DOCSLIB.ORG

The Six Day War: the War That No One Wanted

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Six Day War: the War That No One Wanted Israel Affairs ISSN: 1353-7121 (Print) 1743-9086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20 The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted Yossi Goldstein To cite this article: Yossi Goldstein (2018) The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted, Israel Affairs, 24:5, 767-784, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 Published online: 24 Aug 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1197 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fisa20 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 2018, VOL. 24, NO. 5, 767–784 https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted Yossi Goldstein Israeli Haritage, Ariel University, Ariel ABSTRACT As a military clash that it is still unclear if anyone truly wanted, the June 1967 Six Day War remains one of the most curious military conflicts in modern history. Israel certainly did not prefer the military route, and neither did Egypt, Syria, or the Soviet Union. Yet while it was clear to these parties from the outset that nothing good could come from such a clash, they backed Israel into a corner from which it was unable to extricate itself without going to war. This article explores the factors that caused the war at the time and in the manner it did. KEYWORDS Arab‒Israeli conflict; Six Day War; Israel; Egypt; Soviet Union; US‒Israel relations; Levy Eshkol; Gamal Abdel Nasser; civil‒military relations The immediate turn of events leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day War began on 11 May 1967, when an intelligence officer in the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv passed fabricated information to Syria and Egypt indicating the massing of Israeli forces along the Syrian border. The next day, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt sent a letter to the Soviet foreign minister maintaining that IDF forces had been assigned ‘to carry out aggressive action . aimed at bringing about a collapse of the Syrian regime’, and that they were ‘consulting with the government of the UAR [Egypt] to take appropriate measures’.1 The remainder of the communique provided the ostensive location of the Israeli forces and the timeframe during which Israel intended attacking Syria: between 16 and 22 May.2 In retrospect, these warnings were clearly groundless and falsified,3 which raises the question why the Soviet Union – a global superpower whose statesmen had proven their diplomatic wisdom for many years up to that point – took this information for granted and treated it with such profound gravity. The Soviet provocations that began on 11 May were inextricably linked to the Kremlin’s concerns regarding the possible collapse of the Syrian regime. One explanation for the Soviet request was an alleged warning made the previous month by Israeli Chief-of-Staff Yitzhak Rabin that CONTACT Yossi Goldstein [email protected] Ariel University © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 768 Y. GOLDSTEIN Israel was about to attack Syria,4 though Rabin had made no such threat. Another is that an error had been made in the translation of one of Rabin’s statements,5 which had not referred to operative military action against the Syrian regime but rather warned Damascus against further provocations.6 ‘If there is a danger of war today’, Rabin said in an interview published in the Israeli press on 14 May and quoted by the Arab and Soviet media, ‘it is more a danger of deterioration as a result of a Syrian attempt to draw uninterested countries into war.’7 In any event, if the Egyptians were to take action against Israel, the Soviets now committed their military support. The reasons for the fabrication of the Soviet report have been discussed extensively.8 Initially, it appears to have been a local initiative of junior officials in the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv, which parties in Moscow sought to exploit in the context of internal power struggles.9 The Soviet military attaché in Lebanon conveyed the reports to the embassy, perhaps believing them reliable in light of Prime Minister Levy Eshkol’s and Rabin’s explicit threats to Syria. For some time, the Soviets had been concerned about the possible collapse of the Syrian regime and their stronghold in the region. Although the Soviets knew the reports were fabricated, they used them to push Egypt into providing Syria with extensive deterrence.10 They also appeared to be certain that the fire they started would die out on its own, like other conflagrations they sparked during the Cold War,11 and were unconcerned about possible intervention by the US, which was then embroiled in Vietnam.12 No one in Moscow was genuinely interested in war.13 Egyptian forces move into Sinai Upon receiving the Soviet reports, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser assembled his advisors, led by Defence Minister Abdel Hakim Amer. Two days later, on 14 May, Egyptian Chief of Staff Muhammad Fawzi instructed his forces to raise their state of alert to the highest possible level. He then ordered the formations and units stationed in accordance with the plans and opera- tions . [to move] in their current compositions to their designated assembly areas [in the Sinai Peninsula]. The armed forces shall be prepared to bear the burden of the fighting on the Israeli front, according to the developments.14 That evening, Egypt began to move two divisions into the Sinai Peninsula, filling Cairo’s newspapers with articles on the troop movements and pro- claiming Egypt’s readiness ‘to come to the defence of Syria at a moment’s notice’.15 On 16 May, to demonstrate the seriousness of his intentions, Nasser instructed Amer to convene a meeting of the senior Egyptian command ISRAEL AFFAIRS 769 and to enact a resolution calling for the removal of all United Nations (UN) soldiers from the Sinai Peninsula. The same day, an emissary of the Egyptian chief of staff dispatched a letter to the commander of the UN Emergency Force calling for the immediate removal of his forces to bases within the Gaza Strip.16 The telegram was delivered to UN General Secretary U Thant, who, after some consultation, concluded that the request was serious. In response, Thant’s American aide Ralph Bunche dispatched a telegram calling on the Egyptians to reconsider.17 At this stage, Nasser’s primary aim was to deter Israel from invading Syria.18 His effort to create an atmosphere of crisis along the Egyptian‒ Israeli border may also have stemmed from hope that doing so might extricate him from his failed intervention in Yemen and perhaps even earn him points to overshadow his failure in the 1956 Sinai war. His massing of troops and his demand for the evacuation of UN forces was intended to prove that he would go to any lengths to prevent an invasion of Syria. But there were other reasons for his actions. By moving forces into Sinai, he gained direct access to both the Israeli border and the Straits of Tiran, instantly improving Egypt’s strategic position. He also regarded the move as a victorious response to claims of his rivals, particularly the Jordanians and Saudis, that he was hiding ‘behind the skirt of the United Nations’. The crisis escalates The Israeli government only learned of the tumult three days later. On the evening of 14 May 1967, at a private Independence Day Eve party in Jerusalem,19 IDF Intelligence Directorate chief Aharon Yariv informed Rabin that the Egyptian army had been placed on alert and that substantial forces had crossed the Suez Canal.20 At another event later that evening, Rabin updated Eshkol and recommended calling up reserve forces to deter Egypt. Eshkol, however, preferred to avoid hasty action and regarded the incident as a repeat of the Rotem Crisis, during which, years earlier, Israel had mobilised forces in response to similar Egyptian troop movements that ultimately concluded without hostilities.21 Based on this precedent, and after angry words with Rabin, Eshkol denied the request and deferred the discussion until the following day.22 At a state reception in Jerusalem the next morning, Rabin reiterated to Eshkol his assessments regarding Egypt, informing him of the high state of alert that had been declared throughout the Egyptian army and the order that had been issued to assume formations in accordance with the Kaher plan for the conquest of Israel. But Rabin was no longer as resolute about mobilising the reserves as he had been the previous evening, noting only that he viewed the Egyptian measures as extremely serious and requesting 770 Y. GOLDSTEIN authorisation to assemble substantial numbers of already enlisted compul- sory forces near the border. Once again, Eshkol refused. The following day, on 16 May, Rabin informed Eshkol that the Egyptian army had taken up defensive positions along the northern roads of the Sinai Peninsula.23 Later that day, during a special meeting of the Israeli govern- ment, he informed Eshkol’s concerned ministers about the Egyptian troop movements. But now he too maintained that the manoeuvres were remi- niscent of Operation Rotem24 and that the intelligence assessment sup- ported the assumption that they were thus far defensive in character.25 However, in the hours that followed, Rabin received reports regarding the continued flow of Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula and again requested authorisation to mobilise a large reserve force. In a meeting late that day, Eshkol once again portrayed Rabin’s requests as excessive and authorised him to call up only one armoured brigade.26 The military and political deterioration continued the following day.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bibliography
    BIBLIOGRAPHY Aguilar, Paloma and Carsten Humlebæk (2002), “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War”, in: History & Memory, Vol. 14, Nºs 1/2, pp. 121–164. Almog, Shmuel (1982), Zionism and History, Jerusalem: Magness Press [Hebrew]. Alter, Robert (1991), Necessary Angels: Tradition and Modernity in Kafka, Benjamin and Sholem, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Altshuler, Mordehay (1987), Soviet Jewry since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure, New York et al.: Greenwood Press. Álvarez Chillida, Gonzalo (2002), El antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío (1812–2002), Madrid: Marcial Pons. Amir, Aharon (April 9, 1996), “The Sea, the Last Sea”, in: Maariv (Hebrew). —— (2000), “Horon in the Land of the Hebrews”, in: A.G. Horon, East and West: A History of Canaan and the Land of the Hebrews, Tel-Aviv: Zmora Bitan, pp. 17–27 (Hebrew). Amir, Eyal (1997), And Me for Myself: Studies and Responses, 1944–1996, Tel-Aviv: Golan (Hebrew). Amyot, Robert and Sigelman, Lee (1996), “Jews without Judaism? Assimilation and Jewish Identity in the United States”, in: Social Science Quarterly 77, pp. 177–189. Anagnostou, Yiorgos (Winter 2003), “Model Americans, Quintessential Greeks: Ethnic Success and Assimilation in Diaspora”, in: Diaspora, Vol. 12, Nº 3, pp. 279–328. Angelusz, Róbert and Róbert Tardos (1991), “Politikai és kulturális választóvonalak a parlamenti pártok szavazótáborában”, in: Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tar- dos Hálózatok, stílusok, struktúrák, Budapest: ELTE Szociológiai Intézet-MKI, pp. 182–208. Ansell-Pearson, Keith and Duncan Large (eds.) (2006), The Nietzsche Reader, Vol. 10, Oxford: Blackwell. Appadurai, Arjun (1990), “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Culture Econ- omy”, in: Public Culture, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Engendering Relationship Between Jew and America
    Oedipus' Sister: Narrating Gender and Nation in the Early Novels of Israeli Women by Hadar Makov-Hasson A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies New York University September, 2009 ___________________________ Yael S. Feldman UMI Number: 3380280 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI 3380280 Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 © Hadar Makov-Hasson All Rights Reserved, 2009 DEDICATION בדמי ימיה מתה אמי , וכבת ששים שש שנה הייתה במותה This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my mother Nira Makov. Her love, intellectual curiosity, and courage are engraved on my heart forever. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would have never been written without the help and support of several people to whom I am extremely grateful. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Yael Feldman, whose pioneering work on the foremothers of Hebrew literature inspired me to pursue the questions that this dissertation explores. Professor Feldman‘s insights illuminated the subject of Israeli women writers for me; her guidance and advice have left an indelible imprint on my thinking, and on this dissertation.
    [Show full text]
  • Fo#371/121779
    cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins 1 Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet r V The Israel Ambassador called on me this afternoon. He said that he would be carrying a stage further the conversation which he had had with the Minister of State f* a/f*.Xi»lJ-^on September 15. As he had told Mr. Nutting, the Israeli V •fe- Government deeply resented the condemnation by the / Foreign Office spokesman of Israel's action near Dha Hiriye, which was described as contrary to the assurances given by Israel to the Secretary-General of the o United Nations. This statement was regarded as grossly partial and as an unfriendly act, anticipating as it did . 'VA*** the findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. These findings had now been published on September 17. The Commission condemned Jordan for the killing of the six Israel soldiers which had given rise to the Israeli action. The Israel Government now expected H.M.G. in all fairness to condemn Jordan. There was an additional reason. The Israel Government feared that we were trying to appease the Arabs at Israel's expense, a situation which they were not' prepared to accept. 2. I took note of the Ambassador's request, saying that he would not expect me to give him an immediate reply. I asked him, however, to consider whether a statement condemnatory to Jordan was likely to improve our chances of restraining Jordan, as he knew we were trying to do.
    [Show full text]
  • 1948 Arab‒Israeli
    1948 Arab–Israeli War 1 1948 Arab–Israeli War מלחמת or מלחמת העצמאות :The 1948 Arab–Israeli War, known to Israelis as the War of Independence (Hebrew ,מלחמת השחרור :, Milkhemet Ha'atzma'ut or Milkhemet HA'sikhror) or War of Liberation (Hebrewהשחרור Milkhemet Hashikhrur) – was the first in a series of wars fought between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbours in the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The war commenced upon the termination of the British Mandate of Palestine and the Israeli declaration of independence on 15 May 1948, following a period of civil war in 1947–1948. The fighting took place mostly on the former territory of the British Mandate and for a short time also in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Lebanon.[1] ., al-Nakba) occurred amidst this warﺍﻟﻨﻜﺒﺔ :Much of what Arabs refer to as The Catastrophe (Arabic The war concluded with the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Background Following World War II, on May 14, 1948, the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end. The surrounding Arab nations were also emerging from colonial rule. Transjordan, under the Hashemite ruler Abdullah I, gained independence from Britain in 1946 and was called Jordan, but it remained under heavy British influence. Egypt, while nominally independent, signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that included provisions by which Britain would maintain a garrison of troops on the Suez Canal. From 1945 on, Egypt attempted to renegotiate the terms of this treaty, which was viewed as a humiliating vestige of colonialism. Lebanon became an independent state in 1943, but French troops would not withdraw until 1946, the same year that Syria won its independence from France.
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt's Union with Syria, Its Impact and the June 1967
    Egypt’s Union with Syria, its Impact and the June 1967 War S. Qalb-i-Abid / Massarrat Abid Introduction Four hundred and sixty five million people of the Middle East are almost of the same composition. They share a common language, culture and religion and believe in the concept of the Arab Nationalism - Umma al Arabiya. The Arabic language is a potent unifying bondage. Although spoken Arabic changes widely from area to area, the literary language is more or less the same throughout the Arab world; and all those who speak Arabic are regarded as a part of the Arab Nation. This sacred language of Islam and Quran is the common bondage among the Arabs. The Arab Middle East also comprises the Holy Places for the three major religions of the world - Islam, Christianity and Judaism and remains the place of origin of their faith. Religion has thus always played a major role in political, economic, and social aspects of life for very many years; and in all likelihood, it will also continue to be a significant factor in future politics of this region. Middle East therefore is rightly described as the cradle of Islam. The importance of Middle East in world affairs has been emphasized by the fact that two world wars have had their Middle Eastern commands; and events there, though not principal, weighed heavily on the final results of these gigantic international conflicts. Egypt’s Union with Syria 165 The Middle Eastern politics has therefore always been very important for the World. Politics, transportation, communications, markets, military strategy, imperialism, nationalism, culture, religion and natural resources of this area had always great attraction1 for the “Big Powers” as well as small countries.
    [Show full text]
  • The Knesset Building in Giv'at Ram: Planning and Construction
    The Knesset Building in Giv’at Ram: Planning and Construction Originally published in Cathedra Magazine, 96th Edition, July 2000 Written by Dr. Susan Hattis Rolef Introduction Already in the early days of modern Zionism, it was clear to those who envisioned the establishment of a Jewish State, and those who acted to realize the vision, that once it was established, it would be a democracy, in which a parliament would be built. In his book Altneuland (written in 1902), Theodor Herzl, described the parliament of the Jewish state in Jerusalem in the following words: “[A] great crowd was massed before (the Congress House). The election was to take place in the lofty council chamber built of solid marble and lighted from above through matte glass. The auditorium seats were still empty, because the delegates were still in the lobbies and committee rooms, engaged in exceedingly hot discussion…" 1 In his book Yerushalayim Habnuya (written in 1918), Boris Schatz, who had established the Bezalel school of arts and crafts, placed the parliament of the Jewish State on Mount Olives: "Mount Olives ceased to be a mountain of the dead… it is now the mountain of life…the round building close to [the Hall of Peace] is our parliament, in which the Sanhedrin sits".2 When in the 1920s the German born architect, Richard Kaufmann, presented to the British authorities his plan for the Talpiot neighborhood, that was designed to be a Jerusalem garden neighborhood, it included an unidentified building of large dimensions. When he was asked about the meaning of the building he relied in German: "this is our parliament building".
    [Show full text]
  • Name Tag Line Descriptiosector Tags Ilventure Homepage Promarketing Wizard Digital Ma Social Medifacebook A
    name tag_line yourdescriptio sector tags ilventure_homepage ProMarketing Wizard Digital Ma x000D_campaign. Social Medifacebook_ahttp://ilve http://www Allosterix Drug Disco_x000D_ Pharmaceutdrug_desighttp://ilvenhttp://www. WakeApp Social Alar disorders) Social Medimobile_applhttp://ilve http://www miCure Therapeutics MicroRNA-Bs. in real Pharmaceutmental_healhttp://ilve http://www AppMyDay Your in-eveenginetime. Social Mediphotos,brahttp://ilve http://www Question2Answer Free and Op_x000D_traffic. Social Mediopen_sourchttp://ilve http://www AgeMyWay Private Fam“Fair Digital Heamobile_healhttp://ilve http://www La'Zooz Collaborati_x000D_fare†. Social Medimobile_applhttp://ilvenhttp://lazoo Vidazoo Media Buyicrowdfund Social Mediuser_acquishttp://ilve http://www Applied CleanTech Convertingeing. to Environmenrecycling, http://ilve http://www Powercom Smart Grid Governmeutilities. Environmengas,energyhttp://ilve http://www GridON Fault Curre,nt such as Environmenpower_gridhttp://ilvenhttp://www TransAlgae Developmenconnectiviinjection. Agro and Fbreeding,bihttp://ilve http://www Acrylicom Physical Laconsuminty to POF. Industrial semiconduchttp://ilve http://www Green Invoice Electronic managemg. eCommerce,digital_sig http://ilve https://www SmartZyme Innovation Technologicent. Digital Heapatient_carhttp://ilve http://smz BondX Environment_x000D_BondX is a Environmencleantech,phttp://ilve http://www Treatec21 Industries Water and experienc Environmenwater_purifhttp://ilvenhttp://trea Scodix Digital Pri commercies. Industrial branding,dehttp://ilvenhttp://www
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    BIbLIOgRAPHY All items in Israeli Hebrew-language newspapers (Davar, Ha’aretz, Ma’ariv, Yediot Aharanot, etc.) were in Hebrew. GENERAL Interviews A. Select list of interviews by Michael Brecher Al-Baz, Mahmoud. May 1975. Allon, Yigal. 1960, 1965–66, 1968, 1973–74, 1977–78. Eytan, Walter. 1956. Avner, Gershon. July 1968. Bar-Lev, Haim. July 1974. Bar-On, Hanan. August 1968. Ben-Gurion, David. June 1966, May 1971. Bitan, Moshe. August 1968. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. May 1975. Dayan, Moshe. May 1969. Eban, Abba. 1948, 1965–66, 1968 July 1968, 1973–74, 1977–78, 1995. Evron, Ephraim. March 1972. Eshkol, Levi. April 1966. Gazit, Mordekhai. July 1968, July 1974. Herzog, Ya’acov. April 1966, August 1968. Joseph, Dov. July 1960, June 1971. Keating, Kenneth. July 1974, August 1974. © The Author(s) 2017 365 M. Brecher, Dynamics of the Arab–Israel Conflict, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-47575-2 366 BIBLIOGRAPHY Meir, Golda. August 1966, June 1968. Mohammed Sayeed Ahmad. May 1975, June 1975. Navon, Yitzhak. 1965–66. Peres, Shimon. 1960, 1965–66, 1968, 1973–74, 1977–78. Rafael, Gideon. August 1968. Rosen, Pinchas. February 1971. Sapir, Pinhas. August 1974. Shapira, Haim M. July 1968. Sharett, Moshe. July 1960. Sharif, Zehev. March 1966. Wilson, Harold. December 1972. Yariv, Aharon. August 1974. B. Other Interviews Barak, Ehud. “Continuation of Eyes Wide Shut.” Interview by Ari Shavit, Ha’aretz, 4 September 2002. Melchior, Michael. Interview, Ha’aretz, 12 March 2007, 7. Other Sources Azran, Eran. 2016. Israeli Economy Grew 2.3% in 2015, Its Slowest Pace since 2009. Ha’aretz, 1 January 2016.
    [Show full text]
  • Judah David Eisenstein and the First Hebrew Encyclopedia
    1 Abstract When an American Jew Produced: Judah David Eisenstein and the First Hebrew Encyclopedia Between 1907 and 1913, Judah David Eisenstein (1854–1956), an amateur scholar and entrepreneurial immigrant to New York City, produced the first modern Hebrew encyclopedia, Ozar Yisrael. The Ozar was in part a traditionalist response to Otsar Hayahdut: Hoveret l’dugma, a sample volume of an encyclopedia created by Asher Ginzberg (Ahad Ha’am)’s circle of cultural nationalists. However, Eisenstein was keen for his encyclopedia to have a veneer of objective and academic respectability. To achieve this, he assembled a global cohort of contributors who transcended religious and ideological boundaries, even as he retained firm editorial control. Through the story of the Ozar Yisrael, this dissertation highlights the role of America as an exporter of Jewish culture, raises questions about the borders between Haskalah and cultural nationalism, and reveals variety among Orthodox thinkers active in Jewish culture in America at the turn of the twentieth century. When an American Jew Produced: Judah David Eisenstein and the First Hebrew Encyclopedia by Asher C. Oser Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Jewish History Bernard Revel Graduate School Yeshiva University August 2020 ii Copyright © 2020 by Asher C. Oser iii The Committee for this doctoral dissertation consists of Prof. Jeffrey S. Gurock, PhD, Chairperson, Yeshiva University Prof. Joshua Karlip, PhD, Yeshiva University Prof. David Berger, PhD, Yeshiva University iv Acknowledgments This is a ledger marking debts owed and not a place to discharge them. Some debts are impossible to repay, and most are the result of earlier debts, making it difficult to know where to begin.
    [Show full text]
  • Report from Argentina to Be Submitted to the International Task Force for Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (Itf) December 2010
    REPORT FROM ARGENTINA TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE FOR HOLOCAUST EDUCATION, REMEMBRANCE AND RESEARCH (ITF) DECEMBER 2010 Introduction 1. The promotion and protection of Human Rights is an integral part of the Argentine Human Rights policies, and it has been set out as a priority for the current national government. Consequently, and based on the conviction that Holocaust Remembrance is closely related to the need of guaranteeing memory, truth and justice in all cases of truth and human rights, Argentina carries out its commitment, undertook in 2000 by signing the Stockholm Declaration. In this sense, Argentina is implementing activities related with Holocaust education, remembrance and research through three ministries and diverse non- governmental organizations (NGO) that form the Consultant Standing Committee or Local Chapter of the ITF. This group works as a forum for discussion and exchange of information and activities in order to promote ITF goals. 2. The pro-tempore chairmanship of this Consultant Standing Committee1 is organized by means of a rotational system involving different public agencies. During 2010, the coordination of the group is exercised by the Secretariat of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice, Security and Human Rights. In that role, the Secretariat convenes monthly meetings in order to organize local activities related to its incumbent mandate. Attending the meetings are representatives of the Secretariat of Human Rights, representatives of the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign
    [Show full text]
  • Resumen the Character of Jewish Transnationalism
    CHANGES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION AND LATIN AMERICAN JEWRY: INFORMAL EDUCAtion, 1968–2006 SILVIA SCHENKOLEWSKI-KROLL Resumen Los cambios ocurridos se refieren al transnacionalismo ideológico del Movimiento Sionista aplicado a las relaciones de su órgano ejecutivo, el Departamento de Juventud de la Organización Sionista Mundial (OSM) y sus variantes organizacionales durante el período determinado, con la juventud judía en América Latina, respecto a los movimientos juveniles sionistas pioneros, grupos y asociaciones no sionistas. A ello se anticipa la descripción del tipo de relaciones que precedieron a la Guerra de los Seis Días. Se trata de una evolución desde la consideración de la inmigración a Israel (aliá) como el objetivo principal y casi exclusivo de la educación no formal, hasta la visión de la educación judía como una meta en sí misma, de la cual forman parte integral el sionismo y el Estado de Israel. Este complejo se presenta en el marco de la historia de Israel y los acontecimientos en Latinoamérica y su repercusión en la juventud judía. Las principales fuentes primarias son los protocolos y las resoluciones de los Congresos Sionistas, el Comité de Acción y el Ejecutivo de la OSM. The character of Jewish transnationalism Despite the wide range of attributes of transnationalism, it focuses primarily on issues resulting from the migration of members of one nation 466 Silvia Schenkolewski-Kroll or a certain ethnic group from one country to another. Among these are: how the cultural heritage, and at times also the professional background, they bring with them from their home country influences the manner in which they successfully—or unsuccessfully—take root in their new home; how local groups and bodies influence this process; and the ties to their former homeland, whether they be blood relations, economic aid, or any other real or virtual connection.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Download
    Don Quixote de la Corte: Serial litigants, emotions, and access to justice OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES VOLUME 11 ISSUE 2 (2021), 503–533: “TOO MUCH LITIGATION?”: FACTS, REASONS, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLUTIONS DOI LINK: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.35295/OSLS.IISL/0000-0000-0000-1117 RECEIVED 02 SEPTEMBER 2019, ACCEPTED 09 DECEMBER 2019 ∗ 0BEYAL KATVAN0F ∗ 1BBOAZ SHNOOR 1F Abstract Serial litigants are a well-known phenomenon. This article deals with this phenomenon on two different levels using Israel as a test-case. First, we analyze the impact they have on the judicial system as a whole, and the institutional responses the judicial system uses in order to deal with serial litigants as well as the impact (both positive and negative) such serial litigants have on other litigants. Second, we analyze the personal motives of serial litigants and identify their common denominators, as well as what differentiates them. In this regard the article offers a unique approach by presenting the perspective of serial litigants and the human dimension behind their claims. We then show that serial litigants do not constitute a monolithic group, and suggest that courts have to take the differences between them into account. We further propose the formulation of systemic tools that take into account both the negative and the positive aspects of serial litigants in order to strike a proper balance between the optimal allocation of resources, and the right of access to justice. Key words Courts; serial litigants; access to justice The authors declare that the research published in this paper was done according to the Statement Of Principles Of Ethical Research Practice of the SLSA, as published in https://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/slsadownloads/ethicalstatement/slsa%20ethics%20statement%20_final_%5 B1%5D.pdf ∗ Eyal Katvan is a senior lecturer at the Peres Academic Center.
    [Show full text]