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Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire

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Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire Understanding Catalyzing Myanmar’s Peace Reflection Process: Ceasefire 2/2014 Agreements Min Zaw Oo Imprint Table of Contents swisspeace Catalyzing Reflection Series 2 swisspeace is an action-oriented peace research institute Disclaimer 3 with headquarters in Bern, Switzerland. It aims to prevent the Acronyms 4 outbreak of violent conflicts and to enable sustainable conflict Understanding Myanmar’s Peace Process: transformation. Ceasefire Agreements 7 swisspeace is an Associated Institute of the University of 1 Brief Background of Ceasefires in Myanmar‘s Armed Basel and a member of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences (SAGW). Conflict 8 2 Understanding the Current Peace Process in Myanmar 15 3 Ceasefire Agreements under the Current Cover Photo Peace Process 23 Bagan, Myanmar 2013 4 Implementing Ceasefire Agreements and Addressing Copyright: Stefan Bächtold / swisspeace Challenges 28 5 The Way Forward 34 6 Recommendations 37 Printed in Yangon, Myanmar List of Tables and Figures Summary of Armed Groups in Previous and New Ceasefire Processes 14 Myanmar Government’s Peace Process Organizational Structure 20 Major Differences between the Pre-2011 and Current Peace Process 22 Summary of Ceasefire Agreement Review in Myanmar’s New Peace Process 26 Summary of the Number of Clashes During Ceasefires in Conflict-Affected States and Regions 30 swisspeace Sonnenbergstrasse 17 Annex 1 38 PO Box, 3000 Bern 7 www.swisspeace.org [email protected] © 2014 swisspeace 1 Catalyzing Reflection Series Disclaimer Understanding Myanmar’s Peace Process: Ceasefire This essay was prepared by Min Zaw Oo in his personal Agreements is the second paper in a series of publica- capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are the tions in which local actors involved in the ongoing peace author’s own and do not reflect the view of the Myanmar processes in Myanmar step back and reflect on different Peace Center or the Government of Myanmar. dimensions of the ongoing process. Each of the publica- tions in the series provides a deep analysis of different di- mensions of the peace process: the importance of a gender analysis, the complexity of the ceasefire process, and the necessity of public participation in current peace efforts. With the government of Myanmar and multiple armed groups now engaging in peace talks after more than 60 years of conflict, this series, aptly titled Catalyzing Reflection on Dialogue Processes among Parties in Myanmar, addresses the urgent need to document these dimensions in order to better understand the country’s com- plex and rapidly shifting peace process. The authors are Myanmar nationals, whose expertise in the respective topics is based on their direct involvement on the ground. Their research and analyses speak directly to other actors in the process, the larger Myanmar community, and international actors in supporting roles. We hope that this series catalyzes more discussions and reflection to support current local, national and international peace efforts. 2 3 Acronyms Acronyms AA Arakan Army KNU/KNLA (PC) Karen National Union/Karen ABSDF All Burma Student’s Democratic Front National Liberation Army (Peace ALP Arakan Liberation Party Council) AMRDP All Mon Region Democracy Party KNUSO Karenni National Unity & ANC Arakan National Council Solidarity Organization BGF Border Gruard Force KPF Karen Peace Force BSPP Burma Socialist Party Program KSDDP Kayin State Democracy & CAN Chin National Army Development Party CBOs Community Based Organizations LDF Shan Nationalities League for CNF Chin National Front Democracy CSOs Civil Society Organizations LDU Lahu Democratic Union DAB Democratic Alliance of Burma MNDA Mon National Defence Army DDR Disarmament, Demobilization & MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Reintegration Alliance Army DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army MPC Myanmar Peace Center DKBA-5 DKBA 5/Klo Htoo Baw Battalion MSA Military Security Affairs (Democratic Karen Benevolent Army) MPSI Myanmar Peace Support Initiative DPA Democratic Party for Arakan NCCT Nationwide Ceasefire DPNS Democratic Party for New Society Coordination Team EBO Euro-Burma Office NDA National Democratic Army ENC Ethnic Nationalties Council NDAA National Democratic Alliance GOC Government Of Chinland Army HRP Hangsawati Restoration Party NDA-K New Democratic Army (Kachin) IDP Internally Displaced Persons NDF National Democratic Front IPSG International Peace Support Group NLD National League for Democracy KDA Kachin Defense Army NMSP New Mon State Party KIA/KIO Kachin Independence Army/Organization NNC Naga National Council KKO Klo Htoo Baw Karen Organization NSCN(K) The National Socialist Council of KNDP/A Karenni National Development Party/Army Nagaland (Khaplang) KNDO Karen National Defense Army NUPA National Uinted Party of Arakan KNG Kayan National Guard PDSG Peace Donor Support Group KNLA Karen National Liberation Army PMG/PMF People’s Militia Group/People’s KNLP Kayan New Land Party Militia Force KNO Kachin National Organization PNLO Pa-Oh National Liberation KNPLF Karenni State Nationalities Peoples’ Organization Liberation Front PNO Pa-O National Organization KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party PSLA Palaung State Liberation Army KNU Karen National Union PSLF Palaung State Liberation Front KNU KNU Special Region Group Toungoo RCSS/SSA Restoration Council of the Shan State/Shan State Army 4 5 Acronyms Understanding Myanmar’s Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Since the new government came to power in early 2011, Council Myanmar’s peace process has become a pivotal element SPDC State Peace and Development Council of political reform in the country’s new political epoch. In SNLD Shan Nationalities League for less than two years after the government initiated a “new Democracy peace process,” it has secured ceasefire agreements with SSNA Shan State National Army 14 armed groups. While critics caution that the current SSPP/SSA Shan State Progressive Party/ 14 ceasefires in Myanmar are still fragile, the media’s Shan State Army highlighting of armed clashes magnifies the extent of SSR Security Sector Reform ceasefire violations. The current peace process in Myanmar TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army is still new to most analysts and observers of Myanmar TNP Ta’ang (Palaung) National Party affairs. This paper attempts to demystify Myanmar’s peace UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council process and assess the current ceasefire status, including UNLF United National Liberation Front challenges associated with ceasefire implementation. UPCC Union Peace Central Committee UPWC Union Peace Work Committee The first part of the paper explains how ceasefire deals UWSA United Wa State Army were implemented by the previous military government from WGEC Working Group for Ethnic Coordination 1989 to 2010. This part argues that the way ceasefires were WNO Wa National Organization implemented in the past became institutional memory for ZRO Zomi Reunification Organization both the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and ethnic armed groups. The second part of the paper outlines how the new peace process emerges as a part of the reform initiated by the new government. It argues that the current peace process is diametrically different from the pre-2011 ceasefires, and the process requires all stakeholders to adjust their roles in the new structure of the peace process. The third part explains how new ceasefire agreements were made, arguing that confidence building was a pivotal element of the ceasefire process. The fourth part assesses the challenges associated with implementing ceasefire agreements. Finally, the last part of the paper highlights the post-ceasefire steps in the on-going peace process in Myanmar. 6 7 1 Brief Background of Ceasefires in Brief Background of Ceasefires in Myanmar’s Armed Conflict Myanmar’s Armed Conflict Ceasefire agreements are not a new exercise in jade mines, mineral extraction and logging. In return, ethnic Myanmar. Successive governments have pursued a armed groups agreed not to discuss political settlements plethora of peace initiatives in different forms since with the regime which it claimed was merely a ‘transitional the fighting flared up in the beginning of the country’s government’. The regime argued that only the next ‘political’ independence from the British in 1948, which heralded government would be appropriate to discuss a political sixty years of ethnic armed conflict. Prior to 1988, all peace settlement. efforts had resulted in limited success. Short periods of ceasefires fell apart as combatants resumed fighting under The military government settled these ceasefire deals with the rule of the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP). individual armed groups and refused to talk to the coalitions However, a new initiative for peace emerged after the of groups to negotiate collectively. The regime, for that military regime came to power in 1988. The State Law reason, was accused of applying ‘divide and rule’ tactics and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a military regime with the various armed ethnic groups. On the other hand, known later as the State Peace and Development Council power politics among ethnic armed groups in alliance was (SPDC), replaced the BSPP after the military cracked down also the bane of disunity. Despite ethnic alliances, such as against the nationwide mass uprising in September 1988. the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) in the early-1990s, individual From 1989, the military regime pursued
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