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[40] Political Wisdom and Moral Pragmatism Moshe Sharett and the Beginning of Relations with Germany A Retrospective by Benyamin Neuberger1

In the early 1950s a dramatic episode occurred in the realm of Israel’s foreign relations. The Jewish State – in spite of the Holocaust, which was still most strongly imbedded in the collective memory of all Israelis – decided to enter into direct negotiations with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany’s government over the European Jews’ property plundered by the Nazis. This led to the signing of a historic reparation agreement with her and eventually, step by step, the establishment of mutual economic, political, military and cultural relations. This course of action was led in Israel by David Ben Gurion (Prime Minister in the years 1948-1953 and 1955-1963) who referred to West Germany in those days as “the other Germany,” and Moshe Sharett (Foreign Minister 1948-1956 and Prime Minister 1954-1955). On the subject of Israel’s relations with postwar Germany, these two bitter political rivals saw eye-to-eye and successfully cooperated with each other. While Israeli historian Yehoshua Jelinek, who has extensively researched Israeli-German relations, sees Ben Gurion and Sharett – alongside German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Jewish leaders Nahum Goldmann and Jacob Blaustein and the American high commissioner in Germany, John McCloy – as architects of the reparations agreement2, Niels Hansen, a former German ambassador to Israel, who wrote the most comprehensive account of the beginning of relations between the two countries, sees Sharett, not Ben Gurion, in the dominant Israeli role who formulated policy vis-à-vis West Germany in the early 1950s3. Gabriel Sheffer, Sharett’s biographer, sees it this way also, considering

1 Dr. Neuberger is a political scientist at the Open University, Israel. 2 Y. Jelinek, Deutschland und Israel 1945-1965 – ein neurotisches Verhältnis, 2004, p.215. 3 N. Hansen, Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe: Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben Gurion, 2002, p.215.

DOI 10.1515/9783110255386.376, , published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. The Reparations Agreement – A Retrospective 377 him to be the “motive force” and “main proponent” acting “backstage” towards abandoning the policy of boycotting Germany.4 Hansen and Sheffer both claim that Sharett’s policy towards Germany was a “well-planned”, “active” “long-term view” characterized by its “sustainable capability” in spite of the fact that in regard to this issue, Sharett remained in Ben Gurion’s “shadow.” Thus, for instance, Hansen and Sheffer say that the critical meeting between Nahum Goldmann and Konrad Adenauer in London, December 1951, was prepared by Sharett, and that “the positive results that were an outcome of his far-seeing view and his decisive policy” rather than that of the Prime Minister.5 Whatever the differences of opinion regarding the political roles of Ben Gurion and Sharett, all agree that Sharett was the leading figure in Israeli-German negotiations in the years 1951-1952 and from the outset of the establishment of contact between the two countries until his removal from the post of foreign minister in June 1956 by Ben Gurion who, at the same time, continued to lead the selfsame policy towards Germany in the following years. There is also a consensus that in the early 1950s, the Foreign Ministry led by Sharett was the decisive factor in navigating the policy of Israel, and that its superb diplomatic staff headed by Sharett – Walter Eytan, Abba Eban, Gershon Avner, Shabtai Rosenne, Maurice Fisher, Haim Yahil, Eliezer Shinar – played a critical role in the bringing about of the reparations agreement. Sharett – a liberal and moderate statesman, the “moral conscience” of the Israeli government regarding its policy toward the Arabs – emphasized raison d’état necessitating a constructive attitude towards the establishing of direct contact with post-war Germany. He pointed to the need for the state “to take stock of every shift in the balance of power around it and in the world at large” since “a dispersed, powerless people can, and perhaps should, live only on past memories and a ssianic hope for eventual salvation,” but “a state cannot.”6 Undoubtedly, considerations of the political balance of power are the realist’s classic rationale. Indeed, Sharett recognized the need for establishing relations with West Germany in view the inevitability of its becoming an important power in the international arena and a weighty member of NATO. He saw no purpose in boycotting Germany while no country in either the Western and Eastern blocs did so. Indeed he even saw the danger of Israeli hostility to Germany pushing her into closer relations with the Arab countries. He maintained that as a sovereign state Israel must care for its existence and security as well as its economic interests. Thus, Israel’s political isolation, its lack of intensive backing by a world power, and its catastrophic economic situation during the early 1950s due to the absorption

4 Sheffer, Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate, 1996, p. 1002. 5 Sheffer, ibid., p. 608; Hansen, ibid., p.35 6 Sharett’s speech in the Knesset, 9.1.1952, doc. 18, pp. 269-270. 378 The Reparations Agreement – A Retrospective of waves of mass immigration convinced him that Israeli-German relations must be promoted. However, in the same way that his moderate policy towards Israel’s Arab neighbors was not contrary to the state’s interests, Sharett’s Realpolitik as regards the German issue was not contradicted by moral percepts. He regarded an independent Israel as a haven for the Holocaust survivors and considered it his moral duty to strengthen it in order to safeguard their future. He also saw nothing immoral in regaining the Jewish property plundered by Nazi Germany before and during the Holocaust years and in preventing a recurrence of “Hast thou killed, and also taken possession?”7 The importance of the Jewish state’s representing the Jewish people’s case and the fact that for the first time in the history the Jewish people it was able to demand reparations from its tormentors, were not lost on Sharett. Perhaps this is not a purely moral lesson, but neither is it Realpolitik in its negative sense. Sharett was vehement in rejecting the notion of the German people’s collective guilt. He maintained that blaming every German for the Holocaust even if he was not an accomplice to the crime, even if he was an anti-Nazi, to say nothing of the young generation which could not have been Nazi was a racist attitude. He took the line of the Prophet, who said: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin.”8 Sharett also saw the reparations agreement as a historic precedent of universal importance, as a contribution to the human community’s law and justice, and as a lesson that enmity between peoples, could be overcome. Indeed, ridden as our world is with ingrained enmities, it is possible time and again to point to what ensued in Israeli-German relations and learn from it that no such thing as “eternal enmity” is acceptable. In spite of a history of terrible shedding of blood, reconciliation is always possible. The distinction maintained by many in Israel about the early 1950s between the proponents of “realism,” acting according to calculations of power and profit, and the “moralists” acting in the name of values, conscience and moral purity is simplistic. It does not reflect the true debate and is unjust toward Israel’s leaders in those years. It is not true that the position of the “moralists” who opposed establishing contact with Germany was free of political and Realpolitik considerations. The leaders of leftist Mapam and the Israeli Communist Party supported establishing relations with communist East Germany while vehemently condemning any contact whatsoever with what they called “neo-Nazi” West Germany. What determined their position were considerations relating to the cold war and sympathy toward the Soviet Bloc – not pure moral principles or deep emotional

7 1 Kings, 21:19 8 Deuteronomy, 24:16 The Reparations Agreement – A Retrospective 379 attitudes. Similarly, their assertion that relations between Bonn and Jerusalem should be resisted since they were part of a Western scheme to “legitimize” Germany in order to pave the road to attacking the Soviet Union, was not based on morals and emotions. Even Menahem Begin, whose passionate emotions regarding Germans and Germany cannot be doubted, did not flinch from using Realpolitik arguments in order to buttress his position. In his opinion, the increasing contact between Israel and West Germany endangered Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union (“we are worsening without justification the national-political relations between Israel and that hugely influential factor”). In the name of “the state’s benefit,” not emotions and morals, he called for a change in policy towards Germany, in order to “lessen the hostility” of the Soviet Union towards Israel.9 A fitting definition of the policy adopted by Israel’s leaders in the 1950s towards Germany might be “moral pragmatism.” This policy, pragmatic in form but moral in substance, was rooted in deep moral soul-searching. Indeed, the relations between Israel and Germany clearly demonstrate that a dichotomy between realism and morals in foreign policy could be erroneous. As we have seen, the “realists” who advocated establishing relations with Germany acted not alone from considerations of benefits and power, whereas the “moralists” did not ignore interests and political tendencies. In this case, the distinction between “national egoists,” whose position towards other nations is defined by national interests, and the “idealists,” whose position is characterized by ideals above and beyond the national interest, is surely invalid. Lo and behold, no concrete change in Israel’s policy towards Germany occurred after the torch bearers of morality came to power. It is of course permissible to disagree with Sharett’s German policy, but the fact is that almost all his opponents – Golda Meir in Mapai, the leadership of leftist Mapam (and Ahdut Ha’avoda which seceded from it in 1954), the liberal General Zionists and even the Herut right-wingers over the years accepted the path outlined by him. This is a rare example of a courageous and unpopular stand against a popular view which eventually succeeded in overcoming it. Golda Meir, who in the early 1950s objected to any contact with Germany and saw every German as a Nazi (“I would like to state that I hold a racist view; as far as I am concerned, all Germans are a priori Nazis”10) pursued a totally different policy during her tenure as foreign minister (1956-1965). Nevertheless, in this period intimate military relations developed between Israel and Germany and formal diplomatic relations were established. She considered it the Israeli leaders’ moral duty to overcome personal feelings and to do everything possible for the state’s security. The leadership at that time rightly believed that economic relations would enhance Israel’s security. Thus the “dry” statistics of Israel’s deficit trade

9 “Ha’uma” (Hebrew) no. 58, p. 263. 10 Meir’s speech in Mapai’s Central Committee, doc. 13, p. 130. 380 The Reparations Agreement – A Retrospective balance and its lack of foreign currency took on, in Ben Gurion’s and Sharett’s eyes, a moral dimension which usually does not play a part in the formulation of economic policy. When diplomatic relations between Israel and Germany were established in May 1965, the emotional resistance, which was still fierce, was already much weaker than in 1952. Herut and Mapam still demonstrated against this rapprochement, but their objection lacked the intensity of the 1950s; as for the General Zionists and Ahdut Ha’avoda, they no longer completely objected to maintaining relations with Germany. Begin still proclaimed that there will never be proper relations between Israel and the murderers, but the public was no longer eager to respond. This time, wide sectors thought that the decisive consideration should be the buttressing of the state’s political and military interests, not over-heated emotions. In May 1977, the right-wing “moralists”, who had vehemently opposed any relations with Germany, came to power. All eyes turned towards Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who in 1952 had called for the storming of the Knesset in order to abort the reparations negotiations. As Prime Minister, however, Begin acted differently from his past position as head of the opposition. In June 1977, when asked what he would do when he would have to shake a German statesman’s hand, he replied, “I will conduct myself as a Prime Minister.”11 Consequently, Begin did not sever the relations with Germany and his government maintained the pragmatic policy of its predecessor. Political scientist Dr. Lily Gardner-Feldman defined Begin’s approach during 1977-1983 as very sensitive to the past but always pragmatic.12 Begin held talks with German politicians and diplomats – an action that as leader of the opposition he used to denounce as treasonable. Herut members in the government no longer boycotted Germany; Herut’s foreign ministers Yitzhak Shamir, Moshe Arens, David Levy and Silvan Shalom visited Bonn. Herut activist Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, a Holocaust survivor who still tried to put restraints on Israeli-German relations, said that “the national camp cannot ignore international reality, Germany’s status in it and Israel’s need to maintain relations with the Federal Republic.”13 In 1987, all Herut ministers supported President Chaim Herzog’s visit to West Germany, and regarding the unification of Germany in 1990, the prime minister, foreign minister and minister of defense – all of them Herut members – raised no real objection. Later Prime Ministers Binyamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, all of them past or present Likud members, continued to maintain proper relations with Germany. Similarly, members of Mapam and Ahdut Ha’avoda totally changed their attitude when serving in senior government positions. Yigal Alon, who in the

11 “Ha’uma”, ibid., p. 263. 12 Lily Gardner-Feldman, The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel, 1984. 13 “Ha’uma”, ibid., p. 263. The Reparations Agreement – A Retrospective 381

1950s was one of the main opponents of establishing relations with Germany, maintained close contact with its leaders as foreign minister (“I feel among friends,” he said upon arriving in Bonn on 26th February 1975.14) The extent of the relations with Germany nowadays proves how much Sharett was right in all he said in the 1950s. Germany today is a major power. It maintains “special relations” with Israel – all German governments have committed themselves to regarding these relations as a “primary factor” or “cornerstone” of German foreign policy. This commitment crosses all political party boundaries and has been maintained both for Social Democrat governments and those led by Christian-Democrats (and their major coalitions). Thus, in 2005, the Bundestag, with the assent of all parties (Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, Social Democrats, the “Greens,” and the Democratic Socialists) committed itself to Israel’s existence “within secure borders and free of threats, fear and terror”.15 Time and again, Germany has supplied Israel with weapons vital to its defense. In the early 1960s Germany delivered tanks, helicopters, artillery and hundreds of other military items. Later, gas masks were flown from Germany following the eruption of the Gulf War. Again, following threatening speeches by Iran’s president, the German government decided to supply Israel with modern submarines that are apparently capable of carrying nuclear missiles, giving Israel a second strike capability. Indeed, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (1997-2005) promised that Israel would receive all that it needs for safeguarding its security and would get it at the time it needs it. Economic relations between Germany and Israel are of a major significance as well. The extent of trade, which amounted to $93 million in 1960, grew to $4.6 billion in 2004. After the United States, Germany is second in importance for Israeli exports. Israel is Germany’s most important trading partner in the Middle East, ahead of rich, important, or populace countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. German investments in Israel as well as Israeli hi-tech companies’ investment in Germany amount to billions of dollars. German tourism is also significant. The extent of relations with Germany in matters of science, education and culture, youth exchanges, twinning of cities, contacts between political parties, trade unions, universities and research institutes, museums and professional associations is unprecedented. German investments in Israeli science are significantly larger than those of any other country except for the United States. Relative to the size of its population, no country – including the United States – approaches the extent of German investment in Israeli science. Moshe Sharett supervised operations of the Israeli delegation during the historical negotiations over the reparations, and was the primary and constant

14 Yohanan Meroz, Was it All in Vain? – An Israeli Ambassador in Germany’s Summing Up (Hebrew), 1988, pp. 52-53 15 “Das Parlament”, 17.5.2005 382 The Reparations Agreement – A Retrospective bearer of the brunt of the conflict with the opponents to the direct reparations negotiations in the Knesset, its Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, the government, and the high echelons of the ruling Mapai Party. He played a most critical role in all these developments. It is true that many of these achievements came to being after Sharett’s removal from the Israeli political arena, but they all sprouted from the fertile ground of the reparations agreement, symbolically signed by him and no other Israeli, together with the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. This is how Herbert Blankenhorn, one of the negotiators over the reparations on the German side and a confidant of Konrad Adenauer, characterized Sharett: “his is a restrained and strong personality radiating authority, a dedication to purpose, and a strong attachment to the problems of the present and to the historical background which are both full of suffering. His talk is quiet and is the outcome of organized thinking, free of any empty slogans.”16 Moshe Sharett, who is almost forgotten in Israel, was an exalted statesman. He was right on the issue of Germany; he was right about Israel’s western orientation, and was apparently right in his approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. In all these, his was the voice of reason and foresight.

16 Hansen, ibid., p. 261.