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Consolidating Peace: Priorities and 1 Deliberative Processes Ian Johnstone

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While efforts to suppress violence in Af- each area, ranging from active patron, in- ghanistan, Darfur, and Lebanon dominated the formed by international standards of legiti- peace operation headlines in 2006, most of the macy, to passive observer, deferring at every world’s peacekeepers were doing something step to local ownership and local conceptions different. From Haiti to the Democratic of legitimacy. The central argument of this Republic of Congo (DRC) to Aceh, soldiers chapter is that the best way to determine where and civilians were engaged in the less atten- on that spectrum an intervention should fall, tion-grabbing but equally important work of and how to move from one point to another, is helping to consolidate peace. through genuine deliberation among internal “Peace consolidation” is not a term of art, and external actors. By guiding the engage- and in this chapter it is not meant to describe ment of the relevant actors, deliberative princi- a specific phase or set of activities in a peace ples can help to set priorities and allow for process. The expression is used here as a way midcourse corrections, while cultivating the of discussing the particular role peace opera- sort of conflict resolution and participatory tions can play in planting the seeds of self- governance that sustainable peace requires. sustaining peace, without drawing a sharp line between “peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding.” It assumes that, because there is always pres- Peace Consolidation: sure to end an operation quickly—or at least Priorities and Recent Practice to move from one phase of a peace process to The spectrum of peace operations extends the next—the period when an integrated mili- from pure observer missions to transitional tary, police, and civilian presence is on the administrations with full governing powers.2 ground presents a relatively limited window Most operations fall between those extremes. of opportunity. Peace operations cannot them- Indeed, there has been an evolution: in the selves complete the long-term enterprise of early 1990s, multidimensional missions like consolidating peace, but they can begin the those in El Salvador and Mozambique were process—they can lay the foundations for formally mandated only to monitor and effective peace consolidation. assist; in the mid-1990s, missions in Eastern The starting point in understanding how Slavonia and Bosnia had a degree of execu- to lay those foundations is to acknowledge tive authority; in the late 1990s, the United that peace consolidation is an inherently Nations was given governing powers in political exercise, whose central goal is to Kosovo and East Timor. The United States channel conflict from violent into peaceful had similar authority in Iraq in the early days forms of settlement.1 Recent experience has of the occupation, but most peace operations highlighted the importance of making an early since then have employed more of a “light start in three areas—governance (including footprint,” the strategy used in Afghanistan. economic governance), security, and justice. Yet even assistance missions, like those in Peace operations play a variety of roles in Haiti and Liberia today, sometimes become

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involved in governance functions without footprint” was the right way to support Af- formally assuming executive powers. Thus ghanistan’s nascent governance institutions, it the distinction between patron and passive was not the way to provide security beyond observer, the weight of the footprint, the line Kabul. between consent and coercion, and even the How then to strike the balance is a core “gradations of sovereignty” in postconflict challenge for peace consolidation. Because nei- societies tend to come in shades of gray ther internal nor external actors have privileged rather than either/or dichotomies.3 insight into that question, and because it may The result is that all peace operations vary based on the function (security versus face a basic dilemma: on the one hand, the governance, for example), the process must more proactive the external role, the harder it be interactive. It requires genuine deliberation is for local state structures to gain legitimacy among local actors, and between local and and effectiveness; on the other hand, rigid external actors. Deliberation means more than adherence to “local ownership” can mean consultation and dialogue; it is one of three deferring to local power brokers that may principal modes of public policy decisionmak- lack the legitimacy and capacity to deliver ing in democratic societies, along with bargain- sustainable peace. Where the balance should ing and voting. It is aimed at building consen- lie is rarely self-evident from the start of an sus through reasoned exchange and, when operation, and is never static. If the UN was agreement is not possible, makes it easier to too heavy-handed in the early days of its mis- live with disagreement in a pluralistic society. sion in East Timor, its approach in Haiti in The argument that deliberative principles 2005 was probably too passive. If a “light can usefully guide the engagement of all (AP /David Karp) José Ramos-Horta, then foreign minister of Timor-Leste, speaks at a UN Security Council meeting, 5 May 2006. Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 16

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actors in a peace process is developed further not necessarily evolve into more robust forms at the end of this chapter.4 First, however, a of democratic governance. review of recent practice in three areas—tran- Interim institutions, moreover, do real sitional governance, transitional security, and work: they prepare for elections, write consti- transitional justice—illustrates the value of tutions, manage the budget, and appoint peo- deliberation to peace consolidation. These are ple to the ministries that administer the tran- not priorities per se, but rather frameworks sition, such as Defense, Interior, and Justice. within which specific peacekeeping and peace- Terrence Lyons favorably compares the tran- building activities occur, from police training sitional arrangements leading to elections in to elections to economic reconstruction. The El Salvador, and Mozambique, with those in central point is that the process by which all Angola, Bosnia, and elsewhere.7 The former of these activities are undertaken is as impor- helped to demilitarize politics in their respec- tant as the outcome. And while many of them tive societies, while the latter did little to are long-term endeavors, not all good things cement peace, let alone democracy. Lyons can be done at once and most peace opera- highlights the importance of creating political tions face constant time pressure, from the parties and independent electoral commis- UN Security Council (or other mandating or- sions, but also makes the broader point that ganization), donors and local leaders. The cre- interim institutions can be used to foster ation of the Peacebuilding Commission may peaceful political competition. Liberia recently help to extend time horizons, but it is never- completed a two-year period of transitional theless important that an early start be made government, setting the stage for peaceful in each of these areas, as soon as the worst of elections, the relatively smooth assumption of the fighting is over. Deferring action may power by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and a produc- mean failure to seize the moment when inter- tive first year in office. It is too soon to judge national commitment is greatest. Even more the three-year power-sharing arrangement that serious, noninclusive politics and institutions preceded recent elections in the DRC, but may become entrenched, making it hard to from the perspective of today, it looks more reverse course once the failings are perceived. successful than anyone would have dared hope a few years ago. Transitional Governance Similarly, the process of writing and Cultivating legitimate and effective gover- adopting a constitution can be as important nance cannot be engineered through a series for sustainable peace as the principles and of predetermined steps. However, the nature structures it enshrines. An inclusive, deliber- of governance arrangements between the end ative process is especially important in post- of the worst fighting and the establishment of conflict societies, because the future gover- permanent institutions can have a profound nance of the country cannot be left entirely in effect on the prospects for sustainable peace. the hands of those who fought the war.8 The Not mere placeholders until legitimate govern- making of Afghanistan’s constitution is illus- ment can be established, transitional arrange- trative. The “interim authority” that was ments shape the political landscape for com- selected to govern Afghanistan at the 2001 peting groups in a postconflict society. If well Bonn meeting handed over to the more inclu- designed, they can foster the sort of nonviolent sive transitional government that came out of contestation, conciliatory politics, and consen- the Emergency Loya Jirga held in 2002. This sus building that are at the foundation of sus- gathering of 1,051 elected and 500 appointed tainable peace.5 They hold the promise of what delegates, though not perfectly representa- Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis call tive, debated some of the most difficult and “participatory peace,”6 which may but will controversial issues facing the country.9 That Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 17

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set the stage for the drafting of a constitution and the African Union peacekeepers who were by a 35-member commission, following ex- overseeing its implementation. It quickly tensive public consultations with an estimated became clear that the political process would 178,000 people. The constitution was for- only be salvaged by addressing the concerns mally adopted in a 502-representative Consti- of the other rebel groups through direct nego- tutional Loya Jirga in 2004, paving the way tiations, and by convening a more inclusive to elections in 2004–2005. While this transi- Darfur-Darfur dialogue involving hundreds, tional exercise involved back-room deals and loosely modeled on Afghanistan’s Loya Jirga. pressure tactics, as well as traditional forms of The Darfur situation also illustrates the consultative governance, it did produce a gov- importance of interaction between local and ernment that enjoyed substantial respect external actors. The disconnect between the among the Afghan population—at least until AU mediators and Sudanese parties in Abuja, the lack of progress in improving security on the one hand, and the people of Darfur, on became apparent.10 By way of comparison, the other, led to an agreement that was not the rushed and improvised constitutional implementable. Similarly, the distance between process in Iraq was far less successful in ani- the NCP leadership in the government of mating an inclusive debate about the future of Sudan, and external actors pushing for the UN that country.11 to take over from the AU in Darfur, led to a This is not to say that long-term power- serious impasse over the proposed transition. sharing is easy, as the case of Sudan illus- Given that there is neither the will nor the trates. The north-south conflict ended in a capacity to impose a solution in Darfur, both comprehensive agreement that embodies a the DPA and the transition require that local partnership between the Sudan People’s Lib- dynamics be reconciled with international eration Movement (SPLM) and the ruling Na- expectations and human rights norms. tional Congress Party (NCP). By mid-2006 Interim institutions can also be useful in the partnership was under serious strain, and getting a start on good economic governance. the two parties had all but stopped engaging This is increasingly seen as important to a each other politically. Thus when President peace process because many conflicts are Omar al-Bashir (of the NCP) rejected the de- fueled in part by competition over resources, cision of a boundary commission regarding and because the ability to deliver basic serv- the oil-rich region of Abyei, Vice President ices is a measure of a state’s authority. The Salva Kiir (of the SPLM) figuratively threw Governance and Economic Management Assis- up his hands rather than demand that Bashir tance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia had a justify his position before the world and the rocky start because the initial plan, designed Sudanese people. by the United States, World Bank, Interna- The Darfur peace agreement (DPA) is tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and EU, was too even less promising as a vehicle for sustain- intrusive and therefore was rejected by the UN able power-sharing. Negotiated in Abuja over Security Council. A protracted consultative a period of two years and then rushed to con- process with the Liberian transitional govern- clusion in May 2006, the agreement became ment, the UN, and the Economic Community increasingly disconnected from realities on the of West African States (ECOWAS) resulted in ground. Opposition to the DPA, which was a compromise that included cosigning author- signed by the government of Sudan and only ity for international experts, but also consid- one rebel faction, mobilized almost immedi- erable emphasis on local capacity building. ately, to the point where much of the popula- Moreover, the details of implementation were tion of Darfur became contemptuous of both not spelled out in the initial plan, leaving the rebel faction who had signed the agreement room for deliberation among the members of Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 18

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Box 1.1 The Effectiveness of Peacebuilding: Empirical Studies

The year 2006 saw the publication of the greater the need for international decade, and so there is a need for an two important studies on the effective- assistance to establish a lasting peace. interim strategy for risk containment. ness of peacebuilding strategies. Michael This, combined with qualitative analysis • United Nations peace operations bring Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis published of a number of cases, leads Doyle and the risks down. Moreover, in a typical Making War and Building Peace, a com- Sambanis to a seven-step plan for effec- country, doubling expenditure on peace- prehensive analysis of all UN and non- tive peacebuilding: establish internal keeping would reduce the risk over the UN peace operations between 1945 and security, seek the cooperation of neigh- course of the decade from 40 percent 1999. They identify three key factors that bors, identify some “quick wins” in de- to 31 percent. impact the prospects for success of a livering basic services, build the rule of peace operation, in what they call the law and constitutional consent, guaran- Based on their results, Collier and col- “peacebuilding triangle”: tee property rights, foster democratic leagues propose a “politics+” strategy, in participation, and promote genuine moral which the plus would be long-term eco- • The level of hostility between the fac- and psychological reconciliation. nomic development through substantial tions, measured by the amount of deaths In an August 2006 study of seventy- aid and rapid reform, combined with a and displacement, as well as the type of four cases, Paul Collier and his associ- commitment to the provision of security war and number of warring parties. ates compare the political, economic, and by external peacekeepers throughout the • The local capacities remaining after military aspects of postconflict situa- first postconflict decade. Finally, the the war, measured by per capita gross tions. They come up with three interest- lower the per capita income, the higher domestic product or energy consump- ing findings on the risk of a relapse into the postconflict risks, at the outset of the tion, and past experience with demo- conflict: peace. According to the authors, this pro- cratic governance. vides a clear and uncontroversial princi- • The level of international assistance— • An election reduces the risk substan- ple for resource allocation among post- as measured by type of mandate and tially in the year of the election itself, conflict countries: resources per capita number of troops committed. but increases it even more substan- should be approximately inversely pro- tially in the following year. portional to the level of income in the Their core finding is that the deeper the • Economic development substantially postconflict country. hostility and the less the local capacity, reduces risks, but it typically takes a

Sources: Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Paul Col- lier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, CSAE WPS/ 2006 12, 17 August 2006.

the tripartite steering committee, composed of keepers cannot be expected to keep the peace government actors, international actors, and forever; at a certain point they must hand over civil society representatives. Early signs of to local forces. Peace operations necessarily GEMAP’s impact are positive, as government become involved in that transition, even revenue is rising. though the lead actors in security sector reform (SSR) tend to be bilateral partners. Transitional Security As Barnett Rubin argues, the security tran- In the early days of a peace process, security sition and the political transition are mutually is not up for discussion: either outsiders im- reinforcing; control over security institutions pose it, or a peace agreement obliges it. The is central to building a legitimate state, while primary function of most peace operations is building effective security institutions requires to help provide security, and increasingly credible political leadership.12 And because they are being given robust mandates—if not SSR is not only about equipping and training, always the capacity—to do so. But peace- but also about governance—about who over- Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 19

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sees the security sector and whose interests it protects—the parties to the conflict and security establishments cannot deliberate in secret, alone. Representative assemblies, local governments, and the broader population must be engaged. This lesson was well-learned in Sierra Leone, where the Office of National Security has taken the lead in facilitating inclu- sive decisionmaking processes, including con- sulting local communities.13 The talks on SSR in Afghanistan, on the other hand, lacked trans- parency.14 In contrast to the constitution-making process described above, the security arrange- ments in Afghanistan were driven more by a desire to enlist allies in the war against Al- Qaida and the Taliban, than by a genuine effort to build national security institutions dedicated to supporting the central government. The connection to governance is also borne out by Salman Ahmed’s comment that the most difficult part of SSR is agreeing on (REUTERS/Carlos Bar ria) MINUSTAH peacekeepers from Uruguay the ethnic and regional composition of na- guard the transport of ballots north of tional forces, and reducing their size to fis- Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 6 February 2006. cally sustainable levels.15 The outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste in early 2006 was as much a problem of the neglect of the new defense force, mishandling of the new police, and inattentiveness to governance issues, as it armed gangs engaged in low-level politically was a matter of not staying long enough to motivated or criminal violence. The threat support the new security institutions. In the could have been dealt with through low-inten- Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC and sity military operations, high-intensity police other international actors have been strug- operations, or some combination. The choice gling to create an effective Congolese army, had implications beyond the immediate chal- in part through joint operations. This has lenge of providing security, because ultimately proven to be controversial, because the “inte- the consolidation of peace entails reducing the grated” Congolese brigades, composed of for- role of the military in internal security. Thus mer militias of different ethnic groups, have the process of transitioning from security pro- become a source of human rights abuses. In vided by external military forces, to external Iraq, the building of broadly representative police forces (typically formed police units), security institutions has proven to be enor- to local police forces, is at its core a process mously difficult and, in the view of one ob- of forging a social contract between the local server, may be making matters worse by exac- police and population. This social contract is erbating communal tensions.16 not going to emerge simply from the success- Policing and police reform constitute a fur- ful imposition of law and order; it is an interac- ther illustration of the deeply political nature of tive, evolutionary process. And external actors security sector reform. In Haiti, beginning in have an important role to play, because many early 2005, the main security threat came not postconflict societies see domestic popular from a single organized opposition to the tran- demand for an “iron hand” in dealing with ris- sitional government, but rather from disparate ing violence and crime.17 This can be coun- Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 20

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tered by imparting the ethos of community tradeoff must be made between peace and policing, which has become a major strategy justice is based on too narrow a reading of in peace operations. both concepts. Broadly speaking, there are Multinational institutions, including the three goals of transitional justice: accounta- Organization for Economic Cooperation and bility, truth and reconciliation, and restoration Development (OECD), EU, and UN, have (both individual and societal). These goals begun to develop principles for security sector may be given different priorities in different reform, all of which place a premium on societies, or in the context of particular con- “local ownership” in addition to stressing the flicts. None can be achieved quickly, and often importance of good governance.18 Good secu- the question is whether they should be pur- rity sector governance is widely understood to sued simultaneously or sequentially. It is im- mean limiting the role of the military in inter- portant for a society to begin a discussion nal security, ensuring that all security forces about what sort of justice is appropriate soon are under civilian control, meeting basic stan- after the fighting ends. External actors have a dards of accountability and transparency, and role in encouraging that discussion. There are insisting on respect for basic human rights. international standards that ought to be pro- These standards cannot be imposed by out- moted, and normative red-lines that ought not siders, nor can they be adopted wholesale by to be crossed, such as amnesty for genocide, national security forces in the early stages of a crimes against humanity, and war crimes.21 peace process. But they can be the starting The exercise of agreeing on transitional jus- point for an inclusive dialogue about the secu- tice mechanisms should be a collaborative rity requirements of a given society. While a one, with domestic and foreign actors work- peace agreement may set the path, midcourse ing together to map the range of options and adjustments must often be worked out along to catalyze policy and public deliberations on the way, as the political transition unfolds and which to pursue. legitimate local authorities emerge to lead or A closer look at each of the three goals partner in the process. External actors have a illustrates the complexity of the relationship role to play not only in equipping and train- between local and external actors. Whether ing, but also in giving advice on security sec- based on a theory of retribution or deterrence, tor governance, through a process that ideally accountability reaffirms the shared norms of a engages all national and international “stake- society by expressing condemnation of those holders,” as the new UN mission is doing in who committed the crimes, and condemnation Timor-Leste.19 of the crimes themselves. But rushing to pun- ishment can undermine a peace process. Fear Transitional Justice of being arrested by peacekeepers and handed There is a tendency in peace operations to over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) defer action on justice, given the more press- is one reason why the Sudanese government ing security and governance demands in the opposed a transition to a UN mission in Darfur. immediate postconflict period. This is mis- The Lord’s Resistance Army only entered into guided, for two reasons. First, failure to peace talks with the government of Uganda address justice issues at an early stage can when its leaders were given assurances by the undermine both security and transitional gov- mediators that they would not be handed over ernance: a “rule of law vacuum” can be to the ICC (though the ICC indictments stand). seized on by spoilers and criminal groups;20 Without Nigeria’s offer of asylum to Charles and local leaders may appear to be benefiting Taylor, there likely never would have been a from a culture of impunity, undermining the peace agreement in Liberia. This does not confidence of the broader population in the mean that deferring or ignoring criminal justice peace process. Second, the assumption that a is always wise—the indictment of Taylor by Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 21

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the Special Court for Sierra Leone removed counter the fact that transitional or newly him from the political process in Liberia—but elected governments often lack the legitimacy it does suggest that instant accountability is and capacity to take the lead in rule-of-law not always possible. On the other hand, the reform.26 In Haiti, MINUSTAH shifted toward prospect of prosecution, whether by the ICC, a more proactive approach to justice reform in hybrid tribunals like in Sierra Leone (and pro- late 2005, when it became apparent that sus- posed for Burundi), or national courts, now tained progress would require greater involve- affects the dynamics of almost all peace ment of international personnel throughout the processes. It raises questions about whom one entire system. This meant more hands-on men- engages with: Should indicted war criminals toring of magistrates, prosecutors, and other be treated as legitimate participants in the justice officials, and it had the effect of open- political process? To what extent should their ing the system to closer scrutiny. Restoration, “stake” in the outcome be a consideration? it should be stressed, may involve resurrecting The second broad purpose of transitional traditional approaches to justice rather than justice—truth and reconciliation—is impor- importing models from elsewhere. In Liberia tant when the facts about the past are in and southern Sudan, many citizens—espe- doubt, or in order to “lift the veil of denial” cially in rural areas—are inclined to look to about widely known or unspoken truths.22 customary law and “community-based” sys- Unlike trials that depend on making a choice tems for justice, rather than formal courts and between individual guilt and innocence, truth processes.27 Yet the leadership in each place commissions can hear different points of has concerns about resurrecting traditional view about the pattern of abuses and the systems, in part because they are hard to rec- political, social, and economic conditions that oncile with international human rights norms. may have led to them. If truth commissions This suggests that the planning and implemen- promote reconciliation, as advocates claim, it tation of reform programs requires not only is not because they lead to forgiveness about internal deliberation, but also engagement by the past, but because they are exercises in external actors to ensure that international deliberative politics—a way to stimulate pub- standards are respected while nascent institu- lic debate about how to address the past and tions are built. carry on.23 The Truth and Reconciliation Com- Timor-Leste is an instructive case for all mission (TRC) in Sierra Leone served this three goals. The UN Secretary-General estab- purpose to an extent, and the recently launched lished a commission of inquiry to gather infor- TRC in Liberia has been designed to do the mation on possible violations of human rights same. Belated efforts are now under way to set committed in the period leading to and imme- up a truth commission in Burundi. The UN is diately after the vote on independence in Sep- consulting not only government officials, but tember 1999. That report put in motion a also religious leaders, political parties, and process that led to the establishment by the nongovernmental organizations on the form UN Transitional Administration in East Timor that truth commission should take.24 (UNTAET) of a hybrid special panel on seri- Restoration, a third goal of transitional ous crimes and a truth commission, whose justice, relates directly to rule-of-law reform. 2,000-page report was issued in mid-2005; Societal restoration is about reconstructing national trials in Timor-Leste; the creation of the social, political, and legal systems de- an ad hoc court by Indonesia; the creation of a stroyed by violence.25 Peace operations have “truth and friendship commission” by the gov- an obvious role to play, although rule-of-law ernments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia; and mandates tend to be vague. Scott Carlson, in finally a “commission of experts” to review all a UN lessons-learned study, makes a com- those efforts and make recommendations on pelling case for a more “robust” approach to what more could be done. The most interesting Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 22

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Box 1.2 Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Burundi—A Minor Success with Major Consequences

Carolyn McAskie

Burundi suffered from terrible ethnic pushed for the African Union’s first ever institutions that embodied an evolution conflict for many years, but unlike other peacekeeping mission in 2003 and then away from ethnic bias and toward ethnic peacekeeping “clients,” it was never a for the UN to take over in 2004. By balance. In years of dialogue, the parties failed state. Throughout the darkest days the time the UN Operation in Burundi discovered that their demons diminished of conflict, it had a functioning govern- (ONUB) arrived on the ground, the par- as they spoke to each other. In consoli- ment and an army that, despite its faults, ties had been engaged on one level or dating peace, Burundi’s external partners had control of the territory. What it lacked another for years, and formally for the must deal equally boldly with social and was capacity, due to extreme poverty, six years since 1998. economic needs, to ensure that frustra- years of war, and the flight of people and ONUB’s mandate was to ensure tion and exclusion do not draw Burundi resources. completion of the Arusha peace process into conflict again. Over the past decade, The Burundi peace talks began in before the end of the transitional period the world has come to better understand 1993 with political help from the UN, and the beginning of elections. It under- the link between lack of development, and gained steam in 1995 when former took a complex set of tasks to ensure and conflict. Helping to set societies on Tanzanian president Mwalimu Julius security, encourage the legislative a sound social and economic footing Nyerere launched the round of consulta- process, and improve the human rights must receive the same high-level inter- tions that led to the Arusha peace process. situation, including the position of national attention as does the traditional In Arusha, the Burundian parties slowly women. Support for elections became the peace and security agenda. realized they could talk to each other, most visible element of ONUB’s work, Hope is being placed in the UN but it would take eighteen months after but only part of it. The success of the mis- Peacebuilding Commission, created in the signing of the Arusha Agreement and sion was due to the fact that external play- December 2005. Burundi has been iden- intense pressure from Nelson Mandela ers—political, peacekeeping, and human- tified as one of the commission’s first (who had replaced Nyerere as mediator itarian—worked together in a coherent clients, making it the beneficiary of a following his death), to push them into a way, particularly with Burundi’s neigh- strategic process to bring donors and transitional government. bors. An important challenge for the post- international institutions together with Burundians always assumed there conflict period will be for these elements Burundians to consolidate peace. A con- would have to be a UN peacekeeping to continue to work together coherently to certed effort to help the government force at some time, but it was difficult to support the consolidation of peace. meet the expectations of the population persuade the Security Council or the sen- In the process of negotiating peace, would be a strong signal to Burundi and ior ranks of the Secretariat that this Burundians dealt courageously with other countries in conflict that there are would be realistic. South Africa therefore issues of power and ethnicity, building gains to be made from peace.

Note: Carolyn McAskie is UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, and former Special Representative of the Secretary- General for Burundi. Original article published in International Insights (Canadian Institute of International Affairs) 6, no. 1 (September 2006).

finding is that both governments, Timor-Leste mended a multidimensional approach for the and Indonesia, place more emphasis on new mission in Timor-Leste, which includes “restorative” than “punitive” justice, and seem ongoing monitoring, institutional capacity to be more willing to accept what has been building, support for “accountability” meas- accomplished than are the international ures, and compensation to victims.29 Comple- experts who have investigated and the victims mented by the mission’s governance and and families who were consulted.28 (The posi- security functions, the approach embraces a tion of the Timorese government is driven in broad conception of justice that ultimately is part by a desire not to jeopardize improving designed to build an inclusive political com- relations with Indonesia.) The UN recom- munity in Timor.30 Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 23

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As Secretary-General Annan put it, “re- end-state toward which all postconflict soci- establishing justice systems, planning rule eties must be pushed, deliberative principles of law reforms and agreeing on transitional are aimed at informing the process that deter- justice processes are . . . necessary subjects of mines what the end-state should be and how to serious public consultation and debate.”31 get there.34 Moreover, in a peace operation, International actors have a role to play in these outsiders make decisions that have a pro- debates, both as mediators to help decide what found—sometimes even binding—effect on kind of justice and for whom, and as advocates local citizens. In the spirit of accountability, for international standards. They also have a deliberative principles should guide the en- critical role to play in helping to build a func- gagement of outside actors as well as local sys- tioning legal system, not least because it can tems and institutions. create the conditions for peaceful political con- The ideal of deliberation—that partici- testation. While it may not be possible to guar- pants have equal standing and voice, and that antee rights of political participation, assembly, the debates occur unaffected by relationships and expression in an immediate postconflict of power and coercion35—is not met in any environment, some belief that basic rights will society, let alone one coming out of conflict. be guaranteed in the future are necessary to But two of its underlying principles—partici- create political space for deliberation. pation and publicity—can usefully inform the relationships among the relevant actors. The process of formulating, implementing, and re- Deliberative Principles and Methods vising a peace consolidation strategy should Thus there is a substantial body of recent be as participatory as circumstances permit. practice to suggest that the transitional period Typically this will be limited to the parties to in a peace process be used to foster delibera- the conflict and the most powerful outside tion among and between local and external actors in the early stages, but can become actors. Genuine deliberation means more than more inclusive as the postconflict situation dialogue; it is a fundamental democratic value, stabilizes. Inclusiveness is important because the most important characteristic of which is those who wield the greatest decisionmaking reasoned exchange. Its guiding principle is influence in a postconflict society are not reciprocity—the notion that decisions must always seen as legitimate by the local popula- be justified in terms that all who are bound or tion or powerful outside actors. seriously affected can accept, even if they While it is never possible to consult all who disagree with the decision itself: “you make are affected by every decision (just as it is never your claims on terms that I can accept in possible for all citizens to participate directly principle . . . I make my claims on terms that in democratic decisionmaking), another basic you can accept in principle.”32 Deliberation is deliberative principle—publicity—is an indi- valued both because it leads to better out- rect way of engaging a broader range of stake- comes when there are disputes about public holders. The publicity principle holds that the policy, and because it signals mutual respect. reasons for decisions should be accessible and It makes both reaching agreement and living understandable, and the debates that lead to respectfully with disagreement easier. them should be as transparent as possible. The Deliberative democracy is not incompatible notion that positions must be stated publicly in with liberal democracy, but the differences are terms that all can accept is a device for engag- important in light of recent critiques of the so- ing parliamentarians, opposition groups, and called peacebuilding consensus, with its empha- civil society, turning them into an audience at sis on the establishment of electoral democra- whom the justifications must be directed. Direct cies and market-oriented economies.33 Rather participation is not necessary for deliberative than assuming there is some predetermined principles to have an impact: the audience effect Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 24

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impels the speaker to account for the concerns accountable. The publication of decisions of all who have a stake in the outcome of the by the steering committee that oversees deliberations.36 Liberia’s GEMAP program is an example. None of this is easy, of course, and delib- • In exercising good offices, draw on expert eration is no panacea. Nobody imagines that it opinion and empirical data, in order to pres- can supplant the influence of power; the ambi- sure the parties to deliberate on the basis of tion is more modest. To the extent that politi- assessable evidence rather than self-serving cal struggles take place through deliberation claims. Resolution of the north-south bound- (as opposed to bargaining, and pressure), it ary disputes in Sudan, for example, could levels the playing field by reducing the impact benefit from expert opinion on the historical of power. Moreover, an immediate postconflict boundary and the location of oil reserves. environment is too fraught to expect peaceful, • Start with interim constitutions and even broadly inclusive political competition. If any- legislation, because they automatically come thing, fostering such competition can be divi- up for reconsideration at times and in insti- sive—an obstacle to the sort of consensus- tutions that are likely to be more conducive building and conciliatory politics that is to genuine deliberation compared to an im- required. Thus the deliberative processes them- mediate postconflict period. selves may have to evolve, from confidential • Encourage truth commissions as a first step exchanges among the most powerful actors, to in seeking transitional justice, because they public exercises of justification and reason-giv- are themselves devices for public delibera- ing, to a more stable process in which deci- tion about what happened and why, and sions are made in institutions that lend them- how to move forward. The commissions in selves to inclusive, open—perhaps Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste serve as ex- confrontational but nonviolent—political con- amples. The broad-based consultations on testation. setting up a truth commission for Burundi It is not possible to come up with a check- illustrate the value of inclusiveness even in list of operational devices to incorporate more designing the institution. and better deliberation in any peace process— • Include the leadership of peace operations they are too context-specific. Nevertheless, in committees set up to oversee implemen- the above review of recent practice, as well as tation of a peace agreement. The presence the case studies in this volume, offer some of impartial third parties can generate de- illustrative suggestions: liberation on issues the parties would rather avoid, and can ensure that all perspectives • One of the principal functions of the politi- get a fair hearing. The cease-fire commis- cal head of any mission is to foster deliber- sion for the north-south peace process in ation. Some are much better at this than Sudan is a positive example; removal of the others; former UN Special Representative nonsignatories to the Darfur peace agree- of the Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi ment from the cease-fire commission there is reputed to be one of the best. serves as a negative example. • Use the transitional period to engage actors • Use these joint bodies to engage with civil other than the parties to the conflict, and society and local communities, as the com- provide platforms for them to participate in missions on security arrangements did in decisions, like the Loya Jirgas in Afghan- Aceh. Engaging civil society directly in the istan and the proposed Darfur-Darfur dia- implementation of a peace agreement can logue in Sudan. have the incidental benefit of creating new • Encourage transparency in decisionmaking cadres of political actors while opening po- on important matters of public policy, in litical space for dealing with matters that order to take advantage of the audience do not relate directly to the peace process. effect, indirectly holding decisionmakers • Seek to revive or cultivate traditional de- Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 25

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liberative mechanisms. Local reconciliation and those who see it as a “pipedream” has not initiatives in Liberia and Sudan are ex- been resolved.37 While the built-in conflict- amples, as are the transitional justice management potential of representative dem- approaches adopted in Mozambique in the ocratic institutions is widely acknowledged, early 1990s. Sometimes this requires local there is ample evidence that rushing to elec- community empowerment, as the World tions can be destabilizing. This chapter has Bank has attempted in Timor-Leste and focused on a different element of democracy. Afghanistan with respect to the allocation I have argued that laying the foundations for of development funds. sustainable peace depends as much on delib- • Some UN Security Council visits to mis- erative mechanisms as it does on representa- sion areas can be seen as deliberative exer- tive ones. Clearly there are limits on the cises, where engagement is direct and on scope and impact of deliberation in a post- the basis of reciprocity, rather than “mega- conflict society. Most decisions will be made phone diplomacy.” Security Council mis- on the basis of bargaining, voting, arm-twist- sions to Haiti in 2005 and the DRC in 2006 ing, and less subtle forms of coercion, though are examples. hopefully not violence. In the early days of a • Finally, it is possible to imagine the UN peace process, deliberation may begin at a Peacebuilding Commission as a venue for low level, with few participants and not much not only coordination, but also delibera- publicity, but it can build over time as delib- tion: a forum for reasoned exchange be- erative habits and institutions take hold. More- tween members of the commission and over, deliberation between local and external national counterparts. In fact, when Burundi actors is a way for the latter to practice what and Sierra Leone, the first two “clients” of they preach, enhancing the legitimacy of their the commission, presented their strategies, intervention while cultivating the sort of dem- they were encouraged to attend each other’s ocratic practices that self-sustaining peace sessions—a nod to deliberative principles. requires. In sum, deliberative principles and methods are a way of holding the parties in a peace process accountable to the larger popu- Conclusion lation, and may be the only way of holding The debate between those who would place outsiders accountable to the people on whose democratization at the center of peacebuilding behalf they purport to be acting.

Notes I am very grateful to the following people for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this chapter: Salman Ahmed, Sarjoh Bah, Rahul Chandran, Gillian Cull, Richard Gowan, David Haeri, Bruce Jones, and Richard Ponzio. Any errors of fact or judgment are my own. 1. See United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Address to Opening Session of Peacebuilding Com- mission,” 23 June 2006; Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 2. Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); Simon Chesterman, You the Peoples: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004). 3. On gradations of sovereignty, see Robert Keohane, “Political Authority After Intervention: Gra- dations of Sovereignty,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Eth- ical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stephen Krasner, “Shared Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Secu- rity 29, no. 2 (2004): 85–120. 4. For a similar argument that focuses primarily on internal deliberations rather than deliberation between local and external actors, see Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 87–112. Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 26

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5. Terrence Lyons, “Transforming the Institutions of War: Post-Conflict Elections and the Recon- struction of Failed States,” in Robert Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 6. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 18–19. 7. Lyons, “Transforming the Institutions of War.” On interim consultative institutions, see also Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr, Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 8. Vivien Hart, “Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict,” Peace and Change 26, no. 2 (April 2001): 153–176. 9. Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan, New York, 19 July 2002. 10. See Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace,” pp. 102–103; Richard Ponzio, “Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan (2001–2005),” paper presented at the nineteenth annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, 8–10 June 2006. 11. For critiques of the constitutional process in Iraq, see Hamid Barrada and Philippe Gaillard, “Le Grand Interview: Lakhdar Brahimi,” Jeune Afrique no. 2375, 16–22 July 2006; International Crisis Group, “Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry,” Middle East Briefing no. 19, 26 Septem- ber 2005; US Institute for Peace, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process: An Opportunity Lost,” Special Report no. 155, December 2005. 12. Barnett Rubin, “The Politics of Security in Post-Conflict Internationalized State Building,” in Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace (forthcoming), p. 31; Barnett Rubin, “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Secu- rity?” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 180. 13. See Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Workshop on Peace Consolidation in Sierra Leone,” Freetown, Sierra Leone, 30 June–1 July 2006. 14. Rubin, “Politics of Security,” p. 24. 15. Salman Ahmed, “No Size Fits All: Lessons in Making Peace and Rebuilding States,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 165. 16. Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs, no. 2 (2006). See also, James Baker III and Lee Hamilton, Report of the Iraq Study Group, December 10, 2006. 17. Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, “To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Reform Agenda,” Conflict, Security, and Development 5, no. 3 (2005): 303. 18. OECD, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2005); EU, Concept for ESDP Support to Security Reform (2005); United Nations, DPKO Policy Directive on Law Enforcement Agencies (2006); UNDP, Strategic Approaches to Justice and Security Sector Reform (2002). The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations requested the Secre- tariat to conduct “a process of joint policy-making on security sector reform best practices,” which the UNDP and DPKO are leading in collaboration with other UN entities. UN doc. A/60/19. 19. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690 (2006), 8 August 2006, para. 114; S/RES/1704, 25 August 2006. 20. Scott Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Oper- ations, UN Lessons Learned study (2006), p. 4. 21. The UN registered a reservation to the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone because it granted amnesty for those categories of crimes. 22. Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of the Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 25. 23. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 185. 24. United Nations, Seventh Report of the SG on the UN Operation in Burundi, S/2006/429, 21 June 2006, para. 8. The UN has also been engaged in consultations about a “special chamber” for war crimes, which will likely take the form of a hybrid tribunal. 25. Martha Minnow, “The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?” in Robert Rot- berg, ed., Truth v. Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 253. 26. Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work. 27. On Liberia, see International Crisis Group, “Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System,” 6 April 2006, p. 1. My conclusion on southern Sudan is based on interviews in Juba, September 2006. 28. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Justice and Reconciliation for Timor-Leste, S/2006/580, 26 July 2006, para. 19. 29. S/2006/628, 8 August 2006, paras. 73–90, 125–126. Peacekeeping_1.qxd 1/14/07 2:24 PM Page 27

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30. See Rama Mani, “Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): 511–526. 31. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 19. 32. Gutmann and Thompson Why Deliberative Democracy? See also Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1999). For a fuller analysis of the relevance of deliberative democracy theory to interna- tional affairs, see Ian Johnstone, “Deliberation and Legal Argumentation in International Decision-Mak- ing,” in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud, eds., The Faultlines of Legitimacy (New York: United Nations University Press, forthcoming 2007). 33. Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace,” pp. 88–89; Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Oliver Richmond, “UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus,” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 1 (2004): 83–101; Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cam- bridge, MA: Polity Press, 2004). 34. Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace,” p. 90. 35. Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 36. Even if the public reason-giving is insincere, paying lip service to shared interests can moder- ate behavior, because the speaker feels impelled to make some effort to match words with deeds. Jon Elster calls this the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”; Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 37. For a summary of the debate, see Ponzio, “Transforming Political Authority.”