CASE STUDY

Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

TOWARDS A MORE EQUAL CITY Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Ashok Das and Robin King

CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary...... 1 1. Introduction...... 4 Highlights 2. The Evolution of Surabaya’s Shelter Policy...... 9 ►► Surabaya’s Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) innovated and 3. Transformative Change through Surabaya’s sustained in situ upgrading policies in poor, traditional urban Innovative Shelter Initiatives...... 14 neighborhoods called kampung. 4. Sustaining Progressive Shelter Planning: Emerging Challenges and Inhibitors...... 17 ►► KIP became a model for in situ slum upgrading efforts both 5. Conclusion...... 22 nationwide and internationally. These community-managed efforts Appendix A: List of Interviewees...... 24 brought basic infrastructure and services to the kampung and Endnotes...... 25 provided affordable housing and livelihood opportunities for the References...... 28 poor. Acknowledgments...... 31 About the Authors...... 32 ►► KIP and later settlement upgrading programs were made possible by Surabaya’s pro-poor leadership, which supported the long-term pursuit of urban upgrading; the city government’s support for and collaboration with local universities; and the fact that successful participatory upgrading earned citizens’ trust.

►► Since the decentralization of administration, planning, and World Resources Report Case Studies contain governance in 1999, kampung-focused, community-led, preliminary research, analysis, findings, and incremental shelter programs have been threatened by resource recommendations. They are circulated to stimulate constraints, shifting housing policy priorities, increasing land timely discussion and critical feedback and to influence ongoing debate on emerging issues. values, and overly technocratic planning. To make its pro-poor efforts truly inclusive and equitable, Surabaya must overcome these challenges and end the exclusionary treatment of poor Suggested citation: Das, A., and R. King. 2019. migrants. "Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements." World Resources Report Case Study. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available online at www.citiesforall.org.

Cover photo: Ashok Das Indonesian cities have experienced rapid urbanization and on the KIP community-based approach. Due to its success, economic growth, which make it challenging to keep up Surabaya has received several national and international awards, with infrastructure and housing needs. The city of Surabaya and the KIP model has been implemented across Indonesia and has responded to these challenges by pursuing interventions has informed slum upgrading efforts worldwide. that promote affordable shelter. Its pioneering innovation, KIP, led to the adoption of in situ participatory slum upgrading as KIP benefited from political and intellectual leadership and A decision during the 1960s by the mayors a key affordable housing intervention throughout the global financial support. of Surabaya, Jakarta, and Makassar to improve their cities’ South. This paper examines the transformative impacts of infrastructure and services opened up the possibility of reform Surabaya’s shelter policies and focuses on upgrading kampung, and led the mayor of Surabaya to put Silas in charge of that city’s which are traditional neighborhoods with mostly low-income spatial planning. The adoption of Silas’s then unconventional residents. proposal to upgrade poor settlements (rather than redevelop Indonesia’s shelter policies represent three broad phases. them) marked the inception of KIP and eventually led During the first phase, from independence through the Old to successful citywide upgrading that demonstrated the Order period (1945–66), cities in Indonesia, including Surabaya, importance of community involvement. Funding from struggled to respond to rapid urbanization and the proliferation international donors (especially the World Bank) helped sustain of informal settlements. The second phase, President Suharto’s KIP improvements for three decades, allowing KIP to be scaled New Order (1967–98), saw the emergence of KIPs and is up and mainstreamed; the program has also been incorporated characterized broadly by centralized (national-level) governance into Indonesia’s five-year development plans. of both housing policies and oversight of settlement upgrading programs. The third and current phase, the Reform period, Consistent collaboration between the city and the ITS, as began in 1999 when Indonesia’s housing policies and upgrading well as intellectual guidance and policy support from the programs were decentralized. In Surabaya, we regard this university, enabled Surabaya to take a pro-poor approach phase as having two parts: first, the Comprehensive Kampung to informal settlement upgrading, which strengthened . Pro-poor Improvement Project (CKIP) phase (1999–2008), when the city’s the communitarian ethos of the city’s kampung development initiatives and governance reforms initiated by first grassroots squatter movements emerged; and second, the the current mayor have also contributed to and benefit from the current rusunawa (low-cost rental apartment blocks) phase, symbiotic relationship between the city and the university. which began during the mid-2000s. The persistence of informal settlements and obvious lack of sufficient formal housing This unique city-university relationship does not come options has necessitated the introduction of new housing without its challenges, however. The mayor’s strong policies by the government, which is now trying to produce more preference for building rusunawa—public rental housing formal housing. flats—for instance, rather than upgrading kampung as the ITS traditionally proposed, could diminish the city’s legacy of Johan Silas, a professor of architecture at Surabaya’s championing inclusive shelter policies. The city’s commitment Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (Institut to pro-poor shelter faces other threats as well, including rising Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember; ITS), led the team that land values and aggressive real estate development, inadequate created Surabaya’s KIP. During Suharto’s New Order, Silas public transit infrastructure, constraints on resources and and his team pioneered programs for in situ upgrading of poor capacity that stem from decentralization, an exclusionary bias urban settlements that featured low-cost basic infrastructure towards migrants, and a reluctance to engage with civil society and services, efficient implementation, and community groups. Likewise, a nationally mandated, inclusionary housing participation. These programs benefited from participatory policy has not yet been implemented because of conflicting planning and community-managed microfinance—carried policy priorities. Although much progress has been achieved, forward by innovative postdecentralization efforts such as insufficient and inadequate housing will remain a problem until CKIP—to gradually broaden the focus from making physical these challenges are overcome. improvements to pursuing social and economic development. Many of the ongoing kampung-centered initiatives are premised

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Despite its earlier innovative approaches to upgrading informal settlements, Surabaya could now learn from other Box 1 | Abbreviations cities that have produced more inclusive and sustainable responses to similar or even more complex challenges. It CBO community-based organization will take unconventional thinking to provide long-term formal CKIP Comprehensive Kampung Improvement Project housing options to all residents of Surabaya. This will include forging purposeful coalitions with new partners, such as CSO civil society organization practitioners and researchers across and beyond Indonesia; local ITS Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (Sepuluh and nonlocal civil society and nongovernmental organizations; Nopember Institute of Technology) and neighboring jurisdictions. Local public officials will need KIP Kampung Improvement Program to boldly yet patiently support innovation and recognize that external support can help catalyze local change. Similarly, KIPEM kartu identitas penduduk musiman (temporary academics and students—actors who can be influential in public resident identification card) policy decision-making spheres in Indonesia—should challenge KTP kartu tanda penduduk (resident card) the status quo, advance critical ideas, and engage directly with LHB Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang (Balanced poor communities and civil society groups, which in turn should Residential Environment) actively advocate for the most marginalized and work closely with local government and universities. LPP Labortarium Perumahan dan Permukiman (Laboratory of Housing and Human Settlements) About This Paper OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development This case study is part of the larger World Resources Report (WRR) Towards a More Equal City, which considers PWSS Paguyuban Warga Strenkali Surabaya (Surabaya sustainability to be composed of three interrelated issues: Strenkali People’s Movement) equity, the economy, and the environment. The WRR Rp Indonesian rupiah uses equitable access to urban services as an entry point for RT rukun tetangga (neighborhood unit) examining whether meeting the needs of the under-served can improve economic productivity and environmental RW rukun warga (community unit) sustainability for the city. The case studies examine WRR World Resources Report transformative urban change defined as that which affects multiple sectors and institutional practices, continues across more than one political administration, and is sustained for more than 10 years, resulting in more equitable access to core services and a more equal city. The goal of the WRR is to inform urban change agents—government officials, policymakers, civil society, and the private sector—about how transformative change happens (and does not happen), the various forms it takes, and how they can support transformation towards more equal cities.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 3 Figure 1 | Surabaya at a glance

Population living in informal dwellings (%, 2016)j 15 Access to electricity (% households)k 100 Access to piped water on premises 92.6 (% households, 2014)l

m Surabaya Access to flush toilet (% households, 2010) 87

Trips by mode (%, 2010):n Two-wheelers 71 Private cars 25 Type of jurisdiction City Public and semiformal transport (bus, minibus) 4 Population in: Average trip length (km, 2014)o 13.5 1950a 714,898 2000b 2,599,796 Average prices of urban services: 3 p 2016c 2,853,661 Septage discharge (private, per m ) $5.97 Public transport ride (bus; minibus, per ride)q $0.23–$0.45; 2 d Total land area (in km , 2015) 327 Water (per m3)r $0.30 GDP per capita, Surabaya (2014)e $10,857 Electricity (per kWh)s $0.13 $0.10 Human Development Index, Surabaya (2017)f 0.68 Average price of gasoline (per liter, 2017)t $0.56 Human Development Index, Indonesia (2014)g 0.69 Primary decision-making level for cities: h Gini coefficient, Surabaya (2014) 0.39 City government of Surabaya (Pemerintah Kota Surabaya)

i Population living below the poverty line (%, 2014) 5.8 Type of city leader, term years, and term limits: Mayor, 5 years, 2 terms

Notes: All prices are reported in US$ using market exchange rates for the source’s corresponding year. Surabaya does not have citywide sewerage coverage; most households use septic tanks that are emptied by private service providers. Sources: a. Silas, 1983; b–i. Statistics Indonesia, 2018; j. Based on authors’ personal communication with civil society activists, Surabaya, 2016; k. World Bank, 2017. l. Surabaya City Government, 2015; m. AECOM International Development et al., 2010; n. Bertaud and Bertaud, 2012; o. Rismaharini, 2014; p. Based on authors’ analysis of costs from various private septage removal service providers, Surabaya, 2015; q. Biaya dan Tarif, 2017; r. PDAM Surya Sembada Kota Surabaya, 2012; s. Mr Fixit, 2016; t. Surya.co.id, 2017.

1. INTRODUCTION unmatched success with in situ participatory upgrading, which cities across the developing world have attempted to implement. This case study examines how the sustained implementation In a recent report on adequate, secure, and affordable housing of innovative shelter policies in Surabaya, Indonesia, enabled in the global South, the first of three recommended options is wider transformative planning and governance.1 We believe this in situ participatory upgrading of informal settlements.5 That transformative change materialized as a result of progressive Indonesia lacked a focused, national-level slum upgrading pro-poor leadership, consistent low-cost upgrading of kampung2 plan or program until 2016 makes Surabaya’s experience with (traditional neighborhoods with mostly low-income residents), urban upgrading particularly instructive for appreciating the extensive collaboration between the city and local universities, transformative potential of local planning action.6 citizens’ trust in local government, and efforts to preserve kampung as sites of both livelihood opportunities and affordable housing. Surabaya is the provincial capital of East Java and Indonesia’s second-largest city (see Figure 1). The city covers an area of Surabaya’s flagship urban upgrading3 innovation, the Kampung 327 square kilometers (km2), and since 2000 its population Improvement Program (KIP), became the model for slum has stabilized at just under 3 million.7 Its larger metropolitan upgrading internationally.4 Box 2 describes a typical kampung region, Gerbangkertosusila,8 boasts a population of about 9 environment that KIP targeted. Surabaya’s dedication to million.9 After independence in 1945, Surabaya developed a improving housing for the urban poor allowed it to achieve significant industrial base, which accelerated in-migration and

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urbanization, but since the 1980s the dominant employment sector has been services (including trade, hotels, restaurants), Box 2 | Kampung in Indonesia which contributes 44.5 percent of the city’s gross domestic product (GDP); the manufacturing sector, in comparison, In Indonesia’s urban context, kampung are traditional contributes 22 percent.10 Today scores of universities and neighborhoods that predate rapid urbanization; planned polytechnics in the city draw students from near and far. Figure 1 urban development happened around and spread beyond provides other relevant development indicators for Surabaya. them. Although most kampung were legal, prior to KIP most lacked basic infrastructure and services, and pockets of This case study is part of the larger World Resources Report poverty and slum-like conditions remain in some today. Predominantly residential in use, they are characterized by (WRR) Towards a More Equal City, which focuses on equitable high population density; irregular lots that have minimal access to core services throughout the global South. The WRR or no setbacks (that is, the distance between building and is a series of working papers on housing, energy, the informal street); narrow streets and narrower alleys; and a mix of economy, urban expansion, water, sanitation, and transportation lot sizes, tenure arrangements, building types, land uses, that analyze sectors and themes across struggling and emerging and livelihood options. Kampung feature a distinctive urban cities in the global South.11 The WRR also features a series of city- form; buildings tend to have pitched roofs and traditional architecture (although this is changing). From the dwelling to level case studies on urban transformation, of which this case the settlement level, spaces for living, working, and trading study is a part. are frequently integrated, and private and public space boundaries are flexible, so streets are vibrant, host myriad The WRR uses the term transformative to define urban change that community activities, and facilitate strong community effectively addresses a seminal problem that negatively affects interaction and social cohesion. many people’s lives.12 Experience suggests that when a city resolves Sources: Das, 2017; World Bank, 1995; Rolalisasi, 2018. a seminal problem, it has the potential to generate a broader, more virtuous cycle of transformation. Transformative change involves multiple sectors and institutional practices, continues across more existing informal settlements and limit their future growth.15 than one political administration, and is sustained for more than This case study explains how integrating kampung upgrading 10 years. Each of the WRR city-level case studies examines how into Surabaya’s larger planning vision triggered equitable shelter approaches to addressing seminal problems have (or have not) outcomes and led to broader changes in its planning milieu. resulted in broader citywide transformation and explores how After a brief note on methodology, this paper provides an transformative urban change occurs, under what conditions it overview of urbanization, development, planning, and regresses or stalls, and whether it gets back on track. It is important governance trends in postcolonial Indonesia. Next, it looks at to note that every case has progressive and regressive elements, how, framed by the larger Indonesian context, shelter policy and every city experiences difficulties, conflicts, setbacks, and false in Surabaya evolved through distinct phases and established starts. This case study explores these questions with respect to urban upgrading as an effective pro-poor intervention with affordable housing in Surabaya. far-reaching transformative impacts. It explains how specific Surabaya’s experience suggests that rapid urbanization tends to transformations were influenced by enabling and inhibiting also increase urban informality,13 of which squatter settlements factors and discusses current shortcomings and emergent and street vendors are commonly recognized manifestations challenges. Ongoing development trends, significant in cities of the global South. But much less understood is infrastructure shortcomings that disproportionately burden the how other contemporary spatial transformations that often poor, and the exclusionary treatment of poor migrants preclude violate development regulations and planning norms—peri- true equity and inclusivity.16 Failing to address these issues will urbanization, illicit conversion of agricultural lands, mega- weaken Surabaya’s progressive reputation and squander the developments, and new towns and gated communities, transformative gains of the past. for instance—also make informality a dominant mode of This paper also discusses planning approaches, arrangements, urbanization.14 Informality adversely affects low-income urban and actions needed to sustain and expand Surabaya’s pro- residents’ access to services (e.g., many informal settlements poor outcomes. To achieve transformative change through lack piped utility water and sewage services) but also offers them collaborative planning, local public officials should be bold livelihood and shelter options, so it is important to both embrace

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 5 yet patient in supporting innovation; urban practitioners as Surabaya now has 31 districts and 154 subdistricts, each of well as academics and students should challenge the status which consists of multiple community units called rukun warga quo, advance critical ideas, and engage directly with poor (RW), which are divided into neighborhood units called rukun communities and civil society groups; local civil society should tetangga (RT) that are composed of several households. Before actively advocate for the marginalized and partner with local decentralization in 1999—precipitated by the Asian financial government and universities; and all stakeholders should realize crisis of 1997—subnational (provincial and city) unit heads that external support can help to catalyze local change. were appointed to their positions; today, however, mayors, city councillors, governors, and provincial legislators are all elected Data and Methods Used by citizens. RT and RW heads (mostly volunteers) are almost always chosen by neighborhood residents (see Figure 2). This study analyzes diverse data sources and uses multiple research methods. We reviewed secondary literature, including published Decentralization boosted local autonomy by granting local scholarly articles and books; analyzed research and policy reports governments significant decision-making power. Consequently, published by national, regional, local, multilateral, and private Surabaya has seen the emergence of a unique landscape of urban agencies; consulted descriptive statistics from quantitative data change agents (see Figure 8); although civil society is still the produced by different state agencies; reviewed news media reports, weakest sector, it has grown the most in terms of agency since gathered field observations from transect walks, conversations, and decentralization started. Cities like Surabaya have leveraged their photographs; and conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews postdecentralization autonomy to more effectively reorganize with key informants. During July–August 2017, 20 interviews were governance and planning. Facilitated by nationally implemented conducted by the first author, building on his 12 years of continued decentralization reforms, Surabaya’s current local government research engagement with Surabaya. Respondents included various structure has been rearranged through multiple regulatory stakeholders, including the mayor, planning officials, planners and moves at the provincial and city levels (see Figure 3).23 The architects, academic researchers, representatives of civil society contemporaneous emergence of Surabaya’s first grassroots CSOs organizations (CSOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), representing squatters and advocating for their shelter rights and informed citizens. exemplifies the expansion of autonomous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs across a range of sectors. A Brief History of Indonesian Development, Governance, and Planning Officially, urban planning in Indonesia is divided into socioeconomic development planning and spatial planning, the Indonesia is currently registering the fastest rate of urbanization bifurcation of which was established by the first national spatial (4.1 percent) in Asia and the second-largest absolute expansion planning law of 1992. Since decentralization, multiple laws have of urban land area; by 2025, 70 percent of Indonesians will be revised, refined, and expanded the role of spatial planning.24 city dwellers.17 Even with this growth, Indonesia’s GDP growth Today every level of government, including city and regency— rate (4 percent) remains the weakest in Asia.18 At the same that is, a rural district within a province—as well as metropolitan time, Indonesia has recorded some of the worst rates of income region and island, needs to produce its own Medium-Term inequality in Southeast Asia, its tax collection relative to GDP is Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menegah; the second worst in Southeast Asia, and its spending and quality 5 years) and Long-Term Development Plan (Rencana of basic urban infrastructure services are inadequate.19 It is Pembangunan Jangka Panjang; 20 years) as well as spatial against this backdrop that Surabaya’s story of shelter upgrading plans (rencana tata ruang wilayah); lower-level plans need to be comes into sharp relief. coordinated with higher-level ones, and spatial plans need to align with the development plans.25 The National Development When the Dutch made Surabaya a municipality in 1906, the Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) city’s population was under 175,000.20 After independence on guides socioeconomic planning from the helm, and a new August 17, 1945, Indonesian urbanization accelerated sharply Ministry of Land and Spatial Planning leads spatial planning, due to rural-urban migration; as a consequence,21 poverty rose, the implementation of which is under the Ministry of Public slums proliferated, and shelter conditions worsened in Surabaya. Works.26 Public housing was scarce, and affordable options other than self-help housing (where people build their homes themselves) and kampung were negligible.22

6 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Figure 2 | Organizational structure of government in Indonesia

Nation/Negeri Elected by citizens [President/Presiden]

Province/Propinsi Elected by citizens [Governor/Gubernur]

Urban Rural

City/Kota Elected by citizens Regency/Kabupaten [Mayor/Walikota] [Regent/Bupati]

District/Kecamatan Appointed by District/Kecamatan [Camat] city government [Camat]

Sub district/Kelurahan FORMAL GOVERNMENT FORMAL Subdistrict/Kelurahan Appointed by or Village/Desa [Lurah] city government [Lurah or Kepala desa]

Community unit/ Community unit/ Chosen by Rukun Warga (RW) Rukun warga (RW) area residents [Pak or Ibu RW] [Pak or Ibu RW]

Neighborhood unit/ Neighborhood unit/ Chosen by Rukun Tetangga (RT) Rukun tetangga (RT) area residents [Pak or Ibu RT] [Pak or Ibu RT] COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE

Note: Levels and heads (in box brackets) of government/governance; Bahasa Indonesia terms in italics. Source: Authors.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 7 Figure 3 | Organizational structure of Surabaya City Government

Mayor (Walikota) + Local Legislative Council Deputy Mayor (Wakil Walikota) (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)

Expert Staff (Staf Ahli) Inspectorate Local Secretariat (Inspektorat) (Sekretariat Daerah)

[Local] Units Governance Assistant [Local] Agencies (Badan Daerah) (Asisten Pemerintahan) (Dinas Daerah) • City Planning & • Public Works, Highways, and Drainage (Pekerjaan Divisions (Bagian) Development (Badan Umum Bina Marga dan Pematusan) Perencanaan dan • Governance & Local Autonomy Administration Pembangunan Kota) • Public Housing and Settlements, Building and (Administrasi Pemerintahan & Otonomi Daerah) Spatial Planning (Perumahan Rakyat dan Kawasan • Financial Management • Law (Hukum) Permukiman, Cipta Karya dan Tata Ruang) and Local Taxes • Organization (Organisasi) (Pengelolaan • Health (Kesehatan) Keuangan dan Pajak • Education (Pendidikan) Dareah) Economy & Development Assistant • Cleanliness and Green Open Spaces (Kebersihan (Asisten Perekonomian & Pembangunan) • Disaster Management dan Ruang Terbuka Hijau) and Social Protection (Penanggulangan • Fire Fighting (Pemadam Kebakaran) Divisions (Bagian) Bencana dan • Population and Civil Records (Kependudukan dan • Economy & Local [State-Owned] Enterprises Perlindungan Pencatatan Sipil) Administration (Administrasi Perekonomian & Masyrakat) Usaha Daerah) • Communication and Informatics (Komunikasi dan • Staffing and Training Informatika) • Construction Administration (Adminsitrasi (Kepegawaian dan Pembangunan) Diklat) • Food Security and Agriculture (Ketahanan Pangan dan Pertanian) • Cooperation Administration (Administrasi Kerjasama) • Transportation (Perhubungan) Reporting • Trade (Perdagangan) General Administration Assistant (Asisten Formal linkage • Manpower (Tenaga Kerja) Administrasi Umum) Coordination • Population Control, Women’s Empowerment and Child Welfare (Pengendalian Penduduk, Divisions (Bagian) Responsibility Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak) • General & Protocol (Umum & Protokol) • Culture and Tourism (Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata) • Procurement Services & Asset Management • Social Affairs (Dinas Sosial) (Layanan Pengadaan & Pengelolaan Aset) • Cooperatives and Small Enterprises (Koperasi dan • Public Relations (Hubungan Masyarakat) Usaha Mikro) • Public Welfare Administration (Administrasi • Youth and Sports (Kepemudaan dan Olahraga) Kesejahteraan Rakyat) • Construction and Land Management (Pengelolaan Bangunan dan Tanah) Secretariat of Local Legislative Council (Sekretariat DPRD) • Living Space (Lingkungan Hidup) • Capital Investment and Single Window Integrated Divisions (Bagian) Services (Penanaman Modal dan Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu) • General (Umum) • Libraries and Archives (Perpustakaan dan • (Rapat & Perundang-undangan) Kearsipan) • Information and Protocol (Informasi & Protokol) • Local Police (Satpol PP) • Functional Positions [Professional Personnel] (Jabatan Fungsional)

District (Kecamatan) [31] Notes: ITS = Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology); CSO = civil society organization. Bahasa Indonesia terms/names in parantheses. Sub-district (Kelurahan) [154] Source: Authors.

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2. THE EVOLUTION OF SURABAYA’S ►► Vehicular access roads SHELTER POLICY ►► Paved footpaths Stormwater drainage Shelter policy in Surabaya evolved through what some ►► researchers have identified as three key phases (seen in ►► Garbage receptacles and collection Figure 7):27 the Old Order (1945–66), a period of relative urban ►► Public standpipes for drinking water population explosion, meager public housing supply, and Communal washing areas and public toilets ambivalence towards squatters; President Suharto’s New ►► Order (1967–98), an era of aggressive, centralized kampung ►► Neighborhood clinics (puskesmas) upgrading; and the Reform period (1999 onward), during which ►► Primary schools time housing programs were decentralized. In Surabaya’s case, we view the Reform era as comprising two phases: the The W.R. Supratman KIP continued well into the 1990s and Comprehensive Kampung Improvement Project (CKIP) phase, increasingly focused on community members’ participation. from 1999 to 2008; and the low-cost apartments (rusunawa) Communities contributed a third to more than half of the phase (from the mid-2000s, intensifying after 2009). The CKIP project costs31 and participated in project implementation as phase saw a rise in a strong grassroots movement for squatters’ well as operation and maintenance. KIPs required hands-on shelter rights. Around the transition between the latest two participation in the physical upgrading of housing by kampung phases, a new dynamic mayor of Surabaya, Tri Rismaharini dwellers, exemplifying the “self-help” housing principle, as well (known as “Risma”), entered the scene as the country was as incremental housing improvements rather than the often experiencing larger shifts in national housing policy, the unrealistic “all at once” upgrading plans. 32 These programs were evolution of which is outlined in the next section. subsequently incorporated into several of Indonesia’s five-year plans (see Table 1). Importantly, KIPs did not fund the building The Kampung Improvement Program, of individual houses—they provided financing mechanisms for 1969–98 community-led improvement projects on housing and urban services like water and roads. KIPs were, in essence, the catalytic In 1969, Jakarta and Surabaya initiated their own versions force behind the widespread self-improvement of dwellings, of KIP; with the former included as part of Indonesia’s first economic gains, and land tenure security for low-income urban national Five-Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan dwellers. Lima Tahun; Repelita I).28 This spurred a series of KIPs, which proved to be among the most enduring and effective urban Over the course of fifteen years (1976–91), 22.7 billion Indonesian upgrading initiatives undertaken in the world.29 Johan Silas, a rupiah (Rp) (US$23.63 million)33 of World Bank KIP funding for young architect at Surabaya’s Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Surabaya directly improved the lives of 1.15 million kampung Technology (Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember; ITS), led a dwellers.34 No program has since matched the program’s scale, team that designed Surabaya’s original self-funded kampung expediency, and affordability (the program’s cost of upgrading upgrading initiative, known as W.R. Supratman KIP.30 The was $35–$75 per kampung resident).35 The success of the first program’s approach was simple: provide low-cost, basic public KIPs inspired the World Bank to recommend in situ slum infrastructure in poor kampung, with community support. upgrading internationally. For more than a decade after 1974, the For the first five years of the program, the W.R. Supratman KIP World Bank generously funded the scaling up of Indonesia’s KIPs provided only concrete slabs and gutters. Over time, however, it through four urban development projects (Urban I–IV).36 evolved to include a standardized menu of eight interventions:

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 9 Table 1 | Indonesia’s Five-Year Development Plans Joint evaluations by the city and the ITS’s Laboratory of (1969–98) Housing and Human Settlements (Labortarium Perumahan dan Permukiman; LPP), a research unit founded by Silas, strove to continually make Surabaya’s KIPs more effective.42 By 1983, Repelita I (1969–74): Supported pilot KIP in Jakarta upgrading had resolved the unclear tenure status of many Repelita II (1974–79): KIP in Jakarta and Surabaya kampung households, even incorporating some squatters, Repelita III (1979–84): KIP in 190 cities and towns and had provided kampung residents with a strong sense of Repelita IV (1984–89): KIP in 400 cities and towns security.43 Household access to drinking water rose from 15 Repelita V (1989–94): KIP in 500 cities and towns percent to over 80 percent, and access to toilets improved from Repelita VI (1994–98): KIP in 125 KIP cities and towns less than 20 percent to more than 65 percent; likewise, 70–90 Note: Repelita = Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan); KIP percent of kampung households enjoyed regular garbage = Kampung Improvement Program. 44 Source: Based on authors’ analysis of Silas (1987) and Tunas and Darmoyono (2014). collection.

Comprehensive Kampung Improvement By the early 1990s, KIPs had upgraded almost all legally Project, 1999–2008 recognized kampung (the inner-city and old-town kampung shown in Figure 4), which prevented their displacement, The fact that World Bank financing for KIPs was slated to end demolition, and loss of character; these remain the affordable during the late 1990s prompted city officials, the LPP, World housing options within the city. By the late 1990s, KIPs were Bank representatives, and a private consultant to deliberate credited with lowering Indonesia’s urban poverty by an over the future of upgrading in Surabaya, eventually conceiving estimated 70–75 percent.37 Qualitative evaluations of KIPs found the new CKIP.45 Surabaya’s CKIP leveraged newfound local that they were responsible for significant improvements in autonomy to make urban upgrading more comprehensive (by physical infrastructure, education and health, land and property stressing economic, social, and environmental improvements values, and solid waste management.38 Moreover, the way in in kampung) and more “pro-poor” (by letting residents steer which KIPs encouraged community participation in Surabaya project planning, implementation, and evaluation).46 Unlike its was impressive, particularly considering that nationwide the predecessors' focus on physical interventions, CKIP’s primary maintenance of infrastructure, resolution of land conflicts, objectives were community economic development and participation in decision-making, and role of women and civil empowerment of the poorest kampung dwellers—70 percent society remained weak.39 Sweat equity (self-help labor) was of its budget was for CBO-operated microfinance (revolving common, but in Surabaya people also contributed money, funds).47 CKIP was envisioned as a wholly community-managed totaling more than a third of the program’s $40 million of total venture so as to reduce the stifling grip of influential, sometimes expenditure during 1976–90.40 Some studies have ascribed even venal, RT and RW officials.48 Granting community control this level of participation to East Java’s strong communitarian over CKIP decision-making and implementation was a radically values,41 and almost everyone we interviewed stressed this progressive move.49 It also influenced national initiatives like uniquely Surabayan culture. We argue that the inclusive the National Community Empowerment Program (Program approach was deliberate and the sustained expansion of Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat) and the Neighborhood Surabaya’s KIPs catalyzed local communities’ latent potential to Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project.50 participate.

10 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

In each subdistrict, CKIP required the formation of three new Both Surabaya and the LPP have held discriminatory views kinds of CBOs—a Kampung Foundation, a business cooperative, on urban citizenship, reflecting an improper understanding and multiple self-help groups. The Kampung Foundation chose of the interrelated dynamics of migration, urbanization, and the interventions, apportioned funds, and coordinated the informality57 that has impeded genuinely inclusive planning. overall program; the business cooperative was only responsible More so after decentralization, migrants and undocumented for managing microfinance. Each subdistrict devised its squatters came to be regarded as illegal and, therefore, were own way to choose CBO officials. The program concept had viewed as “undeserving” of assistance. In Indonesia, a person envisaged local NGOs as intermediaries between the city and who moves to another city needs to obtain either a permanent the communities, responsible for building the capacity of the resident identification card (kartu tanda penduduk; KTP) or a nascent CBOs to transform cooperative-run microfinance temporary one (kartu identitas penduduk musiman; KIPEM). But into a self-propagating grassroots incubator. Yet CKIP proved poor migrants often lack a KTP, which is required to obtain all largely ineffective.51 When it ended in 2008, CKIP had reached other documentation. Furthermore, without identification 72 subdistricts—less than half of eligible areas; by 2012, only 20 documents, migrants cannot access city-subsidized services, percent had well-functioning microfinance funds, 38 percent including primary education, community health centers, health performed poorly, and the rest were defunct.52 However, CKIP insurance, social security/insurance, and microcredit.58 Lack of did introduce real participatory planning; it even inspired the access to credit is a debilitating deprivation that CKIP sought Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project and revived to remedy; nonetheless, CKIP business cooperatives rarely ever musrenbang, Indonesia’s version of local participatory budgeting. lend to migrants.59

Indonesia’s sudden and extensive government decentralization Citywide urban upgrading practically ended with CKIP. A local in 1999 revealed the major resource and capacity inadequacies program called Kampung Unggulan (which roughly translates of its cities, turning them into laboratories for externally funded to “Excellent Kampung”) was started in 2010 to promote small development projects. CKIP was a rare exception in that it was enterprises, and it still runs in 10 subdistricts. However, in locally funded and managed. Although it had more autonomy the city’s poorer areas, there remains a need for substantial and control over the project, several factors impeded CKIP’s upgrading.60 In terms of the quality of infrastructure and success, including limited local government funding (a common services, about 278 hectares (ha) of its residential areas are decentralization challenge), competition from better-funded still considered slums; over 28 percent of households reside programs like the World Bank–supported Urban Poverty Project in less than 7 square meters (m2) of housing space; and over (now the Neighborhood Community Empowerment Program), 55 percent lack proper access to water.61 As CKIP waned, the inadequate CBO training, and unsuccessful targeting of the rusunawa public housing projects registered a marked uptick; poorest.53 The negligible role of NGOs, despite the program’s today the national government’s rusunawa program has emphasis on the need to involve them, also constrained the become Surabaya’s leading shelter policy. Critics consider this success of CKIP.54 This prevented the CBOs from acquiring postdecentralization retraction of city funding for inclusive the skills and resources necessary to effectively organize and upgrading (in favor of the scarcer rusunawa option, which manage microfinance.55 So, heeding the LPP’s advice, in 2003 the induces exclusion and avoidable competition) as a neoliberal city created a much smaller CKIP clone, the Social Rehabilitation shift that compromises Surabaya’s commitment to pro-poor for Slums (Rehabilitasi Sosial Daerah Kumuh) program, to target shelter and community participation.62 the poorest kampung residents. Although a modest program, it has grown both its funds and reach.56

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 11 Figure 4 | Location and distribution of kampung in Figure 5 | Location of rusunawa in Surabaya Surabaya

N

CITY CORE

0 2km

Source: Shirleyana et al., 2018.

Source: Authors, with additional assistance by Jiwnath Ghimire. Sources: Esri, HERE, Garmin, Intermap, increment P Corp., GEBCO, USGS, FAO, NPS, NRCAN, GeoBase, IGN, Kadaster NL, Ordnance Survey, Esri Japan, METI, Esri China (Hong Kong), (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS User Community

Grassroots Movement for Squatters’ as that squatters pollute rivers and cannot maintain healthy Shelter Rights living environments. Within just five years and with minimal external assistance, it completely transformed the Strenkali In 2002 Surabaya sent eviction notices to communities squatting squatter settlement of Bratang Tangkis and made progress on on provincial government land along the Strenkali River. two adjoining ones. The community moved back houses located That spurred unprecedented civil society action that took into precariously close to the river, widened access roads, paved account the collective interests of squatters, pushcart vendors, footpaths, ensured all houses had toilets and septic tanks, and 63 sex workers, and homeless children. The local secretariat eliminated the discharge of human waste into the river. The of Uplink—a network of CSOs created by the Urban Poor PWSS also helped residents secure water supply, pay land taxes, Consortium, a prominent Jakarta-based NGO, brought together manage garbage disposal, and establish a microcredit fund. It hitherto unrelated groups. These included nascent NGOs, also demonstrated how simple elevational treatments (using squatters’ CBOs, and faculty and students from some local different materials, colors, and textures on the external face of 64 universities who had never worked with poor communities. By the structure) can provide a stimulating built environment.66 2005, this initial networking between civil society groups had Nearly all improvements (as well as ongoing maintenance and launched the Surabaya Strenkali People’s Movement (Paguyuban repairs) were self-funded, with daily household contributions of Warga Strenkali Surabaya; PWSS), a CSO devoted to improving just Rp 1,000 (approx. $0.10).67 squatters’ shelter security. The PWSS helped enhance the resilience of these squatter The PWSS forged close links with larger CSOs, including communities,68 even without the city’s support. Media coverage Community Architects Indonesia and the Asian Coalition for of the group led to official recognition of Bratang Tangkis’s Housing Rights, and quickly learned the nuances of shelter informal RW and RT by Mayor Risma’s administration. This discourse—especially regarding in situ upgrading and how was also possible because many long-term residents (some of 65 to form coalitions to advance formidable political activism. whom had lived there for 40 years) had obtained KTPs. Despite The PWSS set about dispelling pervasive misconceptions, such

12 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

progress and recognition of the PWSS, demolitions and evictions those of the city’s upgraded kampung. To rid cities of slums, continue.69 Bratang Tangkis residents reject any suggestions to Indonesia’s 1,000 Towers program—an ambitious Perumnas relocate to rusunawa because such apartments are not conducive initiative that began in 2007—aims to add 1 million rusunawa to running home-based enterprises, do not guarantee low rents, and rusunami flats nationwide.76 The national government and prohibit subletting. Residents also fear that moving to offers tax incentives and bears all infrastructure costs if cities rusunawa will compromise their valuable social and economic provide the land—an arrangement that has attracted Mayor networks and, because rusunawa are located in more remote, Risma’s support for construction of rusunawa.77 Surabaya’s less-connected, or inconvenient locations, their transportation current Medium-Term Development Plan (2016–21), a mayoral costs in both money and time will increase. decree, underscores the preference for rusunawa over kampung upgrading—in fact, the latter is hardly mentioned.78 The Steady Rise of Rusunawa (from the Notwithstanding Mayor Risma’s support, the supply of rusunawa Mid-2000s) is scant, and local media reports frequently cite financial Before Indonesia’s decentralization of the government during irregularities, delivery delays, tariff hikes, and substandard the late 1990s, rusunawa construction, especially in Surabaya, construction. Since most squatters occupy provincial or was sporadic, often a consequence of some crisis, constraint, national government land, the city is reluctant to improve their or nonroutine incentive (such as receiving funds from the settlements. Lately, however, city-built rusunawa have begun provincial government to relocate a specific settlement). After accepting some squatters with proper documentation (i.e., KTP). its establishment in 1974, the National Housing Development Surabaya’s subsidies make rusunawa rents (between $2 and Company (Perumnas) began the effort70 to expand two types of $7, monthly) the nation’s cheapest, and the LPP persuaded the public housing: rusunawa (rental flats for poor households) and city government to abolish occupancy term limits.79 Surabaya rusunami (low-income ownership flats).71 A windfall from oil does not have any rusunami projects yet; those sprouting in revenues during the Six-Day War of 1967 between the Arabs and neighboring municipalities could house some migrant workers, Israelis led the national government to build rent-to-own-type but there are not enough low-cost options for the poorest. apartment blocks for the poor in some cities.72 The 1992 national inclusionary housing regulation, Balanced Around that same time, entrusted with the responsibility of Residential Environment (Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang; LHB), improving conditions in Surabaya’s kampung, Silas argued aimed to boost the supply of affordable housing with its 1:3:6 that apartment living was unsuitable for the poor. Instead, principle (i.e., for every luxury unit built, a developer needed he advocated for improving existing kampung.73 The ensuing to build three middle-income units and six low-income units). KIP concept is what Surabaya pursued assiduously, with a few However, the LHB only applies to the construction of individual notable exceptions. In 1984 the LPP designed a rusunawa in homes, not apartments, and in 2011 developers’ complaints Surabaya to house victims of a fire that gutted 83 houses near a got this requirement further reduced to 1:2:3.80 Without a local vegetable market.74 Later, in 1989, it designed three blocks proper enforcement framework, and given the presence of of a rusunawa (150 units) in Dupak Bangunrejo, where in situ corruption and the fact that Perumnas prioritizes higher-income upgrading was not feasible due to the area’s unusually dense, housing, the LHB remains ineffective.81 Modifying the LHB’s squalid, and inaccessible setting. During the 1990s, following provisions to include apartment construction would expand an uprising by urban dwellers who had been evicted from the the future production of rusunawa and benefit the currently Dupak Bangunrejo site, the city authorized the LPP to design struggling 1,000 Towers project.82 Between 2010 and 2014, the three blocks in the subdistrict of Penjaringansari to serve those nationwide rusunami construction exceeded that of rusunawa who had been evicted. by four to eight times, mainly because of their higher return on investments. Leveraging the LHB to generate more rusunawa After decentralization, rusunami and rusunawa construction projects could help to reengage local design entities like the accelerated in Surabaya. Between 2004 and 2009, the central LPP, which has not designed any rusunawa since 2004. (The government built three rusunawa blocks to house squatters; earliest rusunawa complexes designed by the LPP re-created the by 2016, 13 city-built projects (approximately 3,500 units) feel, versatility, and adaptability of the kampung environment 75 were completed or under way. Figure 5 shows the location of in vertical space.)83 Newer rusunawa, however, with their Surabaya’s rusunawa, whose locations are more peripheral than standardized layouts, cramped units, smaller common spaces,

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 13 regulated use, and lack of participatory design, hardly provide numbers, and lanes have proper street signs. It is common such stimulating living environments. for residents to adorn lanes with green and flowering plants. Almost all homes have toilets that are connected to individual Around the world, inclusionary zoning and other planning septic tanks; communal toilets of the early KIP days are now incentives are being used to boost the production of affordable rare. Houses typically have plastered brick walls, paved floors, housing.84 This has not caught on in Indonesia. Fast-tracking corrugated metal or tiled roofs, and reasonable structural building permits for affordable housing is one of the few integrity—a result of steady, incremental self-improvements. incentives that exist for Indonesian developers, and even this is Small garbage receptacles are ubiquitously placed in front of rare. 85 Our interviews revealed that Surabaya neither plans to almost every house, and pushcart food hawkers, a characteristic collaborate with the provincial government to build rusunawa fixture of the kampung, carry their trash and/or put it in for riverbank squatters (since they occupy provincial land) nor receptacles along streets.88 Signs exhorting people to not litter does it intend to incentivize inclusionary zoning for private used to be pervasive but are now rare and unnecessary, which developers—either because it perceives such measures to be further signals transformed civic behavior. Waste still gets complicated or not urgent. collected by uniformed, paid waste collectors in pushcarts or pedi-carts; originally, the city assembled this crew by organizing 3. TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE informal scavengers.89 Garbage from multiple kampung goes to THROUGH SURABAYA’S INNOVATIVE a large dumpster site where trucks then haul it to landfills.

SHELTER INITIATIVES Neighborhood-level waste is commonly managed by the RT-RW This section discusses key triggers of change in informal structure. Since the days of KIP, the city planning agency and housing policy in Surabaya and explores how enabling factors other local government units persistently pursued “socialization” sustained positive development and strengthened coalitions to spread community awareness about health and hygiene.90 The of actors working towards innovative shelter policy. Surabaya’s city utilized teams from the LPP to conduct regular evaluations; unique approach to affordable urban upgrading is reflected their advice helped refine efforts to institutionalize grassroots by its vibrant kampung, which have proved to be a resilient community participation through the omnipresent RT and RW. asset over the decades. Upgrading kampung has contributed to The city initially trained subdistrict and district heads, and they economic development, which has helped to sustain poverty in turn trained and managed their respective RT and RW heads. alleviation; as recently as 2009–14, poverty rates in Surabaya fell Over the decades, this participatory innovation was incorporated from 8.2 percent to 5.8 percent.86 The kampung also provide the into other interventions, such as family planning, primary health poor with affordable housing (even in central urban locations) and education, and youth programs. and extensive livelihood options. The city’s kampung-centered Traditional community-managed revolving credit mechanisms planning approach87 was bolstered by initiatives intended to were also integrated into many initiatives to enhance their promote community participation and build the capacity of financial feasibility. Initially, regional microfinance CSOs like kampung communities to actively participate in planning and Women’s Devotion to Solidarity (Setia Bakti Wanita) offered manage neighborhood-level services. These efforts earned district officials and RT and RW heads training in community the city government a high degree of trust from the citizenry, engagement and managing revolving funds.91 Beginning in the especially the poor. early 1980s, their district office would regularly invite residents Life in the Kampung after KIP to various training meetings. With time, many kampung cooperatives and CBOs emerged to engage in grassroots The remarkable transformation of Surabaya’s kampung is community activities.92 In our interviews, the residents stressed evident in their improved physical and environmental quality that their district and subdistrict officials were sincerely and also the strong sense of civic responsibility of kampung committed to kampung improvement. One interviewee’s remark residents (see Figure 6). A walk through almost any upgraded particularly underscores the significant transformation in kampung usually reveals clean streets, finished with concrete community attitudes and consciousness specifically around paver blocks and speed bumps. All houses clearly display waste management:

14 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

We always exhorted people to dispose their household into tourist destinations. Deploying new technologies has waste in the trash bins. But people also dumped used also improved citywide traffic management.100 Likewise, solid diapers and sanitary napkins in the bins. . . . The waste waste management has been significantly upgraded, and some collectors complained about handling such unhygienic kampung actively undertake recycling and composting. Another and foul-smelling waste. So we in the cooperatives and recent innovation to combat plastic waste is the public “green the RT/RW asked our community members to wash and bus,” which only accepts used plastic bottles for fare.101 dry diapers before disposing them in tightly secured In 2011, responding to further decentralization of power, Mayor plastic bags. . . . Some people are still inconsiderate, but Risma made Surabaya the first Indonesian city to take over the vast majority now does so.93 property tax collection, which improved collections from land 102 Mayor Tri Rismaharini (Risma) as a and construction taxes and land sale duties. Between 2010 and 2017, local revenue generation increased from Rp 4.2 trillion to Change Agent almost Rp 9 trillion, raising its contribution to the city budget During the second half of the twentieth century, under the New from a fifth to a half.103 Mayor Risma’s reform measures would Order, continued mayoral support enabled Surabaya’s kampung- likely not have been as effective without high levels of capacity focused participatory planning to flourish. Decades of sustained and trust, developed over four decades of prior participatory kampung upgrading strengthened the capacity of Surabaya’s development efforts, in local government departments and city planning department, service delivery agencies, and local kampung communities. communities to coordinate development interventions. Yet the centralized, top-down approach characteristic of the New Order Triggers for Pro-poor Shelter Upgrading routinized local government work and stifled innovation. When Strong political will and support have been critical for Surabaya’s Risma was elected as the country’s first female mayor in 2010, success with KIPs. Johan Silas’s ideas and philosophy were a she tried to change this by championing kampung-centered trigger for transformative change in urban housing. Silas’s participatory policies reminiscent of KIP and CKIP. Mayor philosophy of kampung autonomy was likely solidified during Risma’s policies are generally well accepted because she is seen the mid-1970s by his personal friendship with John F.C. Turner, as embracing a pro-poor, pro-environment, and anti-corruption who brought international attention to self-help housing— platform and has built a reputation as a feared taskmaster.94 Her an underlying principle of slum upgrading.104 In addition, administration has focused on leveraging technology to build collaboration between the city and the ITS deepened over time “smart” and sustainable kampung and upgrade their human and expanded to other planning endeavors. development levels95 while using information technology and data analysis to enhance transparency and reduce corruption Suharto’s New Order regime and his mayoral appointee in in city offices. Emerging scholarship on public leadership in Surabaya, Colonel Raden Soekotjo, were supportive of early Asia attributes her popularity and the success of her pro-poor shelter upgrading plans. Colonel Soekotjo was also a close friend measures to the fact that people sense genuine empathy in her of Silas, 105 whom he commissioned to create a master plan actions.96 for Surabaya.106 Silas’s visionary plan rejected mass housing blocks in favor of preserving the kampung. The dozen mayors Under Mayor Risma’s administration, extensive efforts have been since Colonel Soekotjo were mostly pro-poor and supportive of made to landscape street medians, sidewalks, and riparian edges sustaining the form and ways of life of the kampung.107 Mayor as well as to develop pocket parks. As a result, green open spaces Risma, one of Silas’s most famous pupils, is the embodiment of now cover 20 percent of city area.97 In addition, more than 250 this trend.108 km of roads have been widened or added.98 Narrow streets in the city’s poorer neighborhoods are being widened by covering parallel open drains with precast concrete box sections. This and other flood control measures have reduced the city’s flood- prone areas from 52 percent to 2 percent99 and have revitalized once-poor traditional fishing communities (such as Kenjeran)

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 15 International and national recognition for Surabaya’s shelter citizenry. Two entities stand out: a radio show called Voice of upgrading work has helped to maintain the longevity and Surabaya (Suara Surabaya) and the local daily newspaper Jawa momentum of pro-poor housing policies in Indonesia. Since the Pos.113 Launched in 1983 as the first interactive radio program 1980s, the city has received over 160 international and national for commoners to voice concerns, Voice of Surabaya continues to accolades, including the Aga Khan Award for Architecture popularize and criticize development initiatives. Jawa Pos, East and the World Habitat Award.109 Surabaya was left out of Java’s leading newspaper, has partnered with the city since 2005 the debut editions of the annual Adipura awards (1986 and and encourages principles of corporate social responsibility. 1987), Indonesia’s most prestigious recognition for cities,110 The paper organized the Surabaya Green and Clean initiative—a which motivated the city to pursue zealous environmental popular annual competition that recognizes cleanliness and management.111 Thereafter, four consecutively successful environmental management in the city’s kampung. years earned it the Adipura Gold (Adipura Kencana). Risma’s mayorship again brought home the Adipura Gold in 2015 and Enabling Factors for Pro-poor Shelter 2017, when Fortune magazine named her among the top 50 Upgrading leaders of the world.112 Political support, intellectual and pro-poor leadership, Outside actors also played a large role in initiating and and community trust were key enabling factors that led to supporting progressive housing policies. The World Bank’s experimental innovations and allowed different institutions support for scaling up KIPs encouraged the national government to work together over long time horizons. National-level and other international donors to support such efforts as well. commitment as well as long-term support from the World Rarely do poverty alleviation programs enjoy such long periods Bank combined to create a supportive environment for local- of uninterrupted and consistent donor assistance. level innovation that could be scaled up over time. During the New Order, the RT-RW governance structure allowed for Recognition for Surabaya’s KIPs likely also inspired nonstate easy, on-the-ground implementation of programs. During this actors to celebrate kampung improvement and mobilize its period, five-year terms of multiple like-minded mayors, as well as the absence of dissenting political voices, allowed for policy

Figure 6 | A typical upgraded kampung

Photo credit: Ashok Das.

16 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements continuity. The KIPs’ local transformations and their subsequent 4. SUSTAINING PROGRESSIVE nationwide success brought Surabaya national and international recognition, which enabled greater community participation SHELTER PLANNING: EMERGING and the inclusion of socioeconomic development aims in CHALLENGES AND INHIBITORS urban upgrading. This, in turn, was enabled by the continued The poor have long found affordable housing and livelihood strengthening of Surabaya’s unique city-university-community opportunities in Surabaya’s kampung; both in quality and coalition. abundance, few cities boast such supportive living environments

As much as Silas’s role has been pivotal, not much would have for those of modest means. A quarter century ago, however, been accomplished without the cooperation and support of the researchers warned that robust economic growth could turn city government and the ITS (see Figure 8). Sustained support the kampung into high-end commercial and residential from various mayors and the city planning agencies provided developments, pushing the most vulnerable residents out of 117 valuable stability and autonomy to innovate, aided by the their homes. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, evidence showed unique position of the LPP within the ITS. The city of Surabaya that land values had increased in most kampung due to rising steadily helped the LPP and the ITS build capacity and establish demand for land. This, consequently, caused some upgraded intellectual credibility, visibility, and public approbation of its kampung to be demolished and replaced with higher-end 118 shelter policy and spatial planning. The city’s use of university development. Surabaya has tried to restrict the razing resources to further policy goals was new and innovative.114 of kampung to allow them to thrive even in dense, central Other local universities, including Airlangga, the University of locations, but efforts have not been entirely effective. The the 17th of August (Universitas Tujuhbelas Agustus), and Petra threats from increasing property values and a growing real Christian, have stepped up to support other city participatory estate market still loom ominously over the future of the city’s 119 initiatives, which bodes well for future coalition building around kampung-centric and pro-poor legacy. These emerging transformative ideas. challenges and complications are explained in more detail in the next section, followed by a discussion of factors that are All of our interviewees emphasized that participatory planning inhibiting transformative change and those helping to sustain tends to succeed in Surabaya because its communities are progress. remarkably harmonious, egalitarian, and collaborative. Residents’ accounts suggest that since the 1970s, the Emerging Challenges and Complications of pervasiveness of small revolving-credit groups, bolstered by a Pro-poor Shelter Policies large regional network of women’s cooperatives, augmented the capacity of kampung communities to organize and Recent housing development trends are working against partner in local development.115 It is also likely that the city’s pro-poor shelter policies such as KIPs. Private actors began long history of involving communities in urban upgrading pursuing large-scale development in Surabaya during the late projects made the communities more receptive and proactive 1980s, putting pressure on nearby informal settlements that to change. Local government employees’ efforts to inspire depended on the availability of cheap land. The city’s first big community engagement in KIPs and other projects also built shopping mall, Tunjungan Plaza I, was built in 1986 in the city’s 120 up community capacity and deepened people’s trust, which center, displacing an existing kampung. In 1988 Ciputra, a alludes to the importance of engaged local leadership. Since the leading Indonesian developer, acquired a 809 ha spread across 1980s, Surabaya’s population growth has slowed, so pressure on Surabaya’s western fringe and the adjoining Gresik regency for housing did not surge much or suddenly, leaving some room Citraland, a township whose construction began during the 121 for the city to focus on upgrading informal settlements without 1990s. Two other local developers, Pakuwon and Dharmalaya, rushing to provide new housing.116 initiated similar projects nearby. Despite declining occupancy, the number of malls had increased by a third by 2018; growth

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 17 Figure 7 | Timeline of Surabaya's shelter policy

1945 1966 1967 1969 1974 1984 1992 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004

Orde Lama (Old National leadership Order) under Orde Baru (New Order) under President Suharto Reformasi (Reform) post-Suharto, democracy and decentralization – 5 different presidents President Sukarno

National Housing Development Company (Perumnas)

National inclusionary housing regulation (LHB), 1:3:6 (low:mid:high)

National policy Repelita I (1969–74); Repelita II Repelita IV (1984–89); Repelita V (1974–79); Repelita III (1979–84) (1989-94); Repelita VI (1994–98)

9 appointed mayors

City leadership Col. Raden Soekotjo 4 appointed New Order mayors 3 mayoral terms and 2 appointed mayors postdecentralization

W.R. Supratman KIP CKIP (comprehensive) Mayor Soekotjo's initiatives UKIP (urban Rehabilitasi Sosial Daerah Kumuh (RSDK) City policy for urban infrastructure focus) improvements

City- City-university-community partnerships university Coalitions NGOs and academics help form PPTS—a coalition of riverbank squatters, informal vendors, sex workers, and street children

Johan Silas proposes upgrading Johan Silas–led ITS team over mass housing for kampung designs city's first rusunawa Triggers 1986: Surabaya's KIP awarded Aga 1983: Suara Surabaya, an interactive Khan Award for Architecture radio show, increases awareness

Mayor Soekotjo puts Funding from World Bank and Johan Silas in charge of other international agencies Enablers spatial planning Uniquely strong sense of voluntarism, cooperation, and community action in Surabaya's kampung Local political support for preserving kampung ITS graduates strengthen Johan Silas's philosophy in local planning and development agencies

Large-scale commercial real estate development Poor public transportation and no mass transit burdens the poor Inhibiting factors Little implementation of the national inclusionary housing regulation

18 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Figure 7 | Timeline of Surabaya's shelter policy

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Reformasi (Reform) post-Suharto, democracy and decentralization – 5 different presidents

National Housing Development Company (Perumnas)

National inclusionary housing regulation (LHB), 1:3:6 (low:mid:high) National inclusionary housing regulation (LHB) revised to 1:2:3 (low:mid:high) 1,000 Towers program (rusunawa and rusunami) for low- and-middle income groups National Community Empowerment Program (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or PNPM urban)

1 Million Houses program

National Slum Upgrading Program

3 mayoral terms and 2 appointed mayors postdecentralization Tri Rismaharini (appointed in 2010, elected in 2016)

CKIP (comprehensive) Rehabilitasi Sosial Daerah Kumuh (RSDK) Rusunawa replacing upgrading

City-university-community partnerships

NGOs and academics help Breakaway faction from PPTS forms PWSS—Surabaya's first CSOs exclusively for squatters form PPTS—a coalition of riverbank squatters, informal vendors, sex workers, and Emerging city–private sector–NGO partnerships for urban environmental mgt street children

Jawa Pos, a local newspaper, encourages Surabaya Green and Clean campaign

Uniquely strong sense of voluntarism, cooperation, and community action in Surabaya's kampung Local political support for preserving kampung ITS graduates strengthen Johan Silas's philosophy in local planning and development agencies Mayor Tri Rismaharini's proactive approach and popular pro-poor policies

Large-scale commercial real estate development Poor public transportation and no mass transit burdens the poor Little implementation of the national inclusionary housing regulation Rapidly rising land values

Notes: CKIP = Comprehensive Kampung Improvement Project; CSO = civil society organization; KIP = Kampung Improvement Program; LHB = Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang (Balanced Residential Environment); NGO = nongovernmental organization; PPTS = Paguyuban Pembela Tanah Strenkali (Riverside Community Rights Defenders); PWSS = Paguyuban Warga Strenkali Surabaya (Surabaya Strenkali People’s Movement). Source: Authors.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 19 in office space is relatively weak (partly because of the modest multinucleated concentration of jobs. This makes it hard to services sector), yet 2016 experienced the largest single-year provide kampung residents with easy access to urban services addition since 1990.122 Between 2012 and 2017, over 40 new like jobs, health care, and schools. hotels opened in Surabaya,123 even in residential areas and The traditional location of many kampung close to the center of around kampung. Since then, another 50 upscale hotels have the city has helped to mitigate the negative effects of peripheral been built or approved. A rarity just a decade ago, apartment growth and lack of good transport in Surabaya, but challenges blocks for the higher-income groups now dominate Surabaya’s remain (see Figure 4). Therefore, improving transport over western and eastern skylines, and their supply has risen annually the long term is necessary to improve access to urban services by over 200 percent.124 for low-income residents. Low demand for transport in the This “mega influx of capital” into the property market, as one predecentralization period, along with scarce available funds expert describes it,125 has sent land prices soaring. In 1980, postdecentralization, have stalled any investments to improve an 8 m by 20 m plot in what is now a lower-middle-income, public transit infrastructure.135 Mayor Risma’s current plan to centrally located kampung cost about Rp 9,000 ($14.35) per reintroduce a Dutch-era tram by retracing an older route will not m2;126 in 2017, it cost at least Rp 2 million ($149).127 Land prices alleviate the transportation deficit, either, because the proposed have dramatically risen, and as of 2017 they have mostly short corridor is in the city’s core, which is already better served hovered between Rp 1 million and Rp 3 million ($75 and $224) by buses and minibuses.136 Intergovernmental conflict and per m2; along fast-evolving, mixed-use corridors like Mayjen poor coordination bedevil construction of new transportation Sungkono, prices reach Rp 60 million ($4,484) per m2.128 The infrastructure. Most streets are the city’s responsibility, but even lucrative nature of real estate has even turned public sector improving them can be difficult if they are owned by higher companies into housing developers if they own enough land. levels of government.137 Community activists in Surabaya allege One example is Jasa Marga, a public sector toll road operator that conflicts and disagreements among various agencies turned housing developer that has prioritized higher-end, more responsible for providing infrastructure and services also hurt profitable developments over affordable housing.129 The fact that the prospects of urban upgrading and resettlement projects for many state entities (the so-called “land banks”) own large tracts squatters.138 of public land seriously distorts the market.130 In some cases developers have displaced kampung residents by unscrupulous Inhibitors to Progressive Planning means, and large developments raise land and building taxes There are many factors that have inhibited progressive planning in nearby kampung and threaten their physical integrity.131 in Surabaya. For one, rising land values and inadequate public Young people who grew up in Surabaya’s kampung are moving transit are disproportionately burdening Surabaya’s poor to peri-urban jurisdictions in search of affordable rents, less by limiting the space and increasing the fiscal and political congestion, and more space, despite the fact that in the long run, cost of implementing pro-poor policies. The city’s few new the perceived economic advantage is lost to costs incurred from rusunawa are in peripheral locations or are far from main roads, commuting and congestion.132 some unserved even by minibuses (see Figure 5). Also, the The spatial expansion of the metropolitan region has exposed misalignment of national policies with on-the-ground realities Surabaya’s grossly inadequate public transportation network as a and developers’ constraints makes the 1:2:3 ratio of luxury major impediment to sustainable and equitable development.133 units to middle- and low-income units for inclusionary zoning Buses are the only current public mode of transit, and their share ineffective. The current stipulation applies only to detached of overall trips is just 3.5 percent. (The green bus mentioned homes, requiring affordable units to be built right beside high- earlier is a welcome move, but its coverage is limited and its income units. Where land is expensive or scarce, enforcing fare system limits access.) Sluggish private minibuses (bemo) this has proved challenging. Surabaya has hinted at amending used to be the transportation choice for lower-middle-income the regulation but has not consulted with developers, and commuters until easy credit access exploded motorcycle participatory planning beyond the neighborhood scale is not yet ownership. Public transit provision is challenged by narrow the norm in Surabaya.139 roads, a small road network (approximately 6 percent of land Contradictory policy objectives and a reluctance to incorporate area),134 widespread high-density residential areas, and a informal workers and housing into the city proper has

20 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Figure 8 | Landscape of urban change agents in Surabaya

Universities (primarily ITS)

Private Sector

Corporate firms

State Community

Formal City agencies kampung (Planning, etc.) communities

Sub-city units Informal (Kecamatan, Kelurahan) settlements

Civil society

NGOs & other CSOs

= Deliberative/ = Guiding or = Oppositional, = Philanthropic collaborative (decision- training making) untrusting

 Solid arrow = strong relationship; Dashed arrow = weak or occasional relationship

Notes: ITS = Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology); CSO = Civil society organization. Source: Authors.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 21 intensified Surabaya’s affordable shelter challenge. For legacy of Indonesian planning efforts to manage development example, the city is encouraging big real estate development through rigid population controls, discouraging migration as within its jurisdiction yet also advocates for the improvement well as forcing migrants into specific areas, usually outside of access to services for the urban poor living in kampung, of the city center.148 Despite the inclusive nature of Silas’s making them “smart” communities that are connected to outlook—which held kampung to be an abundant, inclusive, and broader city infrastructure and opportunities. It is hard to affordable shelter option—few housing improvement projects prioritize the interests of both big real estate and poor informal have been targeted at migrants. Progressive shelter policy has communities. Another conflict arises because cities desire almost never taken into account migrants and squatters because economic development but not the poor migrants that such they are generally considered illegal. Despite their ample development attracts. Similar to administrations before hers exposure to kampung, few ITS architecture students (many of and in other cities, and despite the overall championing of pro- whom are now city practitioners) question this exclusionary poor policies, Mayor Risma has been generally unwelcoming to propensity. migrant communities in Surabaya. This indicates insufficient Lasting political leadership on pro-poor shelter policies is understanding of how urbanization and informality are linked uncertain and threatens progressive planning. Change agents in a developing society. Research shows that large real estate like Silas and Mayor Risma promoted affordable housing by projects stimulate the informal sector and bring in migrant preserving Surabaya’s kampung and helping their residents workers.140 But because Mayor Risma has so far perpetuated thrive, and continuing this positive legacy will require new a traditional bias against informal migrant communities in leaders to champion pro-poor policies. the city center, she has pushed to relocate manufacturing units and housing to surrounding regions.141 Whereas Mayor Risma made public high school free for Surabaya’s legal 5. CONCLUSION residents, enrollment of migrant children, even in primary Surabaya’s pro-poor shelter planning has affected broader schools, is greatly restricted. The city has banned informal transformations for more than 50 years. In situ participatory vendors on many streets, and it regularly conducts “sweeps” urban upgrading remains one of the most viable planning (unannounced raids) to apprehend those squatters and vagrants interventions for providing secure and affordable housing to who lack identification cards. Whisked away to facilities for the poor in developing countries.149 Surabaya’s success with the mentally ill and street children (liponsos), these persons are upgrading kampung is due to multiple factors—visionary and fingerprinted, “reformed,” and urged to return to their families zealous leadership; political will and commitment; sustained, outside Surabaya.142 Given Surabaya’s robust administration long-term financial support; continuous city-university- and transparency initiatives, it is unclear why city-level data on community collaboration that built institutional capacity and slums and squatters are unavailable or inaccessible.143 Allegedly, intellectual credibility; and, consequently, enhanced community the city planning department has such information144 but does capacity and trust in local government. Democratization and not publish it for fear of jeopardizing its status as an Adipura decentralization in 1999 overhauled planning and governance awardee.145 and yielded considerable improvements. But resource constraints, rising land values, an expanding real estate sector, The exclusionary treatment of migrants and squatters in and the absence of a comprehensive affordable housing Surabaya (which is a pervasive problem across developing policy are eroding Surabaya’s pro-poor shelter commitment. countries), is partly attributable to the technocratic nature of A lingering vestige of the New Order150 is the local planning urban planning education. Surabaya’s planning officials are apparatus’s prejudice against poor migrants and wariness of mostly engineers and architects who have had little exposure CSOs. Current siloed academic curricula inhibit progressive to social science theories of equity, justice, inclusivity, social innovation and fail to inspire students to believe that urban learning, or the nuances of civil society and governance.146 planning can and should address issues of social injustice. Still, Without interdisciplinary training, progressive, pro-poor urban Surabaya serves as an exemplar for developing cities faced with planning that protects the interests of the most vulnerable city the shelter challenges associated with rapid urbanization. dwellers is hard to achieve.147 Compounding this challenge is the

22 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

KIP—Surabaya’s famed low-cost innovation—upgraded and Surabaya’s planners and policymakers receive a highly sustained poor kampung through community participation for technical education, with scant exposure to contemporary nearly three decades. The unique partnership between Silas, the planning perspectives on social justice and inclusivity; this LPP, and the city government fostered policy consistency and means that the exclusionary treatment of poor migrants innovation around KIPs and brought attention and credibility to tends to go unchallenged. Planning curricula need to be the program. Long-term international funding during the New more interdisciplinary, critical, and contextual.151 Surabaya’s Order helped to scale KIPs, improving affordable housing across participatory planning model for kampung has excluded urban Indonesia. Successive mayoral support for KIPs built independent CSOs—no formal shelter initiative has ever invaluable trust in kampung communities and bolstered their involved NGOs, which have mainly focused on supporting capacity for participatory planning, which is reflected in their informal settlements instead of kampung. This stymies the strong communitarian ethos. Surabaya’s successful upgrading innovation, efficiency, and accountability of robust state–civil programs have preserved abundant, centrally located kampung society collaboration.152 Nascent civil society efforts to generate that still provide affordable rental options and informal dialogue around urban issues are afoot, but NGOs that focus livelihoods to most of the city’s poor, including migrants. People on housing do not exist. Surabaya’s first grassroots squatter of different incomes mix across varied land uses in kampung, as movement, too, is dissipating. Surabaya has long been a model do formality and informality, while regulations and norms are for other cities; yet to broaden its pro-poor perspective to make flexibly enforced; yet kampung boast good infrastructure, clean it more inclusive, its planners should draw inspiration and ideas and safe environments, and cohesive and proud communities. from other cities. In Surakarta, Indonesia, for instance, the Unfortunately, rising property values and real estate demand mayor led the inclusive relocation of over a thousand squatter are pushing modest-income households out to peripheral households and informal vendors and extended welfare services regions and are threatening the unique kampung ecosystem to poor migrants.153 Likewise, in Jakarta, where even given and the resilience of poor communities. Unprecedented spatial that city’s fraught context, thousands of the poorest kampung expansion, traffic congestion, and nonexistent public transit are households benefited from in situ upgrading and low-rise further burdening the poor. redevelopment under the Kampung Deret program.154 Another example comes from Thailand’s Baan Mankong program, where Although decentralization empowers cities to design better participatory upgrading has included squatters and has involved policies and customized implementation plans, Surabaya numerous civil society stakeholders.155 experienced growing pains after the sudden change in national governance in 1999 and received limited guidance or support Charismatic individuals like Silas and Mayor Risma have along with newfound autonomy. This explains why CKIP, been instrumental in transforming attitudes and institutions Surabaya’s postdecentralization KIP variant for community-led in Surabaya. To ensure that their transformative energy and economic development, was much less impactful. Upgrading prowess will endure, it is important that reform-oriented efforts have since dwindled. The incumbent mayor, Risma, is thinking and progressive leadership be institutionalized by avowedly pro-poor and pro-kampung; nonetheless, she favors expanding the range of involved stakeholders. More critical rusunawa because the city only has to provide the land and the research is needed to grow the emerging scholarship on national government pays the construction costs. Yet demand leadership in governance and planning156—something local for these public rental housing flats far outstrips supply, and universities, public agencies, and CSOs could promote locally rusunawa discourage the poor’s home-based livelihoods. The and nationally. With land pressures intensifying and prices execution of reform measures that Mayor Risma has introduced soaring, private sector development supported by government has been aided by the existence of adequate capacity and trust leaders threaten the city’s admirable shelter planning legacy in the city’s departments and communities, due to efforts dating and public good imperative.157 Relying solely on the KIP or back to the earliest KIPs. Still, the fact that Risma continues CKIP approaches may not be sufficient to respond to the to deny migrants access to rusunawa, welfare, and work, or increasing complexities of today’s urban development context. encourages them to move out of the city entirely, reflects an institutional history of prejudice against poor migrants and has proved counterproductive to the city’s progressive reforms.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 23 APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

INTERVIEW DATE POSITION AND AFFILIATION NUMBER 1 August 10, 2017 Johan Silas, public university professor; KIP founder 2 August 10, 2017 City planning official 3 August 13, 2017 Private sector and civil society representative (architecture, urbanism) 4 August 14, 2017 Private citizen (upper-middle class) 5 August 16, 2017 Public university professor (environmental engineering) 6 August 16, 2017 Private sector representative (senior director with real estate developer) 7 August 16, 2017 Private sector representative (architect with real estate developer) 8 August 18, 2017 Private university professor (architecture) 9 August 18, 2017 Private university professor (architecture) 10 August 19, 2017 Civil society representative and grassroots activist 11 August 20, 2017 Foreign university professor (arts, architecture) and civil society representative 12 August 20, 2017 Civil society representative (product design, urbanism) 13 August 20, 2017 Private citizen (lower-middle class) 14 August 21, 2017 Public university researcher (architecture, housing) 15 August 21, 2017 Public university researcher (architecture, housing) 16 August 22, 2017 Private university researcher (architecture, civil society) 17 August 23, 2017 Tri Rismaharini, Mayor of Surabaya 18 August 23, 2017 Private citizen (lower-middle class) 19 August 24, 2017 City planning official 20 August 25, 2017 Public university professor and researcher (architecture, housing)

24 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

ENDNOTES 24. Rukmana, 2015. 25. MLIT, 2017. 1. Beard et al., 2016. 26. MLIT, 2017. 2. In the national language (Bahasa Indonesia), the word kampung refers to formal low-income settlements, traditional 27. Das, 2018b: 244; Tunas and Darmoyono, 2014: 168. neighborhoods, and squatter settlements, as well as village 28. Swanendri, 2002. or hometown. Unlike the common perception of a slum, many kampung were never illegal encroachments. However, prior to 29. World Bank, 1995. upgrading, most had slum-like physical and socioeconomic 30. Interview 1. conditions. We use the term kampung to denote both the singular 31. Mukoko and Supriharjo, 1996: 63. and the plural meanings. 32. Wakely and Riley, 2011: 27. 3. Urban upgrading, slum upgrading, or just upgrading are similar terms that reflect personal preferences, nuances in the literature, 33. Authors’ conversion of figures, cited by Mukoko and Supriharjo or contextual differences. This paper uses them interchangeably; (1996: 65), using historical rates provided by the currency unless specified otherwise, in Indonesia they imply upgrading converter FXTOP, https://fxtop.com. kampung. 34. Mukoko and Supriharjo, 1996: 65. 4. Silas, 2016; Das, 2018b. 35. Banes, 2001: 11. 5. King et al., 2017. 36. World Bank, 1995: 13–14. 6. Inspired by Surabaya’s success, KIPs were implemented in many 37. World Bank, 1993: 61. cities as part of national five-year development programs, but there was no nationwide slum upgrading plan. Few cities do 38. World Bank, 1995; Patton and Subanu, 1988; and scores of initiate a slum upgrading plan on their own, without national articles on individual projects. support. 39. World Bank, 1995. 7. Das, 2017; Ostojic et al., 2013: 139. 40. BSHF, 2004. 8. A portmanteau term alluding to the names of Surabaya and six 41. World Bank, 1995: 20, 53. neighboring regencies. 42. Das, 2008: 243–44; Swanendri, 2002. 9. World Bank, 2012. 43. Swanendri, 2002: 185; World Bank, 1995. 10. Dick et al., 2002; IE Singapore, 2014. 44. Swanendri, 2002. 11. Beard et al., 2016. 45. Das, 2008: 245–46. 12. Beard et al., 2016: 7. 46. Das, 2015c. 13. Mahendra and Seto, 2019; Roy and AlSayyad, 2004. 47. Das, 2015c: 260. 14. Roy, 2005. 48. Das, 2015b: 26; Antlöv et al., 2010: 434. 15. Mahendra and Seto, 2019. 49. Das, 2015a. 16. Das, 2018b. 50. Interview 1. 17. World Bank, 2016b. 51. Das, 2008, 2015a. 18. World Bank, 2016b. 52. Das, 2015a: 17. 19. Gibson, 2017. 53. Das, 2015b. 20. Silas, 1989. 54. The LPP (until 2002) and two private civil engineering/ 21. Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001. construction consultants— Cipta Surya Wahana (CSW) (2003– 22. Das, 2018b; Tunas and Darmoyono, 2014. 2005) and Compagnie Vereniging Triwira Jasatama (2006– 2007)—were the only ones the city appointed as so-called NGO 23. Most recently, through the Mayoral Regulations (Peraturan Wali facilitators (Das, 2008: 303–4). In part, this reflects Indonesia’s Kota) of 2016 (e.g., nos. 33, 43, 44, 45, 69). ambiguity and ambivalence about NGOs—a New Order vestige (Eldridge, 2006).

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 25 55. Das, 2015a. 88. The traditional prototype is a yellow, lidded receptacle made of recycled rubber tires. Concrete cubes are more common now, and 56. Interviews 14 and 15. the use of different colored plastic bins, for organic and inorganic 57. Roy, 2005; Tacoli et al., 2014. waste, is spreading fast. 58. See Das (2017) on why it is imprudent to deny services to poor 89. Silas, 1998. migrants who do not possess KTP. 90. Das, 2015c: 260. 59. Das, 2015c. 91. Interview 18; Das, 2015c: 262. 60. Interview 15. 92. Das, 2008: 265–66. 61. World Bank, 2016a: 47. 93. Interview 18. 62. Das, 2017; Rolnik, 2013. 94. Interviews 2, 3, and 4. 63. Das, 2017; Taylor, 2015. 95. Interview 17. 64. Interviews 10 and 16. 96. Diliani and Susanti (2015) argue that her approach is perceived 65. Interview 10. as being “motherly”; Fionna, 2017. 66. Interview 10; Das, 2017. 97. IE Singapore, 2014. 67. Interview 10. 98. Interview 19. 68. Taylor, 2015. 99. Interview 17. 69. Squatter communities were demolished on August 12, 2016, just 100. Risma personally monitors major intersections from her office days after Surabaya hosted PrepCom3—the final deliberations using a wall of large LCD screens with live closed-circuit television before Habitat-III in Quito, where the New Urban Agenda was feeds. adopted. 101. Star2.com, 2018. 70. Perumnas has since built over half a million rusunawa and 102. The two main sources are the land and building tax and the rusunami units (see http://perumnas.co.id). property transfer tax (von Haldenwang et al., 2015). 71. Rusunawa is a portmanteau term for rumah susun sederhana 103. Based on figures provided by mayoral staff in Surabaya over sewa, and rusunami for rumah susun sederhana milik. multiple days, August 2017. 72. Interview 1. 104. For instance, see Turner, 1977. 73. Interview 1. 105. Interview 1. As a young, inspired architect during the mid-1960s, 74. Das, 2018b. Johan Silas and a few like-minded architects established the first 75. Das, 2018b. three architecture schools in Surabaya, including those at Petra Christian University and the ITS. Soekotjo had appreciated these 76. Rolnik, 2013: 9–10. The aim of the program was to build 1,000 efforts and knew Silas as his firm’s civil defense volunteer with towers by 2011; however, by 2012 only about 100 had been built the army—a mandatory requirement then. (Pathoni, 2012). 106. Colombijn, 2016. 77. Beritasatu, 2015. 107. Interviews 1 and 5. 78. Rismaharini, 2016. 108. As an undergraduate architecture student, she successfully 79. Previously, rusunawa renters were allowed to reside for a persuaded Silas to use her as his research assistant on the maximum of nine years, including extensions. Dupak rusunawa project. 80. Yuniati, 2013. 109. For more information on the city’s awards and recognition, see its 81. Widoyoko, 2007; Yuniati, 2013. official website, http://surabaya.go.id/id/cari?q=penghargaan. 82. Tunas and Darmoyono, 2014. 110. Indonesia’s Ministry of the Environment initiated this competition in 1986 to recognize cities for cleanliness and environmental 83. Rusunawa Sombo (1994), designed by a Silas-led LPP team, management. It stopped in 1997 and was resumed in 2002. For exemplifies how patient community consultations and careful details, see Dethier, 2017. design re-created kampung life in vertical space (field visit; interviews 11 and 12). 111. Silas, 1998. 84. Mukhija et al., 2015. 112. Fortune, 2015. 85. Interview 6. 113. Interview 20. 86. Das, 2017. 114. Interview 9. 87. Das, 2017; interviews 1, 5, 11, 14, 15, 19, and 20. 115. Interview 18; Das, 2008: 295.

26 | Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

116. Surabaya’s population growth rate fell from around 3 percent 138. Das, 2017: 16; Taylor, 2015. in 1980 to 0.65 percent in 2010 (Ostojic et al., 2013: 139). 139. Interviews 8 and 9. Among Indonesia’s 11 largest cities, Surabaya’s projected rate of population growth through 2025 is the lowest (see World Bank, 140. Kundu and Kundu, 2010; Rumbach, 2014. 2012: 25.) 141. Interview 17. 117. World Bank, 1995: 7. 142. Interview 17; Jawa Pos, 2017. 118. World Bank, 1995. 143. Interview 9; Das, 2017. 119. Interviews 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, and 20. 144. Interview 19. 120. Multiple Tunjungan Plaza (TP) malls have since appeared on 145. Interview 9. adjacent sites; the latest, TP-VI, became operational in 2017. Out 146. Das, 2018a. of 14 shopping centers and mixed-use retail projects that were to start operating from 2016 (Salanto, 2015: 16), 5 have opened 147. Das, 2018a; Kumar et al., 2016. and another 5 should be functional before 2021 (Salanto, 2018: 148. For a long time, Indonesia’s transmigration program (transmigrasi) 2, Retail). relocated landless people from densely populated to sparsely 121. Interview 6. populated regions, but this also induced ethnic strife, communal violence, and separatist movements (Fearnside, 1997). 122. Salanto, 2015: 2. 149. King et al., 2017. 123. Interview 3. 150. Antlöv et al., 2010. 124. In 2013, it was 233 percent, and in 2014 it was 207 percent (see Salanto, 2015: 9.) 151. Das, 2018a. 125. Interview 3. 152. Das, 2018b. 126. Local currency figures were converted using the 1980 US$ 153. Taylor, 2015. exchange rate at 627. 154. Rukmana, 2015. 127. Interview 18. Local currency figures were converted using the 155. Das, 2018b; WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities, 2016. 2017 US$ exchange rate from the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) at 13,380.87. 156. Berman and Haque, 2015; Fahmi et al., 2016. 128. Interview 6. Local currency figures were converted using the 2017 157. Interview 10; Rolnik, 2013. US$ exchange rate from OECD at 13,380.87. 129. Interview 6. 130. Pugh, 1992; Sivam, 2002. 131. Interview 9. 132. Today, a 20 km commute by car from Surabaya’s edge to neighboring Sidoarjo takes up to three hours (interview 16). 133. Almost every key informant pointed to this as Surabaya’s key planning lacuna. 134. Bertaud and Bertaud, 2012: 5. 135. Interviews 1, 19, and 20. 136. Interview 3; Bertaud and Bertaud, 2012. 137. The difficulty of coordinating with the national government to expand Jl. Achmadyani, a major road, led Mayor Risma to instead seek its approbation to acquire adjoining land to construct five one-way lanes on either side of the existing road.⁠ However, it is nearly impossible for pedestrians and nonmotorized traffic to cross this 4.3 km stretch (interviews 9 and 19).

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World Bank. 2016a. Indonesia—National Slum Upgrading Project. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Washington, DC: World Bank Group. This case study owes special gratitude to Johan Silas—his work, insights, and World Bank. 2016b. Indonesia’s Urban Story. Washington, DC: cooperation are central to its contribution. Sincere thanks also go to Andarita World Bank. Rolalisasi, Wahyu Setyawan, Gunawan Tanuwidjaja, and Gde Dwija Wardana for sharing with us their deep knowledge of the city and their connections to World Bank. 2017. "Access to Electricity, Urban (% of Urban facilitate our field research. Happy Santosa, Indriana Sri Susanthi Wardhani, Population) - Indonesia." The World Bank. https://data.worldbank. Koko Prasetyo, and Prana Kemal Yudistira provided invaluable logistical org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.UR.ZS?locations=ID. Accessed Oct 15, support. We will remain indebted to all the key informants we interviewed for warmly welcoming us into their offices, homes, and communities and 2019. spending hours sharing with us their personal experiences and opinions. WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities. 2016. “Inclusive We especially appreciate the staff of Mayor Tri Rismaharini, who worked to arrange our meeting amidst her always hectic schedule. In addition, we City Development: City-Wide Slum Upgrading and salute Surabaya’s institutions, kampung communities, and squatters for their Housing Development—Somsook Booyanbacha.” YouTube dedication and struggle to make and keep the city a true inspiration. Mulya video, May 26. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_ Amri and the late Asrizal Luthfi deserve special thanks for providing prompt and continue=13&v=MJ9aAolNSDI. Accessed May 15, 2019. essential clarifications to ensure the accuracy of intricacies of Indonesian local governance and planning. Yuniati, V. 2013. “Inclusionary Housing in Indonesia: The Role of Balanced Residential Ratio 1:3:6 in Makassar.” Master’s thesis, We are grateful to Victoria Beard and Anjali Mahendra for inviting us to produce Erasmus University. this case study and for their astute observations and beneficial comments throughout the process. Precise, nuanced criticism by external reviewers— Minerva Novero-Belec, Darshini Mahadevia, Lois Takahashi, and Michael Woolcock—as well as WRI’s internal reviewers—Ani Dasgupta, Anjali Mahendra, Nirata "Koni" Samadhi, Henrique Evers, Hiromi Hashimoto, Emily Matthews, and Retno Wihanesta—on draft versions greatly enhanced this report’s quality. The shortcomings that remain are squarely ours. The case study was supported by the WRI team in Washington, DC, including Jillian Du and Maria Hart, who offered consistent and detailed support and communication throughout this process. We also thank Lauri Scherer for valuable editorial assistance. We also thank the communications team, including Tini Tran, Craig Brownstein, Schuyler Null, Talia Rubnitz, and Veronica Linares, who helped with messaging and outreach, as well as Romain Warnault, Billie Kanfer, and Carni Klirs for their assistance with graphics and layout.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 31 ABOUT THIS WORLD ABOUT WORLD RESOURCES REPORT RESOURCES INSTITUTE This is the seventh city case study of transformative urban change in a series of World Resources Institute is a global research organization that turns big case studies that, together with a set of sectoral and thematic papers, compose ideas into action at the nexus of environment, economic opportunity, and the World Resources Report (WRR): Towards a More Equal City. The series human well-being. includes case studies of cities in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. To obtain electronic copies of this paper and others, and to view supporting materials, Our Challenge please visit www.citiesforall.org. Natural resources are at the foundation of economic opportunity and human well-being. But today, we are depleting Earth’s resources at rates that are not sustainable, endangering economies and people’s lives. People FUNDERS depend on clean water, fertile land, healthy forests, and a stable climate. We deeply appreciate the following donors for their generous Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a sustainable planet. We financial support: must address these urgent, global challenges this decade.

United Kingdom Department for International Development Our Vision Stephen M. Ross Philanthropies We envision an equitable and prosperous planet driven by the wise Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs management of natural resources. We aspire to create a world where the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs actions of government, business, and communities combine to eliminate Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency poverty and sustain the natural environment for all people.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Ashok Das is an associate professor in the Department of Urban and ABOUT WRI ROSS CENTER FOR Regional Planning, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UHM), and an affiliate SUSTAINABLE CITIES faculty of UHM’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Center for South Asian Studies. Previously, he was an assistant professor in San WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities helps create accessible, equitable, Francisco State University’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning; an healthy, and resilient urban areas for people, businesses, and the architecture and planning consultant in the United States and India; and environment to thrive. Together with partners, it enables more connected, the chief cartoonist for Architecture+Design, India’s leading architecture compact, and coordinated cities. The Center expands the transport and magazine. Das researches institutional challenges and innovations in urban development expertise of the EMBARQ network to catalyze innovative providing services and affordable shelter to ameliorate urban poverty in the solutions in other sectors, including water, buildings, land use, and energy. Asia-Pacific region, especially in Indonesia and India. It combines the research excellence of WRI with 15 years of on-the-ground impact through a network of more than 250 experts working from Brazil, Robin King is the Director for Knowledge Capture and Collaboration for China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey to make cities around WRI’s Ross Center for Sustainable Cities. Her research focuses on urban the world better places to live. economics, comparative urban development, and inclusive transit-oriented development. More information at www.wrirosscities.org.

Copyright 2019 World Resources Institute. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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