See story on page 5 Naval Order of the United States – San Francisco Co m m a n d e r y Mission: History Studiorum Historiam Praemium Est Volume 1, Issue 9 HHHHHH 4 October 1999 1944: With the World’s Eyes on Europe, U.S. Fights History’s Largest Sea Battle This Month’s Contents Ambush at Palawan Passage Page 7 Leyte Gulf Actions See Destruction Sibuyan Sea Air Attacks 7 Loss of Princeton 13 Battle of Surigao Strait 2 Of Japanese Navy as Fighting Force Main Event off Samar 3 In October 1944, the attention of American newspapers and radio was firmly fo- Halsey Abandons Kinkaid 3 Leyte Charts 2 cused on Europe, particularly on the German fortress at Metz, in northeast France. Battle of Trafalgar 5 General George S. Patton’s seemingly invincible Third Army had bounced off Metz Trafalgar Chart 16 without leaving a dent. Americans had grown to expect great things from Patton, so they sat by their radios and read the newspapers waiting for Metz to fall. In this vacuum of news from the Pacific, the greatest of all naval battles was fought. The Japanese Navy rolled the dice with everything they had on the line. Two hundred seventy-six war- ships ranging in size from destroyer to the world’s largest battleships took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. When it was over, the Jap navy had ceased to exist as a fighting force. There were no replacements in the pipeline and, in fact, there had never been a pipeline to begin with. The Jap well was dry. Japanese tactical policy had no con- nection whatsoever to a strategic war plan, but was instead based on the megalomanic thought that to refuse to A BABY FLATTOP SUCCUMBS to pounding by Jap battle force. Gambier Bay , like her sister CVEs, yield an inch meant that that inch proved Combustible, Vulnerable , and Expendable. But Taffy 3 turned back four battleships, eight would not be yielded. cruisers and a dozen destroyers. Story on Page 3. “Freedom’s Cost,” painted by Richard C. Moore. (Continued on page 8) Page 2 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Surigao_Strait_Action --- Oldendorf’s Battleline Annihilates NishimurNishimuraaaa Shima Steams into Strait, Sees Wreckage, Steams Out The Japanese southern force that would transit Surigao Strait consisted of two parts. Vice Admiral Shoji Nishi- mura would lead with two battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers. Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima would follow with another two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and seven destroyers. Nishi- mura had been discovered the morning of 24 October 1944 by search planes IN THE OPENING PHASE, Kurita and Nishimura steamed from Brunei in Borneo, taking different from Admiral William F. Halsey’s routes to Leyte Gulf. Shima sailed from the Inland Sea and would follow Nishimura through Suri- Third Fleet and attacked later in the gao Strait while Kurita would transit San Bernardino Strait. The two forces would meet at the inva- morning, but he suffered little damage sion beaches on the east coast of Leyte, crushing the American Seventh Fleet in a pincers. Ozawa, sailing as a decoy from the Inland Sea, would draw off Halsey’s Third Fleet. and the attacks soon shifted to Admiral Takeo Kurita’s much stronger center force in Sibuyan Sea. Nishimura reso- lutely sailed on and entered Surigao Strait at 0244 on 25 October. Prepara- tions had been made for his arrival. Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid had passed down the order, “Prepare for night engagement,” 12 hours earlier, almost to the minute. At 1445 on the 24th, the dispatch was logged aboard Louisville (CA 28), the flagship of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, com- mander of the Leyte bombardment and fire support group. Oldendorf had a powerful force -- six battleships, Pennsylvania (BB 38), Tennessee (BB 43), California (BB 44), Maryland (BB 46), West Virginia (BB 48) and Mississippi (BB 41); four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and FIVE SEPARATE ACTIONS made up the Battle of Leyte Gulf. 1.) Submarines attacked Kurita’s force 28 destroyers. Of the battleships, only in the Palawan Passage. 2.) Third Fleet engaged Kurita with aircraft in Sibuyan Sea. 3.) Seventh Fleet battleships, cruisers and destroyers blocked Nishimura in Surigao Strait. 4.) Seventh Fleet Mississippi was not a veteran of Pearl escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts repelled Kurita in the main battle off Samar. 5.) Harbor. California and West Virginia The Jap decoy force under Ozawa was engaged by the Third Fleet off Cape Engaño. These maps had been sunk and raised, the others are taken from Triumph and Tragedy , volume six of Winston Churchill’s history of World War II. severely damaged. Japan had thought Churchill’s Dispatches to MacArthur, RoosevelRooseveltttt she had put them out of the war. They Winston Churchill, en route home velt “Pray accept my most sincere con- were back and carried a grudge. from Moscow, saw Leyte’s importance gratulations, which I tender on behalf Oldendorf called his commanders and took time to wire MacArthur of His Majesty’s Government, on the aboard Louisville to explain his plan. “Hearty congratulations on your bril- brilliant and massive victory gained by He would plug up Surigao Strait, plac- liant stroke in the Philippines” follow- the sea and air forces of the United ing his battleline squarely across its ing the landings at Leyte. But following States over the Japanese in the recent Leyte exit. The battleline would steam the naval engagement, he wired Roose- heavy battles.” (Continued on page 4) 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 3 Did MacArthur Sleep In U.S. Navy’s Heroic Battle off Samar, Through Surigao Battle? 3 Destroyers, 4 DEs, 6 Baby Flattops Naval History Magazine Turn Back 4 Jap Battleships, 8 CruiserCruiserssss Got its History Wrong At no other time in the history of las MacArthur. “Conveniently missing from the the United States Navy has heroism, The Taffys, operating in assigned dramatic Battle of Surigao Strait was self-sacrifice and dedication to the areas east of Leyte Gulf, were charged General Douglas MacArthur’s flagship, ideals of the service been displayed on with providing air support for MacAr- the light cruiser Nashville — with the the scale it was during the Battle off thur’s forces and maintaining combat war hero out of harm’s way.” Samar, fought on 25 October 1944. air patrol over the amphibious forces Naval History magazine chose those “I have not yet begun to fight,” and anti-submarine patrol for all of words to lead a story written by retired called John Paul Jones from the sink- Leyte Gulf. They were not expected to U.S. Navy Vice Admiral W. D. Houser. ing Bonhomme Richard at Flam- engage in surface combat, nor were The title of the article was “While Mac- brough Head in 1779 as he prepared they equipped to do so. At about 0530 Arthur Slept.” to board and take Serapis . “Don’t give on the morning of 25 October, the Admiral Houser told us that after up the ship” implored mortally Taffys launched morning patrol air- denying a request by Seventh Fleet wounded James Lawrence of his un- craft. Taffy 3 was about 60 miles due Commander Vice Admiral Thomas C. trained crew in the unsuccessful 1813 east of Borongan, now the provincial Kinkaid that he go ashore so Nashville action between his frigate Chesapeake capital of Eastern Samar. could participate in an expected battle, and the British Shannon . Aboard his command ship Wasatch , MacArthur asked where Kinkaid would Kinkaid was occupied with replenish- be. When Kinkaid said he would be No such felicitous phrases were uttered by Rear Admiral Clifton Spra- ing his ships that had taken part in the aboard his command ship Wasatch , invasion and the Battle of Surigao MacArthur said he would join him gue, and that may be why the Battle off Samar, the main part of the greater Strait. Even if they had been rearmed there, according to Admiral Houser. and ready to sail, Rear Admiral Jesse (Continued on page 12) Battle of Leyte Gulf, is so little re- membered today. And make no mis- B. Oldendorf’s heavy combatants take. This was the main battle, even were more than three hours from Taffy though it was fought with the puniest 3 and nine hours from the north of Hook, Line and Sinker - of American forces. Samar and San Bernardino Strait. Kinkaid was not concerned about this Halsey Abandons Kinkaid Sprague was commander of Task back door to Leyte Gulf. Admiral Wil- To Chase Jap Decoy Force Unit 77.4.3, better known by its radio liam F. Halsey and his powerful Third call name of Taffy 3. Taffy 3 con- Fleet were protecting his backside. sisted of six escort carriers mass pro- “WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS Even so, he had sought confirmation duced by Kaiser Industries in Vancou- from Haley at 0412. TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR — ver, Wash., and their “screen” of three THE WORLD WONDERS.” destroyers and four destroyer escorts. But Halsey, thinking his aircraft The message from Admiral Chester Taffy 3 was one of three such units had ended whatever threat might W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the under the command of Rear Admiral emerge from San Bernardino Strait, U.S. Pacific Fleet, angered Admiral Thomas L. Sprague, no relation to had swallowed the Japs’ bait hook, William F. Halsey, and well it should Taffy 3’s boss. Thomas Sprague re- line and sinker. He had taken his entire have. And, though the final three words ported to Vice Admiral Thomas force to engage Vice Admiral Jisaburo were padding, designed to confuse Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh Ozawa’s decoy force of four carriers Japanese cryptanalysts, many think the Fleet, who reported to General Doug- (Continued on page 9) rebuke was well-earned.