Destroyer Escorts of Taffy 3 By: Shanna Schuster Interpretations Coordinator, USS SLATER Seventy-five years ago! the October 25th was a maintained station northward off of the island of Samar. momentous day pacific. for destroyer escorts in the That Taffy 3 was made up of escort carriers, affectionately was the date of the Battle of Samar, and the date that USS known as "baby I'iat tops" or'jeep caniers." They were: SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE-413), would go down in KITKUN BAY (CVE-71) FANSHAW BAY (CVE-70). history. On 6 October 1944, she crossed the Eouator. and KALININ BAY (CVE-68), SAINT LO (CVE-63), WHITE participated in rhe traditional ceremony of turnins PLAINS (CVE-63), and GAMBIER BAy (CVE-73). They pollywogs into shellbacks, while paying homage to Kini were guarded by destroyers JOHNSTON (DD-557), Neptune. It was shortly after this ritual that Commandins HOEL (DD-533), HEERMANN (DD-532), and destroyer Officer. Roberr W. Copeland. USNR received plans lor the escorts SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE-413), JOHN C. upcoming invasion of the Philippines. The ship would be BUTLER (DE-339), DENNIS (DE-405), and RAyMOND operating with Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh (DE-341). Each Taffy group operated 30-50 miles apart. Fleet, under General Douglas MacArthur's command. From the morning of 20 October to the evenins of the MacArthur's plan was to have forces sent ashore on 24th. the mission of rhe rask group was ro proiicle air Leyte Island, on 20 October. By isolating Japan from Leyte support for the landings. The group also supported the and other islands of Southeast Asia, MacArthur hoped to inland advance of the Army's Northern Attack Force, in the keep Japan from vital sources industrial of and oil supplies. Tacloban area on Leyte. The mission of the DEs was to protect the aircraft carriers from submarine, air, and SAMUEL B. ROBERTS anived safely off of Leyte on surface attack. 19 October, and joined Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague,s Escort Carrier Task Group (TG jj.4). This task group was All four DEs were John C. Butler class, powered bv comprised of three escort carrier task units, Taffy |,2,and3. two "D" Express boilers and geared turbine enginei. turning two screws, capable of moving a maximum of 24 Taffy I was stationed off of northern Mindanao, Taffv knots. Each ship was equipped with two 5',/3g guns, three 2 guarded the entrance to Leyre Gulf. and Ta fiy i 21" torpedoes, four 40mm anti-aircraft guns, one Mark l0 .i te. --dl'' -' hedgehog projector, eight Mark 6 depth charge projectors And then they left. Just like that, three destroyer escorts (K-guns), and two Mark 9 depth charge stern racks. The and three destroyers were the only defense in front of six crew consisted of 14 offrcers and 201 enlisted men. escort carriers and the entire invasion force on the island. Lieutenant O. Canoll Amold, the CIC Offrcer on Halsey's run left the San Bernardino Straight open DENNIS, reported on the 24th, "Carriers launched planes when Admiral Kurita, of the Japanese Navy, arrived. The for the moming; we prepared to make a routine day of it, Japanese center force sailed towards. Leyte; the mission chipping paint, and bitching about MacArthur having was the destruction of American forces attempting to seize called us 'his' seventh fleet." The chipping wouldn't get Leyte. Kurita issued orders to "Advance, counting on done this day, but the sailors went to work, nonetheless. Divine assistance." He was certain he was going to meet Halsey's fleet and have his work cut out for him. Kurita The Japanese planned to converge on the Philippines at and his force made their way through the San Bemardino three points; a center force through San Bemardino Strait, Strait under the cover of night. Unknown to any a southem force through Surigao Strait, and a northem Americans, they steamed along the fog-covered coast of force deliberately drawing attention off of Cape Engano. Samar, boasting four battleships, including Yamato, with Japanese Admiral Ozawa, in the North, had been making lS-inch guns, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and noise and smoke, trying to draw attention from the eleven destroyers. American force. Halsey knew that Japanese aircraft carriers had to be kept away from Leyte at all costs, but he Just after 0630 on 25 October, a pilot from FANSHAW took the bait on 24 October, taking his 3rd fleet north to BAY, Ensign W.C. Brooks, radioed Taffy 3 "enemy surface strike the Japanese, leaving Taffy 3 to guard the American force sighted 20 miles north oftask group and closing at 30 Invasion Fleet on the island. knots." Brooks then nosed his aircraft over and dropped two depth charges on an enemy cruiser. As he leveled the Lieutenant Amold described how lucky they felt to be plane back, the horizon was now filled with Japafiese in the presence of such a large fleet, to be side by side with masts. He called for help, and Admiral Sprague ordered a carriers. "I remember how secure and smug we had felt the change of course at flank speed and launched all available aftemoon before. We were standing off of Samar with our planes. General Quarters was called aboard the destroyers carriers, enjoying the late evening breezes and exchanging and destroyer escorts, realizing they were all that stood scuttlebutt. How safe we felt to know that those fast between the Japanese and the American invasion forces. carriers of the Essex and Independence classes, those immense battleships - New Jersey, Massachusetts, North A moment after launching the planes, the Japanese Carolina. South Dakota. and others - were on our side." opened fire at 17 miles. Lookouts aboard ROBERTS reported "splashes from heavy caliber shells" leaving green and purple dye markings between their ship and JOHNSTON. The Japanese dyed their shells so gunners could gage accuracy. It is speculated that radio communications were not working properly aboard ROBERTS, because from Copeland's account, no report from the pilot occurred. Their first knowledge of the Japanese force were shells landing next to the ship. Aboard the other ships, every radio transmission, every frightened face, and the frantic yells coming down the voice tubes from the bridge confirmed, "It's the whole damned Japanese fleet!" All the crews knew "destroyers were never meant to withstlnd battleship fire, much less the shells of a super BB. Such shot, of course, would burst a DE as a pistol shot would burst an egg." Over the IMC aboard ROBERTS, Copeland told his men calmly that they were about to enter "a frght against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected, during which page 4 lrt USS JOHN C BUTLER made it through the Battte of Samar with no personnet or material damage. time we would do what damage we could." As part of his Sprague could only run. Most of his planes were in the crew, RM3c Dick Rohde, said"'He was telling us we were air. He turned his shipi southward for a llngthy sprint, and going to die, but he was telling the other guys that, not me. then shifted southwestward toward Leyte Cutf. fney I kept thinking that somehow I'm going to make it." found their way into a rain squall, which was helpful in hiding from the enemy. Kurita provided the desperate Admiral Sprague ordered "small boys, make smoke" Americans with a break. Instead of sending his ships south and the DEs and DDs laid down heavy black smoke to cut off the approach to Leyte Gulf, he split his force pouring from their stacks and white smoke from chemical three ways, in an effort to box in the Americans. The rain containers on their fantails. The smoke was used as a squall provided enough concealment that ships could get screen to cover movements. Air humidity was heavy, so into better position, and cause this box plan to fail. the smoke lay close on the surface of the water, obscurinq everything. Admiral Sprague hoped to scatter the enemy ships, by commenclng a torpedo attack that would also give the Sprague reported the situation, and requested urgent escort carriers time to turn and escape the situation. The help from Admiral Kincaid. Unfortunately, no backup was destroyers JOHNSTON, HOEL, and HEERMANN were available. The burden fell on Sprague's force in the same tasked with the first attack. Destroyer Escorts DENNIS, manner that the enemy's shells were falling; loudly, RAYMOND, JOHN C. BUTLER. and SAMUEL B. fiercely, and suddenly. ROBERTS were tasked with the second. page 5 ,i' .,A f-_ -- A-: --. _"==- "-2,- '='.--=-: --=-=: -- -',4:-. --f: - -- -- -:-= '-- *+--_-- -_- 17=: i- - -'--: =+:a USS DENN/S took severe damage during the baftle. Never before had US Destroyers, let alone Destroyer then turned and raced back to the carriers. During this Escorts rushed in to trade blows with such a force of heavy torpedo run, she fired her 5-inch guns. She scored several ships. Commander Thomas from HOEL gave the torpedo hits, but because of the rain and smoke, she couldn't see attack order. SAMUEL B. ROBERTS and their the results of her torpedo attack. malfunctioning radio, asked for some clarification, did he want both DDs and DEs attacking? The DEs, who were RAYMOND put her helm over and came to a northerly slower than the DDs, had been ordered to launch their course to close the range, placed the target dead ahead, and attacks after the destroyers in a second run, but he didn't commenced fire with the forward 5-inch gun.