The Six Day War: the War That No One Wanted

ISSN: 1353-7121 (Print) 1743-9086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20

The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted

Yossi Goldstein

To cite this article: Yossi Goldstein (2018) The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted, Israel Affairs, 24:5, 767-784, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475

Published online: 24 Aug 2018.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fisa20 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 2018, VOL. 24, NO. 5, 767–784 https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475

The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted

Yossi Goldstein

Israeli Haritage, Ariel University, Ariel

ABSTRACT As a military clash that it is still unclear if anyone truly wanted, the June 1967 Six Day War remains one of the most curious military conﬂicts in modern history. Israel certainly did not prefer the military route, and neither did Egypt, Syria, or the Soviet Union. Yet while it was clear to these parties from the outset that nothing good could come from such a clash, they backed Israel into a corner from which it was unable to extricate itself without going to war. This article explores the factors that caused the war at the time and in the manner it did.

KEYWORDS Arab‒Israeli conﬂict; Six Day War; Israel; Egypt; Soviet Union; US‒Israel relations; Levy Eshkol; Gamal Abdel Nasser; civil‒military relations

The immediate turn of events leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day War began on 11 May 1967, when an intelligence officer in the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv passed fabricated information to Syria and Egypt indicating the massing of Israeli forces along the Syrian border. The next day, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt sent a letter to the Soviet foreign minister maintaining that IDF forces had been assigned ‘to carry out aggressive action . . . aimed at bringing about a collapse of the Syrian regime’, and that they were ‘consulting with the government of the UAR [Egypt] to take appropriate measures’.1 The remainder of the communique provided the ostensive location of the Israeli forces and the timeframe during which Israel intended attacking Syria: between 16 and 22 May.2 In retrospect, these warnings were clearly groundless and falsified,3 which raises the question why the Soviet Union – a global superpower whose statesmen had proven their diplomatic wisdom for many years up to that point – took this information for granted and treated it with such profound gravity. The Soviet provocations that began on 11 May were inextricably linked to the Kremlin’s concerns regarding the possible collapse of the Syrian regime. One explanation for the Soviet request was an alleged warning made the previous month by Israeli Chief-of-Staff Yitzhak Rabin that

Israel was about to attack Syria,4 though Rabin had made no such threat. Another is that an error had been made in the translation of one of Rabin’s statements,5 which had not referred to operative military action against the Syrian regime but rather warned Damascus against further provocations.6 ‘If there is a danger of war today’, Rabin said in an interview published in the Israeli press on 14 May and quoted by the Arab and Soviet media, ‘it is more a danger of deterioration as a result of a Syrian attempt to draw uninterested countries into war.’7 In any event, if the Egyptians were to take action against Israel, the Soviets now committed their military support. The reasons for the fabrication of the Soviet report have been discussed extensively.8 Initially, it appears to have been a local initiative of junior officials in the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv, which parties in Moscow sought to exploit in the context of internal power struggles.9 The Soviet military attaché in Lebanon conveyed the reports to the embassy, perhaps believing them reliable in light of Prime Minister Levy Eshkol’s and Rabin’s explicit threats to Syria. For some time, the Soviets had been concerned about the possible collapse of the Syrian regime and their stronghold in the region. Although the Soviets knew the reports were fabricated, they used them to push Egypt into providing Syria with extensive deterrence.10 They also appeared to be certain that the fire they started would die out on its own, like other conflagrations they sparked during the Cold War,11 and were unconcerned about possible intervention by the US, which was then embroiled in Vietnam.12 No one in Moscow was genuinely interested in war.13

Egyptian forces move into Sinai Upon receiving the Soviet reports, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser assembled his advisors, led by Defence Minister Abdel Hakim Amer. Two days later, on 14 May, Egyptian Chief of Staﬀ Muhammad Fawzi instructed his forces to raise their state of alert to the highest possible level. He then ordered

the formations and units stationed in accordance with the plans and operations . . . [to move] in their current compositions to their designated assembly areas [in the Sinai Peninsula]. The armed forces shall be prepared to bear the burden of the fighting on the Israeli front, according to the developments.14 That evening, Egypt began to move two divisions into the Sinai Peninsula, filling Cairo’s newspapers with articles on the troop movements and pro- claiming Egypt’s readiness ‘to come to the defence of Syria at a moment’s notice’.15 On 16 May, to demonstrate the seriousness of his intentions, Nasser instructed Amer to convene a meeting of the senior Egyptian command ISRAEL AFFAIRS 769 and to enact a resolution calling for the removal of all United Nations (UN) soldiers from the Sinai Peninsula. The same day, an emissary of the Egyptian chief of staff dispatched a letter to the commander of the UN Emergency Force calling for the immediate removal of his forces to bases within the Gaza Strip.16 The telegram was delivered to UN General Secretary U Thant, who, after some consultation, concluded that the request was serious. In response, Thant’s American aide Ralph Bunche dispatched a telegram calling on the Egyptians to reconsider.17 At this stage, Nasser’s primary aim was to deter Israel from invading Syria.18 His effort to create an atmosphere of crisis along the Egyptian‒ Israeli border may also have stemmed from hope that doing so might extricate him from his failed intervention in Yemen and perhaps even earn him points to overshadow his failure in the 1956 Sinai war. His massing of troops and his demand for the evacuation of UN forces was intended to prove that he would go to any lengths to prevent an invasion of Syria. But there were other reasons for his actions. By moving forces into Sinai, he gained direct access to both the Israeli border and the Straits of Tiran, instantly improving Egypt’s strategic position. He also regarded the move as a victorious response to claims of his rivals, particularly the Jordanians and Saudis, that he was hiding ‘behind the skirt of the United Nations’.

The crisis escalates The Israeli government only learned of the tumult three days later. On the evening of 14 May 1967, at a private Independence Day Eve party in Jerusalem,19 IDF Intelligence Directorate chief Aharon Yariv informed Rabin that the Egyptian army had been placed on alert and that substantial forces had crossed the Suez Canal.20 At another event later that evening, Rabin updated Eshkol and recommended calling up reserve forces to deter Egypt. Eshkol, however, preferred to avoid hasty action and regarded the incident as a repeat of the Rotem Crisis, during which, years earlier, Israel had mobilised forces in response to similar Egyptian troop movements that ultimately concluded without hostilities.21 Based on this precedent, and after angry words with Rabin, Eshkol denied the request and deferred the discussion until the following day.22 At a state reception in Jerusalem the next morning, Rabin reiterated to Eshkol his assessments regarding Egypt, informing him of the high state of alert that had been declared throughout the Egyptian army and the order that had been issued to assume formations in accordance with the Kaher plan for the conquest of Israel. But Rabin was no longer as resolute about mobilising the reserves as he had been the previous evening, noting only that he viewed the Egyptian measures as extremely serious and requesting 770 Y. GOLDSTEIN authorisation to assemble substantial numbers of already enlisted compul- sory forces near the border. Once again, Eshkol refused. The following day, on 16 May, Rabin informed Eshkol that the Egyptian army had taken up defensive positions along the northern roads of the Sinai Peninsula.23 Later that day, during a special meeting of the Israeli government, he informed Eshkol’s concerned ministers about the Egyptian troop movements. But now he too maintained that the manoeuvres were remi- niscent of Operation Rotem24 and that the intelligence assessment supported the assumption that they were thus far defensive in character.25 However, in the hours that followed, Rabin received reports regarding the continued flow of Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula and again requested authorisation to mobilise a large reserve force. In a meeting late that day, Eshkol once again portrayed Rabin’s requests as excessive and authorised him to call up only one armoured brigade.26 The military and political deterioration continued the following day. Egyptian forces continued to approach the border, and by the end of the day Israeli military intelligence concluded that they now consisted of four divisions, between 600 and 1000 tanks, approximately 1000 cannons, and some 80,000 troops.27 The same day, two Egyptian planes flew over the Dimona nuclear reactor, which Israel’s military elite regarded as another indication of Egypt’soffensive intentions.28 And, in an act meant to prove his readiness for battle, Nasser demanded the immediate withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from Sinai. After consultation with the countries whose soldiers constituted the force, Thant had little choice but to order its immediate withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The American pressure against this measure proved ineffective,29 as did Israeli protests to the UN. And with this, another obstacle separating the military forces of Israel and Egypt was removed. The same day, Rabin met with the IDF General Staff, whose members were already in firm support of going to war – that is, unless Nasser refrained from the causus belli which they expected to be his next move: the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. This was something they were certain the Egyptians would do sooner or later, though Rabin was still unconvinced. During their three meetings that day, Rabin informed Eshkol of the developments, discussed their implications, and once again attempted to convince him to mobilise additional reserve units. Still certain that Nasser had no real interest in going to war and determined to avoid being drawn into a conflict by the Egyptian provocations, Eshkol granted only limited authorisation. He was also convinced of the reliability of Yariv’s assessment that Egypt’s sole goal was to deter Israel from attacking Syria. The fact that Yariv had in the meantime changed his assessment and now believed that Egypt was geared toward war did not alter his view.30 For this reason, he was also not overly concerned at news of ISRAEL AFFAIRS 771 the ejection of UN forces from the Sinai or the continued Egyptian build- up. Rabin did not share Eshkol’s assumption that war was not a realistic option for any of the parties in the Middle East.31 But he was also not yet fully convinced that war was inevitable. In any event, despite their differ- ence of opinion, Rabin maintained complete allegiance to the Israeli political echelon in his characteristically meticulous manner. On the night of 18 May, it still appeared as if the two leaders were speaking the same language, albeit with different accents and nuances and their respective political and military approaches. Following Nasser’s expulsion of UN forces from the Gaza Strip, Palestinian brigades of the Egyptian army moved into the evacuated positions. At this point, however, another threat hung in the air, one that Israel considered much more serious – closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, which Egyptian journalists suggested could be imminent.32 As noted, the Israeli government regarded this as a justification for war, as closing the southern maritime shipping route to Israel would block oil shipments from Iran to Israel and Israeli exports to Africa and Southeast Asia. However, beyond its expected economic impact, closing the Straits would provide Egypt with a victory in terms of morale, aimed at under- mining Israeli deterrence and increasing Nasser’s international standing. This helps explain why Rabin perceived the situation as a ‘dilemma of to exist or to cease to exist’.33 Eshkol viewed matters less dramatically. In 1950–1951, he recalled, when Egypt had blocked the Straits, Israel had waited five years to go to war. However, he too understood that Israel could not accept such an act under any circumstances, and he took military and diplomatic measures to dissuade Nasser from taking this step, most prominently the threat of a preventative war. On 19 May 1967, the IDF’s intelligence directorate concluded that Nasser’s next move would indeed be to close the Straits to Israeli shipping.34 Rabin rushed to report this assessment to Eshkol and requested authorisation for an almost complete mobilisation of the IDF reserves. This change in the intelligence assessment transformed Israel’s conception regarding the likelihood of war overnight. Now, for the first time, war seemed much more likely, and, in a symbolic act, Rabin ordered the heads of his office, the Operations Branch, and the Intelligence Branch to report to the underground war-room of the IDF high command (typically referred to in Hebrew as ‘ha-bor’, or the Pit). Through the mobilisation of 55,000 reserve soldiers (the actual number reached 80,000 by the following day),35 Rabin sought to make it clear to Egypt that Israel would stand its ground: if Cairo were to cross its red line and close the Straits to Israeli shipping, the IDF would use all means at its disposal to reopen them. Based on this conception, Eshkol, who was still not convinced by the 772 Y. GOLDSTEIN intelligence assessments, had no choice but to authorise the mobilisation. At the same time, in his capacity as defence minister, he ordered the activation of emergency protocols throughout the military and civil appa- ratus for war.36 Despite Eshkol’s authorisation of an almost complete call-up of the reserves, a chasm began to emerge between the two men regarding what should happen next. Rabin was certain that the die had been cast and that Israel needed to launch an immediate preventative war. During a meeting of the General Staff on the evening of 19 May, he insisted that war was unavoidable. Moreover, in light of the recommendation of IDF intelligence, Rabin hinted at the possibility of an Israeli provocation aimed at sparking war even without the casus belli of the closure of the Straits. Simultaneously, he ordered the IDF to prepare for war.37 The conclusion that war was now inevitable38 created immense pressure on Rabin and the General Staff. After all, according to their own planning, the IDF would enjoy a tremendous advantage if it attacked first. Therefore, on 19 May, Rabin requested Eshkol’s authorisation to go to war even if Egypt did not close the Straits. From Rabin’s perspective, the army was ready for war on all levels, and the loss of life it would ultimately be forced to pay increased with each passing hour. Eshkol viewed things differently. Although he authorised the mobilisation, he was still convinced that none of the relevant parties truly wanted war. He was also not convinced that Egypt’s intentions were truly offensive in nature and were not being guided by propaganda interests. The Egyptian army had not yet been deployed in attack formation, and the timing of the events was also unclear: why was it necessary for Egypt to attack at precisely that point in time?39 These questions motivated Eshkol to use diplomatic channels to allay Egyptian and Syrian concerns. Indeed, he still believed that even the potential closure of the Straits of Tiran was part of a campaign of threats against Israel to deter an invasion of Syria.40 The US administration viewed Israel’s restraint in a positive light.41 At the same time, they too worked to reassure the Egyptians and Soviets, also believing that this would resolve the crisis.42 Over the next three days (19–21 May), the situation appeared to improve somewhat, and on 20 May, the Israeli leadership was informed that an Israeli cargo ship had passed through the Straits of Tiran undisturbed. In this way, as the General Staff urged the country’s political leadership to immediately launch a preventative war, Eshkol and most ministers still held the diametrically opposed view. The Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs passed a resolution stating that Israel would respond with military force only in the event of an Egyptian bombing.43 The generals’ conviction that the longer Israel waited the greater the losses the IDF would sustain exacer- bated the crisis and reduced the trust between the Israeli political and ISRAEL AFFAIRS 773 military echelons. And although Rabin continued to accept the decisions of the political leadership as the final word and an unassailable imperative, he now began to lose faith in Eshkol.44 Eshkol had not always adopted all of Rabin’s recommendations in the past. He believed in Rabin and demonstrated his trust in him up to the point of disagreement. Once that point was reached, however, he was capable of opposing, neutralising, and even silencing his chief of staff. This was one of those times: Eshkol and Rabin reached total and utter disagreement on the question of whether or not to go to war immediately. Rabin called for an immediate preventative war, and Eshkol maintained that Israel would only initiate war after all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted.45 On 22 May, then, these two figures, who were responsible for deciding whether Israel would go to war, were characterised by polar opposite moods. Rabin was deeply disappointed by Eshkol’s position, whereas Eshkol was optimistic46 – despite the winds of war that had kicked up in Cairo, the extensive Egyptian reserve mobilisation, and the Egyptian naval units making their way into the Red Sea.47

Nasser crosses the Rubicon At 4:30 am on the morning of 23 May, Rabin informed Eshkol of a bellicose speech Nasser had delivered at the Bir Gifgafa military base in Sinai, in which he announced a renewal of the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.48 Twenty-four hours later, Egypt made this decision opera- tional by announcing its intention to block the passage of all ships sailing under the Israeli flag and all ships carrying cargo bound for Eilat. Though anticipated by the IDF General Staff,49 the action was received by the Israeli public and around the world with shock and dismay. Until then, in light of the balance of power in the region, it had been assumed that Nasser’s belligerent words and dramatic troop movements were meant purely to deter Israel from attacking Syria. By closing the Straits, however, Nasser had passed the point of no return, and it was clear that the IDF would be unable to exercise restraint over time.50 What motivated Nasser to move beyond his short-term bid for increased standing among fellow Egyptians, the Egyptian military, and throughout the Arab world? Did he truly believe what he said at Bir Gifgafa: that the issue at hand was ‘not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran or the withdrawal of UNEF but . . . the aggression which took place in Palestine in 1948’?51 Nasser understood the balance of power between the IDF and his own military, which had previously convinced him of the futility of war.52 Still, he believed in the deterrent capacity of the Egyptian military, and perhaps more importantly, in the support of the Soviet Union.53 The crux of the answer to this question lies in Nasser’s analysis of the responses 774 Y. GOLDSTEIN of Israel and the United States. From the intelligence he received, and even from the press, he learned that Eshkol was making every effort to prevent war. However, he appears to have been unaware of the discontent brewing within the Israeli General Staff or of Rabin’s demand for an immediate preventative strike. Nasser’s understanding, therefore, appears to have been that he had time to spare, that belligerent words could be retracted later. His overzealous remarks in Cairo on 26 May can be understood in a similar manner. ‘Recently, we have felt strong enough’, he claimed before an inflamed audience,

that if we were to enter a battle with Israel, with God’s help, we could triumph . . . Taking Sharm al-Sheikh [a reference to the evacuated UN base in the site] meant confrontation with Israel. Taking such action also meant that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel . . . Our basic objective will be to destroy Israel. I probably could not have said such things ﬁve or even three years ago . . . I say such things because I am conﬁdent.54

Nasser’s actions, however, conveyed the opposite message, as a high-level Soviet oﬃcial pointed out to the Americans: ‘Nasser may have proclaimed the closure of the Straits but has not closed it in practice.’55 Nasser was also convinced that the US was making an eﬀort to keep Israel in check, which led him to the same conclusion that had been reached by Eshkol and Foreign Minister Abba Eban: that the Americans were traumatised by their allies’ refusal to support them in Vietnam and had therefore moderated their policy through a coordinated international initiative.56 For Nasser, this meant that the Americans would give him time, of which he took advantage to declare the closure of the Straits of Tiran.

Israel edges toward the brink The impatience of Israel’s generals, who were a generation younger than their ministerial counterparts, continued to mount,57 and on the morning of 23 May, Eshkol met with them in the Pit. During the meeting, Rabin demanded defiantly, and with the visible support of his generals, that Israel attack Egypt.58 Eshkol explained that the situation was more complex than it seemed, and that, as far as he was concerned, a diplomatic solution was preferable.59 The General Staff meeting was immediately followed by a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, during which Rabin again argued that Israel would lose its credibility if it did not attack. Still, Eban’s proposal to wait another 48 hours to make another effort to resolve the conflict through diplomatic means, as personally requested by President Johnson, was supported by Eshkol, most ministers, and the heads of the opposition.60 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 775

Rabin found the Ministerial Committee’s decision particularly troubling, as the waiting would clearly last longer than 48 hours and, in the meantime, his generals would continue their pressure to go to war. Ezer Weizmann, Rabin’s deputy and the most prominent hawk, took it upon himself to pressure Rabin in this direction, and, by doing so, to pressure Eshkol. A few hours later, Rabin phoned Eshkol and tried to dissuade him from waiting, but to no avail.61 The prime minister did agree, however, to an afternoon meeting with Rabin and Weizmann to clarify the issue, during which Weizmann called for an immediate attack.62 At another General Staff meeting that evening, Rabin reported on the decisions of the political leadership and heard reports that confirmed his concerns. ‘A massive Egyptian force is organizing itself in the Sinai in a state of high alert’, concluded Intelligence Chief Yariv. One after another, his generals argued that if the initiative to go to war were taken by Egypt, ‘the war would endanger the existence of Israel’.63 At this point, on 23 May, Rabin began to display signs of mental and physical strain64 and fell ill. His mental health in particular had been compromised by the immense psychological strain stemming from the responsibility he bore and his intense running argument with Eshkol and his ‘dovish’ ministers, not to mention the pressure of his generals, his lack of sleep in previous days, his irregular meals, and his incessant smoking.65 In this context, Weizmann was appointed as acting chief of staff. At 5:30 pm, Eshkol entered the Pit, where he was met by almost all the generals of the IDF. Rabin’s illness hung in the air but was treated as a secret; however, it was clear that Weizmann had received command. The rumours characterised Rabin’s illness as serious, giving the impression that he would be absent for an extended period. Yariv reported on the situation on the front and noted that the mobilisation of the reserves was almost complete. Air Force Commander Mordechai Hod presented the force’s plan and expressed complete confidence in its ultimate success. According to the reports, the IDF was ‘prepared for war beginning tomorrow [25 May 1967]’. Eshkol then made brief remarks. This was the hour of diplomacy, he said, emphasising that the political leadership alone would decide how and when to use the military.66 The generals continued to argue with Eshkol, but he silenced them: he and his ministers would determine the timing of going to war. The confrontation marked the zenith of a period of tension that had been building for some time. Until then, Rabin had been able to restrain his generals and to maintain the proper relationship between the political and military echelons. But with Rabin incapacitated and a militant Weizmann momen- tarily at the helm, the tension between Israel’s political and military leader- ships reached new heights. 776 Y. GOLDSTEIN

Israel’s last-ditch attempt to avoid war On 24 May, when Eban left on a mission to Europe and the United States seeking guarantees regarding the opening of the Straits,67 it was clear that if he returned empty-handed war would follow. However, as the answers Eban received from the Americans were vague and subject to different interpretations,68 Eshkol maintained his position, especially after being relayed a message from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin on 27 May implor- ing Israel not to go to war.69 The following morning, Eshkol received another communique from President Johnson urging him to wait for the exhaustion of diplomatic efforts and the mobilisation of a naval force to breach the blockade.70 Later, Johnson claimed that the Soviets had informed his administration that if Israel were to undertake a preventative strike, they would be forced to go to war.71 Eshkol read the communique aloud to his ministers, who voted to continue waiting.72 Rabin, who had meanwhile reassumed his post, regarded the decision as further impairing Israel’s military situation, and, at Rabin’s request, Eshkol agreed to explain it to the General Staff. Eshkol began his meeting with the General Staff by informing them of the government’s decision and asked them to speak freely.73 And speak they did, and in some cases in an insolent manner. Avraham Yoffe, a division commander, argued that ‘if at the moment of an Egyptian attack we continue lobbying France and the United States, we are marching toward a holocaust’. Weizmann followed suit, charging that Israel’s leadership was ‘incapable of national unity in the face of the Arab threat’. And division commander Ariel Sharon asserted that ‘today, with our own hands, we have surrendered the deterrence capability of the IDF . . . Your hesitation will cost thousands of lives’. Eshkol responded by telling the generals that they were ‘blowing things out of proportion’, that the IDF was not ‘a preventative army’, and that war was a last resort. He also reminded them that, as defence minister, he had provided them with all they had requested to build their power of deterrence, the single purpose of which was to prevent war. For this reason, he maintained angrily, it was first necessary to exhaust all diplomatic measures. Eshkol also told them that the Americans had started conveying encouraging messages indicating Nasser’s willingness to enter into negotia- tions for the return of UN observers and the opening of the Straits. The generals were not convinced. They wanted war.74

Moshe Dayan becomes minister of defence During the 10 days that passed since the Israeli public learned of Nasser’s aggressive actions, pressure for Eshkol’s resignation as defence minister ISRAEL AFFAIRS 777 mounted throughout the Israeli population as a result of his public image as weak and hesitant and widespread frustration with the period of waiting the political leadership had imposed on the military. But on 30 May something gave: a meeting of the ruling Knesset Alignment faction, Eshkol’s primary source of political power, advocated bringing Moshe Dayan into the government.75 Dayan was a former chief of staff and a celebrated war hero, and over the previous days calls had been voiced across the political spectrum to appoint him as defence minister in Eshkol’s stead. Eshkol now observed first-hand the coup that was being perpetrated against him even among his most loyal colleagues,76 who had consulted with one another and supported Dayan’s appointment.77 After two marathon cabinet meetings between 1 and 2 June, it was decided to expand the government by bringing in Dayan as defence minister and Menachem Begin and Elimelech Rimalt as ministers without portfolio and to appoint Begin and Dayan as members of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs.78 Eshkol’s concluding remarks received unanimous approval:

I welcome the new members of the government, who are lending their hand to bearing the burden of the ultimate national responsibility. I am certain that this national unity will be received warmly by the people in Israel and the Diaspora.79 Beyond these lofty words, however, it remains unclear whether the formation of the unity government was based on any real logic aside from that of putting an end to the mass hysteria. Although this in itself may have been an important goal, its long-term price is still unclear.

Slouching to confrontation On 30 May 1967, King Hussein of Jordan signed a mutual defence treaty with Nasser.80 This development, along with Dayan’s appointment as defence minister the following day, convinced all those involved that the war no one wanted was on its way. Hussein appears to have believed Nasser’s overconfident assertion that ‘we have returned the state of affairs to 1956; we will also return it to 1948’.81 It appeared, as Eban would later explain, that Hussein had been swept up by the excitement that permeated the Arab world.82 Hussein took Nasser’s words seriously. However, another reason for Hussein’s decision appears to have been his desire to avoid remaining outside a victorious coalition, which he undoubtedly understood could have jeopardised his regime.83 His decision was a major change in orientation, as in the years leading up to 1967 Hussein had attempted to calm the region through a series of meetings with senior Israeli representa- tives. In any event, in June 1967, the IDF found itself facing a cumulative 778 Y. GOLDSTEIN force of approximately 465,000 troops, 3000 tanks, and 800 helicopters (including the Iraqi army) on three different fronts. The superpowers continued to try to ease tensions in the region, and the key to doing so was held by the Americans, who informed Israel that they were communicating with Britain, France, and other states regarding the establishment of a naval force to breach the closure. But the effort was in vain, as only Eshkol, Eban, and a few ministers lent credence to Johnson’s assurances.84 On 30 May, Eshkol wrote Johnson an urgent letter reminding him that the US had committed itself to Israel’s well-being and was therefore obligated to take immediate action to open the Straits.85 A similar letter to Kosygin written two days later was also in vain.86 Eshkol and Eban found themselves alone in the campaign and came to be viewed by the majority of the population as thorns in Israel’s side. Eventually, the Americans also came to understand that war was the only recourse, and on 31 May Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow admitted that the president saw no way out of the crisis.87 The reports they received depicted a panic-stricken Israeli population filling sand bags, donating blood, establishing 14,000 new beds in the country’s hospitals, and digging mass graves. In effect, in early June, when Mossad Director Meir Amit arrived in Washington for additional talks at Eshkol’s initiative, he believed he had received an unspoken green light to attack.88 The countdown to war began on 2 June, one day after Dayan’s appointment and the formation of the national unity government. That morning, the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs, which now included Dayan and Begin, assembled for a meeting with the General Staff.89 The previous night’s events had their effect, and in a stormy meeting, Dayan and Begin joined the majority of the General Staff in demanding war.90 Though a minority of ministers supported Johnson’s request to delay action, this option was no longer seriously considered. Yariv maintained that the Americans would take no serious action to breach the blockade, and the generals in attendance argued that not going to war would be tantamount to abandoning the people. Eshkol, who preferred to wait for Amit’s return from Washington the following day, stressed the centrality of Israeli‒ American relations to Israel’s strategic policy, heightening Dayan’s belief that he would again oppose war. But now Eshkol, too, maintained that the circumstances had made war inevitable. During the meeting, it was Dayan and Rabin who tipped the scales in favour of going to war.91 The timing was left up to Eshkol and Dayan. The following day, at a 4 June meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, Eban reiterated his recommendation to hold off for a few days in light of further American efforts, whereas Dayan insisted that each passing day strengthened the Arab armies. Dayan also reported that the Egyptian military had transitioned from a defensive deployment to an ISRAEL AFFAIRS 779 offensive one with the aim of conquering Eilat.92 During the meeting, Eshkol received the message from Johnson he had been expecting, but it contained nothing new.93 Ultimately, he asked the minsters to approve his proposed course of action, to reply ‘to Johnson with a message explaining the severity of our situation, but not wait for an answer . . . I am in favor of refraining from setting dates and times here, and concluding that we must instruct the army to choose the time, place, and method that best suits it’.94 The change in Eshkol’s position was the product of three primary factors: his conclusion that the Americans would do nothing to open the naval blockade; his view of Hussein’s decision to join Nasser’s war coalition as a dramatic and dangerous development95; and the immense pressure he had been under to go to war. Nonetheless, despite his understanding of the inevitability of war at this point, he was still not convinced of its benefits or its positive long-term implications.

Conclusion Israel won the war in six days in a military clash that no one appears to have wanted. All involved parties had no doubt that the road they were travelling promised nothing but problems, and the precise reasons why Nasser took the actions that left most in Israel calling for war are still a conundrum with which historians continue to grapple. Thus emerged the perfect paradox: a war that was desired by no one, least of all Israel; that Egypt, Syria, and the Soviet Union instigated but never thought would break out; and that ended in a resounding Egyptian and Syrian defeat and a hopeless situation for the instigators. Fifty-one years later, Israel’s victory continues to have a decisive inﬂuence on Middle Eastern aﬀairs.

Notes

1. LBJL NSF, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, Accessed May 14, 1967; Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, Accessed May 15, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. See also LBJL NSF, NSC Histories, The Middle East Crisis, vol. 1, Tabs 1–10, no. 2, State Department circular, President on the Middle East Crisis, May 12–June 9, 1967, Accessed December 19, 1968; Sadat, In Search of Identity, 171–2; Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, 5, 14; Parker, The Six Day War, 42; Shalom, Diplomacy in the Shadow of War, 197–276. 2. Heikal, The Sphinx and The Commissar, 172–4; Zisser, “Between Israel and Syria,” 226; Oren, Six Days of War. 3. Shalom, Diplomacy in the Shadow of War, 206. 4. Riad, The Struggle for Peace, 17. 780 Y. GOLDSTEIN

5. The statement was later published in the Israeli newspaper Lamerhav, Accessed May 14, 1967. 6. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, 15. 7. See the interviews with Rabin in Lamerhav, Maariv, and Hayom, Accessed May 14, 1967. 8. See Parker, The Six Day War,35–49; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, 36; and Shalom, Diplomacy in the Shadow of War, 197–276. 9. Ben-Tzur, Soviet Factors, 204–5. 10. See, for example, Bukay, “Who Is Responsible for the Outbreak of the 1967 War?,” 253; and Heikal, Hassanein, interviewed in The Sunday Telegraph, Accessed October 7, 1975. 11. Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Services; Judt, Postwar. 12. ISA 4/4078/HZ, letter from Argov to Tekoah, Accessed May 14, 1967 and “The United States and the Problem of Soviet Penetration of the Middle East,” Accessed 16 May 1967. 13. See Bukay, “Who Is Responsible for the Outbreak of the 1967 War?,” 258; and Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation. 14. Al-Ahram, Accessed May 15, 1967. 15. Al-Ahram , Accessed May 16, 1967. 16. Parker, The Six Day War, 42. 17. Information memorandum from Popper to Rusk, Washington, Accessed May 17, 1967, and telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, Accessed May 19, 1967, 1430Z, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. 18. Letter from Rostow to Harman, Washington, Accessed May 22, 1967, and Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, Washington, Accessed May 23, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. 19. YRC, Interview with Uzi Narkiss, Accessed July 10, 1997, 49 [Hebrew]. 20. Nakdimon, Approaching H-Hour. 21. Bar-Yosef, “The Rotem Affair”; Teveth, Exposed in the Turret, 11; Shefi, Early Warning Countdown. 22. Eban, Chapters of My Life, 315. 23. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, 151. 24. Teveth, Exposed in the Turret, 11. 25. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Government of Israel, Accessed May 16, 1967. 26. Rabin and Goldstein, Service Notebook, 135. 27. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Government of Israel, Accessed May 16, 1967. 28. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 343 ff. 29. Information memorandum from Popper to Rusk, Washington, Accessed May 17, 1967, and telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, Tel Aviv, Accessed May 19, 1967, 1430Z, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. See also LBJL, NSF, Country File Middle East Crisis, vol. 6, Box 109, CIA memorandum of Accessed May 16, 1967; and New York Times, Accessed May 19, 1967. 30. ISA/YEA, minutes of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, Accessed May 17, 1967 [Hebrew]. 31. ISA 6181/3A, Eshkol’s remarks before the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, Accessed November 22, 1966 [Hebrew]. 32. See for example Al-Ahram, Accessed May 18, 1967. 33. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, 165. ISRAEL AFFAIRS 781

34. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the IDF General Staff, Accessed May 19, 1967 [Hebrew]. 35. ISA/YEA, Rabin’s report to the Accessed May 21, 1967 meeting of the Government of Israel [Hebrew]. 36. Dayan, Milestones, 398. 37. ISF/YEA, Minutes of the IDF General Staff, Accessed June 19, 1967 [Hebrew]. 38. Rabin and Goldstein, Service Notebook, 143. See also the interview with Rabin published in Maariv, Accessed October 4, 1967. 39. See, for example, Zeira, Myth versus Reality, 27. 40. ISA/YEA, Eshkol’s report to the Israeli Government, Minutes of the Government of Israel, Accessed May 21, 1967. 41. ISA 30/5973/HZ, confidential memoranda regarding the Six Day War, Avraham Harman to Foreign Ministry, meeting with Efraim Evron, Eugene Rostow, and Davis, Accessed May 19, 1967 [Hebrew]. See also ISA/YEA, Eshkol’s report to the Israeli Government, meeting of Accessed May 21, 1967. 42. Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, Washington, Accessed May 19, 1967, and letter from Rostow to Harman, Washington, Accessed 22 May 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. 43. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, Accessed May 21, 1967. 44. Rabin and Goldstein, Service Notebook, 148. 45. Gluska, The Confrontation, 13. 46. See Eshkol’s remarks before the Knesset in Knesset Debates, Accessed May 22, 1967. 47. Al-Ahram, Accessed May 22, 1967. 48. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation,90–1. 49. YRC, interview with Uzi Narkiss, Accessed July 10, 1997, 52 [Hebrew]. 50. Maàrachot, May 1967. 51. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation,90–1. 52. Sadat, In Search of Identity, 133. 53. Kerr, “Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution,” 114–34. 54. Eban, Chapters of My Life, 359–60. 55. USNA NND, Box 1795, 969,000, report of the US embassy in Egypt to the US State Department, Accessed May 23, 1967; and USNA, Box 2556, 969,000, memorandum of the US State Department, Accessed May 25, 1967. 56. Eban, Chapters of My Life, 325. 57. See Gluska, The Confrontation. 58. ISA/YEA, summary of the General Staff meeting with Levi Eshkol, Accessed May 23, 1967. 59. Ibid. On the disappointment of the heads of the General Staff, see the interview with Uzi Narkiss, Accessed July 10, 1997, 53 [Hebrew] 60. ISA 30/5937/A, letter from Johnson to Eshkol, Accessed May 22, 1967. 61. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, 172. 62. Rabin and Goldstein, Service Notebook, 156. 63. Ibid. 64. YRC, interview with Uzi Narkiss, Accessed July 10, 1997, 54. 65. See for example Eban, Chapters of My Life, vol. 2, 329. 66. ISA/YEA, summary of the General Staff meeting with Levi Eshkol, Accessed May 24, 1967. 782 Y. GOLDSTEIN

67. See Shalom, Diplomacy in the Shadow of War, 270–377. 68. ISA 30/5937/HZ, report of meeting between Johnson and Eban, Accessed May 26, 1967 [Hebrew]. On Eban’s meeting with Robert McNamara, see LBJL, NSF. NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12–June 19, 1967, Tabs 31–42, Box 17, memorandum of the Department of Defense, Accessed May 26, 1967. 69. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Government of Israel, May 28, 1967. 70. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, Washington, Accessed May 28, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒ Israeli Crisis and War. 71. Letter from Kosygin to Johnson, Moscow, Accessed May 27, 1967, and telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, Washington, Accessed May 28, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. 72. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Government of Israel, May 28, 1967. 73. ISA/YEA, Summary of the General Staff meeting with Levi Eshkol, Accessed May 29, 1967. 74. Ibid. 75. ISA/YEA, File: Party, Central Committee-Secretariat, Minutes of the Knesset Alignment faction, Accessed May 30, 1967 [Hebrew]; Nakdimon, Approaching H-Hour, 155–8. 76. Davar, Accessed October 2, 1967. 77. Nakdimon, Approaching H-Hour, 155–8. 78. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Government of Israel, June 1–2, 1967 (two meetings). 79. Ibid. 80. USNA NND, Boxes 1793 and 1795, 969,000, Reports of the US Embassy in Jordan to the US State Department, 33, Accessed May 31, 1967; Shalom, Diplomacy in the Shadow of War, 391–416. 81. Knesset Debates, Accessed 29 May 1967. 82. Eban, Chapters of My Life, 375. 83. See Bukay, “Who Is Responsible for the Outbreak of the 1967 War?,” 272. 84. Al-Ahram, Accessed May 30, 1967. 85. ISA 4/7454/A, Letter from Eshkol to Johnson, Accessed May 30, 1967. 86. Letter from Eshkol to Kosygin, Accessed June 1, 1967, in Eshkol, Levi Eshkol, Rosh Hamemshela Hashlishi, 546. 87. ISA 5/6444/HZ, Letter from Evron to Foreign Ministry, Accessed May 31, 1967. 88. Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, Washington, Accessed 2 June 1967; Letter from Johnson to Eshkol, Washington, Accessed June 3, 1967; Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Middle East Control Group, Washington, Accessed 4 June 1967 – FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. 89. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, Accessed June 2, 1967. 90. See Gluska, The Confrontation,38–45. 91. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, Accessed June 2, 1967. 92. ISA/YEA, Minutes of the Ministerial Committee of Security Affairs, Accessed June 4, 1967. ISRAEL AFFAIRS 783

93. Letter from Johnson to Eshkol, Washington, Accessed June 3, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab‒Israeli Crisis and War. 94. Ibid. 95. See Bukay, “Who Is Responsible for the Outbreak of the 1967 War?,” 272.

Disclosure statement

No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Yossi Goldstein is professor of history at Ariel University, Israel.

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