Israel Affairs ISSN: 1353-7121 (Print) 1743-9086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20 The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted Yossi Goldstein To cite this article: Yossi Goldstein (2018) The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted, Israel Affairs, 24:5, 767-784, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 Published online: 24 Aug 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1197 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fisa20 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 2018, VOL. 24, NO. 5, 767–784 https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475 The Six Day War: the war that no one wanted Yossi Goldstein Israeli Haritage, Ariel University, Ariel ABSTRACT As a military clash that it is still unclear if anyone truly wanted, the June 1967 Six Day War remains one of the most curious military conflicts in modern history. Israel certainly did not prefer the military route, and neither did Egypt, Syria, or the Soviet Union. Yet while it was clear to these parties from the outset that nothing good could come from such a clash, they backed Israel into a corner from which it was unable to extricate itself without going to war. This article explores the factors that caused the war at the time and in the manner it did. KEYWORDS Arab‒Israeli conflict; Six Day War; Israel; Egypt; Soviet Union; US‒Israel relations; Levy Eshkol; Gamal Abdel Nasser; civil‒military relations The immediate turn of events leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day War began on 11 May 1967, when an intelligence officer in the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv passed fabricated information to Syria and Egypt indicating the massing of Israeli forces along the Syrian border. The next day, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt sent a letter to the Soviet foreign minister maintaining that IDF forces had been assigned ‘to carry out aggressive action . aimed at bringing about a collapse of the Syrian regime’, and that they were ‘consulting with the government of the UAR [Egypt] to take appropriate measures’.1 The remainder of the communique provided the ostensive location of the Israeli forces and the timeframe during which Israel intended attacking Syria: between 16 and 22 May.2 In retrospect, these warnings were clearly groundless and falsified,3 which raises the question why the Soviet Union – a global superpower whose statesmen had proven their diplomatic wisdom for many years up to that point – took this information for granted and treated it with such profound gravity. The Soviet provocations that began on 11 May were inextricably linked to the Kremlin’s concerns regarding the possible collapse of the Syrian regime. One explanation for the Soviet request was an alleged warning made the previous month by Israeli Chief-of-Staff Yitzhak Rabin that CONTACT Yossi Goldstein [email protected] Ariel University © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 768 Y. GOLDSTEIN Israel was about to attack Syria,4 though Rabin had made no such threat. Another is that an error had been made in the translation of one of Rabin’s statements,5 which had not referred to operative military action against the Syrian regime but rather warned Damascus against further provocations.6 ‘If there is a danger of war today’, Rabin said in an interview published in the Israeli press on 14 May and quoted by the Arab and Soviet media, ‘it is more a danger of deterioration as a result of a Syrian attempt to draw uninterested countries into war.’7 In any event, if the Egyptians were to take action against Israel, the Soviets now committed their military support. The reasons for the fabrication of the Soviet report have been discussed extensively.8 Initially, it appears to have been a local initiative of junior officials in the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv, which parties in Moscow sought to exploit in the context of internal power struggles.9 The Soviet military attaché in Lebanon conveyed the reports to the embassy, perhaps believing them reliable in light of Prime Minister Levy Eshkol’s and Rabin’s explicit threats to Syria. For some time, the Soviets had been concerned about the possible collapse of the Syrian regime and their stronghold in the region. Although the Soviets knew the reports were fabricated, they used them to push Egypt into providing Syria with extensive deterrence.10 They also appeared to be certain that the fire they started would die out on its own, like other conflagrations they sparked during the Cold War,11 and were unconcerned about possible intervention by the US, which was then embroiled in Vietnam.12 No one in Moscow was genuinely interested in war.13 Egyptian forces move into Sinai Upon receiving the Soviet reports, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser assembled his advisors, led by Defence Minister Abdel Hakim Amer. Two days later, on 14 May, Egyptian Chief of Staff Muhammad Fawzi instructed his forces to raise their state of alert to the highest possible level. He then ordered the formations and units stationed in accordance with the plans and opera- tions . [to move] in their current compositions to their designated assembly areas [in the Sinai Peninsula]. The armed forces shall be prepared to bear the burden of the fighting on the Israeli front, according to the developments.14 That evening, Egypt began to move two divisions into the Sinai Peninsula, filling Cairo’s newspapers with articles on the troop movements and pro- claiming Egypt’s readiness ‘to come to the defence of Syria at a moment’s notice’.15 On 16 May, to demonstrate the seriousness of his intentions, Nasser instructed Amer to convene a meeting of the senior Egyptian command ISRAEL AFFAIRS 769 and to enact a resolution calling for the removal of all United Nations (UN) soldiers from the Sinai Peninsula. The same day, an emissary of the Egyptian chief of staff dispatched a letter to the commander of the UN Emergency Force calling for the immediate removal of his forces to bases within the Gaza Strip.16 The telegram was delivered to UN General Secretary U Thant, who, after some consultation, concluded that the request was serious. In response, Thant’s American aide Ralph Bunche dispatched a telegram calling on the Egyptians to reconsider.17 At this stage, Nasser’s primary aim was to deter Israel from invading Syria.18 His effort to create an atmosphere of crisis along the Egyptian‒ Israeli border may also have stemmed from hope that doing so might extricate him from his failed intervention in Yemen and perhaps even earn him points to overshadow his failure in the 1956 Sinai war. His massing of troops and his demand for the evacuation of UN forces was intended to prove that he would go to any lengths to prevent an invasion of Syria. But there were other reasons for his actions. By moving forces into Sinai, he gained direct access to both the Israeli border and the Straits of Tiran, instantly improving Egypt’s strategic position. He also regarded the move as a victorious response to claims of his rivals, particularly the Jordanians and Saudis, that he was hiding ‘behind the skirt of the United Nations’. The crisis escalates The Israeli government only learned of the tumult three days later. On the evening of 14 May 1967, at a private Independence Day Eve party in Jerusalem,19 IDF Intelligence Directorate chief Aharon Yariv informed Rabin that the Egyptian army had been placed on alert and that substantial forces had crossed the Suez Canal.20 At another event later that evening, Rabin updated Eshkol and recommended calling up reserve forces to deter Egypt. Eshkol, however, preferred to avoid hasty action and regarded the incident as a repeat of the Rotem Crisis, during which, years earlier, Israel had mobilised forces in response to similar Egyptian troop movements that ultimately concluded without hostilities.21 Based on this precedent, and after angry words with Rabin, Eshkol denied the request and deferred the discussion until the following day.22 At a state reception in Jerusalem the next morning, Rabin reiterated to Eshkol his assessments regarding Egypt, informing him of the high state of alert that had been declared throughout the Egyptian army and the order that had been issued to assume formations in accordance with the Kaher plan for the conquest of Israel. But Rabin was no longer as resolute about mobilising the reserves as he had been the previous evening, noting only that he viewed the Egyptian measures as extremely serious and requesting 770 Y. GOLDSTEIN authorisation to assemble substantial numbers of already enlisted compul- sory forces near the border. Once again, Eshkol refused. The following day, on 16 May, Rabin informed Eshkol that the Egyptian army had taken up defensive positions along the northern roads of the Sinai Peninsula.23 Later that day, during a special meeting of the Israeli govern- ment, he informed Eshkol’s concerned ministers about the Egyptian troop movements. But now he too maintained that the manoeuvres were remi- niscent of Operation Rotem24 and that the intelligence assessment sup- ported the assumption that they were thus far defensive in character.25 However, in the hours that followed, Rabin received reports regarding the continued flow of Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula and again requested authorisation to mobilise a large reserve force. In a meeting late that day, Eshkol once again portrayed Rabin’s requests as excessive and authorised him to call up only one armoured brigade.26 The military and political deterioration continued the following day.