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Fo#371/121779 cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins 1 Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet r V The Israel Ambassador called on me this afternoon. He said that he would be carrying a stage further the conversation which he had had with the Minister of State f* a/f*.Xi»lJ-^on September 15. As he had told Mr. Nutting, the Israeli V •fe- Government deeply resented the condemnation by the / Foreign Office spokesman of Israel's action near Dha Hiriye, which was described as contrary to the assurances given by Israel to the Secretary-General of the o United Nations. This statement was regarded as grossly partial and as an unfriendly act, anticipating as it did . 'VA*** the findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. These findings had now been published on September 17. The Commission condemned Jordan for the killing of the six Israel soldiers which had given rise to the Israeli action. The Israel Government now expected H.M.G. in all fairness to condemn Jordan. There was an additional reason. The Israel Government feared that we were trying to appease the Arabs at Israel's expense, a situation which they were not' prepared to accept. 2. I took note of the Ambassador's request, saying that he would not expect me to give him an immediate reply. I asked him, however, to consider whether a statement condemnatory to Jordan was likely to improve our chances of restraining Jordan, as he knew we were trying to do. Mr. Elath retorted, as usual, that our efforts had no success. He repeated his remarks about appeasing the Arabs, adding that he believed that in condemning Israel last week we had our eye not on Amman but on Riyadh and Bagdad. To this I said that he credited us with too much subtlety. But if he really thought that we had acted /for Tl 21 cms PUBUC RECORD OFFICE "ins I 1 Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet for the reasons he gave I should have expected him to welcome the attempt to weaken Nasser's hold on the Arabs* The Ambassador replied that this might have been so if we had consulted Israel first and had explained that our policy was to strengthen Israel and to weaken her enemies. This naturally led him to refer yet again to Centurion tanks but fortunately he did not pursue the point* 3. In conclusion the Ambassador said that he assumed that we should be making a statement tomorrow and he asked that he should if possible be informed beforehand. I indicated that he must not make any assumptions* (A. D. M. Ross) Copies to: Sept ember 18, 1956* Mr* Hutting Private Secretary Levant Department African Department cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins I Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet r*\ ISRAEL - JORDAN INCIDENTS The Israeli Ambassador called on Mr. Ross yesterday continue his complaint that the Foreign Office statement out on September 13 about the Israel attack on a Jordan // rO ' , FLAG A \-w 'police post (P.O. telegram No. 758 to Tel Aviv) was grossly FLAG B partial and unfriendly. Mr. Ross's record of conversation is attached. 2. The Ambassador has deliberately confused two separate issues: (a) The frontier clash on September 10 in the course of which 6 Israeli soldiers were killed; and (b) The reprisal raid carried out by Israeli forces on the night of September 11/12, which resulted in the deaths of some 19 Jordanians and the complete destruction of the police post and nearby school. 3. It is quite true that the Mixed Armistice Commission pronounced on the first of these only on September 17. It condemned Jordan for the incident, and found that the bodies t p • /-.v* \of the Israel soldiers had been dragged across the demarcation FLAG C '"J line (Jerusalem telegram No. 327). The Foreign Office statement, however, made no reference whatsoever to this incident. 4. The statement referred solely to the Israeli reprisal raid of September 13/12. A United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation statement was made on September 12. This said that Israeli forces had crossed the demarcation line to attack the police post, and that this appeared as an act_pf_retaliation such as had been repeatedly condemned FLAG D "by the Security Council (Jerusalem telegram No. 320). ..-/x/ n i /Even v PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE "21 Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet Evenso the Foreign Office statement was careful to say that the incident was "being formally investigated "by General Burns,,, and "based, itself on "-oreliminary reports". 5. In continuing the complaint about this statement and in suggesting that we should now make one condemning Jordan for the September 10 incident, the Israelis seem to "be deliberately making, trouble. I suggest that the Minister of State summons the Israeli Ambassador and speaks to him Sigmly on the following lines: (a) The Foreign Office statement of September 13 made no reference whatsoever to the incident of September 10 for which Jordan was ID lamed "by the Mixed Armistice Commission on September 17. ("b) The statement referred solely to the Israeli reprisal raid of September 11/12, which the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation had described in a statement issued on September 12 as an act of retaliation such as had been repeatedly condemned by the Security Council. (c) There is a complete difference between a frontier clash, such as that of September 10, and. a planned military operation against neighbouring territory, such as the Israeli raid of September 11/12. It is the deliberate natxire of reprisals, which, as the Ambassador will be well aware, H.M.G. have always condemned. (d) H.M.G. have no intention of issuing a statement abou ' the incident of September 10, Then fo>aiLi ***.t ^ X A ^ ., 4. „• • . H ^-S ,. r. -t nr, o ^ n p,^ ^ H.M.G. in fact noticed that the/Commission's Chairman ^ stated that, while Jordan must be held responsible /for the 1 2 cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins I 1 I 2 ™-Fb 3917 72? 774 U^X Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet for the incident, patrolling by the Israeli forces close to the demarcation line greatly contributed to increased tension. (e) H.M.G. are certainly not trying to appease the Arabs at Israel's expense. On the contrary they have repeatedly urged restraint on the Jordanians. On the other hand the deliberate destruction of Jordanian police posts will make the task of the Jordanian authorities in preventing infiltration into Israel harder. If this is the intention of the Israel Government H.lvl.G. would take a most serious view of it. (f) The Ambassador seems to be trying to make a major issue out of the Foreign Office statement of September 13. If he wants a fight he can have it. He will no doubt have been expecting that the result of the two recent reprisal ra43s will be the holding up of shipments of arms from this country. So far we have not done this. But if the Israelis are really out for trouble we shall have no option but to do so. (R. M. Hadow) September 19, 1956 CONFIDENTIAL FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV Cypher/DTP and FOREIGN OFFICE AMP By Bag DISTRIBUTION No. 790 D. 1.10 a.m. September 22, 1956 September 21, 1956 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Tel Aviv telegram No. 790 of. September 21. Repeated for Information to: Amman Jerusalem And Saving to: Beirut No. 8/2 Bagdad No. 582,. Cairo No. 857 Damascus No, 512 Washington No, 4319 Paris No. 3425 P.O.M.E.F. 1212 UKDEL New York No. 924 My telegram No, 774 [of September 17: Israel-Jordan situation]. The Israel Ambassador called on Mr. Ross on September 18 to continue the complaint made to the Minister of State about the alleged partiality of the Foreign Office statement of September 13 (my telegram No. 758). The Mixed Armistice Commission had on September 17 condemned Jordan for the killing of the six Israeli soldiers which had given rise to the Israeli action. The Israel Government now expected Her Majesty's Government to condemn Jordan for this incident. They also feared that we were trying to appease the Arabs at Israel's expense, which they were not prepared to accept, 2. The Minister of State summoned the Israel Ambassador again on September 20, He told him that Her Majesty's Government had considered the Israel Government's demand that they should condemn Jordan for the incident of September 10 but had decided against it.
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