Motivations of the Kremlin The Crimean Annexation as aDiversionaryConflict Dylan Gerstel

In the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian Kremlin, afraid of its relative weakness due War, Hillary Clinton travelled to Russia to fragile domestic conditions, intervened to rebuild relations between Washington in Ukraine to stoke nationalist spirit and and Moscow. Clinton presented the Rus- to rally the public around Putin. sian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, with This rationale, however, seems unlikely. a “reset” button, a symbolic measure to While domestic concerns surely played a mark a new era in bilateral ties. Ironi- role in this decision, economic and public cally, due to a translation error, the button opinion data indicate that the Kremlin was read “overload” rather than “reset”. (Shus- not in serious risk of losing legitimacy. Be- ter, 2010) In hindsight, “overload” seems fore the annexation, Russian economic in- more appropriate in describing the current dicators were relatively strong and public tension between the two nations. Exactly approval for Putin was above 60%, in dra- five years after the summit and despite matic contrast to the single figure approval threats of sanctions, Vladimir Putin signed ratings for Boris Yeltsin at the end of his a bill absorbing the Crimean Peninsula term in 19991. Furthermore, the majority into the Russian Federation. Soon after, of the public did not favor intervention in Eastern Ukrainian rebels, potentially sup- Ukraine. The key criteria for diversionary ported by Russia, declared independence action, widespread domestic unrest, were from Kiev. In the months that followed, not present in Russia before the interven- the West implemented increasingly tough tion. sanctions and Moscow’s international repu- tation plummeted. Mikhail Gorbachev has In this paper I explore existing schol- warned that Europe is at the brink of a arly literature to determine the factors that “new Cold War.” (Today, 2015) Yet de- motivate diversionary war. Using these spite these high costs Putin’s administra- insights, I establish specific criterion that tion has refused to abandon its interests in classify conflict as diversionary. Second, I the Crimea. investigate various key statistics, including Many theories have surfaced regard- ruble prices, GDP growth, and public ap- ing why the Kremlin is willing to accept proval polls to determine if Russia’s inter- the high economic and political costs of vention in Crimea can be characterized as its actions (including capital flight, reces- a diversionary action. I conclude that Rus- sion, and suspension from the G8). One sia did not annex Crimea due to diversion- such theory is that of diversionary conflict, ary pressures. Lastly, I argue that the de- as summarized by Ariel Cohen: “Russian teriorating economic situation in the wake leaders use foreign policy as a tool to but- of the action could force the Kremlin to tress domestic support and to foster a per- remain invested in the Crimea to distract ception that Russia is surrounded by ene- the population from social hardships. Al- mies at a time when its democratic legiti- though it did not start out as one, Russia’s macy is deteriorating.” (Aiken, 2014) Pro- continued intervention in Eastern Ukraine ponents of this perspective argue that the may develop into a diversionary conflict.

1Putin’s approval ratings are especially impressive when considering that his predecessor, of the same political party, left oce with a less than 5% approval rating. Motivations of the Kremlin 32

Defining Diversionary War

Traditional realist literature has mini- cial unrest, limited extractive capability, mized domestic factors in the outbreak of calls for extreme reform, and a low-cost tar- wars. (Mearshimer, 2001, p. 15) Under this get.” (Oakes, 2006, p. 433) Oakes supple- paradigm, states are seen as actors in an ments Levy’s definition by including causal anarchic international system. Since the linkages and discussing policy alternatives primary goal of states is survival and power to diversionary action. In the case of Ar- is relative, their actions are predictable. gentina, the deteriorating economic situa- Jack Levy challenges this hypothesis in tion in 1981 set o↵a series of nationwide Domestic Politics and War, linking inter- strikes and protests against the military nal factors to foreign policy. He primar- junta. The government’s extractive capac- ily focuses on the diversionary theory of ity plummeted and the state was “on the war, which argues, “political elites can use verge of insolvency,” (Oakes, 2006, p. 454) a foreign war to divert popular attention constraining the actions of the regime re- from internal social, economic, and polit- garding potential economic stimulus. This ical problems.” (Levy, 1988, p. 666) The prevented the opportunity for reform or primary motivation for this action is regime repression, simply because they were too survival in a time of potential domestic cri- costly. Given the junta’s perception that sis. Specifically, elites will try to foster na- Britain would not retaliate, diverting the tionalism and create a narrative of the state public’s attention and rallying the coun- under attack in order to direct the anger of try behind the government by invading the population away from the failing gov- the Falklands appeared as the most cost- ernment. Georges Michon provides an ex- e↵ective way of quelling the unrest. ample of diversionary war with the French foreign policy in 1792: “War was willed In order to di↵erentiate diversionary solely to act as a diversion from the social war from other types of conflict, certain problems. [War] would give the govern- criteria must be met. Regimes facing sim- ment dictatorial powers and would allow ilar internal circumstances to those in Ar- it to eliminate its detested enemies. For gentina before the Falklands War are much these groups the war was a grand maneuver more likely than others to launch a di- of domestic politics.” (Levy, 1988, p. 668) versionary conflict. Specifically, the ruling Similarly, other scholars have linked the party must feel threatened by rising domes- Russo-Japanese War, World War 1, and tic unrest, constrained by decreasing ex- the Falklands War to diversionary pres- tractive capabilities and limited economic sures. policy options, and presented with a low- Amy Oakes expands on the diversion- cost target to invade. To quantify these ary war literature and examines the ra- factors I will use public opinion data to rep- tionale behind Argentina’s invasion of the resent domestic sentiment, tax revenue as Falkland Islands. She argues, “the deci- a percent of GDP to illustrate the govern- sion to initiate a diversionary conflict is ment’s extractive capabilities, and previous typically influenced by three factors: mo- international responses to regional conflicts tivation, domestic constraints, and oppor- to determine if a low cost target exists. If a tunity.” (Oakes, 2006, p. 433) Faced with state is faced with significant drops in pub- these internal issues, the state can re- lic approval ratings and tax revenue and re- form, repress, or divert the public’s at- sponds by invading another country with a tention. A regime is driven to diversion- low perceived cost, then this action is likely ary war when faced with “escalating so- diversionary. 33 Dylan Gerstel

Russia and the Crimean Peninsula

Was Russia’s annexation of the Crimean options, was not present before the annex- peninsula in March 2014 a diversionary ac- ation. Economic indicators are also mixed. tion? Several accounts of this interven- Although the Ruble lost value in early tion claim that it was, given the slug- 2014, stable oil prices (energy sales account gish economy, low extractive capability and for 50% of Russian federal revenue (Simon, relatively low public approval for Putin. 2015)) at the time gave no cause for se- Timothy Frye claims, “Russia’s problem rious concern. On the day of the Crimean is not that it lacks territory but that it annexation oil was trading at $105 a barrel, governs badly the territory it has.” (Frye, which is the price Moscow needs to balance 2014) Applying Oates’s framework, this its budget. (Holodny, 2015) GDP figures il- poor governance hampers the tax collection lustrate a similar story of an economy slow- eciency of the state and therefore its ef- ing down but not in crisis. (Bank, 2015) fectiveness in enacting economic reforms or Although there were anti-Putin demonstra- brutal repression measures. Coupled with tions before the annexation, they were not sluggish GDP growth rates this could be a related to the economy, which at the time precondition for diversionary war. (Bank, seemed to be stable. Clearly the situa- 2015) Others point to Putin’s skyrocketing tion was nothing like the crashing econ- approval rate in the wake of the annexa- omy of Argentina in 1981, with its nation- tion as validation of the administration’s wide workers strikes and mass protests. At e↵orts to distract the Russian people from the time of the Crimean annexation, the the weakening economy. Russian government was not constrained economically with regards to policy due to their stable tax collection and sizeable re- serves. If Moscow had wanted to quell un- rest, it had cheaper options than diversion- ary war.

Reserves of the Russian Federation. Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation

However, a closer look at the economic data presents a di↵erent picture. World Bank reports indicate a stable rate of tax collection as a percentage of GDP for the Approval ratings of V. Putin for 24 months before the last decade. (Bank, 2015) Whereas the Ar- Crimean takeover in early 2014. Source: Levada Center gentine government had lost capacity in the months leading up to the Falklands War, In addition to a relatively stable econ- the Kremlin has been able to maintain a omy, there was no indication of rising do- steady rate of tax collection as a percent mestic unrest before the Crimean annexa- of GDP. Furthermore, unlike the military tion. Per the Levada Center, Putin’s gov- junta, Moscow had almost $500 billion in ernment had an approval rating of 69% just reserves before the crisis, giving the admin- before Victor Yanukovych ceded power, istration some room for economic stimulus. and it had been as high as 86% at other Thus, at least one of the criteria for di- times during his presidency. (Center, 2015) versionary action, lack of economic policy These figures do not describe a government Motivations of the Kremlin 34

in danger of losing the public. A separate for diversionary action. As with the Geor- poll conducted by Gallup presents slightly gian intervention, annexation could pro- lower, but nonetheless stable, ratings of vide an e↵ective way to rally the public 54% in 2012 and 2013. (Ray Esipova, 2014) around the state and distract from inter- Despite the highly publicized protests in nal problems. However, as late as February the wake of the 2012 elections, these num- 2014, 75% of Russians opposed military in- bers suggest that the Putin was not facing tervention in Ukraine. (Aiken, 2014) (How- a legitimacy crisis and that these were iso- ever, this number decreased dramatically lated incidents rather than a widespread after the annexation.) Even if the Krem- movement. In fact, both the Levada and lin perceived growing unrest, the above Gallup polls show that Putin’s approval poll implies that overt military interven- rating was significantly rising before the tion in Ukraine would harm, rather than conflict, likely due to the Sochi Olympics. bolster Putin’s regime. Additionally, this Moscow was not facing significant domes- argument cannot explain the timing of the tic unrest prior to the Crimean annexation, intervention. If Moscow was truly con- and thus it is unlikely that this action was cerned with domestic unrest, then the in- diversionary. tervention should have happened in 2012 or 2013, when approval ratings were at their In response to this data, some would lowest. As mentioned earlier, Putin’s ap- argue that the Kremlin took preemptive proval ratings were rising significantly af- action to prevent approval ratings from ter the Olympics and Russians had grow- falling in the future by annexing the ing confidence in their economy. (Ray Es- Crimea. The weak international response ipova, 2014) While high approval ratings to the Georgian War of 2007 signaled to may have been a result of the intervention, the Russian government that the Crimea they were not the primary motivation for would be a low cost target, a prime target the annexation.

Alternative Explanations

Given the economic and public opinion long been an important strategic region for statistics I have presented, it is highly Russia and is part of the “near-abroad,” unlikely that Russian elites were moti- the Russian sphere of influence defined by vated by diversionary pressures to annex Putin. (Herpen, 2014, p. 244) Furthermore, the Crimean peninsula. Moscow did not there is a key Russian naval base in Sev- face decreasing extractive capabilities or astopol, Crimea that houses part of the widespread social unrest, critical factors for Black Sea fleet. As such, Moscow was un- motivating diversionary action. Alterna- willing to tolerate defection to the EU and tively, Moscow was most likely motivated used coercive force to punish the former So- by strategic concerns and nationalistic am- viet republic. bitions after Ukraine’s overtures to the EU amid waning Russian influence. The pro- Nationalist motivations for interven- Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who tion in Ukraine were also similar to those had just spurned the EU to sign a loan that led to Russian intervention in Geor- agreement with Moscow, had just been gia. Putin considers both states under ousted and replaced with a pro-Western the influence of Russia, and he even re- government. Similarly to Georgia before marked in 2008 that Ukraine, “is not the Russian invasion in 2008, the Ukrainian a real country.” (Herpen, 2014, p. 244) parliament had just signed a trade agree- Medvedev and Putin have frequently de- ment with the EU and was posturing to scribed Ukraine as the “younger brother” join NATO. (Manko↵, 2014) Ukraine has that “may not be separated” from Rus- 35 Dylan Gerstel

sia. (Herpen, 2014, p. 244=6) Ukraine is fall apart. also critical for Putin’s proposed Eurasian Strategic and nationalist motivations Union, an alternative to the EU that would help to explain the timing of the Russian include military integration as well as eco- intervention, a key drawback to the diver- nomic cooperation. Putin has based his le- sionary framework. The regime change in gitimacy on his ability to restore Russia to Ukraine, rather than a desire to distract greatness, and part of this vision includes an upset public, convinced the Kremlin exerting influence beyond Russia’s borders, to take annex the Crimean peninsula in especially with regards to former Soviet re- March 2014. It was critical that Moscow publics. If Ukraine, a country traditionally took action quickly before the West was dependent on Russia, refrains from joining able to support the fledgling regime. Just a the Eurasian Union, the image Putin has month after Yanukovych was ousted from created of Russian prestige and power may power, Russian troops occupied Crimea.

Shift to Diversionary War?

Unfortunately for the Russian economy, turning the conflict in Ukraine into a diver- unlike the Georgian War, the West sionary one. quickly responded by implementing dam- Moscow has achieved this by framing aging sanctions. These sanctions, coupled the conflict as the West trying to humil- with plummeting oil prices, have sent the iate and cripple Russia via sanctions and Russian economy into a deep recession. the new government in Ukraine. Putin has GDP fell almost 5% in the last quarter linked falling oil prices, and therefore the and real disposable income fell by 3.1% struggling economy, to a Western conspir- this year. (Economist, 2015) This has con- acy and launched a widely successful pro- strained the Kremlin, which has chosen not paganda campaign to convince the public. (or has not been able) to attempt any eco- As a result, 66% of Russians polled “believe nomic reform to alleviate the crisis. Shock- Western sanctions are meant to humiliate ingly, approval ratings for Putin are at and weaken Russia” while only 5% believe 89%, an all time high. (Nardelli, 2015) In they are meant to help end the Ukrainian striking contrast to the February 2014 fig- conflict. (Nardelli, 2015) Similarly to other ures, 87% of Russian’s now support the diversionary wars, Putin has rallied the annexation of Crimea. (Nardelli, 2015) Al- public around the government in the face though diversionary pressures did not orig- of a perceived threat to the country. Al- inally motivate the annexation, the regime though the Kremlin and falling oil prices has used the intervention and continued are responsible for the weak economy, most nationalist rhetoric to divert the public’s Russians instead blame the United States attention away from the troubled economy, and the EU.

Implications

The motivations behind the initial annex- gia. (Gross, 2014) It is unlikely that the ation and the shift to diversionary action Kremlin would leave the Crimea and risk a provide policy insights. Rather than sim- weakened image in the eyes of the nation- ply dealing with a besieged regime act- alists it has encouraged. Furthermore, the ing to protect itself from domestic pres- strategic importance of Ukraine to Russia sure, the West faces an administration keen cannot be understated. However, the dete- on stoking nationalism and Soviet nostal- riorating Russian economy has put politi- Motivations of the Kremlin 36

cal elites in a dicult position. The coun- concessions over Crimea. Not only does try now faces risk of recession, plummet- Ukraine matter for Russian pride, it allows ing oil prices, and international isolation. Putin to divert the attention of the pub- In response, the government has blamed lic. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to end the West for Russia’s economy malaise and well for the Russian public. If Moscow con- turned the conflict into a diversionary one. tinues down this route, Russia will grow Although it is dicult to imagine a com- further apart from the West, the economy plete recovery without the assistance of Eu- will continue to su↵er without much needed rope and the United States, these devel- foreign capital, and a long-term solution in opments may prevent Putin from making Eastern Ukraine will be less likely.

References

Aiken, Michael. 2014. From Russia With No Love - Diplomatic Courier. Diplomatic Courier.

Bank, The World. 2015. Data — The World Bank. Tech. rept.

Center, Levada. 2015. Indexes — Levada-Center. Tech. rept. Levada Center.

Economist, The. 2015. The Path to Penury.

Frye, Timothy. 2014. The Downsides of Crimea for Russia. The Washington Post.

Gross, Terry. 2014. How Crimea’s Annexation Plays To Russians’ Soviet Nostalgia.

Herpen, Marcel Van. 2014. Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism.Rowman &Littlefield.

Holodny, Elena. 2015. Here Are the Break-even Oil Prices for 13 of the World’s Biggest Producers. Business Insider.

Levy, Jack S. 1988. Domestic Politics and War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18.

Manko↵, Je↵rey. 2014. Russia’s Latest Land Grab. Foreign A↵airs.

Mearshimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton.

Nardelli, Alberto. 2015. Vladimir Putin’s Approval Rating at Record Levels.

Oakes, Amy. 2006. Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands. Security Studies, 15.

Ray Esipova, Julie Esipova, Neli Esipova. 2014. Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years.

Shuster, Simon. 2010. U.S.-Russia Relations: In Need of a New Reset. Time.

Simon, Ellen. 2015. How Long Can Russia Survive With Low Oil Prices? Investopedia.

Today, Russia. 2015. Gorbachev: US Dragging Russia into New Cold War, Which Might Grow into Armed Conflict.