(C) JONATHON MOLLER (C) JONATHON
Following his inauguration in January 2000, President Alfonso Portillo stands for the national anthem with the President of the Congress, General Efraín Ríos Montt, and the Minister of Defense, as he is officially received as Commander in Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces. Guatemala City, 2000. Hidden Powers Illegal Armed Groups in Post-Conflict Guatemala and the Forces Behind Them by Susan C. Peacock and Adriana Beltrán
Executive Summary
his special report examines the nature and the impact of illegal armed groups in Guate- mala today, as well as the forces behind these groups. It describes how these groups, T commonly referred to as “clandestine groups,” are an unresolved legacy of Guatemala’s 36- year internal armed conflict. It argues that clandestine groups act at the behest of members of an inter- connected set of powerful Guatemalans, commonly called the “hidden powers.” The individuals and groups known as the hidden powers oversee and profit from a variety of illegal activities that they carry out with little fear of arrest or prosecution. Their activities undermine the justice system and perpetuate a climate of citizen insecurity, which in turn creates fertile ground for the further spread of corruption, drug trafficking and organized crime. The result is a self-perpetuating, downward spiral of violence that jeopardizes the rule of law and the functioning of democracy in Guatemala.
Numerous local and international human rights organizations have denounced the existence of the clandestine groups and called for government action to dismantle them. Guatemalan civil society and the international community have publicly echoed their concerns and demands. This report concludes with recommendations on how to address the problem of clandestine groups and the hidden powers behind them. Both illegal armed groups and their sponsors must A WOLA Special Report be investigated, identified and eliminated if the peace process is to move forward and democracy is to be consolidated in Guatemala. September 2003 Illegal Armed Groups In The perpetrators of these abuses have not been brought to justice. Local and interna- Post-Conflict Guatemala and tional observers believe that they are the Forces Behind Them members of illegal armed groups, colloqui- ally called “clandestine groups.” These “... acts of violence affect 002 was the single most violent year clandestine groups are the armed wing of a to date in post-conflict Guatemala, larger phenomenon in Guatemala today the entire population 2 and that downward trend has that is known as the hidden powers. and made 2002 one of continued in 2003. The human rights situation has deteriorated dramatically, What are hidden powers? the most violent years of and is reaching a crisis point. Hundreds of The term hidden powers refers to an informal the country’s post-war cases involving civil society organizations network of powerful individuals who use period…The national and their leaders – ranging from intimida- their positions and contacts in the public tion to assassinations – were reported in and private sectors to benefit economically authorities have not 2002, and reports continue to come in from illegal activities and to avoid prosecu- been able to stop this even as this publication goes to press in tion for any crimes they commit. It describes August of 2003. Escalating threats and an unorthodox situation where legal spiral of violence.” attacks undermine the implementation of authorities of the state still have formal –Tom Koenings, Head of the historic 1996 Peace Accords that power, but, de facto, members of this marked the end of Guatemala’s bloody 36- informal network hold much of the real the U.N. Verification year internal armed conflict. power in the country. Although its power is Mission in Guatemala, hidden, the network’s influence is sufficient 30 January 2003.1 The abuses are clearly targeted. While to tie the hands of all those who threaten its many appear on the surface to be acts of perceived interests, including state actors. common crime, the number and patterns of the cases point to a systematic target- A framework to analyze hidden powers ing of civil society actors and others throughout Latin America, developed by involved in anti-impunity initiatives – Peruvian author Jaime Robles Montayo, both those who seek justice for past explains how “certain military, justice sector abuses (human rights groups, forensic officials, politicians, businessmen or com- experts, judges, lawyers, witnesses, etc.) mon criminals, among others, act within The parish house in Nebaj, and those who denounce present day their own spheres and respond to set goals, Quiché was set on fire by arsonists in the pre-dawn hours of corruption by state agents. Those who using their power, jointly, to make legal February 21, 2002. This act was fight for economic and social rights – mechanisms of social control inefficient.”2 widely seen as a threat against the particularly land rights – and for the end politically active local priest, Rigoberto Pérez, an outspoken to discrimination against indigenous Consistent with this framework, some of advocate of human rights. people are also singled out for attacks. the individuals who comprise Guatemala’s
(C) JONATHON MOLLER (C) JONATHON
2 Hidden Powers: Illegal Armed Groups in Post-Conflict Guatemala and the Forces Behind Them September 2003 hidden powers are private citizens and others military personnel and police, employees are government officials (civilian and of private security companies, common military) who work within the structures of criminals and gang members. Analysts cite the state. The latter exercise formal power the detailed information used by clandes- while at the same time participating in a tine groups to pursue their victims, the hidden power structure. level of sophistication and coordination of their actions, and the impunity they enjoy Illegal activities of the hidden as indicators of links to public security powers forces and military intelligence. In Guatemala hidden powers have connec- tions to drug trafficking and organized The leaders of these clandestine groups are crime. Amnesty International’s February believed to be former military officials – 2002 report entitled “Guatemala’s Lethal some retired and others dishonorably Legacy: Past Impunity and Renewed discharged from service – who occupied Human Rights Violations,” highlights these prominent positions during the internal “… there were increased connections and labels Guatemala a armed conflict. They use clandestine groups signs of the participation “Corporate Mafia State,” which it defines to continue to exert power and influence in as an “‘unholy alliance’ between traditional the country. They are single-minded in of clandestine groups in sectors of the oligarchy, some ‘new entre- their determination to prevent justice for illegal activities linked to preneurs,’ police and military, and common past abuses, and military and intelligence employees of the Public criminals.” It describes the way that reform. It is not surprising, therefore, that members of this informal network collude the pattern of attacks, harassment and Ministry, military to control lucrative, illegal activities threats by clandestine groups is reminiscent intelligence, justice “including drugs and arms trafficking, of the counter-insurgency efforts of the money laundering, car theft rings, the Guatemalan Army. system, and police. These adoption racket, kidnapping for ransom, groups appear to act with illegal logging and other proscribed use of In its thirteenth human rights report relative autonomy…” state protected lands” and “conspire to covering the period from July 2001 through ensure monopoly control of legal industries June 2002, the United Nations Verification –Ambassador Otto J. Reich, 3 such as the oil industry.” Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) Assistant Secretary of State observes that clandestine structures and In addition to reaping huge profits, the illegal groups that were involved in for Western Hemisphere hidden powers in Guatemala use their counter-insurgency activities during the Affairs, 10 October 2002.4 connections – with political actors and internal armed conflict have undergone a with the military and police – to intimi- transformation in post-conflict Guatemala. date, or even eliminate, those who get in According to MINUGUA, commitments their way, know too much, offer competi- included in the Peace Accords to put in tion, or try to investigate their activities. place mechanisms to control such groups – Their victims are targeted because they improvements in police and judicial threaten their financial interests. investigative capacities, strengthened civilian intelligence and congressional Clandestine groups oversight – have not been fulfilled. To the Illegal armed groups that operate clandes- contrary, the report finds that: tinely and do the bidding of the hidden powers are called “clandestine groups” in Shielded by impunity, these structures popular parlance in Guatemala. Often have regrouped and are pursuing illegal concealed by the veil of common crime, business interests and political these clandestine groups are considered influence. With the State no longer responsible for perpetrating a series of committing human rights abuses as a vicious attacks against human rights matter of policy, these groups’ relations defenders and others. The membership of to the Government apparatus are clandestine groups is amorphous and is diffuse, although they still hold some said to be drawn from active and retired key positions and maintain informal
Washington Office on Latin America September 2003 3 links to police, justice officials and security machinery. The Government of military intelligence.6 Guatemala recognizes that it has “[I]n Guatemala practices the obligation to combat any 7 that violate human rights The serious allegation that some state manifestation thereof. agents help cover up illegal activity and have not ended ... These ensure impunity for the perpetrators, or are During the almost four decades of war, close are scars of a past of actual accomplices in crimes committed by collaboration developed between the hidden powers, warrants the concern not security forces, both legal and illegal, and arbitrary acts and only of Guatemalans, but also of the other sectors within Guatemalan society. impunity that we still international community. The Historical Clarification Commission have to overcome. But the (CEH – Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico), established under terms of the current problem is that Antecedents Peace Accords, studied this period and our security and justice issued a report that highlights “the persis- Hidden powers and clandestine groups are tence and significance of the participation system has not identified not a new phenomenon in Guatemala. of the political parties and economic forces the aggressors and their Illegal armed bodies, paramilitary forces in the initiation, development and con- and clandestine security apparatuses were 8 clandestine actions have tinuation of the violence.” an integral part of the counter-insurgency not been penalized.” efforts in the country and committed The CEH report also scrutinizes the role egregious human rights violations during –Edgar Gutiérrez, of the justice system, noting that Guate- the internal conflict. They are the prede- mala has a long history of an ineffective Guatemalan Foreign cessors of today’s clandestine groups. judiciary subject to interference by Minister, 19 March 2003.5 powerful actors inside and outside of the At peace talks in 1994 the Guatemalan government. It describes how this ten- government and the armed opposition, dency was exacerbated during the internal grouped together as the Guatemalan armed conflict: National Revolutionary Unit (URNG- The remains of a woman who was Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional …by tolerating or participating directly killed by members of the Self- Guatemalteca), discussed these groups and Defense Civil Patrols (PAC) while in impunity, which concealed the most she was in hiding in the mountains. agreed that: fundamental violations of human rights, Her husband and son secretly the judiciary became functionally buried her here two days after she In order to maintain unlimited respect was killed in September 1983. inoperative with respect to its role of Near the village of Janlay, Nebaj, for human rights, there must be no protecting the individual from the State, Quiché, Guatemala, 2001. illegal security forces or any clandestine and lost all credibility as guarantor of an
(C) JONATHON MOLLER (C) JONATHON
4 Hidden Powers: Illegal Armed Groups in Post-Conflict Guatemala and the Forces Behind Them September 2003 effective legal system. This allowed Presidential General Staff or (C) PRENSA LIBRE, GU impunity to become one of the most “EMP,” from its initials in important mechanisms for generating Spanish, served a dual 9
and maintaining a climate of terror. function. It provided protec- A
TEMALA tion, logistical support and Much of the configuration of Guatemala’s advice to the President while hidden powers and the clandestine groups at the same time serving as a that do their bidding traces back to center for military intelli- personal relationships, patterns of interac- gence and covert activities. tion and structures of control and author- When General Efraín Ríos ity that developed during the war. Three Montt seized power from groups of men that actively participated in Lucas García, this center was named the Left to right, Retired General Luis Guatemala’s counter-insurgency strategies General Archive and Support Services Francisco Ortega Menaldo and Lt. Col. Jacobo Esdrás Salán – La Cofradía, the Presidential General (Archivo General y Servicios de Apoyo), or Sánchez, two members of the Staff (EMP – Estado Mayor Presidencial), “el Archivo.” It later became the Depart- “brotherhood,” or La Cofradía. and the Self-Defense Civil Patrols – ment of Presidential Security (DSP – warrant scrutiny. Departamento de Seguridad Presidencial).
La Cofradía Declassified U.S. government documents “La Cofradía” or “The Brotherhood” is a reveal that the EMP carried out intelli- “The [Guatemalan] military intelligence clique. It is comprised gence and counter-insurgency operations in of various members of the military intelli- coordination with the Army’s Intelligence government has a grave gence community “associated with com- Directorate (Dirección de Inteligencia Militar responsibility to mon crime and administrative corruption – D-2) and other state security bodies. It confront and dismantle in the period of [military dictator] Lucas maintained a network of informants and Garcia” from July 1978 until March 1982.10 carried out operations against “suspected illegal groups and La Cofradía is led by two retired generals, subversives.”15 Political crimes committed clandestine structures, Manuel Callejas y Callejas11 and Luis during these operations were often dis- which are in part an Francisco Ortega Menaldo.12 guised as common crimes. unresolved legacy of the Ideologically, La Cofradía members are The EMP is implicated in serious human conflict and its former military hard-liners. During the war, they rights violations, including kidnapping, espoused a national security strategy that forced disappearance and extrajudicial counterinsurgency “framed the conflict as a total (100 per- execution. The human rights record of the apparatus…they have cent) polarization of the population – EMP is so notorious that the Peace Accords become a serious you’re either with us or against us.”13 included a commitment to abolish it and to Officers in La Cofradía implemented separately replace both of its functions.16 obstacle to the peace repressive systems of social control during Nonetheless, the EMP exists to this day process, democracy and the war, and used intelligence to commit and its personnel have continued to be brutally repressive acts. The Recovery of involved in abuses.17 the observance of Historical Memory Project (REMHI – human rights.” Recuperación de Memoria Histórica) report Self-Defense Civil Patrols by the Human Rights Office of the Arch- During the war Self-Defense Civil Patrols –U.N. Verification diocese of Guatemala noted that “the (PAC – Patrullas de Auto-Defensa Civil) Mission in Guatemala, complicity born of government intelligence were formed as a paramilitary force to help 22 August 2002.18 work appeared to be the strongest tie the Guatemalan Army in its counter- among members of La Cofradía.”14 insurgency efforts. Operating under military orders and under the command of The Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP) military commissioners, the patrols acted Throughout the internal armed conflict as the Army’s civilian adjuncts, “protect- the Guatemalan military maintained a ing” their communities from the URNG. contingent with an intelligence capacity Ostensibly the patrols were voluntary, but within the Office of the President. The in fact service was obligatory. Tens of
Washington Office on Latin America September 2003 5 Dark History: The PACs During the Conflict The REMHI project documented 1,731 incidents of human rights violations with a total of 3,424 victims where the PACs themselves were implicated. There were an additional 1,799 incidents with a total of 10,602 victims involving the PACs in combi- nation with the military, including participation in 342 massacres.20
thousands of indigenous Mayan men Guatemalteco), has been an important between fifteen and sixty years of age were vehicle for consolidating the political forced to participate in the patrols and to authority of the hidden powers. The FRG “The obstruction of commit human rights abuses.21 has close ties with actors who were involved in counter-insurgency efforts justice, threats, and The PACs also served as an alternative during the internal armed conflict. For intimidation . . . were system of authority over and control of example, retired General Ríos Montt is traced to ‘parallel the population that was directed by the the head of the party’s Congressional military. Since the signing of the Peace caucus and retired General Ortega forces’ or ‘clandestine Accords, this system has remained largely Menaldo is an advisor to Guatemalan groups’ related to intact. Throughout the country, military President and FRG leader Alfonso commissioners and individual ex-PAC Portillo. Many of these same actors have the Government.” members fill leadership positions in local been allegedly associated with the hidden –John Hamilton, government as mayors, city council powers. Since 2000, the FRG has con- members, teachers, and police. Many trolled both the legislative and executive U.S. Ambassador have allegedly used their positions of branches of government. This nexus has to Guatemala, local authority to reap disproportionate allowed hidden powers to wield great 31 March 2003.19 benefits from state funds and develop- influence and to achieve more control ment projects. There are also credible within state institutions, further weaken- allegations that they are responsible for ing the government’s capacity to fight many of the human rights violations that corruption and impunity. continue to occur at the local level, including lynching, threats, intimidations Presidential advisors and murders.22 Members of La Cofradía wield considerable power in the Portillo administration. In particular General Francisco Ortega Hidden Powers Consolidate Menaldo, Lt. Col. Jacobo Esdrás Salán Political Power Sánchez and Colonel Napoleón Rojas Méndez – former military intelligence If hidden powers and clandestine groups officers, all three of whom have previously have existed in Guatemala for decades, and been reprimanded for involvement in their presence and their ties to military illegal activities – became close presiden- intelligence, drug-trafficking and organized tial advisors. The Attorney General’s crime are not a new phenomena, then what Office is currently investigating these is different about the current situation? A three advisors and two other retired new, and particularly dangerous, distin- military officers for their presumed links to guishing factor is the increasingly successful organized crime. consolidation of political power on the part of hidden powers. The advisors are said to have sway with President Portillo with regard to top-level The Frente Republicano appointments, especially in the military. Guatemalteco (FRG) This, combined with a power struggle A political party, the Guatemalan Repub- between the Portillo and Ríos Montt lican Front (FRG – Frente Republicano wings of the FRG, has prompted
6 Hidden Powers: Illegal Armed Groups in Post-Conflict Guatemala and the Forces Behind Them September 2003 unusually high turnover in Presidential © MOISES CASTILLO/ARCHIVOLATINO.COM appointees holding key positions in the administration. In the past three years there have been five Ministers of the Economy, four Ministers each for Defense, Interior and Agriculture, and three Communications Ministers.23
Presidential advisors have also aided in the administration of the federal budget, finding ways to augment monies allocated to the military, and particularly the EMP. Civilian functionaries have transferred funds to the military to undertake joint patrols with the police and to distribute fertilizer, vitamin-enriched cookies for school children, and sets of the “Presiden- tial Library for Peace.”
Hijacking of the justice system There are numerous credible allegations of intimidation, corruption, and manipula- High-profile human rights and corruption Vice President Francisco Reyes tion in Guatemala’s justice system. Death cases languish in the courts. Defense López, President Alfonso Portillo, and ex-dictator Efraín Ríos Montt. threats and intimidation of the judiciary lawyers abuse the system by employing are extremely common in cases involving numerous dilatory appeals and motions. human rights violations, particularly Judges rarely dismiss frivolous appeals or where the defendants were current or patently invalid motions. As a result, former members of the military, military these are used as delaying tactics, fre- commissioners or civil patrollers. A U.S. quently holding up trials for months or State Department report found that, even years. “[w]ith relatively few exceptions, plain- tiffs, witnesses, prosecutors, and jurists The high-profile case against three high- involved in high-profile cases against ranking military intelligence officers – members of the military reported threats, General Edgar Augusto Godoy Gaitán, intimidation and surveillance.”24 Colonel Juan Valencia Osorio and Lieu- tenant Colonel Juan Guillermo Oliva Political factors influence the tenure, Carrera – as alleged intellectual authors of appointment and dismissal of judges. the 1990 murder of renowned anthropolo- The FRG-dominated Congress and gist Myrna Mack Chang graphically A roadside billboard reads: the President are involved in naming illustrates the grave shortcomings of the “Your Army Welcomes You judges to both the Constitutional Court Guatemalan justice system. Despite strong to Quiché Province. (Corte de Constitucionalidad) and the evidence, only one of the Supreme Court. three was convicted, and (C) VICTORIA SANFORD that conviction was Political interference in legal cases, subsequently overturned particularly those where human rights or on technical grounds by corruption charges have been brought an appellate court. The against highly placed officials, is the Inter-American Court of norm. Key cases are assigned to judges Human Rights heard the who appear to be partial to the accused, Mack case in November reportedly because they have been 2002 and is expected to bribed, or because they fear reprisals for rule shortly on multiple their decisions. irregularities and exces-
Washington Office on Latin America September 2003 7 spearheaded this effort, focusing on areas where the Army most aggressively mobi- lized PACs to support its counter-insur- gency campaign.
(C) JONATHON MOLLER (C) JONATHON Last year AVEMILGUA helped organize massive protests by ex-PACs to demand back pay of 20,000 quetzals (about US$2,250) each for the “service they rendered to the state” during the internal armed conflict.26 In June 2002, thousands of ex-patrollers took over much of the northern province of Petén. They closed the area’s airport and crude oil operations, and blocked access to Tikal, holding 62 tourists hostage.
On July 10, 2002, President Portillo stated publicly that the former members of the PAC “were heroes that defended the country” whose requests merited atten- tion.27 Two months later he promised to pay 20,000 quetzals to each ex-patroller.28 Since that time 612,000 former patrollers have formally registered with the government’s Secretariat for Peace to receive compensation. Two sisters watch as the remains sive delays in the application of justice in of their mother and four siblings the Guatemalan courts. are exhumed in the Quiché In order to maintain its political power, department. Their relatives were the FRG must win the November 2003 shot by soldiers in August 1982 but One outcome of an ineffective and corrupt they managed to escape. elections. General Ríos Montt, currently judiciary is continued impunity for the President of the Guatemalan Congress, is hidden powers and their collaborators. running as the FRG presidential The Inter-American candidate.29 An editorial declared Commission on Human Ex-PAC reorganization to rebuild compensation of the ex-PACs “a mere an electoral base 30 Rights “… expresses its electoral strategy of the FRG,” a view Since the FRG assumed power, a concerted shared by many Guatemalans who deep concern over the effort has been made to reorganize the ex- consider it a blatant attempt to buy votes PACs. The Association of Guatemalan reorganization of groups for the FRG in order to solidify the Military Veterans (AVEMILGUA) has party’s electoral base. of former members of the Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PAC) and the existence of clandestine structures AVEMILGUA linked to the State or to Founded in the mid-1990s, AVEMILGUA is comprised of more than 1,200 former members of the Guatemalan armed forces. AVEMILGUA’s stated mandate is to assist in economic or other types increasing the “honor, prestige and dignity” of the Army, to analyze national strategy, of interest, who operate and to raise awareness of the value and function of the military in a democratic state. with the participation or Its current president is retired general Víctor Manuel Argueta Villalta, who was head of the EMP (April 1982-August 1983) during Ríos Montt’s presidency. He continues to tolerance of State agents.” advise Ríos Montt as President of the Congress.31 –26 July 2002.25
8 Hidden Powers: Illegal Armed Groups in Post-Conflict Guatemala and the Forces Behind Them September 2003 (C) PRENSA LIBRE, GU Perspectives on Clandestine Organization of American States Groups and Hidden Powers missions in Guatemala,
including visits by the A
TEMALA A multitude of civil society organizations U.N. Secretary in Guatemala has denounced the exist- General’s Special ence of clandestine groups thought to be Representative on responsible for many targeted acts of Human Rights Defend- abuse. They have repeatedly demanded ers and the Inter- that the Guatemalan government take American Commission prompt and concrete steps to bring about on Human Rights, their demise. Although the Guatemalan underscores the government has publicly recognized the international existence of clandestine groups, its efforts community’s concern for the persistent Former members of the Self- Defense Civil Patrols (PAC) to investigate and eliminate these groups attacks against human rights defenders demand compensation for have been insufficient. The wall of and other civil society leaders, and the “services rendered.” impunity that these groups and their need for stronger government action. The sponsors have constructed to guarantee international community is wary of the continuity of their illegal activities has rampant corruption and the government’s hindered the minimal efforts that have inability to meet its obligations within the been undertaken. peace process. There is growing and resounding consensus that both the The international community has joined clandestine groups and the structures in the chorus of disapproval. The under- behind them in Guatemala need to be taking of a number of United Nations and investigated and dismantled.
General Ríos Montt Exerting Power in the Courts and on the Streets On July 30, 2003, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala issued a ruling that permitted retired General Efraín Ríos Montt to be legally inscribed as a candidate for president, despite a clause in the Guatemalan constitution baring anyone who has participated in a coup from running for elected office. Ríos Montt led a coup d’état in 1982. The UN- sponsored truth commission created by the 1996 Peace Accords found that “acts of SOURCE: CALDH genocide” were committed during counter-insurgency operations under his rule. In the week prior to the Court’s announcement, Ríos Montt’s supporters engaged in wide-scale protests and acts of intimidation. On July 25, Guatemala City was paralyzed by mobs throwing stones, burning tires and blocking the streets. One journalist died of a heart attack while pursued by a mob.
U.S. Ambassador John Hamilton said of the violence:
The violent demonstrations in the City of Guatemala today constitute an affront to democracy and a dangerous mockery of the right of protest and freedom of assem- bly. It is difficult to believe these protests were not centrally planned and organized. FRG party leaders have an unavoidable responsibility to see that these disruptions of public order cease immediately, before there is further loss of life, injury and damage to the prospects of free and fair elections.32 A nun carries a poster that reads: “Wanted: José Efraín Ríos Montt and members of his Army high At the time of this publication, the decision to allow Ríos Montt to run for president stands. command in 1982, for crimes against humanity and war crimes.”
Washington Office on Latin America September 2003 9 Growing Corruption Levels of corruption have increased dramatically in Guatemala in recent years. In a 2002 study by Transparency International in which business leaders and policy analysts were asked to rate levels of corruption in various countries, Guatemala ranked among the 20 most corrupt countries.34 More than half of those who have occupied cabinet-level posts during the Portillo administration now face corruption charges. The result has been devastating in terms of the further weakening of already strug- gling state institutions and the rule of law in the country.
“The involvement of Recommendations to Apparatuses.” This ought to be the vehicle for such an investigation.) clandestine structures Policy-makers Revoke or deny visas to, and move to and groups in attacks Hidden powers and their armed wing, the extradite, Guatemalans involved in clandestine groups, are deeply entrenched against defenders and drug trafficking, organized crime and in Guatemala. If the peace process is to money laundering. allegations of their links move forward in a meaningful way and to state security forces democracy is to be consolidated in Guate- Demonstrate visible and unequivocal mala, they must be brought under control support for all those involved in is a matter of serious and eliminated. Hidden powers undermine human rights protection and anti- concern that must be the functioning of legitimate state institu- impunity initiatives. tions and provide fertile ground for corrup- addressed by the Link international assistance to good tion, organized crime, and drug-trafficking. governance, effective respect for Government on an Clandestine groups sow terror among the human rights, and the implementation populace. Effective governance will not be urgent basis.” of the Peace Accords and the recom- possible in Guatemala until all clandestine –Hina Jilani, U.N. mendations of the Historical Clarifica- groups and their backers are dismantled. Secretary General’s tion Commission (CEH – Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico). Special Representative on Policy-makers, in Guatemala and interna- tionally, should take the following steps to Support efforts to strengthen the Human Rights Defenders, address the problem of clandestine groups justice system in Guatemala. 23 January 2003.33 and hidden powers in Guatemala: Demand the immediate dismantling of Create an international commission the Presidential General Staff (EMP – with technical expertise, unbridled Estado Mayor Presidencial). access to pertinent information, and Suspend all regular military training for sufficient financial resources to investi- either the Guatemalan Armed Forces or gate the existence of clandestine groups the police by foreign governments and in Guatemala, their involvement in international bodies until the Guatema- attacks on civil society actors and in lan government complies with provi- crimes against those seeking justice, and sions of the Peace Accords on military, any links they may have to current or intelligence and police reform. former state actors. (In response to a proposal by Guatemala’s Human Rights Enhance the ability of the Guatema- Ombudsman35, the government of lan Human Rights Ombudsman to Guatemala has requested that the effectively implement the mandate of United Nations and the Organization of his office to investigate allegations of American States participate in a abuses perpetrated by the military, “Commission to Investigate Illegal the police or any other public agency Groups and Clandestine Security or authority.
10 Hidden Powers: Illegal Armed Groups in Post-Conflict Guatemala and the Forces Behind Them September 2003 Maintain political and financial support to monitor and ensure compliance with for the U.N. Verification Mission in the Peace Accords, particularly during Guatemala (MINUGUA) and its efforts the electoral campaign.
WOLA Staff Joy Olson Notes Executive Director 1 United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala 18 Thirteenth Report on Human Rights of the United Nations Kimberly Stanton (MINUGUA), “Towards a Secure Guatemala: Plan of Verification Mission in Guatemala, op. cit., paragraph 66, Deputy Director and Action for the Strengthening of Public Security, Summary p. 11. Director of Studies 19 of Remarks delivered by Tom Koenings,” 30 January 2003, United States Embassy in Guatemala, “U.S. Coletta Youngers p. 1,
Washington Office on Latin America September 2003 11 About WOLA The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a nonprofit policy, research and advocacy organization working to advance democracy, human rights and social justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Founded in 1974, WOLA plays a leading role in Washington policy debates about Latin America. WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training and advocacy. To Order More WOLA has a wide range of publications available on human rights in Latin America and U.S. WOLA Publications policy. WOLA also publishes a regular newsletter, CrossCurrents in English and Enlace in Spanish. See our website for a complete list of publications and contact our office to order.
This Report This report was written by Susan C. Peacock and Adriana Beltrán. A longer and more detailed version of the report will be made available later this year and can be ordered from WOLA. Editing assistance was provided by Geoff Thale, Kimberly Stanton, and Joy Olson. Thanks Special thanks to The Moriah Fund and the Ford Foundation for their support of WOLA’s work on Guatemala.
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