Lingayen Gulf on Th E 20Th

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CHAPTER 2 1 LINGAYEN GUL F

stated earlier in this volume, on 15th September 1944 the Halsey- A Nimitz-MacArthur agreement that the proposed Yap, Talaud Islands and Mindanao landings be cancelled and the date of the assault on Leyt e be advanced from 20th December to 20th October, was accepted by th e OCTAGON Conference at Quebec. The question of the subsequent target , Luzon or Formosa, still remained unresolved . Admiral King strongly favoured the taking of Formosa, with telling arguments to support his con- cept : among them that it would sever Japanese communications with her conquests of 1942, would be a step nearer Japan than would be Luzon, woul d continue the successful "Leapfrog" strategy. But there were more cogent arguments against : MacArthur's that the United States was in honou r bound to liberate the Philippines, and his offer to free Luzon two month s after Leyte with the troops to be employed in this last-named ; and the apprehension that casualties in an attack on Formosa might reach a pro- hibitive figure. Most forceful consideration was that the American Arm y would not be able to provide the necessary forces for the Formosa attac k until three months after Germany had surrendered . At an informal conference in San Francisco at the end of September between Nimitz an d Sherman, the Senior Army and Air Force Commanders in Nimitz's Pacifi c Ocean areas and Admiral King, the Admiral was persuaded that Luzon, not Formosa, should be next on the list . As a result, on 3rd October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued "thei r last important strategic directive of the war" .1 Its main provisions were : MacArthur to invade Luzon on 20th December ; and Nimitz to invade one or more islands of the Bonins-Volcano group on 20th January 1945 , and one or more in the Ryukyus on 1st March . In the event the above dates were not kept . Planning for the Luzon landings was under way before the assault on Leyte, as was the issue o f MacArthur's operational instructions, on 12th and 13th October, for the Mindoro landings on 5th December and for Lingayen Gulf on th e 20th. The land operations were assigned to General Krueger's Sixth Army, and the accompanying naval tasks to Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet . MacArthur was firm about the projected dates, but the air situation trouble d Kinkaid, and his views were supported by Generals Sutherland and Kenney , and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey . The existing plans for Mindoro and Lingayen assumed that by 5th December—the target date for Mindoro— the American Air Force on Leyte would have control of the air over tha t island and the central Visayas. But the Japanese reacted strongly, an d indications were that American air power could not be on top by 5t h

I S . E. Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines (1959), p . 5, Vol XIII in the series .

576 LINGAYEN GULF 1944-45 December ; and in the circumstances, though reluctantly, MacArthur , towards the end of November, agreed to postpone the Mindoro action to 15th December—as mentioned earlier in this volume . The date of th e Lingayen landings was put back from 20th December to 9th January 1945 . Luzon, largest and most important of the Philippine Islands with a n area of 40,422 square miles—little less than half that of the State of Victoria—harbours the capital city of Manila, standing on one of th e world's largest land-locked harbours . The island had a population o f 7,355,000 before the war. Apart from a central plain, almost the whol e of Luzon is mountainous and heavily forested . The two main entrances to the plain from the sea are at Manila Bay in the south and Lingaye n Gulf, a deep indentation reaching south to some 100 miles N .N.W. of the capital. Manila Bay was strongly defended at Corregidor Island , in the entrance. Lingayen was undefended, and from it good roads an d a railway ran to Manila . It was decided to make the landings in Lingaye n Gulf which, rectangular in form, is about 20 miles wide and 30 miles long , exposed to the north-west and with capacious anchorage area at the inne r end, bordered by gradually shelving sandy beaches . The object of th e proposed operation was stated as being the prompt seizure of the centra l Luzon area, destruction of the principal defence forces, denial to the Japanese of the northern entrance to the South China Sea, and the pro - vision of bases for the support of further operations against the Japanese . Kinkaid, Barbey and Wilkinson—the last two commanding the assaul t convoys—were concerned about the exposure of the attacking expeditio n to air and surface assault en route to an objective beyond ready coverage from existing bases. In the light of Leyte experience it was believe d probable that the Japanese might risk part of their fleet in hit-and-ru n attacks by fast surface forces on the transport groups . The fleet could still muster a formidable force of some 4 battleships, 4 fleet carriers, 2 light and one escort carriers, 4 heavy and 5 light cruisers, 35 destroyers an d 54 submarines . These were mainly disposed in the Empire-Kuriles-Formos a area. Though the Japanese air forces in the Philippines had been dealt heavy blows, their power was not neutralised. There were more than 7 0 operational airfields in the Philippines area from which military aircraf t could be operated, and estimated enemy shore-based aircraft immediatel y available in the area at 4th January 1945 were 508 fighters, 332 bomber s and 208 other types. These numbers could be augmented by staging aircraft from Formosa, Hainan, China and the Netherlands East Indies . It was expected that with the forces immediately available the Japanese coul d make daily strikes against the assault forces on their way to Lingaye n Gulf, with 100 fighters and 50 bombers . And it was estimated that from the Empire probably 300 fighters and 150 bombers could be staged throug h Formosa and be available for the defence of Luzon within four to seve n days of the Allied landing. Having regard to this potential enemy opposition, the naval commanders discussed with MacArthur's staff the possibility of landing on southern

Dec1944 CROWDED ROADSTEAD 577 or eastern Luzon. But, because of its terrain, Lingayen emerged as the only suitable point for a major attack on the island . A choice from thre e routes to Lingayen engaged the consideration of the planners—north o f Luzon, through San Bernardino Strait, and through Surigao Strait . This last was farthest from unsubdued Luzon aerodromes ; it avoided exposur e to adverse weather conditions ; it passed almost all the way through water s too deep for mining ; and it afforded land-based air cover for convoys . It was therefore recommended to, and accepted by, MacArthur . Planning for the Luzon operation was done in Hollandia . The naval command status was Vice-Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet , in control of amphibious operations as CTF .77, Commander Luzon Attack Force ; Vice-Admiral Wilkinson, Commander III Amphibious Force , CTF.79, Commander Lingayen Attack Force ; Vice-Admiral Barbey, Com- mander VII Amphibious Force, CTF .78, Commander San Fabian Attack Force. Vice-Admiral Oldendorf commanded the Bombardment and Fire Support Group; Rear-Admiral Berkey the Close Covering Group ; Rear- Admiral C . T. Durgin the Escort Carrier Group; and Rear-Admiral Conolly the Reinforcement Group . In support of the operation the Pacific Fleet was assigned the tas k of destroying any enemy forces threatening interference, and of preventin g reinforcement of air units in Formosa . Third Fleet task groups under Admiral Halsey were disposed in the air north-east of Luzon to cover the operation, and conducted air strikes against Formosa, Okinawa an d northern Luzon . Submarines of the Seventh and Pacific Fleets were disposed to intercept and give warning of any approaching hostile surfac e forces. American air forces based on China, and operating from th e Marianas, supported the operation by strikes on Japanese objectives withi n range, and by scouting missions . And the Far East Air Force, operating from Leyte, Mindoro and Morotai, attacked Japanese communications an d airfields in the Philippines and provided fighter cover for the assaul t convoys . The beaches selected for the Lingayen Gulf landings were spaced alon g the south and south-east shores of the gulf, one group in the vicinit y of the town of Lingayen, and the other—some ten miles to the north-eas t —on both sides of the town of San Fabian. At Lingayen the landings were to be made by the 37th and 40th Divisions of the Sixth Army ; those at San Fabian by the 6th and 43rd Divisions. The troops of the 37th Division had to be transported from Bougainville where—as stated earlie r —they had been relieved by the Australians. Those of the 40th Division were to be carried from New Britain, and the 6th and 43rd Divisions from New Guinea . II On 15th December the roadstead at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougain- ville, was crowded with loaded and troop-laden transports . The eighteen ships of Transport Squadron 13 included Mount Olympus (7,234 tons) , Flagship of Vice-Admiral Wilkinson, commanding the Lingayen Attack

578 LINGAYEN GULF 9Nov-31 De c Force, TF.79, and H.M .A. Ships Manoora (Commander Cousin, Senio r Naval Officer Australian Landing Ships), Kanimbla (Commander Bunyan ) and Westralia (Lieut-Commander Livingston) . 2 The three Australian ships arrived at Torokina on 30th November, after having taken part during tha t month in the transport of troops from Humboldt Bay to Leyte . (The three Australian L .S.I's left Humboldt Bay on 9th November in company with Transport Divisions 8 and 24 . During passage, on 12th November , Transport Division 6 joined up, and the convoy, now consisting of 2 6 transports and their escorts, arrived at Leyte on 14th November .) They were back in Humboldt Bay on 19th November and proceeded thence at intervals, and by stages, to Torokina . Here, in company with other transports, they embarked troops 3 and gear, and on 16th December the convo y of 18 ships of Transport Group A (under the command of Rear-Admiral I. N. Kiland in Mount McKinley') of Admiral Wilkinson's TF .79, escorted by six U.S. destroyers, sailed for Manus via Lae. At Lae they were joined by Rear-Admiral Royal's Transport Group B, with the 40th Divi- sion, from Cape Gloucester. On a beach between Lae and Salamaua, ships and troops rehearsed the Lingayen landing before proceeding on to Manus , where they arrived on 21st December. In the morning of 31st December they left Manus, as Cousin recorded in Manoora's report, "with six destroyer escorts en route to execute assault Mike I in Lingayen Gulf on Luzon Island". Meanwhile other troop move- ments were under way, with Lingayen Gulf as their objective. Admiral Barbey's TF.78, the San Fabian Attack Force, embarked troops of th e 6th and 43rd Infantry Divisions at Sansapor and Aitape—where th e force kept Christmas—and were on their way to Luzon before the end of the year. The Luzon Attack Force Reserve embarked at Noumea, New Caledonia, and sailed from Purvis Bay on Christmas Day for Manus . There were other embarkations in New Guinea and, in all, "the troop s for the Lingayen landing were lifted from sixteen different bases in th e South and South-West Pacific, all but one of which—Noumea—the Allie s had wrested from the Japanese " . 5 On 31st December, when Cousin recorded in Manoora's report the departure of Transport Group A from Manus "to execute assault attac k

2 Cdr E. W . Livingston, DSC, RD ; RANK . Comd HMAS's Bingera 1939-40, Wyrallah 1940-42 , Wilcannia 1942-44, Westralia 1944-45 . Master mariner ; of Sydney ; b . Balmain, NSW, 27 Jan 1903 . Livingston succeeded Knight in command of Westralia while the ship was in Humboldt Bay on 30th October . Recording that fact in his October "Letter of Proceedings", Knight wrote : "During the period of my command of HMAS Westralia in commission as an LSI, namely seventeen months, 1,259 officers and 20,025 other ranks have been trained in this ship i n amphibious warfare . 1,048 officers and 18,460 men were transported in and to the forwar d areas, with 30,829 tons of military equipment (including vehicles) handled mostly by the ship' s landing craft. Westralia has taken part in important landings against the enemy at Arawe , Hollandia, and Panaon . . . As the Commanding Officer with the longest service in an Australia n LSI under the operational orders of Commander TF76, I would like to make mention of th e many considerations shown Westralia, and facilities afforded in the forward areas by Rear - Admiral Barbey's staff . Our needs have always been a priority consideration, and serving unde r this Command has been a happy experience . " s The three Australian ships embarked a total of 191 officers and 3,032 enlisted men of th e 37th Division : Manoora, 55 officers and 958 men ; Kanimbla, 83 officers and 1,247 men ; an d Westralia, 53 officers and 827 men. 4 Mount McKinley, US amphibious force command ship (1944), 7,234 tons . , Morison, Vol XIII, p. 97 .

31 Dec-4 Jan LUZON ARMADA 579 Mike I in Lingayen Gulf", Alliston, in Warramunga, wrote : "Warramunga sailed for Leyte and operation Mike I in company with TG.74.1, and US ships Sands, Clemsons and Dickerson ."7 Their point of departure on this occasion was, however, Kossol Roads in the Palau Islands, and no t Manus. TG.74.1 (Commodore Farncomb in Australia, with Shropshire, Arunta and Warramunga) had left Seeadler Harbour five days before, on 26th December, and spent three days at Kossol Roads before sailing fo r Leyte on their way to Luzon . Leyte was reached at 7 a.m. on 1st January 1945, and the Task Group anchored in San Pedro Bay . Another Australian arrival there on that morning was Warrego (Lieutenant Byrnes) fresh from Sydney and a refit at Garden Island. She had on hoard Commande r Oom as Commander Task Group 70 .5, and joined forces with Gascoyne, which had arrived at San Pedro Bay the previous day after her bus y Christmas Day at Guivan Harbour . After a conference with Commande r Loud, CTG .77 .6, the Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group, it was decided that Warrego would accompany Gascoyne in that group to Lin- gayen Gulf. III At noon on this day, 1st January, the sea road between the Philippine s and the Admiralty Islands was heavy with widely dispersed traffic comprising some 650 ships, landing craft, miscellaneous small craft, and escort forces, making up towards their objective at Luzon . 9 The armada was disposed in four distinct groups . First the Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group, TG .77 .6, plus L.C.I's, oilers, ammunition ships, salvage tugs and screen. It included H .M.A. Ships Gascoyne and Warrego, and was the first to leave Leyte—on 2nd January. Second Group was that of Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group, TG .77 .2 of six battleships 12 escort carriers, eight cruisers, 46 destroyers, and smaller craft—and includin g H.M.A. Ships Shropshire, Australia, Arunta and Warramunga. TG.77 .2 sortied from Leyte on 3rd January and at 6 .30 a .m., when at the northern entrance to Surigao Strait, was some 150 miles astern of TG .77.6, which it was due to overtake at dawn on 5th January off Manila Bay . TG.77.2 was in two circular divisions, separated by about ten miles . The Lingayen Fire Support Unit, plus six escort carriers, and including Shropshire, Arunta, and Warramunga, was in the van, and the San Fabian Fire Support Unit, plus six escort carriers and including Australia, in the rear. The third, and much the largest group, left Leyte Gulf in the evenin g of 4th January . It extended for more than 40 miles from van to rear, and was led by Berkey ' s Close Covering Group, TG .77 .3—with Mac- Arthur embarked in Boise—Barbey ' s San Fabian Attack Force, TF .78 ; two

e Clemson, US high speed transport (converted 1940), 1,190 tons. 7 Dickerson, US high speed transport (1919—later converted), 1,060 tons, four 4-in or six 3-in guns , six 21-in torpedo tubes, 35 kts . ° Lt-Cdr C. A. Byrne, OBE, DSC ; RANVR. HMS's Strafnes, Peony, Kelvin, Janus, Venomous ; HMAS Bungaree ; comd HMAS Warrego 1944-45 . Company director ; of Brisbane ; b . Toowoomba , Q1d, 18 Jan 1903 . ° They included 6 battleships, 18 escort carriers, 10 cruisers, 41 destroyers, 20 destroyer escorts , transports, supply ships, and about 550 landing craft of various types .

580 LINGAYEN GULF 2-6Jan1945 escort carriers and screen ; the landing ships of the Lingayen Attack Force ; and a Mindoro supply convoy . The fourth group, the transports of the Lingayen Attack Force, TF .79—including H .M.A. Ships Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia ; two escort carriers ; and the fleet Flagship, U .S.S. Wasatch with Kinkaid and Krueger on board, left Leyte Gulf on the morning of 6th January . First away, the Mine- 120 125 sweeping and Hydrographic Group and additions—o f whose 85 ships Warrego and Gascoyne formed the stern coverage to the screen —was first to encounter the SEA enemy. The convoy passed

quietly through Surigao 5 . Australia hit Strait and to the westward, Arunta near-mis: 5 Jan at ten knots, and the first— ineffective — air attack b y two to three aircraft occurred just on dusk on 2nd January . One of the attackers was shot down. There were several alarm s during the night, and a t 7.30 a.m. on the 3rd, about ten aircraft attacked . Gas- coyne was near-missed by a "comparatively large" bomb which hit the water abreast the bridge on the starboard side "but luckily did not explode". At least four enemy aircraft were sho t down by ships' fire and fighter cover. For the rest of the day, and throughout Attack forces approaching Lingayen Gulf , the 4th, the weather wa s 3rd-9th January 1945 calm and clear, and the convoy was not attacked . But in Warrego "at 5 .27 p.m. on 4th a large explosion was heard astern following A .A. fire, and it is assumed that some of th e covering forces were being attacked ". The assumption was correct . Since it entered Surigao Strait at 6 .30 a.m. on 3rd January, Oldendorf' s TG.77.2 had had a quiet time until the afternoon of the 4th . It safely traversed the Strait and the Mindanao Sea, and soon after 5 p .m. was almost midway between the island of Panay and the northern tip of Palawan, steering N .N.W. for Mindoro Strait . It was then that "an aircraft

4-5Jan1945 WASTED ROUNDS 58 1 [identified as a navy dive bomber] suddenly appeared at about 15,000 feet over the force. He lost no time in going into a steep dive and crashed into Ommaney Bay's l flight deck just abaft the bridge . Before long the resulting fire in the hangar was out of control and the ship had to be abandoned and sunk . "2 It was the explosion of the aircraft crashing int o the aircraft carrier which was heard over the horizon in Warrego. In this encounter history repeated itself when an innocent watcher cam e under ineffective fire from the Allied ships . In the first volume of this work 3 it was recorded that during an air attack on the Mediterranean Flee t in the preliminary stages of the Battle of Calabria, "the height of th e attacking aircraft, and their appearance as glittering specks, led the 7t h Cruiser Squadron to open fire during the afternoon on the planet Venus . It was an indignity the Goddess of Love, in her day-time manifestatio n in the sky, was often to undergo during the Mediterranean campaign . " She was to undergo it in the South-West Pacific also . On this afternoon of air attacks on TG .77.2 on 4th January 1945, Midshipman Francis i n Shropshire recorded in his diary : "The planet Venus was taken for a high flying aircraft, and, with other ships, Shropshire wasted many rounds of ammunition in this direction . " The next enemy encounter of note was with surface craft by H .M.A. Ships Gascoyne and Warrego and the American destroyer Bennion. 4 At 2.40 p .m. on the 5th, two enemy "cruisers" were reported over the horizo n astern by an American aicraft, and at 3 .50 p.m. they were sighted from the convoy and identified as destroyers . Bennion, Gascoyne and Warrego were detailed to attack, and immediately altered towards the enemy (cours e due south) at emergency full speed . Range was then 15,000 yards. At about 3 .50 Gascoyne and Warrego were abeam of each other, and Bennion was coming up astern from the head of the convoy . With her greater speed she soon led in line ahead formation . At 3.59 Bennion was well out in front of Gascoyne, who had Warrego about 5,000 yards astern and dropping back . Bennion opened fire at 4 .5 p.m., her opening salvoes short, as were those of the two Australian ships at 4 .8 p.m. and 4.10 p.m. respectively . The Japanese immediately reversed course and retired toward s Manila at full speed, making smoke . Then ensued a chase by Bennion, who made the range and claimed a few hits . The Japanese return fir e was most erratic. At 4.29 p.m., when she was about 3,000 to 4,000 yard s ahead of Gascoyne and 5,000 ahead of Warrego, Bennion went into rapid salvoes. She ceased fire at 4 .37 p.m., and ten minutes later ordered Gascoyne and Warrego to rejoin the convoy with her at best speed . As they were rejoining the convoy, Gascoyne recorded, heavy anti- aircraft fire was observed ahead over the convoy, and astern over TG .77.2, the Bombardment and Fire Support Group . Seven suicide bombers attacke d

1 Ommaney Bay, US escort carrier (1944), 7,800 tons, one 5-in gun, 28 aircraft, 19 kts . Sunk in Philippines 4 Jan 1945 . 2 Commander TG .74 .1, "Report of Proceedings " , 1st-31st January 1945. a Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942, pp . 173-4 . *Bennion, US destroyer (1943), 2,050 tons, five 5-in guns, ten 21-in torpedo tubes, 35 kts .

582 LINGAYEN GULF 5Jan1945 the convoy, but "all were disposed of with the only damage a partial hi t on the bows of one L .C.G." TG.77.2 was less fortunate . Commencing at 4.15 p.m., when about 90 miles west of Subic Bay, over a period o f two and a half hours, between 50 and 60 aircraft made runs on the grou p at altitudes varying from 20,000 feet to low over the water . Despite a strong Combat Air Patrol with as many as 58 fighters in the air at th e one time, the Japanese Kamikazes were able to penetrate the defences , and damaged seven ships. Two of the damaged ships were Australian . 5 At 5.35 p.m. Arunta, on the screen of the leading group, sighted two Japanese aircraft on the por t bow, heading straight towards her . Speed was increased to 25 knots an d fire was opened with a barrage set to 3,000 yards . One of the enemy planes veered to the right . The other headed straight for our bridge. The wheel was put hard a'starboard and, thanks to the extreme manoeuvring ability of the Tribal class destroyer, the plane missed by feet . It plunged into th e sea alongside the Gear room on the port side . The plane, a Zero, carried a bomb , estimated to be 250 lbs. The subsequent explosion holed the ship's side in severa l places and severed the electrical leads to both steering motors . The ship continue d to circle with the wheel hard a'starboard for about five minutes, as while enem y planes were still attacking I was anxious to keep moving . 6 Arunta's casualties in this attack included two killed.? At 5.42 Arunta had to stop to repair damage caused by the explosion . The American destroyer Ingraham$ stood by, circling slowly until repair s were completed at 10 .55 p.m., when both ships proceeded at 25 knots for Lingayen Gulf. As Commander Buchanan remarked in Arunta's Action Report, "We were fortunate perhaps that darkness covered most of this period of involuntary immobility ." Meanwhile, in the rear division the other Australian ship damaged i n this attack, Australia, received a direct hit and suffered severe casualtie s in a determined attack made on the division by at least six aircraft, which flew in low, just above the water, and were taken under fire by all ships . One was splashed abreast the destroyer screen and one altered course to pas s astern . The remainder came in weaving low and fast despite intense anti-aircraft fire . They crossed ahead of HMAS Australia, two within a hundred yards . One went on to score a hit on the escort carrier Manila Bay, and another executed a very steep turn to the right, and ending in a vertical dive hit HMAS Australia on the port side of the upper deck amidships at 5 .35 . This plane carried a bomb which wa s responsible for a number of casualties . The resulting fire was quickly subdued. Material damage was slight, and guns put out of action were soo n effective again. The major loss of fighting efficiency was due to casualties . There were some 25 killed and 30 wounded . These comprised the whole of P .2 guns crew ; eigh t members of P .1 guns crew; members of Nos . 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 Bofors and

5 The other five were American : Louisville and destroyer escort Stafford seriously damaged ; escort carrier Manila Bay, moderate damage ; and escort carrier Savo Island and destroyer Helm, mino r damage. The American ships suffered 99 casualties . e Arunta Action Report . ', Those killed were Able Seaman H. L. E. Sellick and Stoker Petty Officer R. A. Hand . 5 Ingraham, US destroyer (1944), 2,200 tons, six 5-in guns, five 21-in torpedo tubes, 34 kts .

5-61an 1945 SUICIDE ATTACKS 58 3 members of, including the captains of the guns, both port and starboard multipl e pompoms, as well as most of the upper deck ammunition supply parties . Thre e officers were killed and one wounded .9 While TG.77 .2 was under attack on the afternoon of the 5th, some 400 miles astern in the western entrance to the Mindanao Sea the large third group had its first encounter with the enemy when a midget sub - marine fired two torpedoes at Boise . Damage was averted by promp t manoeuvring, and the submarine was damaged by an aircraft of the anti- submarine patrol ; it was then rammed, depth charged, and probably sunk by the destroyer Taylor. IV At dawn on 6th January the Minesweeping and Hydrographic Grou p and the Bombardment Group met off the entrance to Lingayen Gulf and, with destroyers as close support and the Bombardment Group as cover , the minesweepers started their sweeping operations in the entrance . Owing to the absence of mines, the Bombardment Group was able to ente r the Gulf earlier than expected, and by 10 .45 a .m. the bombardments of Cape Bolinao by the van section, and of Poro Point by the rear section , had commenced . Australia and Shropshire were with the San Fabia n Fire Support Unit under Rear-Admiral Weyler, which commenced it s bombardment runs just before 11 a .m. Both ships carried out bombardments on Poro Point, and the bay and town of San Fernando, on the eas t side of Lingayen Gulf . Arunta and Warramunga were assigned to support the minesweeping group . Throughout the day there were sporadic air attacks, mainly by suicid e aircraft, and a number of ships were damaged, including the battleshi p New Mexico. She was in column ahead of Shropshire when, at 12.3 p.m., she was hit by a suicide aircraft . It seemed to observers in Shropshire that the aircraft was diving on Australia, who was astern of Shropshire. But it increased height, passed down Shropshire's starboard side at mast- head height, and crashed into the port side of New Mexico's bridge . Shrop- shire scored several hits on this aircraft, and shot away its tail as it passed . Eight minutes later Shropshire was near missed on the starboard side abreast the bridge by an aircraft "which dived from the sun . It was hit by A .A. fire and, narrowly missing the top of B' turret, crashed int o the sea alongside the bridge."10 A few minutes after this, at 12 .19 p.m., two fast, low-flying aircraft— "obviously suiciders"—appeared out of a gap in the hills to the westward . The nearer one was taken under fire b y Warramunga, crossed the destroyer's bow at about 800 yards, and crashed into the American destroyer-transport Brooks, which was lying stopped half a mile away . Warramunga went to the aid of the American ship , which was burning fiercely amidships, and lying stopped beam on t o

0 Australia Action Report, Mike 1 Operation . Examination of the Surgeon's journal and other available sources has failed to establish the actual dates on which the fatal casualties—suffere d in this and a second attack next day—occurred, i.e . on 5th or 6th January. The names of thos e who lost their lives in the two attacks are therefore grouped in footnote 1 below . 10 Shropshire ' s Action Report.

584 LINGAYEN GULF 61an1945 wind and swell. She had no steam and could not fight the fire, and most of her crew and injured were on the forecastle . Commander Alliston too k Warramunga alongside Brooks' lee-side, and his Damage Control parties, backed up by Supply parties, got to work on the fires. The main on e was amidships, where the crashed aircraft had ploughed a large hol e in the deck above the engine room, and had knocked down one funnel . A secondary fire—but potentially more dangerous because the superstruc- ture under which it burned contained a 3-inch magazine—was abaft th e bridge. Warramunga concentrated on this while transferring wounded fro m Brooks' forecastle to her own. Alliston's task was not easy, since "Brook s had the wreckage of boats and davits fouling her port side, and Warra- munga had to be manoeuvred continuously to maintain an angle of abou t 30 degrees between the two ships . The only point of contact was the forecastle . This made the fire-fighting task considerably more difficult ." At 1 .48 p .m. on the 6th both fires were out, and Warramunga had passed her towing wire to the American ship and at 1 .50 set a northerly course up Lingayen Gulf, towing Brooks at seven knots. At 4.25 p.m. they passed the battleships and cruisers of TG .77.2, which entered the lower end of Lingayen Gulf at 3 p .m ., followed by Gascoyne and Warrego. Japanese suicide attacks became frequent, and a number of ships suffere d damage and casualties . New Mexico was hit a second time at about 2 .36 p.m. At 5.15 the Bombardment Group commenced to retire from th e Gulf by reversing course, thus placing Gascoyne and Warrego in the van. At 5 .34 p .m. Australia was again a victim of a suicide aircraft. She was then astern of Shropshire, and Midshipman Francis in that shi p recorded how "the plane, a Navy type dive-bomber, came in with on e wheel down on our starboard quarter . In my opinion this plane was coming for us, but after flying through a Bofors and eight-inch barrage he turne d away in favour of crashing into Australia amidships." Australia recorded how At 5.34 a "Val" dived on the ship from the starboard quarter, and flattening out , hit the ship on the upper deck between S .2 and S .1. This plane also carried a bomb which, from fragments found, appeared to have been converted from a larg e calibre shell. The resulting fire was quickly subdued, though "A" boiler room ha d to be shut down temporarily. Material damage affecting the fighting efficiency wa s confined mainly to S .2 mounting . Both guns were put out of action and all for m of control destroyed . . . . Again the major damage to fighting efficiency was throug h casualties. There were 14 killed and 26 wounded . (The whole of S .2 gun's cre w and most of S.1.) Subsequently, except for a special bombardment firing, ther e were only sufficient crews to man one 4-inch mounting each side, a large proportio n being casualty replacements).

1 Those killed in Australia in the Japanese Kamikaze attacks at Lingayen Gulf on 5th and 6t h January 1945 were : Sub-Lt K . Levy, RANR ; Lt M . H. Marsh, RAN ; Lt C. N . Russell, RAN ; AB N. W. Andersen, AB J . Annear, AB C . R . Avery, AB F. Beake, AB J . T . H . Bourke , OD M. G. Brown, OD W. G . Brown, OD R . Clifford, AB A . A . De Vere, AB C . D. Donnelly , AB F . W . Eames, OD N. J . Everson, Ldg Seaman E. J . Ezard, AB W. R . Fisher, OD H . D . Ford, AB G . R. Frawley, OD R. J . Gannon, AB W. G . Gummow, AB E . L. Hardeman , AB L. L . Hart, AB V. W. Hearne, AB L . I . Herdman, AB C . M . Hughes, AB H . Kennedy , AB M . D . Kirchner, AB A . W . Lade, AB M. S . Loud, AB R . Meddings, AR C. Moore, Ldg Seaman J . J . J . Moore, AB W. T . Munday, Ldg Seaman H . E . O'Neill, AB N . Pringle, AB G . C . Reeve, AB G . W. Riley, Ldg Seaman S . C . Rowley, AB I. S . Sharman, AB P. S . Lilting , AB R . A. Verdon, AB C . R. Ward, AB H . R. Whittaker .

6-7Jan1945 SHROPSHIRE STRADDLED 585 Meanwhile, Gascoyne and Warrego overtook Warramunga and her tow and remained in company to screen them . Japanese aircraft attacks continued, and Gascoyne recorded that our little force found themselves between the battlefleet and the setting sun, a most unenviable position . Fortunately these attacks, which except one were all low level, swept past the sun to attack the main force astern of us . The exception was one vertical dive bomber which came in over Shropshire practically unnoticed . We opened fire with our after 4-inch, range about 4,000 yards, and by a grea t stroke of fortune hit the bomber with the first round just as it commenced to dive . The plane immediately disintegrated . This was later confirmed by Shropshire, wh o "complained" that our shell splinters had spattered her quarterdeck . Relief from air attacks came with darkness, and the battlefleet and th e Warramunga group stood off the Gulf during the night. At dawn on th e 7th Warramunga's tow parted, and Gascoyne took Brooks in tow "just at the time the battlefleet emerged out of the morning gloom to seaward. They had to make an emergency turn away to clear us ." Gascoyne, screened by Warramunga and Warrego, towed Brooks to the shallows off Santiago Island, where the American ship anchored at noon . Brooks' ship's company (excepting her Commanding Officer and 12 men who remained in her a s a salvage party), totalling 12 officers and 110 men, were then embarked in Warramunga and taken by her at 25 knots to the southern end of Lingayen Gulf, where the Bombardment Group had returned to resum e bombardments, and were transferred to U.S.S. Pennsylvania.

V In Lingayen Gulf, 7th January was a quiet day so far as air attack s were concerned . The Bombardment Group re-entered the Gulf at 6 a .m. and carried out the firings scheduled for the day . Australia and Shropshire were allocated a counter-battery role, in the course of which Shropshire was straddled by a number of shells from a shore battery . Australia recorded having little to do . Rounds were fired at railway store-sheds an d certain positions where it was thought pill-boxes or camouflaged gu n emplacements might be situated. An occasional shell, possibly of 6-inch calibre, landed in our area, and various suspected firing positions were engaged, but the gun appeared to be mobile . At about 1600 HMAS Shropshire considered she ha d located a firing position and this was engaged by both ships. There was no furthe r trouble, and it was considered the gun was silenced . Arunta was allocated bombardment areas near the town of Dagupan . "This day," Buchanan recorded, "the enemy had been very subdued . The rough handling he had received the day before had apparently chastened hi s suicidal spirit . " It was one of the convoys on its way to Lingayen Gulf—the third, and largest group—which was this day the object of enemy attack . Two enemy aircraft were shot down by ships of the convoy in an attack during th e evening. Later, about 10.25 p.m., a Japanese destroyer was encountered

586 LINGAYEN GULF 6-8Jan1945 off Manila Bay . Four of the convoy's destroyers were sent in to deal wit h it, and the enemy ship (of the Hatsuharu-cl ass) was reported sunk afte r a brief engagement. 2 On 8th January Australia suffered her third and fourth suicide aircraft attacks within a few minutes . She was last in line of the Bombardmen t Force as it moved into the Gulf after having stood off shore during th e night. At 7 .20 a.m. a Japanese two-engined plan e was sighted coming in low on the port quarter . HMAS Australia, last in the line , opened fire and at the same time four patrolling "Wild Cats" attacked . The enemy plane was splashed twenty yards from the ship and skidded into the ship's side doin g little damage . . . . At 7.39 a second aircraft attacked from the same quarter and was put down just short of the ship but hit the ship on the waterline below th e bridge. It carried a bomb which exploded short of or against the ship's side and blew a hole 14 feet by eight feet, opening a provision room and one oil tank t o the sea and flooding bilges . The ship took a list of five degrees to port and adjacen t compartments commenced to flood slowly . The list was corrected and flooding brought under control, and shoring up of bulkheads carried out . Fortunately the casualties in these two attacks were minor in character , "mostly shock". Referring to the second attack, Australia's report said that the fact of the light casualties "was remarkable, since a lot of shrapnel , one engine and a propeller came inboard and landed in various parts o f the ship". Despite her damage, Australia met her scheduled bombardment engage- ments, though the blast effect of firing her forward 8-inch guns on th e port side was straining the inner bulkheads, so that it was decided no t to fire them on that side except in an emergency. Scheduled firings commenced at 8 a.m. on the 8th in the Lingayen and San Fabian areas, an d later in the San Fernando area, in preparation for the next day's landings . That day's approach was simultaneous with that of the assault convoys , which were now nearing the Gulf, and attracting the attention of suicide aircraft as they passed up the west coast of Luzon . A few minutes after Australia suffered her fourth attack inside the Gulf, the escort carrier Kadashan Bay, with Task Group 77 .5, north-west of Subic Bay, was crashed by an aircraft and had a 15-foot hole blown in he r side. Other ships were variously damaged by near misses . Round about 7 p .m. the Transport Groups of Wilkinson's TF .79 were west of Lingayen Gulf, with Group B leading, and Group A, includin g Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia, ten miles astern . Between the two groups was Rear-Admiral R. A. Ofstie's TU .77.4.3 comprising the escort carriers Kitkun Bay and Shamrock Bay3 and two destroyers. Vice-Admiral Kinkaid in his flagship Wasatch joined TF .79 on 6th January, and at 6 p .m. on the 8th MacArthur in Boise joined the formation . Just before 7 p .m. Kitkun Bay was seriously damaged by a suicide aircraft . Westralia recorded a busy hour commencing at 6 p .m.

2 There is in post-war official records no mention of a destroyer being sunk on 7th January 1945 . The only Hatsuharu-class vessel surviving in January 1945 was Hatsushimo and she was not sunk until 30th July 1945 . 3 Shamrock Bay, US escort carrier (1944), 7,800 tons, one 5-in gun, 28 aircraft, 19 lets.

8-9 Jan 1945 BUSY HOUR 587

Six enemy aircraft attacked the convoy, and three [four according to Kanimbla] were intercepted by carrier-based air cover on our port quarter, and after a thrilling dog fight fought at a low altitude all enemy planes were shot down without loss. At approximately the same time another was shot down into the sea by our fighters . At 1850 an enemy suicide bomber attacked the escort carrier Kitkun Bay , crashing into the stern, causing casualties and disabling the ship, which had to b e taken in tow by tugs. Shortly after this attack a Zeke [Navy fighter aircraft] mad e a suicide attack on Westralia . The enemy approached on a bearing of Red 170 and carried out a steep dive obviously aimed at the bridge . A very good barrage wa s put up and Westralia's guns' crews remained at their guns and kept up well aimed fire eventually causing the aircraft to crash about ten feet astern in a disintegrated condition . The after end of the ship was showered with flying wreckage and on e rating, Leading Stoker Chapman, 4 was slightly wounded . The steering gear wa s also temporarily disabled, but was in action again in approximately 18 minutes . CTG.79.1, Rear-Admiral Kiland, officially credited Westralia with the destruction of the aircraft, and that ship's commanding officer, Lieut - Commander Livingston, remarked in his report that "the fine work don e by the guns' crews actually saved the ship" . He singled out Able Seamen Jeffery 5 and Mitchell6 , and Sapper Jaensch 7 as having been "particularl y outstanding in their devotion to duty" . During the day the Bombardment Group carried out bombardments on Lingayen, San Fabian and San Fernando . Just after 6 p.m . Oldendorf reported to Kinkaid that bombardment disclosed practically no militar y installations or targets in the Lingayen area and relatively few in the Sa n Fabian. The bombardment of San Fernando, last for the day, was completed at 6.40 p.m., and the Bombardment Group spent the night cruising at slow speed in the inner approaches to the Lingayen Gulf, since th e whole outer approaches were "filling up with transports, etc". Meanwhile, during the 8th, Gascoyne and YMS316 8 of the Hydrographic Group completed laying buoys marking the boat lanes to the beache s of the morrow ' s landings. Considerable difficulty occurred in positionin g the buoys correctly owing to the smoke and dust from the bombardments and the fact that some bombardment ship or other was always just where we wante d to get to, or else, having chosen our position, a group of sweepers would commenc e their sweep in our area just at the moment of laying . Only one buoy was swep t up, however, and as the day progressed we all began to understand each other' s habits. All buoys were laid by 4 p.m. VI Weather conditions for the landings on 9th January were excellent . There was little wind and practically no swell . Dawn followed an unusually

a Ldg Stoker W . L . Chapman, S5060 . HMAS's Wollongong and Westralia. Of Russell Vale, NSW ; b . Russell Vale, 17 Nov 1921 . 6 AB L. G . Jeffery, DSM, B3591 . HMAS ' s Wilcannia, Gascoyne and Westralia . Of Brisbane ; b. Brisbane, 8 Jun 1924. 6 AB A . J. Mitchell, DSM, PA1895 . HMAS's Canberra, Kanimbla and Westralia . Of Adelaide ; b . Adelaide, 6 Jul 1923 . 7 Spr W. R. Jaensch, MM, VX57613 . 2 Aust Landing Ships Detachment . Orchard worker ; of Re d Cliffs, Vic ; b . Mildura, Vic, 17 Jun 1920 . 6 YMS316, US motor minesweeper (1942-45), 207 tons, one 3-in gun, 13 kts .

588 LINGAYEN GULF 9Ian 1945 clear night, whose sky was bright with stars and was traversed by a las t quarter moon . Throughout the night the ships of the Lingayen and Sa n Fabian attack forces moved down the Gulf . Vice-Admiral Wilkinson' s III Amphibious Force was to take the right flank (Lingayen beaches ) and Vice-Admiral Barbey 's VII Amphibious Force the left flank (Sa n Fabian beaches) . Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia were with the Lin- gayen group and, with paravanes streamed as a safeguard against mines ,

Lingayen Gulf, 9th January 1945

steamed through the luminous darkness towards their assigned anchorage s off the Lingayen beaches . In Manoora all hands were called at 3 .30 a.m ., and troops and ship's company went to breakfast at 4 o'clock . "Action Stations" was sounded an hour later and, at 7 a .m., just after executin g the "Deploy" signal, "Operational Action Stations". Paravanes were re - covered, and at 7 .30 a.m., right on schedule and only two minutes after sunrise, Manoora anchored in 21 fathoms, 12,500 yards from Crimso n Beach about midway between Lingayen to the west and the town o f Dagupan to the east, and some 5,000 yards from each . The L.S.T's of

9Jan 1945 SUICIDERS' PARADISE 58 9 the attack group anchored close inshore, some 4,000 yards from the beach . All the transports ' boats were ordered away, and the disembarkation of troops and equipment commenced from Manoora and her sisters . Simul- taneously the ships of Admiral Barbey's TF .78 anchored off San Fabia n beaches and commenced disembarkation . Meanwhile the pre-landing bombardment was in progress, and "th e din", recorded Cousin in Manoora's Action Report, "was terrific . Fire was directed by float spotter planes over the area ." The Bombardment Grou p was off the beaches at dawn . Of the San Fabian group, West Virginia and Shropshire were in the centre of the San Fabian area ; New Mexico and Minneapolis were on the left flank; and Mississippi and Australia were on the right. Arunta, too, was with the San Fabian group . The battleships commenced their bombardment at 7 a .m. Shropshire opened fire at 8 .3 0 at targets in San Fabian town . Australia, farther west, also began her bombardment at 8 .30, with the town of Dagupan and various road an d rail junctions as targets . Arunta opened fire at dawn and continued unti l just after 10 a .m., on a variety of targets . "All this time," recorded Buchanan, "the Gulf was being filled with shipping . It looked like a suiciders' paradise ; but our control of the air was so complete that onl y a few single planes attempted to attack, and they had but indifferen t success." Warramunga, away to the westward with the Lingayen force , also opened fire at 8 .30 and, recorded Alliston, "ceased at 5 .30 p.m . During this time fire was intermittent." Though, as Buchanan recorded, "only a few single planes attempte d to attack", they were not without some successes . At 7.25 a.m. the destroye r escort Hodges9 was hit and damaged by a suicide aircraft, and twenty minutes later the light cruiser Columbia was hit, but was soon able to resume bombarding . The landing was scheduled for 9.30 a.m. At 9.10 rocket fire commenced from L .C .I. gunboats preceding the landing craft towards the beaches, and bombardment ships shifted gunfire to both flanks of the beachhead, and thereafter engaged targets of opportunity . From Manoora, Commander Green, on board the L .S.I. as an observer under instructions from Barbey "to participate in the landing at Lingaye n and observe the Australian L.S.I's under combat operational conditions" , landed with the first assault wave, which he accompanied to the village of Binmaley. Describing the landing in his report, Green wrote: All boats were lowered and combat troops embarked without mishap, and as the boats moved inshore practically the entire countryside in the vicinity of the beac h was shrouded in smoke from the exploding shells of the naval bombardment . M y chief impression as we approached the beach was the seemingly ever increasing thunder of the rocket bombardment . All waves of landing craft approached th e beach with admirable station-keeping and as we neared the shore of Crimson Beac h there was no opposition fire whatsoever. This was the general experience at the Lingayen beaches . They

9 Hodges, US destroyer escort (1944), 1,450 tons, two 5-in guns, three 21-in torpedo tubes, 24 kts .

590 LINGAYEN GULF 9 Jan 1945 lay open to "the high winds which often lash Lingayen Gulf into a white-cappe d fury", and immediately behind them lay "numerous swamps and fish ponds, inter- twined by many streams and several fair-sized rivers, which could only be traverse d over a series of easily defended causeways and bridges" . Such disadvantages caused the Japanese, when they invaded Luzon in December 1941, to regard these beache s as unsuitable for an amphibious assault, and they assumed that the Americans woul d take the same view.l o On shore, Green found the devastation caused by the rockets and naval bombardment was almost indescrib- able . Huge craters pitted the ground and most of the trees were either shorn off or riddled with shrapnel . The village of Binmaley presented a dismal sight ; nearly every hut had been wrecked and it was obvious that the place would have to b e completely rebuilt before it would become habitable . At 9 .30 a.m. all firing ceased as the first assault waves landed on San Fabian beach . Three minutes later the first Lingayen beach landings were made. There was some Japanese mortar fire at White Beach, San Fabian , where a number of landing craft were hit, with some casualties. But there was no opposition at the Lingayen beaches, where all assault waves lande d on schedule . At noon it was reported that San Fabian was captured . The main enemy opposition continued to be in the form of Kamikaze attacks, and at 1 p .m. Australia sustained her fifth suicide crash. She had completed her scheduled bombardments by 10 .30 a.m. and, since no targets of opportunity were sighted either from her or the spotting plane , had not again fired . At 1 .11 p.m . two aircraft were sighted coming i n from the east. One dived past Australia and hit U.S.S. Mississippi near the bridge. The other came in ahead of Australia after a curving dive, an d tried to hit the cruiser's bridge and fore controls . He missed his aim, however, and diving under the foreyard his wing tip caugh t on a mast strut which swung him into the foremost funnel and over the side . There was no other material damage than cutting off the top third of the funnel , which necessitated closing down two boilers in "A" boiler room, and damage t o radar and WT aerials, which was quickly repaired . There were no casualties . A hole was cut in the damaged funnel by next day and all boilers were again in action . So ended Australia's last operation in the war .' Meanwhile the discharging of the three Australian L .S.I's continued to schedule. Around 10.30 a.m . the three ships weighed, and proceeded inshore from the outer anchorage to the inner transport area, 4,000 yard s from the beach . Westralia was first of the three to complete discharge, at 5 .30 p.m., the best part of an hour ahead of Kanimbla and Manoora . Manoora's figures give an idea of what was achieved by the Australia n L.S.I's in the Lingayen Gulf operation. The total time taken to discharge Manoora's 4652 tons of cargo, in 219 lifts, was five hours and one minute. This worked out at about 93 tons per hour, or an average of 31 tons pe r hour per hold. Kanimbla and Westralia each achieved a similarly satisfactory performance, and of them Cousin, as Senior Naval Officer Australia n

IU Morison, Vol XIII, p. 126. He was quoting from Sixth Army Report I 7, and MacArthur , Historical Report II 434 . 1 Australia, Action Report .

91an 1945 KAMIKAZE ATTACKS 591 Landing Ships, wrote in Manoora's action report: "H.M.A.S. Kanimbla and Westralia performed their assault landing in an exemplary manner ; the Commanding Officers, officers and ship's companies of these ships are a credit to Australia ." On shore, progress was rapid against little opposition. The only enemy resistance encountered was on the extreme left flank . Just after 2 p.m. General MacArthur, with members of his staff, went on shore at San Fabia n beaches, where they remained for three hours or so . By dusk the invader s had pressed inland . On the extreme right flank the 40th Division seize d the 5,000-foot Lingayen airstrip, and found it in excellent condition ; and then secured the town of Lingayen . By dusk various penetrations up to 6,000 and 8,000 yards deep had been made . "It was almost too easy, " recorded the American naval historian, "the soldiers were given no fore - taste of the rough days ahead for them ."2 VII Dusk on 9th January, with the removal of the Combat Air Patrol , ushered in a dangerous time for the ships in Lingayen Gulf. As many as possible of the unloaded transports and other vessels were sent back t o Leyte, and thus the Kamikaze target was reduced. The three Australian L.S.I's weighed anchor just before 8 p .m. to join a Leyte convoy. During the afternoon Manoora embarked twelve serious casualties from Australia . Stretcher cases, they were hoisted from two boats to Manoora's starboard gunport door. It was an occasion which moved her Executive Officer, Lieut - Commander B . Paul, to comment in his "Report on the Operation i n Lingayen Gulf " : It is hoped that the sight of these men will help to curb the insatiable curiosity of many of the officers and ratings who expose themselves unnecessarily during air attacks . In preparation for a dusk attack by the Kamikaze aircraft, all ships made smoke at 6.24 p.m., so that an effective blanket lay over the target. Con- sequently, though there were several Kamikaze attacks during the hour after sunset, no ship was hit by a suicide plane . But one, the battleship Colorado, suffered 18 killed or mortally wounded as the result of a hi t on the bridge at 7.5 p.m. by a "friendly" 5-inch shell, which had formed part of the anti-Kamikaze barrage put up by the ships . Five minutes afte r Colorado was hit, Vice-Admiral Kinkaid recorded in his Action Report : "The only undamaged heavy ships are Pennsylvania, West Virginia, H.M.A .S. Shropshire, and Portland." Towards evening Australia was directed to report to Vice-Admiral Wil- kinson and, with the damaged American ships Louisville and Columbia , was detailed with Arunta to join the fast transport group returning t o Leyte. Of 36 ships, this convoy—TU .79 .14.1—was in six columns, of which the Australian ships were in the starboard wing column in th e

2 Morison, Vol XIII, p . 136 .

592 LINGAYEN GULF 9-22 Ian order Australia, Columbia, Louisville, Manoora, Westralia, Kanimbla . Escorts comprised eleven American destroyers and H .M.A.S. Arunta. The passage to Leyte, where the convoy arrived in the afternoon of 12th January, was uneventful . During the Lingayen Gulf operation H .M.A.S . Australia was hit five times by suicide bombers and except for the hole in her side and th e casualties among anti-aircraft guns ' crews her fighting efficiency was not impaired beyond the capacity of temporary repairs . Captain Armstrong reported of this : In the matter of casualties we were lucky, as other ships with only one or tw o hits had more casualties . Two of the attackers were definitely put down befor e hitting the ship, two did not appear to be affected by our A .A. fire, and one missed his aim, which may have been due to A .A. fire. I consider that the same numbe r of hits from bombs or torpedoes would probably have done much more damage . The behaviour of the ship's company which I have the honour to command was in accordance with the traditions of the service . They were steady under attack, and action to repair and make good damage was taken promptly and efficiently . Australia was the recipient of many signals before her departure from Lingayen Gulf, both from American and her fellow Australian ships . TG.77.2, Vice-Admiral Oldendorf, signalled : "Your gallant conduct and that of your ship has been an inspiration to all of us . Sorry to lose you at this time." Berkey, CTG .77 .3, said "Sorry the Hell Birds concentrate d on you. My deep regrets for losses in the stout ship's company ." Rear- Admiral Weyler, in his letter forwarding the Report of Bombardments , commented : "The performance of Australia is particularly to be com- mended. Heavily hit three times and with the greater part of her dua l purpose battery out of commission, she nevertheless executed scheduled fires in her usual effective manner ." And Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet, in a report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet , remarked: "H.M.A.S. Australia received two minor and three major hit s from enemy suicide planes . Despite the resulting damage and casualties , the fire schedule was executed in a very satisfactory manner. Her performance during the entire operation was excellent ." On arrival at Leyte, preparations were made to put a temporary patc h on the hole in Australia's side, and when this was done she was sent to Manus on her way south to Australia for repairs. Due to exigencies, Commodore Farncomb returned to Leyte in Australia . It was his intention to transfer with his staff to Shropshire before Australia left Lingayen Gulf, but when that ship and Arunta were ordered to joi n TU.79.14.1, Shropshire was not in the vicinity and he was unable to transfer his pendant before Australia sailed . At Leyte, it was found feasible to fit Arunta for further operational service with the facilities there avail - able, and Farncomb thereupon arranged to return in her to Lingayen an d transfer to Shropshire on arrival. This he did, and joined Shropshire at Lingayen on the afternoon of 22nd January. In recording this in his repor t of the operation, Commodore Farncomb wrote :

Jan1945 A SORE SUBJECT 593

I consider it an honour that H.M .A. Ships Australia, Shropshire, Arunta and Warramunga should have formed part of the vanguard of the Lingayen operation . I saw Gascoyne and Warrego only occasionally as their duties were with the Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group, but was glad to see that they were also i n the forefront . And he closed his report with a comment on what was a sore subjec t with the ships ' companies of the Australian ships at the time : As always, when we leave our base for operations, the mail service has been bad . . . . There have been many opportunities for forwarding mails in convoys fro m Leyte to Lingayen, but so far no mails have been received by this means . Ther e is still no indication as to when our mails may be expected . It is strongly urged that this unsatisfactory state of affairs should be rectified as early as possible . The mail situation at this period caused considerable dissatisfaction, an d most of the Australian ships with Seventh Fleet commented on it in thei r reports. On receipt of Commodore Farncomb 's observations at Navy Office , the matter was referred by the Second Naval Member, Commodor e Showers, to the R.A.N. Liaison Officer with Seventh Fleet Service Force "for information and necessary action", but it was some time before th e cause for complaint was removed .