can make a differ- William Beveridge never led ence; that in the face of huge chal- our country or our party. But he lenges, politics and economics can changed both in a spectacular way. provide positive solutions to make You will, of course, have heard of things better, that government the Beveridge Report, with its bor- should roll up its sleeves, not wring ing title – Social Insurance and Allied its hands. Services – hiding its radical propos- Beveridge was a big-picture als for an assault on the ‘five giant visionary. He was an MP for a evils’ of squalor, ignorance, want, year, but I can’t really imagine him Sir William idleness, and disease. In this and his doing a regular Focus round! When second report – Full Employment in a I need inspiration in the day-to-day Beveridge Free Society – he identified the slay- grind of politics, when I’m out on ers of these evils: state education, the doorstep in the freezing cold or and Simon a welfare state, full employment, the driving rain, when the political decent homes and the National fight just seems too difficult, then I Hughes: very Health Service. remember my second hero, Simon The solutions he put forward, Hughes. different together with the economic poli- Simon is the campaigner’s cam- cies of his fellow-Liberal John May- paigner. Winning the Bermond- individu- nard Keynes, formed the consensus sey by-election in 1983 – in what which underpinned the economic looked like very unpromising terri- als, one a and social policies of Western tory for Liberals – he then held the democracies for a generation. They seat for eight further elections, for thinker and improved the lives of countless 32 years’ uninterrupted service. He one a cam- millions, and helped to steer Brit- exemplified the community politi- ain towards the greatest degree of cian, devoting his time to serving paigner, but equality it has ever known – until his constituents. Stories abound Thatcher’s Tories startled to dis- of his constituency surgeries last- both of them mantle them. ing until well past midnight, with Beveridge had the audacity to people queuing round the block to endlessly think the biggest and best of ideas see him; his having to be retrieved and to make them happen. And he from constituents’ homes during inspiring and did this against the backdrop of the a canvassing session because he’d tightest fiscal contraction this coun- spent so long talking to them; and motivating. try had ever seen. That is a lesson of constituents buttonholing him

4 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Old Heroes for a New Leader

even during a dance at the Ministry radical line. His stints as the Liber- As one during recession to drive up of Sound. als’ and Liberal Democrats’ envi- demand, rebalance the economy But he was never only a ‘good ronment spokesperson in 1983–87 lone man, and create jobs. Keynes challenged local MP’. He fought for what he and 1990–94 were crucial in estab- the classical economic consen- believed within the party, famously lishing us as the greenest of the through his sus, and won the battle of ideas defying the Alliance leaders over main parties. And you have to love that ultimately triggered the New their crazy idea of a ‘Euro-bomb’ in someone who introduces the word determina- Deal in America. For the first time, 1986 – his speech probably swung ‘seventeenthly’ into a Parliamen- government consciously sought to the debate – and consistently argu- tary debate! tion and tackle recession by increased bor- ing for the party to take a more rowing and spending. his vision A decade later, when the Second he literally World War was coming to a close, it was to Keynes that Britain turned changed the to negotiate a peace that would Norman Lamb – John Maynard Keynes last. Keynes used his influence to world. He redesign the architecture of the y Liberal hero was not give up. That summer he wrote global economy. He was driven by never elected an MP. what must be one of the only eco- created the the crucial liberal principle that no MHe was an economist, a nomic tracts ever to become a country must be left at a disadvan- Treasury civil servant, and finally world best-seller, The Economic conditions in tage by the rules of the economy. a Liberal peer. As one lone man, Consequences of the Peace. It was He wanted the wealthiest nations through his determination and too late to stop the flawed Treaty which Europe – in particular the US – to stabilise his vision he literally changed the of Versailles, but Keynes’ book and support the economies of coun- world. He created the conditions in changed public opinion. could turn tries suffering deficits in the after- which Europe could turn its back And over the coming decades, math of war. on conflict and work to build a last- he was proved right. The repa- its back on Keynes didn’t get everything ing peace. rations were unsustainable, and right. Today his theories don’t His name was John Maynard Germany slid into a period of eco- conflict and properly reflect the way that con- Keynes. nomic depression, ruinous hyper- sumer spending relies on private After a promising start to his inflation and political instability work to build borrowing. And modern mac- career as an academic economist at that destroyed the fragile political roeconomics broadens out his Cambridge, Keynes put his skills consensus and triggered the rise of a lasting approach to look beyond consumer to use in the Treasury in the First extremism. peace. demand to a range of other meas- World War, helping to finance the Keynes saw vividly, in the ures of an economy. war effort; he quickly built a repu- smoke-filled rooms of Versailles But Keynes’ vision – of a global tation for delivering the impossible. and in the angry rhetoric of Allied economy where countries co-oper- At the end of the war, he was leaders, the foundations being laid ated, where prosperity would be asked to represent the Treasury at for the Second World War. He shared, and where government was the Allied peace talks. He under- understood that, for any political proactive in making the economy stood the workings of the global system to be stable and enduring, it work in people’s interests – laid the economy better than anyone else must first of all be fair. If the Ger- basis of a peace that has now lasted at that time, and argued against man people had no economic stake for seventy years. It created the crippling reparation payments. He in the political settlement, it would conditions that meant Britain could believed that lasting peace should not last. afford the first steps towards creat- be based on a shared interest in With the onset of the Great ing the National Health Service prosperity: the politics of hope, not Depression of the 1930s, Keynes despite a level of public debt after fear. published the culmination of the the war unprecedented in mod- Keynes’s liberal and generous- theories he had developed, argu- ern British history. And it speaks spirited argument lost out in the ing for an activist government clearly to the values that are still so Versailles peace talks, but he did that invested in infrastructure important to me today.

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 5 Writing about Charles

Charles Kennedy, former leader of the Liberal Democrats, died suddenly on 1 June 2015. The shocking news was met with an outpouring of grief and sadness that is seldom accorded to politicians. Lord Paddy Ashdown, his predecessor as Liberal Democrat leader, tweeted: ‘Charles Kennedy. In a political age not overburdened with gaiety and good sense, he brought us wit, charm, judgment, principle and decency.’ Neil Stockley sums up Charles Kennedy’s career in the SDP and Liberal Democrats through the many tributes and obituaries that appeared in the days following his death.

6 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Writing about Charles

n an affectionate piece, Bar- Alastair Campbell, Downing For much of his career, from the oness Shirley Williams, a for- Street Director of Communica- late 1980s until the middle of the Imer colleague from the SDP tions under Tony Blair, wrote a 2000s, his was among the best and the Liberal Democrats, called moving paean to a ‘lovely man and and most authentic voices of the him a ‘staggering human being’.1 a talented politician’ who ‘spoke revived liberal tradition.12 The Independent lamented the loss of fluent human’.10 Writing in The ‘a gifted, compassionate politician’.2 Telegraph, his long-time friend The paper’s obituary recounted The Scotsman remembered ‘a man of and former brother-in-law, James how: high principles blessed with a keen Gurling, recounted with affection sense of humanity and honour, Charles’s laid-back political style, Kennedy, red-haired and round- who served his constituents with his love of music and writing, his faced, a cheery and approachable dedication’.3 ‘With Charles Ken- easy manner and sense of humour, figure, with a soft Highlands nedy’s death, a light has gone out in his profound understanding of the accent, will generally be remem- Scottish and British politics,’ wrote Liberal Democrats, his political bered less for his political Alan Cochrane in The Telegraph.4 courage and his deep personal com- achievements than for the per- The New Statesman opined ‘that the mitment to the causes of Scottish sona he exhibited in numerous passing of the former Liberal Dem- unionism and Europe.11 television appearances, which ocrat leader … has been greeted Charles deserved the accolades, Alastair stretched well beyond politi- with such sadness is a reflection of both for his personal qualities and cal programmes. Some envious his qualities: decency, principle, his significant achievements as a Campbell, colleagues marvelled at his easy kindness and wit.’5 politician. Nearly all of the tributes charm and wry sense of humour, On 10 June, the House of Com- and obituaries noted that under Downing which chimed well with the mons paid tribute to Charles Ken- his leadership, the Liberal Demo- public increasingly wary of nedy. The outgoing leader of the crats achieved their greatest elec- Street Direc- dour, cautious and manipulative Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, toral success: 53 seats in 2001 and soundbite, party-line politicians, remembered ‘a much-loved politi- 62 in 2005. Not since the 1920s had tor of Com- though it also earned him the cian’ and paid a heartfelt tribute to there had there been such large sobriquet ‘chatshow Charlie’. ‘his wit, his warmth, his modesty’ Liberal contingents at Westmin- munications To the public, he scarcely and ‘honesty, wisdom and humil- ster. Moreover, on his watch, the seemed like a politician at all. ‘I ity’.6 The former party president, Liberal Democrats started to win under Tony make no apologies,’ he told an Tim Farron, fought back tears as he seats from Labour; unlike the old interviewer, ‘for the fact that mourned ‘a very, very special man’ Liberal Party, they did not go back- Blair, wrote I am a paid-up member of the and declared, ‘I loved him to bits’.7 wards with a Labour government human race.’13 Political opponents were sincere in power. a moving and generous in their praise. The The Guardian columnist Martin former Conservative Chancellor, paean to a Kettle described him as: Kenneth Clarke, spoke respectfully The great communicator ‘lovely man of a ‘remarkably decent, honest, There was widespread agreement … one of the very few politi- very highly principled’ parlia- that the key to Charles’ successes and a tal- cians of the modern era to whom mentarian.8 The Labour MP Tom was his tremendous gifts as a com- ordinary non-political people Watson hailed Charles as ‘a very municator. The first theme of the ented poli- instinctively related. People great man [who] stood up for what obituaries and commentaries was liked him and were right to do he believed in [and] led a party of his remarkable ability to project tician’ who so … the centre-left with dignity and himself through the media, espe- … At his best, Kennedy compassion.’9 cially television, to connect with all ‘spoke fluent had the ability to rise above the Perhaps the most touching trib- kinds of people. crowd and speak for his times utes came from friends and family. The Guardian believed that: human’. in easily expressed and easily

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 7 writing about charles

understood language. His ability antidotes to spin and control Yet The Times, like The Telegraph to cut through the evasions and freakery … What was initially and The Guardian, glossed over the cliches of modern politics was a dismissed as frippery when tremendous courage that Charles quality so many others struggle pioneered by Kennedy is now displayed in opposing the Iraq war. to emulate, often without suc- fawned upon by ‘brand manag- As Vince Cable recalled: cess. He also had a great and nat- ers’ as ‘authenticity’.16 ural sense of humour, unusual in He was bombarded with advice a very private man such as he. It from outside and inside the made him one of the few politi- Steely courage party to support the Blair gov- cians who could master every Second, there was a broad consen- ernment; it was said, in particu- form of television interview or sus that Charles combined his skills lar, that a party leader would appearance without looking as a media performer with astute never be forgiven by the public awkward.14 political judgement and what Nick for criticising a military inter- Clegg called ‘a steely courage’17 vention in which British service ‘On a good day,’ Nick Clegg when he took the principled deci- personnel were being killed in lamented in a media interview sion to oppose Britain’s participa- action. shortly after Charles’s death was tion in the second Iraq war. The But he was unpersuaded and announced, ‘he had more political Times contended that: constantly said: ‘the case has not talent in his little finger than the been made’. He went against rest of us put together.’15 It was arguably Kennedy’s fin- the conventional wisdom and Matthew d’Ancona, writing in est hour. He was the first main- opposed the war. Those of us the Evening Standard, explained why stream party leader to oppose present will never forget the Charles Kennedy’s use of humour British military action since debate in parliament when he and his willingness to step outside Hugh Gaitskell resisted the was denounced – mainly from the more conventional formats Suez campaign in 1956. He the Conservative side – for was such an important asset to the spoke eloquently and resolutely treachery and treason, among Liberal Democrats, a third party against Blair’s plans in the Com- the more printable accusa- struggling constantly for public mons. He addressed a ‘Stop the tions. He showed political cour- attention: War’ rally of a million people in age and good judgement in London’s Hyde Park. He com- sticking to a position that was Though his ‘chatshow Charlie’ plained that Britain was ‘being ultimately vindicated.19 persona – most vividly appar- bulldozed into a war not of our ent on Have I Got News for You choosing and not – on the basis The Economist captured more faith- – was interpreted by some as of the evidence so far – vital to fully than most papers the temper evidence of unseemly frivol- national interests’. of the times, and the qualities that ity, it was no such thing. Ken- It was a stance that won the Kennedy displayed. nedy grasped instinctively Lib Dems many new supporters that communication between and one that was seen by them He was perspicacious too, and at the political class and those to be vindicated by subsequent times bloody tough. His opposi- they represented was break- events. It also proved to be the tion to the 2003 Iraq war, pre- ing down, and that humour high-water mark of Kennedy’s sented in a packed and hostile and humanity were essential political career.18 House of Commons, against catcalling from both Labour and Tory MPs, exhibited all these qualities. His critics called him an opportunist, because the threatened war was, unusually in belligerent Britain, unpopular. Yet, in their hearts, they knew that his opposition to the war was based on principle; it also turns out to have been right.20

There was considerable support within the Liberal Democrats for the position that Charles took. The September 2002 Liberal Democrat conference had voted to support any military intervention only as Charles Kennedy a last resort and under a clear UN with Patsy mandate, and only after a debate Calton, candidate and vote in Parliament. There were and later MP for also internal pressures on him to Cheadle, during take a stronger position against the the 2001 election war, as shown when the Federal campaign Executive voted unanimously that

8 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 writing about charles the party officially should take part ‘He was per- himself as a classical liberal – his Charles retained a set of in the February 2003 march. literary credo, The Future of Poli- beliefs which has enduring Writing in The Telegraph, Tim spicacious tics, is a treatise on all sorts of value but is no longer fashion- Stanley explained why the stance freedoms: from poverty, from able: a strong commitment to Kennedy took was so bold, and too, and at government, to innovate, and so progressive taxation and redis- how it delivered political benefits forth – he was not obviously one. tribution of income and wealth for the Liberal Democrats. times bloody He had more faith in the state and a belief that the country than most liberals and was so pre- deserved good public services Until 2003, it was convention in tough. His dictably to the left of them that it and, unapologetically, should be British politics that opposition was tempting to wonder why he asked to pay for them through parties back governments over opposition had not returned to Labour.24 taxation. questions of war … By criticis- to the 2003 The other strand in his polit- ing Iraq, Kennedy put his repu- The paper also asserted that: ical philosophy was liberalism. tation and his party’s reputation Iraq war, pre- Again this was often unfash- on the line. It was not only a As leader he positioned the Lib ionable. I recall that during the moral move but a smart one – sented in a Dems to the left of the Labour 2005 election when the Tories for it cemented in the public’s government by opposing the were whispering, very loudly, mind the impression that the Lib packed and introduction of university tui- ‘are you thinking what we are Dems were courageously inde- tion fees and Britain’s involve- thinking?’, Charles was quite pendent minded.21 hostile House ment in the Iraq war.25 unequivocal: ‘Yes, the immigra- tion of black and brown people Other examples were given of of Commons, It is quite correct that, as Labour has been good for Britain, eco- the prescience and political cour- moved towards the ‘centre ground’ nomically and culturally; and age that Charles Kennedy showed against cat- under Tony Blair and Gordon no, hanging and flogging doesn’t throughout his political career. Brown, Kennedy took the Liberal solve the crime problem.’27 The Times22 and The Telegraph23 calling from Democrats into territory easily recounted how, after the 1987 gen- perceived as ‘left of Labour’ by, for Charles brought together social eral election, Kennedy was the first both Labour example, promising free university democracy and liberalism in a way of the SDP’s five remaining MPs tuition and personal social care. In that was instinctive and not a little to break with the party’s leader, and Tory MPs, the run-up to the 2005 general elec- romantic. The Guardian was surely David Owen, and call for a merger tion, a defecting left-wing Labour correct when it described him as ‘a with the Liberals. He then helped to exhibited all MP, Brian Sedgemore, along with liberal social democrat who knew negotiate the terms amid great acri- these quali- many like-minded people, joined what he believed and loved what he mony and charges of betrayal from the Liberal Democrats; Philip Col- knew’. 28 fellow Social Democrats. ties. His crit- lins of The Times (a former speech- It is, therefore, too easily forgot- Nearly every paper asserted that writer to Tony Blair) was not being ten that other elements of the lib- alone amongst Liberal Democrat ics called him too harsh when he suggested that eral heritage revived and flourished MPs Charles opposed going into electoral considerations also played under Charles’s leadership. There government with the Conserva- an oppor- their part.26 In 2005, the party per- were echoes of laissez-faire when tives in 2010. In fact, at the final formed especially well in university the 2001 general election mani- Parliamentary Party meeting that tunist … constituencies and areas with large festo contained numerous pledges approved the decision to go into Muslim populations and had hopes to reduce ‘red tape’. The ‘1p in the the coalition, although Kennedy Yet, in their of capturing a large section of the pound for education’, an iconic did express doubts, he abstained in grey vote. pledge from the 1990s, was dropped the final vote; six other MPs either hearts, they But the ‘left-wing’ and ‘popu- from party policy. Charles cannot abstained or were absent. In the list’ labels are too simplistic and fail be accused of being a knee-jerk stat- Commons, Charles voted against knew that his to do justice to Charles’s political ist or of being stuck in the past: sen- the rise in tuition fees and in pri- beliefs. Vince Cable’s observations ior colleagues were given licence to vate, he was critical of the coali- opposition are worth quoting at length: innovate. Chris Huhne led a major tion’s welfare reforms. review of the Liberal Democrats’ to the war It is wrong to portray Charles approach to public services. There was based on as a socialist. He had come into were new attempts to be ‘tough’ A social democrat and a liberal parliament as a social democrat and disciplined on public spending The third theme of the tributes principle; it and remained one. Like me, he commitments, with mixed results. and obituaries, ‘what Charles Ken- joined the SDP in the early 1980s And, as Vince Cable recalled, The nedy stood for’, was less informed also turns out when Labour was anti-Europe, Orange Book, which presented many and less conclusive than the other anti-NATO and was looking ‘economic liberal’ viewpoints, was discussions. The Economist typified to have been back nostalgically to the era of published in 2004, albeit with the the views of many in casting him state control and trades union most lukewarm of endorsements as a left-leaning social democrat right.’ power. For those of us who were from the party leader. who instinctively favoured statist attracted to the ideals of social Here, then, was one of the para- policies. justice, and wanted an alterna- doxes of Charles Kennedy’s lead- tive both to Thatcher’s Conserv- ership: his roots were in the social What Mr Kennedy was for, atism and to what Labour then democrat tradition and he was a was sometimes harder to dis- offered, the SDP then the Lib communicator rather than a policy cern. Though he often presented Dems offered a way forward. wonk, but in the run-up to the 2005

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 9 writing about charles general election, it was becoming Marine commando. Others Shortly after reshaping. But his reforming increasingly difficult to link the joked ‘while Paddy Ashdown social democratic and European party’s raft of ‘market liberal’ and gets up at 5am, Mr Kennedy polling day, instincts will live on if the next ‘spending’ proposals together into a gives the impression of only Lib Dem leader takes the party coherent, plausible programme that going to bed at that time’.31 Charles him- on the kind of political journey could be ‘sold’ to the electorate. that his late lamented colleague And it is often forgotten that, fairly The Times went to revive some self said that would have favoured.33 or not, many Liberal Democrats uncomfortable memories for many were disappointed at the results of Liberal Democrats: Charles attend- the Liberal Philip Collins warned that that election. As The Guardian obit- ing a formal meeting in 2001 with Charles’s brand of politics would uary recalled: Yasser Arafat ‘clearly the worse for Democrats be a dead end for the Liberal wear’; his absence from Gordon now had to Democrats. [The party] was perceived to Brown’s Commons announcement have fallen short. The antici- on whether Britain would join the ‘find a fash- For all Mr Kennedy’s consider- pated breakthrough in the Tory Euro, and Brown’s 2004 budget – able virtues as a man, the politi- marginals did not happen and, allegedly due to a ‘stomach bug’; ion and nar- cal example he gave his party far from becoming the main and the party’s spring conference is one it ought not to follow … opposition as some activists had that same year when he appeared rative’. But [He] sought to mobilise opposi- hoped, it remained a distant to be ill when giving the leader’s tion wherever he could locate third in the Commons. Kennedy speech. During an early-morning he seemed it. There are votes to be har- was blamed internally for con- press conference to launch the par- vested in British politics being centrating on trying to attract ty’s 2005 manifesto, he could not unsure as against things. The consequence Tory voters rather than broad- explain the details of the party’s of indulging oppositional sen- ening the party’s electoral appeal policy for a local income tax. This to what the timent, though, is that you are with more progressive electors was explained at the time as the defined only by what you are disillusioned with Labour, but result of a sleepless night caused by narrative against and not at all by what he was nevertheless re-elected his new-born son, Donald, but was you are for … leader shortly after parliament recognised by close colleagues as a should be. Charles Kennedy did what returned.29 sign of bigger problems.32 he did rather brilliantly, with style, wit and warmth and poli- Shortly after polling day, Charles tics would be better for more himself said that the Liberal Demo- A legacy for liberals people of his stamp. But what he crats now had to ‘find a fashion and For all his triumphs and tragedies, did can only take you so far. Mr narrative’30. But he seemed unsure Charles left an important legacy Kennedy’s Liberal Democrats as to what the narrative should be. for the Liberal Democrats, as they climbed all the way to the sum- try to come to terms with their mit of the mountain he set out near-annihilation at the 2015 gen- to climb. The trouble with that Tragic figure eral election. Even though the early is that when you reach the top Discussions of the 2005 general 2000s now seem like a different era, you cannot help but wonder at election and its aftermath led into his approach to political strategy the point.34 the fourth theme of the commen- and his deepest political convic- taries and obituaries: Charles’s tions could prove indispensable to Collins made a valid point. The shortcomings as a leader, his prob- the party as it tries to rebuild. The Liberal Democrats face long-term lems with alcohol and how they led Guardian leader made some percep- strategic dilemmas and these will to his deposition from the leader- tive observations about the choices need to be addressed. But Mat- ship in January 2006. Such was the and the opportunities now facing thew d’Ancona showed a clearer frame for The Times’ somewhat the Liberal Democrats: understanding of the party and its brutal obituary. The paper drew challenges when he suggested that mostly unfavourable comparisons A key decision facing the par- the Liberal Democrats should be between Charles’s leadership style ty’s next leader is whether to inspired by Charles Kennedy’s pas- and that of his predecessor. embrace or reject the legacy of sion as they begin their long, hard coalition. Mr Kennedy would journey back to credibility. Unlike his disciplined, some- have been fair in his judgment, what autocratic, policy-driven but on the rejectionist side. So what’s it to be: Kennedy or predecessor, Kennedy was laid- However, he would have seen Clegg? Campaigning passion or back, convivial and consensual opportunities too, if the party governmental competence? As … He consulted his fellow MPs is clear about its priorities and so often, the dichotomy is false. on speeches and spokesman- direction. He would have seen The future of the Lib-Dems ships. He bantered with jour- an uncertain Labour party, a depends upon the convergence nalists at press conferences. He frustrated Green movement, of the former’s romantic liberal- was not a strong leader in the a decentralising spirit, a fresh ism with the latter’s professional conventional sense, and lacked impatience with the electoral politics. Both are needed. UKIP a compelling political agenda. system and, above all, a battle for has become the ‘none-of-the Some colleagues dubbed him Britain’s place in Europe. It is a above’ party of protest – albeit ‘inaction man’ compared with great loss that Mr Kennedy will with no stability – and Labour Ashdown, a former Royal play no part in Britain’s political is at risk of drifting into its past

10 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 writing about charles

as the voice of left-wing dissent It was left to The Economist – even 13 ‘Charles Kennedy obituary,’ The rather than the engine of centre- though it cast Charles as ‘a periph- Guardian, 2 June 2015. left government. The Lib-Dems eral figure’38 by the time he lost his 14 Martin Kettle, ‘Charles Kennedy: an must start almost from scratch. Commons seat – to lay down the authentic politician who rose above Thus begins the slow, painful gauntlet to Liberal Democrats, and the crowd,’ The Guardian, 2 June work of reconstruction: com- all supporters of Britain’s role in 2015. munity causes, micro-politics, Europe: 15 ‘Death of a Liberal,’ The Economist, 6 pavement-pounding, incremen- June 2015. tal renewal. Mr Kennedy was an outspoken 16 Matthew d’Ancona, ‘Kennedy’s leg- pro-European in a way that few acy will be to remind his party of the Crucially, d’Ancona pointed to a front-line political figures today real Liberal way’, The Standard, 3 June potential source of inspiration for are. Even at 55, he was one of the 2015. the Liberal Democrats in the diffi- youngest of the remaining poli- 17 HC Deb, 3 June 2015, c593. cult years ahead. ticians with an enthusiasm for 18 ‘Charles Kennedy,’ The Times, 2 June Britain’s place in the EU based 2015. In the battle to prevent Brit- on idealistic rather than trans- 19 Vince Cable, ‘Charles Kennedy: he ain leaving the EU – a battle actional factors. He was due was left of Labour, maybe, but always in which Kennedy had hoped to play a prominent role in the a true liberal,’ The Guardian, 2 June to play a central role – the Lib- upcoming referendum on the 2015. Dems have a cause which should country’s EU membership; his 20 ‘Death of a Liberal,’ The Economist, 6 energise and revive them, a energy, popularity and heartfelt June 2015. struggle in which the nation’s ‘As the commitment to the cause would 21 Tim Stanley, ‘Opposing the Iraq War very place in the world is at have been a big asset to the ‘Yes’ was Charles Kennedy’s Finest Hour,’ stake.35 debate camp. His death makes it all the The Telegraph, 2 June 2015. more pressing that a new genera- 22 Charles Kennedy,’ The Times, 2 June This was a telling observation, becomes tion of pro-Europeans step for- 2015. because very few papers acknowl- ward and make the impassioned, 23 ‘Charles Kennedy – obituary,’ The edged what Vince Cable called dominated, wide-ranging case for Britain to Telegraph, 2 June 2015. Charles’ ‘bigger picture: … a remain in the union. A resound- 24 ‘Death of a Liberal,’ The Economist, 6 strong, but practical internation- as it no doubt ing mandate for such a vision at June 2015. alism centred on the European the polls would be a fitting polit- 25 ‘The laughing Cavalier,’ The Econo- project’. He recalled that from his will, by the ical epitaph for the late laughing mist (website), 2 June 2015. earliest days in parliament, Charles Cavalier of Lib Dem politics.39 26 Philip Collins, ‘Kennedy’s legacy had spoken up consistently and noise of sta- will lead Lib Dems nowhere,’ The strongly for full-blooded British tistical claim Neil Stockley is a former Policy Director Times, 5 June 2015. commitment to EU membership.36 for the Liberal Democrats and a long- 27 Vince Cable, ‘Charles Kennedy: he Nick Clegg told the Commons and counter- standing member of the Liberal Demo- was left of Labour, maybe, but always of his chagrin that Charles had been crat History Group. a true liberal,’ The Guardian, 2 June lost to the European cause: claim, I will 2015. 1 ‘You could never be sure if Charles 28 Charles Kennedy’s legacy: Lochaber I suspect many of us will feel miss the lyri- Kennedy was going to show up, says no more,’ The Guardian, 2 June 2015. his absence most keenly when Shirley Williams’, Independent, 2 June 29 ‘Charles Kennedy obituary,’ The our country decides in the next cal clarity of 2015. Guardian, 2 June 2015. year or two whether we belong, 2 ‘Charles Kennedy 1959-2015: A 30 Tania Brannigan, ‘Kennedy prepares or not, in the European Union, Charles’s gifted, compassionate politician’, for the next step,’ The Guardian, 20 because, of all his convictions, Independent, 2 June 2015. May 2005. his internationalism endured belief that 3 ‘Obituary: Charles Kennedy, Scot- 31 Charles Kennedy,’ The Times, 2 June most strongly. He was a proud tish politician’, The Scotsman, 2 June 2015. highlander, a proud Scot and a our future 2015. 32 Ibid. man who believed in our com- 4 Alan Cochrane, ‘With Charles Ken- 33 ‘Charles Kennedy’s legacy: Lochaber munity of nations within the as an open- nedy’s death, a light has gone out in no more,’ The Guardian, 2 June 2015. United Kingdom, but he was Scottish and British Politics,’ The Tel- 34 Philip Collins, ‘Kennedy’s legacy also a lifelong believer that hearted and egraph, 3 June 2015. will lead Lib Dems nowhere,’ The our outward-facing character 5 ‘Leader: Remembering Charles Ken- Times, 5 June 2015. as a country is best secured by generous- nedy,’ New Statesman, 3 June 2015. 35 Matthew d’Ancona, ‘Kennedy’s leg- remaining at the heart of Europe spirited 6 HC Deb, 3 June 2015, c593 acy will be to remind his party of the rather than retreating else- 7 HC Deb, 3 June 2015, c604 real Liberal way’, The Standard, 3 June where. As the debate becomes country is 8 HC Deb, 3 June 2015, c595 2015. dominated, as it no doubt will, 9 HC Deb, 3 June 2015, c603 36 Vince Cable, ‘Charles Kennedy: he by the noise of statistical claim at stake and 10 Alastair Campbell, ‘Charles Kennedy was left of Labour, maybe, but always and counter-claim, I will miss – a lovely man, a talented politician, a a true liberal,’ The Guardian, 2 June the lyrical clarity of Charles’s must be great friend,’ Guardian, 2 June 2015. 2015. belief that our future as an open- 11 James Gurling, ‘The Charles Kennedy 37 HC Deb, 3 June 2015, c593 hearted and generous-spirited defended at I knew,’ The Telegraph, 5 June 2015. 38 Death of a Liberal,’ The Economist, 6 country is at stake and must be 12 ‘Charles Kennedy’s legacy: Lochaber June 2015. defended at all costs.37 all costs.’ no more,’ The Guardian, 2 June 2015. 39 Ibid.

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 11 DID THE GREAT WAR REALLY KILL THE LIBERAL PARTY? The First World War altered lives forever and transformed society; empires fell and new nations emerged. In Britain the party system underwent profound change, a transformation which plunged the Liberal Party into civil war and took it from a natural party of government to electoral insignificance within a few years. The History Group’s conference in November good starting point is so weakened that natural causes 2014 examined key the Trevor Wilson thesis played a part in his death. Wil- A(in his The Downfall of the son, writing in 1966, preferred the issues and personalities Liberal Party 1914–1935). His histori- straightforward causal link from cal analysis of the party’s fortunes event to outcome.1 How does that of the period. This between 1914 and 1935 is encapsu- verdict stand up a century after the lated in a memorable allegory: the traumatic event? special issue of the Liberal Party is likened to an indi- First, what is death? The Liberal Journal contains most vidual who experienced a traumatic Party did not die – after declining accident (a rampant omnibus which for two decades, it maintained itself of the papers presented mounted the pavement and ran for another two and then revived; over him), following which he first it is still alive, albeit with a slight at the conference, lingered painfully, then died. The change of name. What did cease to plus other material. case for accidental death appears exist was a particular form of polit- strong, but as the patient/party had ical party – a mass-supported broad Here Michael Steed had symptoms of prior illness (Wil- party of sufficient size and strength son noted Ireland, Labour unrest to be one of a pair in a two-party examines the impact of and the suffragettes) there are those system. Just as the First World War the war on the Liberal who maintain that despite previ- can be seen as causing the death of ous robust health the patient/party the Habsburg or Austro-Hungar- Party. was already dying – or at least was ian Empire, though Austria and

12 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 DID THE GREAT WAR REALLY KILL THE LIBERAL PARTY?

Hungary each survived, the Wilson Merthyr Tydfil was fought between by time and type of contest (criti- case is about the death of the Lib- pro-war and anti-war Labour can- cal psephological niceties all too eral Party’s historic (1859–1915) role. didates.2 In the December 1918 elec- often forgotten by historians), the The ‘death’ of the historic Liberal tion, Labour made small progress picture becomes clear but com- Party means the end of what made and Macdonald himself lost his plex. To simplify, I focus on one it effective on that scale. seat, a defeat generally attributed measure, the change in the Union- Then, who were the relevant to his record on the war (or to the ist share of the vote.5 In 1912, up victims? Clearly the catastrophe right-wing press’s distortion of it), to the completion of the Liberal of 1914–18 caused, in Wilsonian while he was to suffer humiliation government’s National Insurance terms, many more dramatic deaths at the Woolwich East by-election in legislation in December, the swing of more significant and longer- March 1921.3 Yet only a little later to the Unionists in the 23 con- lived institutions – not just the the same Ramsay MacDonald led tested by-elections was miniscule Habsburg dynasty and empire, his party into government. The (mean 0.4 percentage points); in but Hohenzollerns, Ottomans initially severe wounds inflicted by the 16 clear cases, Liberal/Unionist and Romanovs, as well as many Wilson’s omnibus had fully healed. straight fights directly comparable national borders. His omnibus ran So how could the onset of war with December 1910, it was a little over lots of pedestrians. have been fatal for the historic larger (1.2). The Asquith govern- Specifically, in the category of Liberal Party but not for the nas- ment re-elected in December 1910 Westminster political parties, it cent Labour Party? Was it that the enjoyed twelve months of reason- potentially injured four – Irish, patient/party’s health in 1914 was able popularity. Labour and Unionist as well Lib- already weak? In 1912 and 1913 the picture eral. One (Redmond’s Irish parlia- There are contemporary meas- changed dramatically as the Mar- mentary nationalists) died almost urements of health – plenty of by- coni scandal and other problems instantly, one (Unionist) survived elections in 1911–14, as well as annual threatened. In all 33 contested by- in good health with a name change municipal elections each November elections, the pro-Unionist swing while a third, after bad apparent up to 1913. These have been used, How could was 4.8 per cent; in the 18 clear injury, went on to grow stronger. all too often selectively, to support cases it was 4.6 per cent. Given the This last case merits careful contrary views as to the state of the the onset large number of marginal seats at consideration. historic Liberal Party. Generally, the that period, any general election In 1914, the Labour Party was fourteen by-election seats gained of war have taking place with a swing on that deeply split by the onset of war, by Unionists from Liberals, and the scale would have put the Unionists while the Liberal Party was osten- role played in those losses by Labour been fatal back in power. sibly united. Most Labour MPs interventions, are quoted in support for the his- Then, although we have only supported entry into the war, but of the ill-health thesis;4 but other eight contests in 1914 before the Ramsay MacDonald, their leader, historians such as Roy Douglas have toric Liberal wartime truce took effect, another did not (though he subsequently emphasised Liberal successes in tak- dramatic change is clear;6 as Union- supported the war effort) and had ing Labour seats in Hanley (1912) and Party but not ists grappled with the conundrum to resign. Much of the party in Chesterfield (1913), as well as some of how to be loyal both to the the country agreed with him, or better results against the Unionists for the nas- Crown and to Ulster, the Union- went further, taking a pacifist posi- on the eve of the war. ist vote actually dropped (0.1 per tion. In the first major by-election Examining the votes cast in cent Labour cent in all eight; 1.5 per cent in the contest of the war, in November all the by-elections, not just seats solitary clear case). But the press 1915, the late Keir Hardie’s seat in changing hands, and sorting them Party? headlines told a different story: the

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 13 did the great war really kill the liberal party?

Unionists gained four seats, all nar- There is little need to debate Imperialist Grey wrote of halt- rowly and three of them on a split why. Wartime conditions altered ing ‘spendthrift … expenditure’ in the anti-Unionist vote. the perceptions of force as a legiti- on defence.9 Capitalist and pacifist Here lies the material for rival mate and effective means of attain- elements in the party sang in har- predictions as to a hypothetical 1915 ing political goals, as well as the mony. In 1910, Liberal candidates general election. If the Liberal and likely reaction of the authorities mentioned defence rather less and Labour parties fought each other on towards the use of force. The Easter by the December election it had any scale, that could have allowed a 1916 rebellion followed, and then become a strongly Unionist tune, Unionist victory. But if the nearly the brutal treatment of its leaders; with 89 per cent of their candidates comprehensive pact of 1910 had their ‘sacrifice’ swung Irish opin- stressing defence as an issue com- been replicated, the Liberals would ion, and Redmond’s party became pared with only 37 per cent of Lib- have been returned as the largest irrelevant. So the Irish Party was eral ones.10 party, with Labour as an ally. Since not so much killed instantly by the Thus the peace-promoting Lib- the by-elections also showed the omnibus as failed to survive what eral Party was clearly uncomfort- Liberal Party easily beating Labour followed; or to shift the allegory, able in the atmosphere of escalating challengers, it is likely that such a it expired in a radically changed armaments leading up to 1914. It pact would have been agreed – oth- environment. stuck to its faith in a naval defence erwise Labour stood to lose most of The total war of 1914–18 put strategy to protect Britain, with its presence in parliament. political parties, as with all institu- international arbitration as the way Local elections did show a small, tions which had developed during to prevent war. Though Unionists net Labour advance – but as half the previous century of generally were mainly on the attack over Ire- the total Labour advance across the peaceful change, under totally new land, the Lords and Marconi, there whole country was in Yorkshire, stresses. Some by their inner logic was also an incessant demand, espe- too much cannot be made of that, and character could survive (or cially in the right-wing press, for a though the contrast in local elec- even prosper) in such conditions; stronger, more expensive, probably tions between Yorkshire and Lan- some found it more difficult, even conscription-necessitating, more cashire throws an interesting light impossible. Why should that have land-based defence strategy. The on Peter Clarke’s findings.7 been such a strain for the historic 1911 Agadir crisis caught the Lib- Electoral support is not the only Liberal Party? eral cabinet divided, with the once test of a political party’s health, Peace was in the core DNA of pro-Boer Lloyd George delivered but it is a good one. On that basis, the party, expressed in its mis- a sharp warning to Germany in the historic Liberal Party showed sion triptych, whether linked his Mansion House speech in July no overt sign of disease in summer with Retrenchment and Reform 1911; this calculated switch from 1914. For an incumbent govern- or Reform and Liberation. Free dove to hawk had been cleared with ment, its support was holding up trade had been central to the union Asquith and Grey, but not the cabi- well against its main opponent; it of Whigs, Radicals and Peelites net – Morley and Loreburn saw the was easily beating off the threat of that formed it in 1859; Cobdenite Chancellor’s intervention as pro- a rival to its electoral base (more evangelists for free trade always vocative and aggressive.11 so, indeed, than the Conservatives preached the peace-inducing effect Liberal MPs and the party at were able to against UKIP in 2014); of their cause. In 1868 Gladstone large were disturbed. The alliances and it would probably have been re- had defined his mission as bring- by then in place meant that if the elected for a fourth term in 1915. ing peace to Ireland; reforms – dis- European powers went to war, sup- That, of course, does not rule establishment, tenant rights and Peace was in port for France against Germany out another version of the ‘natu- later home rule were means to that meant support for Czarist Russia, ral causes’ hypothesis – that the end. John Morley saw Gladstone’s the core DNA in Liberal activist eyes one of the patient/party suffered from some acceptance of the Alabama arbitra- more brutal and illiberal regimes hidden but inexorable medical tion as adding ‘brightest lustre to of the party, in Europe. The Liberal rank and problem or innate weakness which his fame’, an action which Roy file turned out during the winter had yet to surface. The case of Jenkins described as ‘the great- expressed of 1911–12 to promote a campaign the other party killed by Wilson’s est triumph of nineteenth-century for Anglo-German understanding, omnibus throws light on what that rationalist internationalism over in its mis- moved more by belief in arbitration might be. short-sighted jingoism’.8 The Lib- and dislike of Czarist oppression For three decades, the Irish eral Party resisted late nineteenth sion triptych, than by any love for the Kaiser.12 Nationalist MPs had held the firm century jingoism, and lost some So when war loomed between allegiance of the nationally minded support over its stance on questions whether Germany/Austria-Hungary and (or Catholic) Irish vote, despite the like the Sudan or the Anglo-Boer France/Russia in summer 1914, Parnellite split and despite the fail- War. linked with the Liberal Party was potentially ure to have made much progress The landslide 1906 victory con- Retrench- deeply divided. That split was towards home rule. By 1914 they solidated the Liberal sense that averted by the German invasion were close to that goal. Yet in 1918 the party stood for peace, empha- ment and of Belgium, which turned a Great (indeed also in by-elections towards sising efficient, rational defence Power quarrel into a moral crusade the end of the war) they were expenditure rather than Unionist Reform or on behalf of international law and utterly swept away by a rival party, profligacy. Campbell-Bannerman’s small peaceful nations, so uniting Sinn Féin, dedicated to a much personal electoral address con- Reform and all but a few Liberals. If the troops more far-reaching goal and a very demned ‘costly and confused War had really come home by Christ- different strategy. Office experiments’; the Liberal Liberation. mas, a united Liberal Party could

14 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 did the great war really kill the liberal party? still have faced the electorate suc- The evi- outcome; it was a cruel form of or comparison with an earlier elec- cessfully in 1915. natural selection in a harsh new tion where was no contest in Decem- It was not to be. The drawn-out dence is environment. ber 1910). land war (negating the assump- 6 The methodology and 1911–13 fig- tions of Liberal Imperialist strat- that the his- Michael Steed is Honorary Lecturer in ures discussed in footnote 5 are cru- egists), the militarisation of life, Politics at the University of Kent. cial here. In 1914 there was only one the irrational and implicitly racist toric Liberal clear case (Grimsby in May – with a anti-German hysteria, the deeply 1 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the switch from a Liberal Unionist label divisive introduction of conscrip- Party was in Liberal Party 1914–1935 (London, to simple Unionist), so the evidence tion and the arrogance of the con- pretty good 1966), especially pp. 18–19. of the seven other contests is critical servative elite of military leaders 2 In a members’ ballot the South Wales for Grimsby’s significance. The only (who sentenced conscientious health in Miners Federation selected J. Win- other Unionist/Liberal straight fight objectors to death, to be reprieved stone as the Labour candidate over in 1914, Wycombe in February, also at Asquith’s insistence) all chal- 1914 and was the miners’ agent in Merthyr Tydfil saw a Liberal recovery, but compared lenged Liberal values. The Labour (C. B. Stanton) by 7,832 to 6,232. with January 1910, as there was no Party was more divided by the not fatally Stanton then stood as a pro-war Inde- contest in December 1910. See also outbreak of war, but as war did pendent Labour candidate in the Iain McLean, What’s Wrong with the not challenge its raison d’être, the injured by a by-election on 25 November 1915, British Constitution? (Oxford, 2010), mobilisation of the working class defeating Winstone by 10,286 to Figure 11.1, p. 230. McLean measures interest, it could recover. For the single trau- 6,080. In 1918 Stanton was re-elected public opinion by the average Union- historic Liberal Party, the belief as Coalition Labour (NDP) with a ist vote at by-elections, rather than that reason, trade and moral princi- matic event. massive vote (78.6 per cent) over the the change in the Unionist share; he ple could together bring peace was official Labour candidate, though he shows a very similar pattern to my close to a raison d’être. It may be was then defeated on a massive 35.8 analysis, except that his method iden- It is an exaggeration to see this per cent swing in 1922. There is no tifies the drop in the Unionist level of belief as being as central to Liberal better lik- Liberal parallel to this indicator of support as occurring in early autumn identity as class was to Labour’s. Labour voters’ attitude to the Great 1913. My analysis identifies the first But it was an important constitu- ened to an War at successive stages. sign of the change at a by-election ent in the glue that held together 3 Labour had held Woolwich East in the tiny Wick Burghs constitu- the disparate elements making up individual unopposed in 1918, and was to hold ency on 8 December 1913. Ignoring the party. It was a key part of the required the seat continuously from 1922 three-cornered fights, there are three historic Liberal Party’s faith that until it went SDP in 1983. But in the by-election tests of Unionist/Liberal it possessed the capacity to foresee by an unex- March 1921 by-election MacDon- support in the December 1913 to May and manage progress, and so pro- ald was defeated by the Conserva- 1914 period. All showed a swing from mote the best common or national pected event tive candidate, a working-class war Unionist to Liberal since the previous interest. With that glue softened by hero with Coalition Labour (NDP) contest, with an average of 2.4 per years of all-out war, the disparate to alter their antecedents. cent. elements looked to their particular 4 Chris Cook and John Stevenson, 7 P. F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New interests and a different, Conserva- whole style A History of British Elections Since Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971) provides tive, view of the nation’s interest 1689 (London, 2014) lists all 20 seats support for the good pre-war health came to prevail. Liberal self-confi- of life. changing hands at by-elections in of the Liberal Party, based mainly on dence and credibility evaporated. 1911–14 (table 11.10, p. 289), includ- evidence from that region. The party’s historic role had gone. ing a Liberal gain from Unionist in 8 Roy Jenkins, Gladstone (London, This is a rather different version Londonderry not included in my 1995), pp. 356–57, quoting John Mor- of the Wilson thesis. The evidence analysis. Cook and Stevenson (p. 290) ley in full. is that the historic Liberal Party was conclude that the evidence points to 9 Taken from more extensive quota- in pretty good health in 1914 and ‘Liberal decline’, but do not distin- tions in A. K. Russell, Liberal Land- was not fatally injured by a single guish between by-elections held in slide – The General Election of 1906 traumatic event. It may be better 1912–13 and those held in 1914. (Newton Abbot, 1973), p. 70; Rus- likened to an individual required 5 My analysis covers all British by- sell summed up his analysis of Lib- by an unexpected event to alter elections in 1911–14; figures taken eral candidates’ election addresses their whole style of life. The new from F. W. S. Craig, British Parlia- as painting ‘their belief in arbitra- style made severe demands, which mentary Election Results 1885–1918 tion and rationality in international suited some individuals and not (London, 1974). It may seem counter- affairs on the canvas of alleged others; this one’s particular charac- intuitive to measure Liberal health by Unionist irresponsibility and war’ (p. ter, which had previously served it reference to the change in the Union- 69). so well, could not cope so well with ist vote, but as we are concerned with 10 Analysis of individual candidates’ those demands. Decline and a much the state of the historic Liberal Party’s election addresses in Neal Blewett, reduced role in life followed. broad support at a period when that The Peers, the Parties and the People – This is also not far from a Dar- included a partial pact with Labour, The British General Elections of 1910 winian version of the ‘natural change in the Unionist vote best cap- (London, 1972), p. 326. causes’ thesis, understanding the tures this. The 1911–13 figures show 11 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers – impact of war as dependent on the that the change in the Unionist vote How Europe Went to War in 1914 (Lon- character of each party. It was not was very similar in the 34 clear cases don, 2012), pp. 209–11. the force of the omnibus hit, nor to what it was including the 22 more 12 Ibid., p 236. previous disease, that decided the complex ones (three-cornered fights

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 15 To the historically conscious at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the name of Sir Edward The Long Shadow of War Grey encapsulates a range of often barely Sir Edward Grey and Liberal Foreign Policy before 1914 understood impressions of Britain’s past. It conjures up images of the long recessional, of the glorious Edwardian summer drawing to a thunderous close, of the moment when ‘the lamps [were] going out all over Europe’.1 Grey’s tenure of the Foreign Office remains contested, but for now his critics dominate the field. More, he seems to stand for the failings of the upper-class amateurs who made up the Edwardian political class. To the wider public he is portrayed as ‘a b***dy awful Foreign Secretary’, 2 a frock- coated ‘donkey’ who, through incompetence and obstinacy, plunged Britain into war, leaving it then to the brass-hatted asses to lead the British army onto Flanders’ fields.3 Professor T. G. Otte examines Grey’s record in the run- up to war.

16 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 The Long Shadow of War Sir Edward Grey and Liberal Foreign Policy before 1914

t is one of the many ironic First elected for Berwick-upon- Grey’s social background set him twists of modern British poli- Tweed in 1885 – not natural Lib- somewhat apart from the bulk Itics – and of the history of eral territory then, Percy influence of the 1905 administration. He the Liberal Party more especially and the Anglican clergy usually was one of a handful of aristo- – that Grey’s historical persona is ranged against him – he continued crats – Crewe, Harcourt and, largely the product of David Lloyd to represent the seat in parliament later, Churchill being others – George’s poisonous pen. His war- for the next thirty-one years.6 For amongst men mostly middle class time memoirs – self-serving and exactly eleven of these he was for- by descent, profession or habits. dishonest by any standard – were eign secretary, irreplaceable if not Birrell and Haldane or McKenna meant to settle old scores and to always irreproachable. Grey, in and Morley, and indeed Asquith, cement his own leadership creden- fact, remains the longest, continu- were more representative of the tials, and to that end the reputa- ally serving occupant of the office embourgeoisement of the Liberal tions of Asquith and Grey had to since the creation of the Foreign Party at Westminster and in the be eviscerated on the altar which Office in 1782. Palmerston and country at large. Grey’s pedigree, the Welsh idol had erected for him- Salisbury held its seals for longer however, was unquestionably Lib- self. Lloyd George dismissed Grey overall – fourteen years and nine eral. His family, the border Greys, as more ignorant of foreign affairs months in Palmerston’s case and was perhaps better known for its than any other cabinet minister, thirteen years, seven months in military and naval exploits – his and suggested that his ‘personality Salisbury’s – but the former occu- great-great-grandfather, the 1st was distinctly one of the elements pied the post three times and the Earl Grey, was ‘No Flint Grey’ that contributed to the great catas- latter four times. Amongst twen- of North American fame, and his trophe’ because he was ‘not made tieth-century foreign secretaries, great-grandfather, the 1st Baronet, for prompt action’.4 It is little won- Antony Eden comes close with ten had been Nelson’s flag captain on der that Margot Asquith should years and three months, yet he, too, HMS Victory – or its ecclesiasti- have wished to dance on Lloyd took the Foreign Office on three cal eminence – his great-grand- George’s grave. As for Grey, he was occasions. But Grey was also vital uncle was the Bishop of Hereford too refined and too reserved for any to the inner workings of the last and through his paternal grand- such display of emotion. And here, Liberal government as an essential mother he was descended from perhaps, lies part of the explanation connecting tube between differ- two further bishops (Lichfield for Grey’s low political reputation. ent sections of the party. This role and London), and there was also a His aloof personality and his own and the position which he occupied Wilberforce connection as well as, reluctance to refute Lloyd George, in the Liberal ideological spectrum more curiously, one with Cardinal reinforced by his increasing blind- make him a useful prism through Manning. ness and compounded by family which to study the variegated But amongst the many admi- tragedies, left him an easy target. nature of Edwardian Liberalism, its rals and generals, the scattering of Indeed, ‘neither [Grey’s] admir- fault lines and problems. Even so, clergymen, and the odd colonial ers nor his critics know quite what it is on his stewardship of foreign governor, the Northumberland they should say about him.’5 affairs, and the degree to which he Greys had also achieved a certain Grey’s low reputation stands in succeeded or failed in tackling its political prominence in recent sharp contrast to the high esteem many challenges, that his reputa- years. They had produced one in which he was held throughout tion rests. Sir Edward Grey prime minister, his great-grand- his long public career. His political (1862–1933) in uncle, the 2nd Earl, one of the stars longevity, indeed, is remarkable. ~ 1914 in Liberal firmament since 1832,

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 17 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914 and his grandfather, Sir George together, introduced Bills as necessary in terms of facilitat- Grey, three-times home secretary together, and supported one ing the transition to democratic (‘Prime Minister for Home Affairs’) another by speech and vote’.11 politics and as the only practically and one of the mainstays of Lib- viable alternative to a unicameral eral cabinets from 1839 until 1866. Grey was driven by a strong sense solution, which he regarded as dan- From him, ‘[c]areful in action and of the growing ‘democratisation’ gerous.16 Grey was, indeed, as A. J. moderate in speech’,7 Edward Grey of British society and politics. Even Balfour observed with acuity, ‘a inherited a strong patrician sense if he himself did not feel entirely curious combination of the old- of public service. But he was also comfortable with the new age of fashioned Whig and the Socialist’.17 descended from the Whitbreads, mass politics, the era of the com- For those to whom a Tory judg- the Bedfordshire brewers and Lib- mon man was approaching, and it ment may be suspect, Prince Lich- eral politicians; and he was con- behoved the old elites to smooth nowsky, the German ambassador, a nected to the Whig cousinhood, its progress. This consideration man of great intelligence and per- albeit in its more recent extension. was at the root of Grey’s support ception, later reflected that ‘[Grey] The Baring earls of Northbrook for MPs’ salaries to allow working joined the left wing of the party were relatives, as were the earls of men to enter parliament, his advo- and sympathised with Socialists Gainsborough.8 Indeed, his back- cacy of land reform, his pro-home- and pacifists. One might call him ground, familial connections and rule stance, and his championing a Socialist in the most ideal sense his private and public identifica- of women’s suffrage when many [of the term], for he carries the the- tion with rural Northumberland leading Liberals were opposed to Grey was ory [of socialism] into his private and Hampshire made Grey a much it, though not as fiercely usually as life, which is marked by greatest more recognisably English politi- their wives. Of course, there were driven by a simplicity and unpretentiousness, cian, a rarity in a party now domi- pragmatic calculations of politi- although he is possessed of ample nated by the ‘Celtic fringe’. Even cal advantage at work here, too. strong sense means.’18 Asquith and Churchill, as Anglo- An infusion of working men at Whatever Grey’s reforming Saxon as could be, after all, repre- Westminster would broaden the of the grow- instincts at home, on foreign policy sented Scottish constituencies.9 Liberals’ base and so facilitate their he parted company with the Radi- Grey’s political outlook also survival as a truly ‘national’ party. ing ‘democ- cals, whose international pacifism deserves closer attention. Given his Resisting such reforms, by contrast, made for loose thinking and self- association with Rosebery, in some would lead to social disintegra- ratisation’ delusions. His outlook, by contrast, ways one of his political mentors, tion and class warfare, the break-up was shaped by J. R. Seeley’s Expan- and with Asquith and Haldane, of the Liberal Party and politi- of British sion of England with its emphasis his contemporaries in the Liberal cal chaos.12 But Grey pursued such on the imperial theme in Britain’s League, Grey tends to be labelled as schemes because he thought them society and post-1688 development, in sharp a Liberal Imperialist. He was that, to be right and necessary. Inde- politics. Even distinction from the usual Whig but the label captures and privi- pendence of thought, he observed themes of the advance of consti- leges only part of his politics. These in the House of Commons during if he him- tutional governance and liberty.19 were more complex and variegated a debate on MPs’ salaries in words If Seeley gave a degree of intel- than the LImp label would sug- that have a familiar ring to them self did not lectual rigour to Grey’s views, his gest, even if Grey himself was far even at the distance of over a cen- favourite country pursuit offers a from the ‘compleat politician’, as his tury, ‘is not a monopoly of men feel entirely glimpse into Grey, the man and the part in the clumsy Relugas intrigue of wealth and leisure … . [I]n our politician. The qualities required against Campbell-Bannerman in excessive anxiety to make sure comfortable to succeed in fly-fishing would 1905 underlined.10 If anything, in Members are men of leisure, we serve any diplomat or politician his views on domestic affairs, he not only get the men who are by with the new well. They need to be alert to ‘the was closer to the Radicals than to nature and habit leisurely outside untoward tricks’ of wind and cur- any other Liberal grouping. He was the House but who introduce hab- age of mass rents. These could not be overcome part of a progressive caucus among its of leisure into business inside the ‘by sheer strength’, but had to to members of the 1885/6 intakes, House.’13 politics, the be ‘dodge[d] and defeat[ed] unob- guided by John Morley, who ‘may In a similar vein he supported trusively’. For this ‘[q]uiet, steady, be said to have been our [political] the female franchise because he era of the intelligent effort’ was needed; and foster parent’: understood the ‘sense of injus- the sportsman ‘should make guesses tice of [women] being deprived of common founded upon something which ‘[W]e were thrown together the vote.’14 Indeed, according to he has noticed, and be ever on the instantly as members of a lit- John Burns, the workingman Lib- man was watch for some further indications tle group of advanced Liberals, eral minister, ‘Grey ha[d] become approach- to turn the guess into a conclusion. which formed itself soon after almost obsessed by his fanatic adhe- […] But there is a third [quality] … the General Election. The group sion to his cause.’15 Support for it ing, and it It is self-control.’20 consisted of Asquith, Edward fitted a pattern of piecemeal consti- Grey, Haldane, Arthur Acland, tutional reform to enlarge the dem- behoved the ~ Tom Ellis and myself [Sydney ocratic element in British politics. Buxton]. We were personal It was for this reason that Grey, in old elites to Given Grey’s association in the pub- friends, holding the same pro- his Leith speech of December 1909, lic mind with the events of 1914, gressive views, and anxious as advocated reforming the House of smooth its historians have tended to view far as possible to advance these Lords, by substituting popular elec- his foreign secretaryship through views. We sat together, worked tions for the hereditary principle, progress. the prism of Anglo-German

18 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914 relations. This is a problematic. The shifts in compromise and now the crippling with it Britain’s position in Egypt. For by privileging the German of Russian power had transformed Whatever assurances of support aspect it produces a skewed per- the interna- Britain’s strategic position. It pre- were given, however, they had to spective on Edwardian foreign sented an opportunity, but there be conditional so as to ensure that policy. It is imperative to keep in tional land- were also risks attached to it. Rus- France did not provoke Germany. view its global, imperial charac- sia’s prostration made her biddable This was meant to render impos- ter. In equal measure a European scape on and so facilitated a compromise sible any ‘independent action’ by and an Asiatic power, Britain had to defuse the ‘Great Game’, the France without prior consultation a global strategic paradigm which account of struggle for mastery in Asia that with Britain. A British guaran- linked her dispersed interests. The had bedevilled relations between tee was out of the question. Such only other comparable power in the waning the two countries for so long. On an undertaking would be ‘a very this respect was Russia. Only she and waxing the other hand, her decline had serious [matter] … it changes the had the capacity to affect British unhinged the European equilib- Entente into an Alliance – and Alli- interests on both continents. There of Russia’s rium. No longer threatened by the ances, especially continental Alli- was nothing novel about the Rus- prospect of a two-front war, Ger- ances, are not in accordance with sian factor in British foreign policy. might estab- many was free now to throw her our traditions.’29 Indeed, it had been a constant in weight about. This was the root Carefully phrased statements Britain’s strategic equation since the lished the cause of the European crises after addressed to Berlin were the reverse 1820s, if not before.21 International 1905. of Grey’s constructive ambiguity in politics were anything but stable broad strate- The Anglo-French conven- dealings with the French. London during Grey’s period at the helm of tion of April 1904 was the work ‘did not wish to make trouble’, the the Foreign Office, however, and gic parame- of Grey’s predecessor, Lord Lans- Wilhelmstrasse was told, but this British policy faced unprecedented downe. But he had supported this assurance was coupled with the hint challenges. Russia’s double crisis – ters of Grey’s colonial compromise as an act of that, were Germany to fall upon catastrophic military defeat abroad overdue imperial consolidation that France, ‘it would be impossible [for and the subsequent turmoil at home policy. There would remove any leverage which Britain] to remain neutral.’30 Grey’s – eliminated her as an international the not entirely honest broker in stance compelled both France and factor for the foreseeable future was a further Berlin’s Wilhelmstrasse (the loca- Germany to act with restraint, the after 1905. London’s strategic cal- tion of Germany’s foreign office) former to secure Britain’s support, culus thus was complicated by Rus- significant had over Britain.24 The agreement the latter to prevent her from enter- sia’s weakness and her resurgence remained a ‘cardinal point in our ing any continental conflict. This from 1912 onwards. factor which foreign policy’ for Grey. Indeed, was not traditional balance-of- The shifts in the international influenced ‘the spirit of the agreement is more power politics; Russia’s weakness landscape on account of the waning important than the letter of the made that impossible. It was rather and waxing of Russia’s might estab- his outlook: agreement’, he argued.25 Several a form of British neo-Bismarckian- lished the broad strategic param- historians have criticised Grey’s ism, to which the Edwardian gen- eters of Grey’s policy. There was his political apparent preoccupation with the eration was attracted.31 a further significant factor which ‘spirit’ of the convention, with the Grey stuck to this line in sub- influenced his outlook: his politi- generation’s implication that he neglected Brit- sequent years. The Anglo-French cal generation’s experience of Brit- ain’s national interests.26 This is a notes of November 1912, and the ain’s relative isolation in the 1890s. experience of grotesque caricature. For Grey had ‘division of labour’ between the In the years after 1900, Grey toyed not irrevocably committed Britain two navies underlined this. The with the notion of a ‘new course’ Britain’s rela- to France. Given the international arrangement was an exercise in in foreign policy. Its aim was a rap- instability after 1905, he followed a entente management and in con- prochement with Russia ‘to elimi- tive isolation policy of constructive ambiguity. taining Germany, but without nate in that quarter the German When, during the first Moroccan committing the government to broker, who keeps England & Rus- in the 1890s. crisis, the French ambassador ‘put any particular course of action. sia apart and levies a constant com- the question … directly & formally’ Britain had the flexibility and the mission upon us.’22 Dispensing with – that is, would Britain support strength to forge a policy com- Berlin’s brokering services was the France in the event of a continental mensurate with her regional inter- operative idea here; and it shaped war – Grey promised ‘benevolent ests. Decision-makers in London Grey’s thinking after 1905, as an neutrality’, but intimated that the were ‘faced with alternatives, not internal minute from early 1909 British public ‘would be strongly necessities.’32 Britain’s degree of testified. Britain ‘used “to lean on moved in favour of France’, pro- leverage over Paris was confirmed Germany”’ in the 1880s and 1890s, vided she did not commit an act of by none other than the French he noted: ‘[W]e were kept on bad aggression.27 Such carefully dosed president. As the Sarajevo cri- terms with France & Russia. We assurances also extended to the sis reached its climax, Raymond were sometimes on the brink of war controversial military talks, which Poincaré recorded in his diary with one or the other; & Germany Grey authorised to continue in that ‘[o]n account of the ambigu- took toll of us when it suited her.’23 January 1906. The advantages of ous attitude of England, we let it For as long as Britain was learning the details of French mili- be known at St. Petersburg … .’33 locked into antagonistic relations tary planning aside,28 Paris had to Although not altogether free of with France and Russia, it proved be prevented from buckling under duplicity, advising Russia not to impossible to escape from this rela- pressure from Berlin. If that hap- precipitate matters was dictated by tive dependence on Germany. But pened, the colonial agreement of the necessity of carrying Britain the 1904 Anglo-French colonial 1904 was likely to unravel, and with the Franco-Russian group.

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 19 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914

Britain’s dealings with France Steering such even-handed policy by support- to avoid if possible a revival of fric- were conditioned by the chang- ing joint action by the powers as tion with her, and we wish to dis- ing value of the Russian factor. a course was the only means of preventing an courage the French from provoking Grey’s attitude towards Russia, Austro-Russian rupture.40 Lack of Germany.’46 however, was complex. As any neverthe- influence over Russia remained a The cooling of relations with right-thinking Liberal, he was sus- problem, but Grey did not privilege Russia and the détente with Berlin picious of tsarist autocracy. In the less beset preserving the wire to St Peters- were linked. Indeed, the state of spring of 1917, out of office now, he burg over maintaining the interna- Anglo-German relations had been ‘rejoice[d] at seeing Russia purge with practi- tional concert. He could not do so very much a function of those with her Gov[ernmen]t & strike out for because the two were linked. With- the Russian empire since at least freedom.’34 No doubt, such overt cal difficul- out coordination with the Franco- 1878. Even so, it would be a per- ideological hostility especially ties, largely Russian group, there was no verse attempt at revisionism to sug- amongst the Radicals complicated prospect of moderating St Peters- gest that the antagonism between dealings with St Petersburg. Grey’s because Grey burg, in which case Germany was Britain and Germany after 1905 did Russian policy was nevertheless unlikely to keep Vienna in check. not exist. But in terms of high poli- driven by pragmatic considerations and the For- The challenge was to balance these tics it was short-lived, and it needs of British global strategic interests. competing demands. That this to be placed in its proper context. He appreciated the broader view eign Office could be done was demonstrated by The nexus with Anglo-Russian that the waning of Russian power Grey’s surefooted mediation and his relations aside, Grey strove for the disrupted the European equilib- found it well skilful presiding over the London same even-handedness in his deal- rium. It was desirable, therefore, ambassadorial conference, in many ings with Germany as character- that Russia was soon ‘re-established nigh impos- ways the zenith of his international ised his policy towards France and in the councils of Europe & I hope influence. There was, however, a Russia. ‘Real isolation of Germany on better terms with us than she sible to read tension between the two objects, would mean war’, he thought, but has yet been.’35 But he also under- and Grey was alive to the inherent ‘so would the domination of Ger- stood that Russia’s recent decline Germany. risks of this policy. By 1913–4, he many in Europe. There is a fairly allowed for settling matters in Asia. had begun to realise that interna- wide course between the two Such an arrangement would help Pace some tional politics was on the cusp of extremes in which European poli- to consolidate the security glacis major change, and it seemed better tics should steer.’47 around India, including the Per- historians, to stay one’s hand until the pieces Steering such a course was nev- sian Gulf: ‘And if we don’t make had settled into a new pattern: ertheless beset with practical dif- an agreement, we shall be worried they did not ‘The best course … is to let things ficulties, largely because Grey and into occupying Seistan and I know invent the go on as they are without any new the Foreign Office found it well not how much besides’ – and over- declaration of policy. The alterna- nigh impossible to read Germany. stretch would beckon.36 ‘German tives are either a policy of complete Pace some historians, they did not By any standard, the 1907 isolation in Europe, or a policy of invent the ‘German threat’ to suit Anglo-Russian convention was threat’ to definite alliance with one or the some psychological need on their a considerable success, but Grey’s other group of European Powers.’ part. If any thing the nature and policy towards Russia suggests suit some Indeed, Grey knew that ‘we have direction of Germany’s ambitions, a deeper understanding that this been fortunate in being able to go and the motivations that under- imperial compromise was no more psychologi- on for so long as we are’ without pinned them, appeared confused. than a temporary alignment, made having to choose.41 The kaiser’s glittering public per- possible by Russia’s weakness and cal need on Russia’s recovery from the nadir sona – so unlike Grey’s in almost likely to loosen again once Rus- of 1905 complicated Anglo-Russian every way – was one complication. sia recovered her strength. British their part. relations and Great Power politics ‘I am tired of the Emperor’, he con- policy could not control Russia, in general. More robust Russian fessed, ‘– he is like a great battle- but nor did Grey give in to Rus- proceedings in Persia raised doubts ship with steam up and the screws sian blackmail during the Bosnian about the continued viability of the going but no rudder and you can- crisis of 1908–9.37 Nor, for that mat- 1907 compromise.42 Renegotiating not tell what he will run into or ter, could he prevent the subsequent the compact, Grey thought, would what catastrophe he will cause.’48 rise of Austro-Russian antagonism be awkward: ‘all along we want More fundamentally, uncertainty in the Balkans.38 In many ways, a something, and have nothing to about Germany mirrored the stra- Romanov–Habsburg settlement give. It is therefore difficult to see tegic confusion at the heart of Ger- in the region would have diffused how a good bargain is to be made.’43 man policy. As Zara Steiner has the most explosive international A Franco-Russian attempt to coax observed, ‘[a]s the Germans them- flashpoint: ‘[A] war between them Britain into a naval agreement selves were divided, no foreign [Austria-Hungary and Russia] complicated matters further.44 Grey secretary, however acute, could would be very inconvenient. I do was adamant that no such deal with have accurately read the German not think that we could take part Russia was possible, even if it was riddle’. 49 OfficialWeltpolitik rheto- in it, and intervene on the Russian not politic to say so to St Peters- ric, emanating from the Wilhelm- side in a Balkan War, and yet our burg.45 Any move in that direction strasse and its pliant press, covered absenteeism would prove a danger would impair relations with Ger- that puzzle in stardust but it offered to the present grouping of Euro- many, so much improved in the last no real clues as to what Germany pean Powers.’39 eighteen months before Europe’s really wanted. During the two Balkan wars last summer: ‘we are on good terms Grey’s policy towards Germany of 1912–13 Grey continued his with Germany now and we desire sought to combine accommodation

20 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914 with compellence. He was ready to increasing the German Army.’55 by then another matter occupied make concessions to satisfy legiti- Even so, he refrained from exploit- the minds of Grey and the German mate German ambitions, but not ing Germany’s difficulties for polit- chancellor.60 at the price of sacrificing Brit- ical gain. It seemed politic to let To some extent, the episode ain’s naval supremacy or her rela- matters run their natural course. was yet another amongst countless tions with other powers. To some Any attempt to formalise the end such failed initiatives that litter the degree, Grey’s readiness to accom- of the naval race ran the risk of pro- pages of diplomatic history books. modate Germany was shaped by longing it by encouraging Tirpitz But to see it in this light means the ideological divisions in the Lib- and his supporters to mount a To some to miss its real significance. For it eral Party between ‘navalists’ and rearguard action against the shift underlines the essential flexibility ‘economists’. But his attempts to in defence spending. With this in degree, of British foreign policy. In 1914, negotiate a naval agreement with mind, Grey stopped Churchill from Grey and his officials anticipated Berlin was also driven by his con- travelling to Germany to meet the Grey’s readi- another shift in the constellation viction that the various arms races kaiser on the fringes of the Kiel ness to of the powers. Russia’s resurgence between the powers risked ruining regatta in June 1914. Even under tilted the military balance against them. They faced a danger, ‘greater very different circumstances, the accommo- Germany, but also left a question … than that of war – the danger idea of letting these two mercu- mark over Anglo-Russian relations of bleeding to death in times of rial men, liable at the best of times date Ger- in Asia. Some repositioning on Brit- peace.’50 to be carried away by their own ain’s part then seemed necessary, Any naval agreement with Ber- rhetoric, settle matters had little many was and a rapprochement with Germany lin, however, had to be based on to recommend itself to Grey.56 But was an option worth pursuing. The reciprocity.51 And this proved to in 1914 such a visit was likely to shaped by episode therefore also suggests the be the nub of the problem. In 1909 cause more problems than could be need to reconsider Grey’s policy in and 1913, Grey’s policy of compel- resolved afterwards by Grey and his the ideologi- more general terms. Grey did not lence, tempered by conciliation, diplomats. privilege relations with France and appeared to have manoeuvred As naval matters receded into cal divisions Russia, and to that extent he was Berlin to where he wanted it to the background in 1913/14, there not ‘ententiste à outrance’. Support- be, ready to settle the naval ques- was a growing sense in diplomatic in the Lib- ing France was the correct policy tion and to agree to a fixed ratio of circles of ‘une détente et … un rap- response in 1905 and 1911; an Asi- capital ships.52 Both sides, however, prochement’ between Britain and eral Party atic arrangement with Russia was misread the situation, and the talks Germany.57 This was not merely a practical politics after 1905; and remained fruitless. Grey reasoned, question of atmospherics. A fort- between maintaining it after 1907 served not entirely inaccurately, that night before Sarajevo, the two gov- Britain’s global, strategic interests. growing financial pressures would ernments concluded an agreement ‘navalists’ But Grey was not willing to adhere force Germany to curb her naval on Near Eastern affairs, which and ‘econo- to both agreements beyond the programme. In Berlin, by contrast, aimed ‘to prevent all causes of mis- point at which they ceased to be use- Grey was thought to be under the understandings between Germany mists’. But ful policy tools. And yet, Grey was thumb of the Radicals who were and Britain’, and which, it was ‘ententiste’ in that the Near Eastern calling for retrenchment and social hoped, would provide a platform his attempts agreement with German conformed reform. Ultimately, the German for further arrangements.58 Grey to the principles that had informed demand for a political formula certainly was determined to build to negoti- the arrangements with France and to complement a naval conven- on it: ‘the German Gov[ernmen] Russia. Like them, it was meant to tion, in effect a British neutrality t are in a peaceful mood and they ate a naval consolidate Britain’s international pledge, was a step too far. It would are anxious to be on good terms position by accommodating a rival have given Berlin a blank cheque with England, a mood which he agreement without sacrificing vital interests. to resort to preventive war.53 Nei- [Grey] wishes to encourage.’ Inter- This has broader implications for ther Haldane nor Churchill in 1912 national politics were on the cusp with Ber- scholarly interpretations of pre-1914 and 1913 was able to remove this of change. As the Franco-Russian foreign policy. For it calls into ques- obstacle. But by then the Anglo- group regained its strength, so Brit- lin was also tion the descriptive and analytical German naval race was over. Ger- ain could revert to her traditional value of the notion of a ‘policy of the man defence spending had come balancing role. She could now act driven by ententes’. No such policy existed in up against a fiscal ceiling, com- as ‘the connecting link’ between the sense of a commitment to France pounded by the accelerating French Berlin, Paris and St Petersburg, his convic- and Russia. It did exist as a strategy and Russian (and Belgian) arma- and so help to restrain ‘the hasti- of imperial consolidation through ments programmes on land, and ness of Austria and Italy.’59 There tion that targeted and limited concessions to threatening to trigger a constitu- is, in fact, a substantial body of cir- the various actual or potential competitors; and tional crisis in Germany. The 1913 cumstantial evidence to suggest this was in a line of continuity with German army channelled funding that Grey was ready to go further arms races much of British foreign policy since away from the navy, and was, in and to explore the possibility of a the Crimean War. effect, a unilateral German declara- more substantive rapprochement. between tion of naval arms limitation.54 For this purpose his private secre- ~ Grey understood well enough tary was meant to visit Germany the powers the reasons behind Berlin’s now on a secret mission. Ultimately, the The détente with Germany and more emollient tone: ‘[I]t is not visit never materialised. It had to be risked ruin- the underlying sense Great Power the love of our beautiful eyes, but postponed several times, and was politics were on the verge of a the extra 50 million required for finally scheduled for July 1914 – but ing them. major transformation established

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 21 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914 the parameters of Grey’s diplo- and the fact that the Wilhelmstrasse into view, there were no good matic moves in July 1914. From turned a deaf ear to the warnings of outcomes for Britain. In the sum- the moment the news of the Sara- its man in London. For Grey there mer of 1914, the inherent logic jevo murders reached London, he were good practical reasons for of Britain’s geopolitical position was fully alert to the risk of escala- pursuing the course he had chosen. meant that, given the greater like- tion. Indeed, he was ‘rather nerv- Recent experience had reinforced lihood of an Austro-German vic- ous as regards Austria & Servia.’61 the importance of Anglo-Ger- tory, Britain had to enter the war His room for manoeuvre, how- man cooperation in settling prob- against these two.68 ever, was limited, both on account lems in South Eastern Europe; and Grey made mistakes, however. of foreign policy calculations and throughout the first half of 1914 Consistent in his pursuit of inter- of domestic constraints. The latter everything seemed to indicate Ger- national mediation, his various were not insignificant. Any prema- man willingness to establish closer schemes for intervention by the ture intervention had the potential ties with Britain. Any direct warn- four powers not directly affected to split party unity, always brittle ing addressed to Berlin would abort by the Serbian crisis were never- in matters of foreign policy. At the joint crisis management, and might theless problematic. The quar- same time, any firm indication of drive Germany into a preventive tet idea was not without its own Britain’s stance was liable to trigger war, precisely what Grey – and his internal logic, but Grey never unwelcome reactions by the other contemporaries and later critics – explained why he preferred this powers. wished to avoid.65 slimmed down version of the clas- Grey’s interviews with the Ger- That criticism of Grey is col- sic European concert to involv- man and Russian ambassadors on oured largely by a Lloyd Geor- ing all the Great Powers; and it 6 and 8 July constituted a form of geian fable has already been noted. allowed Vienna to operate in the early, if indirect, intervention. The But it is also based on an assumed shadows of international diplo- peaceful resolution of the Sarajevo dichotomy between a ‘blue-water’ macy to plot a war against Serbia. crisis depended on cooperation and a continental security strat- Grey also misread Austro-Hun- with Germany. Already the previ- egy. This is a strategic fallacy. For garian policy in that he concluded ous Balkan turmoil had demon- the purposes of practical politics, that Habsburg policy could only strated this. The groupings of the no such alternative existed. For be moderated by Berlin, and so powers were not to ‘draw apart’, Britain, the Russian and German never developed the habit of direct Grey warned and promised that factors were connected because exchanges with the Ballhaus- he ‘would use all the influence [he] she was both a European and an platz. But in most other respects, could to mitigate difficulties.’62 It overseas power, and her security British influence was limited. In was vital, moreover, that the Rus- paradigm was thus global.66 The 1929, Grey wondered whether sian government reassured Ger- cabinet did not decide to enter he could have gone further in his many, ‘and convince her that no the war in Europe as a lesser evil attempts to restrain Russia. Yet coup was being prepared against when compared with the recru- ‘I have London’s ability to apply pressure her.’63 If it failed to do so, a diplo- descence of the Anglo-Russian on the Russian government was matic solution would prove elusive. Asiatic antagonism. Ultimately, a searched my circumscribed, not least by the The resurgence of Russia made the majority of ministers, swayed by knowledge that any such attempt alliance with Austria-Hungary Asquith and Grey, concluded that heart contin- would have triggered demands more important for Berlin, and ‘the non-interference was not a real- for a firm commitment to Russia: more valuable will be the Austrian istic proposition. Whatever the uously as to ‘And to that question he [Grey] alliance for Germany, and the more outcome of the war, Britain would could not have given an affirma- leverage Austria will have over be left in a much-reduced posi- whether we tive answer.’69 Indeed, given that, Germany.’ Indeed, Grey sought to tion. If, most likely, the central in July 1914, the Russian foreign instil a sense of urgency in both the powers won, they would reorder could have minister pressed for the mobilisa- Russian and German ambassadors: Europe; and a now rampant Ger- tion of Russia’s armed forces in ‘The idea that this terrible crime many would challenge Britain at kept out of it the expectation that Britain would might unexpectedly produce a gen- some point in the future, and from not join the fray, it is scarcely cred- eral war with all its attendant catas- a much broader base owing to her & I am sure ible that moderating advice would trophes – after all the great efforts acquisition of the French navy and have had any effect on him. If any- in recent years to avoid it … “made colonial empire. If, by contrast, the conse- thing, it was Russian, and to an his hair stand on edge”.’64 France and Russia emerged victo- extent French, recalcitrance that In this manner, Grey signalled rious, they would destroy the two quences of forced Grey to utter his explicit British concerns about a possible Germanic powers and the balance staying out warning of a world war on 29 July. escalation, coupled with a reminder of power with it, and they were The experience of Europe hur- that London could not be ignored not likely to pay much attention would have tling towards war weighed heavily if matters were to escalate. Even so, to British interests.67 And even if on Grey’s mind afterwards: the focus in the scholarly literature the continental powers, weakened been worse on Grey’s actions in the summer of by a prolonged war, were to agree I can’t tell you how much I feel 1914, whether by commission or to a negotiated peace, it would than being the horror of the great catas- omission, is misplaced. For at the unite them against Britain. Peace trophe. The whole time is like root of the escalating crisis was the might have been a British interest in, but it is a great scourge; something reluctance of France and Russia to – the old mantra since 1815 – but inexorable & inevitable. I have listen to counsels of moderation, once a continental conflict hove awful.’ searched my heart continuously

22 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914

as to whether we could have What- Crisis: The World’s Descent into Government (pb., London, 1984), kept out of it & I am sure the War, Summer 1914 (2014). p. 319, who, however, implies a consequences of staying out ever Grey’s degree of ‘Scottishness’ in Grey. I would have been worse than 1 As quoted in H. W. Harris, J .A. am grateful to Keith Robbins for his being in, but it is awful.70 manoeu- Spender (London, 1946), p. 159. thoughts on Grey’s ‘Englishness’. Grey’s recollection was less clear, [E.] 10 In later years Grey suggested that the Indeed, at some point later in vres in July Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty- ‘Relugas Compact’ had been more August he seems to have suffered a Five Years, 2 vols. (New York, 1925) about the tone and style of Campbell- mental breakdown.71 1914, once vol. ii, p. 20. Bannerman’s pronouncement than The war marked the end of an Vienna and 2 M. Parris, The Spectator, 22 Feb. 1997. about the substance of his politics, era for Europe, for Britain and her 3 Most recently M. Hastings, Grey to Elizabeth Haldane, 14 June empire, and for Grey’s party. He Berlin had Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1930, Haldane MSS, National Library himself ploughed on, impelled by a (London, 2013). Grey’s most persistent of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 6037. sense of duty and despite significant embarked scholarly critic is Keith Wilson, see 11 S. Buxton, ‘Notes on Asquith’ (MS), health problems,72 until Asquith’s Policy of the Ententes: Essays on the n.d., Buxton MSS, British Library resignation in December 1916. But on a course Determinants of British Foreign Policy, (henceforth BL), Add. MSS. 87045. he was a man out of his time now: 1904–1914 (Cambridge, 1985); ‘Grey’ 12 This was a constant concern of ‘I took things as I found them and of escala- in id. (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Grey’s, e.g. Grey to Asquith (private), for 30 years spoke of progress as Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First 26 Oct. 1910, Asquith MSS, Bodleian an enlargement of the Victorian tion, he had World War (London, 1987), pp. 172– Library, Oxford, MS Asquith 12. For industrial age: as if anything could 97; and ‘The Making and Putative further thoughts on the perceived be good that led to telephones and no tools left Implementation of a British Foreign danger of social disintegration see cinematographs and large cities and Policy of Gesture, December 1905 also H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal the Daily Mail.’73 to avert the to August 1914: The Anglo-French Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a Entente Revisited’, Canadian Journal of Post-Gladstonian Elite (Oxford, 1973), ~ descent into History, xxxi, 2 (1996), pp. 227–55. pp. 128–9. 4 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2 13 Hansard, Parl. Deb. (series 4), vol. It has been tempting for historians war. vols. (new edn., London, 1938) vol. i, 334, col. 1196 (29 Mar. 1889). to present British foreign policy pp. 56, 58 and 60. For an interesting 14 Hansard, HC (series 1), vol. 36, cols. in 1914 as a study in failure. It has parallel with Churchill’s memoirs see 673–7 (28 Mar. 1912). He remained proved even more tempting for D. Reynolds, In Command of History: silent, however, on women MPs. them to follow Lloyd George up the Churchill Fighting and Writing the 15 Burns diary, 25 Jan. 1913, Burns MSS, garden path of history. Both temp- Second World War (London, 2004). BL, Add. MSS. 46335. tations should be resisted. If any- 5 K. Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: A 16 ‘Sir Edward Grey at Leith’, The thing, the events of 1914 underline Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon Times, 6 Dec. 1909; see also V. the limits of British power at the (London, 1971), p. 13. For a succinct Bogdanor, ‘The Liberal Party and end of the long nineteenth century. appraisal of Grey’s policy see K. the Constitution’, Journal of Liberal It is a peculiarly British, or perhaps Neilson, ‘“Control the Whirlwind”: History, 54 (2007), pp. 48–52. more particularly English, delusion Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary, 17 As quoted in R. Jenkins, Mr. Balfour’s to think that this country could (or 1906–1916’, in T. G. Otte (ed.), The Poodle: Peers v. People (pb. repr. can) shape the decisions made by Makers of British Foreign Policy: From London, 1989), p. 71. others. All too often, indeed, criti- Pitt to Thatcher (Basingstoke and New 18 [K. M.] Prince Lichnowsky, ‘Meine cism of Grey is little more than a York, 2002), pp. 128–49. Londoner Mission, 1912–1914’, form of latter-day ‘Little Englan- 6 G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon Börsen-Courier, 21 Mar. 1918, repr. in derism’, albeit one appearing in the (London, 1937), p. 24; H. Pelling, M. Smith (ed.), The Disclosures from drab garb of scholarship. Grey him- Social Geography of British Elections, Germany (New York, 1918), pp. 86–88 self had a shrewder appreciation of 1885–1910 (London, 1967), pp. (my translation). the constraints placed on Britain, 331–3. Before 1885 Liberals and 19 Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, p. 28. For and of the range of practical options Conservatives were evenly balanced Seeley see D. Wormell, Sir John Seeley open to British diplomacy. here, and its electors usually returned and the Uses of History (Cambridge, This raises the wider issue of one candidate from each party. Only 1980), pp. 75–109. agency. Whatever Grey’s manoeu- Sir Alan Beith represented this seat 20 .[E.] Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Fly vres in July 1914, once Vienna and for longer (Nov. 1973 – May 2015). Fishing (rev. ed. repr. London, 1947 [1st Berlin had embarked on a course 7 M. Creighton, ‘Grey, Sir George edn. 1899]), pp. 18–20. of escalation, he had no tools left (1799–1882)’, Dictionary of National 21 See K. Neilson, Britain and the Last to avert the descent into war. To Biography, viii (London, 1908), p. 627; Tsar: British Policy towards Russia, that extent it might be argued that also Memoir of Sir George Grey, Bart., 1894–1917 (Oxford, 1995); also T. G. British policy had run its course. GCB (London, 1901), pp. 113–6. Otte, ‘“A Very Internecine Policy”: It cannot be argued, however, that 8 Through his paternal grandmother Anglo-Russian Cold Wars before the under Grey’s stewardship of foreign he was also related to the Tory Ryder Cold War, 1743–1940’, in C. Baxter, affairs that process was accelerated. family (the earls of Harrowby), and M. L. Dockrill and K. Hamilton (eds.), both Northbrook and Gainsborough Britain in Global Politics, vol. i: From T. G. Otte is Professor of Diplo- joined the exodus of the Whigs. Gladstone to Churchill (Basingstoke and matic History at the University of East 9 M. Bentley, Politics without Democracy: New York, 2013), pp. 17–49. Anglia. Among his latest books is July Perception and Preoccupation in British 22 Grey to Maxse (private), 24 Nov.

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 23 the long shadow of war: sir edward grey and liberal foreign policy before 1914

1901, Maxse MSS, West Sussex T. Wilson, ‘Britain’s “Moral Queen Mary College, PP5; see 1914, Rumbold MSS, Bod., Ms. Record Office, Chichester, Commitment” to France in also T. G. Otte, ‘“The Winston Rumbold dep. 16; Otte, July Maxse 448. August 1914’, History, lxiv, 212 of Germany”: The British Crisis, pp. 142–3. 23 Min. Grey, n.d., on Goschen (1979), pp. 380–90. Foreign Policy Elite and the Last 62 .Grey to Rumbold (no. 214, to Grey (no. 141), 16 Apr. 33 .Poincaré, notes journalières, 30 German Emperor’, in Canadian secret), 6 July 1914, BD xi, no. 1909, The National Archive July 1914, Papiers de Poincaré, Journal of History, xxxvi, 4 (2001), 32; Lichnowsky to Bethmann (Public Record Office), FO Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, pp. 471–504. Hollweg (secret), 6 July 1914, K. 371/673/14511. Bnfr 16027, fo. 125 r. 49 Z. S. Steiner, Britain and the Kautsky, M. Montgelas and W. 24 Grey to Spender, 19 Oct. 1905, 34 Grey to Haldane, 25 Mar. 1917, Origins of the First World War Schücking (eds.), Die Deutschen Spender MSS, BL, Add. MSS. Haldane MSS, MS 5913. (London, 1977), pp. 255–6. Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 4 46389. This was what Grey had 35 Grey to Spring Rice (private), 50 Hansard, HC (series 1), vol. 22, vols. (Berlin, 1919) vol. i, no. 20. in mind when he emphasised the 22 Dec. 1905, Spring Rice cols. 1977–91 (13 Mar. 1911); also 63 .Grey to Buchanan (no. 264), 8 fact that the convention ‘marks MSS, TNA (PRO), FO Grey to Goschen (no. 89), 14 July 1914, BD xi, no. 39. a change of policy’, to Maxse 800/241; Neilson, ‘“Control the Mar. 1911, FO 371/1123/9827. 64 .Benckendorff to Sazonov (private), 21 June 1904, Maxse Whirlwind”’, pp. 129–30. 51 .Min. Grey, n.d., on Dumas to (private), 26 June/9 July 1914, O. MSS, Maxse 452. 36 Grey to Fitzmaurice, 24 Sept. Whitehead (NA Report no. 20), 4 Hoetzsch (ed.), Die Internationalen 25 Grey, Cannon Hotel speech, 20 1906, Fitzmaurice MSS, Bowood July 1906, FO 371/78/23178. Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Oct. 1905, The Times, 21 Oct. House, EFm 20. I am grateful to 52 .‘Aufzeichnung’ Bethmann Imperialismus, 1st ser., 5 vols. 1905; partially reproduced in The Most Hon. The Marquess Hollweg, 13 Aug. 1909, J. Lepsius, (Berlin, 1931–6) vol. iv, no. 146. Trevelyan, Grey, pp. 90–2. of Lansdowne for granting A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and 65 This consideration provides 26 J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: me access to this collection; F. Thimme (eds.), Die Grosse the context to the exchanges Britain, the Balance of Power and for some of the background see Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 40 on 1 Aug. 1914, tels. Grey to the Origins of the First World War, also K. Neilson, ‘Watching the vols. (Berlin, 1922–7) vol. xxviii, Goschen (nos. 250 and 252), 1 1874–1914 (London, 1999), p. “Steamroller”: British Observers no. 10325; Goschen to Grey (no. Aug. 1914, BD xi, no. 411 and 332, echoing Wilson, Policy of the and the Russian Army before 93), 21 Aug. 1909, BD vi, no. 186. 417; for a fresh interpretation of Ententes, pp. 86–99. 1914’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 53 .Min. Grey, n.d., on tel. Goschen the ‘misunderstanding’ see Otte, 27 Memo. Grey, 10 Jan. 1906, viii, 2 (1985), pp. 199–217. to Grey (no. 94, secret), 21 Aug. July Crisis, pp. 480–5. Campbell-Bannerman MSS, 37 Min. Grey, 15 Apr. 1912, FO 1909, BD vi, no. 187. 66 See the ‘twin’ pieces by K. BL, Add. MSS. 41218; T. G. 371/1493. 54 T. G. Otte, ‘War, Revolution, Neilson, ‘The Russo-Japanese Otte, ‘“Almost a Law of Nature”: 38 Grey to Lowther (no. 434), and the Uncertain Primacy of War and British Strategic Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign 15 Oct. 1908, BD v, no. 383; Domestic Politics’, in R. N. Foreign Policy’, in R. Kowner Office and the Balance of Power, Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, Rosecrance and S. E. Miller (ed.), Rethinking the Russo- 1905–1912’, E. Goldstein and p. 300. (eds.), The Next Great War?: The Japanese War, 1904–5, 2 vols. B. J. C. McKercher (eds.), Power 39 Grey to Bertie (private), 9 Jan. Roots of World War I and the Risk of (Folkestone, 2007) vol. i, pp. and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1912, Grey MSS, TNA (PRO), U.S.–China Conflict (Cambridge, 307–17, and T. G. Otte, ‘The 1865–1965 (London, 2003), pp. FO 800/53. MA, 2015), pp. 106–8. Fragmenting of the Old World 77–118. 40 Tel. Grey to Bertie (no. 445), 55 .Grey to Goschen (private), 5 Mar. Order: Britain, the Great Powers 28 Grey to Morley (private), 3 Nov. 25 Sept. 1912, BD ix/1, no. 745; 1913, BD x/2, no. 465. and the War’, in R. Kowner 1911, Morley MSS, Bod., Ms. Asquith to George V, 2 July 1913, 56 .Memo. Grey, 25 May 1914, BD (ed.), The Impact of the Russo- Eng. d. 3574. CAB 41/34/24. x/2, no. 512; for a Churchillian Japanese War (London, 2007), pp. 29 Grey to Bertie (private), 15 Jan. 41 Grey to Harcourt (private), 10 interpretation see J. H. Maurer, 91–108. 1906, Bertie MSS, BL, Add. Jan. 1914, Harcourt MSS, Bod., ‘Averting the Great War?: 67 .Min. Crowe, 25 July 1914, on MSS. 63018. Ms. Harcourt dep. 442. Churchill’s Naval Holiday’, US tel. Buchanan to Grey (no. 166, 30 Grey to Lascelles (no. 11), 9 Jan. 42 Grey to Spender (private), 24 Naval War College Review, lxvii, 3 urgent), 24 July 1914, BD xi, no. 1906, G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Sept. 1912, Spender MSS, Add. (2014), pp. 25–42. 101. Temperley (eds.), British MSS. 46389. 57 J. Cambon to Doumergue 68 Otte, July Crisis, pp. 495–500; Documents on the Origins of the 43 Grey to Buchanan (private), 30 (no. 51), 4 Feb. 1914, Ministère see also J. C. G. Röhl, ‘Goodbye War, 1898–1914, 11 vols. (London, Mar. 1914, BD x/2, no. 535. J. des Affaires Étrangère (ed.), to all that (again)?: The Fischer 1928–38), vol. iii, no. 229. Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia Documents Diplomatiques Française, Thesis, the New Revisionism 31 See T. G. Otte, The Foreign and the Final Struggle for Central 3rd ser., 1911–1914, 11 vols. (Paris, and the Meaning of the First Office Mind: The Making of Asia (London, 2002), pp. 175–96, 1929–36), vol. ix, no. 220. World War’, International Affairs, British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914 provides some insight into the 58 ‘German–British Convention’, xci, 1 (2015), pp. 164–5. (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 298–302. regional problems. 15 June 1914, BD x/2, no. 249; 69 Temperley interview with Grey, 32 .K. Neilson, ‘“Greatly 44 .Min. Grey, n.d., on memo. T. G. Otte, July Crisis: The 1929, Temperley MSS, private. Exaggerated”: The Myth of the Nicolson (secret), 17 Apr. 1914, World’s Descent into War, Summer 70 Grey to Louise Creighton, 28 Decline of Great Britain before FO 371/2092/17370. 1914 (Cambridge, 2014), pp. Aug. 1914, Creighton MSS, 1914’, International History Review, 45 .Grey to Bertie (no. 249, secret), 1 149–50. Bod., Ms. Eng. lett. e. 73/2. xiii, 4 (1991), p. 704; see also May 1914, FO 371/2092/19288. 59 .Memo. Bertie (on conversation 71 Crowe to Clema Crowe, 6 T. G. Otte, ‘Grey Ambassador: 46 .Memo. Bertie (on conversation with Grey), 25 June 1914, Bertie Aug. 1914, Crowe MSS, Bod., The Dreadnought and British with Grey), 25 June 1914, Bertie MSS, Add. MSS. 63033. Ms.Eng.e.3020. Foreign Policy’, R. J. Blyth, A. MSS, BL, Add. MSS. 63033. 60 For a detailed account see my 72 Grey to Crewe, 29 May 1916 Lambert and J. Rüger (eds.), The 47 Min. Grey, n.d., on Rodd to ‘Detente 1914: Sir William and 2 Feb. 1917, Crewe MSS, Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age Grey (no. 47), 10 Feb. 1909, FO Tyrrell’s Mission to Germany’, Cambridge University Library, (Farnham, 2011), pp. 69–72. The 371/599/6296. Historical Journal, lvi, 1 (2013), pp. box C/17. notion of a binding commitment 48 Grey to Katherine Lyttelton, 175–204. 73 Grey to Katherine Lyttelton, 16 has been effectively refuted by 8 Nov. 1908, Lyttelton MSS, 61 Goschen to Rumbold, 11 July Jan. 1918, Lyttelton MSS, PP5.

24 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 The Liberal Party, the Labour Party and the First World War by Pat Thane

nquestionably the to varying degrees, during or were the large numbers of living- ­Liberal Party emerged immediately after the war. Many in servants and shop workers, and Uweaker from the war, workers, especially trade union- any woman over the age of 30 who Labour stronger. The extent to ists, had enjoyed unprecedented was not a ratepayer or married which Labour gained at the Liber- full employment and improved to a ratepayer. However women als’ expense is harder to judge, but living standards during the war.2 made up a substantial proportion of there are reasons to believe it was They wanted these conditions to the individual membership of the one of the significant factors in continue after the war, supported party, over 250,000 by the late 1920s the Liberal decline. These reasons the reforms and may have trusted – at least half of individual party include the following. Labour to carry on pressing for membership, in some constituen- Labour was represented for delivery. Also Labour were une- cies more.4 It is often argued that the first time in the wartime coa- quivocally in favour of continued women voters were always strongly lition cabinets. In 1915–16 there state action to improve social and biased towards Conservatism, but was just Arthur Henderson, first economic conditions, of the sort there is no clear evidence of this for at the Board of Education, then as that had been successful during the interwar period.5 The refusal paymaster-general; then Hender- the war, whereas the Liberals were of Asquith’s government to grant son and George Barnes in Lloyd more divided on the role of the votes for women before the war George’s war cabinet, although state. Some reform minded Liberals Deep dissen- alienated some women from Liber- Henderson resigned in 1917 over of course switched to Labour dur- alism. On balance, it is likely that the government’s unwillingness ing or after the war, such as Chris- sion within Labour gained votes from the fran- to seek a negotiated peace, while topher Addison. chise extension to the disadvantage Barnes remained in the cabinet Labour agreed a new constitu- the Liberal of the Liberals. until 1920. The trade unionist John tion in 1918 which improved its Deep dissension within the Lib- Hodge was the first minister for the organisation, including for elec- Party con- eral Party contributed a great deal newly formed Ministry of Labour tions. It established permanent to its post-war decline. The fact in 1916–17, followed by George constituency parties with individ- tributed a that a reform-minded alternative Roberts, 1917–19. Labour politi- ual members, whereas previously great deal existed in the form of the Labour cians thus gained experience which membership was only possible via Party, which was growing in perhaps gave them greater credibil- membership of an affiliated organi- to its post- strength and credibility, gave many ity in the eyes of voters. sation such as a trade union or the voters an alternative, assisting the The trade union movement Fabian Society. This assisted it in war decline. long-run decline. grew significantly in numbers and mobilising members more effec- strength during the war, from 4.1 tively to improve its performance The fact that Dr Pat Thane is Research Professor in million in 1914 to 6.5 million in in central and local elections after Contemporary History at Kings Col- 1919.1 Most trade unionists were the war. a reform- lege, London. Her publications include automatically Labour Party mem- The impact of the franchise The Foundation of the Welfare bers. The unions were Labour’s extension in 1918 is hard to judge minded State (2nd ed. 1996). main source of funding and big- because, of course, voting was ger unions meant more funds for secret and there were no opinion alternative 1 David Butler and Gareth Butler, the party and improved capacity to polls at this time. Many working Twentieth Century British Political fight elections. Of course, being a men and women got the vote for existed in the Facts, 1900–2000 (Palgrave Macmil- union member had not prevented the first time, but so also did many lan, 2000), p. 399. men from voting Liberal or Con- middle and upper-class men who form of the 2 J. M. Winter, The Great War and the servative in the past, but Labour’s were not independent property British People (Palgrave Macmillan, clear support for wartime strikes, holders, mainly younger, unmar- Labour Party, 1985). while Asquith was far more equivo- ried men.3 However, the percent- which was 3 Duncan Tanner, Political Change and cal, may have won the support of age of potential electors from the the Labour Party (Cambridge Univer- some trade unionists. manual working class increased growing in sity Press, 1990). Labour Party supporters were from 76 per cent to 80 per cent of 4 Pat Thane, ‘The Women of the Brit- actively and prominently involved an electorate which grew dramati- strength and ish Labour Party and Feminism, in a range of successful social cally from 7 million to 21 million. 1906–1945’ in Harold. L. Smith (ed.), reform campaigns during the war: It is unlikely that all new voters credibility, British Feminism in the Twentieth Century. for rent controls, more and better voted Labour but there was a prob- (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990), p. 125. housing, higher old-age pensions, able advantage to Labour from the gave many 5 Pat Thane, ‘What Difference did the improved maternal and child wel- extended male franchise. Women Vote Make?’ in Amanda Vickery fare, and for the extension of the had at last achieved the vote, but voters an (ed.), Women, Privilege and Power: Brit- franchise to women and to all men. the female franchise was biased ish Politics, 1750 to the Present (Stanford All of these were implemented, against poorer women: excluded alternative. University Press, 2001), pp. 253–288.

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 25 JOHN MORLEY’S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1914

This article supplements the account in Morley of Blackburn1 of John Morley’s resignation from Asquith’s cabinet on the outbreak of war in 1914. Writing such an article is not easy because of the unceasing flow of books and articles about the origins of the war, and the need to maintain a reasonable level of objectivity about an event that, even after a hundred years, arouses powerful emotions. In one of the last articles he wrote before his death, Patrick Jackson analyses the reasons for Morley’s resignation and challenges the views of those who ascribed it solely to his optimism about Germany and his pessimism about Russia.

26 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 JOHN MORLEY’S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1914

ome commentators have no his resounding denunciation of the monarchy’ of Austria-Hungary felt doubt that Britain was right Boer War fifteen years earlier were threatened by militant Slav nation- Sto join France in a war justi- disappointed if they hoped for a alism. Germany feared encircle- fied, despite an appalling cost in similar declaration in 1914. Instead ment by Russia and France. Behind human lives, by the need to safe- Morley opted out of his share of the strident nationalism there was guard Europe from German domi- responsibility for the war by retir- a deep-seated fatalism about the nation, just as it was right to resist ing quietly to the well-stocked inevitable decline of older regimes Nazi aggression twenty-five years library of his home in Wimbledon and their evolutionary replace- later. For those who take this view, Park. Nevertheless in private he ment by rising races, a struggle for Morley’s motives are of little sig- remained certain that he had been the survival of the fittest in which nificance. His inability to recognise right to resign, and that the lead- war played a natural part. Some self-evident truths must be attrib- ers of the Liberal government, par- of the European powers sought uted to declining powers, and he ticularly Asquith and Grey, bore a greater security in alliances that can be written off as ‘yesterday’s heavy responsibility for what had were regarded by the participants man’, an elderly icon of obsolete gone so disastrously wrong. As he as defensive but by opponents as Gladstonian morality who failed told Rosebery in November 1920, threatening. to understand the new realities of amid the clamour over German Britain had traditionally twentieth-century power poli- war-guilt, ‘I do not let go my obsti- favoured a policy of isolation, rely- tics. David Hamer writes almost nate conviction that the catastrophe ing on naval supremacy to avoid despairingly in the Oxford Dic- … was due to three blunderers, the entanglements in mainland Europe, tionary of National Biography that Kaiser and a couple of Englishmen but when the Liberals came to Morley ‘did not even [my italics] whom I’d as lief not name with the power in 1905 the foreign secre- find a casus belli in German aggres- proper adjectives.’2 tary, Edward Grey, inherited Brit- sion against Belgium.’ ish membership of a new entente On the other hand, for those designed to end the imperial rivalry of us who believe that more could The international background with France. Liberals were uneasy have been done in July 1914 to pre- Despite a general rise in economic about the implications of the alli- vent the Balkan crisis from escalat- prosperity during the early years ance between France and tsarist ing into a catastrophic world war of the twentieth century there was Russia, and feared that the strate- (regarded by all the participants as a widespread feeling of insecurity gic conversations between army defensive or preventive), and who as the great powers jostled for com- and naval officers would com- find the case for British involve- petitive advantage and prestige. mit Britain to a policy of hostility ment inconclusive, Morley’s resig- Britain’s vulnerability, as an over- towards Germany. In 1871, after nation raises significant questions. extended maritime empire, had the Franco-Prussian war, Morley Why did he fail to ensure that the been painfully exposed in the Boer had welcomed ‘the interposition cabinet explored the key issues War; and Russia, despite huge nat- in the heart of the European state adequately before reaching its pre- John Morley, 1st ural resources, had been similarly system, of a powerful, industrious, cipitate decision? Why did he refuse Viscount Morley humiliated by Japan. France still intelligent and progressive peo- to speak out publicly against the of Blackburn resented the loss of Alsace-Lorraine ple, between the Western nations war? Admirers who remembered (1838–1923) in 1871, and the ramshackle ‘dual and the half-barbarous Russian

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 27 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 swarms.’3 The following decades the House of Commons that ‘the heard about the assassination. After saw a growing antagonism between two great Empires begin to realize nearly nine years at the Foreign Britain and Germany, but Morley, that the points of cooperation are Office, making him the most expe- like many Liberals, continued to greater and more numerous than rienced foreign minister in Europe, believe that German militarism was the points of possible controversy.’7 Grey was well aware of the precari- a temporary phase better dealt with ous balance of power in the Bal- by conciliation than by confronta- kans. He must have realised that the tion. The tensions reached a climax A wasted month: 28 June – 24 murder of the heir to the imperial in 1911, after a German infringe- July 1914 throne, with the suspected conniv- ment of French colonial pretensions Accounts of the events leading ance of Belgrade, would provoke a in Morocco. Morley urged caution to the outbreak of the war tend violent reaction in Vienna, and that on Asquith, ‘I utterly dislike and to underestimate the seriousness the Austrians would seek a pre- distrust the German methods … of the delay in responding to the liminary guarantee of support from But that is no reason why we should assassination at Sarajevo on 28 their German allies just as the Serbs give them the excuse of this provo- June. Nearly a month of inactiv- would appeal for help from Rus- cation.’4 He recognised the danger- ity followed, with no determined sia. When the crisis finally ended in ous instability of the kaiser, but diplomatic attempts to defuse the a world war, Grey claimed that he argued that ‘the way to treat a man dispute between Austria-Hungary had worked tirelessly for peace; but who has made a fool of himself is to and Serbia before the other major most of his initiatives took place in let him down as easily as possible’.5 European powers were dragged in. the final days of frantic activity that In August 1911, when it emerged In Britain, politicians and the press followed the Austrian ultimatum, that plans had been finalised to were preoccupied by the situation and by that stage they were all ‘too transport British troops to France in Ireland resulting from the mili- little, too late.’ in the event of war, Morley secured tant refusal of Ulster to accept sub- When Grey was warned on 6 a ruling that no firm commitment ordination to a home rule authority July by the German ambassador should be incurred without prior in Catholic Dublin. Lichnowsky that Germany would cabinet approval. During the next A conference of the conflicting support an Austrian attack on Bel- two years Grey encouraged a series parties at Buckingham Palace col- grade he seems to have remained of initiatives designed to relieve lapsed in failure on 24 July. On the complacently confident that the Anglo-German tensions. During following day, when news broke balance of power would work to Haldane’s mission to Berlin in Feb- of the harsh Austrian ultima- achieve a peaceful settlement. Ger- ruary 1912, it became clear that the tum to Serbia, nearly four weeks many could be relied on to restrain Germans would not renounce their after Sarajevo, The Times belat- Austria (rather than urging her to competitive programme of warship edly acknowledged the existence act quickly before Russia was ready building without a reciprocal Brit- of these wider problems: ‘Eng- to retaliate), and France would sim- ish undertaking to remain neutral land cannot suffer the failure of ilarly restrain Russia. Poincaré, the in a continental war. Discussions the Home Rule Conference … to French president, was due to pay a took place over colonial policy divert her attention from the grave crucially important state visit to St when Lewis Harcourt, negotiated Accounts of crisis that has arisen in Europe Petersburg from 20 to 23 July; but with his German opposite number within the last thirty-six hours.’ Grey had no idea whether Poin- an agreement for the partitioning the events John Morley had been particularly caré’s aim was to be conciliatory, or of Portugal’s African colonies in preoccupied by Ireland: the third whether he would be mainly con- the not unlikely event of financial leading to Home Rule Bill was the climax of cerned to stiffen Russian resolve.9 default. The agreement was ini- a political career that had begun A Times leading article on 23 July tialled in October 1913, but not the out- nearly thirty years earlier when expressed the hope that the state published. In June 1914 agreement he had acted as Gladstone’s deputy visit would ‘operate as a salutary was reached on the vexed question break of the in introducing the first home rule warning to the “war parties” in all of the Baghdad railway project: legislation. the great countries against the dan- the Germans agreed to terminate war tend to For many British people Sara- ger of playing with fire.’ the line at Basra and to consult the jevo, and Belgrade the Serbian capi- This reflected Grey’s wish- British government before any sub- underesti- tal, were distant places in which ful thinking. His over-optimism sequent extension. Scholars differ it was hard to detect any direct arose partly from his acknowledged about the significance of these ini- mate the national interest. Many would have success during the previous year, tiatives, but they show that Grey agreed with John Burns, the presi- when he had chaired an ambassa- did not regard Germany as an seriousness dent of the Board of Trade who dorial conference of the six major implacable aggressor with whom of the delay later resigned from the cabinet with European powers (France, Russia, improved diplomatic relations were Morley, when he robustly declared, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy not to be contemplated. Plans for in respond- ‘Why 4 great powers should fight and Great Britain) which achieved a secret mission to Berlin by his over Servia no fellow can under- a provisional settlement of the first private secretary Sir William Tyr- ing to the stand.’8 C. P. Scott’s Manchester Balkan War: the Treaty of London, rell were aborted by the outbreak Guardian took a similar view: Man- signed on 30 May 1913. However, of war,6 but in July 1914 relations assassination chester cared about Belgrade as this diplomatic coup makes it all the with Germany were better than little as Belgrade cared about Man- more surprising that Grey did not they had been for over a decade. On at Sarajevo chester. However none of this pro- reconvene the conference immedi- 23 July (less than a fortnight before vides any satisfactory explanation ately after Sarajevo, in an attempt war broke out) Lloyd George told on 28 June. for Grey’s failure to act as soon as he to secure international agreement

28 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 about the terms that it would be Colonel House had described the Grey was strong supporter of Grey’s policies reasonable to impose upon Ser- European situation to him as ‘jin- and was regularly briefed by Tyr- bia. Instead he waited until 27 July, goism run stark mad.’ Unless some- respected rell. On 29 July a leader (‘Close the when the Austrians were about to one acting for the president could Ranks’) insisted that there could be attack Belgrade (after an ultima- ‘bring about a different under- for the hon- no question of a change in politi- tum that shocked him by its sever- standing there is bound some day to cal control involving the replace- ity) before proposing a four-power be an awful cataclysm.’10 esty of his ment of Grey. This same article ambassadorial conference. Aus- Grey was respected for the hon- emphasised the need to be faithful tria-Hungary and Russia, the two esty of his motives, but he lacked motives, but to allies: ‘England will be found as major powers involved directly the imagination to seek new ways ready to stand by her friends today in the dispute, would be excluded of filling the gaps in the interna- he lacked as ever she was aiding Europe [to] from the conference and thus in tional negotiating machinery. fling off the despotism of Napo- effect subjected to arbitration. Grey Instead he pursued a policy that the imagina- leon.’ However the article reit- explained to the House of Com- seemed sometimes to consist of lit- tion to seek erated that Britain had no direct mons that, as long as the dispute tle more than drifting, hoping for interest in the Balkans, and there had involved only Austria-Hun- the best of both worlds by enjoy- new ways of was as yet no suggestion that Ger- gary and Serbia, ‘we had no title to ing the security of the entente many was the only threat, even interfere.’ When it became obvi- while avoiding its aggressive com- filling the though powerful pressures were ous that Russia would intervene, mitments and seeking to remain being brought to bear to overcome the short time available had forced friendly with Germany. During the gaps in the the ‘pacific leanings’ of the kaiser. him to take the risk of ‘making a final days of July it became increas- By 31 July any remaining balance in proposal without the usual prelimi- ingly clear that the two aims were international the assessment of the situation had nary steps of trying to ascertain incompatible. However, if Grey disappeared: whether it would be well received.’ failed to seize the diplomatic initia- negotiating Unsurprisingly the extraordinary tive during the crucial weeks after We must make instant prepara- proposal was rejected, although Sarajevo, it has to be said that Mor- machinery. tions to back our friends, if they The Times applauded the way in ley and those who were to oppose are made the subject of unjust which Grey had taken such prompt British involvement in the conflict attack. … The days of ‘splendid action, ‘with characteristic indiffer- showed little greater awareness isolation’ … are no more. We ence to considerations of personal of the urgency of the situation. In cannot stand alone in a Europe and national amour propre’. 1911 Morley had spoken out about dominated by any single Power. Of course the powers might the dangerous implications of the have similarly rejected a much entente, but in 1914 he waited until On Saturday 1 August the tone of earlier initiative to recall the full 24 July for Grey to raise the cri- self-righteous emotional conviction six-power conference, but at that sis in the cabinet. The delay was persisted: for Britain this would stage Grey would have had time disastrous. not be a war of national hatred, to consider alternative initiatives. since we had ‘nothing to avenge Perhaps the king might have been and nothing to acquire.’ Our only persuaded to suggest to the kaiser The final days motives were ‘the duty we owe to a conference in Berlin, attended by During the days after 28 July when our friends and the instinct of self- the tsar and the Austrian emperor Austria declared war on Serbia preservation.’ There was no serious with all their senior advisers. and Russia embarked on partial examination of essential questions Although notoriously unpredict- mobilisation, the focus of the crisis such as the exact nature of the sup- able, the kaiser was susceptible shifted with dramatic suddenness posed threat to British interests, to flattery and ambivalent about to the prospect of an impending and the arguments for and against Britain, his mother’s country. As it continental war in which none of British involvement in a continen- was, no attempt was made to take the European powers could avoid tal land war rather than relying advantage of the imperial family entanglement. upon traditional naval power. The relationships until 1 August, when In Britain the shift was espe- absence of any rational discussion the king was awakened by Asquith cially remarkable: by the bank of the case against British participa- in the early hours of the morn- holiday weekend of 1–2 August, tion was partly offset by the pub- ing to send a message to his cousin, when the decision to go to war was lication on the same day of a long the tsar, in a belated and predict- reached, the issue was widely seen letter from Norman Angell (whose ably futile attempt to delay Rus- in terms of Britain’s moral obliga- The Great Illusion11 had strongly sian mobilisation. Another possible tion to support France (and inciden- influenced the international peace initiative during the period imme- tally Belgium) against unprovoked movement) and of a pro-German diately after Sarajevo might have military aggression. The fact that manifesto signed by a group of been to invoke the good offices of France had knowingly placed her- academics. Angell repudiated the the United States President Wood- self at risk by the alliance with suggestion that neutrality would row Wilson, who was to play a key Russia no longer seemed relevant result in dangerous isolation: on role in the setting up of the League except to Morley and a minority the contrary it would mean that, of Nations after the war. When he who still thought in these terms. while other nations were torn and offered to mediate, on 2 August, it The changing perspective can weakened by war, Britain ‘might was far too late, but he might have be seen in successive leading arti- conceivably for a long time be the responded to an earlier approach. cles in The Times. Although nomi- strongest Power in Europe.’ Con- On 25 May 1914, his representative nally Conservative, the paper was a versely British involvement would

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 29 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 ensure the supremacy of Russia to their own positions and the dis- Morley’s and after the 29 July meeting Burns (‘two hundred million autocrati- cussions were patchy and perfunc- reported that when the situation cally governed people, with a very tory, with neither Grey nor Morley account of had been ‘seriously reviewed from rudimentary civilization, but heav- making any serious attempt to win all points of view’ it was ‘decided ily equipped for military aggres- the overall argument. Eventually the cabinet not to decide.’ Grey was instructed sion’), rather than a Germany cabinet agreement, of sorts, was to tell the French and German ‘highly civilized and mainly given reached on the peripheral questions meetings, ambassadors, Cambon and Lich- to the arts of trade and commerce.’ of Belgian territorial integrity and nowsky (both increasingly frus- Behind the scenes, in a series the security of the Channel coast, in his Memo- trated by Britain’s indecision) that of seven cabinet meetings on the rather than on the major questions we were unable to pledge ourselves ten days between 24 July and 2 that had gone unaddressed. randum on in advance ‘either under all condi- August, ministers stumbled con- Morley’s account of the cabinet Resignation, tions to stand aside or in any con- fusedly from the consideration of a meetings, in his Memorandum on ditions to join in.’ However Grey distant crisis that no one regarded Resignation,12 is an essential source is an essen- warned Lichnowsky, without cabi- as calling for British participation, for anyone seeking to understand net authorisation, that if Germany to the prospect of an unprovoked his role; but it is a flawed and frus- tial source and France went to war Britain attack on France about which it was trating record that reads at times might be forced to intervene. difficult for anyone to remain indif- like a later reminiscence. However for anyone It seems to have been at the ferent. By the end of the series of the text was written within a few 29 July meeting that the possible meetings only Morley and Burns, weeks of the events, and cleared seeking to infringement of Belgian neutrality out of a much larger original num- with John Burns, who confirmed was first raised, but Morley insisted ber of dissenters, remained com- its essential accuracy and added a understand that the issue remained secondary mitted to British neutrality. It is passage clarifying his own stand- to that of support for France. In the not easy to follow the process by point. In August 1928, Guy Mor- his role; but final days before the declaration of which this shift occurred, but no ley, who had inherited his uncle’s war, Belgium provided a highly one reading the surviving accounts papers, decided that the work ought it is a flawed emotional pretext for those previ- (there were no formal minutes of to be published. The Memorandum ously opposed to British participa- cabinet proceedings) can fail to be plunges straight into an account of and frustrat- tion, but it remained a peripheral appalled by the inadequacy of the the cabinet meeting on 24 July, the issue. Belgium had not always been discussions. This was supposed to first since Sarajevo at which foreign ing record a popular subject for radical sym- be a mature parliamentary democ- affairs had been discussed. Grey pathies, outraged by Morel’s con- racy facing one of the most critical startled his colleagues by disclosing that reads demnation of colonial atrocities in moments in its history and the fail- the contents of a telegram from the at times the Congo. Moreover no one knew ure to address many of the major ambassador in St Petersburg who whether the German army would questions was lamentable. Asquith reported that Russia and France like a later need to cross more than a corner and Grey must bear the main bur- were determined to react strongly of Belgian territory, and whether den of responsibility, but Morley, to the Austrian ultimatum against reminiscence. the Belgian government would too, failed to ensure that the cabinet Serbia, and that the Russian for- actively resist the invasion rather considered the crucial issues ade- eign minister was calling for Brit- than accepting a German offer to quately. What would be the prob- ain’s support. According to Morley, respect Belgian territorial integrity able outcome if Britain remained Grey announced ‘in his own quiet after the war. neutral? How serious would Ger- way’ that the time had come for the Morley’s account of the cabinet man supremacy in Europe actually cabinet to ‘make up its mind plainly discussions during the last week be? Would it be possible to confine whether we were to take an active of July is spasmodic, and the tone British participation to naval action part with the other two Powers of of his interventions is sometimes rather than sending land forces to the Entente, or to stand aside … casual, almost as if he was tak- the continent? What would be the and preserve an absolute neutrality.’ ing part in an academic debate. He costs of involvement, in financial Morley was relaxed about the cabi- was clearly over-confident about and human terms? Was it right to net’s likely response, and Asquith’s the strength of support for a policy dismiss without further explora- account of the meeting (in a letter of neutrality, and seems to have tion the offers made by Germany to his inamorata Venetia Stanley) had no expectation that the case in an attempt to secure British reported that although Europe was for war would soon prove irresist- neutrality? ‘within measurable … distance of ible. When, on one occasion, Grey It became obvious at an early a real Armageddon … Happily ‘rather suddenly let fall his view stage that the cabinet was dead- there seems to be no reason why … that German policy was that locked. Grey, inhibited by his assur- we should be anything more than of a great European aggressor, as ance that the military discussions spectators.’13 bad as Napoleon’, Morley merely with France had not involved any During the next two meet- replied that although ‘I have no firm commitment, failed to con- ings the impasse remained unre- German partialities … you do not vince a majority of his colleagues solved. After the 27 July meeting, give us evidence.’ This was surely that there was a valid case for Brit- Lloyd George told C. P. Scott that the crucial question upon which ish participation in the forthcom- there could be ‘no question of our Grey should have been challenged. ing war. But he threatened to resign taking part in any war in the first On another occasion Lloyd George rather than concede the demand instance.’14 However Grey contin- ‘furthered the good cause’ by for a declaration of unconditional ued to resist calls for a declaration reporting that leading figures in the neutrality. The two sides held firm that Britain would remain neutral, City and major manufacturers were

30 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 john morley’s resignation in august 1914

‘aghast at the bare idea of our plung- of the day Morley and Burns had shld be wiped out as a Great Power’, ing into the European conflict.’ resigned, but the way in which the as it was for Germany to be allowed However when Morley sought to final decision swung against them ‘to use the Channel as a hostile raise this important question at a seems almost casual with none of base.’ But the employment on the later meeting, Lloyd George replied the critical issues debated. continent of a British expedition- ‘rather tartly’ that he had never said At the morning session Grey ary force was seen by Asquith ‘at he believed it all. At another session conceded that the entente entailed this moment’ as being ‘out of the Morley found his colleagues ‘rather no formal commitment to sup- question.’17 surprised at the stress I laid on the port France, and that Britain was In the Memorandum Morley Russian side of things’: not ‘bound by the same obliga- described a lunchtime meeting tions of honour’ as those that bound of eight or nine cabinet ministers If Germany is beaten … it is not France to Russia. However he who opposed British participation England and France who will reminded his colleagues that, under in the war. These included Lewis emerge pre-eminent in Europe. the terms of the Anglo-French Harcourt, who had organised the It will be Russia … [and people] naval agreement, the French fleet lobby with his usual diligence and will rub their eyes when they had been deployed in the Medi- deviousness, and Lloyd George realise that Cossacks are their terranean, leaving the Channel who was still sitting on the fence. victorious fellow champions coast undefended. After a long Morley offered the waverers a way for freedom, justice, equality of and difficult discussion Grey was to opt out: man … and respect for treaties. authorised to assure an increas- ingly agitated Cambon that the Personally my days were dwin- This little speech has a rather ‘set British navy would provide pro- dling. I was a notorious peace- piece’ flavour, like the riposte when tection in the event of German man and little Englander. My Grey extolled the contribution to aggression in the Channel. At this disappearance would be totally peace of the balance of power. For point Burns resigned (a blow that different from theirs … with Morley this was a euphemism for Asquith took ‘a trifle too coolly’), their lives before them and ‘two giant groups armed to the since he regarded the decision as long issues committed to their teeth, each in mortal terror of the tantamount to a declaration of war. charge. other, both of them passing year Morley was readier to accept it, and after year in an incurable fever of Morley similarly he reported in an oddly Morley left the meeting doubting jealousy and suspicion!’ relaxed way how the cabinet acqui- whether ‘the fervid tone’ of these In contrast the Memorandum doubted esced in Grey’s request to warn colleagues would last: ‘I saw no records John Burns’s uncompromis- Lichnowsky that ‘it would be hard standard bearer.’ But he had few ing stand against British interven- what to restrain English feeling on any doubts about his own position, and tion. Burns saw himself as a trustee violation of Belgian neutrality by during a period of quiet reflection for the working classes, and as such grounds either combatant.’ In fact, a minute at the Athenaeum he cleared his it was his ‘especial duty to dissoci- there were reproduced at the end of the pub- mind before returning for the even- ate myself … from such a crime as lished Memorandum reveals that this ing cabinet. Morley doubted what the contemplated war would be.’ ‘for expect- warning had been given to the Ger- grounds there were ‘for expect- After the 29 July meeting, Burns man ambassador on the previous ing that the ruinous waste and told Morley ‘with violent empha- ing that day, when Lichnowsky attempted havoc of war would be repaid by sis’ that ‘we look to you to stand to draw Grey into formulating peace on better terms than were firm’; but after a similar appeal on the ruin- the assurances, relating to French already within reach of reason and 31 July, Morley ‘was not keen in or Belgian territory, that would persistent patience.’ He compared response as to my taking any lead.’ ous waste secure British neutrality. Grey had the gains of war ‘against the fero- On 1 August there was no real pro- refused to consider any such bar- cious hatred that would burn with gress and the cabinet remained and havoc of gain, and Asquith dismissed this inextinguishable fire, for a whole deadlocked. In Asquith’s account ‘rather shameless attempt … to buy generation at least, between two they came ‘near to the parting of war would our neutrality’ as an example of communities better fitted to under- the ways,’ with Morley still on ‘the ‘something very crude and almost stand one another than any other Manchester Guardian tack’ of declar- be repaid childlike about German diplo- pair in Europe?’ ing that ‘in no circumstances will macy.’16 However Morley noted his we take a hand. This no doubt is the by peace view that it was a pity not to ‘take With a fleet of overwhelm- view for the moment of the bulk of advantage of the occasion for more ing power … when the smoke the party.’ Lloyd George, although on better talk and negotiation … instead of of battlefields had cleared … ‘all for peace’ was ‘more sensible terms than this wooden non possumus.’ England might have exerted an and statesmanlike, for keeping the In his account of the morn- influence not to be acquired by position still open.’ Grey contin- were already ing cabinet, Asquith reckoned that a hundred of her little Expedi- ued to insist that ‘if an out & out Lloyd George, Morley and Har- tionary Forces. … policy of non- intervention … within reach court were still opposed to inter- is adopted he will go.’15 The cru- vention, as were three-quarters This was a powerful message and cial decisions that led to war were of reason and of the Liberal Party in the House if delivered in parliament, or even reached on 2 August – the Sunday of Commons. Asquith listed the in cabinet, it might have provided of a hot Bank Holiday weekend – persistent points on which he was quite clear the leadership which the opponents when unprecedentedly there were what was right and wrong: it was of British participation so con- two cabinet meetings. By the end patience.’ ‘against British interests that France spicuously lacked. But Morley no

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 31 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 longer had the mental or physical playing a last tactical card, rely- failure to explore the German stamina to face the emotional tur- ing on Morley’s vulnerability to offers to negotiate terms for Brit- moil. Instead he returned for the flattery and emotional blackmail to ish neutrality. Many of the speakers evening cabinet and told Asquith of ensure that he did nothing to rock saw Germany as a less serious long- his decision to resign with Burns. the boat. If that was the aim it was term threat than Russia, and they He agreed to remain until after the very successful. were unconvinced by the need to meeting on the following morning, safeguard the territorial integrity Monday 3 August. of Belgium. The underlying cause Morley was anxious not to spoil The closing of the ranks of the war was ‘a deep animosity the occasion of this last cabinet, On the afternoon of 3 August against German ambitions … [a] twenty-eight years after he joined Morley did not go to hear Grey’s mad desire to keep up an impossi- Gladstone’s third government in House of Commons speech in bility in Europe.’ It was not a peo- l886. Asquith paid tribute to Morley which the decision to go to war was ple’s war, but one brought about ‘by as ‘the senior of us all, the one who Morley announced. He would have found men in high places … working in is the greatest source of the moral the cheers from the Conservative secret … [to preserve] the remnant authority of the government.’ He included in benches depressing; but he might of an older evil civilisation which recognised that other members of have been heartened to hear the is disappearing by gradual and the cabinet and many government the Memo- strong case made by some of the peaceful methods.’ The Conserva- supporters in the House of Com- Liberal dissenters, which showed tive Balfour finally wound up the mons shared Morley’s views, and in randum an that Morley’s views on the war proceedings, contemptuously dis- normal circumstances this would were not a personal eccentricity. missing the arguments as ‘the very impose on a prime minister the extraordi- Much of Grey’s speech was devoted dregs and lees of debate.’ Asquith duty to resign. However Asquith to an insistence that he had worked had secured majority support in the said that in the present national nary final untiringly for peace and that, House of Commons, but at a heavy emergency ‘I cannot persuade although Britain was not formally price. myself that the other party is led by exchange of committed by the entente to pro- On the following day, 4 August, men … capable of dealing with it.’ vide armed support to France, there The Times report of the debate was This speech is a reminder that party correspond- was a moral obligation: euphoric. The House of Commons politics remained an important had been ‘at its best’ in its recep- consideration for many members ence with If … we run away from those tion of a speech ‘destined to remain of a Liberal government who were obligations of honour and inter- memorable in the history of the proud of its achievements. On the Asquith, est … I doubt whether, what- world’, and the half-hearted voice previous day Bonar Law had writ- ever material force we might of dissent ‘served but as a foil to the ten to Asquith undertaking to pro- who wrote have at the end, it would be of general unanimity.’ On 6 August, vide Conservative backing for any at midnight very much value in face of the The Times reported that the House measures the government decided respect we should have lost. … of Commons was ‘maintaining its to take ‘in support of France and on 3 August [We should be unable to prevent united front superbly’: when the Russia.’ This could be seen as a the whole of the West of Europe] prime minister announced the res- threat, as well as a promise. begging Mor- falling under the domination of ignations of Morley, Burns, and Morley included in the Memo- a single Power. Trevelyan, ‘nobody showed the randum an extraordinary final ley ‘with all slightest concern.’ Even the Man- exchange of correspondence with Bonar Law assured the govern- chester Guardian, which had cam- Asquith, who wrote at midnight my heart’ ment of Conservative support, and paigned for British neutrality, was on 3 August begging Morley ‘with the only immediate note of dis- muted, although in one of the let- all my heart’ to rethink his posi- to rethink sent came in a brief speech by the ters congratulating Morley on his tion before taking a step ‘which Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald. resignation C. P. Scott said that it impoverishes the Government, his posi- He dismissed the appeal to honour: would have been dreadful if we had and leaves me stranded and almost throughout history statesmen had been ‘dragged into a war for the alone.’ Morley was touched by this tion before similarly justified their crimes. As balance of power without a single uncharacteristically emotional for the special relationship with resignation from those who stand appeal but reiterated the ‘cardinal taking a France, ‘no such friendship … for the older Liberalism.’19 One of difference’ on foreign policy which between one nation and another the most moving of the letters was made his resignation necessary. It step ‘which could ever justify one of those one from Grey: would be easy to judge Asquith’s nations entering into war on behalf final approach cynically. The claim impoverishes of the other.’ My heart is too full of all the that he was being left ‘stranded and the Govern- An attempt by backbenchers misery of the time to let me almost alone’ came oddly from a to extend the discussion was frus- write what I feel. I am choked leader who had maintained party ment, and trated by Asquith’s vague promise with it. But I think of you unity by isolating all those who of a full debate on some later date, with much tender feeling & opposed him, and who could rely leaves me but eventually they secured a two- affection.20 on cross-party support in parlia- hour adjournment debate at the end ment. On 1 August 1914 he had told stranded of the day’s sitting. Many accounts The absence of any trace of trium- Venetia Stanley that ‘we may have pay insufficient attention to this phalism in this letter reinforced to contemplate with such equa- and almost debate, in which about twenty Morley’s resolve not to make things nimity as we can command the loss Liberals spoke forcefully against harder for those left to bear the of Morley.’18 Perhaps Asquith was alone.’ what they saw as Grey’s precipitate brunt of the war. He told Haldane

32 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 that ‘I part from my colleagues in Britain’s involvement in the war in There was Morley (Fairleigh Dickinson Univer- more sorrow than I expected. The 1914 was partly personal: he was sity Press, 2012). pang is sharp.’21 Morley’s stance was old and tired and reluctant to speak no adequate 2 NLS MS 10048 1222. not a heroic one. He had always out against ministerial colleagues 3 Jackson, Morley of Blackburn, p. 49. lacked the last degree of ruthless- of whom he had become fond. But debate, in 4 AP MS Asquith 13, fo. 39. ness necessary for a political career, the failure was also more general. 5 BL, Hirtzel Diary, 5 Nov. 1908. and by 1914 he was too old and tired There was no adequate debate, in the cabinet 6 T. G. Otte, ‘Détente 1914: Sir Wil- to lead a crusade for peace. Even for the cabinet or in parliament, about liam Tyrrell’s Secret Mission to Ger- a younger man it was not easy to the reasons for going to war (par- or in parlia- many’, Historical Journal (March 2013). stand out against the popular war ticularly the case for sending an 7 A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: fever. On 18 August 1914, Morley army to France rather than relying ment, about Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939 wrote to Rosebery, after reading a on naval power). Opponents of the the reasons (1957), p. 126. ‘screed’ in The Times about the war war failed to face up clearly to the 8 Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: A being ‘long and very long’, that ‘the implications of neutrality. It was for going to Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon (Lit- insanity of the hour would have uncomfortable to argue that France tlehampton Book Services, 1971), p. seemed incredible a month ago.’22 should be ‘left in the lurch’ against war (particu- 287. Lloyd George, who up to the elev- a German attack, and those tak- 9 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalk- enth hour had been doubtful about ing such a line needed to make it larly the case ers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 British participation, was soon pro- clear whether they believed that the (Harper, 2013), p. 446. ducing speeches full of stomach- consequences of a German victory for sending 10 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (Allen turning rhetoric: on 19 September were not as serious as suggested. Lane, 1998), p. 153. he professed to envy young people Looking back after a century (much an army to 11 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A their opportunity to share in ‘the of which has been devoted to the Study of the Relation of Military Power glow and thrill of a great move- struggle against Russian domina- France rather to National Advantage (G. P. Putnam’s ment for liberty.’23 Almost para- tion that Morley foretold), it is eas- Sons, 1910). doxically, the appalling level of ier to accept Germany’s leadership than rely- 12 J. V. Morley, Memorandum on Resigna- casualties, instead of raising doubts of Europe as natural and inevitable. tion (Macmillan, 1928). about whether the corresponding But at the time few were willing or ing on naval 13 Michael and Eleanor Brock (eds.), benefits were proportionate, merely able to spell this out, and Morley’s H. H. Asquith – Letters to Venetia Stan- made it harder to admit that the critics were able to portray his opti- power). ley (Oxford University Press, 1988), slaughter might initially have been mism about Germany and his pessi- letter 103. avoided. mism about Russia (although these Opponents 14 Robbins, Grey, pp. 291–2. It is only through occasional ref- views were widely shared) as being of the war 15 Brock (eds.), Asquith Letters, letter erences in the letters written dur- based upon emotional prejudice. 112. ing the war that Morley revealed There is still no clear consensus. failed to face 16 Ibid., letter 110. his feelings. The comradeship 17 Ibid., letter 113. that he had established with John Patrick Jackson was the author of Mor- up clearly to 18 Ibid., letter 112. Burns in the stressful time of their ley of Blackburn, a biography of John 19 MP MS Eng d 3585, fo. l42 resignations was reinforced over Morley published in 2012. This article the impli- 20 MP MS Eng d 3585, fo. 146 the years. On 9 July 1916, Morley was one of the last he wrote before his 21 NLS MS 5910, fo. 253 wrote that he would not soon ‘for- death in November 2014 (see obituary, cations of 22 NLS MS 10048, fo. 70 get your visit here tonight … the Journal of Liberal History 86 (winter 23 John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace angry vision of this hideous war 2014–15)). neutrality. to War 1912–16 (Methuen, 1985), p. … makes me proud that I hold the 165. hand of such a comrade in a great 1 Patrick Jackson, Morley of Blackburn: 24 Morley, Memorandum, p. xi. piece of history.’24 Morley enjoyed A Literary and Political Biography of John 25 NLS MS 5910, fo. 291 being entertained in one or another of Rosebery’s great houses, and he kept in touch with some of his for- mer ministerial colleagues. Some- Liberal Democrat History Group online times he argued with them, but as Website he put it to Haldane in November See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of our activities and publications, guides to archive sources, 1914, the issues were ‘too momen- research resources, and a growing number of pages on the history of the party. (Please note that we are tous … to reduce them to mere cut ciurrently upgrading our website, and there may be some delay in making all content available.) and thrust. It is as if some blasting and desolating curse had fallen over Email 25 the world.’ He wondered ‘whether Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest any war has not been too heavy a way to find out what we’re doing. Fill in the form at: http://bit.ly/LDHGemail. price for its gain – excepting per- haps the American Civil War’ Facebook page which had ended slavery. 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Conclusion Twitter Morley’s failure to explain more A daily posting of Liberal events on this day in history. Follow us at: LibHistoryToday. clearly his motives for opposing

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 33 GILBERT MURRAY v. E. D. MOREL LIBERALISM’S DEBILITATING DIVIDE OVER FOREIGN POLICY

Students of early- twentieth-century British politics have for the most part been more comfortable with domestic-policy debates than with foreign-policy ones. They have been happier distinguishing New Liberal social policies from the Gladstonian variety than differentiating the thinking of the League of Nations movement from that of the Union of Democratic Control. In consequence, they have largely neglected the cleavage that came to the fore during the First World War between liberal-internationalist and radical-isolationist tendencies within the Liberal Party and the damage which that cleavage did to that party. By Martin Ceadel.

34 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 GILBERT MURRAY v. E. D. MOREL LIBERALISM’S DEBILITATING DIVIDE OVER FOREIGN POLICY

rom 3 August 1914 these divergent approaches to for- Feign affairs were respectively personified by Gilbert Murray and E. D. Morel. Murray endorsed Grey’s foreign policy from 3 August 1914; he soon became a leading campaigner for the League of Nations; and he always stayed loyal to the Liberal Party. By con- trast, Morel opposed Grey; within days of British intervention he helped to found the Union of Dem- ocratic Control; and he ended up in the Labour Party. This article therefore asks: how significant was this foreign-policy split of August 1914 for the party’s subsequent decline? The Liberals had long seen themselves as the party of ‘peace, retrenchment, and reform’, the word order being a revealing one; but they had developed two rather different answers to the question of how peace was to be promoted, in which the origins of the Murray– Morel split of 1914 can be detected. The answer that I call radical, and which later became associated with E. D. Morel, stressed the need within states democratically to con- trol the domestic elites and vested interests that benefited from war. It assumed that the people did not so benefit, and so were always a force for peace. It therefore advo- cated popular control of foreign

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 35 gilbert murray v. E.D. Morel: liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy policy. The one that I call liberal, prime minister to espouse the Lib- Previous pages: But in promoting such an and which later became associated eral label, Palmerston, a political left – Gilbert engagement Gladstone held back with Gilbert Murray, doubted that magician who managed to present a Murray (1866– from the crusading enthusiasms any section of the population was chauvinistic foreign policy in such 1957); right to which some radicals had previ- immune from the war-promoting a way as to appeal to the increas- – E.D. Morel ously succumbed and which Palm- cult of sovereign nationalism. It ingly influential radical artisans (1873–1924) erston had often found it useful to therefore promoted internation- who wanted Britain to crusade for exploit. Gladstone presented Lib- alism, and stressed the need to the liberties of Europe against the eralism as a pacific tendency that improve relations among states by despots repressing the 1848 revo- above all repudiated, at least in the promoting commercial links, by lutions. The Peace Society, then rhetorical sphere, the spirited for- agreeing to arbitrate inter-state close to Cobden, loathingly admit- eign policy now claimed on behalf disputes, and by developing inter- ted that Palmerston was ‘an adroit of the Tories, since Palmerston’s national law. trickster, perfect in the art of moral demise, by the Earl of Beacons- The way in which these radical legerdemain [whom] … straight- field, the former Benjamin Dis- and liberal approaches emerged in away the English people fall down raeli. Gladstone’s condemnation in Britain had been somewhat hap- and worship’. 2 The major foreign- 1876 of Britain’s traditional ally, the hazard. The radical approach was affairs feud of the mid-nineteenth Ottoman Empire, for the ‘horrors’ the first to articulate itself clearly, century was thus within the emer- it was inflicting upon its Bulgarian being a product of the French revo- gent Liberal Party, as the non- subjects, suggested that the Liberals lutionary era. In the 1790s the radi- interventionist Cobden clashed would pursue morality in foreign cal thinkers William Godwin and repeatedly with the ultra-interven- policy rather than realpolitik. This Thomas Paine had blamed war on tionist Palmerston, not only over was confirmed during the 1879–80 monarchs and aristocrats, and had the Don Pacifico affair in 1850 and Midlothian campaign by Glad- argued that republicanism – what the Crimean War of 1854–6, but stone’s sustained attack on ‘Bea- would later be called democratic also over the bombardment of Can- consfieldism’ – his short-hand for control – would achieve lasting ton in 1857, following which Cob- Tory jingoism, imperialism, and peace.1 But they had disagreed den brought Palmerston down in raison d’etat. about how best to promote repub- the House of Commons, though Gladstone’s intense yet pacific licanism: Godwin abhorred war, the Cobdenites were trounced by rhetoric enthused in particular except possibly in self-defence, so the Palmerstonians at the ensuing some newly enfranchised artisans would promote republicanism only general election.3 and helped to bring them into the in a pacific way; yet Paine was a By 1865, the year in which the Liberal fold. I stress that I am talk- crusader who hoped that Revolu- polarising antagonists Cobden and ing here of rhetoric, and recognise tionary France would win its war Palmerston both died, artisan and that it was belied in office by, in against Britain, so as more quickly other enthusiasm for crusading had particular, the occupation of Egypt to bring about a republic here. somewhat subsided. Liberalism’s in 1882. Yet when this rhetoric The liberal-internationalist new leader, the political moralist was confronted by the Lord Salis- approach did not fully set out its William Gladstone, now gave his bury’s more judicious playing of distinctive stall until the 1830s and party a clearer foreign-affairs iden- the imperial defence card, it did not 1840s, its emblematic figure being tity.4 Ever since his days as a High perform well electorally, as some Richard Cobden, free-trade cam- Church Tory, before he became a Liberals soon realised. Indeed, as a paigner and spokesman for the Peelite and thereby migrated into generalisation, progressive rhetoric Manchester School. His dismissal of the Liberal Party, Gladstone had has fared less well in the interna- much military spending as outdoor approved of the Concert of Europe tional sphere than in the domestic relief for the aristocracy harked and its management of continen- one. Relatively orderly state struc- back to Paine and Godwin. So too tal affairs, and was in consequence tures can be expected to imple- did his hostility to the Concert of much more engaged with inter- ment domestic reforms – or at least Europe, whereby in the name of national politics than Cobden had could be expected to do so prior to Christian legitimacy, as well as been. But Gladstone now grounded the post-cold-war period with its by the logic of realism, the great this engagement, not upon great- increasingly globalised economy powers managed the international power legitimacy and privilege, and its many failed states. It was relations of their continent in the but upon the need to uphold what always less plausible to expect a way that the UN Security Coun- he called ‘the public law of Europe’. relatively anarchic international cil was later supposed to manage This was an idealist and supra- structure to do the same, except in those of a wider world. Cobden’s national idea, though like almost all especially fortunate zones of peace suspicion of elitist diplomacy of his Liberal contemporaries Glad- such as western Europe during the this kind was expressed in his early stone stopped short of proposing last six decades. In late-nineteenth- cry of ‘no foreign politics’. But his an international organisation to century Britain, as mass opinion more constructive policies of cre- develop that public law and impose became more important because ating economic interdependence it upon states. Without repudiat- of suffrage extension, and moreo- through free trade and of inserting ing Manchester School thinking, ver became so at a time of imperial arbitration clauses into all interstate Gladstone thus moved liberalism competition and social-Darwin- treaties heralded a new and more away from the non-interventionist, ist thinking, an idealistic, pacific positive liberal internationalism. little-England ethos that Cobden rhetoric could seem implausible. Ironically, Cobden’s princi- had imbued it with, and towards an In the 1890s a ‘Liberal Imperialist’ pal political bugbear was the first internationalist engagement. faction therefore emerged within

36 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 gilbert murray v. E.D. Morel: liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy

Liberalism that regarded Gladsto- kind.5 Born in Australia in 1866, he whom he accused of deliberately nian rhetoric as a political handicap. was at a young age drawn to teeto- obstructing him in order not to Indeed, the opposition of a radical talism and animal welfare in reac- offend their Belgian ally. Given the section of the Liberals, soon dubbed tion to his father’s alcoholism and fanaticism and self-obsession that ‘pro-Boers’, to the South African his class-mates’ cruelty. Arriving in troubled even his admirers, it is War helped to lose the party the England aged 11, just as Gladstone hard not to speculate about a psy- ‘khaki election’ of 1900. limbered up for his Midlothian chological link between Morel’s When, largely as a result of Tory campaign, and being sent for a clas- intense hatred of the entente cor- disarray, the Liberal Party returned sical education to public school and diale and his unhappy Anglo- to government in December 1905 Oxford, he espoused both partisan French background. He vented his under Campbell-Bannerman, Liberalism and cultural Hellenism, anti-entente (and therefore inevi- domestic circumstances proved which fused in his mind as a single tably pro-German) feelings in a conducive to its ‘New Liberal’ civilising mission. They were fur- well-researched book, Morocco in reform programme, which revived ther entrenched when in his early Diplomacy, which appeared in 1912, the party’s ideological confidence. twenties he both married into the the year he also became prospec- But external circumstances, par- Whig aristocracy and became a tive Liberal candidate for Birken- ticularly the German threat, were professor of Greek. A supporter head. And, unsurprisingly, he too ill suited to its traditional exter- of Irish home rule and female suf- favoured British neutrality when nal-policy watchwords, peace frage, he was in Liberalism’s pro- the European war broke out on 28 and retrenchment. In this area of Boer camp, though, revealingly, he July 1914. policy, the Liberal government disapproved of J. A. Hobson’s Impe- The split between Murray and inherited two commitments from rialism: a study, when he was sent it Morel came on 3 August 1914 when its Tory precursor. The first was in draft, disputing its radical cri- Murray was present in the gallery to out-build the expanding Ger- tique that the pandering of an elitist of the House of Commons to hear man fleet, which eventually forced government to financial interests the speech by Sir Edward Grey, a it to abandon retrenchment. The had caused the war. Thereafter tour de force of halting anti-rhet- second was to nurture an entente Murray’s political interests were oric that won over many Liberals with France, which was eventually During these mainly in domestic affairs, though to the cause of British interven- supplemented by one with Rus- he became senior member of the tion, which duly took place the sia. Gladstonians worried about years both Oxford War and Peace Society, following day. Murray felt sympa- the abandonment of retrench- formed in February 1914 to support thy for a fastidious Oxonian from ment and the confrontation with Gilbert Mur- the work of Norman Angell, whose an old Whig family struggling to Germany. And the radicals on the recent best-seller The Great Illu- do the right thing, and became left of the party, though no longer ray and E. D. sion had argued a neo-Cobdenite Grey’s apologist, making two con- troubled by monarchical or aristo- Morel were case; and after Austria-Hungary tributions to OUP’s Oxford Pam- cratic power, were suspicious of the declared war against Serbia on 28 phlets 1914 series, and publishing a behind-the-scenes influence of both among the July Murray initially campaigned short book, The Foreign Policy of Sir the elitist Foreign Office (which for British neutrality. He thus Edward Grey, in 1915. Even so, Mur- they suspected of secretly practis- many Liberal had good reason to claim, look- ray still regarded himself as pro- ing an entangling diplomacy for ing back a few months later: ‘We peace. Despite supporting the war, its own professional satisfaction) critics of Grey Radicals had always worked for he championed the cause of con- and the arms trade (which obvi- peace, for conciliation, for mutual scientious objectors. And he sup- ously had a vested interest in war). and Asquith, understanding’.6 ported the movement for a League Both Gladstonians and radicals E. D. Morel was a difficult man of Nations, the institutionalisation feared that – given the dreadnought though it whose Liberalism was of the stri- of Gladstone’s public law of Europe. race, the ententes, Grey as foreign dent, alienated, and populist kind.7 The League of Nations Society, secretary, and Asquith as Camp- would have Born in 1873 to a French father, established in May 1915 attracted bell-Bannerman’s successor – the who had died when he was 4, loyal Asquithians like Murray who Liberal Imperialist faction had cap- been possi- and an English mother, who had had reluctantly accepted British tured foreign policy. For their part, quarrelled with her in-laws and intervention but took seriously of course, Grey and Asquith saw ble to predict returned to Britain, he became a the justification for that interven- themselves as upholding the public shipping clerk in Liverpool, and tion as a war that would end war. law of Europe against a militarist that Mur- later wrote trade-related arti- Many patriots regarded post-war threat in a fashion of which all Lib- cles for the local press. Learning projects like a League of Nations as erals should approve. ray might through this work of the mal- ‘pacifist’ distractions from crushing During these years both Gil- be won over treatment of his Congolese sub- Prussianism; and the mainstream bert Murray and E. D. Morel were jects by the king of the Belgians, Liberals who mainly comprised the among the many Liberal critics of by the party he in 1904 launched the Congo League of Nations Society did not Grey and Asquith, though it would Reform Association, a one-man want to offend them. So the society have been possible to predict that leadership band which succeeded in having kept its head down until American Murray might be won over by the the Congo Free State removed entry into the war under a pro- party leadership whereas Morel whereas from royal control – a remarkable League president transformed the never would. campaigning achievement. While League project from liberal dream Gilbert Murray was an amiable Morel never pulling this off, Morel developed to prospective reality. After April man whose Liberalism was of the an almost paranoid loathing of 1917, therefore, realists sought to sensitive, well-connected and elitist would. British and French policymakers, adapt it to their own purposes,

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 37 gilbert murray v. E.D. Morel: liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy some of them calling for the imme- it, becoming the UDC’s principal ‘declinists’, who see Liberalism as diate formation of a League on the driving force. destined to lose working-class sup- basis of the wartime alliance against Though one of the UDC’s port even if the First World War Germany. When the League of demands was for an international had not taken place, and ‘cata- Nations Society rejected this, a council, which has sometimes been strophists’, who believe that a going separate body, the League of Free equated with a League of Nations, political concern was destroyed by Nations Association, was founded Morel envisaged this merely as a the particular events of 1914–18. in the summer of 1918, to press for public forum through which diplo- My instincts are declinist: I find an immediate League, without macy could be made un-secret and it hard to interpret Britain’s class- Germany. The sudden ending of therefore democratically account- based partisanship, which seemed the war in the autumn rendered able. He never wanted a collective so deeply entrenched from the 1930s the disagreement between the two security organisation of the kind to the 1980s during which time a League associations moot, enabling favoured by the League of Nations majority of the working class iden- them to merge in November 1918 Society, and even more so by the tified with Labour, as in a sense as the famous League of Nations League of Free Nations Associa- accidental. Union. Murray played a crucial tions. Indeed, Morel came strongly Already by the First World role: he had been a vice-president to dismiss the international organi- War, the Liberals had alienated of the League of Nations Society; sation eventually established at enough trade unionists and work- he was chairman of the League Geneva as another diplomatic ing-class would-be politicians of Free Nations Association; and device for entangling his country in for the Labour Party to become he became chairman also of the conflicts that did not concern it. a significant force even on a lim- merged League of Nations Union, During the first half of the war ited suffrage. The Gladstonian which was within a decade to put the UDC had been a controversial party’s preoccupation with home down deeper roots in civil society The Mur- body. But it steadily gained accept- rule for Ireland and dislike of sec- than any other peace association, in ance as war-weariness developed, tional legislation had held it back Britain or elsewhere.8 ray–Morel particularly after the tsar’s abdica- from helping the trade unions By contrast, Grey’s speech prob- tion raised doubts as to Russia’s per- when important court judgements ably reinforced E. D. Morel’s neu- split thus severance with the military effort. started going against them in the tralism; and, within six days of It found the British labour move- 1890s. In addition, particularly Britain’s declaration of war on 4 reflected two ment increasingly fertile soil for its after Salisbury had astutely made August, Morel helped to create the propaganda during 1917–18. Morel single- rather than double-mem- First World War’s most influen- longstand- thereby became such a thorn in the ber constituencies the norm from tial peace association, the Union of British government’s side that he 1885, the Liberals failed to adopt Democratic Control (or UDC, as ing cleavages was gaoled for a fairly technical working-class candidates, except it soon became known). As its title within Lib- breach of the Defence of the Realm in the handful of wholly proletar- indicated, the UDC was a radi- Act. The UDC’s historian, Mar- ian constituencies, such as mining cal organisation, which implicitly eralism. One vin Swartz, rather cruelly observed districts, where ‘Lib-Labs’ were blamed British secret and elitist that, parted from his UDC follow- indeed chosen. Politically ambi- diplomacy, as much as German mil- was an ideo- ers, Morel suffered ‘malnutrition tious workingmen had mostly itarism, for the conflict.9 Professing of the ego’; but, having been given therefore been forced to look else- not to be a stop-the-war organisa- logical cleav- the prison system’s punitive ‘second where. The consequence was the tion, it called for an eventual peace division’ regime, he also suffered Labour Representation Commit- settlement that reflected demo- age between physically – indeed he suffered so tee of 1900, which, thanks in part cratic wishes and therefore avoided palpably that when Bertrand Rus- to an electoral pact unwisely con- annexations and indemnities. internation- sell was similarly convicted he ceded by the Liberals, overtook Morel’s three UDC co-founders made sure of being placed in the the Lib-Labs to become the Labour were: Ramsay MacDonald, who alist engage- first division. Party following the 1906 elec- stood down from the chairmanship The Murray–Morel split thus tion. Labour was thus entrenched of the Labour Party in opposition ment of a reflected two longstanding cleav- in the Commons before New Lib- to British intervention; Charles ages within Liberalism. One was eral policies could signal to work- Trevelyan, who resigned as a Lib- Gladstonian an ideological cleavage between ingmen that the post-Gladstonian eral junior minister; and Norman internationalist engagement of a party was interested in social Angell, whose Neutrality League variety, rep- Gladstonian variety, represented by reform. And the industrial unrest had been the most dynamic element Murray, and little-England isola- of 1911–12 signalled to many work- within the eight-day campaign to resented tionism, represented by Morel. The ers that the Liberals were a party keep Britain out of the European by Murray, other was a sociological cleavage of bosses. The union ballots under conflict.10 Arthur Ponsonby, a Lib- between mainstream Liberal loyal- the 1913 Trade Union Act all eral MP, was also involved from and little- ism of a respectable kind, embodied went in favour of paying a politi- the outset, but did not go public at by Murray, and anti-establishment cal levy to Labour. For declinists, this stage. The UDC was widely England iso- radicalism of a ‘trouble-making’ therefore, the eventual shift from denounced as pacifist; but its radi- kind (as A. J. P. Taylor lovingly householder suffrage to male suf- cal members endured unpopu- lationism, described it),11 embodied by Morel. frage would have clinched Labour’s larity much more stoically than But what part did the split play supplanting of the Liberals even the Asquitheans of the League of represented in the Liberal Party’s sidelining without the First World War. But Nations Society; and the intran- by Labour? This requires me to of course declinists would have sigent Morel positively relished by Morel. touch on the controversy between expected a slow death of Liberal

38 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 gilbert murray v. E.D. Morel: liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy

England. They fully accept that the mainstream’s support for what During MacDonald as leader – had joined war dramatically speeded it up. proved to be a messy and protracted the UDC. There was a real prospect Catastrophists see the First British intervention, which Mur- the early that this split over British inter- World War as causing problems for ray represented, undoubtedly made vention would become entrenched the Liberals at the organisational, it much harder than previously to 1920s Morel when Henderson was drawn first ideological, and leadership lev- identify Liberalism with progress. into the coalition government els. Their organisation fell apart Support for the war undoubtedly seemed thus which Asquith formed in May as Liberal agents joined the army tarnished the Liberal brand. 1915 and then into Lloyd George’s and Nonconformist congregations In addition, the Morel faction to have tri- small war cabinet. One important declined, whereas trade unionism helped Labour in two ways. First, as reason why it did not was the war expanded and thereby provided was pointed out by Swartz as early umphed over cabinet’s insensitive treatment of Labour with a stronger institutional as 1971, Labour’s ability to recruit Murray, as Henderson in the famous doormat base. Entering a war, accepting the UDC members gave it a significant incident of August 1917, which led McKenna duties, and introduc- infusion of the workers ‘by brain’ his foreign- to his resignation in order to recon- ing conscription constituted ideo- which it aspired to enrol, as clause struct the Labour Party on a firmer logical challenges to Liberalism, 4 of its new constitution indicated. affairs think- ideological basis and with a broader though Asquith skilfully kept the In particular, the UDC supplied popular appeal. Henderson even resultant resignations to a mini- foreign-policy experts who assisted ing enjoyed wanted to change its name to the mum. Meanwhile, the increased Labour in its rapid transition from People’s Party.12 In reconstructing state control required by the war a single-issue pressure group into a period of Labour, Henderson received Mac- economy was helping Labour’s ide- a plausible party of government. Donald’s cooperation. But these ological cause. The biggest catas- Although UDC members fared hegemony old colleagues could not have come trophe was obviously the leadership disastrously in the December 1918 together as effectively as they did split between Asquith and Lloyd general election, thirty of them whereas had the UDC not provided a policy George in December 1916. The were elected as Labour MPs in which their pro- and anti-war fol- ousting of a leader who had been November 1922, when MacDonald the form in lowers could both enthusiastically dominant during peacetime but resumed the Labour leadership; and support. Setting aside their previ- could not provide inspiration and in due course the UDC’s co-leaders which the ous disagreement about the merits drive in wartime need not in itself – Morel, Trevelyan, Angell, and of intervention, both factions now have been fatal. The Tories sur- Ponsonby – all joined MacDonald League of focused on the need for a peace vived the very similar split of 1940 in the Parliamentary Labour Party. without annexations and indemni- between Chamberlain and Church- The first Labour government con- Nations had ties. As a result Labour ended the ill, a comparison which shows that tained fifteen UDC members, nine been cre- war more united and in a more pos- the behaviour of the ousted prime of them in the cabinet, including itive frame of mind than could have minister was the key factor. Cham- MacDonald not merely as prime ated in 1919 been predicted eighteen months or berlain served under his successor, minister but also – to the distress so previously. And, although the and, by dying promptly, enabled of the excluded Morel, who felt caused ini- public’s patriotic, and therefore Churchill soon to become party entitled to the post – as foreign sec- anti-UDC, mood in the 1918 elec- leader as well. The Conservatives retary. Few, if any, of those transi- tial disillu- tion held Labour back for a parlia- therefore went into the 1945 gen- tioning from Liberal to Labour via ment, by 1922 the party’s UDC eral election in one piece. Asquith the UDC would have done so over sion with policies helped it cash in on the performed neither of these services domestic issues. public reaction against the Treaty for Lloyd George. Instead, he went Secondly, and less commonly Murray’s of Versailles, which had notori- into semi-opposition on the back- noted, UDC thinking helped ously involved both annexations benches, his division of the House Labour heal its own divisions over alternative. and indemnities. of Commons in the Maurice debate the war, which at one time looked During the early 1920s Morel brought about the ‘coupon elec- very serious. The party lost its seemed thus to have triumphed tion’ in which the split between dominant figure when MacDon- over Murray, as his foreign-affairs Asquithians and coalitionists was ald’s opposition to British interven- thinking enjoyed a period of entrenched. And Asquith stayed on tion prompted his resignation. He hegemony whereas the form in as official Liberal leader for another was no pacifist, as he showed when which the League of Nations had decade. By 1922 the Liberals had he allowed his name to be used at been created in 1919 caused initial ceased to be the official opposition a recruitment meeting during the disillusion with Murray’s alterna- to the Conservatives. military crisis of late August and tive. But 1924 proved to be radical For declinists, the Murray– September 1914. MacDonald was isolationism’s last hurrah. Those Morel split was merely another instead a radical isolationist who, joining the first Labour govern- factor speeding an inexorable except during that military cri- ment had to resign their UDC decline. But for catastrophists, sis, believed that British interests membership. Needing as prime every factor that caused Liberal- were not involved in the Euro- minister and foreign secretary con- ism to lose its lustre and Labour to pean quarrel. One of the party’s structively to resolve the Franco- broaden its appeal was of impor- most important affiliates, the ILP, German quarrel, MacDonald tance. The Murray–Morel split did also opposed the war, for a mix- came to realise how negative and both. Despite hitching its star to ture of pacifist, radical, and social- biased were the UDC’s isolation- the League of Nations and adapting ist reasons. But most Labourites ism and hostility to France. And, well to the ideological challenges were pro-war, even if some – like within weeks of the government’s posed by the war effort, the party Arthur Henderson, who replaced fall, Morel, whose health had been

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 39 gilbert murray v. E.D. Morel: liberalism’s debilitating divide over foreign policy lastingly damaged in prison, died From the the inter-war period: ‘if a Liberal Relations’, in Peter Ghosh and Law- suddenly. Without his fanati- knocked on your front door to can- rence Goldman (eds.), Politics and cal commitment the UDC faded mid-1920s, vass, then there was a fairly high Culture in Victorian Britain: Essays in fast; and an attempt to commit it probability that when asked what Memory of Colin Matthew (Oxford to blanket opposition to League of therefore, the Liberal Party stood for, this University Press, 2006), pp. 74–94. Nations sanctions caused a dam- earnest man or woman would talk 5 For Murray, see Duncan Wilson, Gil- aging split in 1928. By then, pub- Murray’s about “Peace” and the League of bert Murray OM, 1866–1957 (Oxford lic hopes for peace had come to Nations prior to anything else.’15 University Press, 1987); and Francis be focused on Geneva; and, with mainstream- From the mid-1920s, therefore, West, Gilbert Murray: A Life (Croom Gilbert Murray still chairing its Liberal for- Murray’s mainstream-Liberal for- Helm, 1987). executive committee, the League of eign-policy approach triumphed 6 Cited in Martin Ceadel, ‘Gilbert Nations Union rapidly supplanted eign-policy definitively over Morel’s radical Murray and International Politics’, in the UDC as the country’s princi- alternative. But the Liberal Party Christopher Stray (ed.), Gilbert Mur- pal peace association, collecting approach was by then too far gone institu- ray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre and more than 400,000 annual subscrip- tionally to benefit from this final International Politics (Oxford Univer- tions at its organisational peak in triumphed triumph. And Morel’s foreign-pol- sity Press, 2007), p. 223. 1931 and even more remarkably icy-led defection had contributed 7 The authoritative source for Morel’s persuading 38 per cent of the adult definitively significantly to the speed of this life is Catherine Cline, E. D. Morel population to take part in its pro- institutional failure. 1873–1924: Strategies of Protest (Black- League pseudo-referendum, the over Morel’s staff Press, 1980). Peace Ballot, in 1934–5.13 Liberal Martin Ceadel is Professor of Politics at 8 The foundational work on this sub- internationalism thus became intel- radical the University of Oxford, and Fellow of ject is Henry Winkler, The League lectually hegemonic: even Tories New College, Oxford. of Nations Movement in Great Britain, such as Baldwin had to pay lip ser- alternative. 1914–1919 (Rutgers UP, 1952). See also vice to the League; and Churchill 1 Martin Ceadel, The Origins of War Donald Birn, The League of Nations linked his rearmament campaign Prevention: the British Peace Movement Union 1918–1945 (Clarendon Press, to the internationalist cause rather and International Relations, 1730–1854 1981); Martin Ceadel, Semi-Detached than to that of go-it-alone patriot- (Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 36–40. Idealists: The British Peace Movement ism. Labour had to stop dismissing 2 Herald of Peace, August 1862, p. 86. and International Relations, 1854–1945 Geneva as a league of capitalist vic- 3 Martin Ceadel, ‘Cobden and Peace’, (Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. tors, and – despite a wobble in 1933 in Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan 7; and Helen McCarthy, The Brit- – were steered towards collective (eds.), Rethinking Nineteenth-Century ish People and the League of Nations: security by Arthur Henderson.14 Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicententenary Democracy, citizenship, and internation- The declining Liberal Party saw Essays (Ashgate, 2006), pp. 189–207. alism, c.1918–45 (Manchester Univer- the League as its own special cause. 4 Martin Ceadel, ‘Gladstone and a sity Press, 2011). As Richard Grayson has noted of Liberal Theory of International continued bottom of next page

Letters Emlyn Hooson and the Graham should have mentioned defending as a junior he showed Falklands war the comment of Labour peer, Hugh a charm when addressing a jury J. Graham Jones’ article on ‘Emlyn Jenkins – Lord Jenkins of Putney which was accompanied by a twin- Hooson, Voice of Montgomery- – who spoke immediately after kle in his eye. shire’ ( Journal of Liberal History 86, Emlyn: ‘My Lords, your Lordships On one such occasion I was sent spring 2015), continues his excellent have just listened to what was to me by my principal to ‘instruct’ him work on Welsh Liberal history. perhaps the most remarkable speech at a trial at Denbighshire Quarter He mentions Emlyn’s remark- that I have listened to since I had Sessions. I saw at first hand all these able speech against the Falklands the privilege of joining your Lord- qualities. While the jury was out, war, made in the House of Lords ships’ House.’ his instructions to me were to go to when the conflict was at its height Michael Meadowcroft his car (a beautiful Rover 90) many and when there was considerable times to see from his car radio if the pressure on politicians to close Torrington by-election result was ranks and to support the British Emlyn Hooson and the law yet declared. This was in 1958. The forces. It was all the more impres- I read with interest the article on fortunes of the party came a very sive because it came from a distin- Emlyn Hooson. I think Graham close second. guished Liberal lawyer rather than Jones has not understood him prior Quentin Dodd from a kneejerk left-wing Labour to his taking silk and becoming a speaker. serious politician. When he was

40 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 New from the Liberal Democrat History Group British Liberal Leaders Leaders of the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats since the Great Reform Act

Edited by Duncan Brack, Robert Ingham and Tony Little

The British Liberal Party, and its successor, the Liberal Democrats, has a good claim to be the oldest political party in the world. From the Whigs of 1679 to the formation of the Liberal Party in 1859, and then to 1988 and the merger with the Social Democratic Party to form today’s Liberal Democrats, politicians of all these labels held to a core of liberal principles: the belief in individual liberty; the quest for an equitable society at home and abroad; and the pursuit of reform, in the economic and social spheres as well as the political, with the aim of enlarging freedom for all.

This book is the story of those parties’ leaders, from Earl Grey, who led the Whigs through the Great Reform Act of 1832, to Nick Clegg, the first Liberal leader to enter government for more than sixty years. Chapters written by experts in Liberal history cover such towering political figures as Palmerston, Gladstone, Asquith and Lloyd George; those, such as Sinclair, Clement Davies and Grimond, who led the party during its darkest hours; and those who led its revival, including David Steel, Roy Jenkins and Paddy Ashdown. Interviews with recent leaders are included, along with an analysis of the characteristics required to be an effective Liberal leader.

Liberal Leaders will be available in September, as part of a series of three books, published by Biteback, examining the leaders of the three major British political parties.

British Liberal Leaders will be launched at the Liberal Democrat History Group’s fringe meeting at the Liberal Democrats’ autumn conference in Bournemouth, on Sunday 20 September (time and venue to be confirmed in the autumn issue of the Journal).

The book will be available at a special discounted price to subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History: £20.00 instead of the normal £25.00. Copies will be available at the History Group’s stand in the conference exhibition at Bournemouth or ordered via our website, www.liberalhistory.org.uk.

9 Harry Hanak, ‘The Union of (Hull Academic Press, 1996). McKibbin. Cultures, and Politics: Essays on Democratic Control during the 10 Martin Ceadel, Living the Great 13 Martin Ceadel, ‘The First Brit- British History for Ross McKibbin First World war’, Bulletin of the Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1972– ish Referendum: The Peace (Oxford University Press, 2011), Institute of Historical Research, 1967 (Oxford University Press, Ballot, 1934–5’, English Historical pp. 247–62. 36 (1963), pp. 167–80; Marvin 2009), ch. 5. Review, 95 (1980), pp. 810–39. 15 Richard S. Grayson, Liber- Swartz, The Union of Democratic 11 Morel was one of the heroes 14 Martin Ceadel, ‘Arthur Hen- als, International Relations and Control in British Politics during of Taylor’s The Trouble Makers: derson: An Evolving Liberal Appeasement: The Liberal Party, the First World War (Clarendon Dissent over British Foreign Policy Internationalist among Labour 1919–1939 (Frank Cass, 2001), p. Press, 1971); Sally Harris, Out of 1792–1939 (Hamish Hamilton, Little-Englanders’, in C. Clare 139. Control: British Foreign Policy and 1957). V. Griffiths, James J. Knott, and the Union of Democratic Control 12 I owe this information to Ross William Whyte (eds.), Classes,

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 41 Lloyd George and Churchill

David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill were the two most important political figures in twentieth- century British political history, a status that derives substantially but not wholly from their positions as war leaders.1 Comparing their experiences in the First and Second World Wars raises questions which go beyond the matter of who had the greater personal leadership ability. It n Britain, there has already failing to articulate this view them- provides us a lens with been published a flood of books selves. In fact no such consensus Isurrounding the hundredth does exist. Given that fact, the Brit- which to examine anniversary of the war’s outbreak, ish government may well have been and there has been a great deal right to insist that the officially key issues such as state of public discussion. Gary Shef- sponsored centenary events should capacity, civilian– field has claimed: ‘Like all wars, it involve commemoration but not was tragic, but it was certainly not interpretation. military relations, futile.’2 Max Hastings has argued: Nevertheless, it is true that the ‘The [British] Government has not Second World War tends to be the relationship uttered, and apparently does not seen in Britain as ‘the good war’, between parliament plan to utter, a word about the vir- in contrast with the First World tue of Britain’s cause, or the blame War, which, even if it is not viewed and the executive, and that chiefly attaches to Germany exclusively negatively, is certainly for the catastrophe that overtook much more contested. On this the construction of Europe.’3 These historians seem basis it is hardly surprising that, in historical memory. By to suggest that there is a historical Britain, Churchill is viewed over- consensus that the Germans were whelmingly positively whereas Richard Toye. chiefly at fault in 1914 and the gov- Lloyd George fails to benefit from ernment is being pusillanimous in having been ‘The Man Who Won

42 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Lloyd George and Churchill as War Leaders

the War’. Undoubtedly, First World Lloyd George and Churchill were George’s failure to protect him. War revisionists are correct that the already closely associated with According to the diary of Lord ‘lions led by donkeys’ caricature is one another in the public mind Reading, ‘W. says [he] has always unsatisfactory. Still, there a risk in on account of their political alli- supported L.G. through thick & going too far in the opposite direc- ance that developed after Churchill thin but L.G. has now made his tion. An understanding of the war joined the Liberals from the Con- dispositions in such a way as to based on the works of the poets servative in 1904. To their political bring Winston down’.7 Around this Robert Graves and Wilfred Owen opponents during the Edward- time Churchill wrote to a friend: is obviously insufficient. But a per- ian constitutional crisis, they were ‘Between me & Ll G tout est fini.’8 spective that simply discounts their peas in a pod – dangerous quasi- Another telling comment was viewpoint is obviously wrong too. socialists determined to stir up class made by Churchill in January 1916, It is quite right to point out that hatred for their own political ends. when he was serving on the West- millions of people in 1914 regarded Long after they had gone their dif- ern Front, having temporarily the conflict as a fight for national ferent ways politically, they were withdrawn from politics but hop- honour, but that does not mean that still lumped together by those ing to make a comeback. He wrote we, too, are bound to accept that who distrusted them. Talking pri- to his wife that, although Lloyd verdict, which at any rate oversim- vately in 1937, Stanley Baldwin, George would not be sorry if he, plifies the way the public related the Conservative prime minister, Churchill, were killed, he would to the war. Vocal patriotism could repeated with approval a saying he find it politically inconvenient. combine with subtle acts of resist- had heard: ‘L.G. was born a cad and Therefore, even though her own ance to authority. never forgot it; Winston was born a severe criticisms of Lloyd George’s This article’s comparison of gentleman and never remembered personal disloyalty had much merit, Lloyd George and Churchill as it’. In the same year Neville Cham- she should stay in touch with him war leaders will consider firstly berlain referred to them as ‘These all the same – because he stood to their interactions with one another two pirates’.5 be useful in the future. Yet at other throughout their careers, but par- But in spite of the perception moments the claim that political ticularly during the two world that they were thick as thieves, the conflict had never descended into wars, and secondly their capaci- relationship between the two men personal acrimony was politically ties as military strategists and their was not always warm and com- convenient for both Lloyd George attempts to enforce civilian control fortable. They themselves created and Churchill; hence, in part, their of the military. a powerful mythology that sug- displays of comradeship and protes- ‘L.G. was gested that, as Lloyd George put tations of mutual devotion. it in 1936, ‘in spite of the fact that This does not mean that we The personalities of Lloyd born a cad we have fought against each other should treat their relationship cyni- George and Churchill on many occasions there has never cally. Rather, we must be alive to We may begin by noting that the and never been an occasion when I could not its paradoxes. After Lloyd George two men had very different per- call Mr. Winston Churchill my succeeded Asquith as prime min- sonalities. Lord Hankey, the most forgot it; friend and I think that he could do ister in 1916, he brought Church- influential civil servant of the age, Winston the same’.6 In fact, Lloyd George ill into his coalition government summarised the difference between and Churchill did not always feel as soon as he judged it politically Lloyd George and Churchill as fol- was born a affection towards one another, and safe to do so. As minister of muni- lows: ‘Imagine the subject of bal- at crucial moments the relation- tions, he may not have shown as loons crops up. Winston, without gentleman ship broke down. One such crucial much originality and flair as Lloyd a blink, will give you a brilliant moment came when Churchill’s George had previously done in hour-long lecture on balloons. and never career hit the rocks in 1915 as the the same role. But Churchill did L.G., even if he has never seen you Gallipoli disaster unfolded. After demonstrate both efficiency and before, will spend an hour finding remembered Asquith demoted Churchill from creativity and, furthermore, he out anything you know or think his position at the Admiralty, the demonstrated a growing political about them.’4 When war broke out, it’. latter complained bitterly at Lloyd maturity. He largely kept his head

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 43 lloyd george and churchill as war leaders down and got on with the job at problem in the summer of 1940 itself to save the world’. In contrast, hand, and there were fewer flare- was the upsurge of popular anti- he makes a persuasive case that in ups with Lloyd George than there Chamberlainite feeling, but when fact Britain was ‘a first-class power’ had been previously. Still, Church- he wanted to – as a quid pro quo for with impressive technical and sci- ill resented his exclusion from the getting Chamberlain’s agreement to entific capacity and a position as ‘an war cabinet, and during the four Lloyd George entering the war cabi- industrial giant which remained years of the post-war coalition the net – he could pull strings to get the at the heart of the world’s trade’ relationship again showed its char- press campaign stopped, ‘like turn- – the idea that she was pacificistic acteristic alternation between con- ing off a tap’.10 and poorly prepared was a myth. flict and cooperation. Key issues To a much greater extent than He also makes a convincing effort included the Russian civil war, the Churchill, Lloyd George was to show why it was that the opti- conflict in Ireland, British policy obliged to improvise his own mistic narratives that accompanied in the Middle East, and the 1922 machinery of government. The the end of the war were in time Chanak crisis (which triggered Ministry of Munitions has already supplanted by ‘declinist’ ones that Lloyd George’s fall from power). been mentioned. After Lloyd suggested that Britain had at best After the collapse of the coali- George entered 10 Downing Street muddled through against its more tion the two men’s paths diverged there was a further wave of inno- technically sophisticated German politically and, during the 1930s, vations. These included the intro- opponents.13 Lloyd George was of consider- duction of a prime ministerial Here we may digress for a ably less political relevance than secretariat, a small executive war moment to reflect on two diary Churchill was, even though cabinet, and an array of new min- descriptions, one of Lloyd George both were ‘in the wilderness’. As istries under ‘men of push and go’ in the First World War, and one of Churchill campaigned against the such as Sir Joseph Maclay, the ship- Churchill during the Second World dangers of Nazism, Lloyd George ‘Lloyd George ping controller. There was also now War. The second of these is well made the gross error of visiting a gradual move towards an efficient known but the first is not. It is from Hitler and showering him with was find- system of food rationing. Some the journal of Cecil Harmsworth, fulsome praise. In spite of clear dif- of these developments had been a Liberal MP, who was the brother ferences between the two men, ing his way anticipated under the previous gov- of Lords Northcliffe and Rother- Churchill was still tainted in ernment, and did not all take place mere. In his entry for 22 May 1918, some people’s minds by his past through an overnight. There were further cri- Harmsworth reflected his experi- links with Lloyd George. In his ses to come. Yet, as Churchill later ences working in Lloyd George’s novel Men at Arms, Evelyn Waugh untried field’, wrote, the ‘vehement, contriving, prime ministerial secretariat: recounts the hero’s reaction to the resourceful, nimble-leaping Lloyd political changes of 1940: ‘Guy noted Walter George seemed to offer a brighter Those anxious radicals who knew of Mr Churchill only as a Layton, who hope, or at any rate a more sav- have imagined Ll.-G. as domi- professional politician, a master of age effort’ than the staid Asquith nated in Cabinet by the reaction- sham Augustan prose, a Zionist, an had been a regime.11 The era of ‘wait and see’ ary Tories – Curzon, Milner advocate of the Popular Front in was at an end. & Bonar – have been strangely Europe, an associate of the press- Ministry of ‘Total war’, it should be said, mistaken. On the few occa- lords and of Lloyd George.’9 was not a fact but an aspiration, sions that I have been present at Munitions which was arguably never fully Cabinet the Wizard has ruled realised, even by 1918. (The fail- the roost with no appearance The experience of the two official dur- ure to implement conscription of challenge from any quarter. world wars in Ireland is clear evidence of When, too, he has been absent in Let us now turn to what Lloyd ing the First this.) Nonetheless, the achieve- France or elsewhere it has been George and C did as war leaders. ments were considerable; during interesting to observe from the To understand this fully we should World War. the Second World War Church- Cabinet ministers how many compare the strengths and weak- ill was able to benefit from lessons decisions have been deferred nesses of their respective positions. ‘Winston that had previously been learned. “until the Prime Minister They both succeeded once-popular ‘Lloyd George was finding his way returns”. He is in truth the life figures who appeared to have failed Churchill was through an untried field’, noted & soul of the party in no merely to prosecute the war with sufficient Walter Layton, who had been a conventional meaning of the vigour. Although they were both applying the Ministry of Munitions official dur- expression. His vivid personal- still distrusted by significant sections ing the First World War. ‘Winston ity prevails in the Cabinet room of opinion, in both cases their pre- lessons of Churchill was applying the les- as in the world outside. […] miership appeared more or less inev- the first war sons of the first war and adapting An easier chief to work with itable. Both then had to deal with a a highly developed apparatus of in some respects it would be dif- predecessor viewed by loyalists as and adapt- government.’12 ficult to find. He is wholly unaf- the ‘king over the water’ – although This coincides with the argu- fected & unspoilt by enormous in this respect H. H. Asquith was ing a highly ments that David Edgerton has success. I knew him slightly in more problematic to Lloyd George made in recent years. He argues the dark days of the Boer War than Neville Chamberlain was to developed that the now-dominant view of when he was certainly the most Churchill. Chamberlain of course Britain’s role in the conflict is one unpopular man in England. I see remained in Churchill’s cabinet, apparatus of that suggests that the country was no change in his manner now whereas Asquith insisted on stay- ‘a faltering power in 1940, which in when he is, I suppose, the most ing outside. Actually, Churchill’s government.’ one last heroic gesture bankrupted popular man in the whole great

44 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 lloyd george and churchill as war leaders

Alliance. I have often spoken to very able, but felt under no obliga- It might be shadow. But by the same token him more directly than I dare to tion to tell anyone else what he was he was able to learn from him, my brother N. [Northcliffe] &, doing. The earlier ‘Curragh inci- better to say although without imitating him whether he has agreed with me or dent’ (of March 1914), for example, slavishly. not, he has never resented any- was symptomatic of a wider crisis that Church- thing I have said. The experience of civil–military relations which […] of the other members of the Churchill simply did not face. ill was the Conclusion Secretariat has been the same.14 When Churchill perceived that Lloyd George’s executive man- generals such as Claude Auchinleck greater geo- agement of the war effort was in Contrast that with the second of were underperforming or failing to many ways very successful but this our entries, written by General Sir communicate he simply got rid of political (not was combined with a ‘presidential’ Alan Brooke, Chief of the Impe- them. We may do more than haz- military) political style that tended to mar- rial General Staff (CIGS) from ard that Lloyd George’s problems ginalise parliament.17 Churchill 1941 onwards, who repeatedly in this regard were connected to strategist, undoubtedly found criticism very denounced Churchill’s behaviour the Irish issue, which in itself was irritating but to his credit he did in his diary. In 1944 Brooke wrote: also much more problematic for the but that not attempt to run away from it. British government as a whole dur- He made a point of answering par- He [Churchill] knows no details, ing the First World War than dur- Lloyd George liamentary questions even when has only got half the picture in ing the Second. However irritating he could have delegated the task to his mind, talks absurdities and and inconvenient Irish neutrality had a more others. His willingness to answer makes my blood boil to listen was in 1939–45 it was nothing com- ‘as humbly as if he had been the to his nonsense. I find it hard to pared to the problems caused by the creative and youngest of Under-Secretaries’ remain civil. And the wonderful 1916 rebellion and its aftermath. endeared him to MPs: he carried thing is that ¾ of the population During the worst periods of the inventive out the task ‘dutifully, carefully, of the world imagine Winston Second World War, Churchill was subserviently’.18 Unlike Lloyd Churchill is one of the great repeatedly urged to take the Lloyd vision of the George during the First World Strategists of History, a second George small war cabinet model War, he did not isolate himself from Marlborough, and the other ¼ as his own. In April 1941, Lloyd power of the Commons but took pains to have no conception what a pub- George argued in the House of present himself as its servant. lic menace he is and has been Commons for a ‘real War Council’. the wartime But if in some ways Church- throughout this war. […] With- Churchill, he said, was ‘a man with ill’s war leadership was superior out him England was lost for a very brilliant mind – but for that state. to that of Lloyd George, it was a certainty, with him England very reason he wanted a few more Lloyd George’s own experience has been on the verge of disas- ordinary persons to look after him’, and efforts that helped make that ter time and again. […] Never independent people who would possible. It seems impossible to say have I admired and despised a stand up to him. Churchill resisted which of the two men faced a more man simultaneously to the same such calls: difficult job as prime minister – extent. Never have such oppo- which in turn makes it inappropri- site extremes been combined in My right hon. Friend spoke ate to ask which was the greater war the same human being. of the great importance of my leader, as though this were a ques- being surrounded by people tion that could be settled by award- The diary, it should be stressed, was who would stand up to me and ing marks out of ten. The orthodox written in the heat of the moment, say, ‘No, No, No.’ Why, good view is encapsulated in the phrase, and after the war Brooke conceded gracious, has he no idea how ‘Lloyd George was the abler politi- that he had made insufficient allow- strong the negative principle is cian, Churchill the greater states- ance for Churchill’s difficulties. ‘I in the constitution and work- man.’19 This may seem superficially thank God I was given an oppor- ing of the British war-making persuasive but it is perhaps too tunity of working alongside such a machine? The difficulty is not, I glib. It might be better to say that man,’ he wrote.15 assure him, to have more brakes Churchill was the greater geopoliti- Arguably, Churchill was luck- put on the wheels; the difficulty cal (not military) strategist, but that ier than Lloyd George in his com- is to get more impetus and speed Lloyd George had a more creative manders. Brooke and many others behind it. At one moment we are and inventive vision of the power may have been driven up the wall asked to emulate the Germans of the wartime state. by Churchill’s behaviour but they in their audacity and vigour, were not contemptuous of politi- and the next moment the Prime Richard Toye is Professor of Modern cians as a class, in contrast to the way Minister is to be assisted by History at the University of Exeter. He that Henry Wilson, as CIGS dur- being surrounded by a number is the author of three books on Winston ing the First World War, dismissed of ‘No-men’ to resist me at every Churchill, the most recent of which is them as ‘the frocks’ (a reference to point and prevent me from mak- The Roar of the Lion: The Untold their frock coats). Lord Kitchener’s ing anything in the nature of a Story of Churchill’s World War appointment as war secretary in speedy, rapid and, above all, pos- II Speeches (2013). His edition of 1914 was symptomatic of a problem itive constructive decision.16 the Cecil Harmsworth diary, edited that was in evidence well before jointly with Andrew Thorpe, will Lloyd George became prime min- This reminds us that up until this be published next year. ister. Kitchener commanded huge point, if not beyond, Churchill had respect, and was in many ways been operating in Lloyd George’s concluded on page 60

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 45 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16 a new source for the Liberal Party and the First World War

In 2008, the Treasury allocated the Harcourt family papers to the Bodleian Library under the Acceptance in Lieu scheme. The main bulk of this archive had been on deposit and available to researchers since the 1970s, with further groups of papers being deposited in the 1980s.1 This material included most of the papers of the Liberal MP and cabinet minister, Lewis ‘Loulou’ Vernon Harcourt, 1st Viscount Harcourt (1863–1922). Mike Webb reviews the contents of Harcourt’s papers to analyse their value as a new source for the history of the Liberal Party and of the First World War.

46 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16 a new source for the Liberal Party and the First World War

mong his papers were his when he likes, a temper under cabinet meetings, and the absence journals to 1895, and his good control, a hard worker, but of an official diary of cabinet meet- Aofficial and private cor- no-one trusts him, and every- ings (until one was introduced by respondence. In 2008 the Bodleian one thinks that language is only Lloyd George in December 1916) received further tranches of papers employed by him to conceal his makes them all the more impor- that had been retained by the fam- thought. tant as a source. They cover the ily, comprising largely the eight- whole of Harcourt’s period in the eenth- and nineteenth-century In March 1915 he describes Har- cabinet, 1907–16, and they were correspondence of the Harcourt court as: derived from notes taken at cabinet family, and also further papers of meetings. Lewis Harcourt.2 Among these subtle, secretive, adroit, and not As already mentioned, these additional papers of Lewis Har- very reliable or au fond coura- journals did not come to the Bodle- court was his political journal for geous, does not interfere often ian with the bulk of Lewis Har- the years 1905–17 which gives us in discussion, but is fond of con- court’s papers in the 1970s and a new insight into cabinet poli- versing with the P.M. in under- 1980s; though had we but known tics during his time as first com- tones; a hard worker and a good it, we did have a few scraps of the missioner of works, 1907–10, and office chief. diary for 1911 and 1912 in the form 1915–16, and as colonial secretary, of notes on Foreign Office tel- 1910–15, before he lost his cabinet Something of a cloud hung over his egrams. Lewis Harcourt’s papers position with the fall of Asquith in personal life. There is evidence that include fairly comprehensive sets of December 1916. This article looks he was a sexual predator towards printed Foreign Office telegrams, at the journal as a source for Lib- both sexes, though there is nothing though as the Bodleian catalogue eral and coalition politics in the reflecting this in his own papers. It notes, a great many of these are first half of the First World War, seems that his death in 1922 at the ‘wanting’. We now know the rea- 1914–16. age of fifty-nine was quite likely to son for their disappearance from Lewis Harcourt was a curious have been suicide following accu- the sequence. At the head of many figure. He came into politics as his sations of sexual advances towards of the 1914 and 1915 pages of the better-known father’s close and Edward James, an Eton schoolboy.4 journal, Harcourt has written ‘cop- constant companion, acting as his The existence of Harcourt’s ied literally from F.O. Telegrams’; private secretary in the late Victo- journals is hinted at in the Guide to and as well as the journal, the 2008 rian period when Sir William was the Papers of British Cabinet Minis- accession included many other home secretary and then chancel- ters,5 but the authors were told that a loose political papers, one carton lor of the exchequer. He only occa- diary of 1905–15 had been lost since containing a series of the origi- sionally makes an appearance in the 1970s. An obituary in the Daily nal FO telegrams with Harcourt’s the published edition of the diary Sketch relates a story that Harcourt journal scribbled in pencil in the of Charles Hobhouse.3 Hobhouse admitted keeping a secret diary, margins and on the reverse of the gives two brief assessments of cabi- and that it was so full that it would printed pages. These telegrams net members in August 1912 and probably be burned by the public were the ones missing from the again in March 1915. In August 1912 hangman. Lewis (‘Loulou’) sequence already in the library. he said of Harcourt: Before looking at the sub- Harcourt, Harcourt’s journal turned out to stance of the journals, it is worth 1st Viscount be more than just a private record Harcourt has many attractive considering their nature. These Harcourt (1863– of cabinet meetings. Preserved qualities: charming manners are truly first-hand accounts of 1922) in 1911 among its pages are numerous items

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 47 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16: a new source for the liberal party and the first world war of correspondence, notes passed at that about one-half of the whole I said it was inconceivable that meetings and even the odd sketch. is taken up by one person. we should take part in a Euro- Among these is this letter from pean War on a Servian issue, but H. H. Asquith dated 5 October 1916: Harcourt has added the initials still more inconceivable that we ‘WSC’ in case posterity should be should base our abstention on It has been represented to me by in any doubt about who was meant. such a bargain. some of my colleagues that you Harcourt’s political journals are in the habit of taking notes of cover the period more or less con- He adds: what goes on at the Cabinet. tinuously from 1906 to 1917. I have As I have more than once not read through the entire jour- After the Cabinet I had talks pointed out in the past, this is a nal, which runs to twenty-four with several colleagues in order violation of our unwritten law, boxes;7 I have, however, made a to form a Peace party which under which only the Prime more detailed study of the 1914–16 if necessary shall break up the Minister is entitled to take & section in preparing the Bodleian Cabinet in the interest of our keep any record of Cabinet Library’s exhibition, The Great War: abstention. proceedings. Personal Stories from Downing Street I think I can already count Yours always to the Trenches, 1914–1916, which ran on 11. HHA from June to November 2014, and I … If we destroyed this Govt. published several extracts from the to prevent war, no other cd. This of course explains why Har- diaries in the accompanying book.8 make it’. court wrote up the full journal after An idea of their value as a source for cabinet meetings, but he must still the politics of the era can be gained On 29 July 1914 he says: have kept fairly full notes in order by focusing on a few episodes to do this. This letter comes more recorded by Harcourt in the period I am determined not to remain than two years after a warning 1914–16. in the Cab. if they decide to join Harcourt noted in his diary during In July 1914 Harcourt was one in a war – but they cannot so a cabinet meeting in July 1914: of a group of cabinet ministers who decide as I am certain now I can argued the case for Britain’s neu- take at least 9 colleagues. Winston at this point remon- trality in the European war. In his strated with me for taking notes own account he ascribes to him- It is interesting to compare this of Cabinet proceedings, so I self a leading role in galvanising with Hobhouse’s version of events. desisted – the following were a ‘Peace Party’. On the 26 of July, He records that only Harcourt, made from memory later. Harcourt records that he motored Simon and Beauchamp were for over from Nuneham to Sutton unconditional peace. As Patrick Jackson has written in Courtenay to see Asquith: Harcourt’s journal entry for the Dictionary of National Biogra- 30 July 1914 runs to several pages phy,6 Harcourt was quite close to We talked about the probable and makes some important obser- Asquith: not only were they neigh- Austro-Servian War … and I vations on events, among which bours at the cabinet table, but also told him that under no circs. is a record of meetings with sev- on the Thames where the Har- could I be a party to our partici- eral colleagues that day, includ- court seat at Nuneham Courtenay pation in a European War. ‘We talked ing Hobhouse, as part of his peace was across the river from Asquith’s I warned him that he ought campaign: home, ‘The Wharf’ at Sutton to order Churchill to move no about Courtenay. They shared many ship anywhere without instruc- Simon, J. Morley, Hobhouse, social interests, and Asquith and tions from the Cabinet. I have a the prob- Beauchamp, Pease, Runciman, his wife often crossed the Thames profound distrust of Winston’s Montagu, Birrell all been in my to visit the Harcourts. They saw judgment & loyalty & I believe able Austro- room this afternoon – all with eye-to-eye on several of the major that if the German fleet moved me, but Hobhouse with some issues of the day. By contrast, out into the Channel (agst. Servian War reservations as to Belgium (he Harcourt clearly distrusted both France – not us) he would be was of course a soldier). Lloyd George and Churchill. The capable of launching our fleet at … and I told cabinet journal is full of negative them without reference to the As colonial secretary, Harcourt was remarks and stories at the expense Cabinet. him that of course obliged to carry out cer- of both. There are two cartoons The P.M. pooh poohed the tain preparations in case war should by Jack Pease, the education secre- idea – but I think he is wrong under no break out, though he records his tary, among the pages of the jour- not to take this precaution. circs. could reluctance to do so: nal, mocking Lloyd George and Churchill, which were presumably At the next day’s cabinet meet- I be a party Sent special fresh warnings by passed round the table like a secret ing we find Harcourt determined tel. to all Domins. & Cols. to joke in the classroom. Harcourt to resist the slide to war, but we to our par- prevent search – am much afraid carefully preserved an exasperated also learn that this position is not of an ‘incident’ over search on note in the Asquith’s hand dated unconditional. The Germans ticipation in some German vessel … March 1915: attempted to gain British neutrality Lambert of Admlty told with a promise of no annexations in a European me Churchill last night hired I shall some day keep a Cabinet France – she would be content with ‘Acquitania’ (Cunard)? What timetable. I roughly estimate some French colonies: War.’ for? transport of troops to

48 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16: a new source for the liberal party and the first world war

Belgium or for guard ship in ‘War situa- seeking the approval of the House Burns clearly realised the implica- Mersey? also commandeered of Commons, Harcourt’s view was tions of a commitment to defend all coal in South Wales – Car- tion I fear that he should receive a reply, as: the French coast, and was not pre- diff paralysed: he is sd. to have pared to wait for any further Ger- incurred expenditure of over much worse … it helps our Peace friends to man moves: £1,000,000 – he told us at Cab. keep quiet – most important yesterday ‘Precautionary’ tonight. Pray they should do so and we in J. Burns sd. he could not agree stage expenses wd. not exceed Cab. still remain uncommitted to Grey’s formula to Cambon £10,000. I think he has gone God I can so as to strengthen Grey’s hand this afternoon as to German mad. Every room in admiralty diplomatically. fleet attack on Fr. coast and must lighted & men at work when I still smash resign at once – almost in tears. passed at 2 a.m. this morning. I our Cabinet As always though, Harcourt does fear he is carrying his prepara- not trust Lloyd George who, hav- After the cabinet meeting, Har- tions too far & getting prema- before they ing canvassed business opinion, court was at another gathering at turely in the war stage. leant towards non-intervention: Beauchamp’s house in Belgrave can commit Square: And later that day Harcourt records Ll. G. very eloquent agst. our that he declined to send a telegram the crime.’ participation & impressed Cabi- J. Morley, Simon, Samuel, Ll. asking ‘Australia to place her fleet at net – but as he depends on public Geo. also came. We telephoned our disposal … on ground prema- opin. he may wobble over again for Pease, Mc K[innon] Wood & ture, unnecessary & that I wanted in 2 days. Runciman who joined us after initiative to be taken by Australia’. luncheon & discussed plans for The 30 July entry is rounded off With all this, Harcourt is at this afternoon. Beauchamp feels with several interesting statements. stage optimistic that Britain will we were ‘jockeyed’ this morn- Harcourt suggests most overtly stay out of the war: ing over Germ. Fleet; Simon here that he is the moving force in agrees & thinks we ought to the peace party: I feel now that this Cabinet will have resigned with Burns. I dif- never join in this war – though fer as I think the prevention of J. Morley told me this aft. he was several colleagues are uneasy on a German fleet attack & capture prepared to resign at my sig- the subject of our treaty obliga- of French territory on shore of nal, but I don’t think it will be tions about Belgium. Channel a British interest. tomorrow. We agreed to refuse to go As we have seen the journal goes to war merely on a violation of Then: beyond recording cabinet meet- Belg. neutrality by a traverse for ings, and includes references to ad invasion purposes of territory Ld. Bryce has been to me – and hoc gatherings. One such entry but to regard any permanent separately Molteno M.P. on occurs on Sunday 2 August when danger or threat to Belg. inde- behalf of Radicals to ask situa- Simon and Illingworth came to see pendence (such as occupation) as a tion. Both sd. they were confi- Harcourt at 14 Berkeley Square at vital Brit. interest. dent in me and as long as I stayed midnight to ask him to come to see in Cabinet they wd. assume that Lloyd George at 11 Downing Street For Harcourt, then, an attack on peace was assured. I am to let at 10 o’clock the next morning. At France by the German fleet was them know if that situation alters. the meeting were Pease, McKinnon more important as an issue than Wood, Beauchamp, Simon, Runci- an invasion of Belgium, with the The situation did indeed alter, man, Lloyd George and Harcourt caveat that invasion and occupa- though Harcourt does not record himself: tion were to be seen in very differ- the reactions of these colleagues to ent lights. his own change of heart. At the end Settled we wd. not go to war for During the cabinet meeting of of the day’s entry, Harcourt is vio- mere violation of Belgian ter- the morning of 3 August, Harcourt lently for peace: ritory & hold up if possible any records his own intervention: ‘I sd. decision today. gt. advantage if Germany declared War situation I fear much worse 11.0 a.m. Before Cab. Ll. war on us’. The waverers were per- tonight. Pray God I can still Geo. & I went to P.M. & sd we haps now looking for a formula that smash our Cabinet before they represented 8–10 colleagues who would allow them to stay in gov- can commit the crime. wd. not go to war for Belgium. ernment and salve their consciences P.M. listened, sd. nothing. should it come to war. Reporting the cabinet meet- During this cabinet Asquith ing of 31 July, Harcourt begins to There follows an account of the announced the resignations of emphasise the importance of the cabinet meeting held between Burns, Morley and Beauchamp and appearance at least of cabinet and 11am and 1.55pm, and of Churchill acknowledged a split in the party, government unity over individual threatening to resign: saying that it was a consciences. When Arthur Pon- sonby, who was strongly against ‘If Germ violates Belg. neutral- ‘most thankless task to me to go intervention, asked for assurance ity I want to go to war – if you on’. … Simon sd. ‘if country at that no commitments should be don’t I must resign’. J Morley sd. war it was the duty of men like made to France or anyone without ‘if you do go to war I resign’. himself and the Peace party to

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 49 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16: a new source for the liberal party and the first world war

support the Govt.’: he broke ‘I think Ll. ‘two Imperial reasons’, which he Churchill wants to put German down. declined to explain. prisoners on German captured Geo. weak- It is not really possible to say at ships to clear the floating mine It is not entirely clear at exactly this stage what Harcourt’s jour- fields. We refused to allow this. what point Harcourt becomes ening in his nal adds to our understanding of committed to intervention. On 4 Asquith’s government 1914–16. It On the next day, he records that: August 1914, he is still trying to peace “con- certainly provides some new per- rein in Churchill: spectives. As colonial secretary Churchill has ordered all neu- victions” he seems to take a very personal tral fishing vessels to be seized I insisted, and Asq. agreed, that under the ownership of some of the opera- or sunk in the North Sea if sus- orders shd. be sent to our Medi- tions, which is surprising given pected! We told him to cancel terranean Fleet not to fire on impression of his recently recorded convictions. order at once. ‘Goeben’ till we have become Whereas on 3 August 1914 he was at war with Germany. Winston mad popular able to record his holding back on At the cabinet meeting of 7 Sep- was compelled to send these launching any strikes against Ger- tember another lighter moment is orders & at once. enthusiasm man possessions in South West recorded: Africa with the lofty remark to de But Harcourt has clearly already in streets for Villiers Graaf that it is ‘often eas- We laughed when Kitchener made his decision to stand by the ier to take than to give up at end’, proposed … to say that this government, and on the eve of the war.’ by the next day he writes almost was ‘a war against military des- declaration of war we find him enthusiastically: potism’ Ll. Geo. applying this busy playing his part, sending the phrase to Kitchener. [Presum- delayed telegrams to the colonies, I told them I cd. tomorrow ably said behind his back.] and in the thick of discussions about destroy or seize great German possible military strategy: wireless station in Togoland. Sometimes Harcourt records pri- May do so tomorrow. vate conversations, at dinners or Long discussion as to tactics. in private houses. In January 1916 Churchill wants to block And on 6 August 1914, he writes: Harcourt noted a conversation with Amsterdam & mouth of Rhine, Kitchener at York House, where he Asq., Grey & I insisted we wd. German Colonies: I shall take had been invited to help in design- not violate neutrality of Hol- most of them but not Came- ing the war secretary’s garden at land. Our defence of small roons at present. Broome Hall in Kent (Harcourt nationalities our greatest asset. being a keen gardener himself). We insisted on this. The conversation inevitably drifted ~ to the war, and Harcourt notes There is another swipe at Lloyd The brief sketches of personalities down Kitchener’s six-point plan to George: around the cabinet table are one of finish the war by the end of 1916: the most interesting aspects of the I think Ll. Geo. weakening in journal. Kitchener and Winston 1.Offensive by allies in west in his peace ‘convictions’ under Churchill not unexpectedly feature Mar–April with considerable the impression of mad popular prominently. Harcourt records a German retreat enthusiasm in streets for war. Churchillian joke made at the cabi- 2. Offensive by Russia May– net of 18 August 1914: June with similar results The very fact that he can criti- 3. Internal trouble in Germany cise the shallowness of someone Winston said ‘we may have to in consequence and request else’s convictions so readily seems borrow one thousand millions for allies’ terms of peace, to show that he himself now had before the war is over’. Some June–July no doubts about the rights of the laughed & he said ‘It is time we 4. These terms specified and cause, and that he had satisfied his got something out of posterity’. rejected by Germany August own conscience that he was doing 5. Renewed offensive by Rus- the right thing. From now on, he The First Lord and the War Sec- sians, French & British Sept records cabinet discussions and retary feature again in the cabinet and Oct with further success describes his own role in furthering meeting of 31 August: viz retirement of Germans the war effort without any com- beyond Meuse to the Rhine ment or reflection on his former Kitchener says he can’t have War 6. Nov – acceptance by Ger- position. We can only speculate correspondents at the front: give many of terms previously how much the importance of gov- great trouble to Commanders. offered. ernment unity and the threat to Asq. sd. to Kitchener ‘you his own career might have played are thinking of your neighbour’ This was of course the rationale for a part, and we only know from (Churchill) who had great rows the Somme offensive (originally other sources that Morley for one when he was a correspondent in planned for spring 1916), and it all was angry at his abandoning the S. Africa with Kitchener. seems impossibly optimistic in the cause. Esher’s journal records that light of what we know of the battle Harcourt sent an apologetic let- And in a further passage, not which began that summer. ter to Morley, saying that he had recorded by Hobhouse, Harcourt The personal insights that Har- decided to stay in the cabinet for says that: court gives us into the political

50 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16: a new source for the liberal party and the first world war world are highly illuminating, see Bonar Law…to tell him the 1916 when Labour’s refusal to especially at moments of crisis such ropes & teach him his lesson accept a compromise threatened to as the formation of the coalition in words of one syllable. I was break up the government. We have government in May 1915. Now, horrified to find that he con- the image of Curzon coming in clearly we have to take into account templated corresponding direct reeking of chloroform as he had just that Harcourt might have been with Prime Ministers of the had another operation on his elbow. overstating his part in these events. Dominions behind the back of In the debate Harcourt claims that The journal reads in many ways the Gov[ernor]s General, but I he himself pressed home the dan- like a self-conscious preparation for think I got this idea out of his ger that the French would make memoirs. Indeed, in a private let- head. peace if they thought Britain was ter dated 4 March 1916 he refers to not prepared to commit to com- his memoirs which ‘will never be On 8 June the cabinet discussed pulsion (incidentally noting that written’.9 Harcourt includes in the conscription, which Harcourt was they had the Cameroons to bargain journal a detailed account of the against. He gives himself credit for with owing to the British blunder forming of the coalition, written wrecking the Universal Registra- of handing it to France). Grey said at Nuneham on 25 May 1915. He tion Bill. He sat on a committee to it was the most serious crisis since records a conversation with Asquith discuss this proposal and records 2 August; Kitchener was threaten- in which the latter tells him that Long’s complaint that the bill had ing to resign though acknowledg- he deeply regrets having to sac- been destroyed by the committee’s ing that the break up of the cabinet rifice Harcourt (he was moved to proceedings – ‘(he meant by me!)’. would be an ‘appalling disaster’; the Board of Works) and that he On the 17 June Harcourt Bonar Law said that even if he thought it ‘an Imperial disaster recorded an acrimonious debate in accepted a six-week delay to try to that you should leave the Colo- which Lloyd George and Carson persuade the Labour Party (Hen- nial Office and so do most other were against reinforcing the Dar- derson’s proposal), the Tory Party people’. On being told that Bonar danelles expedition, which was would bring the Unionists out of Law is to have the Colonial Office, ‘marching straight to disaster’ in the cabinet. Harcourt then records Harcourt records his own reaction: Lloyd George’s words: ‘Carson sd the meeting as though it were a ‘Good God then Canada & the rest Winston ‘talking nonsense’. Win- play, something he did quite often of the Dominions are to be ruled by ston very angry’. to convey a dramatic quality: Sir Max Aitken’. He explains that In October there is an extraor- Bonar Law is intimate with Aitken dinary copy or draft letter on Now 2.45 and under financial obligation to Office of Works headed paper from Asq. ‘What am I to say in the H him – this was of course the future Harcourt to the prime minister. of C at 3.45’ press baron Lord Beaverbrook, who Marked ‘Secret’, it states: Balfour ‘that the Brit consti- worked to bring Asquith down. tution is bankrupt, that we Asquith then gave his opinion that For God’s sake do not accept have broken down & are unfit Bonar Law would be less danger- 30,000 [conscripts] per week as a to conduct the war & tell the ous at the Colonial Office than at possible number because allies to make the best peace the Foreign Office, and Harcourt a. you cannot get them they can & soon as they can’ joked that ‘It is for you to choose b. you cannot afford them Asq. ‘Am I to say that?’ which part of the Empire you c. new divisions are not doing Balfour ‘It is the bare truth’’. would soonest lose’. At the end of well the account, Harcourt records that d. we cannot arm & officer 70 On 8 June In these extreme circumstances, he asked Asquith if he could remain divisions the coalition agreed to accept Hen- next to him at the cabinet table, and e. after April 1st ’16 we cannot the cabinet derson’s proposals and the crisis Asquith agreed. Harcourt carefully afford to pay for them with was averted for the time being. A preserved a letter from Asquith in other liabilities discussed few days later the Easter Rising the journal, received just before the L.H. 14.10.15. erupted. coalition cabinet first met, in which conscription, There is a great deal that might Asquith apologises for changing his And another letter of the same date be said about the cabinet debates mind about keeping Harcourt next also to the PM states that he thinks which Har- of 1915–16, and I hope that there is to him at cabinet: it ‘very indecent that a civilian enough here to make some kind of minister like Curzon should collect court was judgement as to the value of this On reflection I think Lansdowne (& circulate) opinions from anony- journal as a source. The interest of must sit next me [sic] – sorry mous officers at the front on the against. He the journal seems to me to lie in as I am to part with your close question of conscription’. He ends gives him- its very personal perspective; we companionship. the letter by saying that he thinks have seen how character sketches half the cabinet are mad, but that self credit of the likes of Lloyd George and This is followed by a sketch of the he does not think more than 10 per Churchill add a certain dimension new arrangements at the cabinet cent of the British population share for wrecking to the journal, and the accounts table, with Lansdowne intruded their mania. One has to wonder if of private conversations, particu- between Harcourt and the PM. he ever sent these letters. the Universal larly with the PM and the king, A few days after that first coa- The compulsion issue remained are really fascinating and unique. lition cabinet meeting, Harcourt to the forefront for several months Registration We learn much about the atti- went over to the Colonial Office to, more. There is a particularly vivid tudes of Harcourt and his close as he puts it: account of the cabinet of 19 April Bill. allies to other cabinet members,

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 51 Lewis Harcourt’s Political Journal 1914–16: a new source for the liberal party and the first world war as in January 1916 when at a lunch ‘PM says his Mike Webb is Curator of Early Mod- harcourt-fam-add.html. at Downing Street, Harcourt and ern Archives & MSS at the Bodle- 3 See Edward David (ed.), Inside Asquith discuss the fear of Simon’s opposition ian Libraries. He is the author of the Asquith’s Cabinet: From the Diaries possible resignation at the Home book From Downing Street to the of Charles Hobhouse (John Murray, Office. Asquith felt that Harcourt to female Trenches: First-hand Accounts 1977). was the only man for the job. Har- from the Great War, 1914–1916 4 See James Lees-Milne, The Enigmatic court’s response was that nothing suffrage (Bodleian Publishing, 2014). Edwardian: Life of Reginald, 2nd Vis- would induce him to take it, list- count Esher (Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, ing the factors that would make it is vitally 1 See the Bodleian online catalogues 1986), p. 337. uncongenial, ‘Press Censor, aliens, affected by of Harcourt family papers: http:// 5 Cameron Hazlehurst, Sally White- prisoners camps, capital sentences, www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/ head and Christine Woodland (eds.), police, prisons & above all heavy women’s wmss/online/1500-1900/harcourt-w- A Guide to the Papers of British Cabinet parliamentary work with innu- l/harcourt-w-l.html; http://www. Ministers 1900–1964 (Royal Historical merable bills’. He candidly admits work in the bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/ Society Guides and Handbooks, 19; that his suggestions for alternatives online/1500-1900/harcourt-w-l-add/ Cambridge University Press, 1997). had but ‘one object … to find some war. I said harcourt-w-l-add.html; and http:// 6 Patrick Jackson, ‘Harcourt, Lewis one who is not myself’. www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/ Vernon, first Viscount Harcourt There is an interesting sidelight the only logi- wmss/online/1500-1900/harcourt- (1863–1922)’, Oxford Dictionary of on the conversion of both Harcourt estate/harcourt-estate.html. National Biography, Oxford Univer- and Asquith to the idea of female cal & possi- 2 For the catalogue of the Additional sity Press, 2004; online edn, Jan. suffrage in August 1916. As always, Lewis Harcourt papers, see: http:// 2008. Harcourt gives himself a lead role ble solution www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/ 7 Now catalogued as MSS. Eng. c. in this. If true, it appears to push wmss/online/modern/harcourt- 8264–8271, d. 4173–4188. back the date of Asquith’s conver- is Universal lewis-adds/harcourt-lewis-adds. 8 Mike Webb, From Downing Street to sion, though I have not checked html. For the mainly eighteenth and the Trenches: First-hand Accounts from detailed sources on this: Suffrage nineteenth-century additional Har- the Great War, 1914–1916 (Bodleian court family papers, see: http://www. Publishing, 2014). PM says his opposition to female (including bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/ 9 Bodleian Library, MS Harcourt 446, suffrage is vitally affected by online/1500-1900/harcourt-fam-add/ fo. 79. women’s work in the war. I women).’ said the only logical & possible solution is Universal Suffrage (including women). This upset most of the cabinet, but the PM agreed with me … Grey says this is a criminal waste of time when we ought to be devoting our energies to win- ning the war. Reports I will end with another insight into the fall of Asquith in December 1916 when Harcourt, who of course Among the Fallodonistas fell with Asquith, records his con- versation with King George V on Sir Edward Grey and the outbreak of the First World War the occasion of his ennoblement as FCO/LSE symposium, 7 November 2014 Viscount Harcourt. Speaking of Asquith, the king said: Report by Iain Sharpe

‘I feel his loss very much & I he understandable focus was the only such event, it was cer- stuck to him and fought for him of First World War cente- tainly an impressive and enlighten- to the end, but I fear your Govt. Tnary commemorations on ing one, with speakers including had got a little out of touch with the suffering and sacrifice of those many leading experts on pre-First public opinion, you allowed on the front line has meant that World War European diplomacy. them to push you instead of the political and diplomatic back- The opening speaker was Pro- leading them, and then you had ground to the outbreak of war has fessor T. G. Otte of the University all that d—d Press agitation tended to be marginalised. Even of East Anglia, whose recent book against you’. I said I wondered so, it was a surprise to learn in Pro- July Crisis is broadly sympathetic how long it wd be before North- fessor David Stevenson’s opening towards Grey’s diplomacy. Pro- cliffe turned agst. Ll. Geo. and remarks that the Foreign and Com- fessor Otte commented that Grey that when he did I expected Ll. monwealth Office/LSE symposium has been unlucky in the treatment Geo. wd. close up his papers and ‘Sir Edward Grey and the Outbreak of his posthumous reputation. His shut Northcliffe up. The King sd of the First World War’ at Lancaster critics have been the dominant ‘and a good job too or this coun- House on 7 November 2014 was the voice, from the unfair attacks in try will be ruled only by the only 1914 centenary event to focus Lloyd George’s War Memoirs to his newspapers’. specifically on diplomacy. Yet, if it being voted the worst MP ever in a

52 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 report: among the fallodonistas recent poll. What Otte described as Professor John Kieger of Cam- in London, and rumours of extra- Grey’s ‘aloof and reticent personal- bridge University argued that marital affairs and illegitimate ity’ combined with the destruction while Grey sought to avoid making children. It appears that Grey and of his personal papers has contrib- a specific commitment to France, his first wife Dorothy were soul uted towards this. He argued that the defining moment was the mates without being lovers, and historians have often failed to rec- exchange of letters between the for- she yearned for him to give up poli- ognise the constraints under which eign secretary and French ambas- tics. Dr Smith commented that it Grey laboured. Throughout his sador Paul Cambon in November is interesting to speculate whether foreign secretaryship, he pursued 1912, which divided naval responsi- Grey would have remained at the a diplomatic policy of construc- bilities between the two countries, Foreign Office until 1914 had she tive ambiguity, trying to deter with Britain concentrating on the lived. He expressed scepticism France from provoking Germany, North Sea and France on the Medi- about the cases cited by Michael but warning Germany against bel- terranean. While the prime minis- Waterhouse, in his recent biogra- ligerence towards the French. As a ter, Asquith, claimed that the letters phy of Grey, about possible illegiti- result, in order to win British sup- made no specific commitment and mate children. While men did take port, in 1914 France went to some indeed were ‘almost a platitude’, mistresses, there were rules, includ- lengths not to be seen as the aggres- in Kieger’s view they meant that ing sticking to married women, and sor, even at the expense of greater Cambon had manoeuvred Grey it seems unlikely that Grey would initial losses. into a position from which he could have been caught out three times. Grey was concerned about the not break free in August 1914: Brit- This was reinforced by comments dangers of British isolation: even ain having a moral obligation to from Grey’s great-great nephew, when in opposition he had writ- France which amounted to an alli- Adrian Graves, who said that recent ten privately of the need to make ance in all but name. DNA tests showed no close match peace with Russia to escape the Keith Wilson, emeritus profes- with descendants of three of the problem of always requiring diplo- sor at Leeds University, discussed supposed illegitimate children. matic backing from Germany, for Grey’s relationship with Russia. In the case of Grey’s second which it exacted a high price. Rus- Wilson’s work in many ways pre- wife, Pamela Tennant, Grey cer- sia’s temporary weakness following figured Niall Ferguson’s arguments tainly enjoyed a long and close defeat in the 1904–5 Russo-Japa- about Britain’s reasons for going friendship with her during her first, nese War enabled Grey to conclude to war, in particular claiming that unhappy marriage, although he a treaty in 1907. But he was aware Grey had already committed Brit- was also a close friend of her hus- that this weakness was transient, ain to supporting France and Rus- band, Margot Asquith’s brother and increasing tensions between the sia in the event of war, and stressing Eddy Tennant. Pamela was two meant that Britain might not the importance of Britain’s need to rumoured to have had many affairs have renewed the agreement when conciliate Russia in Asia in order and one of her children, David it expired in 1915. Although Grey to protect the Indian frontier. He Tennant, believed Grey might has been accused of prioritising the highlighted Grey’s assurance to have been his father. David Lloyd entente with France above all else, Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov, Otte argued that he was aware of three weeks before the assassina- the twin dangers of German isola- tion of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, tion and domination. He insisted that friendship with Russia was on British naval supremacy but by the cornerstone of British policy. 1914, with the naval race effectively According to Wilson this gave won by Britain, he sought détente Russia greater leverage over Brit- with Germany based on resolving ain, so that in late July Sazanov was imperial and Near East matters and effectively able to blackmail Grey this was increasingly bearing fruit. by saying that Britain must either Throughout the July 1914 crisis he support Russia or forfeit her friend- was alert to the dangers of conflict ship in Asia. He concluded that this escalating. This is why he sought to imperial dimension, Grey’s belief promote conflict resolution mecha- that peace on the Indian frontier nisms via Anglo-German crisis trumped everything, together with management, an approach that had the impact on the Liberal cabinet of proved successful in the Balkan his threat to resign, was what car- wars of 1912–13. Grey made mis- ried Britain into war. takes, particularly in trying to deal The first afternoon session was with Austria through Germany devoted to Grey’s personal life. Dr rather than directly but, citing the Richard Smith, senior historian at comment of a contemporary writer the Foreign and Commonwealth that ‘diplomacy could only post- Office stressed the apparent con- pone the evil day’, Otte concluded tradictions about Grey: his lack of that ‘Grey’s policy did not bring overt political ambition, his inter- that day forward.’ est in country pursuits and his The next session focused on reputation as a man of high princi- Grey’s relations with the ‘entente ple; versus his long tenure of high powers’, France and Russia. office, spending much of his life

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 53 report: among the fallodonistas

George thought Grey’s untainted Professor let France be crushed. During the July to be ‘the most formidable doc- personal reputation too much to July Crisis itself, for Grey the fact ument I have ever seen addressed bear and made references in his Clark dis- of Germany transgression of Bel- by one state to another’ and, as the papers to Grey not being found out. gian neutrality was important for crisis progressed, he did not really Dr Smith concluded that there are cussed the convincing those in Britain who consider the justice of the Austro- elements of Grey’s private life, as doubted the wisdom of war. Pro- Hungarian demands – he contin- well as his public life, that are des- contradic- fessor Mombauer concluded, how- ued to view the crisis through the tined to remain an enigma. ever, that British ambiguity did lens of the entente. For example, he The next speakers considered tions of not affect the outcome of the cri- believed that it would be difficult Grey’s relations with the Central sis. Other countries took decisions to persuade Russia not to mobilise Powers, with F. R. Bridge, emeri- Grey’s career: regardless of what was decided in when Austria-Hungary was mobi- tus professor at Leeds University, London and Britain’s role was less lising, while failing to consider that and Professor Annika Mombauer the fact that decisive than British diplomats the latter’s mobilisation was only of the Open University discuss- his policy liked to think. against Serbia, whereas the former’s ing Austria and Germany respec- The July Crisis was the specific was against Austria-Hungary and tively. Professor Bridge stressed was opposed focus of the lecture by Christopher Germany (and therefore by impli- the extent to which Grey’s prestige Clark, newly appointed Regius cation more provocative). None- in the country and reputation for by many of professor of History at Cambridge theless, Clark acknowledged the honesty and integrity enabled him University. Professor Clark began constraints that Grey faced, includ- to overcome radicals in the cabi- his Liberal by coining the term ‘Fallodonis- ing the reality that in foreign policy net. Grey rejected the idea of try- tas’ (after Fallodon, Grey’s North- the building blocks are not of one’s ing to build friendship with Austria colleagues umberland home) to describe the own making, that his influence because he did not want Germany assembled company. Like Richard over his entente partners was lim- to be isolated. At the same time, and sup- Smith earlier, Professor Clark dis- ited and that he could not know if he feared Russia being drawn into cussed the contradictions of Grey’s his own cabinet would ultimately the orbit of the Triple Alliance, ported by his career: the fact that his policy was support him. Clark concluded that which would leave Britain isolated. opposed by many of his Liberal there was no evidence that clearer So he tried to preserve the balance Conservative colleagues and supported by his signs from Grey to Germany would of power, believing that Europe Conservative opponents; his aura have changed the course of the cri- could be divided into two diplo- opponents; of engaging in politics out of duty sis. On the question of the decision matic groupings without being at not ambition, yet becoming foreign to intervene, it was hard to fault the war. The London Conference after his aura of secretary only as a result of conspir- argument of his speech to parlia- the Balkan Wars appeared to vindi- atorial planning. ment on 3 August 1914. cate this approach, but according to engaging in Through his recent bestselling The final panel session included Professor Bridge, it destroyed Aus- politics out work, The Sleepwalkers, Professor contributions by Zara Steiner tria’s confidence in diplomacy, with Clark is known for arguing against (author of many works on pre-1914 Serbia doubling in size and look- of duty not the primary German responsibil- diplomacy, including Britain and the ing to add to its territory. Although ity for the outbreak of war, and his Origins of the First World War), Grey’s he criticised Grey’s ‘insouciance’ ambition, yet book is quite critical of Grey. To the biographer Professor Keith Rob- during the July Crisis, his greater ears of this audience member, his bins and Professor T. G. Otte. Dr charge was that by prioritising becoming comments at the conference repre- Steiner stressed the extent of Grey’s good relations with Russia above sented a slight softening of attitude independent-mindedness: in 1905 all else in the preceding years, Grey foreign sec- towards Grey. He acknowledged he was firmer than both his Lib- had already alienated Austria. that the pace of change in European eral Imperialist colleagues Asquith Annika Mombauer was rather retary only diplomacy was stepping up in the and Haldane in negotiations with less critical of Grey and placed years before 1914, with the Italo- Campbell-Bannerman. Despite his responsibility on Germany for the as a result of Turkish War and the Balkan Wars. reputation for being on the right of outbreak of war. She pointed out He acquitted Grey of any charge of the Liberal party, he was in domes- that even before taking office, Grey conspirato- failing to take the news of the assas- tic politics firmly Liberal: in favour in a famous speech of November sination in Sarajevo seriously. For of labour interests and women’s 1905 had spoken of the need for rial planning. example, on 5 July Grey warned suffrage. As foreign secretary, his rapprochement with Germany, France of the need to calm things views were independent of his offi- provided this did not compro- down, and he warned the German cials, who have wished for a clearer mise good relations with France. ambassador, Lichnowsky, that Brit- commitment to France. Grey Unfortunately, détente was only ain’s relations remained good with believed in Britain having ententes possible if both sides wanted it its entente partners and later made rather than alliances and pursued and Germany felt strong enough clear that Britain would find it hard his own policy. repeatedly to reject British over- to stand aside and watch France be Keith Robbins, whose 1971 tures. Although relations began to crushed. biography remains the most improve after the 1911 Agadir Cri- At the same time, Clark authoritative study of his Grey’s sis, Germany wanted more than remained critical of Grey’s atti- life, focused on aspects of his per- Britain could give, namely a guar- tude towards Austria-Hun- sonality that are often ignored. He antee of neutrality. In 1912 Grey gary. Although acknowledging stressed the importance of Grey’s had pointed out to Germany that that some of the dual monarch’s physical vigour. While the focus is although Britain’s hands were not demands against Serbia were fair, often on his interest in birdwatch- tied they could not stand aside and Grey still considered its note of 23 ing and fly-fishing it is too easy

54 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 reviews forgotten that he was also a real might have left an open-minded were prepared to ‘put up a quar- tennis champion. Robbins also audience member more sympa- ter of a million’. Quite how this defended Grey against criticism thetic to Grey by the end of the transaction was to be put into effect about not travelling or speaking day than at the start; however, he was not explained, but Sir Walter’s foreign languages: pointing out is destined to remain an elusive and assessment on this occasion of ‘a that Grey was always at his desk, controversial figure. It is unfortu- clever incompetent person without unlike modern foreign secretar- nate that the 1914 commemorations any sense of proportion’ does not ies who ‘travel all the time and did not include more events of this seem wide of the mark.2 do nothing’. Robbins stressed the nature, but it remains a consider- What had charmed Sir Walter importance of the influence on able achievement to bring together in 1920 was a preview of the first Grey of the historian and Angli- such an impressive range of speak- volume of Margot’s Autobiogra- can bishop Mandell Creighton, in ers for a one-day event. The organ- phy, published later that year. She particular his essay on the English isers also deserve credit for making had, she admitted, ‘been discreet national character and the sense of attendance free of charge and open about Downing Street’.3 Even so, Grey being groomed as the embod- to members of the public rather what she did write offended many. iment of that character. In a cabinet than restricted to policy-makers, ‘People who write books ought with considerable Celtic influence, parliamentarians and academics. to be shut up’, suggested George Grey was a very English figure and Podcasts of most of the papers V in evident perturbation at the played up to the idea of the sensible given at the conference are avail- prospect of Margot’s forthcoming Englishman. Professor Otte agreed able at: https://audioboom.com/ publication.4 The king’s concerns with Professor Robbins about playlists/1265752-sir-edward- appear to have been justified. He Grey’s Englishness and stressed the grey-and-the-outbreak-of-the- ‘let fly about Margot’, recorded influence of the imperialist and his- first-world-war-podcasts Lord Curzon. ‘He severely con- torian J. R. Seeley on Grey’s gener- demns Asquith for not reading and ation – in particular the belief in the Dr Iain Sharpe completed a Univer- Crewe for reading and passing her importance of British greatness and sity of London PhD thesis in 2011 on scandalous chatter.’5 What His Maj- of Britain being different because it ‘Herbert Gladstone and Liberal party esty would have made of Margot’s was a maritime power. revival, 1899–1905’. He works as an edi- The diary is unexpurgated wartime diaries, The symposium showed how tor for the University of London Inter- edited now by Michael and Eleanor vigorous the debate remains about national Academy and has served as a written in Brock, whose earlier collaboration Grey’s policy and reputation. The Liberal Democrat councillor in Watford made Asquith’s revealing letters to overall impact of the contributions since 1991. the same his young confidante, Venetia Stan- ley, generally available, we can only breathless surmise. This book, covering the period manner, with between the outbreak of war passion as and her husband’s loss of office in December 1916, is certainly of evident as more value to historians than the memoir published nearly a hun- punctuation dred years ago. It has the merit of REVIEWS immediacy, with no evidence that is absent. the author attempted to revise her contemporary judgments in the Margot fre- light of later reflection, though The view from Downing Street she did occasionally add marginal quently comments at a later date. Further- Michael and Eleanor Brock (eds.), Margot Asquith’s Great more, the Brocks reveal the cava- War Diary 1914–1916: The View from Downing Street (Oxford employed lier way in which Margot used her diary as an aide-memoire in the University Press, 2014) underlining writing of her autobiography. But Review by David Dutton an uneasy question remains about – one, two or the diary’s worth as an historical cannot recall ever having characteristics, much misjudged’.1 source. Scholars who have worked had such an entertaining and Over the years that followed, Sir even three on the Liberal Party’s history in Ienjoyable hour’s conversation Walter would have cause to modify lines – to this period, even if they have not with anyone before.’ So wrote Sir his opinions, not least when Mar- used the diaries themselves, will be Walter Runciman, father of the got wrote to suggest that he might drive home familiar with Margot’s style. Her one-time Liberal cabinet minister finance the purchase of a new car letters, often scribbled in pencil, of the same name, after a meeting in for her personal use, as an alterna- her emphasis pepper the surviving private col- 1920 with Margot Asquith, second tive to her husband’s Rolls Royce, lections of her husband’s political wife of H. H. Asquith, then still and when in 1926 she suggested that and some- contemporaries. The diary is writ- leader of the Liberal Party. She was, Walter junior could become Liberal ten in the same breathless manner, judged Runciman, ‘a most like- leader in succession to her husband times her with passion as evident as punctua- able person, perfectly frank and, I and ‘Prime Minister whenever he tion is absent. Margot frequently think, taking into consideration her likes’, providing father and son indignation. employed underlining – one, two

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 55 reviews

‘very quick, hopelessly uneducated but not ultimately convincing.’ and naif’ (pp. 31–2). ‘No cad that Within days, Holt was writing of was ever bred could have made a his suspicions of a ‘dirty intrigue’.6 viler speech’ than Law’s on the gov- Such alternative opinions of ernment’s temporary resolution Asquith cannot be ignored. Lady of the Irish problem in September Tree’s throwaway question to the 1914 (p. 38). His inclusion in the prime minister – shrewd jibe or coalition government after May merely a joke – ‘Do you take an 1915 clearly pained her: ‘I could not interest in the war?’ may have been help watching Bonar Law, and feel- extreme (p. c). But contemporary ing how tragic it was for Henry to observers and later commentators see this third-rate man, who had have judged that Asquith, often called him “liar”, “cheat”, “fraud” – befuddled by drink, probably failed every name under Heaven – sitting to devote himself with sufficient quietly there, wondering which energy to the national crisis and of his followers he would impose certainly did not convince others upon Henry’ (p. 123). Indeed, Mar- that he was doing so. Margot was got clearly held that the formation no doubt sincere in her belief that of the coalition involved the inclu- her husband was irreplaceable. But sion of a lesser breed inside the Brit- there was also a financial dimen- ish government. ‘What have we sion in her concern at the prospect gained by having Lansdowne?’ she of leaving Downing Street. World asked herself, ‘(charming, courtly, war had not curbed her notori- elderly, barren person); Bonar Law? ous extravagance. ‘If the Gov. is (provincial, ignorant, unreliable); going to break’, worried Margot, Austen Chamberlain? (sticky and ‘Where H., Puff, Eliz. and I would correct).’ live … I’ve never had less than 16 In contrast to such political pyg- servants, sometimes more, and my mies, Asquith’s stature was, in Mar- secretary Miss Way’ (p. 229). On got’s eyes at least, almost heroic. another occasion she expressed the or even three lines – to drive home ‘Henry knocks all the others into a hope that, after the war, Asquith her emphasis and sometimes her cocked hat’, she wrote in Novem- might be given Walmer Castle as indignation. But no one can read ber 1914. ‘His calm, sweetness of a residence for life, together with her words in the belief that here temper, perfect judgment, sympa- a generous pension. ‘He deserves was a sound and balanced observer thy, imagination and un-irritabil- everything the King can give him: of the political scene of which her ity have amazed me. I feel proud of of this there are not two opinions’ marriage to Herbert (or Henry, as being near so great a man’ (p. 49). (p. 100). she invariably called him) Asquith ‘Henry was born for this war’, she This book is full of minor gems, made her an intimate witness. The noted just over a year later (p. 222). throwing light on the extraor- Brocks’ own assessment that she And as late as the end of July 1916, dinary domestic bubble within was ‘an opinionated egotist, often she was convinced that ‘Henry’s which the wartime premier oper- inaccurate, the victim of flattery, position in the country and in the ated, not least Margot’s outrageous and occasionally prone to fantasy’ cabinet [was] stronger than it has attempts to influence the conduct is difficult to dispute. But their ever been’ (p. 273). The problem is of many of her husband’s minis- further contention that such dis- that such assessments are a long way ters. Her narrative, however, does advantages are outweighed by her from those of many, perhaps the not always serve to clarify. The advantage – ‘she was closer to the majority, of the prime minister’s account of Asquith’s final removal Prime Minister, and thus to the contemporaries and of subsequent from Downing Street is particu- centre of events, than anyone else’ – historians. Margot’s reaction to larly confusing. ‘I have no time is more open to challenge, not least her husband’s address to the parlia- for anything! I can’t write up my because she was so often mistaken mentary Liberal Party, explaining notes, so jump from date to date’, in her assessments of her husband the formation of the first coali- she confessed, and there is men- and his qualities (p. vii). tion, well illustrates the point. He tion of a separate volume, which Most notably, Margot failed to ‘made the most wonderful speech has not survived, containing ‘every appreciate the erosion of Asquith’s he ever made in his life’, insisted fact of the crisis’ (pp. 311, 297). The position as a wartime leader, still the ever-loyal Margot. When he Brocks’ editorial work is of a high less his inherent disqualifications had finished, ‘there was not a dry quality, though one or two mis- for such a role. She clearly took a eye, he had not only melted but takes have crept in. Jacky Fisher fairly dim view of the majority of moved all his men to the core’ (p. resigned from the Admiralty in her husband’s political contempo- 125). Richard Holt, MP for Hex- May 1915, not March, and it was raries, particularly – though not ham, was among those who were Prussian, not Russian, militarism exclusively – those in the Conserv- less enthusiastic: ‘The PM attended that Asquith condemned in his ative Party. Her dismissal of the an impromptu meeting of Liberal Guildhall speech in November 1914 Tory leader, Bonar Law, was espe- members … and alleged foreign (pp. 99, 302). More seriously, Glad- cially brutal: ‘He is cunning, cau- affairs of an unrevealable character stone’s first Home Rule Bill met its tious and shallow’, judged Margot; as his reason in a speech impressive fate in the Commons, not the Lords

56 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 reviews as suggested. But, if we cannot nec- 1 Elshieshields Tower, papers of Sir outgoing Liberal leader, described essarily accept Margot’s self-assess- Walter Runciman, Sir W. Runciman Grey as ‘the young hope of the ment that she was ‘a sort of political to W. Runciman, 28 April 1920. party’ (p. 72). clairvoyant’ (p. xlvii), there can 2 Ibid., Sir W. Runciman to W. Runci- Though embarrassing party be no doubt that the editors have man 6 November 1926. leader, Henry Campbell-Banner- provided us with a rollicking good 3 Ibid., Sir W. Runciman to W. Runci- man, over his very public support read! man 28 April 1920. for the Boer War, and being one of 4 H. Nicolson, King George V (London, the ‘Relugas Compact’ conspira- David Dutton’s most recent book is 1952), p. 342. tors, Grey’s standing in the Liberal Tales From the Baseline: a History 5 K. Rose, George V (London, 1983), p. ranks ensured that he was offered of Dumfries Lawn Tennis Club 376. the post of foreign secretary shortly (2014) – a new departure for a student of 6 D. Dutton (ed.), Odyssey of an Edward- before the party’s election landslide twentieth-century British politics. ian Liberal (Gloucester, 1989), p. 38. of 1906. Grey accepted and retained the post until 1916. His tenure of the Foreign Office was characterised by closer relations with both France and Russia and a failure to achieve an understanding with Germany. Assessing Edward Grey After outstanding colonial disputes between Britain and France had Michael Waterhouse, Edwardian Requiem: A Life of Sir been settled, Grey, who was given Edward Grey (Biteback 2013) great latitude under both Campbell- Bannerman and Herbert Asquith, Review by Dr Chris Cooper emerged as one of the foremost champions of the Anglo-French he historical reputa- drawing upon fresh sources would entente. Though he inherited this tion of Sir Edward Grey be most welcome. But this reviewer policy from his Conservative pre- T(1862–1933) stands remark- was disappointed. The book offers decessor, he pursued it vigorously. ably high for a man whose efforts little beyond the existing knowl- He sanctioned formal military con- to maintain European peace as for- edge of Grey. Many readers will versations with the French, thereby eign secretary (1905–1916) failed understandably be interested in his enhancing Britain’s moral commit- in August 1914 with catastrophic political career and diplomacy. Yet ment to them whilst managing to consequences. Neville Chamber- fishing adventures and birdsong cultivate crossbench support for his lain, whose similar efforts failed repeatedly interrupt the narrative approach to foreign affairs. twenty-five years later, has not of important events in European Grey’s previous dealings with been afforded such a sympathetic history. Grey’s attachment to the German leaders bolstered his desire hearing. Michael Waterhouse’s country and wildlife should really for an Anglo-French rapproche- biography of Britain’s longest con- have been dealt with separately and ment. Convinced that ‘morals do tinuously serving foreign secre- more briefly. not count’ in German diplomacy tary reinforces the conventional Edward Grey was drawn from (p. 146), he refused to threaten a view of Grey: he strove admirably Whig stock. His most famous blossoming friendship with France to avert the seemingly unstoppa- ancestor was the second Earl Grey, for an agreement with Germany ble drift to war. He is depicted as ‘a prime minister when the 1832 which might have proved worth- first-class Foreign Secretary’ who Reform Act was passed. Grey less. He began warning the Ger- ‘prepared his country for the inevi- entered parliament in 1885 and, man ambassador about Britain’s table’ (p. 375). While Grey was less after establishing himself on the likely participation in a Franco- flamboyant than Liberal contem- imperialist wing of the party, he German war in defence of France poraries such as Winston Churchill became Lord Rosebery’s junior as early as January 1906. During and David Lloyd George, he is well minister at the Foreign Office in the Moroccan Crises of 1905–6 and remembered. The famous words 1892. Yet Waterhouse suggests 1911 Grey threw diplomatic sup- he uttered after the House of Com- that Grey was always a reluctant Waterhouse port behind the French, thereby mons had in effect sanctioned Brit- participant. He served in several strengthening the entente. Linked ain’s entry into war, ‘The lamps are governments only out of a sense is too ready to the Anglo-French accord was going out all over Europe. We shall of duty. Nonetheless, with the for- Grey’s advocacy of closer relations not see them lit again in our life- eign secretary in the Lords, Grey to defend with Russia, particularly granted time’, have been grafted on to Brit- explained the government’s pol- the two powers’ unresolved colo- ain’s national consciousness. This icy and answered questions in the a man he nial issues. This was a formidable was signified in August 2014, on the elected chamber. He had, there- clearly task, not least because many Lib- centenary of Britain’s declaration fore, assumed an important role erals loathed the autocratic tsarist of war, when the lights went out and he filled the post with distinc- admires and regime. Nonetheless, an entente across the UK and candles were lit tion. It was in this capacity that he was signed with Russia in 1907. in their place. made his celebrated declaration in is unwilling Grey then attempted to reach an With the last biography of Grey 1895, outlining British interests agreement with Germany. He was, being published four decades ago, on the River Nile to deter French to mete out however, thwarted in his attempts a fresh study taking account of his- expansionism. Before the turn of to slow the pace of German naval toriographical developments and the century William Harcourt, the criticism. construction and refused to

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 57 reviews guarantee British neutrality in a was never to return to high office, of Birds (1927) is a page and a half future Franco-German war. although he did serve a brief, and long. Even in the midst of the July Following several near misses, largely fruitless, term as Britain’s Crisis the reader learns about Grey’s Grey was unable to avert a general ambassador in Washington and catches, when the author should European war in 1914. After the acted as the Liberal leader in the probably have criticised Grey for assassination of Archduke Franz Lords during 1923–4, despite his leaving his desk in Westminster – Ferdinand, Grey’s previous success failing eyesight. particularly as his diplomacy was in containing the first Balkan War Grey the politician is difficult to arguably overtaken by events. (1912–3) prompted his unsuccessful compartmentalise. Arthur Balfour, Michael Waterhouse has missed attempt to assemble a conference in once remarked that Grey was ‘an an excellent opportunity to con- London in July 1914. Once hostili- odd mixture of an old-fashioned tribute to the historical record in ties began, Britain’s participation Whig and a Socialist’. His imperial- terms of Grey’s career after 1916. in the conflict, though likely, was ist credentials were clear and Grey The sketch reveals little that is new. far from certain. Despite the moral adopted a non-partisan approach to While Grey’s private papers were commitment to France, and to a foreign affairs, which saw a good destroyed shortly after his death, a lesser extent Russia, Britain was deal of support from the Conserva- proper trawl through Hansard, dig- not legally obliged to go to their tive benches. Yet, as Waterhouse itised newspapers and the private aid. The crass German ultimatum notes, he ‘had surprisingly strong papers of leading Liberals would sent to Brussels and the subsequent ties to the radical wing of the party’ have shed considerable light on his violation of Belgian neutrality, (p. 69). This was clear in his support post-1916 career. The main revela- however, helped clarify Britain’s for extending the franchise, land tion is that, despite Grey’s increas- position. Grey’s noteworthy speech reform, the establishment of a fed- ing blindness, he could still catch to the Commons on 3 August 1914 eral United Kingdom, an elected trout! Although Grey was con- ‘carried a united nation into war second chamber and a scheme of sulted by Liberals who held office and solved a ministerial crisis’ (p. national insurance. Grey also sat on during the hectic days of 1931 and 353). But Grey’s career had, by the board of directors for the North 1932, his thoughts on the splinter- now, passed its peak. Once the war Eastern Railway and accepted the ing of the Liberal party, the bank- began, Grey was ‘not a Foreign Sec- need for business and government ing crisis, the formation of the retary for a wartime environment’ to work with, rather than smash, National Government, the cel- (p. 354). He enjoyed little success in trade unions. ebrated ‘agreement to differ’, and foreign policy from 1914–16. After One new departure in Water- his disillusionment with what he receiving a peerage in July 1916, house’s study is the possibility that called the ‘so-called Liberal Party’ he stepped down as foreign secre- Grey may have had a colourful pri- are either barely mentioned or com- tary when Lloyd George became vate life. This is surprising granted pletely ignored. Disappointment prime minister in December. He that he was renowned for his integ- is compounded when one learns rity and straightforwardness in nothing about Grey’s thoughts on public life. While the evidence pre- the League of Nations World Dis- sented is circumstantial, Grey, who armament Conference which began had married the frigid Dorothy in 1932, or the preceding Prepara- Widdrington, may have had extra- tory Commission, particularly as marital affairs and fathered illegiti- Grey was the first president of Brit- mate children. But Waterhouse uses ain’s League of Nations Union and these claims to draw conclusions it was he who coined the maxim about Grey’s political career. His ‘great armaments lead inevitably to ability to ‘justify to himself his dou- war’. This lack of new findings is ble life’, helps explain ‘how he man- unsurprising granted that the select aged to survive so long at the top bibliography implies that no archi- in politics’ (p. 59). The author also val research has been undertaken draws odd parallels between Grey’s and there is little engagement with love of wildlife and his political recent historiographical debates. career. His ‘amazing ability to tame Waterhouse repeatedly picks a very birds and animals’ somehow dem- easy target, in Lloyd George, to onstrated ‘the same sense of trust correct what he deems are common and patience that had stood him so misconceptions. While myths ped- well at the Foreign Office’ (p. 393). dled in Lloyd George’s War Memoirs Waterhouse continually reminds (1933) are identified, the Welsh- his readers that Grey was a pro- man’s apparent amnesia is already ficient ornithologist, lover of well documented. wildlife, reader of poetry, keen Waterhouse’s overall grasp fisherman and gifted sportsman. of the period under discussion is Yet the detail that the author goes unconvincing. He relies on succinct into regarding Grey’s pursuits is studies such as Norman Stone’s tiresome. The chapter entitled ‘The Short History of World War One and Boer War’ is constantly interrupted merely regurgitates the findings with tales from the countryside. of worthy, but dated, studies. To One extract from Grey’s The Charm undermine Lloyd George’s claims

58 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Important notice for Journal of Liberal History subscribers Discounted prices for books and booklets Subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History enjoy discounted prices (usually a 20 per cent reduction) for the books and booklets we publish. With the upgrade of our website, these can now be ordered via our online shop at www.liberalhistory.org.uk/shop. When checking out, subscribers need to apply a ‘coupon code’ to receive the discount. The code will be printed on page 3 of each issue of the Journal (in the box at the bottom of the page), and will be changed each year. Subscription increase Subscriptions to the Journal of Liberal History will increase with effect from 1 October 2015. We last increased the subscription rate in 2006, and of course now face higher printing and postage charges compared to nine years ago. On top of that, the average length of the Journal has increased significantly.

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We hope you appreciate the Journal of Liberal History, and will stick with us even at the new rates! Next year we will carrying out one of our regular feedback exerecises to ensure we are providing what our readers want. that the cabinet was unaware Waterhouse’s judgment is and, at times, downright obsti- Many readers would also of the nature of Britain’s com- also questionable. Without nate’ (p. 269). He was at the challenge the claim that Grey mitments to France, Water- more evidence, Grey’s sup- zenith of his powers in 1914, had a ‘capacity for hard work’ house quotes Zara Steiner’s posed role in constructing the respected in parliament and (p. 36). Amazingly, this stay-at- 1969 monograph at length. The ‘Special Relationship’ with the across Europe, and he was not home diplomat made only one infamous ‘misunderstanding’ United States appears exag- afraid to threaten resignation. trip abroad during his eleven- between Grey and the German gerated. Grey was on friendly Grey is, therefore, portrayed year tenure of the Foreign ambassador on 1 August 1914 is terms with prominent Ameri- as a political heavyweight who Office. Grey characteristically not explored – despite the his- cans but this falls some way could carry the cabinet with retreated to his country cot- toriographical debate on the short of bringing America into him. Yet, if so, why did Grey tage over the weekend of 25–26 subject being nearly forty years the First World War. He him- not deliver a timely and an July 1914, just as Churchill had old. Likewise the proposed mis- self admitted that ‘it was the unequivocal message to Ber- left the First Fleet at Portland to sion to Germany in mid-1914 unrestricted [German] sub- lin about Britain’s near-certain guard the Channel. Similarly, by Grey’s private secretary, marine campaign that precipi- participation in the unfolding it is difficult to accept the con- William Tyrrell, is overlooked. tated American entry’ (p. 372). war? True, there were divi- tention that Grey ‘continued to While vaguely acknowledging Furthermore, Grey, according sions in the cabinet and parlia- push himself to the limit’ dur- Grey’s commitment to main- to Waterhouse, was a ‘tena- ment had to be consulted, but ing the first years of the war, taining ‘the European balance cious character’, ‘made of if Grey was the unflappable particularly as Waterhouse power’, the author does not ‘sterner stuff than many give and universally trusted states- informs us that he ‘enjoy[ed] a explore the ‘unspoken assump- him credit for’, carried ‘great man depicted, surely he could certain amount of leisure time tions’ which helped shape Brit- weight in cabinet’ (p. 213) and have acted more decisively to during his war years in office.’ ish policy. ‘was nothing if not resolute solve the crisis. (p. 363).

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 59 A Liberal Democrat History Group evening meeting catastrophe the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

The 2015 election is the most catastrophic in the history of the Liberal Democrats and its predecessor parties; in no other previous election has the party lost such a high proportion of its votes and seats.

Entry into coalition with the Conservative Party in 2010 meant that the party always knew it would lose a good number of those who had voted for it in 2010, but Liberal Democrats hoped that they could replace at least some of them with new supporters who had not previously believed the party had a realistic chance of power. The party also assumed that the incumbency factor would save many of their MPs even though the national vote was falling. Neither of these things happened, despite a campaign that was generally recognised as well organised and well funded.

Discuss why everything went wrong with Phil Cowley (Professor of Parliamentary Government, University of Nottingham and co-author of The British General Election of 2010) and Baroness Olly Grender, Paddy Ashdown’s second-in-command on the ‘Wheelhouse Group’ which ran the Liberal Democrat election campaign. Chair: Lord Wallace of Saltaire.

6.30pm, Monday 13 July David Lloyd George Room, National Liberal Club, 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1

This study is not without Lloyd George and Churchill Parliamentary Archives, Lloyd Machine: Weapons, Resources and merit, but it is far from ‘scin- as war leaders George Papers, LG/G/208/4. Experts in the Second World War tillating’ as the book jacket concluded from page 45 7 Lord Reading diary, 27 May 1915, (London, 2011), pp. 1–2. claims. Waterhouse is too ready India Office Library, Lord Read- 14 Cecil Harmsworth diary, 22 to defend a man he clearly 1 For the full history of their rela- ing Papers, MS Eur/F118/152. May 1918, University of Exe- admires and is unwilling to tionship, see Richard Toye, 8 Winston Churchill to Archibald ter Special Collections, Cecil mete out criticism. Grey’s con- Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals Sinclair, 9 June 1916, in Mar- Harmsworth Papers. duct during July 1914, his fail- for Greatness (London, 2007). tin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. 15 Alex Danchev and Daniel ures in wartime diplomacy, his 2 Gary Sheffield, ‘A pitiful war, Churchill: Companion Volume IV, Todman (eds.), War Diaries, failed mission to the America but not a pity’, The Guardian, 18 Part 1 (Boston, 1978), pp. 5–6. 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord after the armistice and his work Jun. 1913. 9 Evelyn Waugh, Men at Arms Alanbrooke (London, 2001), pp. rate should all have been thor- 3 Max Hastings, ‘Sucking up to the (London, 1952). 590, 713 (entry for 10 Sept. 1944, oughly interrogated. It is to be Germans is no way to remember 10 Neville Chamberlain to Ida and post-war comment). hoped we don’t have to wait our Great War heroes, Mr Cam- Chamberlain, 8 June 1940, in 16 Hansard, HC (series 5), vol. 371, another forty years for a fresh eron’, Daily Mail, 11 June 2013. Robert Self (ed.), The Neville cols. 880, 937 (7 May 1941). assessment of Grey’s life and 4 C. P. Snow, Variety of Men (Lon- Chamberlain Diary Letters: Volume 17 Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd career. don, 1967), p. 94. 4, The Downing Street years, 1934– George’s Premiership: A Study 5 Thomas Jones diary, 11 Jan. 1940 (Aldershot, 2005), p. 538. in “Prime Ministerial Govern- Dr Chris Cooper was awarded a 1937, National Library of Wales, 11 Winston S. Churchill, Great Con- ment”’, Historical Journal , vol. PhD by the University of Liverpool Thomas Jones Papers, Class Z. temporaries (London, 1937), p. 115. xiii, no. 1 (Mar. 1970), pp. 130–57. in 2013. He has lectured at a number 6 ‘Rough notes taken of speeches 12 ‘Commemoration of the Cente- 18 Harold Nicolson to Ben and of higher education institutions and delivered on the occasion of a nary of the Birth of David Lloyd Nigel Nicolson, 21 Sept. 1943, he has published a number of journal private dinner given by Messrs. George, 17th January, 1863: in Nigel Nicolson (ed.), Harold articles covering a variety of themes Ivor Nicholson & Watson at the Prichard-Jones Hall, University Nicolson, The War Years: Dia- of modem British political history. Reform Club on Thursday, Octo- College of North Wales, Ban- ries and Letters 1939–45 (London, He currently teaches History and ber 29th 1936 in honour of the gor, Saturday, 30th March, 1963’, 1967), p. 320. Politics at St Anselm’s College, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George O.M. Trinity College, Cambridge, 19 Earl of Swinton, Sixty Years of Birkenhead. M.P., on the occasion of the com- Walter Layton Papers, Box 7/39. Power: Some Memories of the Men pletion of his “War Memoirs”’, 13 David Edgerton, Britain’s War Who Wielded It (London, 1966), p. 38.