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Annual Safety Performance Report 2010/11 If you would like to give feedback on any of the material contained in this report, or if you have any suggestions for future editions, please contact: Liz Davies Safety Intelligence Strategy Manager RSSB Block 2, Angel Square 1 Torrens Street London EC1V 1NY 020 3142 5475 [email protected] The report may be downloaded from the RSSB website: www.rssb.co.uk. Additional hard copies may be ordered at cost price by contacting the RSSB enquiry desk on 020 3142 5400. Rail Safety and Standards Board 2011 Contents __________________________________________________________________________ Contents Executive summary v 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Purpose of the report 1 1.2 Scope of the report 1 1.3 How the report analyses safety 1 1.3.1 Person type 1 1.3.2 Fatalities, injuries and FWI 2 1.3.3 Methodology 3 1.4 Data quality 3 1.5 RSSB reporting to be used for ORR’s National Rail Trends 4 1.6 Report structure 4 2 Safety overview 5 2.1 System risk profile 6 2.1.1 Fatalities 6 2.1.2 Fatalities and weighted injuries 7 2.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2010/11 8 2.3 Notable safety-related occurrences of 2010/11 9 2.4 Long-term historical trends 13 2.4.1 Rail usage 13 2.4.2 Fatalities 14 2.4.3 Train accidents 15 2.5 Looking to the future 16 2.5.1 Future influences on safety 16 2.5.2 Research and Development Programme 19 2.5.3 Sustainable Rail Programme 19 2.6 Safety overview key safety facts 20 3 Progress against industry trajectories and targets 21 3.1 Trajectories of the 2009 – 2014 SSP 22 3.1.1 How progress towards the trajectories is measured 23 3.2 DfT High Level Output Specification 32 3.3 Common Safety Targets 34 3.3.1 NRVs, CSTs and CSIs 35 3.3.2 Assessing performance against the NRVs 36 3.3.3 Current performance against the NRVs 37 4 Benchmarking railway performance 41 4.1 Transport risk in general 42 4.1.1 Transport accidents with multiple fatalities 43 4.2 Comparing the railway with other modes of transport 44 4.2.1 Making meaningful comparisons between modes 44 4.2.2 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality risk 45 Annual Safety Performance Report 2010/11 i Contents __________________________________________________________________________ 4.2.3 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: total risk 46 4.2.4 Safety trends in car and train travel 47 4.2.5 Comparing the mainline railway and London Underground 48 4.2.6 Freight transport: comparison of fatality rates by road and rail 49 4.3 International comparisons 50 4.3.1 Comparing rail safety within the EU 50 4.3.2 Railway safety worldwide 51 4.4 Occupational risk: comparisons with other industries 52 4.4.1 Safety at work: train drivers and station staff 52 4.4.2 Safety at work: infrastructure workers 53 4.5 Assessing risk at a local level 54 5 Risk to passengers 55 5.1 Passenger risk profile by accident type 56 5.2 Passenger fatalities and injuries in 2010/11 57 5.3 Trends in passenger harm by injury degree 59 5.3.1 Passenger fatalities 60 5.3.2 Passenger major injuries 61 5.3.3 Passenger minor injuries 62 5.4 Trends in passenger harm by accident type 63 5.4.1 Slips, trips and falls in stations 64 5.4.2 Accidents at the platform-train interface 65 5.4.3 Passenger harm from accidents on board trains 67 5.5 Passenger personal security 68 5.5.1 Passenger and public assaults by location 69 5.5.2 Perceived security 70 5.5.3 Perceptions of security on the railway – more detail 71 5.6 Further analysis of passenger safety 72 5.6.1 Passenger safety by day of week 72 5.6.2 Passenger safety by time of day 73 5.6.3 Passenger safety by month of year 74 5.6.4 The effects of weather on passenger safety 75 5.6.5 Passenger safety and age 77 5.6.6 Passenger safety and gender 78 5.7 Passenger key safety facts 79 6 Risk to the workforce 81 6.1 RSSB’s independent review of RIDDOR reporting by Network Rail and its contractors 82 6.2 Workforce risk profile – accident types 83 6.3 Workforce fatalities and injuries in 2010/11 84 6.4 Trend in workforce harm by injury degree 85 6.4.1 Workforce fatalities 86 6.4.2 Workforce major injuries 88 6.4.3 Workforce minor injuries 89 ii Annual Safety Performance Report 2010/11 Contents __________________________________________________________________________ 6.5 Trends in workforce harm by type of worker 90 6.5.1 Rail infrastructure workers 91 6.5.2 Train drivers 101 6.5.3 Other on-board train crew 104 6.5.4 Station staff 107 6.5.5 Revenue protection staff 109 6.5.6 Other workforce groups 110 6.6 Workforce personal security 111 6.6.1 Trend in harm from workforce assaults 112 6.7 Workforce key safety facts 118 7 Risk to members of the public 119 7.1 Public risk profile by accident type 120 7.2 Public injuries in 2010/11 121 7.3 Trends in harm to members of the public 122 7.4 Trends in public harm by accident type 123 7.4.1 Trespass 123 7.4.2 Harm to members of the public not involving trespass or level crossings 130 7.5 Vandalism 131 7.5.1 Cable theft 132 7.5.2 Cable theft by BTP area 133 7.6 Suicide 134 7.6.1 Railway suicides in the wider context 135 7.7 Delays and costs arising from public behaviour 136 7.8 Public key safety facts 137 8 Risk from train accidents 139 8.1 Types of train accident and train accident risk 140 8.2 Train accident risk 142 8.3 Fatalities and injuries in train accidents 143 8.4 Long-term trends in fatal train accidents 144 8.4.1 Potentially higher-risk train accidents in 2010/11 146 8.5 Trends in potentially higher-risk train accidents 148 8.5.1 Derailments 149 8.5.2 Collisions between trains 151 8.5.3 Collisions between trains and road vehicles 152 8.5.4 Buffer stop collisions 153 8.5.5 Accidents involving dangerous goods trains 153 8.6 Other train accidents 154 8.7 Trends in train accident precursors 155 8.7.1 The Precursor Indicator Model 155 8.7.2 Trends in the PIM indicator 157 8.7.3 Infrastructure failures 160 8.7.4 Irregular working 161 Annual Safety Performance Report 2010/11 iii Contents __________________________________________________________________________ 8.7.5 SPADs 163 8.7.6 Objects on the line 165 8.7.7 Public behaviour at level crossings 165 8.7.8 Trains and rolling stock 165 8.8 Train accident key safety facts 166 9 Risk at the road-rail interface 169 9.1 Risk at the road-rail interface 170 9.2 Risk at level crossings 171 9.2.1 Level crossing risk by cause and user type 171 9.2.2 Types of crossing 172 9.2.3 Fatalities and injuries in 2010/11 173 9.2.4 Collisions between trains and road vehicles in 2010/11 174 9.2.5 Trends in harm at level crossings 175 9.2.6 Trends in fatalities at level crossings 176 9.2.7 Collisions between trains and road vehicles 177 9.2.8 Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians 179 9.2.9 Trains striking level crossing gates or barriers 182 9.2.10 Factors affecting the risk at level crossings 183 9.3 Vehicle incursions 185 9.4 Bridge strikes 187 9.5 Road-rail interface key safety facts 188 10 Data quality 189 10.1 SMIS 189 10.1.1 Data quality issues 190 10.1.2 Data quality improvement measures 191 10.2 Other sources of data 193 10.3 Different definitions of similar terms 195 Appendix 1. Key safety facts 197 Appendix 2. Fatalities in 2010/11 204 Appendix 3. Interim methodology for assessment of trajectories and targets 205 Appendix 4. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways 207 Appendix 5. Level crossing types 208 Appendix 6. Accident groups used within ASPR 212 Appendix 7. Definitions 213 Appendix 8. Glossary 219 iv Annual Safety Performance Report 2010/11 Executive summary __________________________________________________________________________ Executive summary Introduction This report reviews the rail industry’s safety performance over the financial year 2010/11. RSSB reports on a financial year basis for consistency with Control Period 4 (CP4), its associated High Level Output Specification (HLOS), and the Railway Strategic Safety Plan (SSP), all of which cover the period April 2009 to March 2014. As stated in the European Safety Directive, the overarching safety requirement for European railways is to maintain safety and improve it where reasonably practicable. The trajectories of the SSP are in keeping with this aim and meeting them will additionally ensure that the passenger and workforce safety targets laid out by the DfT in the HLOS are met. With two years of CP4 passed, safety performance satisfies most of the SSP trajectories and both the HLOS targets. In addition, performance satisfies each of the national targets set for the UK by the European Railway Agency, and Britain’s railways compare very favourably against the rest of Europe. Rail continues to be one of the safest forms of transport.
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