IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 24 The Civil War in Syria Keys survival untilnow. sions of its divi- opponents have certainly contributed the to its dictatorships, Arab toppled recently other than ruthless and resilient more proven has regime national backers. It will be shown that, while the Ba’ath use of violence and the various goals of different inter- between insiders and exiles, over the role of Islam, the divisions the examines theincreasingly It and elements. armed powerful political the both conflict; of years two after opposition Syria’s of state the siders ed and effective front against Assad. This article con- third year, Syria’s opposition has failed to form a unit- the uprising has as evolved into a and civil war that now toll enters its their taken have repression of ades dec- the Yet unexpected. more the all 2011 March the uprising against President Assad that broke out in making years, fifty nearly for institutions government by depoliticised actively been have Syrians loyalists. with packed and out hollowed organisations gious reli- many and unions trade with weak, extremely was were banned or co-opted by the regime. Civil society and membership outlawed, while rival political parties crushed violently were Brotherhood, Muslim the of opposition. Militant opponents, such as Syria’s branch little tolerated and has (2000-present) (1970-2000) al-Assad Bashar Hafez by dominated been and 1963 since Syria ruled has that regime Ba’ath The Queen Mary, UniversityofLondon School ofPolitics andInternationalRelations Middle East Lecturer intheInternationalRelationsof Christopher Phillips of OppositiontotheSyrianRegime The Civil War inSyria: The Variety The CivilWar inSyria 1 was finalisedbefore June2013(Editor'snote). Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme. His first book, Christopher Phillips is Lecturer in the International Relations of the Middle East at Queen Mary, University of London and Associate Fellow at the 1 Everyday Arab Identity , was published by Routledge in 2012. This article Brotherhood, were as surprised by the uprising as uprising the by surprised as were Brotherhood, Muslim the including abroad, exile from operating many groups, opposition older of remnants The single, viablemovementlateron. a into opposition all channel to attempts to obstacle major a prove would that something uncoordinated, and parochial was uprising the outset the from hand, other the On threat. a posed have may that key leaders any eliminate and locate to unable Assad with grew,only movement protest the yet detained, sands thou- saw uprising the of months first The activists. stand the mass detentions, and later executions, of its with- could Syria across activities LCCs’various the hand, with no central organisation or national leaders, a blessing and a curse for the opposition. On the one both proved protests early these of nature leaderless re- the gime’s from emanated violence any and peaceful brutal crackdown, most evidence suggests they were his justify to armed were protestors that insisted sad As- While manner. uncoordinated and spontaneous (LCCs)Committees a in Syria across all up sprung – Coordination Local the – committees these cerns, con- economic short-term and forces security sad’s reflecting long-term resentment at the indignity of As- Tunisiaand and Egypt in protests similar by Inspired beyond. and Hama Homs, Banias, in followed that sition groups led the first protests in Deraa and those oppo- established than rather notables local and ists activ- of committees formed Hastily players. external and internal between divided was opposition political Syria’s 2011, March in unrest of outbreak the From The FailureofPoliticalOpposition , the Shabiha the provocateurs, agent militias. The The militias. after decades of persecution (Phillips, 2012). From 2012). (Phillips, persecution of decades after ground the on base activist tiny a having it despite Brotherhood, Muslim Syrian the allies their by nated domi- be to came it Party, AK ruling Turkey’s from pressure Under exiles. by dominated was it giance, alle- pledged individuals and LCCs some though and, Syria inside territory no held It counterpart. yan Istanbul in August 2011 was very different to its Lib - first step in defeating Assad. Yet the SNC formed in tight Syrian opposition group might be formed as the (NTC), similarly a Council hoped was It Gaddafi. Muammar against Transitional National the group, opposition coordinated Libya’s supporting militarily Turkey,and was Qatar Arabia, Saudi powers gional re- key and UN the NATO,of time blessing the with the At opposition. the for address’ ‘an desired and LCCs the of structure leaderless the at frustrated grew governments foreign Assad, on turning After 2011. August in down stand to him on called ally rack Obama and several other world leaders eventu- ating diplomatic and economic sanctions before Ba- brutality, urging him instead to reform, and then initi- Assad’s condemn to reluctant initially govern- were Westernments and Arab powers. foreign from received it support considerable the for not it were group to emerge, the Syrian National exile Council (SNC), major first the faced have may fate same The provocateurs, theShabihamilitias emanated fromtheregime’sagent they werepeacefulandanyviolence crackdown, mostevidencesuggests were armedtojustifyhisbrutal While insistedthatprotestors Assad attracted littlepopularsupport(Sayigh,2013). Kilo’s Michel and Hussein’s Louay as such were, efforts secular and democratic these though Well-intentioned LCCs. the to leadership offering of hope the in before decade a Assad by liquidated those to similar forums created Spring,’ ‘Damascus 2000 short-lived the of oppositionists veteran the protests, early by untouched largely Damascus, In relevant to a spontaneous and leaderless movement. themselves make to struggled and itself, regime the , they Platform, Democratic Syrian Building the Syrian State Syrian the Building directly. Finally, it remained plagued by internal divi - internal by plagued remained it Finally,directly. militia armed and impotence SNC’s the recognised eventually powers these even groups, rebel armed and backers external between channel a become some provided funds and weapons for the SNC in eventually the hope it could Turkey and Qatar bia, Ara- Saudi in allies NTC While legitimacy. domestic with Libya’s provided had that its backers from Western intervention armed the secure not could loyalty. It their command and fighters the to relevant itself make to failed then it and 2012, February in ing the new violent strategy only after many disputes endors- slowly, reacted SNC The back. fighting ed doned the peaceful approach of the LCCs and start- autumn 2011 when after locally formed armed important rebel groups aban- more the all became ground. This the on deliverables into support national Secondly, the SNC was unable to translate its inter- did nottrust. Muslim Brotherhood whom the largely secular Kurds a post-Assad Syria and, again, the dominance of the the by in autonomy deterred Kurdish countenance to refusal SNC’s were regime, Ba’ath the by tion persecu- historical their despite (10%), Kurds ia’s Syr- Even justified. appeared fears these language, sectarian using When emerged later triumph. militia jihadist Sunni to they were non-Sunnis persecution and feared (65%), majority Arab Sunni the ments, the SNC was perceived as mainly a voice for mained loyal or neutral. Despite a few token appoint- population), re- largely who the (3%), Druze of and (10%) Christians (10% sect Alawi own sad’s support of Syria’s minority communities such as As- importantly, the SNC proved unable to win the mass More regime. the to close too was it claiming tion, negotia- favoured that (NCC) Change Democratic for Committee Coordination National formed newly the with work to refused it while veterans, Spring Muslim Brotherhood put off many secular Damascus the of dominance The it. join to oppositionists key hoped are manifold. Firstly, it failed to convince other had backers external its and it way the in opposition Syria’s unite to failure SNC’s the for reasons The hijacking theirrevolution. and touch of out being for ground, exiles the criticised the who on activists among credibility of lack a by and powers, external by together forced larists ticularly between the Muslim Brotherhood and secu- its inception, internal divisions plagued the SNC, par­

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 25 The Civil War in Syria Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 26 The Civil War in Syria Keys d t aiiy o oto ay ees hy re and armed they rebels any control to ability its ed impotent as the SNC. Western governments doubt- as appearing help, not did rebels for weaponry ern Westsecure to - SOC the of inability continued The independently. operated largely support pledge did that those even and it, recognise to refused Nusra, al- Jubhat jihadist the notably groups, armed many proxy.TurkishSimilarly Qatari a and as it dismissing (PYD), Party Union Democratic the powerful, most the with join, to refused again groups Kurdish ia’s Syr- position, presidential vice third a offered being Despite emerged. soon problems familiar However, transformed intoacivilwar Syria’s peacefuluprisingwas casualties, inthesummerof2011 capable ofcausingsustained fighting back inorganisedunits one, oncetheoppositionstarted reportedly killingciviliansfromday While forceswere Assad’s ately announcedtheirsupport. and Army Syrian Aleppo’s Tawhid Brigade, Free discussed below, immedi- the including ground, the on groups fighting key SNC, the unlike Moreover, Brotherhood. Muslim the counter by domination to of claims vice-Presidents, as and himself al-Atassi, Seif Suheir Riad secularists, two and dent mascus’ Umayyad mosque, Moaz al-Khatib as Presi- Da- of Imam former the Islamist, moderate pendent inde- an elected they Similarly, rest. the up made others and representatives LCC while seats 63 its of third a only SNC the giving by divide nal-external of the SNC’s weaknesses, such as healing the inter- some addressed It Arabia. Saudi Turkeyand Qatar, EU, US, the by encouraged again 2012, November in Kuwait in formed was (SOC) Forces Opposition and Revolutionary Syrian for Coalition National new a Seif, Riad member SNC by proposal a Following opposition. the reboot to sought opponents tional interna- Assad’s ineffective, proving SNC the With President first Bourhan Ghalion. its and Kodmani, Bassma person spokes- al-Manna, Haytham activist veteran cluding in- resignations profile high several to leading sions, both tactically and ideologically. There now exists in exists now ideologically.There and tactically both evolved conflict the as task daunting a faced rebels thus armed The them. joined have to rumoured were fighters Guard Republican Iranian and bollah by Hez- 20,000 to up while resupplied arms, Iranian and Russian and well-trained government remained remaining troops the so, Even 2013. early by this halved nearly had casualties and defections a into civil war. Though Assad transformed started with 200,000 was troops, uprising peaceful Syria’s causing sustained casualties, in the summer of 2011 of capable units organised in back fighting started opposition the once one, day from civilians killing reportedly were forces Assad’s While ground. the on developments to much owed has leadership tive The inability for the political opposition to offer effec- The AscendencyofrmedGroups had fadedfast. opposition effective and united need much the vide oppositionist 2013 the high hopes that the SOC could finally pro- Christian veteran George Sabra replaced Khatib as President, by mid- and remained Hitto While interference. Qatari at anger his gested West’s continued refusal on arms, but rumours sug- the at frustration to due officially quit, also himself ib ing vice-President Atassi, to resign. Days later Khat- and Turkey, prompted twelve SOC members, includ- ceived to be close to the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar per- Hitto, Ghassan to premiership the of awarding the and process, selection the of nature democratic at anArab seat League summit hosted by Qatar that Syria’s month. The un- to take and fighters, bel administer territory in northern Syria now held by re- into appointing a government in exile, theoretically to SOC reluctant a pushed Turkey, and Qatar trons, pa- key two example, for 2013, March In tension. of The influence of external members. powers was another source SOC many by denounced immediately something conditions, certain under regime the with announced in January 2013 that he would negotiate sions remained, such as when Khatib controversially divi- policy of matters On executive. SOC’s the ed dominat- Brotherhood, Muslim the extension by and SNC, the LCCthat the complained of still members structure, command balanced the Despite coalition. the within continuing divisions the by alarmed were questions over the type of Islamism a militia adhered Brother- Muslim hood-dominated SNC in December 2011. However the with aligned Asaad Colonel all after FSA, Sunni mostly the for problem no was itself Islamism radicalisation. to led conflict the of ity of most others, whom were for already pious Sunni Muslims, the brutal- Gulf, the in donors servative gain much needed weaponry and support from con- to tactic a was this some For Islamist. overtly more became militia different the escalated, conflict the As problem. a proved FSA the of nature centralised northern Syria were in rebel hands. of However, the stretches de- large year-end by and Aleppo, of city second the on they assault major a launch summer to able were late the In weapons. sophisticated more capture to bases army Syrian overrun to able were units rebel Turkishborders, and Lebanese the over channels through Arabia, Saudi and key,Qatar cess. Aided materially and logistically by allies in Tur- suc- significant enjoying was FSA the mid-2012 By and Idlibgovernorates. Hama Homs, the in particularly forming, brigades FSA local new and army Syrian the from defecting thousands of tens with nevertheless, grew sation FSA’sthe However organi- 2011. and late numbers rebels in Rastan and the Bab Amr district of Homs in the to out meted were defeats crushing with army one-sided, professional well-armed regime’s the early the and Consequently,units FSA self-declared these between clashes control. centralised tle lit- with forming units local and spontaneous earlier: LCCsthe months as pattern same the followed tion opposi- move- armed the of evolution his the Instead, ments. restricted initially government Ankara the where base, Turkish his from control little very to be members of the FSA, Colonel Asaad exercised litia quickly formed inside Syria declaring themselves mi- though However, force. military by Assad topple to messages, video online by intention, his claring Turkey,de- in al-Asaad, exile Ri’ad in colonel fected de- a by 2011 July in founded was It core. ganised French Resistance, although it does also have an or- the to akin perhaps purpose, similar a with militia of range diverse a together holding loosely ganisation tional militia. It is best understood as an umbrella or- conven- a being from far is it although (FSA), Army The most high-profile armed group is the Free Syrian beliefs, loyalties andagendas(Lund,2012,2013). opposing with militia different many Syria with asimilarpurpose together adiverserangeofmilitia looselyholding umbrella organisation militia. Itisbestunderstoodasan it isfarfrombeingaconventional although the FreeSyrianArmy(FSA), The mosthigh-profilearmedgroupis formed in summer 2012 with a clear Salafist ideology group, umbrella an is This SILF). - Front Liberation Islamic (Syrian al-Islamiya al-Souriya al-Tahrir hat The most significant group allied to Idriss is the Jab- the moremoderatemilitia. depleting often them, join to likely are Syrians tant mili- young more the is, group certain a successful more the Importantly, allies. SOC its and FSA the opposing totally others and control, Idriss’direct of ally fighting under the name of the but FSA, well out has been done by other groups, some allied to and year occasion- past the in Assad against fighting successful the of most However, extremists. to ons weap- sending of fearful Westernpowers by armed be to pushing been has SOC the rebels’that erate ‘mod- the of consists defectors of body disciplined control over around 10,000 fighters. This small well- direct has only actually he estimate analysts but er, command- rebel top the as recognition international enjoys certainly and Assad, fighting groups armed all command to claims Idriss command. effective role and the FSA’s Chief of Staff, Salim Idriss, figurehead given a into sidelined was Asaad militia. the on command centralised of kind some impose to attempt an in 2012 December in reorganised fore there- was structure command FSA the agement, encour- outside With backers. external rebels’ the alarmed leadership, political the of failures the like leadership, military rebel single a of absence The and hiscommandstructure. Asaad with do to little had media Western in FSA the as to referred groups most 2012 late by regime, Assad’s of enemy common the against continued cooperation While FSA. the of structure localised ly that opened further divisions within the already high- differences ideological created Jihadist to to Salafist Brotherhood) Muslim (often moderate from to,

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 27 The Civil War in Syria Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 28 The Civil War in Syria Keys the most prominent of which, Jubhat al-Nusra (the al-Nusra Jubhat which, of prominent most the an emerged, have groups jihadist extreme further even At SOC. and FSA the with association fused re- have militias other the war, civil multi-facetted cating the often-blurred nature of allegiances in this indi- umbrella, FSA the within is Homs of Brigade fighters. While one member of the coalition, the Haqq 13,000-25,000 have militias their estimate Analysts militia. al-Sham Ahrar the by dominated and SILF, sounding similarly the than Salafists stricter SIF), – Jabha al-Islamiya al-Souriya (the Syrian Islamic Front al- is coalition One mid-2012. since emerged have Several other powerful radical Islamist armed groups leadership tofail viable andeffectiveunitedpolitical caused allattemptstocreatea by differentforeignpowershas Islamists, andbetweenthosebacked and internalactors,secularists overcome divisionsbetweenexiled The politicalopposition’sinabilityto jihadist banner. from black a apart under instead operating groups radical more them set to primarily seems this today SOC), and SNC the allies political their (and FSA the under three-starred fight still they While posts. border and bases air regime capturing successes multiple ing enjoy- brigades, Tawhid and Farouq the particularly fighters, SILF well-drilled with trend, this of tinuation con- a seen has 2013 Early launched. once it port gade’s planned assault, and then felt obliged to sup- Tawhidthe prevent to Bri- unable was but attack, an opposed council military FSA’slocal the of head the was seen This during the assault on Aleppo independent. in July 2012, when essentially are they Idriss, command FSA the councils created in December 2012 nominally under on sit commanders these of some While Iraq. and Jordan Libya, from fighters,particularly foreign by some aided fighters, 37,000 approximately have they Reportedly, Aleppo. from originally Brigade, Tawhid the and Homs, from nally origi- Brigades, Farouq the including militia, cessful suc- most and largest Syria’s of some contains and originally associated with the the with associated originally Istiqlal helped train the Popular Protection Units (YPG), (YPG), Units Protection Popular the train helped also has Barzani Barzani. Regional Massoud Kurdish Government, Iraq’s of President the of sion supervi - close the under (KNC), Council National Kurdish the form to 2011 in differences own their aside put to able were that groups Kurdish Syrian er, it has historically been opposed by many smaller Howev- withdrew. forces Assad’s after targets civil inevitably moved to take control of most military and and group Kurdish best-armed and organised most Syria’s was this 2011, Before PKK. the separatists, Turkish-Kurdish the of branch Syrian the (PYD), ty Dominating the region is the Democratic Union Par- united.Yet from groups. far rebel are any Kurds the regime’s withdrawal, they have refused to align with the following vacuum power the filled and formed have militia secular- Kurdish while the such, As Kurds. to minded appealing more no prove would Islamism rebels’ the that estimated correctly sad As- the rule, Ba’athist under suffered While long have Kurds region. Kurdish north-eastern from Syria’s withdrew strategically he elsewhere losses suffered Assad As militias. Kurdish the are armed fighters of range diverse the complicating Further ists andotherrebelgroups. jihad- the between conflict open into tensions over boil may these before, even or falls, Assad once that expect Many rebels. any to arms sending from powers foreign deterring is Salafists and hadists ji- the of radicalism the that complained have FSA and SOC the while capture, its in after soon reported Raqqa SILF’s were al-Nusra the and between Brigades Farouq Clashes risen. have ten- sions but Assad, against cooperated largely have SIF al-Nusra, far Thus erty looting employed by many FSA-affiliated militia. prop- the from abstaining and Aleppo of parts torn war- to aid distributing by ground the some on support won have they State, Islamic an tablishing SOC, rejecting its pluralist approach in favour of es- the recognise to Refusing 2013. March capital, in Raqqa, governorate first the capturing including victories, stunning some brought larger has This groups. theoretically than cohesion and discipline an estimated 5-10,000 fighters, but boasts superior al- Qaeda in Iraq for during the Iraqi civil war, al-Nusra has fought who Syrians and Iraqis by Swelled 2013). Blake, and (Benotman 2013 April in Qaeda al-Nusra openly Front), declared its allegiance to al- n te S/IF alliance FSA/SILF the and tional community from direct military intervention or interna- reluctant already an deterred have sions fective united political leadership to fail. These divi- ef- and viable a create to attempts all caused has powers foreign different by backed be- those and tween Islamists, and secularists actors, ternal in- and exiled between divisions overcome to bility ina- opposition’s political The blame. some shares opposition the forecast, grim this for responsible most are regime murderous his and Assad While failed a state looksadistinctpossibility. into Syria of collapse The defeated. how some- is Assad if even groups rebel between tinue con- could conflict civil them, over control exercise to opposition political the for inability the and day, to- Syria in operating groups armed different the of nature fractious the given Moreover, soon. time any end an to war the bringing and triumphing side ther ei- see to hard is victory,it outright achieve to ened weak too forces Assad’s but front, united a provide to failing opposition the With displaced. million 3 than more left and 100,000 over killed President has that war against civil vicious a into descended has al-Assad movement Bashar protest a peaceful erupted, demonstrations since years two the In Conclusion: WhileDamascusBurns ia’s civilwar,butitseemsunlikelytolast. has region been relatively peaceful in the first two years of Syr- Kurdish The control. central reassert to attempt either should troops, Assad’s or rebels the with clash may groups both sustained, is truce ni’s key ally, Turkey. Moreover, even if the PYD-KNC Barza- with conflict resume allies PKK PYD’s the if Assad. However, this truce may not hold, especially to effectively power share in the regions vacated by agreement in July 2012 an between the PYD and KNC brokered also Barzani militia. KNC’s the tively effec- but force, civil PYD-KNC joint a theoretically - S P L L L B References defeat Assadand,afterthat,holdSyriatogether. to ever is it if better far cards its play to needs it but hand, tough very a dealt been have may opposition the occasion, which they have largely failed to do. The to rise to opponents Assad’s circum- required have stances the Nevertheless, surmount. to able been yet has leader no that character parochial and ised decentral- opposition, a elements, armed and political its the in both gave – suppression of history this over, the localised nature of the uprising – because of uprisings that occurred independently spontaneous in 2011. More- the lead to position a in were groups opposition few suppression, of decades After huge. been has opposition the facing task the fairness, In have thrived. tives, and in the absence of this, radical alternatives groups fighting in Syria from becoming loyal opera- armed various the dissuaded has weaponry eign for- attract and unite to inability this turn, the armed In rebels. to weaponry significant sending from und und und hillips ayigh eno International Affairs (UI-SIIA), Stockholm,2013. International Affairs(UI-SIIA), of Institute Swedish Front, Islamic Syrian The don, 2012. Lon - House, Chatham Policy, Syria Frustrated Peace, Washington, 2013. International for Endowment Carnegie Problem, sorting-out-david-ignatius/ – accessed 12/4/13 3/4/13 Comment Stockholm,2012. International Affairs(UI-SIIA), London, 2013. Foundation, Quilliam Briefing, Strategic A ra: , , , tman ao, Srig u Dvd gais in Ignatius” David Out “Sorting Aaron, Aaron, Aaron, , , Yezid, no h Qamr: Turkey’s Quagmire: the Into Christopher. , Noman and Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of Rise The Insurgents: Salafi Syria’s , Swedish Institute of Institute Swedish Jihadists, Syria’s The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Opposition’s Syrian The www.joshualandis.com/blog/ R oisin Blake. Jabhat al-Nus- Syria

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