Recovery Working Group Report Following Title of Report: Item 15 the Ufton Nervet Rail Crash Report to be Executive considered by: Forward Plan Ref: EX1058

CP1 – Providing strong community leadership CP5 – Ensuring that the street environment is clean, well maintained and safe CP7 – Promoting safer communities Corporate Plan Priority: CP9 – Enhancing the sustainability of the West Berkshire community and preserving the local environment through improving environmental resource management D2 – Building capacity through partnership and innovation D3 – Customer focus The proposals contained in this report will help to achieve the above Corporate Plan priorities by: Providing strong community leadership in an emergency.

Purpose of Report: To brief the Executive regarding the work led by the Council following the train crash in Ufton Nervet on 6 th November 2004.

Recommended Action: (1) To note the actions of the Recovery Working Group.

(2) To endorse the recommendations.

Reason for decision to be taken: To determine the Council’s response to the recommendations of the Recovery Working Group, which was set up to oversee and manage the local response to the Ufton Nervet rail crash.

List of other options considered: Not applicable

Key background documentation: None

Portfolio Member: Councillor Geoff Findlay Tel. No.: (01635) 871992 E-mail Address: [email protected]

Contact Officer Details Name: Margaret Goldie Job Title: Corporate Director (Community Care and Housing) Tel. No.: 01635 519730 E-mail Address: [email protected]

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005

Implications

Policy: The recommendations contained within the report include some proposed changes to the Council’s Emergency Planning procedures. Personnel: Some recommendations will require further training for staff. Legal: The Council is required to have Emergency Planning procedures in place. Environmental: None arising directly from the report. Risk Management: Adoption of the report and its recommendations will ensure that the Council is well prepared to manage any future major incident.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 Supporting Information

1. Background

1.1 At approximately 10 past six on Saturday 6 th November 2004, the 17.35pm high-speed train from Paddington to Plymouth was involved in a collision with a Mazda 323, which was stationary on the level crossing at Ufton Nervet. As a result of the collision, the train - consisting of 2 power cars and eight carriages - was derailed in its entirety.

1.2 Estimates of the number of people on the train have varied significantly, but the official number is thought to be in excess of 300 – and possibly as high as 345. There were 101 casualties, including 6 people who were seriously injured. Seven people died, including the driver of the train and the car driver. Anjanette Rossi, PA to the Chief Executive, and her seven year old daughter Louella, were amongst those who lost their lives. Following the accident, Police Family Liaison Officers were assigned to all the bereaved families; the appropriate local authorities took responsibility for meeting the needs of those other people involved in the crash.

1.3 The response of the emergency services to the incident was swift and effective. The majority of casualties were evacuated to the Royal Berkshire Hospital, with a small number taken to Basingstoke District hospital. Emergency responders came from Thames Valley Police, Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, Royal Berkshire Ambulance Trust, local doctors and other emergency services from across the Thames Valley and the south of England.

1.4 The response of people living near the scene was also immediate. The location of the accident, between Ufton Nervet and Padworth, and some distance from the A4, meant there was a need to provide somewhere for the passengers to wait whilst ambulances or coaches were available to transport them to hospital or to home as appropriate. Local pubs provided hot drinks and a resting place for large numbers of people. Many local residents also responded on the night, later describing scenes of injured passengers emerging out of darkness across fields and of taking them into their homes whilst awaiting help.

1.5 West Berkshire Council played a key role, both in relation to the first response on the night and the remainder of the weekend, and particularly over the next two months as lead of the Recovery Working Group.

2. The Council’s initial response

2.1 The Council’s out of hours Emergency Control Officer was alerted by the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service at 18.42 hours on Saturday evening. At this point the emergency services were not requesting any support from the local authority, but staff were put on stand-by in order to respond to any requests. A Liaison Officer from the Council attended the scene to liaise directly with the emergency services and provide information back to the duty manager.

2.2 The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was opened as a precaution, and was staffed and running by 10pm. Staff from the AWB ICT service came in to assist with the setting up of equipment. The Chief Executive and staff responsible for highways issues, communications and rest centres were informed. Two vehicles carrying equipment such as shelters, generators, lighting etc. were sent to the scene, However, the only specific request for help received by the Council on the night was to close the A4 and divert the traffic, to allow ambulances and other emergency vehicles easier access to the site. Highways and Ringway staff managed this operation, and traffic was diverted along local roads via Bucklebury. The closed section of the A4 was then used as a car park and storage area for

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 emergency vehicles and equipment. The A4 was of course eventually opened under a contraflow system

2.3 The main Gold Command structure to oversee the first phase Emergency Response was set up at Thames Valley Police HQ at Kidlington, and the Council’s Principal Emergency Planning Officer attended to assess any further action required of the Council at that stage, and to provide feedback to the EOC. Following the Gold meeting it was agreed that there was no further need for the EOC, and this was closed down at 1am. A Council representative remained on site at Ufton Nervet throughout the night, and attendance at Gold by Council staff continued throughout Sunday and Monday. Highways and Engineering staff remained at the Ufton Nervet site all day on Sunday. It should be noted that Thames Valley Police initially approached the Emergency Planning Officer in Oxfordshire to act as Gold Liaison Officer, and whilst this is a long-standing practice, it proved less than helpful in the circumstances.

It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that in any future such incident, Thames Valley Police contact the Emergency Planning Officer of the actual Council that will ultimately need to assume responsibility for co-ordination of the recovery phase .

2.4 It should be noted that the issue of representation at Gold has been passed to the Berkshire Chief Executives to make a decision, as Thames Valley Police have requested that there is one procedure for them to follow for calling in Local Authorities to Gold.

2.5 The emergency services and First Great Western responded very quickly to the incident, and moved the injured and other passengers from the scene with great speed. Casualties were taken to local hospitals; those not requiring hospital treatment were taken home, either by relatives, or by specially laid-on coaches travelling to the West Country. Later attempts to establish accurate figures for those who had been travelling on the train did in fact founder because passengers left the scene within hours, and whilst the identities of the dead and injured were known, no names were taken for those who were un-injured. This caused difficulties later when accurate records of those travelling were needed for such purposes as insurance claims, or for invitations to the Memorial Service. The council did in fact offer to set up a survivor reception centre and had rest centre managers on stand by. If this offer had been taken up then the registering of the survivors could have been more comprehensive. Perhaps the recommendation should be that the local authority provide staff to record the details of the survivors?

2.6 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that in any future such incident, local authority staff attend to ensure that the names of those passengers who were on the train but who did not require hospital treatment be recorded, either before they leave the scene, or as part of the arrangements for transporting them home made by the Rail Companies.

It is a further recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that a member of Corporate board attend an incident scene, both to oversee the council’s response and to act as the main liaison point with Gold.

2.7 On Monday 8 th November, the Council assumed responsibility for co-ordinating the recovery phase of the incident, and the Recovery Working Group met for the first time that afternoon. The official hand over of the co-ordination of the incident from gold to the RWG took place on Friday 12 th November.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 3. The Council’s role

3.1 West Berkshire Council gave a coherent, corporate and highly competent response to the duties placed on it following the accident. There was a palpable sense of the whole organisation – staff and Members - pulling together to do whatever was necessary. This response was noted by the other local organisations with whom we work, and has been referred to in many of the debriefing sessions that took place during December and January.

3.2 The main priorities for a local authority during such a time are to provide support to the Emergency Services and essential humanitarian assistance. This could include information, advice and practical support to those affected in some way by the accident, to signpost people on to other sources of help as appropriate, to set up systems for multi-agency working to ensure that there are no gaps, to oversee and manage any highways issues and to co-ordinate any other offers of help. West Berkshire’s position following the crash was particularly difficult because of its dual role as victim and responder. The sense of grief in the Market Street office was tangible, and for this reason the decision taken by the Chief Executive to locate the responsibility for co-ordinating the recovery phase of the incident in Northcroft House was especially helpful, because it allowed that co-ordinating role to be undertaken by staff outside the area where Anjanette had worked .

3.3 By the Monday morning following the accident, arrangements had been made to tell staff what had happened and a joint letter was sent to everybody from the Chief Executive and the Partnership Director. Regular briefing notes for staff and Members were distributed throughout November and early December. Arrangements for counselling were in place for those staff and Members who were particularly badly affected and a Book of Condolences placed in the front reception area for Members, staff and the public.

3.4 Both Council and AWB staff responded to all that was asked of them. The Contact Centre fielded calls before the establishment of a dedicated helpline; ICT staff undertook the necessary technical work to allow dedicated phone lines and e-mail access; social services managers in Children and Young People and Community Care and Housing ensured their teams could respond quickly and knowledgeably to distressed members of the public; Environment and Public Protection staff oversaw the first response on the night, followed by later road closures, site-clearing and traffic management for the funeral; Strategy and Resources staff managed a media blizzard with resourcefulness, briefed staff and Members regularly and provided a range of support whenever asked to do so. Staff from across the Council offered to be on the Helpline, and delivered leaflets in the first week across the affected area. Members attended church services and community drop-in sessions, and alerted officers to any particular concerns within their wards, especially in those areas closest to the accident site.

3.5 It is a testament to the Council’s staff, and to Members of both political groups, that not only did services to the public continue with no disruption at this time, but also that the Council’s response was widely judged by the public to be swift, efficient and effective.

4. The Medium Term response – the Recovery Working Group

4.1 The roles and responsibilities of the emergency services and local authorities in situations such as this one are formally described in guidance papers such as "Dealing with Disaster" revised third edition. This is soon to be superseded by "Responding to Emergencies" which is currently out for consultation.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 4.2 Initially, it is suggested that a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) is established in the immediate aftermath of an emergency incident, chaired by a senior officer from one of the Emergency Services. In this instance, this role was undertaken by Gold Command at TV Police HQ. A Recovery Working Group is set up as a sub-group of the SCG, and is normally chaired by the Local Authority. At some point after the emergency has been stabilised, the Senior Police officer will stand down the SCG and hand over control of the recovery phase to the local authority and the Recovery Working Group.

4.3 The Terms of Reference for the Recovery Working Group are to: • Prepare an action plan of the work required for the protection of the environment, support to the community and support to the site recovery (as required); • Co-ordinate recovery issues with other committees, provide a spokesperson for media briefings, and brief the Council and public on the recovery strategy; • Keep a record of all actions and decisions, and evaluate alternative options as required; • Consider recovery over three phases – immediate (days), medium term (weeks to months) and long term (months to years).

4.4 The aims set out for of the Recovery Working Group are as follows: • To implement a systematic and balanced recovery plan, involving all agencies, that is rapid, economical and fits the needs of the incident; • To establish a proactive and integrated framework for support to the local community and those affected by the incident; • To co-ordinate as appropriate any environmental protection issues; • To co-ordinate the information and media management of the recovery process; • To establish an integrated plan for traffic management and highways issues; • To establish appropriate methods of community involvement in the recovery process; • To establish protocols for political involvement and liaison at parish, district and parliamentary levels; • To oversee the financial and commercial implications of the emergency.

5. Implement a systematic and balanced recovery plan, involving all the agencies, that is rapid, economical and fits the needs of the incident

5.1 Membership of the Recovery Working Group in West Berkshire included staff from across the whole Council, a Member of the Council’s Executive, Thames Valley and British Transport police, First Great Western and Network Rail, HM Rail Inspectorate, health and voluntary sector representatives and a representative of the Bishop of Reading. Other input was sought from the Environment Agency as appropriate.

5.2 The Recovery Working Group started by taking stock of the situation as of the afternoon of Monday 8th November, in order to determine what needed to happen next. Details of the wider membership of the group, other local links that would prove helpful, expertise from similar accidents elsewhere (eg Selby), a communications strategy and up-to-date feedback from the scene were all considered during the first meeting. The Group then drew up an Action Plan which set out the work needed over the coming 3-4 weeks under the areas identified in paragraph 4.4 above.

5.3 The Group received feedback from that day’s Gold Command meeting, including an update from the accident site. The RWG concluded that the primary focus initially needed to be on media management and communication issues and decisions were reached as to press releases, written information for staff and Members, links to parish councils and support for people living locally who had responded on the night. Highways matters were also considered.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005

5.4 The RWG updated the Action Plan daily for the first two weeks and weekly thereafter. This kind of structured approach to managing the aftermath of a significant incident is to be recommended.

5.5 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that the Council’s Emergency Planning Procedures be amended to include the requirement that an Action Plan be drawn up to identify the work required, and to monitor its completion, in the event of any future such serious incident. It is a further recommendation of the Recovery working group that a Thames Valley recovery Plan be produced, to ensure that the lessons from this experience and from Exercise Aldex 05 held earlier in the year, be disseminated.

6. Support to the local community and those affected by the incident

6.1 The most immediate need was to identify those people who might require support following on from the incident, either in the short or medium term, and to provide this support in a number of different ways. A Helpline was established, staffed by volunteers from across the Council, who sat within the Community Care & Housing team within the contact centre on four hour shifts covering 9 – 5, Monday to Friday. An answerphone service directed calls outside of these hours to the Berkshire-wide social services Emergency Duty Team based in Bracknell. The Mental Health out-of-hours crisis service was alerted also, as was the Berkshire Healthcare Trust. Additional Helpline arrangements were made for the two weekends following the accident, when it was predicted that the volume of calls might rise. Newbury and Community PCT made space and telecoms available in the West Berkshire Community Hospital at weekends so that staff would not be working alone. Information to answer frequently asked questions was provided and updated daily, and arrangements were made to debrief staff at the end of each shift.

6.2 The Helpline number was advertised widely via the press, radio, TV, Council website. Particular efforts were made to ensure that passengers involved in the accident were aware of the contact number we were keen that this number was not blocked by press trying to ascertain additional information, so we therefore contacted local radio and TV and asked for their co-operation.

6.3 In order to achieve this key members of the RWG made direct contact with the media to give them updates that had come via RWG the previous evening. Reporters were encouraged to ring the Helpline number to satisfy themselves about the answer phone message for out of hours, this proved successful.

6.4 In the event the Helpline was less busy than expected. In total there were just under 30 phone calls during the month the helpline was active, and these varied from:

v Requests to pass on condolences to the bereaved families v A phone call from a lady whose family had suffered a similar experience to that of the car driver’s family and asking us to pass on sympathy to his family. v People wanting to send cards to Anjanette’s family - these were sent to Northcroft House and re- routed as appropriate. v People saying they were on the train but had left the scene because they were un-injured – they were directed to British Transport Police. v A mother whose son was on the train and she did not know how to help him – she was sent leaflets and given contact names and numbers. v Young person feeling guilty because her friend and herself were both on the train, her friend was injured - she was referred to 14-21 and given our leaflets

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 v A GP who had phoned to say thank you – one of his patients had been involved in the crash, she had contacted us and we had been able to put in some home-care support immediately. v Gentleman who was on the train, was unhurt, thought he was o.k. but the week-end after the crash was having flashbacks and was feeling shocked by his delayed reaction. He was given leaflets v Several calls from people feeling anxious about getting back on a train once the line had re-opened. v A gentleman who was involved in the Paddington rail disaster – suffering flashbacks, seeking self help. He was given leaflets v Updates of road closures and when would the track be re-opened. v Information regarding the funeral and memorial services.

We also implemented a Frequently Asked Questions proforma which was updated every evening after RWG to ensure that the most up to date information was given out each day. This was also made available to staff via the intranet.

6.5 A number of lessons were learned following the running of the Helpline:

v A telephone, new number, PC, and groupwise account had to be acquired, set up from scratch for the specific function of the helpline.

v Initially there was no one person who could be asked at short notice to take on the task of manning a helpline. An all users e-mail was sent asking for volunteers and the response was truly overwhelming - despite people’s personal grief they wanted to offer help.

v The helpdesk was set up in Market Street, in the contact centre, as initially it was thought the best location for this function. However debriefing sessions have indicated how difficult staff found this due to the fact that Anjanette worked in Market Street and people were in mourning and shock.

v Staff had not been trained in how to handle these types of calls, although depending on which service area they worked in some were more comfortable dealing with grieving, upset and anxious people than others.

6.7 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that the Council:

v Retain the phone, helpline number, PC and Groupwise account so they can be utilised quickly with the minimum of disruption in the event of another major incident.

v Keep a list of volunteers, who have been trained in how to deal with the type of calls experienced during this period, to be held in Emergency Planning, in order they may be asked to take on this function at short notice.

v Implement a proper training session for Helpdesk volunteers, raising their awareness to the type of calls we may receive.

v Establish a mechanism for briefing staff about what to expect before they start a shift on the helpdesk.

v Put a mechanism is put in place for staff to share their experiences and talk through any issues after they have finished their shift. Counselling sessions may need to be arranged if the phone calls are particularly traumatic.

v Thought is given to the location of a helpline, and the networks of support surrounding it.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 6.8 Public Information leaflets were also drawn up, based on work previously undertaken by staff within Berkshire Healthcare Trust on coping with traumatic experiences. Two leaflets were produced – ‘Coping After the Ufton Nervet rail crash’ and ‘Dealing with your Feelings after the Ufton Nervet Railcrash’. The purpose of the leaflets was to reassure the people involved in the crash itself, along with a wider number of people living locally who had been affected in some way, that the kinds of physical and emotional reactions they might experience in the aftermath of the accident were quite normal and would subside over time. The leaflet emphasised that if somebody found that their symptoms did not subside after six weeks or so, that was then the time to approach their GP for further help. The usual public response after such an incident is to assume that everybody touched in some way by it will require counselling. This is not the case, and providing counselling services at too early a stage is contrary to all medical and Department of Health advice. As the leaflets made clear, the best help for people initially is to understand and accept the intensity and depth of their reactions, to express these feelings, to gather as much information about what has happened as possible and to think and talk about the incident as much as needed. The leaflets also pointed at other sources of help and listed a number of other contact numbers for organisations able to offer specialist expertise, eg Samaritans, support groups for those who had been bereaved etc.

6.9` A total of 12,000 leaflets were printed and distributed in the first week. Printing this quantity would not have been possible without the help offered by our LSP partners, notably Vodaphone and the Greenham Common Trust. Copies were placed in GP surgeries, public libraries, hospitals, Council offices, police stations, railway stations, shopping centres, and the pubs and community centres near to the accident site, sent to voluntary organisations, provided to Home Care and Community Nursing staff, and placed on the Council and PCT websites and the BBC Radio Berkshire website, with a link from the main BBC website established. Thames Valley Police had assigned an officer to work solely in the Ufton Nervet and Padworth areas in the two weeks immediately after the crash, and he delivered leaflets to all the houses in the area. Further supplies were given out at the two community support meetings held on Sunday afternoons in November, and were available at the Memorial Service held in Reading in December. At all times, any communication with the media referred to the leaflets, re-iterated the main messages they contained, outlined where to obtain further supplies and repeated the Helpline number..

6.10 The response to the leaflets was immediate and positive. The fact that some written information was `available so quickly was much appreciated by the public, and its message – physical and emotional symptoms of all kinds are to be expected, are normal and will diminish over time – understood and acted upon. Local GPs reported that they were less busy than they had expected with people reporting symptoms, and were able to give copies of the leaflets to patients if appropriate. People attending the community support sessions, police officers, library staff, home carers and community health care staff all reported that the availability of clear written advice had made an enormous difference. Whilst the leaflets themselves referred specifically to the Ufton Nervet railcrash, it is clear that more general written advice on coping with traumatic incidents needs to be available for use in any future such incident.

6.11 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that generic advice leaflets on coping with such an incident be produced and printed, and made available both in the immediate aftermath of such an incident, to those who first respond or those people actually involved in it, and, in the medium term recovery phase, to the wider community.

6.12 Particular attention was also paid to possible support needed by the children attending Speenhamland school (which Louella had attended) and Ufton Nervet school. On the morning of the first school day following the incident telephone contact by the Education Service was made with each school and a range of support offered. Members of the Educational Psychology Service attended a

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 meeting with staff at Speenhamland to talk through how the school was responding and to give support and advice. There was subsequent follow-up contact and assurance that support would be available whenever needed.

6.13 People living in the area close to the crash were expected to need some particular support and up to date information initially, and this proved to be the case. Two community drop-in meetings were held, one in Ufton Nervet on the Sunday afternoon following the crash, and a second one two weeks after that in Padworth. The first meeting took place after church services had been held locally, and was attended by a number of local people, together with local clergy, Members, staff from the Council, Thames Valley and British Transport Police and Network Rail and some of those emergency services staff who had attended on the night. The Head Teacher of Ufton Nervet school opened one of the classrooms for the meeting, and was available to speak to local parents as required, and this was much appreciated by those who attended. Council, Police and Network Rail staff were able to update local people on progress in removing the train, and give information as to the likely timetable for local roads opening and where to get help and support if needed. The second meeting was held in Padworth Village Hall and facilitated by the Parish Council, attracting smaller numbers but nevertheless proving a helpful source of advice for local people and providing helpful feedback for Council staff as to the likely demand for ongoing help and support. The Red Cross offered to hold a series of ongoing community support meetings during December; the views of local residents as to the need for this were ascertained by the local PC as part of his ongoing work in the neighbourhood. In the event this longer term help was not requested.

6.14 Particular attention was paid by the Council to the needs of those staff and Members who had been very affected by the death of Anjanette and her daughter. HR colleagues made arrangements for trained counsellors to be available in Market Street during the first week, and for ongoing help and support during the next few months. The availability of this kind of support, and its timeliness, was very much appreciated.

6.15 Other offers of help of all kinds flooded in during the days immediately after the accident. It is of particular note that all parts of West Berkshire Council responded quickly and positively, and that normal work was set aside in order to respond to requests from either the emergency services or the Recovery Working Group. A range of external organisations came forward, including local clergy, CAWB, representatives of local voluntary groups such as St. John’s, LSP partners and other councils across Berkshire. One point of contact was established for all such offers, to ensure that individuals and organisations received a response and that all help was co-ordinated in one place.

6.16 Establishing good links between the various different agencies involved both in the emergency and the recovery phases is particularly important, and this was achieved by an RWG member attending the Gold meetings each day until the overall responsibility passed to the RWG at the end of the first week.

6.17 The Recovery Working Group benefited considerably from the experience of those involved in similar such incidents elsewhere in the UK, and contact was made with those who had been involved in the recovery phase of the Selby and Paddington rail crashes, the Kegworth aircrash and the Salzburg coach crash amongst others.

6.18 The key issues disseminated from these other areas, which were integrated into the West Berkshire response, were as follows: • Survivors disappear quickly afterwards – and may need to be contacted through TV and press appeals; we used a wide range of media and co-ordinated ICT options, all linked to the TVP Casualty Bureau, to achieve this.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 • No survivor is completely uninjured – and awareness raising of the possible impact of the incident is important; we achieved this through the leaflets and the Helpline. • People living close to the accident site need good information about what’s happening next, someone to check that they are OK and to know where to go for support of they need it; TVP stationed a beat officer in the Ufton Nervet/ Padworth area for two weeks to keep local people informed and to identify anybody particularly badly affected. • People living locally who have got caught up in the accident in some way benefit from opportunities to talk to each other, and to have some kind of simple debrief about what happened and possibly why it happened; two drop-in sessions to offer some initial debrief and further support were held, one in Ufton Nervet the Sunday after the crash, and one in Padworth two weeks later. • There needs to be close co-operation between police Family Liaison Officers and social services staff within the Council; these links have been established. • Local media contacts need to be cultivated and used to get messages out; all the organisations involved did this very successfully.

6.19 Council Members also made a valuable contribution by their public expressions of sympathy and support, and reassurance to the local community that the Council was overseeing all of the necessary recovery work.

6.20 The Recovery Working Group recommends that any future, similar response ensures that support to the community is offered at a variety of levels – to individuals, to groups and to local neighbourhoods – using a variety of means such as written leaflets, presence in the community, the use of press coverage to disseminate messages and interviews with senior and Ward Members and, where appropriate, senior managers from within the Council or other agencies.

7. Co-ordination of the environment and environmental protection issues

7.1 Environmental work at the site focussed primarily on four areas – identifying and dealing with any contamination as a result of the accident; clearing the site once the train had been removed; clearing litter and rubbish in the days following the accident, both from the site and from surrounding roads; and designating a site for the laying of flowers and sensitively moving these at an appropriate time.

7.2 The Recovery Working Group was aware that there was the possibility of a diesel spillage from the train and therefore the Environment Agency was initially invited to join both Gold Control and the Recovery Working Group meetings. In the event a decision was reached by the EA that this was not considered to be a major environmental incident and therefore their attendance was not necessary. Written confirmation of their position was received on 10 th November as follows:

“An estimated 900 litres of diesel was lost to ground and the majority of this has been captured in the track ballast which will be removed following the lifting of the forward engine. Trial pits will be dug to monitor any additional flow in perched water. All remaining fuel was drained from the undamaged tanks prior to their removal. There are still no visible signs of oil on the river or canal and precautionary booms remain in place. British Waterways are considering re-opening the canal but will consult with Network Rail regarding removal of fixed booms. Thames Water are considering ‘standing down’ their response team due to the continued low risk of any pollution occurring.”

7.3 A significant quantity of product was recovered and remaining contaminated areas were treated with 'Imbiber Beads' (an absorbent product) and biological reagents. 3 observation boreholes were installed for monitoring purposes. No visible signs of fuel were ever observed on Kennet & Avon

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 Canal or River Kennet. Bore hole samples were analysed for total oil content during the months following the incident. The results did not provide any cause for concern regarding further pollution issues.

7.4 The initial moving of the train and restoring the track was undertaken by First Great Western and Network Rail. British Transport Police remained on site until this had been achieved. Clearing of the railway line and adjoining site once the train had gone and the Incident Unit had moved on was primarily undertaken by Network Rail, with support from the Council’s Streetcare team. The large numbers of people present at the scene meant that there was a significant amount of litter, both during the first weekend and until the press had moved on, and Streetcare also took responsibility for this. Removal was dealt with promptly and efficiently. British Transport Police took responsibility for removing passengers’ property, and for storing it at their property holding point in London until it could be returned by courier. A link was made to the BTP unit property through the Casualty Bureau, and the contact number advertised on the Council and Police web-sites and elsewhere.

7.5 Great care and sensitivity was needed with regard to flowers left at the site of the accident. Police Liaison Officers escorted the bereaved families onto the track to leave tributes, and other members of the public wishing to lay flowers were requested to give these to the police constable on duty, who then laid them in the appropriate place. Flowers could also be left at Ufton Nervet church. Before the trains started running again, First Great Western asked that all flowers and other tributes be removed so that train drivers would not be upset or distracted by them. Arrangements were made by the Recovery Working Group to move everything to Ufton Nervet Church, and the Reverend Richard Thomas and a BTP representative conducted a brief trackside ceremony at 6.30am on the day that trains restarted.

8. Information and media management of the recovery process

8.1 The Recovery Working Group received a substantial amount of advice regarding managing communications, information and the media from other local authorities which had experienced similar incidents, and from Thames Valley Police in particular. TVP advised that the media impact could be viewed as having three phases – firstly, at the time of the incident, when the initial news is disseminated, together with messages about road closures and the need to avoid the area. Secondly, news about those who had been killed or injured, along with items of local interest, and thirdly, an interest in safety issues more generally, such as the dangers of level crossing etc. The RWG Communications Plan ought to use these different phases as opportunities to get a variety of messages out to the local community.

8.2 ‘Phase 1’ issues were primarily dealt with by Gold, with input from RWG and the Council as appropriate. TVP led on media management for all agencies at this stage, ensuring that the press were briefed regularly and that enquiries from passengers who had left the scene were responded to. The RWG provided a local perspective on these issues, and ensured that press releases were prepared for the Council Chairman and Leader, and that press interviews were arranged as appropriate.

8.3 Once formal identification of those killed had been announced, the media calls to the Public Relations office were literally relentless for the first day, and intense for the second. Also, they had to advise and coordinate internal communications with staff, whilst rapidly preparing and gaining approval of media statements to respond to a plethora of national and local media enquiries. A PR emergency service for Speenhamland School was also provided.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 8.4 The media enquiries were principally on three aspects. First, details of the incident. Although a number of these enquiries could be directed to the emergency services the team had to provide regular updates on road closures and traffic management. Two, impact at the Council on the loss of a work colleague. The difficult element was gaining consensus/approval on what was said to the media and managing those messages to satisfy the media circus thus keeping them at bay from the many immediately affected. Three, the impact at the school. Immediately a child is involved the media think 'school' and decend on that establishment to gain reaction from them. The PR team worked closely with the headteacher, agreed statements, and acted as the PR office for the school.

8.5 Virtually all the national papers carried pictures as well as the full story at length. Some tabloids made it their front page lead. The PR team were satisfied that they had used the statements and messages issued and there was very little deviation from these.

8.6 The main focus of activity for the Recovery Working Group itself concerned the impact of the second phase, particularly the intense interest that had been generated by the deaths of local people and the actions of the car driver, as well as details of the funeral arrangements and the help and support that were available.

8.7 The importance of Members as sources of information for their communities was recognised at the outset, and a briefing session arranged prior to the Executive meeting on the Thursday following the crash. Invitations to that briefing session were also issued to the Chairs of Ufton Nervet, Sulhampstead, Padworth, Beenham, Stratfield Mortimer and Englefield Parish Councils. Representatives from the Council, TVP and the Church provided members with an update on the week’s events and responded to specific questions. A number of helpful messages from Members were conveyed back to the RWG during the meeting, including the need to manage local sensitivities with regard to community support issues, and the arrangements for the funeral and Memorial Services.

8.8 Throughout the month following the crash, regular written briefings were provided for Members through the Members’ Information Bulletin, and for staff through Reporter. Additional briefing for local MPs was provided by the Chief Executive. Briefing notes were also issued to staff of partner agencies by the Head of Communications. Specific guidance was issued to Members, staff and schools regarding the arrangements for the funeral and the Memorial Service.

9. Establish the method of community involvement in the recovery process

9.1 Advice to the RWG from other organisations which had previously been involved in this type of emergency incident was that it was important to focus on the needs of the wider community as well as on the victims of the accident itself. Local people living near to the crash site formed one group – people who may or may not have been involved on the night, but whose lives would be disrupted to some extent by the aftermath of the incident. It was also stressed that the needs of the wider West Berkshire community would require some attention, particularly in the form of regular communication, together with opportunities to express grief and sympathy.

9.2 The RWG and the Council put a number of measures in place. The two community drop-in sessions provided opportunities for people living in the immediate vicinity of the site to meet, share experiences and be connected to other offers of help and support. TVP allocated a full-time officer to the Ufton Nervet and Padworth areas, who made regular contact with local residents, kept them updated, alerted the RWG to any particular problems and generally provided a ‘presence’ in the area that was very reassuring and much appreciated.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 9.3 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that, in the event of a similar incident in the future, this model of a full-time police presence be established in the area close to the scene, to provide reassurance to the community, a focal point for local residents and to liaise with the RWG as appropriate.

9.4 As noted above, the RWG did consider the option of establishing an ongoing community support framework, but concluded, in consultation with local residents, that this was not necessary. However, the RWG agreed to keep this under review.

9.5 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that this report be sent to the six parish councils covering the area, and that their views be sought on the need for any longer term support required by their communities.

9.6 The written leaflets described in paragraph 6.3 above were widely circulated throughout the local area, delivered to local houses and made available for staff from all of the agencies involved. Every media opportunity was used to publicise these leaflets, and feedback has been that they were immensely useful. The content of both was drawn from material provided by staff of the Berkshire Healthcare Trust; if such advice had not been immediately to hand, it would have taken much longer to get leaflets distributed, and the RWG is indebted to the Healthcare Trust for permission to use their work.

9.7 It is recommended that the Chairman of the Council write to the Chief Executive of the Berkshire Healthcare Trust to express gratitude on behalf of the RWG for the help and advice received from BHCT staff at this time.

9.8 Two events requiring the greatest amount of sensitivity were arrangements for the funeral locally, and for the Memorial Service held in December. The role of the RWG in respect of the funeral was to co- ordinate traffic and highways issues, liaise with Gold regarding the media management and provide support for staff in the Council and the staff and children at Speenhamland School. The RWG was aware of the enormous impact that a painful double funeral would have on the local community, the families and friends affected and staff and Members of the Council. The RWG proactively managed many of the practicalities associated with the funeral, supported throughout by the presence of Richard Thomas, Director of Communications for the Bishop of Oxford.

9.9 Much thought was put into the nature, timing and location of the Memorial Service. The purpose of such a service is to help all those people who have been physically or emotionally damaged by the accident to begin the healing process. It is designed to help the wider community express their solidarity with those who have been personally affected. The timing also needs to be carefully considered. It needs to be long enough after the accident not to clash with funeral arrangements, and so that people who have been injured can attend. In this instance it also needed to take place before the Christmas and New Year period, which tends to form a natural point for new beginnings.

9.10 In respect of location, the Diocese was very aware that to hold such a service in Newbury shortly after a double funeral would mean a further traumatic event for the local community. It was also the case that the passengers on the train, plus those who had been involved in the rescue, had come from an area stretching from London to the West Country. It was therefore decided to hold the service in Reading. This proved to be the right decision, as did the agreement between West Berkshire and Reading Councils to co-host the reception afterwards. The RWG remained aware that there may be a request for a memorial service of some kind in West Berkshire at some time in the future.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 9.11 In order to respond to the public desire to record their sympathy and support for those affected, the Council placed Books of Remembrance in the Market Street office and in libraries. Many people wished to make a donation and arrangements were made to receive these at the Market Street cash office. Many staff also wished to make a specific donation in memory of Anjanette.

9.12 Finally, the Children and Young People’s Directorate responded directly to the needs of the children in the primary schools at Speenhamland and Ufton Nervet. Teachers and school nurses were asked to identify any children needing support, and the schools were linked to the educational psychology service for advice and direct work as appropriate. Social work teams in Children and Young People and Community Care and Housing were alerted to the possible need to respond quickly, and Team and Service Managers briefed regularly.

9.13 Feedback from the schools was that they had felt well-supported throughout. There was also a suggestion that some proactive work with Headteachers might be valuable in the event of the death of a pupil or member of staff at some future date.

9.14 The Recovery Working Group recommends that the Corporate Director (Children and Young People) be asked to undertake some appropriate preparation and training of headteachers.

10. Establishment of an integrated plan for traffic management and highways issues

10.1 The Highways and Engineering Service has in place a very effective emergency response system in conjunction with its contractor, Ringway Highways Services Ltd, and deals with approximately 200 highway emergencies every year. Most are relatively minor and involve reacting to requests for assistance in relation to road traffic accidents, fallen trees, flooding and winter gritting. Fortunately activation of the Council’s major incident plan is rarely required, however the Ufton incident demonstrated that when the plan is activated, the highway standby/callout Procedures are very effective.

10.2 The Service has a trained out of hours Highways Duty Officer available to receive and act upon calls from the Emergency Control officer. Ringway will react to a call for assistance and be on site within one hour. If further advice is required then an escalation procedure is implemented and the Head of Service or other senior manager is contacted.

10.3 For the Ufton Nervet rail crash, the Head of Highways and Engineering was contacted and immediately instructed Ringway personnel to attend the site and take initial instructions from the Police. As described in section 2 of this report a request to close the A4 was received from the Police and trained staff immediately implemented a well signed diversion route via Bradfield , Bucklebury and Thatcham. This route was regularly inspected over the course of the weekend to ensure that an adequate level of signing was in place. The highway operation was overseen by the Head of Service who remained on site throughout the week, assisted by the Traffic Manager, whose traffic management experience proved critical over this period.

10.4 In the days after the incident, liaison between Thames Valley Police, highway officers and Ringway was maintained and a plan put in place to safely re-open the A4, firstly under contraflow with the westbound lanes remaining closed. Later in the week the A4 was fully re-opened. This significant traffic management plan was completed without incident.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 11. Establish protocols for political involvement and liaison

11.1 The importance of keeping politicians properly informed remained a key issue for the Recovery Working Group, and reference has been made to the ways in which this was achieved throughout this report. The then Executive Member for Community Care and Housing – Councillor Phil Barnett - joined the RWG at its second meeting and participated fully throughout. His presence ensured that RWG members were kept appraised of the needs of local politicians – including MPs, District and Parish Councillors – to be regularly updated and to act as a bridge back to their local communities.

11.2 The Chief Executive ensured that local MPs were briefed and the Members’ Information Bulletin was used to update all Councillors regularly, as noted in paragraph 8.5 above. The Communications Strategy included a specific section on Member information, which ensured that a focus was kept on this area at each meeting.

11.3 All staff involved in the RWG, and from across the Council and other organisations, very much valued the advice and support offered by Members throughout November and December, and appreciated the many offers of help that were made by them during this time.

12. Manage the financial and commercial implications of the emergency

12.1 Initially it will never be possible to predict with any accuracy the likely financial implications of such an incident, and it was helpful that the Council’s Head of Resources joined the RWG to provide advice and guidance on this matter.

12.2 The ODPM will make emergency financial assistance available to local authorities under section 155(4) of the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act – assistance usually referred to as the Bellwin Scheme. The Scheme is designed to be activated in any case where an emergency or disaster occurs, which involves destruction of, or danger to, life or property, resulting in one or more local authorities incurring expenditure to safeguard life or property, or to prevent suffering or severe inconvenience. It has been traditionally seen as a response to incidents of bad weather which cause “threats to life and property beyond all previous local experience”. Before being eligible for grant under the Scheme, an individual authority is required to have spent 0.2% of its annual budget – in any one year, not simply any one incident - on works arising as a result of the incident or incidents. The threshold for West Berkshire was £300,000.

12.3 The following examples might qualify for grant: • Costs of setting up temporary premises • The hire of additional vehicles or plant and machinery • Removal of trees and timber posing a danger to the public • Initial repairs to the highway or pavements • Initial land drainage works • Additional temporary employees or contractors, or special overtime for employees • The costs of temporary mortuaries • Emergency supplies of food and other emergency provisions

12.4 Expenditure codes for RWG, Council and contractor activity were set up in the first week, and spend coded as appropriate. In the event, the amount judged to have been spent - £67,000 - as a consequence of the Ufton Nervet incident fell below the Bellwin threshold and has been written off as Council expenditure. An insurance claim will be made if the insurers of the stationary vehicle are held liable for the costs of the crash and our interest has been registered with the Motor Insurance Bureau.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 12.5 The other area of financial activity related to the need to receive public donations at Market Street, and arrangements were made for these to be managed by the Cashier’s office as noted earlier. The British Red Cross offered to manage a contribution fund should this be required, although this proved not to be necessary. Although we had some enquiries at the cash counter no actual public donations were made to us, and potential donors were redirected to the Naomi House appeal. Collections from staff were similarly forwarded to Naomi House.

13. Debriefing Sessions

13.1 It is important to be aware that those people involved initially, and in the recovery phase following such an incident, bear a significant additional burden of work. The emotional impact of dealing with the aftermath is also very high, and must not be underestimated. Some of those involved may require counselling input – and this was offered where appropriate – and all will benefit from structured debriefing sessions in order to draw out what went well, or less so, and identify lessons for the future.

13.2 During December and January three separate debriefing sessions were held for Council staff and those who had worked with them – those people who had responded on the night, those who staffed the Helpline and with the Recovery Working Group. Thames Valley Police, the NHS and the Emergency services managed similar debriefing sessions for their own staff.

13.3 The main positives identified from the debriefs were felt to be: • Good support for all the involved agencies from Gold; • The Emergency Operations Centre was set up and well-organised quickly; • Excellent support was received at the scene from the Highways contractor, and traffic managed effectively overall; • The Recovery Working Group was set up quickly and effectively, was well-led, decisive, and worked as a team to a clear Action Plan; • The RWG focused on the people-aspects of the emergency, which is unusual but was really helpful; • Excellent inter-agency communication and joint working was demonstrated and lasting good relationships established for the future; • All staff involved responded with professionalism, goodwill, speed and efficiency, and made good use of the training they had received previously; • There was an overwhelming response from staff to work on the Helpline, which got up and running quickly from scratch, and was scaled down appropriately when the need diminished.

13.4 The less effective aspects identified from the debriefs were: • A lack of visibility of the Council at the scene on the night – staff were there, but needed to be better identified; • A senior officer of the Council needs to attend Gold from the outset, both to ensure a robust link with Corporate Board and Members and to feed information back to the Chief Executive and/or the Emergency Operations Centre as appropriate; • Gold needs to liaise with the relevant Council, not just one Thames Valley authority representing all the others; • Staff need to be identified and trained for Survivor Reception Support duties in advance; • The Council’s Emergency Planning procedures need to be amended, both to formalise the lessons learned from the RWG about managing the recovery phase following the incident and to ensure that staff are properly prepared and trained for their role on a public Helpline. • The Recovery Working Group needs to be set up sooner – although this may prove difficult when an accident happens at the weekend such as this one.

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005 • Senior staff and Members of the Council need a better understanding of the Gold and Silver Command structure.

13.5 Emergency Planning staff have already taken these findings – and those from other agencies – into account in their revisions to the Council’s emergency planning policies. A number of other procedural recommendations were made, that will be incorporated in the Council’s Emergency Planning procedures by the relevant staff.

14. Longer term recovery

14.1 Mention has been made above of the need to acknowledge that there may be longer term consequences of an incident such as this, both for individuals living close to the scene, and the wider community.

14.2 A recommendation has been made earlier in this report regarding seeking feedback from parish councils as to any longer term support needs that they may be aware of in their communities. It is also possible that there may be further support required at either Speenhamland or Ufton Nervet schools.

14.3 It is a recommendation of the Recovery Working Group that the Corporate Director (Children and Young People) be asked to liaise with the two Head Teachers to determine whether there are any emerging needs to respond to at either of the two schools.

14.4 It is also possible that staff within the Council may have further support needs.

14.5 The Recovery Working Group recommends that this report is made available to staff of the Council, and other agencies involved, and that managers be asked to be alert to the needs of any of their staff who may require additional help.

15. Conclusions

15.1 West Berkshire Council led an outstanding professional response following the train crash at Ufton Nervet in November 2004. The Council can take pride in the way in which Members and staff worked together with representatives from a wide range of agencies locally to deal with the aftermath of the accident. It is a tribute to the commitment and dedication of all of those involved that the response has been so widely judged to be effective. The work done then has laid the foundation for the further development of strong inter-agency relationships locally, and the lessons learned from the response will ensure that the Council will be well-placed to respond to any other emergency incident in our area in the future.

Appendices

None

Consultation Responses

Local Stakeholders: Recovery Working Group comments incorporated throughout. Officers Consulted: Corporate Board Trade Union: N/A

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005

West Berkshire Council Executive 15 September 2005