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Israeli Defense Industry: Limits to Growth

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Israeli Defense Industry: Limits to Growth THE ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY: LIMITS TO GROWTH? BLAIR L. LABARGE Two conflicting forces are shaping Israel's system of defense. On one side sits the defense industry coalition whose main interest is the development of high-powered weapons. It is opposed by a more conservative sector, concerned with confining the industry to its original mission of enhancing nationaldefense to the extent the country can afford. Blair L. LaBarge examines some of the factors that have contributed to the phenomenal growth of the Israeli defense industry, its impact on the international arms market, and some recently imposed limits to its growth, exemplified by the case of the Lavi fighter. INTRODUCTION At a time when global expenditures for defense show a steady upward trend, the group of major exporters of weapons and defense-related services remains a small and exclusive club. International arms exports are dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Other industrial powers such as Britain, France, the two Germanies, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and the People's Republic of China capture smaller shares of the market. In the last decade, they have been joined by leaders of the industrializing nations of the Third World, notably Brazil and India, whose ambitious programs to develop domestic arms industries have been remarkably successful. Countries that have developed domestic arms industries generally are large, have a significant industrial base, access to sophisticated technologies, positive eco- nomies of scale and a well-trained work force. These conditions constitute formidable barriers to most developing countries, and it is likely that mem- bership in the arms manufacturing and export club will remain small. It may come as a surprise, then, that one of the fastest-growing weapons exporters in the global market is the state of Israel. This country, with a population of just over 4 million people, is home to an impressive military- industrial sector which ranks in the top ten in total exports.I An estimated 10 percent of the national work force, 2 including 25 percent of all industrial labor, is employed in weapons production. 3 More than a quarter of all Israeli industrial exports come in the form of weapons and security services. 4 The largest of the many enterprises in the military-industrial sector, Israel Aircraft Blair LaBarge is a candidate for the MAID degree at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 1. Thomas L. Friedman, "How Israel's Economy Got Hooked on Selling Arms Abroad," New York Times, 7 December 1986, sec. F, p. 1. 2. Ibid. 3. Alex Mintz, "Arms Production in Israel," TheJerusalem Quarterly 42 (Spring 1987): 89. 4. Ibid. THE FLETCHER FORUM SUMMER 1988 Industries (IAI), is already the single biggest manufacturing concern in the Middle East,' and the sector as a whole is now of central importance in the national economy. How did a tiny country that achieved its independence 40 years ago rise to prominence in weapons manufacturing so quickly? The key lies in Israel's security dilemma. Surrounded by hostile neighbors and frequently excluded from international circles, Israel considers domestic weapons production crit- ical to national survival. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the role of American assistance to Israel, it is important to note that U.S. military aid has allowed the Israelis to pour tremendous amounts of resources into building a defense industry infrastructure. The defense industry gained heightened economic and strategic importance over the past 20 years. However, it was not until the controversy surrounding the Lavi fighter jet project that defense interests coalesced into a bloc with substantial political influence. The debate revealed powerful defense consti- tuencies that exist in society and in the military, industrial and government bureaucracies. The pro-Lavi group represented an effort to reorient defense production toward "big ticket" weapons systems that promote economic wel- fare of special interest groups rather than national security. Yet the coalition of defense interests appears to have come up against economic constraints. A narrow majority of Israelis who realized that their country could not afford the Lavi defeated the project in the Knesset. Two poles of opinion thus emerged from the confrontation, each struggling to shape the future of Israeli arms production. One, a powerful bloc of defense industry interests, pushes for more grandiose weapons projects. The other, mindful of Israel's small economy and limited resources, works to confine the industry to its original mission of enhancing national defense wherever eco- nomically feasible or strategically expedient. That defense interests suffered a setback over the Lavi affair perhaps signals a slowdown to the industry's rapid growth of the past twenty years. THE RISE OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX The roots of the Israeli domestic arms industry are found in the pre- independence period when Jewish fighters had difficulty obtaining adequate weapons. British colonial authorities enforced a strict weapons embargo on Jews in Palestine, forcing the independence movement to produce light arms and explosives clandestinely. These early homemade weapons, although crude, were instrumental to the Israeli expulsion of the British from Palestine. More significantly, Israelis realized that they must depend upon themselves for weaponry.6 Following the war of independence, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion consolidated the scattered domestic arms producers into a single industry to 5. Hesh Kestin, "A $640 Hammer Is a Bargain," Forhes 137, no. 14 (June 30, 1986): 46. 6. Friedman, p. 10. LABARGE: ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY facilitate production and ensure central administration and quality control. 7 The continued growth of the defense sector throughout the 1950s and early 1960s led to the establishment of three government-owned manufacturing concerns: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), specializing in aircraft, missiles and naval vessels; Israel Military Industries (TAAS), specializing in artillery, small arms and ammunition; and the Armament Development Authority (RAFAEL), specializing in military research and development with an emphasis on elec- tronics.8 These pioneers spawned a host of small, privately-owned firms pro- ducing high-technology military and electronic equipment. The Six-Day War of 1967 and subsequent cut-offs by some arms suppliers marked a critical turning point in the Israeli defense industry. Before the war, domestically-produced weaponry focused on small arms, ammunition, artillery and missiles using relatively unsophisticated technology. Israel relied on for- eign suppliers, principally France, for major weapons. 9 The 1967 War changed that. Because of French disapproval over its preemp- tive strike, the Israelis found it difficult to buy supplies from abroad. France, who supplied Israel with its major weapons systems, levied a total arms embargo - including items already purchased. '0 This cut-off by the primary supplier profoundly affected the thinking of Israeli strategic planners. Since hostilities with the Arabs were likely to continue, it became obvious that Israel could no longer rely on foreign supplies of arms. This conviction was reinforced in 1969 when the British Cabinet abruptly canceled an agreement for the purchase of Chieftain tanks intended to serve as the mainstay of the Armored Corps through the next decade." Israel's leaders determined that the nation must seek greater autonomy in weapons manufacturing, including production of major classes of weapons systems.12 This goal was first achieved in domestic production of a fighter plane. Agents of Mossad (the Israeli intelligence agency), working through a Swiss, engineer, stole blueprints for the French Mirage V jet that Israel had imported before the 1967 embargo. Engineers at IAI modified the design, and Israel began building the Kfir (Hebrew for young lion) in the early 1970s. 3 IAI also designed and built the patrol boats Reshef and Saar, and equipped them with the highly successful Gabriel anti-ship missile. The IDF designed and built the Merkava (Chariot) tank in the late 1970s, which performed well in the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.14 As the arms industry became more ambitious, the Israelis discovered several comparative advantages in arms production. First, Israel's universities ensure the availability of the expertise needed to develop and adapt advanced tech- 7. Moshe Lissak, "Paradoxes of Israeli Civil-Military Relations: An Introduction,"Journal of Strategic Studies, 6 no. 3 (September 1983): 3. 8. Friedman, p. 1. 9. Louis Kraar, "Israel's Own Military-Industrial Complex," Fortune, 13 March 1978, p. 73. 10. Ibid. "11. Peter Hellman, "Israel's Chariot of Fire," Atlantic, March 1985, p. 86. 12. Friedman, p. 1. 13. Kraar, p. 73. 14. Hellman, p. 95. THE FLETCHER FORUM SUMMER 1988 nologies to weapons production. Israel also benefits from a large pool of relatively cheap skilled labor which lowers production costs. In addition, Israel can design systems to meet local strategic needs, thus avoiding the high cost of modifying imported weapons. Moreover, the high domestic demand of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) enables production runs of many weapons to be large enough to further lower costs through economies of scale. Finally, government-owned defense enterprises, which include Israel's three largest producers of arms, can sell their products to the IDF at cost. International arms dealers, taking advantage of the oligopolistic characteristics of the arms market, usually include a considerable profit margin in their prices." In addition to producing weapons cheaply, Israel has excelled in the pro- duction of high-quality weapons. Many are made to accommodate the specific needs of the user - such as the small pilotless drones used to gather battlefield intelligence during the second invasion of Lebanon. 16 The defense industry has also increased the quantity of its output, particularly in the production of munitions. Between 1965 and 1977 the military industry grew at a real annual growth rate of 12 percent, while the industrial production of Israel as a whole grew by only 7.9 percent.
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