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the body that represents the opposition in opposition the represents that body the (SNC), Commission Negotiation Syrian the of backbone the became later It landscape. opposition divided in ’s of hope a ray as organisation the welcomed community international and the Initially, many Syrians position. in a difficult itself finds below), 1 Box Etilaf, see (the Forces Opposition and Revolutionary for Syrian Coalition the 2012, umbrella, main opposition Syria’s in November foundation its after years Eight Introduction Government. It also requires building a partnership with to jointly support local local Turkey support with jointly to building a partnership requires also It Government. Interim of the control the under nominally are that Syria and northern northwestern of areas to EU support conditional piloting by pursued be can objective this speaking, Practically regime. Assad the to opposition of political centre aviable into bodies these and develop maintain help will support Such met. be can of conditions number a if it, linked with Government Interim and the Etilaf for the support their increase to States and Member EU institutions recommends nevertheless brief the addressed, be to need that challenges and operational of structural arange faces today Etilaf the While potential. original its lost rapidly Etilaf the in which developments to contributed policy This and capabilities. legitimacy domestic its expand to it have allowed would that policies with conflict the during on early organisation the granted it legitimacy the international substantiate the not EU did that highlights brief The conflict. Syrian of the context in the development its on impact and their Etilaf the with strategies 2012. in late founded was which (Etilaf), Forces and Opposition Revolutionary for Syrian Coalition the umbrella, opposition political main Syria’s with and relationship EU’s engagement the examines brief policy This Syrian administration(s) in the same areas. same the in administration(s) (Etilaf) Syrian the with EU engagement picking?Fruitless cherry 2021 JULY crumbling alliances with both armed and armed both with alliances crumbling its and conflicts, internal regime, Assad of the advances military the to due Syria within momentum lost it time, same the At Turkey. alignment with and its Syria, inside organisation’sthe legitimacy eroding conflict, Syrian in the of interest lessening ageneral to due community international the from support significant lost has Etilaf however, the years, few past the Over process. peace Geneva UN-sponsored the It discusses the EU’s engagement EU’s engagement the discusses It

Lars Hauch CRU Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief

Box 1 A short backgrounder on the Etilaf

The Etilaf ( for ‘coalition’) was founded in Doha in November 2012. It is a coalition of Syrian opposition groups and officials that includes members of the former , representatives of local councils, armed groups, the , the Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO), other minorities such as Syrians of Turkmen origin, and individuals who played a role in the Damascene Spring of 2000 and the Declaration of 2005.

The Etilaf intends to govern opposition-held territory, unite the Syrian armed opposition under an overall military command, establish a transitional government, including a functional judiciary, and manage the opposition’s international relations.

While its headquarters are based in , Turkey, the Etilaf and its Interim Govern­ ment also maintain offices in the Turkish-controlled areas of northern Aleppo. The Etilaf has a total of 86 members, spread across its Presidency, Political Committee and General Assembly.

The ‘Syrian Interim Government’ that was established in 2013 represents the Etilaf’s temporary executive branch. It consists of nine ministries (interior, defence, finance, health, education, justice, local administration, services, agriculture), which are intended to oversee and support local and provincial councils in opposition-held areas.

Source(s): https://en.etilaf.org/ (accessed 25 May 2021); Sayigh, Y., Endgame for the Syrian National Coalition, 2020, online (accessed 25 May 2021); Three interviews with Syrian opposition figures (conducted between January and March 2021).

civil opposition groups. As this brief shows, walking a tightrope between maintaining the international and domestic dimensions some independence, being a partner of are interdependent, which has caused Turkey, and functioning as Ankara’s proxy. somewhat of a vicious circle to evolve.1 The Etilaf’s role in the SNC is also fraught with challenges. Given the continuing Today, the Etilaf and its Interim Government deadlock of the UN track due to the operate in Turkish-controlled areas in intransigence of the Assad regime, the entire northern Aleppo province and in a stretch effort runs the risk of becoming irrelevant of land between Tel Abyad and Ras al A’in, (including the SNC). While the EU supports the Etilaf in its capacity as key contributor to the SNC, it refuses to support the Etilaf’s Interim Government to prevent indirect 1 This policy brief is based on social/online media legitimisation of Turkey’s incursions into analysis, review of official documents and literature northern Syria, which the EU considers research, as well as 19 interviews conducted illegal.2 between October 2020 and May 2021. Of these interviews, 2 were with civil society representatives, The EU is unlikely to abruptly abandon the 1 with a humanitarian coordinator of a Syrian NGO Etilaf, but the nearly-collapsed peace process active in northwest Syria, 2 with members of the will negatively affect assessments in Brussels (SNA), 2 with members of the Etilaf, 6 with politically involved Syrians and 6 with EU diplomats. I would like to thank Aron Lund (Middle East analyst) and Erwin van Veen (Clingendael) for their constructive review of 2 European Parliament, European Parliament the brief. Its contents naturally remain my own resolution of 11 March 2021 on the Syrian conflict, responsibility. 2021, online (accessed 21 May 2021).

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and European capitals about the need to include a wide array of opposition elements, keep supporting it. But little thought has the Etilaf’s more inclusive approach fitted so far been given to alternatives, which is with the EU’s need to find a partner for the problematic given the EU’s enduring refusal political transition that was envisaged in to engage with the Assad regime unless the Geneva Communiqué5 of 30 June 2012. and until a ‘meaningful political transition’ However, the creation of the Etilaf was not is initiated. While it is understandable that based on a new understanding between many eyes rest on the new US presidency opposition groups that would have allowed and any fresh initiatives it may bring, the for tighter and more effective collaboration, EU risks being bereft of any Syrian political but rather on increasing the number of body on which to anchor its long-term groups participating in it. strategy. This brief examines the history of EU engagement with the Etilaf and outlines a As politically significant as the gesture of path towards a durable political engagement international recognition was, it had few legal strategy. and practical consequences. Contrary to the wording at the Friends of Syria conference, the EU shifted to referring to the Etilaf only as The early years: Recognition of ‘a legitimate representative’ or as ‘legitimate the Etilaf, but with caveats representatives’ of the Syrian people shortly after the Marrakesh conference. Most importantly, the recognition did not European support for the Etilaf began with mean that the EU saw the Etilaf as the a big political gesture in the immediate representative of the Syrian state. Contrary to aftermath of its creation in November the situation in Libya in 2011, where France 2012. In December of the same year, and other EU members promptly established more than 100 government delegates diplomatic relations with the Libyan and representatives of international opposition’s National Transitional Council organisations, including the EU, recognised (NTC),6 the EU did not grant the Etilaf such the Etilaf as ‘the legitimate representative practical diplomatic recognition. of the Syrian people’ at the Friends of Syria Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco.3 Inside Syria, a large number of local councils Contrary to the Etilaf predecessors’4 failure to and armed factions operating under the umbrella of the Free (FSA) initially supported the Etilaf, although with certain reservations, for two reasons. First, 3 Moroccan Foreign Ministry, The Fourth Ministerial local councils and armed groups hoped that Meeting of The Group of Friends of the Syrian the Etilaf’s Interim Government (established People, 2012, online (accessed 21 May 2021). in March 2013) would support them with 4 The Syrian National Council was the most funds and arms. Secondly, these same significant opposition organisation until it joined the stakeholders expected the Etilaf to be able to Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf) in November 2012. Founded in secure decisive Western military intervention August 2011 in Turkey, the Syrian National Council in Syria. However, when the Obama included a variety of political blocs such as the administration did not enforce its stated red Syrian , signatories of the line following the Assad regime’s large-scale of 2005, some Kurdish factions, representatives of local coordination committees, as well as some other parties and/or platforms such as the National Blog or individuals independents (for the initial list of members that participated in the so-called from 2012. See: https://carnegie-mec.org/ movement (2000). See: https://carnegie-mec. publications/?fa=50104 (accessed 4 May 2021). org/publications/?fa=48334 (accessed 2 May 5 Action Group for Syria, Final communiqué of 2021). While Syrian National Council members the Action Group for Syria, Geneva, 2012, online were mostly political exiles (i.e. outside of Syria), (accessed 3 May 2021). the Etilaf also included representatives of Syria’s 6 See: https://www.france24.com/en/20110310- local councils and armed opposition factions, France-NTC-national-transitional-council- and provided greater room for minorities and embassy-Libya (accessed 18 June 2021).

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chemical attacks against East and West Council in December 2015.8 The resolution in August 2013 (at least not in the called for a cease fire as well as a political view of many among the Syrian opposition), process to achieve a negotiated end to many armed factions lost hope in a Western the conflict. Such negotiations required a military intervention and withdrew their counterpart to the Assad regime, but initially support for the Etilaf. Three months later, the Etilaf refused9 to negotiate with it. In July the , a coalition of powerful 2015, for example, the Etilaf had rejected a Islamist armed groups, was established UN initiative for dialogue with the regime and attacked weapon depots controlled by because it did not stipulate that Bashar the Etilaf’s Interim Government’s Supreme al-Assad would leave office.10 To overcome Military Council (SMC). The rise of radical this deadlock, and in order to create a armed groups subsequently proved to be a negotiation body that included a wider key factor in ending the overt military role of array of opposition groups, the international the Etilaf between late 2013 and early 2014. community supported the creation of the An ancillary consequence was that the High Negotiations Committee (HNC)11 during Interim Government struggled to exert the Riyadh-I conference, which was granted influence in opposition-held areas. A lack of a mandate to represent Syria’s opposition military capability quickly translated into a in Geneva. This development stripped the lack of political influence. Etilaf of its position as ‘sole representative’ of the Syrian opposition in Geneva. However, Interestingly, the EU did not anticipate it retained a dominant12 role in the HNC and increasing the capabilities or relevance of the thus remained an indispensable partner to Etilaf on the ground in Syria in its new Syria develop the political transition stipulated in strategy of 2013, but sought only to enable UNSCR 2254. it to strengthen its emergent international legitimacy so that it ‘takes part in the Geneva Beyond international recognition and II conference and is represented by legitimate partnership, the EU continued its policy of interlocutors that can make commitments’. not offering support to strengthen the Etilaf The EU did commit to ‘assist the different in terms of its practical capabilities inside components of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces [Etilaf] to prepare for the conference’.7 8 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2254, New York, 2015, online (accessed 21 May 2021). UNSCR 2254 as lode star 9 It should be noted that the Etilaf has always been dependent on its backers (first and foremost Qatar In October 2015, new diplomatic in 2015), and that Qatari influence, according to two developments underscored the need for a individuals close to the negotiations interviewed for reasonably legitimate and capable Syrian this publication, determined the Etilaf’s decision to reject the UN-initiative to a large extent. opposition. Spurred on by ’s open 10 See: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/ military intervention on the side of the 10/syria-opposition-political-military-reject-de- Assad regime and cautious rapprochement mistura.html (accessed 8 May 2021). between Iran and the US on the Joint 11 The HNC’s 34 seats were distributed among Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the armed opposition groups (11), including armed International Syria Support Group (ISSG), Islamist groups outside the ’s including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, France, orbit; independents (8); the Etilaf (9); and, most the UK, the US, Russia and Iran, negotiated notably, the National Coordination Committee what would become UNSCR 2254, which for Democratic Change (6), a Damascus-based was unanimously adopted by the UN Security opposition coalition tolerated by the Government of Syria. On the National Coordination Committee: https://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48369 (accessed 4 May 2021). 12 With its own 9 seats and its good relations with 7 European Council, Towards a comprehensive EU the armed factions and independents, the Etilaf approach to the Syrian crisis, Brussels, 2013, online was usually able to secure a majority of votes in (accessed 21 May 2021). the HNC.

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of Syria. This would have required political, would be at risk.’15 Yet, at the time it was technical, and financial support, but also written, the danger had already materialised. military engagement. The EU was not able The Russian military intervention of to provide this while its member states September 2015 and the following reduction were largely unwilling to do so.13 At this of opposition-held territory left no room for point, the EU’s ambivalent stance towards peacebuilding at the national or local level. the Etilaf can be explained in part by the Moreover, well-resourced violent extremist troubled relationship between the EU and groups rapidly extended their control, the HNC. Riad Hijab, a member of the Etilaf unhindered by the insufficient levels of and head of the HNC between 2015 and international support for the armed factions 2017, did not reach out much to the EU but operating under the banner of the Free instead considered Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Syrian Army. Turkey as his key allies. The consequences of the continuing gap between international provision of political recognition on the The Etilaf as international friend, one hand, and the absence of international but local stranger administrative and military support on the other, deepened: internal rifts within Syria’s moderate political and armed opposition From 2016 onwards, Turkey’s military grew while those willing to escalate incursions in northwest Syria once again militarily, i.e. Russia and Iran, rendered the upended the mosaic of territorial control. Etilaf increasingly less relevant. The Etilaf’s While the EU was supportive of Operation limited governance capabilities inside Euphrates Shield in 2016/17, it criticised opposition-held areas also produced a against the further vicious Catch-22 situation since it Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units made the organisation less suitable as the (YPG)-held Afrin in 2018 and condemned EU’s humanitarian partner. Acting as such Operation Peace Spring in its entirety in could have increased its domestic legitimacy 2019.16 The diplomatic conflict between which, in turn, would have boosted its Turkey and the EU also affected the EU’s international credentials. Combined with stance towards the Etilaf. considerable shortcomings on the part of the Etilaf itself (addressed below), this produced In 2017, in an astute political move, Turkey further erosion of the organisation’s granted the Interim Government nominal legitimacy inside Syria. control over the Turkish-held areas in northern Aleppo province. Ankara hoped to An EU 2016 risk assessment hit the nail on secure and develop these areas as its own, the head by observing that ‘should the space to improve border security, enable refugee for peacebuilding initiatives shrink again, return, and block the Syrian Kurdish YPG. negotiations fail and local peacebuilding be At the same time, handing nominal control undermined by military activity, then most, to the Interim Government allowed Ankara if not all, of the activities which could be to frame its incursion as a joint project implemented by the [SPPI] programme14

fpi/news/eu-reiterates-its-commitment-peaceful- 13 Van Veen, E. et al., Band-aids, not bullets EU policies future-syria-un-general-assembly_en (accessed and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars, 3 May 2021). The Hague: Clingendael, 2021. 15 European Commission, Commission implementing 14 The Syria Peace Process Support Initiative (SPPI) decision on the exceptional assistance measure was launched in 2016 by the EU and the German in favour of Syria — Comprehensive Syria Peace Federal Foreign Office. It is funded from the Support Initiative, Brussels, 2016, online (accessed Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace 21 May 2021). (IcSP) with the aim of bringing together actors from 16 European Parliament, European Parliament different sides of the various conflict fault lines resolution of 24 October 2019 on the Turkish military and to promote the role of women in political and operation in northeast Syria and its consequences, societal developments. See: https://ec.europa.eu/ Strasbourg, 2019, online (accessed 21 May 2021).

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Box 2 A brief outline of the ‘Moscow’ and ‘Cairo’ platforms

The ‘Moscow’ platform advocates for democratic reform and rejects foreign meddling but is supportive of Russia’s intervention. It emerged as a result of the National Dialogue Conference in Tehran in 2012 and negotiation processes in Moscow in early 2015, and with the support of the Popular Front for Change and Liberation, a faction of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Kurdish National Youth for Justice and Development party, and representatives of parties that are part of the National Progressive Front. It should be noted that some of these parties and alliances are not organised political entities but rather loose and temporary creations. The Moscow platform is headed by Qadri Jamil, a former deputy prime minister in the Assad government who now heads the People’s Will Party.

The Cairo platform was formed in Egypt in early 2015. It includes prominent figures such as Ahmad al-Jarba, a former President of the Etilaf, who now heads Syria’s Tomorrow Movement, The Tomorrow Movement’s formation was attended by representatives of both the Assad regime and Russia. It maintains good relations with the Damascus- based National Coordination Committee for Change but has also engaged in other coalitions such as the Peace and Freedom Front, which includes the Kurdish National Council (a member of the Etilaf).

Although the Moscow and Cairo platforms have little influence on the ground, Russia uses both to influence the UN track in Geneva and to manage its relations with the (SDF). For example, the SDF’s political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (which is excluded from the UN track due to Turkish objections) has lately considered participating in negotiations within the framework of the Cairo or Moscow platforms.

Source(s): Lund, A., Go or Not to Go: Syria’s Opposition and the Paris, Cairo and Moscow Meetings, 2020, online (accessed 25 May 2021); Interview with Anton Mardasov, 25 May 2021; two interviews with Syrian opposition figures, March 2021.

under the auspices of the recognised Syrian heavy protests from the Etilaf.17 The EU opposition, thus countering accusations of a wanted to keep the SNC alive, and Russia ‘Turkish occupation’. The EU viewed matters soon provided reasons to stick to this differently, however, and, especially after the goal. Although 2017 was characterised by Etilaf’s open support for Operation Peace deadlocked UN-led discussions in Geneva Spring in 2019, drew its own conclusions. and parallel trilateral negotiation efforts According to EU diplomats, direct EU support by Russia, Iran and Turkey in the Astana/ for the Etilaf was terminated with the result Sochi formats, early 2018 raised hopes that the organisation, as well as its Interim of a return to the UN process as Russia Government, became more dependent on initiated the so-called Constitutional Turkey and Qatar. Committee (an element of UNSCR 2254). It subsequently requested the UN to officially On the international stage, the EU remained assist the Committee (Staffan de Mistura, committed to supporting the HNC, which then UN special envoy to Syria, had already transformed into the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) at the Riyadh-II conference in November 2017. Under Russian 17 See: https://syrianobserver.com/resources/21726/ pressure, the Russia-friendly Moscow and renowned_opposition_groups_issue_statement_ Cairo platforms (see Box 2 below) both rejecting_outcomes_riyadh_ii.html (accessed received four seats on the SNC, despite 3 May 2021).

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been involved in the planning process). Overall, military developments on the ground The Etilaf played a key role in composing the seriously weakened the UN-sponsored opposition delegation (its former President, political process, undid EU-investment in Hadi al-Bahra, serves as the Constitutional the Syrian political opposition and, most Committee’s co-chair) and had some say in importantly, undermined both the legitimacy the nomination of delegation members. and the international negotiating position of the Etilaf.22 With time, EU support helped to transform the Constitutional Committee’s opposition delegation into an effective and competent Taking stock of EU engagement negotiation team. Yet the EU was unable and Etilaf performance to date to act when the Assad regime and its allies crushed the so-called de-escalation zones starting in early 2018.18 It was also In the main, it is safe to say that a virtuous powerless when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham cycle developed between EU support and (HTS) took over at the expense of the Etilaf performance as negotiator in the Interim Government, local councils and less UN-led Geneva process. Internationally, radical armed groups in early 201719. HTS’s SNC delegates are considered competent expanding influence directly affected an negotiators who learned from their past ongoing pilot project (2018–mid-2019) of the mistakes and who are doing a professional European Commission (EC) in opposition- job. The fact that the Assad regime refuses held areas of Syria. The EU’s 2017 Syria to engage in meaningful negotiations does strategy20 explicitly mentioned the Interim not detract from this assessment. As the Government and pledged to support it. In EU continues to pursue a ‘genuine political that context, the EC funded humanitarian transition’ in line with UNSCR 2254, and as projects of the Assistance Coordination re-expressed in its 2017 Syria strategy,23 it Unit (ACU), a relief organisation affiliated continues to grant considerable technical with the Etilaf, in order to strengthen the and political support through the Syria Interim Government’s legitimacy through its Peace Process Support Initiative (SPPI) to coordination role in these projects. However, the Etilaf-dominated Syrian Negotiation the EC ultimately arrived at the conclusion Commission via the EC. that the Interim Government’s limited influence on the ground did not enable it to However, a more detrimental cycle act as an effective partner.21 developed between EU support and Etilaf performance with regards to governing and/or administering opposition-held

18 Hauch, L., Syria’s Constitutional Committee in Review, 2020, online (accessed 21 May 2021). 19 The local councils in Idlib and surroundings were affiliated with the Interim Government before HTS 22 Etilaf domestic legitimacy was also undermined by took over. While some local council members had its lack of a credible commitment to secularism and to resign since HTS considered them too close equality between sects and genders, insufficient to the Interim Government and/or the Etilaf, most inclusion of women, its initial failure to provide a of the local councils continued their work on the clear and inclusive position towards Syria’s Kurds, condition of recognising the HTS-backed Salvation and an economic vision that did not address the Government. concerns of socially deprived Syrians as well as 20 See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ public sector employees. In addition, internal press-releases/2017/04/03/fac-conclusions-syria/ power struggles, clientelism and a lack of political (accessed 8 May 2021). experience of many of its members weakened the 21 A humanitarian coordinator of a Syrian NGO who Etilaf from the inside. See for instance: Daher, J., was involved in the project in northwestern Syria Pluralism lost in Syria’s uprising, 2019, online noted, however, that its unsatisfactory results were (accessed 21 May 2021). first and foremost a consequence of poor project 23 See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ design that ignored a number of realities on the press-releases/2017/04/03/fac-conclusions-syria/ ground. (accessed: 3 May 2021).

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areas inside Syria. Here, the EC24 considers – and dependent on – it. While on the the Etilaf and its Interim Government technical level, working relations between insufficiently capable – a perspective Europeans and their Turkish counterparts shared by representatives of Syrian civil are fairly amicable, the political relationship society groups and aid workers interviewed is poisoned. Since the EU considers Turkish for this publication. The Etilaf and its incursions into northern Syria illegal and Interim Government are seen as lacking views the Etilaf and its Interim Government local legitimacy, management expertise, as dependent on Turkey, it does not support and planning capabilities.25 The Interim their nominal governance role in Turkish- Government’s administration employs controlled Afrin, in northern Aleppo province, competent technical staff but, in Brussel’s or further east between Tel Abyad and Ras view, this is not sufficient since project al Ain. This EU view extends even to the implementation also requires management Euphrates Shield area (northern Aleppo abilities and local legitimacy. Some province), which Turkey took as part of an humanitarians interviewed for this brief went operation initially supported by the EU. further, pointing to low levels of governance and resource utilisation transparency On the issue of Turkey’s dominance of the – a red flag for most Western donors – Etilaf and Interim Government, interviews26 as well as undemocratic practices and conducted for this brief suggest that the mismanagement. Civil society representatives Interim Government operates under the interviewed generally supported these administration of the Turkish governors of assessments, adding that the Etilaf lacks Gaziantep and Kilis, who oversee the area’s commitment to human rights, independence, local councils. Turkey is also making sure and the inclusion of diverse (political) voices, that the local governance and security especially with regard to the representation structures remain sufficiently divided and/ of women. As noted, one consequence or under-resourced in order to control of this negative EU view of the Interim them.27 For example, although the Interim Government has been that it channels Government maintains in the city of Azaz and much of its humanitarian aid through local nominally oversees the local councils in the partners, coordinated from EU offices in Euphrates Shield region, Turkey refuses to Gaziantep and Beirut, which further sidelines hand over control of revenues from shared the Interim Government. border crossings to the Interim Government, which would allow the latter to gain more This negative view of the Etilaf and the control over the armed groups that now Interim Government worsened in tandem make up the (Turkey-controlled) Syrian with the deteriorating relationship between National Army (SNA). the EU and Turkey, which was hardly the fault of the Etilaf. As the latter is hosted by Even though EU views of, and support for, Turkey and operates predominantly under the Etilaf have suffered from rock-bottom Turkish direction, it has inevitably needed EU-Turkish relations, and even though to take Ankara’s wishes into account and most interviewees recognised that Turkey’s has become more closely associated with dominance over the Etilaf leaves it with little room for more independent development on the ground, the question remains as to why the EU considers Turkish oversight of the 24 Note that the EEAS leads the EU’s political Etilaf/Interim Government so problematic. engagement in Geneva while the European The EU fields the argument that Turkey’s Commission leads EU humanitarian, governance, human rights, and recovery efforts. In brief, there are also different priorities and views in play within the EU institutions. 26 See Hauch, L., Formal and informal political and 25 How realistic it is to expect such capabilities to be security structures in the Euphrates Shield area, acquired shortly after emerging from conditions of 2021, unpublished. pre-war political repression and under conditions 27 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern of actual warfighting, is a different matter beyond Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, 2021, online the scope of this brief. (accessed 22 May 2021).

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presence in Syria is against international law Etilaf and the SNC at the international level, and that therefore engagement with Turkey any agreement that the SNC might one day and the Etilaf/SIG has legal limitations. sign will not be seen as legitimate as long However, this is an argument of convenience as it does not enjoy domestic legitimacy. insofar that the EU does not follow a In addition, while the EU’s assessment that consequent policy of non-support in cases negotiations need to have two sides is of breaches of international law, as the correct, it never absorbed the empirically examples of Morocco, Libya and Israel show. observable fact that the Assad regime was not willing to seriously negotiate. The near After all, Ankara’s Spring Shield offensive collapse of the Constitutional Committee in in February/March 2019 showed it is the 2021 was just the latest illustration of this only international actor willing to intervene position, which has been evident throughout decisively against the Assad regime. If the conflict. President Assad’s consistent the EU is serious about the ‘meaningful refusal to table a transitional government political transition’ it calls for, Turkey is an body, as stipulated by UNSCR 2254, as essential partner to create leverage and the part of the Geneva agenda has also been Etilaf and Interim Government important indicative.28 bodies to engage with. While Ankara’s anti- Kurdish incursions are deeply problematic for the harm they have done, the EU could Settling down for the long differentiate between support for Operation haul? Parameters for EU re- Euphrates Shield areas and Idlib on the one hand (more positive), and Afrin plus parts of engagement with the Etilaf the Tel Abyad–Ras al Ain area on the other (more negative). The Assad regime and its backers are not willing to enter into serious negotiations in Geneva based on UNSC Resolution The vicious circle: No legitimacy 2254, which remains the legally binding without support, no support international consensus on how to end the Syrian conflict.29 The EU refuses to engage without legitimacy with the regime as long as this is the case. The result of these two positions is a Throughout the eight years of its existence, stalemate in which regime-held areas will the Etilaf has faced a thorny problem. recover slowly and selectively from the war, if Western actors (the EU especially) demanded at all, while US- or Turkey-backed areas will a high degree of domestic legitimacy as a remain separate and potentially recover more condition for political, technical and financial rapidly. As the US-backed areas are run by support. However, to be able to govern and the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which is not part of administer in a manner that would have the Etilaf, they fall outside the scope of this enabled it to gain such legitimacy, the Etilaf brief. In consequence, here we assess only first needed large-scale support, including how the EU should consider the role of the military assistance. Neither the EU nor other Western actors have seriously sought to resolve this issue by piloting large-scale support. The result is that the Etilaf has 28 See Hauch (2020), op.cit. increasingly been marginalised and/or has 29 Scharf, Sterio and Williams note that ‘the inter­ had to rely on Turkey, which inevitably linked national legal community is largely in agreement it to Ankara’s agenda. that (…) UN Security Council resolutions are legally binding under UN Charter Article 25‘. Hence, On balance, continuous EU support for the the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on Syria contain ‘legally entrenched commitments Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) did to a transitional government, new constitution, not counter the eroding position of the Etilaf and cessation of violence‘. (Scharf, M., Sterio, inside and outside the country. After all, no M. & Williams, P., The Syrian Conflict’s Impact on matter how much international legitimacy International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University the EU and its partners confer upon the Press, 2020, p. 152.)

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Etilaf in Turkish-backed areas in relation to • A partnership with Turkey based its overall Syria strategy. on Syrian local priorities and legitimation: The EU and Turkey would While there is currently no window for both need to act as sponsors of the effective negotiations between the Assad Etilaf based on a shared intention to regime and the Syrian opposition, the EU’s prioritise Syrian recovery priorities and approach is based on an assumption that representative processes, where possible an opportunity might arrise in the future. by applying UNSC Resolution 2254, as However, there is a substantial risk that a precondition for large-scale European there will be no opposition left, at least technical and financial support. Such a not in a relatively representative and partnership needs to be based on a clear impartial form. If the EU is serious about political agreement, regular dialogue, a ‘meaningful political transition’, it is not and verifiable practices. A high-level in its interest to let this happen. In turn, monitoring body might be considered. this requires re-engaging the Etilaf and Importantly, this needs to include a Interim Government with regard to their role commitment to bringing all existing Syrian and presence inside Syria. The long-term National Army factions under effective objective could be the development of a control of the Etilaf with stringent representative and legitimate Syrian political (and capacitated) Syrian civil society opposition that provides high-quality monitoring of the quality of accountability governance in at least some areas of Syria. and oversight. This can serve as a rallying point for Syrian political activity, administer the recovery • A commitment from the Etilaf to of such territories, and develop capable an internal improvement plan: The individuals to help govern a re-united Syria current Etilaf would have to agree to at some point in the future. Yet, the pitfalls an assessment of its organisational are many and include all the Etilaf’s noted and administrative structures, as well internal shortcomings, Turkey’s current as its election policies and practices, sway over it, and Ankara’s mistreatment of representation (including an increase in Kurdish populations in Syria. This makes women’s participation and the adoption it essential that any EU re-engagement is of a gender-sensitive approach), policy- based on a set of core principles: making and policy-implementation practices, as a basis for negotiating an • Focus support on the northern improvement plan to the way in which Aleppo area: As this is where the it operates. This is vital to ensure that it Interim Government is currently based, restores both domestic legitimacy and Turkey has full control, Ankara’s international accountability for funds it presence is least disputed (the EU receives. Syrian civil society organisations initially supported Operation Euphrates should be involved in this process. Shield), and many Syrians reside, it makes sense as a point of departure for • Direct oversight of financial support piloting EU support to the Etilaf. Once and administration: The EU and Turkey Idlib is brought under full Turkish control would have to apply a joint twinning and/or HTS co-opted, engagement could approach in which oversight and capacity grow. Before considering any extension building of Syrian local administration go of support to the Afrin and Tel Abyad– hand in hand and are executed onsite in Ras al-A’in areas, the EU should ensure the form of embedded technical experts that Turkey and the Interim Government/ as well as triple sign-off procedures for Syrian National Army make emotional expenses. This can be put in place for a and material reparations for atrocities transitional period, the end of which is committed against the Syrian Kurds in contingent on the capabilities, standards these areas. and culture required for accountable administration of funds and recovery efforts being in place.

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• Long-term engagement starting as re-engagement with the Etilaf must also be a pilot: As trust, working practices and integrated into the EU’s broader strategy on capabilities between the EU, Turkey and Syria, including sanctions, humanitarian aid, Syrian actors need to build gradually, and relations with Syria’s Arab neighbours a long-term engagement is essential. and the Gulf states. Finally, agreement with Yet, given current difficulties and different Turkey based on these principles may be viewpoints, this will be a slow process difficult to achieve at the operational level. replete with argument and mistrust. If it is designed based on an experiential logic Nevertheless, helping to revive an that allows for regular critical discussion organisation that can represent millions informed by data-driven feedback loops of Syrians and improve the lives of those and endowed with channels for gradual residing in Turkish-held areas would seem escalation, it can combine stability an essential element to create leverage over of commitment with adaptability of the Assad regime and, eventually, conduct implementation. any future negotiations on the governance of Syria. Provocatively put, if the EU is not Naturally, any strategy based on these willing to consider such a step, it needs to principles requires, first and foremost, the revise its entire pursuit of a ‘meaningful political flexibility of mind to put the tense political transition’ since it will at some point situation between the EU and Turkey aside be hard to find organised and legitimate insofar as it concerns Syria. This may not political opposition that can join it. be possible. Subsequently, any EU

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About the author

Lars Hauch is an independent researcher who focuses on the Syrian conflict. He has worked with various humanitarian organizations, security companies and political consultancies. His work on non-state armed groups, humanitarian response and political dynamics in Syria and the wider region has appeared in numerous German and international publications.

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