Safety Case for the Introduction of New Technology Into an Existing Railway System

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Safety Case for the Introduction of New Technology Into an Existing Railway System Safety Case for the Introduction of New Technology into an Existing Railway System Peri Smith M.Sc., B.Eng.,DIC 20th September 2016 Imperial College London Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Centre for Transport Studies Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and the Diploma of Imperial College London Declaration I hereby declare that the work here within is that of the author and work of others has been appropriately referenced. Some of the material represented in this thesis has been published in conference and journal material as referenced in this thesis. PhD Student: Miss Peri Smith Date: September 2016 Academic Supervisor: Professor Washington Ochieng Date: September 2016 Academic Supervisor: Dr Arnab Majumdar Date: September 2016 ‘The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives licence. Researchers are free to copy, distribute or transmit the thesis on the condition that they attribute it, that they do not use it for commercial purposes and that they do not alter, transform or build upon it. For any reuse or redistribution, researchers must make clear to others the licence terms of this work’. 3 Dedication I dedicate this research to my great-grandmother Metella Smith. 4 Abstract This thesis addresses safety in the railway industry with a focus on safety culture, defined by the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive as ‘the behavioural aspects (i.e. what people do) and the situational aspects of the company (i.e. what the organisation has)’. Current safety management systems do not appropriately incorporate safety culture. This has the potential to cause serious harm to human life. As the definition implies, safety culture is not easily measured or quantified. It involves factors that influence human behavior in safety critical and technology dense environments such as the railway environment. Furthermore, as railways become more advanced in their operational capabilities and integrated across European countries, safety culture will become increasingly important. Therefore, safety culture should be a key component of an organisation’s safety management system. However, research to date has shown its integration to be piecemeal. To address this problem, this thesis specifies an enhanced safety case that uses safety culture as an integral part of the process. This provides an improved approach towards safety management. The key findings from this research show that railways are inherently safe. This is primarily due to the regulations across technical and operational disciplines. Regulations and procedures typically relate to the three possible operational states that can occur: normal, degraded and emergency. An example of a degraded operational state includes a signal failure where a train driver may be given the permission to proceed at caution. The variability between the states can affect a humans understanding of the various technical interfaces and their emergent properties. This in turn can affect the type of behaviour exhibited by a driver, signaller, controller or maintainer. System architecture is therefore an essential tool to identify functional and physical relationships and can be used as a training tool. Training was found to be an effective measure to practically test and evaluate safety culture behaviours. Specifically, the use of a simulated environment has shown to be efficient for learning and training exercises and can be used to improve an organisations safety management system. The safety case derived in this thesis is therefore, driven by the safety management system and is optimised by an understanding of the particular environment and the user interfaces. The process of integrating safety culture is shown through the improved and derived safety assessment process developed in the thesis. 5 Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor Ochieng for the opportunity to carry out research at The Lloyds Register Foundation Transport Risk Management Centre at Imperial College. Conducting research in the field of railway engineering safety has been an enjoyable and motivating experience. I would like to give additional thanks to Professor Washington Ochieng who sponsored my research via the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department. This opportunity has not only enabled me to carry out research in a field which I thoroughly enjoy but it has also enabled me to travel and meet a variety of people both via academic and professional industry networks in the UK and abroad. I have been fortunate enough to have peer colleagues good in nature, willing to share knowledge and work as a team. I would like to particularly thank Samira Barzin, Felipe A.C Nascimento and Nicolo Daina. Through my travels and conducting this research as a part time student I have had support from a number of organisations. This includes The Lloyds Register Foundation, Abellio Greater Anglia, VTI in Sweden, Transport for London and Network Rail. I would particularly like to thank staff from Abellio Greater Anglia, from the managers to the participant train drivers whose subject matter expertise and experience has been used to support data analysis. A special thanks is paid to Eduardo da Silva from Network Rail, Ian Innes and Rob Jones, safety gurus from Transport for London with whom I have had many interesting discussions with on all aspects of safety. I have also had the opportunity to work with numerous subject matter experts with a range of experience and knowledge that significantly aided my research and progress. I would particularly like to thank Björn Peters and Mats Lidström from VTI in Sweden for their invite to view and test the train simulators in Sweden and for the interesting topics and forward thinking. Thanks to Peter Statsny who helped me with my first conference paper in my early days as a PhD student and to Dr Darwish for his sound advice as I embarked on my life as PhD student. However, all being said, my foremost thanks is to our Holy Father Jehovah for guiding and sustaining me in everything that I do, in all situations and in everyday of my life. In closing, I thank the most important person in my life, my mother Eugenie Smith who I love very much. I thank her for her kindness, support and encouragement to be the best I can be. I also thank my mother for her positivity towards whichever avenue I have been routed in life. 6 Table of Contents DECLARATION 3 DEDICATION 4 ABSTRACT 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS 7 LIST OF FIGURES 12 LIST OF TABLES 14 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 16 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 21 Research Background 21 Aims and Objectives 22 Thesis Structure 24 CHAPTER 2 THE RAILWAY SYSTEM: CURRENT & MODERNISED 28 Configuration of Railways 28 Societal Impacts on Railways 30 Railway System Functionality 32 Interlocking Subsystem 33 Train Detection Methods 34 Signals and Point Operating Equipment 36 Train Systems 37 Implementation of Railway System Functionality 37 Railway Architecture 40 Architecture Description – Conventional Signalled Railway 45 Architecture Description – European Railway Traffic Management System 49 Global System for Mobile Communications – Railways 54 The Role of Humans in a Railway System 60 7 Navigation Technologies 61 Summary 62 CHAPTER 3 FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT 64 Introduction 64 Safety Management in the Railway Industry 68 3.1.1.1 Review of Failures in Railway Safety 69 Safety Management in Other Safety Critical Industries 75 Construction Industry 75 Safety Management in the Chemical Industry 80 Safety Management in Aviation 80 Summary – Railway and Other Industry Comparison 82 Safety Culture 84 Safety Culture Origins, Theories and Applications in the Railway Industry 84 Safety Culture in Other Safety Critical Industries 87 Marine Industry Safety Culture 87 Safety Culture in the Aviation Industry 88 Safety Culture in the Medical Industry 89 Safety Culture in Formula One Racing 90 Summary 91 CHAPTER 4 SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS 94 Review of Railway Safety and Risk Assessment 94 Cyber Security Risk Assessment – Impact on Railways 105 Implementation of Safety Assessment Methods and New Features 110 Application of Failure Scenarios 113 Failure Scenarios 114 Observational Failure Scenario 1: Data Entry 114 4.4.2.1 Application of Observational Failure Scenario 1 to the Safety Assessment Process 121 Observational Failure Scenario 2: GSM-R Communication Failure 122 4.4.3.1 Application of Observational Failure Scenario 2 to the Safety Assessment Process 124 Observational Failure Scenario 8: Railway Adhesion 124 4.4.4.1 Application of Observational Failure Scenario 8 to the Safety Assessment Process 125 CHAPTER 5 SAFETY ASSESSMENT: IMPACT OF SAFETY CULTURE 130 Risk: Failure Mode Scenarios 131 Risks and Mitigation Strategies 132 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 133 Summary 140 Understanding the Driving Environment 140 8 European Comparison Study: hu(Man)-Technology - Organisation 142 Conclusion 150 Structured Questionnaires and Observation Design 150 The Driving Environment 150 5.3.1.1 Processes within the Driving Environment 151 5.3.1.2 Signalling Interface to the Driver 152 5.3.1.3 Train Driver Cognition 154 Train Driver Task Analysis 155 Questionnaire Design and Implementation Methods 163 Train Driver Observations 169 Development of Observational Scenarios 174 Safety Critical Observational Scenarios 178 Application of Observational Scenarios to European Railways 179 5.3.7.1 Observational Failure Scenario 1 - Data Entry 183 5.3.7.2 Observational
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