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INTRODUCTION ANNUAL SAFETY SAFETY OVERVIEW PERFORMANCE REPORT PROGRESS 2007 AGAINST THE SSP BENCHMARKING PASSENGERS WORKFORCE PUBLIC TRAIN ACCIDENTS LEVEL CROSSINGS PERSONAL SECURITY STATION SAFETY LEARNING FROM ACCIDENTS EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS APPENDICES Annual Safety Performance Report 2007 If you would like further information, wish to give feedback on any of the material contained in this report, or if you have any suggestions for future editions, please contact: Marcus Dacre Senior Safety Intelligence Analyst Rail Safety and Standards Board Evergreen House 160 Euston Road London NW1 2DX 020 7983 6752 [email protected] The report may be downloaded from the RSSB website: www.rssb.co.uk. Additional printed copies may be ordered at cost price by contacting the RSSB enquiry desk on 020 7904 7518. Version 1.0 (29 April 2008) © Rail Safety and Standards Board 2008 Intentionally blank Contents Executive summary vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Purpose of the report 1 1.2 How does the ASPR assess safety performance? 1 1.2.1 Scope 1 1.2.2 Grouping risk 1 1.2.3 Fatalities, injuries and FWI 2 1.2.4 Data sources and methodology 3 1.2.5 Data quality 5 1.3 Report structure 6 2 Safety overview 9 2.1 Fatalities and injuries in 2007 9 2.2 Risk profile 11 2.2.1 Fatality risk profile 11 2.2.2 FWI risk profile 12 2.3 Safety diary 15 2.4 Longer-term trends 19 2.4.1 Rail usage 19 2.4.2 Rail safety 19 2.5 Looking to the future 21 2.5.1 Future influences on safety 21 2.5.2 Research and Development Programme 23 2.5.3 Sustainable Rail Programme 23 3 Review of progress against SSP trajectories 25 3.1 Introduction 26 3.2 Review of progress 28 3.2.1 Passengers at stations 28 3.2.2 Passengers on trains 30 3.2.3 Workforce – train crew 31 3.2.4 Workforce – track workers 32 3.2.5 Workforce at stations 34 3.2.6 Engineering – track 35 3.2.7 Engineering – trains 37 3.2.8 Public behaviour – crime 37 3.2.9 Public behaviour – level crossings 39 3.3 Future developments in the trajectory approach to safety planning 40 3.4 Further information 41 4 Benchmarking railway performance 43 4.1 Comparing the railway with other modes of transport 43 4.1.1 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes 43 4.1.2 Whole-journey risk 46 2007 Annual Safety Performance Report i Contents 4.1.3 Total risk associated with different transport modes 47 4.1.4 Inter-modal safety trends 49 4.2 International comparisons 50 4.3 Occupational risk: comparisons with other industries 52 4.3.1 Industry risk 53 4.3.2 Occupational risk 54 4.4 Benchmarking within the industry 55 5 Passenger safety 57 5.1 Passenger risk profile 58 5.2 Passenger fatalities and injuries in 2007 59 5.3 Passenger safety trends 60 5.3.1 Trends in passenger fatalities 61 5.3.2 Trends in passenger injuries 62 5.4 Passenger safety by location 64 5.4.1 Passengers in stations 64 5.4.2 Passengers on trains 64 5.5 Factors affecting passenger risk 66 5.5.1 Alcohol and drugs 67 5.5.2 Age 69 5.5.3 Gender 70 6 Workforce safety 71 6.1 Workforce risk profile 72 6.2 Workforce fatalities and injuries in 2007 74 6.3 Workforce safety trends 74 6.3.1 Trends in workforce fatalities 74 6.3.2 Trends in workforce injuries 77 6.4 Workforce safety by occupation 77 6.4.1 Track workers 77 6.4.2 Train drivers 80 6.4.3 Train guards and other train crew 83 6.4.4 Station staff 85 6.4.5 Shunters 87 6.5 Further information 88 7 Public safety 89 7.1 Risk profile for members of the public 90 7.2 Public fatalities and injuries in 2007 91 7.3 Public safety trends 92 7.4 Trespassers 93 7.4.1 Fatalities and injury trends 94 7.4.2 Near misses and other trespass reports 95 7.4.3 Factors affecting trespass 96 ii 2007 Annual Safety Performance Report Contents 7.5 Level crossing users 102 7.6 Other members of the public 102 7.6.1 Members of the public in stations 102 7.6.2 Falls onto the mainline railway 102 7.6.3 Road vehicle incursions 103 7.6.4 Railway neighbours 103 7.7 Suicide 103 8 Risk from train accidents 107 8.1 Trends in the numbers of train accidents 108 8.2 Train accident risk profile 108 8.3 Train accident fatalities and injuries in 2007 111 8.4 Trends in train accidents 112 8.4.1 Long-term trends in the number of fatal train accidents 113 8.4.2 Trends in the number of potentially higher-risk train accidents 114 8.4.3 Trends in the number of non-PHRTAs by type 122 8.5 Trends in precursors to train accidents 123 8.5.1 The Precursor Indicator Model 123 8.5.2 Trends in the PIM 124 Analysis of PIM subgroups in more detail 126 8.6 Further information 133 9 Risk at level crossings 135 9.1 Level crossing risk profile 136 9.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2007 138 9.2.1 Pedestrians 138 9.2.2 Road vehicle users 139 9.2.3 Suicides 140 9.3 Trends in injuries at level crossings 140 9.3.1 Level crossings FWI since 2003 140 9.3.2 Fatalities by user type since 1998 141 9.4 Trends in collisions and near misses at level crossings 142 9.4.1 Collisions with road vehicles 142 9.4.2 Near misses with road vehicles 143 9.4.3 Near misses with pedestrians 144 9.5 Factors affecting the risk at level crossings 144 9.5.1 User behaviour 144 9.5.2 Equipment failure 146 9.5.3 Trains striking gates or barriers 147 9.5.4 Workforce error 148 9.5.5 Railway crime 149 9.6 Further information 150 10 Personal security 151 2007 Annual Safety Performance Report iii Contents 10.1 Personal security in context 152 10.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2007 153 10.3 Trends in workforce personal security 153 10.3.1 Harm to the workforce from assaults 154 10.3.2 Workforce assaults by type 155 10.3.3 Workforce assaults by severity 156 10.3.4 Time lost as a result of workforce assaults 157 10.3.5 Further analysis of workforce assaults 158 10.4 Trends in passenger and public personal security 161 10.4.1 Personal security incidents 162 10.4.2 Personal security incidents by type 162 10.4.3 Further analysis of passenger and public assaults 163 10.5 Public disorder 164 10.6 Perceived security 166 11 Station safety 169 11.1 Station risk profile 170 11.2 Fatalities and injuries in stations during 2007 170 11.3 Station safety trends 171 11.3.1 Trends in fatalities at stations 172 11.3.2 Trends in major injuries at stations 173 11.4 Passenger safety in stations 174 11.4.1 Boarding and alighting 175 11.4.2 Other accidents at the platform edge 176 11.4.3 Moving around the station 177 11.4.4 Other hazards in stations 178 11.5 Workforce safety in stations 180 11.6 Public safety in stations 181 12 Learning from accidents 183 12.1 Industry processes for learning from accidents 183 12.2 Investigations completed during 2007 184 12.2.1 Lessons learnt during the year 184 12.3 Industry progress against recommendations from investigations 187 12.3.1 Analysis of the key themes from recommendations 190 12.3.2 Formal inquiry recommendation process 192 12.4 Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System 193 12.4.1 Who reports to CIRAS? 194 12.4.2 Why do people report to CIRAS? 194 12.4.3 Key issues of concern in CIRAS reports in 2007 195 12.4.4 Additional CIRAS research outputs 196 12.5 Developments in industry strategy 197 12.5.1 Learning from accidents workshop and strategy 197 iv 2007 Annual Safety Performance Report Contents 12.5.2 European developments in learning from accidents 198 12.6 Further information 199 13 European developments 201 13.1 ROGS and Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 202 13.2 Technical Specifications for Interoperability 202 13.3 Train driver licensing 203 13.4 Safety Management Systems and Safety Certification and Authorisation 204 13.5 Common safety targets, methods and indicators 205 13.5.1 Common safety targets 206 13.5.2 Common safety methods 209 13.5.3 Common safety indicators 211 Appendix 1. Key safety facts 215 Appendix 2. Fatalities in 2007 223 Appendix 3. Potentially higher-risk train accidents 225 Appendix 4. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways 227 Appendix 5. Level crossing types 228 Appendix 6. Definitions 232 Appendix 7. Glossary 238 2007 Annual Safety Performance Report v Contents Intentionally blank vi 2007 Annual Safety Performance Report Executive summary Executive summary Introduction This report reviews our industry’s safety performance over the calendar year and assesses progress in the key risk areas identified by the Strategic Safety Plan. It benchmarks rail safety in Britain against other transport modes and overseas railways, reviews the way that our industry learns from accidents, and discusses the European developments that are having an effect on the way safety is managed. This is the third Annual Safety Performance Report that RSSB has produced in-house, and the first to be based on the revised weightings for shock, trauma and minor injuries in the calculation of fatalities and weighted injuries, which were introduced in April 2008.
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