Recovery Working Group Report Following Title of Report: Item 15 the Ufton Nervet Rail Crash Report to be Executive considered by: Forward Plan Ref: EX1058 CP1 – Providing strong community leadership CP5 – Ensuring that the street environment is clean, well maintained and safe CP7 – Promoting safer communities Corporate Plan Priority: CP9 – Enhancing the sustainability of the West Berkshire community and preserving the local environment through improving environmental resource management D2 – Building capacity through partnership and innovation D3 – Customer focus The proposals contained in this report will help to achieve the above Corporate Plan priorities by: Providing strong community leadership in an emergency. Purpose of Report: To brief the Executive regarding the work led by the Council following the train crash in Ufton Nervet on 6 th November 2004. Recommended Action: (1) To note the actions of the Recovery Working Group. (2) To endorse the recommendations. Reason for decision to be taken: To determine the Council’s response to the recommendations of the Recovery Working Group, which was set up to oversee and manage the local response to the Ufton Nervet rail crash. List of other options considered: Not applicable Key background documentation: None Portfolio Member: Councillor Geoff Findlay Tel. No.: (01635) 871992 E-mail Address: [email protected] Contact Officer Details Name: Margaret Goldie Job Title: Corporate Director (Community Care and Housing) Tel. No.: 01635 519730 E-mail Address: [email protected] West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 Implications Policy: The recommendations contained within the report include some proposed changes to the Council’s Emergency Planning procedures. Personnel: Some recommendations will require further training for staff. Legal: The Council is required to have Emergency Planning procedures in place. Environmental: None arising directly from the report. Risk Management: Adoption of the report and its recommendations will ensure that the Council is well prepared to manage any future major incident. West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 Supporting Information 1. Background 1.1 At approximately 10 past six on Saturday 6 th November 2004, the 17.35pm high-speed train from Paddington to Plymouth was involved in a collision with a Mazda 323, which was stationary on the level crossing at Ufton Nervet. As a result of the collision, the train - consisting of 2 power cars and eight carriages - was derailed in its entirety. 1.2 Estimates of the number of people on the train have varied significantly, but the official number is thought to be in excess of 300 – and possibly as high as 345. There were 101 casualties, including 6 people who were seriously injured. Seven people died, including the driver of the train and the car driver. Anjanette Rossi, PA to the Chief Executive, and her seven year old daughter Louella, were amongst those who lost their lives. Following the accident, Police Family Liaison Officers were assigned to all the bereaved families; the appropriate local authorities took responsibility for meeting the needs of those other people involved in the crash. 1.3 The response of the emergency services to the incident was swift and effective. The majority of casualties were evacuated to the Royal Berkshire Hospital, with a small number taken to Basingstoke District hospital. Emergency responders came from Thames Valley Police, Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, Royal Berkshire Ambulance Trust, local doctors and other emergency services from across the Thames Valley and the south of England. 1.4 The response of people living near the scene was also immediate. The location of the accident, between Ufton Nervet and Padworth, and some distance from the A4, meant there was a need to provide somewhere for the passengers to wait whilst ambulances or coaches were available to transport them to hospital or to home as appropriate. Local pubs provided hot drinks and a resting place for large numbers of people. Many local residents also responded on the night, later describing scenes of injured passengers emerging out of darkness across fields and of taking them into their homes whilst awaiting help. 1.5 West Berkshire Council played a key role, both in relation to the first response on the night and the remainder of the weekend, and particularly over the next two months as lead of the Recovery Working Group. 2. The Council’s initial response 2.1 The Council’s out of hours Emergency Control Officer was alerted by the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service at 18.42 hours on Saturday evening. At this point the emergency services were not requesting any support from the local authority, but staff were put on stand-by in order to respond to any requests. A Liaison Officer from the Council attended the scene to liaise directly with the emergency services and provide information back to the duty manager. 2.2 The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was opened as a precaution, and was staffed and running by 10pm. Staff from the AWB ICT service came in to assist with the setting up of equipment. The Chief Executive and staff responsible for highways issues, communications and rest centres were informed. Two vehicles carrying equipment such as shelters, generators, lighting etc. were sent to the scene, However, the only specific request for help received by the Council on the night was to close the A4 and divert the traffic, to allow ambulances and other emergency vehicles easier access to the site. Highways and Ringway staff managed this operation, and traffic was diverted along local roads via Bucklebury. The closed section of the A4 was then used as a car park and storage area for West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 emergency vehicles and equipment. The A4 was of course eventually opened under a contraflow system 2.3 The main Gold Command structure to oversee the first phase Emergency Response was set up at Thames Valley Police HQ at Kidlington, and the Council’s Principal Emergency Planning Officer attended to assess any further action required of the Council at that stage, and to provide feedback to the EOC. Following the Gold meeting it was agreed that there was no further need for the EOC, and this was closed down at 1am. A Council representative remained on site at Ufton Nervet throughout the night, and attendance at Gold by Council staff continued throughout Sunday and Monday. Highways and Engineering staff remained at the Ufton Nervet site all day on Sunday. It should be noted that Thames Valley Police initially approached the Emergency Planning Officer in Oxfordshire to act as Gold Liaison Officer, and whilst this is a long-standing practice, it proved less than helpful in the circumstances. It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that in any future such incident, Thames Valley Police contact the Emergency Planning Officer of the actual Council that will ultimately need to assume responsibility for co-ordination of the recovery phase . 2.4 It should be noted that the issue of representation at Gold has been passed to the Berkshire Chief Executives to make a decision, as Thames Valley Police have requested that there is one procedure for them to follow for calling in Local Authorities to Gold. 2.5 The emergency services and First Great Western responded very quickly to the incident, and moved the injured and other passengers from the scene with great speed. Casualties were taken to local hospitals; those not requiring hospital treatment were taken home, either by relatives, or by specially laid-on coaches travelling to the West Country. Later attempts to establish accurate figures for those who had been travelling on the train did in fact founder because passengers left the scene within hours, and whilst the identities of the dead and injured were known, no names were taken for those who were un-injured. This caused difficulties later when accurate records of those travelling were needed for such purposes as insurance claims, or for invitations to the Memorial Service. The council did in fact offer to set up a survivor reception centre and had rest centre managers on stand by. If this offer had been taken up then the registering of the survivors could have been more comprehensive. Perhaps the recommendation should be that the local authority provide staff to record the details of the survivors? 2.6 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that in any future such incident, local authority staff attend to ensure that the names of those passengers who were on the train but who did not require hospital treatment be recorded, either before they leave the scene, or as part of the arrangements for transporting them home made by the Rail Companies. It is a further recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that a member of Corporate board attend an incident scene, both to oversee the council’s response and to act as the main liaison point with Gold. 2.7 On Monday 8 th November, the Council assumed responsibility for co-ordinating the recovery phase of the incident, and the Recovery Working Group met for the first time that afternoon. The official hand over of the co-ordination of the incident from gold to the RWG took place on Friday 12 th November. West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 3. The Council’s role 3.1 West Berkshire Council gave a coherent, corporate and highly competent response to the duties placed on it following the accident. There was a palpable sense of the whole organisation – staff and Members - pulling together to do whatever was necessary. This response was noted by the other local organisations with whom we work, and has been referred to in many of the debriefing sessions that took place during December and January.