A WOLA Conference Report | July 2007

Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges Rapporteur’s Report by Coletta A. Youngers1 Introduction and summary of common themes

n December 2006, President Hugo Chávez was re-elected by a wide margin to a new six-year term in office.2 He has remained in the headlines since, announcing a series of Imoves to accelerate Venezuela’s transition to what he calls “21st Century Socialism.” At this crucial time for Venezuela and U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) held a conference aimed at enhancing understanding in the United States of political dynam- ics in Venezuela, the domestic and foreign policies being pursued by the Chávez government, the state On February 14, 2007, WOLA of Venezuelan democracy and its in- convened a conference stitutions, and the roots of Chávez’s to examine the political continuing popularity. WOLA situation in Venezuela and sought to create a space in Wash- the implications for regional ington for a diverse, plural exchange developments and U.S. policy that would avoid the extreme posi- in the wake of President tions and polarizing rhetoric that Hugo Chávez’s resounding often mark debates in and about re-election in December Venezuela. The discussion was nevertheless impassioned and lively, 2006. This conference report as was anticipated. In organizing the synthesizes the main issues of conference, WOLA was also mind- discussion and debate among ful that even a day-long event with the group of scholars, NGO high-caliber presentations would representatives, policymakers, but scratch the surface of the many and others who participated. complicated and profound issues unfolding in Venezuela today. In that sense, the event was organized in the spirit of open and ongoing debate, and in hopes of stimulating more nuanced and informed consid- eration of Venezuela and U.S.-Ven- ezuelan relations in the months and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez speaks at the years to come. Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas on December 5, 2006, two days after being elected to another six- year term in office. He holds in his hand a copy of the A dozen distinguished speakers from Venezuelan constitution, with a picture of Simón Bolívar Venezuela, the United States, Can- in the background. (Photo: Associated Press)

1 Coletta A. Youngers is an independent consultant and a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). 2 With his victory in December 2006, in which he won nearly 63 percent of the vote, Chávez has been elected Venezuela’s president three times. He first won the presidency in December 1998, with 56.2 percent of the vote. A year later, Venezuelans backed a new constitution, setting new elections for July 2000. Chávez garnered 59.9 percent of that vote and a six-year term. Assuming that Chávez serves the entirety of his new presidential term, he will have been in power for 14 years when it expires in 2012. Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges

FEBRUARY 14, 2007 • CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

9:30 am Registration and Continental Breakfast

10:00 am Opening Remarks: John Walsh, Senior Associate for the Andes, Washington Office on Latin America WOLA sought to 10:15 am PANEL I: POLITICAL CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY create a space in Chair and Moderator: Cynthia McClintock, Professor of Political Science and Washington for a International Affairs, George Washington University diverse, plural exchange  Michael Shifter, Vice President for Policy, Inter-American Dialogue; Adjunct Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University that would avoid the  Margarita López Maya, Professor, Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, extreme positions and Universidad Central de Venezuela

polarizing rhetoric that  Jennifer McCoy, Director of the Americas Program, Carter Center; Professor often mark debates in of Political Science, Georgia State University and about Venezuela.  José Virtuoso, Member, Board of Directors, Ojo Electoral

12:00 pm Lunch (provided)

12:45 pm PANEL II: INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES Chair and Moderator: Geoff Thale, Program Director, Washington Office on Latin America

 Julia Buxton, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK; Visiting Professor, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University

 Carlos Ayala, President, Comisión Andina de Juristas

 Daniel Hellinger, Professor of Political Science, Webster University

 Antonio González Plessmann, Venezuelan human rights activist

2:30 pm Coffee Break

2:45 pm PANEL III: ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY Chair and Moderator: William LeoGrande, Dean of the School of Public Affairs and Professor of Government, American University

 Roger Tissot, Director, Latin America Country Strategies, PFC Energy

 Luis Lander, Director, Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales

 Carl Meacham, Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Republican Staff)

 Ana María Sanjuán, Director, Centro para la Paz y los Derechos Humanos, Universidad Central de Venezuela

4:30 pm Concluding Remarks: panel chairs Cynthia McClintock, Geoff Thale and William LeoGrande and conference organizer John Walsh

2 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges ada and England were chosen because of their taken since the elections with regard to tradi- in-depth knowledge of the complex issues fac- tional democratic indicators and the further ing the country today; together, they brought consolidation of power in the presidency. a tremendous amount of knowledge and Proposals to permit indefinite presidential re- understanding to key policy debates. Three election, allow Chávez to rule by decree for 18 panels were organized around the themes of months, eliminate proportional representation Political Conflict and Democracy, Institutions in the National Assembly, and create a single and Public Policies, and Energy and Foreign pro-Chávez party, among other actions, are Policy. This report provides a summary of being questioned by some sectors of Venezue- the presentations made in each panel, the lan society and the international community. subsequent discussion, and closing remarks by Some panelists also noted that the perceived the panel moderators and conference organiz- lack of checks and balances and mechanisms Most, if not all, panelists ers. Given the rapid pace of political devel- for accountability and transparency could lead agreed that President opments in Venezuela, please keep in mind to higher levels of corruption. Chávez’s legitimacy when reading this report that the discussions it conveys occurred over the course of one A related issue of debate was President was enhanced by day in mid-February 2007. For example, by Chávez’s responsibility to his electorate and the December 2006 the time the conference took place, Chávez whether or not he can deliver what he has had already announced that the broadcast promised. Expectations are running high for elections. He won license of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV) continued reforms and improvements in living nearly 63 percent of standards, yet as power is increasingly concen- would not be renewed when it expired at the the vote – obtaining end of May. However the repercussions of trated, two problems emerge. First, can the that decision, within Venezuela and interna- state bureaucracy and parallel organizations 1.7 million more votes tionally, remained to be seen. that have been set up deliver the goods? Will than he did in 1998 the government ultimately enter into a crisis Although WOLA made clear at the outset of over-reach? Some pointed to the difficul- – in elections in which that consensus was not the aim of the confer- ties of delivering when power is increasingly the political opposition ence, some common themes and questions concentrated and claimed that trends point to- united behind a single did emerge over the course of the day and ward tremendous inefficiencies in government. became the focus of extended debate. One Second, at what point would Chávez begin to candidate and which point that most, if not all, panelists agreed take the blame for lack of progress? Until now, international and upon is that President Chávez’s legitimacy many view him as a “Teflon president,” but domestic observers was enhanced by the December 2006 elec- as his involvement in the daily functions of tions. He won nearly 63 percent of the vote government increases, so will his responsibility considered to be – obtaining 1.7 million more votes than should things go wrong. basically free and fair. he did in 1998 – in elections in which the political opposition united behind a single Much of the day’s discussion centered on the candidate and which international and question of democracy – what democracy is domestic observers considered to be basically and what it should be. What is the balance free and fair. Moreover, he won the major- between democracy and authoritarianism ity of votes in each of Venezuela’s 23 states in Venezuela today? What are the tradeoffs and the capitol district. Chávez has a strong between more traditional forms of representa- mandate and popular support which cannot tive democracy and the kind of participatory be denied by his critics. Also of significance, democracy being put forward by Chávez Chávez continues to benefit from high oil as a new model? And can they co-exist? A prices – generating nearly $50 billion in related issue is the balance between respect annual revenues – and strong growth rates for democratic norms and making significant (the economy grew 10.3 percent in 2006). In progress in redistributing economic resources short, he has money to spend on social and and wealth, which inevitably leads to con- other programs. frontation with those who stand to lose.

At the same time, many panelists expressed While many agreed that “democracy” in concern about the direction that Chávez has Venezuela has historically failed to serve

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 3 the needs of some middle and lower income ers, however, expressed concern about more sectors of society, debate ensued as to how to traditional human rights issues and the grow- take into account the importance of promot- ing problem of citizen insecurity. President ing social equity as an indicator of democratic Chávez inherited a plethora of human rights progress. Given the stark inequalities and and crime-related problems. To what extent deep poverty that persist in Latin America, has the government addressed these ongoing it was asked whether the region’s liberal problems, or have they worsened due to gov- democracies should even be referred to as ernment policies? Issues raised included the democratic. Some argued that the vast major- lack of independence of the judiciary, threats ity of the poor have never felt that they were to freedom of expression, the rising homicide represented politically before and – despite rate, violence in the prisons, and high levels the concerns expressed above – now feel of impunity. that the system is more democratic, as they High levels of political feel included in politics, are benefiting from Lively debate also took place regarding the and societal polarization improvements in their quality of life, and are long-term viability of the direction that are likely to continue in hopeful about the future. While the majority Chávez appears to be leading the country and of panelists agreed that a proper melding of potential points of opposition. Most analysts the near- to medium- representative and participatory democracy concurred that the political opposition had term in Venezuela, was the most desirable, the question re- taken an important step forward in participat- ing in the last elections and hence reentering and present a serious mained as to whether or not this is the direc- tion in which the country is going. the political arena. However, the traditional challenge to effective political opposition remains very weak in its governance. Combating poverty and social exclusion ability to challenge Chávez or his programs. are priorities for the Chávez government Effective opposition is more likely to come and an array of programs and initiatives are from within Chavismo itself. All agreed that underway to address those concerns. Another the high levels of political and societal polar- topic was therefore the extent to which these ization are likely to continue in the near- to programs – and in particular, the misiones, medium-term and present a serious challenge or social programs – have led to concrete to effective governance. improvements in the lives of the poor. Has progress been made in addressing inequality Turning to Venezuela’s role in the interna- and unemployment? Are the social programs tional arena, one question is whether or not simply another form of handouts or are they Chávez is exporting his “Bolivarian Revolu- promoting long-term development? What tion” to other countries in Latin America. should the role of the state be with regards to While some see Chávez as a threat to U.S. social spending? While views on this differed interests in the region, various panelists widely, most agreed that there is a need for downplayed Chávez’s significance in the more rigorous and balanced analysis of what emergence of more progressive and left-wing is being delivered, drawing on not only quan- presidents. On the contrary, this trend is a titative but also qualitative social science result of common problems many countries research methods. Similarly, significant de- are facing, including disillusionment with bate ensued as to the content and meaning of the so-called “Washington Consensus” and the “21st Century Socialism” that became the economic policies that have failed to de- defining theme of President Chávez’s election liver for the poor majorities; the collapse of campaign and subsequent initiatives. traditional political parties and the search for more meaningful democratic practices; con- From a human rights perspective, advances cern with how Latin American countries can in economic, social, and cultural rights best manage their insertion into the global were lauded by some panelists. Pointing to economy; and anti-U.S. sentiment prevalent the misiones, they signaled that important across the region. Chávez may be well placed progress is underway in providing improved to take advantage of the present political dy- education, health care, and other forms of namic, but he did not create it and his ability social security. These same panelists and oth- to influence it remains limited.

4 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges Most panelists argued that Chávez should not be seen as a direct threat to the United States or other regional powers, because of either his foreign or energy policies. The issues of Venezuela’s activist role within the Organiza- tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and as a reliable energy partner for the United States were the subject of heated debate. As a petro-state, it is in Venezuela’s interests to maintain high oil prices, and the country has historically played a very active role within OPEC to promote those interests. For Venezuela, oil revenues are the engine of domestic economic growth and the means to foster regional integration.

For the United States, however, higher oil prices are problematic politically and potential- ly negative economically. Beyond Venezuela’s role as a price hawk within OPEC, the issue arose as to the reliability of Venezuelan oil for Public demonstrations like this one in Caracas accompanied the recall referendum in August 2004 and the the U.S. market. While opinions on that issue December 2006 presidential elections. (Photo: Noah Friedman-Rudovsky, The Carter Center) differed, most agreed that for the foreseeable future, Venezuela will remain dependent on are presented as much as possible in each U.S. crude oil refineries and the U.S. market panelist’s own voice, with repetition of the and that the United States will remain depen- panelists’ names as necessary to clarify whose dent on the flow of Venezuelan oil. Despite views are being presented. antagonistic rhetoric from both governments, this interdependence will continue to serve as a moderating force in bilateral relations. PANEL I: Political Conflict A final and very important question revolved around the role of the United States. Many and Democracy concurred that an aggressive, confrontational The first panel provided an overview of A confrontational U.S. U.S. approach backfires, reinforcing Chávez’s political dynamics in Venezuela and the cen- approach reduces the nationalist credentials and fueling for his anti- tral questions of democracy’s meaning, the American rhetoric. A confrontational U.S. direction of politics in Venezuela today, and opportunities for political approach reduces the opportunities for politi- how to craft a democratic system that works criticism and open cal criticism and open debate within Ven- for the bulk of the population. The factors debate within Venezuela ezuela by making it easier for Chávez to label leading to President Chávez’s first election critics and opponents as tools of a hostile U.S. and underlying his continued support were by making it easier for empire. Instead, U.S. policymakers should explored, along with issues of governance and Chávez to label critics tread lightly in Venezuela and work with the obstacles to implementing 21st Century other Latin American governments to deal ef- Socialism. The last panelist reflected on the and opponents as tools fectively with regional concerns, in particular state of the country’s electoral system and of a hostile U.S. empire. confronting poverty and inequality. the extent to which elections are an effective means of ameliorating political conflict. The following pages provide summaries of the discussions that took place during the three Michael Shifter3 initiated the panel with conference panels. The views and arguments a critical and stark portrayal of the state of

3 Michael Shifter is Vice President for Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue and an adjunct professor of Latin American politics at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 5 democracy in Venezuela today, focusing on chet’s Chile. In addition, one of the primary the beginning of President Chávez’s second lessons of that period in Latin American six-year term. In Shifter’s view, a series of history is that elections alone do not make a anti-democratic measures taken by President democracy. While Chávez clearly has elec- Chávez since his re-election in December has toral legitimacy, there is a broader concept of shifted the nature of the debate on Venezuela. democracy that is generally accepted in the The question is no longer what type of regime region, which highlights the importance of this is – it is now clearly autocratic in his view checks and balances and separation of pow- – but rather, whether or not this is good or bad ers. In that sense, Venezuela has regressed for Venezuelans and whether or not the re- and is at odds with regional trends. gime will last. He noted the “benefit of clarity” that has come with recent measures, which At the same time, Shifter recognized that point to this autocratic model. according to the latest Latinobarómetro poll, the three countries in the region whose citi- While Chávez clearly Some of the more troubling steps taken in zens rated their country as most democratic has electoral legitimacy, recent months include: are Uruguay, Venezuela, and Costa Rica.  Passage of an “enabling law” which allows This may indicate that many Venezuelans there is a broader Chávez to govern by decree in key policy have a very different notion of democracy, concept of democracy areas for an 18-month period; based more on issues of social justice. A significant portion of the Venezuelan popula- that is generally  A National Assembly that is 100 percent tion feels that they are benefiting from the pro-government and where the leader of accepted in the region, present government; they feel included and that body claims that her role is to con- that they have a leader who looks out for the which highlights the tribute ideas to the president, rather than poor and marginalized. In other societies, to legislate; importance of checks concepts of democracy may be based more and balances and  President Chávez’s stated intention to on how democratic institutions are working. seek indefinite re-election to the office; separation of powers. Shifter also speculated that the answer to  The president’s effort to consolidate all of the question of why Chávez is going in this the political groups on the left into one, direction, despite the power he has already pro-Chávez party; and accumulated, may very well have to do with  The government’s decision not to renew his concept of participatory democracy. the broadcast license of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), whose concession Regarding the potential longevity of the expires in May. (RCTV is accused by model taking root in Venezuela, Shifter Chávez of supporting the 2002 coup and it expressed skepticism that Chávez, in the role regularly espouses anti-government views.) of sole decision maker, can last for very long in the context of present political trends in the Through these and other measures, Chávez is region and the reality of the complex global exerting greater political control and con- economy. Even as Chávez has consolidated centrating power, while eroding the basic power, the vulnerabilities and soft spots of the elements of checks and balances and separa- regime are becoming more evident. Potential tion of powers. Shifter posed the question as fault lines include the likelihood of continued to why Chávez has gone to such extremes, political and social polarization and increas- given his overwhelming popular support as ing schisms and rifts within Chavismo itself, indicated in the last elections and his already and the lack of strong popular support for the tight grip on the government. president’s indefinite re-election, or Chávez as “president for life.” Shifter also pointed out Shifter then turned to the question of how that plans to create a single pro-Chávez politi- Chávez lines up with previous authoritarian cal party are not widely embraced by those regimes in Latin America, pointing out that within the Chávez coalition. there is no comparable example. Venezuela does not suffer from the levels of repression For its part, the traditional political opposition characterized by Somoza’s Nicaragua or Pino- deserves some credit for the last elections. It is

6 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges finally showing some sense of political strategy, moderated his tone in order to attract unde- having largely united behind one candidate cided voters. The centerpiece of his campaign and participated in the elections. While that – 21st Century Socialism – became devoid candidate has fizzled somewhat since the elec- of meaning, as it grew to include so many tions and the opposition needs to regroup, it demands and issues. In the end, each voter should continue to be engaged and participate had his or her own interpretation: it could politically. Even as Chávez seeks to ensure mean getting a new house, better education, that no independent, internal challenges to belief in an egalitarian society, or something his rule emerge, actors within his coalition else. Thus 21st Century Socialism came to and outside it could prove to be obstacles to represent all of the societal demands accumu- achieving that objective. lated over the years. Its appeal and power as a campaign theme was precisely that it allowed In conclusion, Shifter quoted from a speech people to adopt their own personal meaning. given by Simón Bolívar in Caracas on Janu- Now that the elections are over, this void is ary 2, 1814: beginning to be filled as Chávez announces The appeal and power more concrete initiatives. Huid del país donde uno solo ejerce todos los of “21st Century poderes: es un país de esclavos. To date, no fundamental shifts in the econom- Socialism” as a Flee the country where one person exercises ic model have occurred, and the announced campaign theme was all power: it is a country of slaves. nationalizations are allowed under the 1999 precisely that it allowed constitution. On the other hand, the political Margarita López Maya4 followed with her model is becoming increasingly clear and is people to adopt their reflections on the country’s direction in the oriented around the concept of the “dictator- own personal meaning. wake of the elections and possible short- and ship of the majority.” In addition to concerns Now that the elections long-term trends. She began with two key discussed by Shifter, López Maya underscored points. First, Hugo Chávez won unprecedented the proposal to eliminate proportional repre- are over, this void is support in the December elections, receiv- sentation in the National Assembly, which beginning to be filled as ing more than 7.3 million votes, representing means that minorities would lose represen- nearly 63 percent of valid votes (there was a tation. While this is already the de facto Chávez announces more 25 percent abstention rate) – the biggest mar- situation, it would become institutionalized if concrete initiatives. gin of victory for a president since 1958. Not the proposal is officially adopted. Venezuela surprisingly, President Chávez has interpreted is moving towards a system of greatly reduced this as a strong mandate to pursue his 21st political pluralism and little opportunity for Century Socialism and other political projects. the expression of the views of minorities.

Second, the country is in very good shape Another area of concern is the constitutional economically. The government has ben- reform process underway, which circumvents efited from three years of sustained eco- the established State Council (Consejo de nomic growth, with double-digit expansion of Estado). Instead, Chávez formed a Presiden- Venezuela’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). tial Commission of Constitutional Reform to Oil prices are booming, creating a fiscal bring the 1999 constitution into line with his bonanza for the government. In other words, plans for 21st Century Socialism and named the President has money to implement his members of other “public powers” – such as 21st Century Socialism. the Attorney General, the National Assem- bly, and the Supreme Court – as commission Exactly what the electorate was voting for, members. In the case of both the enabling however, is not as clear as it might seem. The law and this commission, Chávez is sending electoral campaign began in black and white the message that there is no time for delibera- terms, with a very aggressive and hard-line tions or debate to achieve his goals. Formal discourse by Chávez. As time went on, he structures of government independent of the

4 Venezuelan historian Margarita López Maya is a professor at the Central University of Venezuela’s Center for Development Studies and a researcher for the Research Promotion Program at the National Fund for Science, Technology and Innovation (FONACIT).

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 7 executive branch,  There is “a lot of noise within such as the State Chavismo,” with different and diver- Council, are being gent opinions about where 21st Century discarded in favor Socialism should go. Right now, space is of others that open for internal discussion and though imply concentra- it is not yet expressed publicly, oppo- tion of power in sition to the present path is likely to the presidency. emerge. This is not the case, however, This is not illegal, for the political opposition, which has but contradicts not been able to adapt to Venezuela’s the meaning of new political reality; and participatory  Other progressive Latin American democracy and governments are playing a useful role in illustrates that the moderating Chávez’s actions, maintain- independence of ing strong bilateral relations despite his the public powers confrontational style and presenting is weakening. options for alternative approaches.

Margarita López Maya of the Central University of Venezuela (foreground) In contrast to López Maya believes that if these tenden- and Jennifer McCoy of the Carter Center speak on the “Political Conflict and Shifter, López Democracy” panel. (Photo: Jeremy Bigwood) cies within Venezuela are left to develop on Maya resisted la- their own, counter-balancing forces could beling the regime that is emerging, but clearly prevail. However, direct confrontation by stated that it can no longer be thought of as the United States is counterproductive, a “liberal democracy.” The government is benefiting the hard-line sectors within tending towards a pyramid structure, where in Chavismo and bolstering President Chávez practice all other authorities are subordinate himself. Venezuelans must be allowed to The concentration of to the president. “Popular power,” which is forge their own path – free of interfer- power is likely to result represented at the grassroots level by commu- ence from the U.S. or other governments nal councils, is hierarchical, as by law all are in severe problems – hopefully in the direction of a more just subjugated to the Presidential Commission for and democratic society. of governance. With Popular Power (Comisión Presidencial del Poder Popular). At the state level, Chávez has sug- one person in control, Jennifer McCoy5 focused her presentation gested incorporating into the constitutional inefficiencies are likely on three fundamental questions: reform the addition of several vice presidents to increase and at some (instead of just one, as is now the case) to de-  What conditions gave rise to the point, Chávez will begin velop regional policies, which will weaken the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela? present system of governors – despite the fact to take the blame. that they are all currently Chávez supporters.  What does it look like today and what are its risks and vulnerabilities?

Given the president’s strong popular support  Are there similar conditions in other and the weakness of the traditional political countries to make it exportable? opposition, there is little chance of chang- ing course in the short term. However, three She concurred with the previous speakers in tendencies are emerging which could lead to expressing concern about the breakneck speed changes in the medium term: with which President Chávez has moved  The concentration of power is likely to since the December elections and the nature result in severe problems of governance. of the changes underway. In McCoy’s opin- With one person in control, inefficiencies ion, this is not necessarily surprising. Chávez are likely to increase and at some point, initially had to contend with several years of Chávez will begin to take the blame; fierce opposition, followed by two consecutive

5 Jennifer McCoy is the director of the Carter Center’s Americas Program, directing its Friends of the Inter-American Democratic Charter group, and is a Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University in Atlanta.

8 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges elections, during which time he had to attend to elected representative institutions. Ini- to popular concerns. Now with re-election tially, Chávez relied heavily on the military. behind him, Chávez can devote his attention For example, Plan Bolivar 2000 provided to his more ambitious political project. development and disaster relief through the military rather than through regional gov- Three underlying factors gave rise to ernments. In 2003 and 2004, he developed Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution. First, and implemented the misiones, or social pro- Venezuelans had experienced severe social grams, which run parallel to the traditional dislocation. The country’s poverty rate bureaucracies. More recently, 2006 and 2007 increased from 25 percent in the 1970s to have witnessed the creation of communal The conditions giving 65 percent in the 1990s. Per capita income councils and higher-level organizations go- rose until 1978, peaked that year, and ing all the way to the top, which run parallel rise to the Bolivarian then steadily declined. Second, the state to municipal and state governments. The Revolution are shared remained weak and public services dete- end result is the reliance on direct democra- to some degree by riorated. This led to the third factor: the cy and the unmediated relationship between fragmentation of the political party system the leader and the people. many other countries and the implosion of the traditional parties. in the region, including These had largely functioned by doling out Turning to the risks and vulnerabilities of frustration with neo- resources and services; as these declined, so the Bolivarian Revolution, McCoy claimed did support for the traditional parties. Many that the space for consultation and delibera- liberalism’s failure came to view them as elitist and exclu- tion is closing, which could lead to resent- to improve peoples’ sionary. Within this context, charismatic ment, the erosion of political support for outsiders emerged to vie for the presidency. Chávez, and increasing conflict. Already, lives, anger over U.S. Chávez was a product of the failure of the uneasiness is becoming visible among unilateralism, weak traditional party system. Chávez supporters, social movements, and states and poor public particularly among intellectuals, although Contrary to popular perceptions, in McCoy’s that has not yet transformed into open dis- services, and party opinion Chávez came into office in 1998 sent. Within the traditional opposition, sup- system implosion or without a clear plan or ideology; he has im- porters of presidential candidate Manuel Ro- provised from the beginning. He was seeking sales finally recognized their minority status fragmentation. an alternative to the neo-liberal Washington and the government’s victory last December. Consensus model, but recognized the failures Yet precisely when they have reentered the of Soviet-style socialism. Chávez gravitated political arena, Chávez is cutting them off by towards something in the middle – a mixed closing political space. The risk of this kind economy with state-led development based of concentration of power is that the leader on oil revenues – not unlike models used by becomes too isolated and does not benefit previous Venezuelan governments. Cru- from healthy debates; he is not challenged or cially, however, Chávez changed the way in given bad news. which oil revenues were distributed. During the Punto Fijo democracy from 1958 to 1998, This scenario also creates extreme pressure oil revenues were distributed via subsidies to on the bureaucracy to perform. There is a organized groups such as unions, the business risk of over-reach and a crisis of distribution, sector, the military and the middle class, as which could lead to frustrated expectations. a means of building consensus and political McCoy concurred with López Maya that stability. Now, revenues are distributed to Chávez will likely increasingly receive the the previously “unorganized poor” – those blame for any failures to deliver, since power who are not part of the groups just men- is concentrated even more in his hands. tioned – and to foreign countries through Chávez’s oil diplomacy. McCoy asserted that the conditions giving rise to the Bolivarian Revolution are shared Another key aspect of the Bolivarian to some degree by many other countries Revolution is that the Chávez government in the region, including frustration with is creating parallel structures to the state and neo-liberalism’s failure to improve peoples’

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 9 lives, anger over U.S. unilateralism, weak sals against some who supported Chávez’s states and poor public services, and party removal from office. As a result, the referen- system implosion or fragmentation. Across dum left Venezuelan society more polarized Latin America, there is a demand for fuller and divided. The lack of confidence in the citizenship – for extending the political country’s electoral system grew and many rights provided via electoral participation viewed the CNE with distrust and suspicion; to civil and economic spheres in order to it lacked the credibility to be an independent address inequalities in access to justice, arbiter of the electoral process. These argu- social services, and income. All of these ments were used by many in the opposition issues – and the thorny questions of how to to justify their political position of abstention best relate to the global economy and to the from voting. United States – were visible in the electoral debates across the region in 2006. No other In the regional and congressional elections of The dialogue and country, however, has all of the conditions 2004 and 2005, the number of eligible voters compromises that took giving rise to the Bolivarian Revolution, who opted not to participate in the elections combined with extraordinary resources grew. By 2005, the abstention rate reached place on so vital an issue behind a charismatic leader. 80 percent. The CNE continued to be widely as the electoral process questioned, with some opinion surveys show- illustrate the capacity for McCoy concluded with a fundamental ques- ing as much as half of the electorate holding tion raised by the situation in Venezuela unfavorable views of the CNE. As a result, Venezuelans to seek and and other countries in the region: can the the 2006 presidential election campaign got find common solutions democratic framework manage the change underway in a climate of profound distrust of required and the inevitable conflict that the country’s electoral apparatus and with an and show that many comes with attempts to redistribute political important sector of society not believing in Venezuelans want to and economic resources peacefully? Or is the the electoral process. find an alternative to alternative authoritarianism and/or conflict and violence? Therefore, it was necessary to rebuild con- continued polarization fidence in the electoral process and restore and potential violence. The final speaker on the panel, José Vir- the legitimacy of the CNE. The non-govern- tuoso,6 shifted attention to the state of the mental organization Ojo Electoral focused its electoral process in Venezuela. He provided energy on those tasks and, in particular, on an overview of recent elections, concluding efforts to forge agreements between differ- that, while the votes have been conducted in ent actors to support a transparent and fair a technically sound manner, they have failed electoral process. The behavior of both the to serve as an effective means of mediating political opposition and President Chávez political conflict. contributed to improving the electoral climate. The opposition united behind one The August 2004 presidential referendum main candidate, who was in turn able to took place in a climate of extreme po- gain national recognition. Chávez engaged larization and political intolerance. The fully in the electoral campaign, creating a Carter Center, which observed the elections, climate of competition. reported some irregularities that largely stemmed from lack of transparency and the At a technical level, a fundamental problem ad hoc operating style of the National Elec- was the voter registry, which was widely ques- toral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral or tioned. Studies by various universities and by CNE). The political opposition declared the Ojo Electoral ultimately concluded that while elections fraudulent – though no evidence of there were many inaccuracies and inconsis- this was provided – and refused to recognize tencies in the registry, these would not affect Chávez’s victory. The government, in turn, the outcome of national elections (though disqualified the opposition and took repri- these concerns would need to be addressed

6 Jesuit priest Francisco José Virtuoso Arrieta is director of the Jesuit Center for Research and Social Action of Venezuela and is a founder and board member of Ojo Electoral, a non-governmental organization created in 2004 to promote free and fair elections in Venezuela.

10 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges prior to regional and local elections). Ques- been overshadowed by the actions taken by tions also arose regarding the automated vot- President Chávez since he won re-election. ing system. The CNE, Ojo Electoral, and the The present political climate again serves to political parties worked together to develop further political polarization. a technical auditing system to guarantee that all votes would be cast secretly, a fundamen- Much of the discussion that followed tal pillar of free elections. focused on the issue of democracy. Several in the audience pointed out that Venezuela In addition, an electoral observation system tried representative democracy for many years was put in place that allowed for political and it did not work, hence people are seeking parties and civil society groups to observe the a new model. Margarita López Maya elaborat- voting. This included a manual audit of more ed that many people perceive improvements than half of the votes cast to ensure that in their quality of life and do not necessarily the paper ballot results coincided with the care if political space is closing, as they have Many people perceive electronic voting results, procedures to check never felt represented before. It is now the improvements in their ballot tallies at each voting table, and other middle and upper classes that feel excluded. oversight mechanisms of the official tally. quality of life and do López Maya also reiterated that the not necessarily care if Ojo Electoral concluded that the selection democratic framework is still in place in political space is closing, of members for regional and local electoral Venezuela, as Chávez was democratically boards for the December 3, 2006, elections elected. Moreover, social equity is very basic as they have never felt followed established procedures and worked to democracy. She noted, however, that represented before. effectively. However, concerns were raised the country lacks some important aspects regarding the use of public funds for political of a democratic regime, most importantly, campaigns, particularly in the case of the pluralism and tolerance of differences. She president. On election day, Ojo Electoral also pointed out that Venezuelans have lived carried out a quick count based on 337 in a polarized society for the last ten to fifteen voting tables; the results coincided with the years; they can live for a long time in an official count. The systems just described aggravated society, where tensions surge and functioned effectively and no major then subside. abnormalities were reported by the Ojo Electoral observation team. Michael Shifter clarified his earlier remarks, indicating that, while there are many Virtuoso concluded by noting that the elec- weaknesses – such as the lack of checks and tions were successful from the point of view balances and likely splits within Chavismo – of democratic participation. Of particular he would not expect the Chávez government importance, the political parties, civil society to collapse any time soon, pointing to the organizations, and the CNE reached accords relative longevity of General Pinochet in on how to ensure the transparency and fair- Chile, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Fidel ness of the electoral process. Despite some Castro in Cuba. The question, according to continuing weaknesses, the CNE effectively Shifter, is whether or not Chávez is putting carried out its mandate. As a result, the into place the mechanisms that he needs to outcome was widely accepted. Constructive govern effectively and therefore maintain dialogue and respect for democratic institu- power. In short, there are two contradictory tions contributed to a sound electoral process. forces at work: on the one hand, the staying According to Virtuoso, the dialogue and power that such regimes have shown in compromises that took place on so vital an Latin America historically; and on the other, issue as the electoral process illustrate the the vulnerabilities described earlier and capacity for Venezuelans to seek and find the growing problem of common crime and common solutions and show that many Ven- citizen insecurity. ezuelans want to find an alternative to con- tinued polarization and potential violence. Jennifer McCoy added that, while Chávez Unfortunately, this democratic advance has benefits from electoral legitimacy now, that

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 11 condition will not last, as the erosion of and in particular, the topic of evaluating the checks and balances will eventually leave the misiones. While Chávez’s anti-poverty record is electoral process without effective oversight crucial to understanding the political dynam- mechanisms. At what point will the country ics underway in the country, most analysis and cross the line of elections that are not accept- debate about it tend to be prejudiced by anti- able enough? Similarly, Virtuoso pointed out or pro-Chávez viewpoints. There is a need for that a weakness of the last campaign was the a more nuanced understanding of his policy inability of the CNE to exert control over initiatives, or we run the risk of losing the les- the president as a candidate. The CNE, the sons learned from this social experiment. judiciary, and citizens more broadly are in- creasingly unable to set limits on presidential Turning to global anti-poverty initiatives, power and actions. Buxton pointed out that progress towards poverty reduction has been fitful and halt- A related debate was the extent to which ing and that the international community is there is open dialogue and debate within not likely to reach its stated goal of halving Chavismo. According to López Maya, there the number of people living in poverty by is evident discussion, debate, and dissent, 2015. Some programs – such as conditional though people are very cautious as they know cash transfers – have had interesting results, that Chávez seeks to destroy any opposi- but have not led to a rapid and progressive Panelist Julia Buxton of Georgetown University and the University of tion. They have learned that they cannot diminution of poverty. Bradford, UK, addressed the need be confrontational. In contrast, Shifter sees for more comprehensive evaluation little room for dissent and McCoy claims that Among what has been learned to date about of the impact of the misiones in Venezuela. (Photo: Jeremy Bigwood) while there was space for dissent previously, it poverty reduction, Buxton emphasized: has been closing since January 2007. She also  Poverty reduction strategies have limited pointed to the weakening of the National As- viability and sustainability if they do not sembly and the move to create a single party allow people to exercise decision mak- as other indicators of the shrinking delibera- ing and identify their own needs; are tive space within Chavismo. delivered top down; and do not enhance political capacity;

PANEL II: Institutions  Sectoral interventions in education, and Public Policies health care, etc., may lead to improve- ments in social development indicators, The second panel delved deeper into the but will not lead to reductions in income content of Chávez’s 21st Century Socialism, poverty unless they are part of a package as well as the roots of the popular support of interventions that are supported by for President Chávez. More in-depth sustained fiscal expenditures; and analysis was provided of the misiones and the government’s efforts to both improve  Meaningful reductions in poverty and people’s daily lives and redistribute income. inequality in particular require the redis- Panelists also laid out human rights and tribution of wealth and the redistribution rule of law issues not discussed in detail of the means of wealth generation. previously, and dealt with the thorny questions related to citizen security and Efforts to redistribute wealth affect vested and increased crime and violence. The content material interests and hence by definition are and meaning of democracy continued to be divisive and conflict inducing, as is so evident a subject of debate. in Venezuela today.

Julia Buxton7 launched the panel, focusing With respect to the misiones, Buxton her remarks on social policy in Venezuela asserted that, in theoretical terms and

7 Julia Buxton is a visiting professor in the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University and a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.

12 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges MISIÓN DATE OF CREATION GOAL Misión Barrio Adentro April 2003 Health and well-being Misión Robinson I July 2003 Literacy Misión Sucre July 2003 Creating more openings in universities Misión Miranda October 2003 Organization of the military reserves Misión Robinson II October 2003 Elementary education Misión Ribas November 2003 Secondary education, for high school drop-outs Misión Mercal January 2004 Access to a basic basket of goods, including food and medicine, for the poorest populations Misión Identidad February 2004 Documentation of the entire population Misión Vuelvan Caras March 2004 Developing programs to involve more citizens in efforts for sustainable development Misión Habitat August 2004 Construction of new housing units for the poor Misión Guaicaipuro October 2004 Food safety, health, education, and land reform initiatives in favor of indigenous groups Misión Pilar October 2004 Support for miners and for environmentally-sound mining practices Misión Zamora January 2005 Land reform, expropriation of large estates Misión Cultura July 2005 Enhancement of cultural identity and education about Venezuelan culture Misión Negra Hipólita January 2006 Gathering information about the needs of and providing for the homeless

Sources: http://www.mem.gob.ve/misiones/index.php and D’Elia, Yolanda, “Las Misiones Sociales en Venezuela: una aproximación a su comprensión y análisis,” Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales in Caracas, Venezuela, October 2006. despite some flaws, the Venezuelan A balanced assessment of the programs is Poor people are not government is in fact pursuing what leading needed, one that looks at both their good somehow irrational development institutions consider best and bad aspects. Buxton then laid out some practices, for the following reasons: issues that should be taken into account if they support in such an assessment. First is the need to a movement or  The misiones are a complete, integrated be holistic in evaluating the misiones. For package of social policy interventions; government that example, disputes over the illiteracy rate are  The government has sought to improve not a satisfactory basis for rejecting the mis- provides their families access to credit; iones all together. Second, other economic with basic medicines variables need to be factored in, such as  The programs are predicated on popular and educational the severe economic recession in 2002 and empowerment, grassroots delivery, and 2003. A third issue is that of sustainability, opportunities. popular identification of need; though she noted that many major capital  The programs are largely financed from outlays – such as schools and purchases of taxes and hence are not dependent on medical equipment – have already been commodity fiscal streams; and made. Finally, she pointed to the need to engage in qualitative and not merely quan-  Gender issues are mainstreamed into the titative analysis. Looking at the traditional misiones. quantitative indicator data is not enough; evaluators need to go into communities and Indeed, the social programs have had a posi- talk to people. What Buxton has learned in tive impact on poverty and inequality in the her field research in Venezuela is that people country. However, the extent of that impact feel a tremendous sense of empowerment has yet to be determined. Buxton qualified and opportunity, which she had not found her assertions by noting that there is a lack of in her previous 15 years of working in and good empirical research and data on the pov- on the country. erty reducing impacts of the misiones. More- over, it is difficult to disaggregate the poverty Latin America has the dubious distinction of reducing impacts of high oil prices, economic being the most unequal region in the world, growth, and increased public spending from with significant percentages of people living the direct impacts of the misiones. in extreme poverty. There is a pressing need

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 13 for a wider and While Venezuela has always aspired to dem- more serious ocratic regimes and the ideal of opportunities debate on poverty for all, the political system – with few excep- reduction in the tions – has been characterized by too much Americas, one power in the executive branch, arbitrariness, that is not ideo- corruption, lack of transparency, economic logically driven or inequality and poverty, and inefficient public dogmatically “free services. Almost all democratic govern- trade.” To poten- ments have come to power promising voters tially discard the to overcome these impediments to progress. lessons learned For many Venezuelans, Chávez’s triumph from the misiones in 1999 represented an opportunity to do experience in just that. The vast majority, including those Venezuela be- in the opposition, saw a new constitution cause of political as necessary for transforming the country. prejudices would Despite the fact that Chávez engineered a be detrimental for constituent assembly composed mostly of his A banner from the December 2006 presidential elections urges Venezuelans to vote for Chávez and “against the devil, against the empire.” (Photo: Avery the whole region. supporters, the final text of that constitution Davis-Roberts, The Carter Center) Finally, Buxton represented an important advance in human noted that U.S. rights, citizen participation, and mechanisms policymakers need to understand that grind- for direct democracy. ingly poor people are not somehow irrational if they support a movement or government President Chávez clearly enjoys majority sup- that provides their families with basic medi- port and his popular message has resonance; cines and educational opportunities, and they however, he also taken on a quasi-religious should seek to understand the widespread cult like figure. His notion of “the people” global rejection of market-based solutions includes only his supporters, he is intoler- and the strength of the demands for inclusive ant of criticism, and he uses a militaristic and meaningful citizenship. discourse, with political opponents viewed as the enemy. Many of Venezuela’s problems In contrast to the panel’s first speaker, persist and some are even worse. Carlos Ayala8 painted a worrisome picture of the state of human rights and Ayala then turned to the situation of victims democratic institutions in Venezuela today. of violence. Venezuela’s homicide rate has He began by putting the present situation risen sharply since the early 1990s, especially in its historical context. Over the course in large cities, and the number of murder of its nearly 200 years of independence, victims reached approximately 12,000 in Venezuela has had 16 revolutions and 27 2006. The victims are for the most part poor, constitutions. Moreover, political and males, minorities, and unemployed. Impunity constitutional changes have almost always is the norm for these cases, over 90 percent of been carried out under the banner of Simón which remain unsanctioned. Citizen security Bolívar, Venezuela’s liberator. Historically, is further eroded by paramilitary police death militarism and Bolivarism have gone hand squads. According to official statistics, from in hand, as military leaders have governed 2000 through 2005, 6,034 police officers were the country the majority of the time. Each under investigation for arbitrary executions, new “revolutionary” government has sought yet not one has received a final conviction. to break with the past, inaugurating a Of particular concern are the sicarios, or hired new epoch with a new constitution while guns, that operate in rural areas where there invoking the historical legacy of Bolívar. are land disputes.

8 Presently a professor at the Andrés Bello Catholic University and at the Central University of Venezuela, Carlos M. Ayala is the President of the Andean Commission of Jurists and the former president of the OAS’s Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

14 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges Another pressing problem is prison violence, the station’s right to report the news, but also which has worsened over the last eight the people’s right to receive it. years. Between 1999 and 2006, 2,744 murders and 9,524 wounded were reported, Human rights and other non-governmental out of a prison population of about 18,000. organizations (NGOs) have also been subject More prisoners are killed in Venezuelan to attacks and intimidation because of their prisons than in any other South American work. Legislation pending approval in the country. Ayala asserted that the government National Assembly (the International Coop- appears to be more interested in exerting eration Law) would severely restrict the work political control than in controlling crime. of some NGOs. As evidence, he cited the rapid turnover of personnel in key positions in the Ministries Ayala concluded by noting that nearly 40 A true democracy is of Justice and Interior (nine ministers) and percent of the Venezuelan electorate voted the Director of Prisons (15 directors). This for the political opposition. These Venezu- measured by how the has made it impossible to design and execute elans have the right to be recognized and majority respects the effective policies. represented as citizens, with full liberties – including the right to oppose the govern- rights of the minority. The justice system is also an old problem that ment via democratic means. A true democ- Unfortunately, in in some respects has worsened. Undeniable racy is measured by how the majority respects Venezuela today only operational advances are evident in issues re- the rights of the minority. Unfortunately, in lated to labor and minors. However, the jus- Venezuela today only those who support the those who support the tice system is characterized by impunity, lack president are first-class citizens; those who president are first- of independence, and inadequate professional oppose him are second-class. Those in the class citizens; those formation of judges. Of particular concern, first class have access to benefits and jobs; an expanded Supreme Court has shown clear those in the second class feel excluded and who oppose him are bias towards the government in its rulings, are discriminated against. Given this situa- second-class. and political interference has also hindered tion, the challenge facing the country today the work of other courts. Judicial indepen- is how to strengthen and deepen pluralistic dence – an essential element of democracy and constitutional democracy for all sectors – is sorely lacking. of society.

Setbacks are also evident in freedom of Daniel Hellinger9 began his presentation expression. Ayala pointed to the criminal- with brief comments on a survey of grassroots ization of public protest, in response to the attitudes towards democracy in Venezuela, peaceful public mobilizations that have conducted with Luis Lander. The interviews occurred in recent years. Violent repression were conducted in popular and middle class of such protests is increasing, and criminal neighborhoods with a high level of commu- charges are now sometimes filed against nity organizing, so it was not a representative those involved in the protests. Other viola- national sample. Moreover, it was completed tions of free speech include intimidation in August 2006 and significant changes have and physical aggression toward reporters and taken place since then. Thus, it is a snapshot censorship. In 2006, three journalists were of attitudes within particular communities at killed, presumably because of their work, and a particular moment in time, and should be judicial charges were filed against numerous analyzed as such. journalists. On December 28, 2006, President Chávez announced his decision not to renew The results of the survey show that participa- the contract of the privately-owned RCTV, tion in neighborhood organizations is rela- which is viewed nationwide and widely tively high. Venezuelans in both lower and among popular sectors. This affects not only middle class neighborhoods remain highly

9 Daniel Hellinger is a Professor of Political Science at Webster University in St. Louis, Missouri, and is President of the Venezuela section of the Latin American Studies Association.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 15 committed to the more traditional charac- the president. RCTV “makes FOX TV teristics of representative democracy, and look like the BBC.” It does not help to contrary to conventional wisdom, they show build tolerance, despite its popular appeal. a high tolerance for dissenting views. They Hellinger said that the more important remain deeply pessimistic about political par- question about RCTV is to whom and for ties and their relationship to democracy. what purpose the license will be re-allocated. It is not clear that Regarding the present political situation, With regard to Chávez’s authority to rule Chávez will succeed in Hellinger maintained that “hope,” “anxiety,” by decree during an 18-month period, the uniting all the left. The and “astonishment” best describe the actions first two decree powers – transformation of taken by President Chávez since his landslide the institutions of the state and civic par- looming questions are re-election on December 3. His re-national- ticipation – enable Chávez to try to bolster how a single party will ization of important sectors of the economy “popular participation” mechanisms, espe- be organized internally may have little support in the country’s cially the communal councils, and to redraw middle class, but it is widely popular among the jurisdictions of states and municipali- and how party officers the majority of the population. The public ties. This raises the question, brought up in and nominations for is similarly aligned over his plans to amend the first panel, of how the organs of popular office will be filled the constitution to allow him to stand for power will relate to local governments. The another re-election and to redraw the system communal councils are the next generation of municipalities and states. of popular participation after the Bolivar- ian Movements. Already, 18,000 communal Hellinger presented a different view than councils have been formed. Two-hundred those previously articulated regarding families must register to form one council, Chávez’s decision not to renew the although communities are petitioning for a broadcasting license of the RCTV station. lower number in rural areas. In his opinion, the announcement should hardly have come as a surprise, given the Why has the president decided to legislate media’s central role in the coup against through decree rather than entrust policy to a legislature controlled almost entirely by supporters of his revolution? In Hellinger’s view, Chávez is attempting a non-violent Cultural Revolution; in other words, he is trying to make an end run around his own political establishment. Chávez is frustrated with his own bureaucracy and mid-level political leadership. For the same reason, he is trying to force the hand of his coali- tion partners by requiring that they form the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Chávez has some grounds for believing that at this moment, he can use his charisma to launch a popular movement that will accomplish his goals.

It is not clear, however, that Chávez will succeed in uniting all of the left. Reading between the lines of the three largest minor- ity partners in his coalition, their declara- tions on the PSUV considerably hedge their commitment to unity. The key variable is not whether the PSUV can formulate an ideo-

Patients wait for medical care at Misión Barrio Adentro in Caracas, November 2006. (Photo: Fernando Llano, logical manifesto acceptable to all; rather, the Associated Press) looming questions are how a single party will

16 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges be organized internally and how party officers transcends the basic principles of liberal de- and nominations for office will be filled. mocracy, characterized by periodic elections, separation of powers, and freedom of expres- The experience in the Chavista labor sector sion. While also incorporating this definition, suggests a minefield ahead for forging unity. the 1999 constitution includes multiple forms There are serious disputes within the of popular participation and underscores the Bolivarian labor movement about labor rights pursuit of social justice. in endogenous development projects, such as cooperatives and co-managed companies, and Those governing Venezuela today understand about how to elect its own leadership. These democracy to include the construction of a same issues are likely to re-emerge when the just model of social organization and social PSUV tries to organize itself. In the end, relations, as well as the democratization of Chávez will likely have to intervene personally, power and wealth in a profoundly unequal which is probably not what he wants. society. This concept of democracy has been Ironically, the best embraced by a growing percentage of the measure of Chávez’s However, if Chávez is successful in creating electorate: 56.2 percent in the 1998 presi- a united front, will the members of either dential elections, 59.9 percent in the 2000 success in creating a popular organizations or the PSUV be able presidential elections, 59.1 percent in the United Socialist Party of to say “no” to their leader? In Hellinger’s 2004 referendum, and 62.9 percent in the view, an invigorated participatory democracy December elections, according to the CNE. Venezuela (PSUV) will combined with representative democracy The construction of this new form of demo- be whether the party is the ideal. In the case of Venezuela, the cratic socialism will be defined in the next is able to say “no” to its profound distrust of political parties transfers period of government. sometimes into a lack of confidence in repre- own creator. sentative government, which is why within The social policy of the Chávez government Chavismo there are sectors calling for the differs significantly from that of his prede- replacement of representative with participa- cessors. There are three main conceptual tory democracy. Actively involved citizens differences: can invigorate representative democracy, but the system will only work if people are  The proactive role of the state in correct- empowered to go in a different direction than ing inequality through public policy and Chávez, should they so desire. Ironically, the redistribution of wealth; the best measure of Chávez’s success will be  “Positive discrimination” in favor of whether the PSUV is able to say “no” to its the poorest sectors of society, as seen own creator. Another telling sign will be how through the lens of universal rights; the PSUV conducts itself in local elections and scheduled for 2008.  The stimulation of popular participation, In concluding, Hellinger noted that all paths such that the goal is not only to redis- are open in Venezuela at the moment. While tribute wealth but also to democratize there are reasons for concern, Venezuela political power. must also be viewed as a great experiment in decentralization of budget-making authority The primary indicator of the government’s and grassroots democratization. political will to redistribute wealth is social spending, which doubled as a percentage The final speaker, Antonio González Pless- of GDP between 1998 and 2005, when it mann,10 further elaborated on what democ- reached 14.69 percent. The impact is evident racy means in Venezuela today. Since the in public policies in health, education, the 1998 election, the concept of democracy that distribution of land, social security, job train- Chávez has offered to the country is one that ing, and food security.

10 Sociologist Antonio José González Plessmann is the Diagnostic Coordinator of the National Commission for Police Reform of the Ministries of Justice and the Interior and has also worked in the Ministry of Planning and Development.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 17 Greater resources invested in education, of political change underway, intolerance for example, have led to greater coverage. and sectarianism, the lack of mechanisms for The number of children in class compared evaluating and strengthening new institu- to the number that should be there doubled tions, the creation of new economic elites for pre-school age and increased between 7 protected by the state, and the inability to and 12 percent in other educational levels. control crime, which primarily affects popu- Through the Misión Róbinson 1, nearly 1.5 lar sector youth. million people achieved literacy. As a result, UNESCO has declared Venezuela free of Given these contradictions and inconsisten- illiteracy. All together, nearly two and a cies, it is easy to conclude either that democ- half million people have benefited from the racy is critically wounded or dead, or that initiatives in education. While many prob- the democratization of society is underway. The number of protests lems in the education system remain, clear Data can be found to support the conclusions for social rights has advances are being achieved. that stem from one’s ideological perspective. However, what is undeniable is that on nu- doubled since the Similar gains have been made in social secu- merous occasions Venezuelans have had the previous government; rity, where coverage has increased for retirees, opportunity to choose between very different in food distribution, and in health care. These political projects, exercising their political the vast majority advances have taken place in the context of rights without unleashing extreme violence. of the protagonists economic growth, decreasing unemployment are popular sectors and underemployment, and increases in the The principal challenge for Venezuelans purchasing power of salaries. As a result, rates today is to strengthen democratic tendencies where support for the of poverty and critical poverty have declined; while neutralizing the authoritarian tenden- government is high. the former fell to 19.9 percent in the first half cies evident in the political process. Towards of 2006 and the latter to 12.9 percent. that end, there is much that the United States can do. The U.S. inclination to inter- Changes in social policy are accompanied by vene in Venezuela in various ways, contrary increased local participation in many forms. to the self-determination of peoples, fuels While problems of paternalism, clientelism, both the most conservative and the most left- and bureaucracy persist, the number and wing sectors and stimulates sectarianism. The variety of experiences in participation are challenge is to manage the two countries’ encouraging. Interestingly, social sectors undeniable differences within the framework continue to mobilize to press their demands of the international legal consensus in the before the state. The number of protests for OAS Charter, via diplomatic channels. social rights has doubled since the previous government; the vast majority of the protago- Two issues were repeatedly raised in the nists are popular sectors where support for the wide-ranging discussion that followed the government is the strongest. For González presentations. The first is the role of the mis- Plessmann, progress in constructing social iones and their relationship with state institu- democracy is advancing slowly but insuf- tions ostensibly tasked with providing similar ficiently, as Venezuela continues to have a or the same services. According to Julia very unequal distribution of wealth. Buxton, the misiones were created precisely because state institutions were so ineffective Venezuelans are living through a political and hence they are a very de-institutionalized process that is ambiguous and contradictory. project that at some level does create parallel Various tendencies point to the democrati- institutions. This is a big challenge for do- zation of power and wealth: popular sectors nors: how to promote pro-poor growth when are more aware of their rights and are better state structures do not work and the poor do organized, and policies are now in place not have access to them? Realistically, more that improve their ability to meet basic informal structures must be relied upon. In needs. Yet other tendencies point in another the opinion of Antonio González Plessmann, direction: continued corruption, Chávez’s this is an unresolved problem and is the big- cult-like figure which weakens the process gest weakness of the misiones.

18 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges One member of the audience raised the ques- domestic elites have conspicuously failed to tion of the extent to which the misiones are a address these issues. hand-out program as opposed to a means for promoting long-term development. González Discussion also returned to the issue of Plessmann acknowledged that they do func- democracy. Carlos Ayala noted that justice tion largely as an emergency response, but is one of the most important components of noted that slow progress is being made in insti- a democratic system. Interestingly, in both tutionalizing their role. Buxton took issue with poor and middle class sectors, Venezuelans the way in which the concept of the welfare point to the importance of a judiciary where state was being questioned, maintaining that all citizens are treated equally. For the middle “the welfare state creates citizens, not beggars” class this may be a more abstract concept, but and that the role of the state is to create op- for the poor it has to do with their daily lives. portunities by providing benefits to its citizens. They encounter injustice when they relate to The principal challenge the police, to violence, to the court system for Venezuelans The second issue was the question of whether and the prisons. For the poor, judicial inde- and to what extent Chávez is a destabilizing pendence in reality means better treatment, today is to strengthen influence in the region. Pointing out the U.S. less violence, and access to justice in general. democratic tendencies government’s long record of intervention Therefore, the call for judicial independence while neutralizing across the region, Daniel Hellinger wondered is not only a mechanism of political control “how can you even ask about Venezuela?” within a democracy, but has very direct im- the authoritarian The more interesting question for Hellinger plications for the daily lives of those from the tendencies evident in is how Chávez carries out diplomacy as it poorest sectors of society, who are hurt most relates to social movements. For example, when judicial independence does not exist. the political process. there are some sound reasons for Venezuela to have positive relations with Iran, but should Chávez be embracing a president who Panel III: Energy is widely criticized by social movements in his own country? Often, what Chávez wants is and Foreign Policy at odds with indigenous and environmental The final panel focused on the complex movements in his own and other countries. issues of oil and energy policy. The topic ran through the day’s discussions, as oil revenues González Plessmann noted that U.S. state- have provided the resources necessary for ments to the effect that Venezuela poses a the Chávez government’s social policies and danger for Latin America arouse fear in the its ambitious foreign policy. Specific topics country, since similar expressions by the U.S. explored in this panel included Venezuela’s government have in other circumstances re- role in the global oil industry, its effort to sulted in direct intervention. (In the previous diversity partners and the role of China in panel, Jennifer McCoy had stated that there that effort, its historical role in OPEC, and was no possibility of a U.S. invasion, due to its petro-diplomacy. A contentious topic was lack of political support within the United whether or not Venezuela is a reliable oil States and the lack of operational capacity partner for the United States. Finally, the of U.S. troops, now spread very thin. Rather, Chávez government’s broader foreign policy the fear of an invasion is created by Venezu- and regional role were analyzed. elan political leaders.) Roger Tissot11 opened the panel with an According to Buxton, Chávez has found a overview of global and regional trends as they niche internationally as he heads one of the relate to Venezuelan energy policy. Picking few governments tackling the difficult issues up on comments by previous speakers, he of poverty and exclusion. U.S. disengagement noted that the benefits of globalization have from the region has hurt its credibility, while been unevenly distributed and clustered in a

11 Roger Tissot is a Director in PFC Energy’s Country Strategies practice, where he is responsible for conducting political, energy sector, and economic analysis on Latin America. He has also worked for numerous Canadian-based energy companies.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 19 few prosperous countries, which is one factor moving trade barriers and seeking to deepen leading to expression of different regional and market integration. However, this approach national political alternatives. Within this failed to solve the inequity problem. Trade global climate, the sense of energy insecurity liberalization increased the wage gap between is increasing for both consumers and skilled and unskilled workers, reduced formal producers, creating suspicions on both sides. employment, and forced more workers into Four factors are at play: the informal economy. Today, the political  Industrialized countries question the inten- landscape has shifted significantly, as dis- tions and capabilities of resource holders; content with the Washington Consensus has grown and electoral results show a deep  Resource holders question the polarization based on income differences. sustainability of demand;  Competition for access to energy resources Though many analysts characterize recently from industrializing Asia is creating greater elected governments as left-wing and popu- competition for resources; and list, they are better described as “neo-popu- The sense of energy  Populations of the major resource list,” in that they have learned from the past holders are demanding a greater share and are fiscally conservative. They are paying insecurity is increasing of revenues. off debts and accumulating reserves as protec- for both consumers tion from external shocks, and monetary Asia and the Middle East will rival the policies are keeping inflation under control. and producers in United States and Europe for energy demand In addition, trade surpluses have allowed for the global market, by 2016. China in particular is generating large international reserves accumulation. creating suspicions significant energy insecurity as it is buying However, other problems remain prevalent up reserves in many countries to fulfill its across the region, including low savings rates, on both sides. resource needs. high levels of spending, and a severe infra- structure development deficit. From the point of view of the international oil companies, industry costs are rising and Within the international and regional it is increasingly difficult to replace reserves. context, oil and commodity exporting Most of the remaining oil reserves are in the countries are the “winners,” while oil hands of governments or state oil companies; importing and manufacturing exporters are there is less “real estate” available and what is the “losers.” As the hydrocarbon powerhouse, there tends not to be in the hands of friendly Venezuela is well positioned. Tissot pointed governments. As a result, oil companies out that Latin America holds the largest are “rule-takers and price-takers.” As petroleum reserves in the world after the resource nationalism has surged, national oil Middle East, but that these are unequally companies have been strengthened, reversing distributed. Venezuela holds nearly 70 previous privatization trends. However, doors percent of the total proven Latin American are not being closed to private investors; hydrocarbon reserves. If extra heavy crude rather, they are active participants through oil is included, Venezuela’s oil reserves rival strategic partnerships and production sharing those of Saudi Arabia. agreements. According to Tissot, Venezuela is a trend-setter in this regard, as it seeks to Venezuela is taking advantage of its oil obtain a greater share of oil profits. abundance to leverage development, promote regional integration, and reduce dependence He then turned to the situation in Latin on the United States. The current national America. Because of the decline in oil development strategy is aimed at promoting production in many non-OPEC countries, in- economic improvements in the long-ne- creasingly the solution for energy demand is glected center-south region of the country, in Latin America. Traditionally aligned with as well as implementing the social programs the Washington Consensus model of eco- previously described. Regionally, oil is used nomic development, most Latin American for forging foreign relationships, such as with countries adopted globalization policies of re- Cuba and the Caribbean. Venezuela is provid-

20 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges ing significant economic support to friendly when Venezuela was the first oil-exporting governments such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and country in the world and sought to work Nicaragua. It is also seeking to diversify with governments from the Middle East as markets and thereby reduce its dependence on they entered the market. OPEC, the most the United States. Key to that effort is China, successful association of producer countries of which is building factories and helping with raw materials, was created in 1960 largely due technology transfer in exchange for oil. to the work of government ministers from Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. Also, the San In conclusion, Tissot noted that Venezuela José Agreement was signed in 1980 by the faces many challenges ahead. As oil represents governments of Venezuela and Mexico (the 80 percent of export revenues, its economy is producer countries) and 11 Central American increasingly vulnerable to oil price declines. and Caribbean countries to provide financing Oil profits have financed massive spending, facilities to help non-producer countries cope but excess liquidity is causing inflation, which with high oil prices. The core of the accord could prevent the country from meeting was a schedule indicating when the full price its investment and other goals. Significant for oil was to be paid or when a sliding scale investments by Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. would take effect, indicating what percentage (PDVSA), the state-owned oil company, are of the sale would be paid outright and what needed to meet the government’s ambitious percentage would be financed, depending on Luis Lander of the Central University production goals, but such investments could the price of oil. A very similar accord – the of Venezuela discusses the use of compete with social programs that now also Caracas Energy Agreement – was reached energy resources in Venezuela as a diplomatic lever in international capture a significant percentage of PDVSA in October 2000 between Venezuela and relations. (Photo: Jeremy Bigwood) revenues. The government will have to ad- Central American and Caribbean countries, dress the increasing macroeconomic imbal- also based on a financing scheme. ances, which could suggest the need for a more modest foreign policy in the future. Lander then turned to Venezuela’s Venezuela is taking Petroamérica project. Although there is no The next presentation, by Luis Lander,12 defined structure, Petroamérica encompasses advantage of its oil focused on the use of energy resources in three distinct initiatives: Petrocaribe, Petrosur abundance to leverage Venezuela as a diplomatic lever in interna- (which includes the Mercosur countries), and development, promote tional relations. For this to be successful in Petroandino. The latter was originally con- any country, three specific conditions must ceived as part of the Andean Community of regional integration, and be met. First, the country needs to have the Nations, but since Venezuela has pulled out, reduce dependence on resource, be it oil or another commodity. As cooperation continues to take place bilater- explained by the previous speaker, Venezuela ally with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colom- the United States. is an energy powerhouse, with the largest bia. In each case, Venezuela is seeking to use reserves in the hemisphere and the sixth larg- oil as a tool for regional integration. est in the world. It is also the fifth largest ex- porter of petroleum in the world. Second, the Petrocaribe is the most structured initiative. product market needs to be strong. At times Venezuela is the only supplier country oil is a consumer market, but right now prices involved, while 13 Caribbean countries are high and producers have the upper hand, have signed on to receive benefits. The creating opportunities for oil diplomacy. The arrangement is very similar to the accords third key ingredient is political will to use oil just described, with payment schemes and as a tool in international relations – which is financing mechanisms based on the price of clearly the situation in Venezuela today. oil. However, Petrocaribe goes further, as it includes additional investments, such as in Lander pointed out that the country has oil refineries. For example, an oil refinery a long history of such engagement, going in Cienfuegos, Cuba, is being reactivated back to the late 1940s and early 1950s and is expected to start operations in 2007;

12 Luis E. Lander is a mechanical engineer and a professor in the school of Social Sciences and Economics at the Central University of Venezuela.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 21 old refineries in Kingston, Jamaica, and Finally, an agreement was signed with in Dominica are also being reactivated. Uruguay to increase the capacity of an oil Efforts are also underway to increase refinery there. Significant investments oil transportation and storage capacity. by PDVSA, the state- Venezuela presently operates a fleet of 21 Petroandino is the weakest of the three initia- owned oil company, oil tankers, with plans to increase that to 51 tives, largely because it involves countries in the coming years to increase its ability to that all pump and export oil, though not are needed to meet the serve the region and the rest of the world. on the scale of Venezuela. A gas pipeline government’s ambitious is being constructed to connect Caribbean In the case of Petrosur, bringing together ports in Venezuela and Colombia. In 2006, production goals, but Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and an agreement was being negotiated to refine such investments could Venezuela, the most important component Ecuadorian oil in Venezuela and return it compete with social is the envisioned trans-Amazon pipeline. to Ecuador in the form of by-products. The While it is not yet fully defined and many negotiations were derailed due to the politi- programs that now also environmental concerns have yet to be cal situation in Ecuador, but with the Correa capture a significant resolved, recently President Chávez and government in place the agreement is now percentage of PDVSA Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva expected to advance. formally agreed to begin work on the gas revenues. pipeline. The initial branch would run from In conclusion, Venezuela’s strategy is to eastern Venezuela to northeastern Brazil. use energy resources to create a network of The two governments have also agreed to inter-relationships among governments of build refineries with high output potentials. the region that strengthens regional integra- tion. However, other govern- ments are undertaking similar Venezuela: The Hydrocarbon Powerhouse initiatives. For example, last year Mexico and Colombia promoted a Meso-America After the Middle East, Latin America holds Proven World Oil Reserves, 2005 (billion barrels) Energy Integration Pro- 800 the largest petroleum reserves in the world. gram for Central American 700 countries. While the logic is Reserves are unevenly distributed, with 600 different than that employed Venezuela holding nearly 70% of the total 500 in Petrocaribe, it is clearly in Latin American hydrocarbon reserves. 400 Orinoco Belt competition with it.

300 If the extra heavy crude oil is included, 200 Venezuela is also seeking to Venezuela’s oil reserves compete with 100 diversify the markets for its Saudi Arabia’s. 0 oil. Currently, about 60 per- Middle East Former Soviet Latin America Africa United States Asia Others Union (FSU) & Orinoco Belt & Canada cent of Venezuela’s oil exports are purchased by the United States, accounting for 10 to Proven World Gas Reserves, 2005 (trillion cubic feet) 3000 12 percent of U.S. oil imports. Venezuela’s desire to diversify 2500 Other S. & C. America 1% Mexico 12% markets away from the United Argentina 2% 2000 States is seen by some as a Brazil 10% 1500 threat to U.S. energy security.

Colombia 1% To the extent that Venezuela 1000 Ecuador 4% is seen through the lens of Trinidad & Tobago 1% Peru 1% 500 U.S. energy security, tensions will continue in bilateral rela- Venezuela 68% 0 Middle Former Soviet Latin Africa United States Asia Others E.U. East Union (FSU) America & Canada tions.

Sources: PFC Energy, BP and PDVSA A very different perspec- tive was presented by Carl

22 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges Meacham,13 who spoke about how energy economy, President issues and U.S.-Venezuelan relations are Chávez is using oil viewed on Capitol Hill. According to revenues to subsidize Meacham, the bipartisan consensus in the supporters and other U.S. Congress regarding Venezuela and countries. energy is clear: Venezuela is an unreliable supplier of oil. Recent events contributing to In addition, Venezu- this consensus include: elan oil production is declining. Though  The Venezuelan government’s vow to strip some of the world’s biggest oil com- Venezuelan officials panies of their controlling stakes in heavy note that supply to oil projects in the Orinoco Belt by May 1, the United States 2007; continues uninter- rupted, many sources  The impending nationalization of the oil support the conclu- sector; and sion that Venezuelan  Statements by Venezuela’s Ministers crude oil production of Oil and Foreign Affairs that the is falling. The coun- Ana María Sanjuán of the Central University of Venezuela and Carl Meacham of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee comment on energy and Venezuelan economy can do fine without try pumped about 3 foreign policy. (Photo: WOLA) the billion dollar purchases and invest- million barrels of oil ment of the United States. per day in 2001, but this year output is forecast to fall to 2.44 mil- President Chávez’s efforts to implement an lion barrels per day and is falling at an annual aggressive nationalization of the country’s rate of about 100,000 barrels per day. OPEC telecommunications and electricity sectors and the International Energy Agency believe have further helped shape opinion in the that the 2006 production figure was around U.S. Congress, as visits from troubled private 2.5 million barrels per day. U.S. investors have become the norm. While there is no interest on Capitol Hill in Though Venezuelan Meacham asserted that most in the U.S. discontinuing relations with Venezuela, this Congress are puzzled by the fact that, rather situation makes it hard for congressional of- officials note that oil than learning how nationalization has led to fices. Meacham noted that he is always careful supply to the United collapsed economies around the world, Presi- in talking about how domestic policies in dent Chávez intends to pursue the same failed other countries should be crafted; however, States continues policies. For Meacham, that failure is already in the case of Venezuela, the money from oil uninterrupted, many evident today. A major problem in Venezuela could be invested in boosting declining oil sources support is the lack of food on the shelves. Deliver- production and in improving the productivity ies of beef, pork, poultry, meat, and sugar to of the country’s agricultural sector. These in- the conclusion that grocery stores have largely stopped because vestments would pay long-term economic divi- Venezuelan crude oil the maximum prices stores can charge for dends and provide for long-term job creation. them are below production costs. Farmers production is falling. have simply stopped delivering animals to From the perspective of the U.S. Congress, slaughterhouses. Food retailers that have it looks like President Chávez’s economic sold goods above the maximum prices set by model threatens Venezuela’s own immedi- the government have been fined and shut ate economic interests, as well as mid- and down. As a result, the only way consumers long-term U.S. energy interests. It has forced can get meat and many other foods is to pay Members of Congress and U.S. government more for them on the black market. Instead officials to pursue a broader policy to con- of providing long term solutions to these and solidate support in the region and to hasten other structural problems in the Venezuelan energy diversification.

13 Carl E. Meacham is the lead committee staffer on Latin America for Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 23 Recently, the U.S. Undersecretary a form of blackmail. Instead, promoting a of State for Political Affairs, bio-fuels partnership in the region could Nicholas Burns, traveled to lead to political and economic develop- Brazil for a series of meetings ment and create jobs and energy security, with Brazilian officials in pursuit ultimately strengthening the independence of a strategic partnership with of individual countries. In addition, work- that country to expand the use ing with Brazil and other countries on this of ethanol and other bio-fuels issue could generate much needed goodwill throughout the hemisphere. Bio- among nations in the region. If implemented fuel is any fuel that is derived from vigorously and expansively, this policy could The CITGO sign overlooking Boston’s Fenway Park is a reminder biomass, or recently living organisms or their signal the largest transformational change in of the oil-based interdependence metabolic byproducts, such as manure from the way the United States conducts policy between Venezuela and the United States. (Photo: WOLA) cows. Biodegradable outputs from industry, towards the region. agriculture, forestry, and households can also be used to produce bio-energy. Bio- The final speaker, Ana María Sanjuán,14 fuels can be found in every country in the took a broader perspective, trying to move region and, according to Meacham, can be a away from a focus on Chávez himself and powerful catalyst for poor nations to produce look at the country’s foreign policy objec- their own energy and capitalize on trading tives and its impact. In Sanjuán’s view, the partnerships to boost economic opportunity perception of Chávez’s influence in different and political independence. countries and on the elections that took The Venezuelan place in 2006 is an image that does not While applauding the U.S.-Brazil bio-fuels match reality. Moreover, what happened in foreign policy agenda initiative, Meacham indicated that Latin 2006 was not a “red tide,” but a “pink tide.” is more radical on America – where the richest 10 percent earn The governments that have recently come about half of the income, the poorest 10 into power in Latin America do not have some points, but on percent earn only 2 percent of total income, radical agendas, with some exceptions, such the whole it shares key and about 40 percent of the people live in as Venezuela. components of the poverty – will require substantial additional assistance to help the region’s oil depen- Sanjuán then turned to the international foreign policy agendas dent and poor countries to benefit from the and internal factors shaping Venezuela’s of other governments opportunities that the development of a bio- foreign policy and how that policy sorts out in the region. fuels market would provide. friends and enemies. One clear factor is the regional context, where there is now a clear The United States should work with majority of countries seeking autonomy in Brazil, which has over thirty years of international relations, greater indepen- experience in this area, to accelerate the dence from the United States, and more development of bio-fuels through the democratic or diversified international rela- promotion, production, and funding of tions. Many governments in the region also infrastructure development; research and seek to use regional integration as a strategic training of personnel; and the deepening of tool for national development, and national cooperation on bio-fuel production. interests are viewed in terms of economic development. The levels of economic na- The objective of this initiative, according tionalism and state presence in the economy to Meacham, is not primarily to reduce U.S. vary, as do ways of relating to the United dependence on foreign oil sources, but rather States, ranging from open resistance as with to increase the capacity of countries in the Cuba and Venezuela, to close collaboration, region to act without being tied to other in the case of Colombia. The Venezuelan countries’ political interests. Using oil politi- foreign policy agenda is more radical on cally is an irresponsible use of that resource, some points, but on the whole it shares key

14 Ana María Sanjuán is the Director of the Center for Peace and Human Rights at the Central University of Venezuela and is also a consultant on security and foreign policy issues for various international agencies.

24 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges components of the foreign policy agendas of agreement. One very important point is that other governments in the region. the Colombian Foreign Minister recently thanked the Venezuelan government for its Another key factor is energy. As was stated efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to earlier, when energy prices are higher, the Colombian conflict, offsetting assertions oil nationalism is more likely to emerge that Venezuela might be supporting guerilla and the government will attempt to make groups in Colombia. geopolitical use of energy resources. This approach was also prevalent in the 1970s In the case of the United States, a con- and 1980s, not only with the San José frontational relationship clearly exists on agreement, but also through Venezuela’s both sides. Nonetheless, over the last year involvement in promoting democracy and in Venezuela stepped up trade with the United efforts to resolve the Central American wars States with the participation of both public and other crises. and private sector actors. The Venezuelan state did not interfere in the relations that The domestic determining factors of Venezu- private Venezuelan actors have with U.S. ela’s foreign policy include both historic and companies and individuals. It also continued economic factors. Throughout the 20th cen- to make foreign debt payments. tury, Bolivarianismo was characterized by the use of oil as a foreign policy instrument, the Sanjuán then analyzed the impact of Consequential promotion of democracy, and presidential Venezuela’s multi-polar foreign policy and opposition to Chávez hyperactivity. Today, at this time of greater whether or not it has served to democratize economic nationalism and more endogenous international relations. The answer to that in Venezuela is likely to development, foreign policy is a fundamental question is more negative than positive, in come from within his tool for implementing the country’s eco- her opinion. The personification of Venezu- movement and not from nomic project. ela’s foreign policy in Chávez has given rise to perplexity and concerns in the region that the traditional political Sanjuán referred to statements made in previ- prevent certain bilateral and multilateral opposition; those to ous panels implying that Venezuela is a threat relations from solidifying. to international stability, and is increasingly watch are the dissidents isolated in the region. She disagreed on both In the end, Venezuela’s approach is to be within Chavismo. of these points. Venezuela does not constitute “good friends with one’s friends.” Venezuela a threat; rather, it is one of the few countries is the country that has the biggest balance of in Latin America that has regional integra- trade with all countries in the region, with tion mandated in its constitution, and uses significant increases in trade in particular energy resources for economic development. with Argentina and Brazil. The balance of Comparing three of Venezuela’s bilateral for- trade for Venezuela, however, is unfavorable, eign policy agendas – with Cuba, Colombia, as the country has become more dependent and the United States – is illustrative. on imports through these relationships. Nor did Venezuela prevail in its efforts to attain a In the case of Cuba, a more ideological rela- temporary seat on the U.N. Security Coun- tionship prevails, but it is also a relationship cil or to promote its preferred candidate for of cooperation. The two countries just signed election as president of the Inter-American a $2.6 billion economic cooperation project. Development Bank. Cuba has 26,000 citizens working in health care and other areas in Venezuela. Venezuela In conclusion, Venezuela is neither a has equally close – and pragmatic – rela- threat, nor is it isolated. It does not have tions with Colombia. Trade with Colombia serious problems or any sort of rupture reached $3.2 billion last year. The Colombi- with any country in the region, beyond an Foreign and Trade Ministers were just in a temporary cooling with Mexico. Yet Caracas to promote the Colombian-Venezu- Venezuela’s foreign policy has serious elan pipeline and a specific petition on the limitations in terms of the country’s part of President Uribe for a bilateral trade fundamental development objectives.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 25 A recurring theme in the discussion in the company targeted is compensated adequately. final panel of the day was the question of Ultimately, it is Venezuela’s choice whether it whether or not Venezuela is a reliable oil wishes to deal with the United States or not. partner with the United States, and, indeed whether it should be. Debate continued on Ana María Sanjuán reiterated that there market diversification and interdependence is a clear co-existence between the two between the two countries. The question was countries and Venezuela is abiding by also posed that, if Venezuela’s foreign policy the basic rules of engagement: trade is not a threat to the region, perhaps Chávez continues, loans are being paid, and oil himself is a threat. is being delivered. Moreover, Venezuela provided assistance in the aftermath of Roger Tissot reiterated that Venezuela hurricane Katrina and provides subsidized has always maintained its oil supply to oil to the poor in the United States. the United States, except for a brief Sanjúan also took issue with a tendency period during the opposition-led strike. to confuse Venezuelan policies and He pointed out the tradeoff between Chávez’s personality. Chávez’s behavior The challenge for maximizing production and maintaining on the international scene may be bad the price needed to guarantee a healthy or inappropriate, but there are political Chávez and for other profit; Venezuela needs to evaluate structures and policies that go beyond governments in Latin and balance those two factors. It is in one person. Regarding nationalizations, America that face Venezuela’s interest to seek to maximize she pointed out that there are many profit; Washington should understand state companies across Latin America, serious problems of this and not view it as a threat. With particularly in the oil sector, that work quite citizen security is to regard to the interdependence between efficiently, just as there are many private Venezuela and the United States, he companies that do not function well. provide an effective asserted that the United States could inflict state response to crime serious harm on Venezuela if it chose to The panel ended with a final comment and violence, while do so by discontinuing purchases of its by Sanjuán. A recent World Bank report oil – Venezuela is very vulnerable. In the predicts that in 2007, Latin America will not resorting to the end, it is not in the best interests of either have the lowest growth rate in the world. traditional mano dura government to become independent of This poses a major challenge to all countries approach. the other. Rather, both should seek to in the region, as no clear alternative model understand each other’s policy objectives. to the Washington Consensus exists. The challenge for Venezuela and other countries Luis Lander reiterated that, with the high is to achieve economic growth that allows for price of oil, Venezuela has the luxury of us- significant decreases in poverty and inequality. ing the proceeds to finance social spending and diplomacy. While recognizing that mar- The conference concluded with brief com- ket diversification takes time, Venezuela is ments by the three panel chairs. Cynthia investing in refineries both within Venezuela McClintock15 began by highlighting the and outside of the country that will allow for points of consensus by the speakers on the the refining of heavy crude oil. Over time, first panel, on political conflict and democ- this will permit real market diversification. racy in Venezuela:

 The representative democracy of the Expanding upon his earlier comments, Carl Punto Fijo period was deeply flawed and Meacham stated that Washington is just most Venezuelans felt estranged from it; asking for Venezuela to abide by its existing contracts. Every country has the right to pur-  The 2006 elections were a milestone sue nationalizations if it chooses to do so, but – both in the sense of inclusion felt by the U.S. interest is in making sure that any the bulk of the population and the suc-

15 Cynthia McClintock is Columbian College Distinguished Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University.

26 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges cessful efforts to build confidence in the misiones. Two panelists argued strongly that WOLA Staff electoral system – and greatly enhanced the state, both through the work of the Joy Olson Chávez’s legitimacy; ministries and the misiones, has indeed made Executive Director significant progress in addressing poverty Geoff Thale  The traditional political opposition took and unemployment. Buxton argued that the Director of Programs important steps forward by participat- misiones represent an integrated package Jason Schwartz ing in those elections and accepting its that draws on best practices as understood Director of Operations and Finance minority status; and in mainstream development theories. From Lori Piccolo that a discussion developed on the need for Director of Development  Since those elections, a dramatic serious, depoliticized research to evaluate Roger Atwood concentration of power has occurred, fully the impact of government programs Director of Communications particularly in the office of the president. to date. Strong arguments were put forward John Walsh that the implementation of policies across Senior Associate for the Andes and Drug Policy McClintock then pointed out one area of dis- the country has been heterogeneous and Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli cussion among the panelists: how vulnerable needs to be studied at the local level. Finally, Senior Associate for the president is as he continues to consolidate panelists argued that such research needs to Colombia and Haiti power. While Shifter compared Chávez to take into account the views of the barrio, or Vicki Gass Pinochet and Fujimori, indicating that the those targeted for such assistance. Senior Associate for Venezuelan president’s longevity should not Rights and Development be underestimated, other panelists emphasized The second and related theme was Chávez’s Adriana Beltrán the inherent constraints – including inef- programs and the definition of 21st Century Associate on Violence Against Women and Organized Crime ficiency, over-reach, and blame – or a poten- Socialism, and in particular the notion of Maureen Meyer tial drop in oil prices. They believe that the participatory democracy as it is developing Associate for Mexico consequential opposition to Chávez is likely to in Venezuela today. What forms are mecha- and Central America come from within his movement and not from nisms for popular participation taking? What Elsa Falkenburger the traditional political opposition; those to does participatory democracy mean in rela- Program Officer for Cuba and Gangs watch are the dissidents within Chavismo. tion to more traditional forms of representa- Connie McGuire tive democracy? Most provocatively, can Research and Outreach Coordinator for the Central McClintock also underscored McCoy’s as- participatory and representative democracy American Youth Gangs Project sertion that Chávez came into office without develop and co-exist together? Joel Fyke a clear ideology and has largely improvised. Program Officer McClintock noted that, for a U.S. audience, The third theme encompassed an important Jessica Eby it is particularly important to note the dif- set of traditional human rights concerns and Program Assistant ferences between Venezuela today and Cuba the institutionalization of democracy. Issues Lilia López even a year after the revolution. Venezuela’s raised included the weakness of the judiciary Program Assistant reliance on elections and call for interna- and police forces and the continued problem Kristina Demain tional observers stands in stark contrast to of impunity. Thale observed that the com- Program Assistant Cuba. Moreover, Venezuela has a much plex and related problems of crime, violence, Ana Paula Duarte larger middle class compared to Cuba in and citizen security deserved more time for Development Associate 1959, is more economically developed, and discussion. The challenge for Chávez and for Coletta Youngers is connected to the global economy. These other governments in Latin America that Senior Fellow are structural constraints on the Chávez face serious problems of citizen security is to George Withers Senior Fellow government that were not discussed on the provide an effective state response to crime panel, but are worth taking into account. and violence, while not resorting to the Rachel Neild Senior Fellow traditional mano dura approach. 16 Laurie Freeman Reviewing the second panel, Geoff Thale Fellow highlighted three major themes. The first William LeoGrande17 summed up the debate is social spending and the role of the state on the third panel, noting that one of the in addressing poverty and unemployment key points that emerged is that Venezuela issues, and in particular the role of the would like to diversify markets so as to

16 Geoff Thale is Program Director and Senior Associate for Central America and Cuba at the Washington Office on Latin America. 17 William M. LeoGrande is Dean of the School of Public Affairs and Professor of Government at American University.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 27 reduce its dependence on the United States, similarities in their relations with the United while the United States wants to diversity States. Chávez is confronting Washington its suppliers so as to reduce its dependence with very incendiary rhetoric, as did Castro on Venezuela. While this would probably in 1959. In both countries, the message of be in the best interests of both countries, defiance – “we will not take orders from you reducing the level of interdependence would anymore” – is directed in part at a domestic also eliminate one of the most important audience, in part at the rest of the region, barriers to a further deterioration in bilateral and in part at Washington. Venezuela is relations. challenging the organized economy and society in the hemisphere, just as Cuba in Another interesting point that probably the early 1960s presented an alternative to merited more discussion was the role of the failed neo-liberal economic policies of China in Latin America and specifically in the 1950s. Today, Chávez has picked up helping Venezuela to develop its petroleum Cuba’s banner and is leading the challenge industry, which is very worrisome for to U.S. economic and political hegemony in Across the globe and in U.S. policymakers. Since the Monroe the hemisphere, and that is why the United Venezuela in particular, Doctrine, Washington has sought to keep States is so hostile to him. other big powers from gaining influence people are wrestling in the region. This has manifested itself Conference organizer John Walsh18 with fundamental politically as concern with Latin American concluded the day by pointing out that questions about how countries that develop relations with other Venezuela and the United States have had governments as a counterweight to the a long relationship, based mostly on oil, to organize themselves United States. Many in U.S. policymaking but there has typically been little curiosity politically, the proper circles see China’s growing influence as in the United States about what actually a threat to U.S. interests; it diminishes melding of models of happens in Venezuela. But when tensions U.S. hegemony and provides a point of flare, the lack of curiosity gives way to government, the role conflict in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. certainty: “We don’t know much, but of the state, and the Similarly, because the bilateral relationship we’re certain about what is going on.” The is confrontational, Washington sees conference demonstrated that there is much meaning of democracy. Venezuela’s activism within OPEC – which that those in both the United States and in We in the United States is not new – as directed against the United Venezuela do not know about one another. need to engage with States, although it is completely rational There are many issues that need to be from the Venezuelan point of view. Finally, explored together so that neither country’s that conversation. Venezuela’s use of its petro-dollars to citizens fall prey to exaggerations or over- advance its interests in the region is viewed simplifications. with suspicion by Washington, despite the fact that this is common practice for The conference also underscored the fact the United States. LeoGrande concurred that history has not ended. Across the globe with the panelists who argued that Chávez and in Venezuela in particular, people are should not be seen as a threat to the United wrestling with fundamental questions about States. how to organize themselves politically, the proper melding of models of government, While agreeing with McClintock’s points on the role of the state, and the meaning of the domestic differences between Venezuela democracy. We in the United States need to and Cuba, LeoGrande highlighted the engage with that conversation.

18 John M. Walsh is Senior Associate for the Andes and Drug Policy at the Washington Office on Latin America.

28 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Panel I: Political Conflict and Democracy

CHAIR AND MODERATOR: and Latin America. Her publications include The Bank of the Cynthia McClintock is Columbian College Distinguished Workers of Venezuela: More than a bank? (1989); The United Professor of Political Science and International Affairs States in Venezuela: 1945-1948 (Revelations of the American at George Washington University. Dr. McClintock has Archives) (1996); Popular Struggle, Democracy, Neoliberalism: authored, co-authored, and edited numerous books on Popular Protest in Latin America in the Years of Adjustment Latin America, including The United States and Peru: (1999); “Hugo Chávez Frias: His Movement and Presidency” Cooperation – At a Cost (2003); Revolutionary Movements in in Venezuelan Policy in the Era of Chávez: Classes, polarization Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path and conflict (2003); and From Black Friday to the Recall (1998); Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru Referendum (2005). (1981); and The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (1983). From 1994 to 1995, Dr. McClintock was President of the Jennifer McCoy is Director of the Carter Center’s Americas Latin American Studies Association, an international Program and Professor of Political Science at Georgia State scholarly association of more than 5,000 members. She has University in Atlanta. She currently directs the Carter testified before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Center’s Friends of the Inter-American Democratic Charter Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, and appeared group, and previously directed The Carter Center’s project on numerous television and radio programs to discuss Latin on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004). American politics. She has directed election monitoring projects for The Carter Center in Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, PANELISTS: Jamaica and Peru. Dr. McCoy’s academic career has Michael Shifter is Vice President for Policy at the Inter- included extensive fieldwork in Venezuela, Nicaragua, American Dialogue. Since 1993, Mr. Shifter has been and Uruguay, where she conducted research as a Fulbright adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of fellow (1991-1992). A specialist on democratization, Foreign Service, where he teaches Latin American politics. international collective protection and promotion of Mr. Shifter’s recent articles on U.S.-Latin American democracy, and Latin American politics, she is editor and relations have appeared in major U.S. and Latin American contributor to The Unraveling of Representative Democracy publications such as the New York Times, Washington Post, in Venezuela (with David Myers, 2004); Do Politicians Learn Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign from Political Crises? (2000); and Venezuelan Democracy Policy, Journal of Democracy, Harvard International Review, Under Stress (1995). Clarin, O Estado de S. Paulo, and Cambio. Since 1996, he has frequently testified before Congress about U.S. policy Francisco José Virtuoso Arrieta is Director of the Gumilla towards Latin America. Prior to joining the Inter-American Foundation (Jesuit Center for Research and Social Action Dialogue, Mr. Shifter directed the Latin American of Venezuela) and the Social Coordinator for the Jesuits in and Caribbean program at the National Endowment Venezuela. A Venezuelan Jesuit priest, with a bachelor’s for Democracy, and before that, the Ford Foundation’s degree in Political Science and a doctorate in History, governance and human rights program in the Andean region Father Virtuoso has extensive experience with socio- and Southern Cone. political analysis in Venezuela and is a collaborator on local development with many community organizations. Margarita López Maya is Distinguished Professor of the Father Virtuoso was a founding member of and continues Center for Development Studies at the Central University to be involved with the board of directors of the civil of Venezuela (UCV). From 1999 to 2004, she was the association Ojo Electoral, or Electoral Eye. He teaches at Director of the Venezuelan Magazine of Economy and Social the Andrés Bello Catholic University and the Theological Science. Dr. López Maya has received various academic Institute for Monks. He is also a regular columnist for SIC prizes, published several books, and authored numerous book Magazine and has collaborated on and published numerous chapters and more than 60 academic articles in Venezuela articles of political and social analysis in Venezuela.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 29 Panel II: Institutions and Public Policies

CHAIR AND MODERATOR: and Ibero-Americana University in Mexico (2004). He was Geoff Thale is Program Director and Senior Associate for appointed by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights the Central American Youth Gangs Program and the Cuba as a member of the International Supervising Commission Program at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). for the process of selecting and naming the Supreme Court of As Program Director, Mr. Thale oversees WOLA’s country- Justice of Ecuador (2005). Mr. Ayala serves as a lawyer and specific and thematic program work. He has followed Central defender of human rights and as an advisor on human rights America issues since the mid-1980s and U.S.-Cuba policy since in several international organizations, including UNESCO. the mid-1990s. An author of numerous WOLA publications, his current work on ‘intermestic’ issues of gang violence in Daniel Hellinger is a Professor of Political Science at Webster Central America and the United States resulted most recently University in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds a Ph.D. from Rut- in the publication of Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues gers University and has published numerous scholarly articles in Human Rights, Effective Policing, and Prevention (2007). He on Latin American politics. He is co-editor of and contribu- has spoken widely on U.S. policy and human rights in Latin tor to Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era (2003), author of America. Before joining WOLA, he was the founder and Ex- Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy (1991) and The Democratic ecutive Director of the El Salvador Policy Project in Washing- Facade (with Dennis Judd, 1994), and will soon publish a ton, DC (1988-1995). He holds a Masters degree in Industrial textbook, Democracy at Last, on Latin American politics. Dr. Relations from the University of Wisconsin. Hellinger’s present research includes comparative analysis of natural resource policies in Chile and Venezuela. He has been PANELISTS: a visiting professor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, UK, and Julia Buxton is Visiting Professor in the Center for Latin the Central University of Venezuela, and held two Fulbright American Studies of Georgetown University and Senior lectureships at the Universidad Católica in Valparaíso, Chile. Research Fellow in the Department of Peace Studies, He is currently President of the Venezuela Studies Section of University of Bradford, UK. She has written extensively on the Latin American Studies Association. Venezuela and has been engaged by a number of private and public sector organizations as a consultant on Venezuela-re- Antonio José González Plessmann is Diagnostic Coordi- lated issues. Dr. Buxton’s most recent publication, The Politi- nator of the National Commission for Police Reform, by cal Economy of Narcotics: Production, Consumption and Global appointment of the Minister of the Interior and Justice. In Markets (2006), builds on her current research interest in 2006 he served as Director of Research and Technical Assis- post-conflict country contexts, specifically the reintegration tance of the Founding School of Social Management. For 11 of ex-combatants and the transformation of war economies. years prior to this, he held various positions in the Venezu- elan Program for Education and Action on Human Rights Carlos M. Ayala is President of the Andean Commission of (PROVEA), including Research Coordinator. He is cur- Jurists, the former president of the Inter-American Commis- rently an associate member of PROVEA and of the Support sion on Human Rights (IACHR), and a former interpreter of Network for Justice and Peace. His publications include El rights for the Pueblo Indians of the Americas through the IA- Derecho a la Vida: Marco Teórico - Metodológico Básico (2005) CHR. He is a professor of Constitutional and Human Rights and Las Estrategias de la Impunidad: Nueve años de lucha por at the Andrés Bello Catholic University and the Central la justicia en El Amparo (1997). He has also collaborated on University of Venezuela, and has taught at Georgetown Uni- many texts and articles for social science and political maga- versity (1998), American University College of Law (1999), zines and for the national Venezuelan press.

Panel III: Energy and Foreign Policy

CHAIR AND MODERATOR: Dr. LeoGrande was an International Affairs Fellow of the William M. LeoGrande is Dean of the School of Public Af- Council on Foreign Relations and worked with the Demo- fairs and Professor of Government at American University, cratic Policy Committee of the U.S. Senate. In 1985-1986, where he has been on the faculty since 1978. In 1982-1983, he served on the staff of the Democratic Caucus Task Force

30 Conference Report  Venezuela after the Re-election of Hugo Chávez: Political Dynamics and Policy Challenges on Central America of the U.S. House of Representatives. rumbos en la política petrolera venezolana? (2003); La insurrec- Professor LeoGrande is the author of Our Own Backyard: ción de los gerentes: Pdvsa y el gobierno de Chávez (2004); and The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (1998) and Insurrección de la tecnocracia petrolera en Venezuela (2006). Cuba’s Policy in Africa (1980). His articles have appeared His political writings include Elecciones de 2000 en Venezu- in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Latin American Research ela: Implantación de una nueva hegemonía (2001); Referendo Review, American Political Science Review, The New Republic, revocatorio y elecciones regionales en Venezuela: Geografía elec- New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Miami toral de la polarización (2005); and Novedades y continuidades Herald, and other journals and newspapers. de la protesta popular en Venezuela (2006).

PANELISTS: Carl E. Meacham is Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-Indiana) Roger Tissot is Director of PFC Energy’s Country Strategies lead Committee staffer on Latin America. He joined Sena- practice, where he is responsible for conducting political, tor Lugar’s Foreign Relations Committee staff in 2003, economic, and energy policy analysis on Latin America. after working in the Senate since 2000. Prior to that, he Prior to this, he worked at EnCana Corporation, where he was Special Assistant for the Deputy Secretary of Com- developed political risk analysis tools, and analyzed and merce. Mr. Meacham holds an M.P.A. from Columbia implemented risk mitigation strategies for corporate projects University’s School of International and Public Affairs in Latin America and Africa. He has also worked with a (1999) and an M.A. in International Development from number of Canadian-based energy companies on political, American University’s School of International Service economic, and market risk issues in Latin America, and co- (1997). He is currently a team member for the Council on ordinated the energy component of a Cooperation Program Foreign Relations. His professional publications include between Canada and Colombia. He began his career as an numerous reports to the Senate Committee on Foreign energy economist at the Canadian Energy Research Institute Relations such as: “Plan Colombia: Elements for Success” (CERI), where he co-authored studies on the “Latin Ameri- (2005); “Giving Voice to the People” (2006); “Embassies can Petroleum Industry” and “South American Natural as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign” (2006); Gas Market.” Mr. Tissot holds an M.A. in Economics from and “Haitian Elections: Setting the Foundation for Democ- the University of Laval (Quebec) and an M.B.A. from the racy” (2006). University of Calgary. Ana María Sanjuán is the Director of the Center for Peace Luis E. Lander is a Professor in the School of Social Sci- and Human Rights at the Central University of Venezuela. ences and Economics at the Central University of Venezu- Dr. Sanjuán has written widely and spoken at numerous ela (UCV). Since November 2004, he has also served as conferences in Venezuela and internationally on Venezuelan Director of the Venezuelan Magazine on Social Science and politics and international relations. She currently serves as Economics of UCV. He has published more than forty book a consultant on topics of security, democracy, and foreign chapters and magazine articles and has spoken widely on policy for the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), energy and politics at conferences in Venezuela and inter- the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the nationally. His works on energy include: La reforma petrolera Organization of American States (OAS), and the Inter- del gobierno de Chávez (2002); Gobierno de Chávez: ¿nuevos American Development Bank (IDB).

Concluding Remarks

CONFERENCE ORGANIZER: “Rethinking Bretton Woods Project” at the Center John M. Walsh is Senior Associate for the Andes of Concern, an effort to forge consensus on ideas for and Drug Policy at the Washington Office on Latin reform of the World Bank, International Monetary America (WOLA). Previously, Mr. Walsh served Fund, and international trade arrangements. Mr. Walsh as Director of Research at Drug Strategies, a policy has testified before the U.S. Congress on issues of research group that builds support for more pragmatic human rights and democracy in Venezuela. He holds and effective approaches to U.S. drug problems an M.A. in Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins (1995-2003). From 1993 to 1995, he worked on the University Institute for Policy Studies.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2007 31 About WOLA The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a nonprofit policy, research, and advocacy organization working to advance democracy, human rights, and social justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Founded in 1974, WOLA plays a leading role in Washington policy debates about Latin America. WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training, and advocacy.

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