CHAPTER 2 1 LINGAYEN GUL F stated earlier in this volume, on 15th September 1944 the Halsey- A Nimitz-MacArthur agreement that the proposed Yap, Talaud Islands and Mindanao landings be cancelled and the date of the assault on Leyt e be advanced from 20th December to 20th October, was accepted by th e OCTAGON Conference at Quebec. The question of the subsequent target , Luzon or Formosa, still remained unresolved . Admiral King strongly favoured the taking of Formosa, with telling arguments to support his con- cept : among them that it would sever Japanese communications with her conquests of 1942, would be a step nearer Japan than would be Luzon, woul d continue the successful "Leapfrog" strategy. But there were more cogent arguments against : MacArthur's that the United States was in honou r bound to liberate the Philippines, and his offer to free Luzon two month s after Leyte with the troops to be employed in this last-named ; and the apprehension that casualties in an attack on Formosa might reach a pro- hibitive figure. Most forceful consideration was that the American Arm y would not be able to provide the necessary forces for the Formosa attac k until three months after Germany had surrendered . At an informal con- ference in San Francisco at the end of September between Nimitz an d Sherman, the Senior Army and Air Force Commanders in Nimitz's Pacifi c Ocean areas and Admiral King, the Admiral was persuaded that Luzon, not Formosa, should be next on the list . As a result, on 3rd October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued "thei r last important strategic directive of the war" .1 Its main provisions were : MacArthur to invade Luzon on 20th December ; and Nimitz to invade one or more islands of the Bonins-Volcano group on 20th January 1945 , and one or more in the Ryukyus on 1st March . In the event the above dates were not kept . Planning for the Luzon landings was under way before the assault on Leyte, as was the issue o f MacArthur's operational instructions, on 12th and 13th October, for the Mindoro landings on 5th December and for Lingayen Gulf on th e 20th. The land operations were assigned to General Krueger's Sixth Army, and the accompanying naval tasks to Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet . MacArthur was firm about the projected dates, but the air situation trouble d Kinkaid, and his views were supported by Generals Sutherland and Kenney , and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey . The existing plans for Mindoro and Lingayen assumed that by 5th December—the target date for Mindoro— the American Air Force on Leyte would have control of the air over tha t island and the central Visayas. But the Japanese reacted strongly, an d indications were that American air power could not be on top by 5t h I S . E. Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines (1959), p . 5, Vol XIII in the series . 576 LINGAYEN GULF 1944-45 December ; and in the circumstances, though reluctantly, MacArthur , towards the end of November, agreed to postpone the Mindoro action to 15th December—as mentioned earlier in this volume . The date of th e Lingayen landings was put back from 20th December to 9th January 1945 . Luzon, largest and most important of the Philippine Islands with a n area of 40,422 square miles—little less than half that of the State of Victoria—harbours the capital city of Manila, standing on one of th e world's largest land-locked harbours . The island had a population o f 7,355,000 before the war. Apart from a central plain, almost the whol e of Luzon is mountainous and heavily forested . The two main entrances to the plain from the sea are at Manila Bay in the south and Lingaye n Gulf, a deep indentation reaching south to some 100 miles N .N.W. of the capital. Manila Bay was strongly defended at Corregidor Island , in the entrance. Lingayen was undefended, and from it good roads an d a railway ran to Manila . It was decided to make the landings in Lingaye n Gulf which, rectangular in form, is about 20 miles wide and 30 miles long , exposed to the north-west and with capacious anchorage area at the inne r end, bordered by gradually shelving sandy beaches . The object of th e proposed operation was stated as being the prompt seizure of the centra l Luzon area, destruction of the principal defence forces, denial to the Japanese of the northern entrance to the South China Sea, and the pro - vision of bases for the support of further operations against the Japanese . Kinkaid, Barbey and Wilkinson—the last two commanding the assaul t convoys—were concerned about the exposure of the attacking expeditio n to air and surface assault en route to an objective beyond ready coverage from existing bases. In the light of Leyte experience it was believe d probable that the Japanese might risk part of their fleet in hit-and-ru n attacks by fast surface forces on the transport groups . The fleet could still muster a formidable force of some 4 battleships, 4 fleet carriers, 2 light and one escort carriers, 4 heavy and 5 light cruisers, 35 destroyers an d 54 submarines . These were mainly disposed in the Empire-Kuriles-Formos a area. Though the Japanese air forces in the Philippines had been dealt heavy blows, their power was not neutralised. There were more than 7 0 operational airfields in the Philippines area from which military aircraf t could be operated, and estimated enemy shore-based aircraft immediatel y available in the area at 4th January 1945 were 508 fighters, 332 bomber s and 208 other types. These numbers could be augmented by staging aircraft from Formosa, Hainan, China and the Netherlands East Indies . It was expected that with the forces immediately available the Japanese coul d make daily strikes against the assault forces on their way to Lingaye n Gulf, with 100 fighters and 50 bombers . And it was estimated that from the Empire probably 300 fighters and 150 bombers could be staged throug h Formosa and be available for the defence of Luzon within four to seve n days of the Allied landing. Having regard to this potential enemy opposition, the naval commanders discussed with MacArthur's staff the possibility of landing on southern Dec1944 CROWDED ROADSTEAD 577 or eastern Luzon. But, because of its terrain, Lingayen emerged as the only suitable point for a major attack on the island . A choice from thre e routes to Lingayen engaged the consideration of the planners—north o f Luzon, through San Bernardino Strait, and through Surigao Strait . This last was farthest from unsubdued Luzon aerodromes ; it avoided exposur e to adverse weather conditions ; it passed almost all the way through water s too deep for mining ; and it afforded land-based air cover for convoys . It was therefore recommended to, and accepted by, MacArthur . Planning for the Luzon operation was done in Hollandia . The naval command status was Vice-Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet , in control of amphibious operations as CTF .77, Commander Luzon Attack Force ; Vice-Admiral Wilkinson, Commander III Amphibious Force , CTF.79, Commander Lingayen Attack Force ; Vice-Admiral Barbey, Com- mander VII Amphibious Force, CTF .78, Commander San Fabian Attack Force. Vice-Admiral Oldendorf commanded the Bombardment and Fire Support Group; Rear-Admiral Berkey the Close Covering Group ; Rear- Admiral C . T. Durgin the Escort Carrier Group; and Rear-Admiral Conolly the Reinforcement Group . In support of the operation the Pacific Fleet was assigned the tas k of destroying any enemy forces threatening interference, and of preventin g reinforcement of air units in Formosa . Third Fleet task groups under Admiral Halsey were disposed in the air north-east of Luzon to cover the operation, and conducted air strikes against Formosa, Okinawa an d northern Luzon . Submarines of the Seventh and Pacific Fleets were dis- posed to intercept and give warning of any approaching hostile surfac e forces. American air forces based on China, and operating from th e Marianas, supported the operation by strikes on Japanese objectives withi n range, and by scouting missions . And the Far East Air Force, operating from Leyte, Mindoro and Morotai, attacked Japanese communications an d airfields in the Philippines and provided fighter cover for the assaul t convoys . The beaches selected for the Lingayen Gulf landings were spaced alon g the south and south-east shores of the gulf, one group in the vicinit y of the town of Lingayen, and the other—some ten miles to the north-eas t —on both sides of the town of San Fabian. At Lingayen the landings were to be made by the 37th and 40th Divisions of the Sixth Army ; those at San Fabian by the 6th and 43rd Divisions. The troops of the 37th Division had to be transported from Bougainville where—as stated earlie r —they had been relieved by the Australians. Those of the 40th Division were to be carried from New Britain, and the 6th and 43rd Divisions from New Guinea . II On 15th December the roadstead at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougain- ville, was crowded with loaded and troop-laden transports . The eighteen ships of Transport Squadron 13 included Mount Olympus (7,234 tons) , Flagship of Vice-Admiral Wilkinson, commanding the Lingayen Attack 578 LINGAYEN GULF 9Nov-31 De c Force, TF.79, and H.M .A. Ships Manoora (Commander Cousin, Senio r Naval Officer Australian Landing Ships), Kanimbla (Commander Bunyan ) and Westralia (Lieut-Commander Livingston) .