The June 1967 War and Its Aftermath Gabi Siboni, Kobi Michael, and Anat Kurz, Editors
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Six Days, Fifty Years The June 1967 War and its Aftermath Gabi Siboni, Kobi Michael, and Anat Kurz, Editors Memorandum 184 Six Days, Fifty Years: The June 1967 War and its Aftermath Gabi Siboni, Kobi Michael, and Anat Kurz, Editors Institute for National Security Studies The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006. The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel’s national security agenda. INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in Israel and abroad, and the general public. INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Six Days, Fifty Years: The June 1967 War and its Aftermath Gabi Siboni, Kobi Michael, and Anat Kurz, Editors Memorandum No. 184 November 2018 שישה ימים וחמישים שנה עורכים: גבי סיבוני, קובי מיכאל וענת קורץ Institute for National Security Studies (a public benefit company) 40 Haim Levanon Street POB 39950 Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 6997556 Israel Tel. +972-3-640-0400 Fax. +972-3-744-7590 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.inss.org.il Editor: Ela Greenberg Graphic design: Michal Semo Kovetz and Yael Bieber, TAU Graphic Design Studio Cover photo: Israel Defense Forces moving toward Rafah, June 5, 1967, National Photo Collection, Government Press Office Cover design: Michal Semo, TAU Graphic Design Studio Printing: Elinir All rights reserved © November 2018 ISBN: 978-965-92670-8-8 Contents Introduction: Fifty Years since the Six Day War: A Retrospective 7 POLITICAL-SECURITY PERSPECTIVES Where Would Israel Be if the Six Day War Had Not Happened? 19 Udi Dekel The Renewed Debate Over Partition: The Effects of the Six Day War on Israeli Politics and Israel’s International Status 35 Shlomo Avineri Political Infighting and Its Effect on Deterrence: The Eshkol Government prior to the Six Day War 45 Zaki Shalom Junction ’67: A Turning Point in the History of the Palestinian National Movement 61 Anat Kurz MILITARY PERSPECTIVES The Six Day War: The Victory that Spurred a Fixed Mindset 75 Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon The Effect of the Six Day War on Arab Security Concepts 85 Ephraim Kam IDF Force Buildup since the Six Day War 97 Gabi Siboni and Gal Perl Finkel Thoughts on Deterrence: Lessons from Israel’s Wars since 1967 111 Shlomo Brom From Civilian Protection to a Civilian Front: The Triple Paradox 121 Meir Elran and Carmit Padan The Six Day War: The Intelligence Assessments on the Road to War 135 David Siman-Tov and Shmuel Even The 1967 War Model: Changes and Challenges 149 Avi Kober CIVIL-MILITARY PERSPECTIVES The Watershed Moment: The Influence of the Soldiers’ Talk and the Movement for Greater Israel on Israeli Discourse 165 Omer Einav CONCLUSION War and Peace: Thoughts on Israel’s Security Concept from a Perspective of Fifty Years 183 Amos Yadlin Contributors 191 Introduction Fifty Years since the Six Day War: A Retrospective There is a broad consensus that the Six Day War of June 1967 was a formative event for the State of Israel and the Middle East as a whole, evidenced by the numerous academic, public, and political events held to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the war. Likewise at INSS, much thought and research were devoted toward a better understanding of this landmark episode. Various aspects of the war and its results, both short and long term, are discussed at length in this collection’s essays. In addition, INSS held a one-day conference in collaboration with Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, which included the presentation of some of the essays compiled here. The collection is therefore a contribution by INSS to the public discourse following the fiftieth anniversary of the war, which too often reflects a common tendency to emphasize one of two opposing viewpoints on this significant occurrence: superlative evaluations of the war itself and its immediate political and territorial outcomes; or a critical view of Israel’s political and military leadership prior to and during the war, and the war’s consequences in subsequent decades. The State of Israel and Israeli society have changed dramatically since the Six Day War. The results of the war not only tripled the territory under Israel’s control and strengthened the image of the IDF in Israeli society, in the international community, and within the military itself; they also all at once bolstered the sense of security among the Israeli public and the self- confidence of its political leadership and its military, to the point of euphoria and intoxication. Alongside Israel’s territorial achievements and upgraded regional and international status, the results of the war created a deep political rift in Six Days, Fifty Years : The June 1967 War and its Aftermath I 7 8 I Introduction Israeli society. They also shaped military and political thinking for years to come. Furthermore, there has been a change in the nature of IDF activity as a result of the tremendous resources it was forced to invest in policing operations in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria. Likewise over the past five decades, the Palestinian national movement grew rapidly, and this translated into greater international pressure on Israel to soften its opposition to the national claims of the Palestinians. The State of Israel became increasingly perceived in the international arena as an occupying force—a kind of “David turned Goliath.” A historical perspective facilitates a critical examination of events and their results that is as balanced as possible, but it can nonetheless be misleading. The tendency to ascribe various trends and developments to the Six Day War and its aftermath can be problematic, since some of the developments attributed might have occurred in other historical contexts as well. Nonetheless, it appears that this war created four main conflict arenas and affected their respective developments in subsequent years: the internal Israeli arena; the Israeli-Palestinian arena; the regional arena; and the international arena as it relates to Israel. These arenas, of course, overlap and influence one another. The connection between them is reflected in many of the essays in this collection, which have been divided into three sections by subject: security-political issues, military dimensions, and civil-military relations. This introduction discusses issues that appear in many of the essays and in all three sections: the military-security challenge facing Israel, as it developed since the Six Day War and against the background of the war’s political and territorial outcomes; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which joined the regional and international agendas as a result of the war, and became the center of discourse and debate in Israeli society itself; and questions on relations between the socio-political and military leaderships that arose following the war and remained of vital importance in subsequent decades. The Military Challenge and the Paradox of Power Prior to the Six Day War, the State of Israel lived under the shadow of the Arab military threat. Although the military leadership conveyed a sense of confidence in the ability of the IDF to defeat the Arab armies despite its numerical inferiority, this was conditional on a preemptive strike. In contrast, the political leadership did not share this level of confidence, and then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol asked that all political possibilities be pursued on the Fifty Years since the Six Day War: A Retrospective I 9 international level in order to avoid war. The waiting period significantly heightened the anxiety among the Israeli public while disrupting economic activity, due to the large scale mobilization of reserves. The outcome of the war changed the atmosphere all at once, and the sense of achievement and euphoria in Israeli society may have reduced the motivation to learn and internalize the lessons of the war. As a result, military thinking froze, and this in turn affected IDF operations up to the Yom Kippur War (October 1973). The territory appended to the State of Israel not only solidified the sense of self-assurance but also led to the neglect of thinking about defense and to only partial internalization of the geostrategic implications of the added territory. The Six Day War itself can also be interpreted as the erosion or even failure of Israeli deterrence. The military achievement and impressive victory were meant to revalidate and reinforce Israel’s deterrence, and indeed the feeling after the war was that the magnitude of the accomplishment, the clear-cut victory, and the shock experienced by the Arab leaders and their military commanders would deter the Arab countries from any further military action against Israel and would postpone the next war well into the future. However, Israeli deterrence did not pass the test and the War of Attrition began shortly after the Six Day War. It continued until the summer of 1970 and exacted a high number of causalities. Israeli deterrence again failed the test when the Yom Kippur War broke out only three years after the end of the War of Attrition. The Egyptian success in the early stages of the 1973 war and the cost in soldiers’ lives to Israel can also be attributed to rigid military thinking and the euphoria among some of the IDF commanders following the spectacular victory of the Six Day War.