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Volume 1, Issue 9 HHHHHH 4 October 1999 1944: With the World’s Eyes on Europe, U.S. Fights History’s Largest Sea Battle

This Month’s Contents

Ambush at Palawan Passage Page 7 Leyte Gulf Actions See Destruction Sibuyan Sea Air Attacks 7 Loss of Princeton 13 Battle of Surigao Strait 2 Of Japanese Navy as Fighting Force Main Event off Samar 3 In October 1944, the attention of American newspapers and radio was firmly fo- Halsey Abandons Kinkaid 3 Leyte Charts 2 cused on Europe, particularly on the German fortress at Metz, in northeast France. Battle of Trafalgar 5 General George S. Patton’s seemingly invincible Third Army had bounced off Metz Trafalgar Chart 16 without leaving a dent. Americans had grown to expect great things from Patton, so they sat by their radios and read the newspapers waiting for Metz to fall. In this vacuum of news from the Pacific, the greatest of all naval battles was fought. The Japanese Navy rolled the dice with everything they had on the line. Two hundred seventy-six war- ships ranging in size from destroyer to the world’s largest battleships took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. When it was over, the Jap navy had ceased to exist as a fighting force. There were no replacements in the pipeline and, in fact, there had never been a pipeline to begin with. The Jap well was dry. Japanese tactical policy had no con- nection whatsoever to a strategic war plan, but was instead based on the megalomanic thought that to refuse to A BABY FLATTOP SUCCUMBS to pounding by Jap battle force. Gambier Bay , like her sister CVEs, yield an inch meant that that inch proved Combustible, Vulnerable , and Expendable. But Taffy 3 turned back four battleships, eight would not be yielded. cruisers and a dozen destroyers. Story on Page 3. “Freedom’s Cost,” painted by Richard C. Moore. (Continued on page 8) Page 2 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Surigao_Strait_Action --- Oldendorf’s Battleline Annihilates NishimurNishimuraaaa Shima Steams into Strait, Sees Wreckage, Steams Out The Japanese southern force that would transit Surigao Strait consisted of two parts. Vice Admiral Shoji Nishi- mura would lead with two battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers. Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima would follow with another two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and seven destroyers. Nishi- mura had been discovered the morning of 24 October 1944 by search planes IN THE OPENING PHASE, Kurita and Nishimura steamed from Brunei in Borneo, taking different from Admiral William F. Halsey’s routes to Leyte Gulf. Shima sailed from the Inland Sea and would follow Nishimura through Suri- Third Fleet and attacked later in the gao Strait while Kurita would transit San Bernardino Strait. The two forces would meet at the inva- morning, but he suffered little damage sion beaches on the east coast of Leyte, crushing the American Seventh Fleet in a pincers. Ozawa, sailing as a decoy from the Inland Sea, would draw off Halsey’s Third Fleet. and the attacks soon shifted to Admiral Takeo Kurita’s much stronger center force in Sibuyan Sea. Nishimura reso- lutely sailed on and entered Surigao Strait at 0244 on 25 October. Prepara- tions had been made for his arrival. Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid had passed down the order, “Prepare for night engagement,” 12 hours earlier, almost to the minute. At 1445 on the 24th, the dispatch was logged aboard Louisville (CA 28), the flagship of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, commander of the Leyte bombardment and fire support group. Oldendorf had a powerful force -- six battleships, Pennsylvania (BB 38), Tennessee (BB 43), California (BB 44), Maryland (BB 46), West Virginia (BB 48) and Mississippi (BB 41); four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and FIVE SEPARATE ACTIONS made up the Battle of Leyte Gulf. 1.) Submarines attacked Kurita’s force 28 destroyers. Of the battleships, only in the Palawan Passage. 2.) Third Fleet engaged Kurita with aircraft in Sibuyan Sea. 3.) Seventh Fleet battleships, cruisers and destroyers blocked Nishimura in Surigao Strait. 4.) Seventh Fleet Mississippi was not a veteran of Pearl escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts repelled Kurita in the main battle off Samar. 5.) Harbor. California and West Virginia The Jap decoy force under Ozawa was engaged by the Third Fleet off Cape Engaño. These maps had been sunk and raised, the others are taken from Triumph and Tragedy , volume six of Winston Churchill’s history of World War II. severely damaged. Japan had thought Churchill’s Dispatches to MacArthur, RoosevelRooseveltttt she had put them out of the war. They Winston Churchill, en route home velt “Pray accept my most sincere con- were back and carried a grudge. from Moscow, saw Leyte’s importance gratulations, which I tender on behalf Oldendorf called his commanders and took time to wire MacArthur of His Majesty’s Government, on the aboard Louisville to explain his plan. “Hearty congratulations on your bril- brilliant and massive victory gained by He would plug up Surigao Strait, plac- liant stroke in the Philippines” follow- the sea and air forces of the United ing his battleline squarely across its ing the landings at Leyte. But following States over the Japanese in the recent Leyte exit. The battleline would steam the naval engagement, he wired Roose- heavy battles.” (Continued on page 4) 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 3 Did MacArthur Sleep In U.S. Navy’s Heroic Battle off Samar, Through Surigao Battle? 3 Destroyers, 4 DEs, 6 Baby Flattops Naval History Magazine Turn Back 4 Jap Battleships, 8 CruiserCruiserssss Got its History Wrong At no other time in the history of las MacArthur. “Conveniently missing from the the United States Navy has heroism, The Taffys, operating in assigned dramatic Battle of Surigao Strait was self-sacrifice and dedication to the areas east of Leyte Gulf, were charged General Douglas MacArthur’s flagship, ideals of the service been displayed on with providing air support for MacAr- the light cruiser Nashville — with the the scale it was during the Battle off thur’s forces and maintaining combat war hero out of harm’s way.” Samar, fought on 25 October 1944. air patrol over the amphibious forces Naval History magazine chose those “I have not yet begun to fight,” and anti-submarine patrol for all of words to lead a story written by retired called John Paul Jones from the sink- Leyte Gulf. They were not expected to U.S. Navy Vice Admiral W. D. Houser. ing Bonhomme Richard at Flam- engage in surface combat, nor were The title of the article was “While Mac- brough Head in 1779 as he prepared they equipped to do so. At about 0530 Arthur Slept.” to board and take Serapis . “Don’t give on the morning of 25 October, the Admiral Houser told us that after up the ship” implored mortally Taffys launched morning patrol air- denying a request by Seventh Fleet wounded James Lawrence of his un- craft. Taffy 3 was about 60 miles due Commander Vice Admiral Thomas C. trained crew in the unsuccessful 1813 east of Borongan, now the provincial Kinkaid that he go ashore so Nashville action between his frigate Chesapeake capital of Eastern Samar. could participate in an expected battle, and the British Shannon . Aboard his command ship Wasatch , MacArthur asked where Kinkaid would Kinkaid was occupied with replenish- be. When Kinkaid said he would be No such felicitous phrases were uttered by Rear Admiral Clifton Spra- ing his ships that had taken part in the aboard his command ship Wasatch , invasion and the Battle of Surigao MacArthur said he would join him gue, and that may be why the Battle off Samar, the main part of the greater Strait. Even if they had been rearmed there, according to Admiral Houser. and ready to sail, Rear Admiral Jesse (Continued on page 12) Battle of Leyte Gulf, is so little re- membered today. And make no mis- B. Oldendorf’s heavy combatants take. This was the main battle, even were more than three hours from Taffy though it was fought with the puniest 3 and nine hours from the north of Hook, Line and Sinker - of American forces. Samar and San Bernardino Strait. Kinkaid was not concerned about this Halsey Abandons Kinkaid Sprague was commander of Task back door to Leyte Gulf. Admiral Wil- To Chase Jap Decoy Force Unit 77.4.3, better known by its radio liam F. Halsey and his powerful Third call name of Taffy 3. Taffy 3 con- Fleet were protecting his backside. sisted of six escort carriers mass pro- “WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS Even so, he had sought confirmation duced by Kaiser Industries in Vancou- from Haley at 0412. TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR — ver, Wash., and their “screen” of three THE WORLD WONDERS.” destroyers and four destroyer escorts. But Halsey, thinking his aircraft The message from Admiral Chester Taffy 3 was one of three such units had ended whatever threat might W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the under the command of Rear Admiral emerge from San Bernardino Strait, U.S. Pacific Fleet, angered Admiral Thomas L. Sprague, no relation to had swallowed the Japs’ bait hook, William F. Halsey, and well it should Taffy 3’s boss. Thomas Sprague re- line and sinker. He had taken his entire have. And, though the final three words ported to Vice Admiral Thomas force to engage Vice Admiral Jisaburo were padding, designed to confuse Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh Ozawa’s decoy force of four carriers Japanese cryptanalysts, many think the Fleet, who reported to General Doug- (Continued on page 9) rebuke was well-earned. Halsey was the guard dog that went rabbit hunting on his own. When much was at stake on Leyte’s invasion beaches, Halsey had left his post to chase a decoy force of Jap aircraft carriers, taking his entire force with him and allowing Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita to debouch unmolested from San Bernardino Strait, bringing with him a force very nearly the equal JAPANESE SUPERBATTLESHIP Yamato was “unsinkable,” but her sister Musashi had been sunk by of that defending the beaches. carrier planes in the Battle of Sibuyan Sea. In the Battle off Samar, she fired her 18-inch guns for (Continued on page 15) the first time in anger, at thin-skinned escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts. Page 4 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Surigao Strait Was Well-Well -Laid--Laid Trap for Jap ShipsShip sss retired. He pressed on. Orders had been given to open fire (Continued from page 2) would blow in half at about 0344, the with the heavy guns when the range at a majestic 5 knots so it would not two halves sinking between a half-hour dropped to 26,000 yards. The cruisers have to countermarch frequently. He and an hour later. opened fire first and the battleships stationed his cruisers parallel to the The second group did even better. joined in at 0353. Nishimura steamed battleships at the southern end of the Monssen and McDermut (DD 677) on, thinking Fuso was still with him, battleline except for three, including launched torpedoes at about 0310 and, but accompanied only by the heavy HMAS Shropshire , at the other end. as they turned away, saw them hit. cruiser Mogami and the destroyer Six picket destroyers would be sent They didn’t know what they had hit, Shigure . He was so busy, he neglected deep into the strait while six other but after the war it was learned that to inform Shima what was going on. squadrons would parallel the battleline Monssen had scored on Yamashiro , The once-sunk California and West at increasing depth into the strait. failing to stop her and McDermut had Virginia , along with Tennessee , had the hit three different destroyers. Yama- “Our plan of battle was to use torpe- latest fire control radar and had the en- gumo was fatally hit, Michishio was does and heavy gunfire,” Oldendorf emy in their “sights” long before he damaged and Asagumo had her bow said, “the former to slow down the en- came within range. Between them, they blown off and was forced to retire. emy, the latter to destroy him com- got off about 230 rounds of 16-inch and At 0302, Desron 24 had been or- pletely.” There was another element to 14-inch armor-piercing fire. Most of the dered to attack, again in two sections. the welcoming committee. Thirteen fire descended on Yamashiro , which sections of three PT boats each were was returning fire but not hitting any- patrolling the Mindanao Sea and the thing. At 0409 the battleline was or- entrance to the strait. The boats had dered to cease fire because U.S. de- been shadowing Nishimura, reporting stroyers were threatened by “friendly” his consist and position, since 1100 fire. When fire was ordered resumed at when Nishimura spotted them , and took 0419, no targets were to be found. Ya- them under fire, damaging three lightly. mashiro had sunk, Nishimura going With his position known, Nishimura down with her, and a battered Mogami radioed that he was under attack by had retired with Shigure . Mogami torpedo boats. It was the first Shima would be attacked twice by PT boats had heard of his whereabouts. before exiting the strait and by aircraft Nishimura formed his ships with at 0833. She was abandoned at 0910. Of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf two destroyers leading, followed in Nishimura’s Southern Force, only the column by the battleships Yamashiro HMAS Arunt a was in the second divi- destroyer Shigure escaped. (Nishimura’s flagship) and Fuso with sion. At 0319 Yamagumo blew up from Dropping back one hour in time, we the heavy cruiser Mogami bringing up McDermut’s torpedo and lit up the find Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima the rear and two more destroyers flank- scene for Desron 24. The fortunes of rounding the tip of Panaon Island head- ing the flagship. Now it was the U.S. war were smiling on the Americans and ing for Surigao Strait with two heavy destroyers’ turn, and Desron 54 pre- would not stop this night. Killen (DD cruisers, Nachi and Ashigara , a light pared to attack the Japs with torpedoes. 593) launched five torpedoes at Yama- cruiser, Abukuma and four destroyers. On board Monssen (DD 798) they shiro at 0325 and scored one hit, slow- At 0325, a torpedo delivered by a PT knew about night torpedo attacks, having the Jap flagship. Hutchins (DD 476) boat holed Abukuma , slowing her to 10 ing fought them in the Solomons when sent five fish at the destroyer Asagumo knots, and forcing her to drop out of the Japs usually won. It would be dif- at about 0350. They missed, but the line. At 0410, Shima passed what he ferent this night. crippled Michishio turned into their thought were two large burning ships. It Shortly before 0300, the destroyers path, took all five, blew up and sank. A was the two halves of Fuso . Fifteen made their run in two groups, led by third attack may have scored hits on minutes later he encountered the Remey (DD 688), at 30 knots. As the Yamashiro , but it was time for the big stricken Mogami , and Nachi actually first group loosed their torpedoes at guns to take over. Albert W. Grant (DD collided with her. Shima now realized 0301, the Japs flicked on their search- 649) became the first U.S. destroyer what had happened to Nishimura, came lights and were right on target. The casualty on this run, absorbing 18 hits about and retired, taking Mogami and destroyers dodged gunfire as they that stopped her dead. She was saved Shigure with him. made their escape, waiting to see if by Newcomb (DD 586), which hauled That was the end of the Battle of their torpedoes found their targets. At her clear. Surigao Strait, but it was not the end of least one from Melvin (DD 680) did, so The major gunfire portion of the Shima’s problems. Mogami was sunk severely damaging Fuso that she battle began at 0351. Nishimura had by aircraft as she retreated and Olden- pulled out of line. Nishimura was un- been in the strait proper for only 67 dorf’s cruisers and destroyers caught up aware of this and continued to send minutes and had lost a battleship and with the damaged Asaguma and sent Fuso orders she could not obey. Fuso two destroyers sunk and a destroyer her to the bottom. 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 5 About Those Signal Flags 1805: Nelson’s Victory at Trafalgar Across the Top of Page 1 Perhaps the most famous signal ever Still ‘Most Important Ever’ to ManManyyyy sent by a commander to his fleet was that of Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson as The Nelson Touch Battle Created a Lasting he was about to engage the combined Alfred Thayer Mahan, in his The In- Public Pride in Royal Navy French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar fluence of Sea Power upon History: 1660 almost two hundred years ago. Throughout most of the world, and - 1783 , allows himself to slip into the Across the top of page 1 of this issue certainly all of the English-speaking nineteenth century to speak of Admiral of Mission: History are the signals Nel- world except the United States, the most Lord Horatio Nelson, the hero of the son ordered flown shortly before noon important naval engagement in all his- Nile, Copenhagen and the battle at hand on 21 October 1805. Reading left to tory was the Battle off Cape Trafalgar, today, Trafalgar. right, the flags say “England – expects – fought on 21 October 1805 between the that – every – man – will – do – his – The British fleet won the Battle of English fleet under Lord Horatio Nelson d – u – t – y.” and the combined French and Spanish (Continued on page 16) fleet led by the Compte de Pierre Charles Jean Baptiste Silvestre Ville- nueve. The United Kingdom is today in the middle of a ten-year celebration of Nel- son and his battles. Called “The Nelson Decade,” it will culminate on the 200th anniversary of Trafalgar. No American commander or battle has been so honored. Trafalgar is important. Nelson lost his life at Trafalgar, providing a tangible link between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy. That is something that Companions of the Naval Or- der should reflect on every time they see a bluejacket, for the enlisted man’s black kerchief is a symbol of mourning for Nelson. Some say that the three stripes on his cuff represent Nelson’s three great victories, at Copenhagen, the Nile and Trafalgar. ON BOARD NELSON’S FLAGSHIP as his signals man lays out the flags for his famous invocation Bonaparte’s Navy Destroyed to his fleet. A print after a painting by T. Davidson If we strip away the Byzantine diplo- As the signal broke on board Victory , macy that pervaded Europe at the time, cheers rang out throughout the fleet and A Nelson Captain Writes ignore the ambitions of the Corsican and a band on the flagship played “England In Remorse of His Death disregard baffling command structures Strikes Home,” even though the battle (Captain Henry Blackwood of the 36-gun frig- of the armed services during the Napole- was being joined. Fif- ate Euryalus wrote to his wife from on board ship onic Wars, the Battle of Trafalgar be- teen minutes later, Nel- the day following the Battle of Trafalgar. Portions comes simple, and Nelson would have it son signaled again. of his letter appear in the story that follows.) no other way. “Engage the enemy When Captain Henry Blackwood Nelson left Portsmouth on 14 Sep- more closely.” called on Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson tember, his flag in Victory and accompa- Had Nelson flown at his home in Merton on 2 August nied by Euryalus , Ajax and Thunderer . the signal that first oc- 1805, he was greeted with “I am sure Taking command of the Mediterranean curred to him, “Nelson you bring me news of the French and fleet off Cadiz, he immediately withdrew expects …” the cheers Spanish fleets.” his main force beyond the horizon. As would have echoed Blackwood told him that the French Nelson was sailing to join the fleet, Na- down the centuries, had re-fitted and were now at Cadiz, in poleon ordered Villenueve to sail “when according to the Nelson Society. company with the Spanish, and begged conditions were favorable.” On 19 Octo- Nelson to offer his services as com- ber, he got a few ships out of harbor and Neither the French nor the Spanish mander of the English fleet that would on the 20th the remainder of the com- fleets had a system of signals by which a face Bonaparte’s combined fleet. bined fleet sailed. commander could communicate orders. (Continued on page 6) (Continued on page 6) Page 6 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Though the fleets were only 11 miles Nelson Broke Through Villenueve’s Line, apart, it took six hours for Nelson to close. He was arranged in two lines, And Raked the Enemy Ships Stem to Stern leading the windward line in Victory (Continued from page 5) first ordered a general chase but during with Vice Admiral Cuthbert Colling- Villenueve had 33 ships of the line, the night placed his fleet between Ville- wood leading the lee line in Royal Sov- 15 of them Spanish, five frigates and two nueve and Cadiz. The French com- ereign . Shortly before noon, Nelson sent smaller ships. The combined fleet sailed mander, expecting to be attacked during his famous “England expects” signal and southwest to clear Cape Trafalgar, a the night, had tried to form a battle order followed it quickly with “Engage the promontory half way between Cadiz and in the darkness. As a result, when the enemy more closely.” Gibraltar, and continued south south- two fleets sighted each other at day- At about noon, the first shots were west. Nelson’s “eyes,” a small squadron break, the combined fleet was in disar- fired as Collingwood broke through the led by Capt. George Duff in Mars , re- ray. Villenueve ordered his ships to combined fleet line behind the 112-gun ported every move. form a reverse order and as they at- Santa Ana , firing each of his guns in Nelson, with 27 ships of the line, four tempted to do so in light airs, they took succession along the Spanish ship’s frigates, a sloop and a cutter, including on a shallow crescent formation, with deck, killing almost 400 seamen. About Duff’s squadron which was detached, at overlapping elements. 20 minutes later, Victory approached the 130-gun Santisima Trinidad . All at once six or seven ships fired broadsides into Victory and Nelson said to Capt. Tho- mas Masterman Hardy, “This is too warm work to last long.” At 1300, Vic- tory passed slowly behind Santisima Trinidad, repeating Collingwood’s tactic, killing about 300 of her company and putting her out of the battle. Much the same was taking place as other Brit- ish ships penetrated Villenueve’s line in a tactic that would forever be called “The Nelson Touch.” After Victory had done with San- tisima Trinidad , the French 74-gun Re- doubtable closed close abeam and fired one broadside. When the smoke drifted IN THE DAYS OF SAIL there was no shortage of things for men cast into the sea to cling to. This painting by W. L. Wyllie depicts the scene at Trafalgar at about 1430, when the battle was winding away, marksmen in her fighting tops down. Victory is in the center and what’s left of Santisima Trinidad is on the far right. rained fire on the English flagship and ‘‘‘Buonaparte’‘Buonaparte’ Has Not Learned to Cope with English atat SeaSe aaa Nelson fell to one knee. “They have done for me at last,” he (Continued from page 5) and regretted in a way not to find ex- said to Hardy. As the afternoon wore So it was that the two sailed from ample. into evening, Nelson’s life drained

England, Nelson with his flag in Vic- [A] nd such an Admiral has the away, but as it did he heard cheers in the tory and Blackwood in command of Country lost, and every officer and English fleet as ships in the combined man, so kind, so good, so obliging a Euryalus . Blackwood was with his hero fleet struck their colors. Though some friend as never was. Thank God, he from before the beginning until after British ships were reduced to little more the end. The day following the battle, lived to know that such a Victory never was before gained. than hulks, they all fought on and none he wrote to his wife. Lord Nelson has left cause for every struck its colors. In the end, 17 of Ville- My heart ... is sad and penetrated man who had a heart never to forget nueve’s ships of the line had been taken with the deepest anguish. A Victory, him....I stayed with him until the enemy and one caught fire and exploded. Only such a one as has never been achieved, commenced their fire on the Victory, 15 escaped and four of those were taken yesterday took place in the course of when he sent me off. He told me, at two weeks later. five hours; but at such an expense, in parting, we should meet no more; he As a result of the battle, Napoleon the loss of the most gallant of men, and made me witness his Will, and away I best of friends, as renders it to me a was denied control of the sea and the came with a heart very sad. Victory I never wished to have wit- threat of an invasion of England was nessed — at least on such terms. After Under Lord N. it seemed like inspi- gone, but his victories ashore continued. performing wonders by his example ration. The last signal he made was The real importance of Trafalgar was its and coolness, Lord Nelson was such a one as would immortalize any effect on the British public. It created a wounded by a French Sharpshooter, man, ’England expects that every man national pride in the Royal Navy that and died three hours after, beloved will do his duty.’ persists to this day. 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 7 Subs Darter, Dace Ambush Kurita in Palawan Passage, Sink Two Jap Cruisers Two Japanese forces left Borneo on 22 October 1944, bound for Leyte Gulf by different routes. The smaller force of two battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers under Admiral Shoji Nishimura would cross the Sulu Sea and transit Surigao Strait to Leyte. The main Japanese force under Ad- miral Takeo Kurita, consisting of five battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, two light THE HEAVY CRUISER Atago was Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s flagship, until the U.S. submarine cruisers and 15 destroyers, would navi- Darter torpedoed and sank her, putting the Jap commander in the water. Also in on the ambush, gate the treacherous Palawan Passage, Dace torpedoed two heavy cruisers, sinking Takao and forcing Maya to return to Brunei. along the western side of the island of known, he had failed to deploy a screen 0530 when she torpedoed and sank Palawan on the edge of the South in front of his heavy ships as he pro- Atago , putting Kurita literally in the China Sea. From there, he would sail ceeded northeast through the Palawan water. Dace was not far behind, torpe- through the Sibuyan Sea and the San Passage, his flag in the heavy cruiser doing and sinking one heavy cruiser Bernardino Strait to reach the Philip- Atago . Two American submarines were Takao and severely damaging another, pine Sea. An eight-hour cruise would waiting, Darter (SS 227) and Dace (SS Maya , which was sent back to Brunei take him to Leyte Gulf. 247). The two subs had met to ex- with two destroyers as escorts. Kurita, Two of Kurita’s battleships were change information and were not an- fished from the water, transferred his Yamato and Musashi , the largest war- ticipating meeting a major part of the flag to Yamato . ships in the world at 68,000 tons and Japanese fleet. As they lay side by side The experience cannot have been carrying nine 18-inch guns. Those in the early hours of 23 October, salubrious for Kurita. Moreover, his ships, in theory, would allow Kurita to Darter’s radar picked up a possible staff became scattered when members stand off from the fast U.S. Iowa-class group of ships. Dace’s radar confirmed were rescued by different ships. How battleships and pick the American fleet the contact. The subs’ coordinated their much these disquieting experiences apart at long range. plans and went after what they thought affected him later in the Battle off It was a voyage fraught with perils was a large force of enemy ships. They Samar is unknown, but they didn’t that would tax any sailor and Kurita were correct. help. He sailed on toward the Sibuyan was not at his best. For reasons un- Darter drew first blood at about Sea, three heavy cruisers lighter.

It Takes 19 Torpedo Hits to Sink Unsinkable Musashi in Battle of Sibuyan Sea Following their ambush early on 23 San Bernardino Strait and a third far- Sherman. Three raids of around 50 October by two American submarines ther north off the east coast of Luzon. planes each were largely repulsed, but in Palawan Passage, the presence of A fourth task group had been released not before the light carrier Princeton Kurita’s ships was known but their to go to Ulithi to replenish. Each task (CVL 23) was mortally wounded. group consisted of three or four big position was not. After sinking two Though land-based, at least some of the heavy cruisers and putting a third out of carriers, two fast battleships and attacking planes were navy types, the war, the subs did not stay near the around 20 cruisers and destroyers. which would later lead Halsey to think surface to admire their work. The Shortly after dawn on the 24th, all there were enemy carriers nearby. Americans knew, though, that at least three task groups launched search two forces were converging on Leyte planes to look for Kurita’s force. At As Halsey’s three groups were con- Gulf and by that evening preparations centrating north of Samar, they were 0812, a plane from Intrepid (CV 11) were being made for battle. launching aircraft to strike Kurita. By spotted Yamato as Kurita was entering On the morning of 24 October, Ad- 1030 the Japanese force was under Tablas Strait east of Mindoro. At 0827, miral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet attack. Yamato was hit by a bomb that Halsey ordered his three task groups to was lying in the Philippine Sea, north- failed to penetrate her deck, Musashi concentrate off San Bernardino Strait east of Leyte where Vice Admiral Tho- was hit by a torpedo but she was pro- mas C. Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet had and recalled the fourth. By noon, he tected by an anti-torpedo bulge, and the landed General Douglas MacArthur’s had his three groups together but, be- heavy cruiser Myoko was hit by a tor- forces on the 20th. Kinkaid’s fleet was fore he could launch an air attack on still providing fire support for the Sixth pedo that did enough damage to send Kurita, land-based Jap planes attacked her back to Brunei. When the attack Army and for its own transports and the northern task group, commanded auxiliaries. Halsey positioned one task finally broke off, Kurita had lost a by Rear Admiral Frederick C. group near Leyte Gulf, another near fourth heavy cruiser. (Continued on page 14) Page 8 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Japan Had Insisted on Defending the Indefensible , Now She Was Forced to Gamble Her Entire Navy (Continued from page 1) at the invasion of Saipan. The Jap fleet Following the Battle of Midway in came out in force for the first time in June of 1942, Japan’s fortunes were nearly two years, with five battleships. still on the ascendancy but, instead of Five fleet carriers and four light carri- pausing to draw a breath, to build air- ers carried 473 airplanes. In the ensu- craft carriers and train pilots to replace ing air battles, 346 of those planes were the losses sustained at Midway, she shot down against only 30 American continued to dream of new conquests aircraft. That earned the Battle of the — India, perhaps Australia. Philippine Sea the nickname, the Marianas Turkey Shoot, and that was- n’t all. American submarines sank two Jap fleet carriers and pilots from USS Belleau Wood got a light carrier. By the end of the action, the Jap fleet had Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita 35 aircraft left. the American fleet and isolating the So it was, when on 20 October 1944 Sixth Army. the American Seventh Fleet — MacAr- The plan relied on a decoy force, thur’s Navy it was called because Vice and the Jap carriers, virtually impotent Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid reported for lack of trained pilots, would be the to the general — landed four divisions bait. Under Vice Admiral Jisaburo of the U.S. Sixth Army on the south- Ozawa, four carriers and a dozen other eastern corner of Leyte, in the Philip- ships including a pair of hybrid carrier- battleships would sail from the north pines. Kinkaid was supported by Ad- and appear off northeast Luzon, draw- miral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet, ing off Halsey’s covering force. Admiral William F. Halsey but Halsey reported to Admiral Chester A center force under Vice Admiral W. Nimitz. Command was not unified. When the Americans began to re- Takeo Kurita would sail from Lingga take islands recently won by conquest, With the landing at Leyte backed by Roads near Singapore with seven bat- there were no Dunkirks for Japan, no tleships, including the two most power- saving men and materiel to fight again, ful in the world, Yamato and Musashi , with the benefit of shorter internal lines each at 68,000 tons and carrying nine of communication. The orders went 18-inch guns. Kurita’s flag was in the out: Fight to the last man. And as it heavy cruiser Atago and he had 10 oth- was with Hitler and Stalingrad, the ers. He also had two light cruisers and policy spelled the end of empire for 19 destroyers — a truly formidable Japan. force. With Halsey absent, he would Only the Japanese navy was spared sail through San Bernardino Strait, the terrible attrition imposed by this north of Leyte, around the island policy, though its remaining carriers Samar, and descend on Leyte Gulf. had the greenest of pilots to fly their aircraft. The Imperial Japanese Navy Kurita would be met there by Vice continued to thirst for a showdown Admiral Shoji Nishimura with two with the American fleet — the one more battleships, a heavy cruiser and decisive battle that could change the four destroyers. Vice Admiral Kiyo- course of the war. But naval warfare Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid hide Shima would follow Nishimura was changing, no longer would heavy through Surigao Strait south of Leyte with another two heavy cruisers, a light ships slug it out with other heavy ships. most of the U.S. Navy’s presence in the cruiser and seven destroyers. Beginning with the Battle of the Coral Pacific, the Japs put into effect a plan Sea, followed by Midway, conflict at they hoped would enable their navy to What ensued were five separate bat- sea shifted from battleship warfare to deal the Americans a decisive blow, tles, called collectively the Battle of carrier warfare. and restore momentum to Japan in a Leyte Gulf. They were also five en- In June of 1944, Japan thought she war not yet lost. The plan risked their tirely different types of action. Each had a chance for the naval showdown remaining surface forces, but offered will be dealt with separately. At the when a strong American fleet appeared the remote possibility of destroying end, there will be no Jap navy. 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 9 Opposing Forces Spot Each Other and Taffy 3 Doesn’t Hesitate

(Continued from page 3) and the lookouts believed they saw closest targets. The destroyer Johnston and a dozen other ships including a fleet carriers, cruisers and destroyers. (DD 557) trailed the CVEs, laying pair of hybrid carrier-battleships. He Every ship was upgraded two notches, white smoke from her fantail. had notified Kinkaid, but his message and if those ships were present, their Johnston’s skipper, Cdr. E. E. Ev- was confusing and the Seventh Fleet battleships must be nearby. Kurita ans, now informed his crew that their commander thought that at least one proceeded cautiously. At the same ship would “engage major portions of carrier group had been left behind. time, Taffy 3 saw flak as Kurita’s the Japanese fleet” and, without or- None was -- the back door to Leyte ships shot at the Taffy 2 airplane. Ra- ders, turned toward the heavy cruisers Gulf was left open to Vice Admiral dar aboard Fanshaw Bay (CVE 70) Kumano, Suzuya, Tone and Chikuma . Takeo Kurita who still had four battle- confirmed contact and visual sighting It was the spark, and at this point a ships, six heavy cruisers, two light reported pagoda masts. Sprague sensi- squall shielded the escort carriers from cruisers and a dozen destroyers. bly turned tail, leaving the Jap fleet to the Japs’ visual fire control. All that stood between Kurita and Halsey. At 0708, Thomas Sprague ordered the Leyte beachhead, where ships were As Kurita closed within 15 miles of all Taffys to launch all aircraft. From the 16 CVEs, 65 fighters and 44 TBMs (General Motors-built torpedo planes) were launched. Because of the haste, only a few of the TBMs carried torpedoes, and many planes were under fu- eled. After expending what ordnance they had, they continued to harass the Jap ships with dry runs, forcing them to take evasive action and confusing Kurita’s battle line. Typical of the launch, Gambier Bay (CVE 73) was able to launch nine TBMs, two with torpedoes, two with depth charges, three with bombs and two with nothing. Johnston was now in range of the Japs and began firing on Kumano . The fire was returned by five heavy cruisers, but none were able to hit the twist- ing tin can. For now. At 0716, Clifton Sprague, unaware of Johnston’s action, ordered his destroyers to attack DESTROYER ESCORTS and Gambier Bay make smoke, but Kurita’s force is upwind of Taffy 3 with torpedoes. Five minutes later, and the escort carrier remains exposed, becoming a focal point for guns ranging in size from 8 Johnston unloaded ten torpedoes at inches to 18 inches. Nevertheless, she fought bravely until succumbing to superior gunfire. Kumano . They ran hot, true and on still unloading and the beach was piled Taffy 3, Yamato’s 18-inch guns came target. At least one, probably more, high with the materials of war, was to life, firing for the first time in an- scored and put the Jap ship out of the Task Group 77.4 -- the three Taffys. ger, and the other Jap ships joined in fight. Between 0530 and 0600, the Taffys with their heavy guns. Clifton Sprague The destroyer Hoel (DD 533) now launched aircraft for morning patrol sent a plain-language call for help and came within range of the battleship and then settled down into routine ordered his ships to make smoke. Ku- Kongo and the Jap ship replied with her with normal underway watches. At rita ordered a general attack. It was main batteries, hitting Hoel’s bridge about 0630, a Taffy 2 plane sighted 0700. and engine room. At this point, the Kurita’s force and closed within anti- At 0703, Kinkaid received a reply to Taffys’ aircraft arrived and badly dam- aircraft range. When Clifton Sprague the inquiry he had made of Halsey at age the heavy cruiser Suzuya . Johnston received the message, he thought the 0412 and was appalled to learn that and Hoel continued to be hit by 14-inch pilot had seen some of Halsey’s ships the three Taffys were all the protection shells from Kongo , but received tempo- and asked that identification be veri- he had for his back door. At the same rary respite when the rain squall shifted fied. time, 14-inch and 18-inch shells con- over them. At 0645, Japanese lookouts spotted tinue to rain on Taffy 3’s escort carri- The cover of the squall had moved Taffy 3 masts on the horizon. Kurita ers White Plains (CVE 66), St. Lo away from the escort carriers as they also thought Halsey was in the area (CVE 63) and Fanshaw Bay , Kurita’s continued to flee south. Clifton Spra (Continued on next page) Page 10 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Fury of Five-Five ---inchinch Guns Has Kurita Thinking He’s Facing CruisersCruiser sss 4,000 yards from the Jap cruiser column, unseen because her small size kept her hidden among the splashes and smoke. She fires her three torpedoes at the heavy cruiser Chokai and turns tail. Chokai is hit and drops out of formation. Destroyer escorts Dennis and Raymond engage heavy cruisers Haguro and Tone , firing their full load of three torpedoes each. The fish miss, so Dennis goes after one of the ships with her five-inch guns. DESTROYERS DODGE SHELLFIRE making smoke. Johnston and Hoel , hidden by their own smoke and splashes from enemy gunfire, were mistaken by Jap spotters for cruisers. Perhaps Johnston continued to engage the they thought themselves cruisers — neither survived the day against the enemy’s big guns. heavy cruisers and after the war it is found that one ship had logged the ac- gue asked Kinkaid for permission to two of the four destroyer escorts were tion as being with an American heavy move his force to the protection of heavily engaged with the Jap heavy cruiser. At exactly 0800, Heermann Oldendorf’s heavy ships. Kinkaid de- ships, though Johnston and Hoel had fired her last three torpedoes at the nied permission and Sprague deduced been badly damaged and could make battleship Haruna , and missed. But the that his force was considered expend- only half-speed. The six baby flattops torpedoes continued toward the super able. No surprise there; ask a sailor were once again under heavy fire and battleship Yamato , Kurita’s flagship. at least one, Gambier Bay , was chasing aboard a CVE what the initials mean Yamato turned away from the battle to splashes, hoping the Jap gunners kept and he’s likely say “Combustible, Vul- present her stern to the torpedoes and adjusting their aim. Some help arrived nerable, Expendable.” rang up flank speed, taking Kurita with a flight of TBMs from Taffy 2, When the escort carriers exit the away from the fight for a considerable which was 30 miles to the south -- two rain squall at about 0730, Kurita sends period. This may have contributed to hours steaming for the CVEs and an the heavy cruisers Tone and Haguro on his later indecision and, if so, was a hour for their escorts. an end run around their eastern side. Shortly before 0800, destroyer es- highly significant “near miss” for Jap destroyers would attempt to get to cort Dennis (DE 405) arrived to find Heermann . Things were not going well the south of the CVEs to drive them Hoel, Heermann, Johnston and Rob- for Kurita anyway. Taffy 3’s TBMs hit back to the heavy ships. The U.S. de- erts conducting a torpedo attack on Haguro and she joined Chokai , out of stroyer Heermann (DD 532) at this the Jap heavy cruiser line, though the battle. time was racing at 30 knots through the Johnston was firing her still oper- Nevertheless, the Japanese fleet is CVEs in response to the order to enable guns, having expended her closing the escort carriers, which turn gage and nearly collided with the de- torpedoes. The jeep carrier Kalinin from south to southeast and begin lay- stroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts (DE Bay (CVE 68) was hit by several ing smoke. The two CVEs nearest the 413), so Roberts decided to do what- 8-inch shells in quick succession, Japs are exposed, when their smoke ever she could to help. sustaining significant, but not seri- drifts south. Gambier Bay and the al- Now, Roberts was even less of a ous, damage. The Japs were using ready damaged Kalinin Bay are now threat to Kurita. You could put three of armor-piercing ammo which the primary targets. The CVEs prepare her side-by-side between the goal lines passed through the thin-skinned to defend themselves with their single and sidelines of a football field without CVE. five-inch guns. Meantime, the remain- drawing a penalty. She was armed Hoel found herself in the middle of ing U.S. destroyers and destroyer es- with two five-inch guns and three tor- the Jap fleet and began taking hits from corts are returning to Taffy 3. Johnston pedo tubes. Her job was anti-sub pa- every size gun. More than 40 shells hit and Roberts won’t make it. At 0810, trols. Her skipper, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Hoel, flooding her engine room and Gambier Bay is hit by eight-inch shells Copeland decided on his own to join causing her to lose headway. She de- and fires break out. the attack, just like Evans in Johnston . veloped a 20-degree list. It took almost Now a curious thing occurs. Spot- This sort of initiative was typical an hour for the ship to sink, and during ters high in the pagoda masts of the throughout the battle. Shortly thereaf- that time her two remaining guns con- Jap battleships Haruna and Kongo ter, Sprague ordered his destroyer es- tinued to fire, expending between 250 sight the escort carriers of Taffy 2 to corts to attack the Japs with torpedoes, and 300 rounds each, the gun crews the southeast and report that they have so Raymond (DE 341) turned toward doing it manually because all electric seen six CVLs of Halsey’s fleet, giving the enemy with the intent of sinking power had been lost. Kurita something else to distract him. the cruiser Haguro . But that was later, and it is now Taffy 2 was steaming into the wind to By 0745, all three destroyers and about 0800. Now we find Roberts only (Continued on next page) 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 11

Johnston, Hoel and Roberts Unsurpassed in U.S. Navy HistorHistoryyyy (Continued from previous page) Roberts puts on the brakes to avoid repeatedly hit and the crew of Roberts launch aircraft, which brought it closer running into an enemy salvo and before had been ordered to abandon ship. to the battle, but it never got too close. she can get going she is hit by three At 0911, Kurita signaled all his Gambier Bay was taking the fire of shells, knocking out electricity and ships to break off the action and fol- five Jap cruisers and just about every communications and rupturing a main low him north at 20 knots. steam line. The battleship Kongo takes hand was on damage control. Armor No one knows why Kurita did this, up the attack on the little destroyer piercing ammo punched holes too nu- with destruction of Taffy 3 in his grasp escort and hits her with all three rounds merous to count in the ship. A near and the road open to the Leyte Gulf from a single turret. miss buckled her plates, flooded her landing grounds. He had not had an By 0900, the Jap cruisers were fo- merous to count in the ship. A near easy two days, with his flagship sunk miss buckles her plates, floods her en- cusing on Kitkun Bay , except for Tone , from under him. He had been given gine room and sealed her fate. The outrageously inflated reports on the other CVEs moved on without her. nature of the force he was facing. He Kinkaid, who had been following had been taken out of the battle by vir- the reports from intership communica- tue of Yamato evading torpedoes, and tion within Taffy 3, at 0822 radioed he was without a doubt dead tired. Still, Halsey in plain language “FAST BAT- no one knows why Kurita turned back TLESHIPS ARE NEEDED IMMEDI- when he did, and the answer was not ATELY IN LEYTE GULF,” the first forthcoming following the war. of several urgent messages to “The Bull.” But Kinkaid didn’t know where The battle wasn’t quite over, though. Halsey was. Johnston was being pummeled by the five destroyers she had engaged. She The Japanese continued to fire on would sink at 1010. Several survivors Gambier Bay , by now a sitting duck, and at about 0830 Kitkun Bay (CVE reported independently that, as their 71) came under fire. Smoke hung ship slid beneath the waves, they saw heavy on the water and Heermann , an officer on board an enemy ship sa- rushing to aid Johnston , nearly col- lute Johnston for her gallantry. Roberts lided with a CVE while racing through sank about the same time. the group and then nearly ran over The heavy cruisers Chikuma and Johnston . As Heermann engaged Chi- Chokai sank at around 0930. At 1015, the heavy cruiser Suzuya is again at- kuma , she was joined by Roberts , AMERICAN SURVIVORS were not fished out whose effective fire knocked out the of the Philippine Sea for two days following tacked by aircraft and left sinking. cruiser’s No. 3 turret, destroyed her the battle. This picture was taken by U.S. At around 1100, Taffy 3’s escort bridge and started fires. Destroyer Army Private William Roof carriers came under the first organized escort Butler , the only Taffy 3 ship which hit Dennis with three shells. kamikaze attack of the war. St. Lo and that still had torpedoes, also engaged Taffy 2’s aircraft now hit Chikuma some others were hit but St. Lo’s Chikuma with her five-inch guns but with two torpedoes which start fires wounds were fatal. She sank at 1125. couldn’t get in position to launch her and Kitkun Bay’s planes score nine Though Kurita made one more ten- fish. Johnston is now audaciously fir- hits on Chokai , putting her out of ac- tative move toward Leyte Gulf, it was ing on the battleship Kongo , scoring tion. Kurita sent a squadron of five short lived, and he headed for San hits, while the Jap ship is returning destroyers led by the light cruiser Ya- Bernardino Strait. He had been de- fire and missing. At around 0845, hagi to attack the escort carriers with prived of his objective by a handful of Heermann is hit by eight-inch fire that torpedoes at about 0905. Johnston , the smallest surface combatants in the kills most on her bridge. Hoel can be still afloat and still acting on her own, U.S. Navy and he had lost three heavy seen in the distance, abandoning ship. but limited to about 17 knots, took on cruisers. Also at 0845, fresh TBMs arrive all six, hitting the cruiser a dozen The Americans had lost two escort from Taffy 2 and go after the heavy times with her five-inch guns. Yahagi carriers, two destroyers and one de- cruiser Suzuya , fatally wounding her. and the destroyers fired their torpe- stroyer escort. This one action had The arrival of these aircraft was the does prematurely and turned away. given the United States Navy four first massed air attack on the Jap force, Johnston’s action earned her the atten- names it can pin up with USS Constitu- but it came too late to save Gambier tion of Tone and Haguro. tion , on her best day. Bay . At 0848 she was abandoned but, because of the press of the battle, her As the clock approached 0910, USS Johnston . crew was not rescued from the sea for Gambier Bay rolled over and sank, USS Hoel . two days. Enemy gunfire shifts to Fan- Kitkun Bay, White Plains, Fanshaw USS Samuel B. Roberts . shaw Bay and she is hit several times. Bay and Kalinin Bay were all being USS Gambier Bay

Page 12 Mission: History 4 October 1999 ‘Transfer from a Combatant Ship to a Noncombatant Ship? Never!’

(Continued from page 3) never been in a major naval action and Report and the 1994 Thomas J. Cutler Kinkaid said that would be impossi- I am anxious to see one.” book, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 ble so, in the words of Admiral Houser, In Battle Report , a four-volume his- October 1944 , was “Transfer from a “while the battle of Surigao Strait raged tory of the U.S. Navy in the Second combatant ship to a noncombatant 40 miles to the south, MacArthur slept World War prepared from official ship? Never! I have never been in the in the flag cabin of the Nashville .” The sources by Capt. Walter Karig USNR, middle of a naval engagement and I writer speculates that the general, Lt. Cdr. Russell L. Harris USNR and would like nothing better than being in “Having acquired the unflattering nick- Lt. Cdr. Frank A. Manson USNR, the one tonight.” name ‘Dugout Doug’ during the war authors tell of the unhappiness of Nash- Speculation about the possibility of and being such a highly visible person, ville’s skipper, Capt. Charles Coney, at the general’s concern over the nick- he may have imagined that he could missing the fight. name “Duckout Doug” is juvenile and anticipate ‘Duckout Doug’ being added “With the Battle of Surigao Strait unbecoming a flag officer, but still to to his nicknames if he left the ship just coming up, I naturally wanted to get in be answered is the question of whether prior to its going into battle.” there and mix it up,” recalled Coney. “I the Battle of Surigao Strait took place He closes his hit-piece, “Whatever went to General MacArthur and told “While MacArthur Slept.” the case, he slept while the Nashville him that I would like very much to take Quite the contrary. While the night- sat out the Battle of Surigao Strait at my ship into action and would it be time sky of Leyte Gulf was rent by the anchor off Tacloban.” asking too much of him if he would orange and white flashes of naval gunfire, the thunder of the guns was plainly

Another View audible at Tacloban, 40 miles to the It is difficult to reckon where Admi- north. By all accounts, MacArthur lis- ral Houser might have done his re- tened unhappily to the battle as he search, and harder still to guess what paced the deck of Nashville , confined prompted him to marshal his “facts” so like a caged lion to Kinkaid’s cabin. that he could malign MacArthur. He Ric Teague writes that “discussions between Mac- Arthur and Kinkaid cannot be verified,” 1941: Four-Piper Reuben James but he’s wrong about that. First U.S. Ship Lost in WW II MacArthur’s Reminiscences should be in Admiral Houser’s library. The While on convoy duty, escorting general says that he agreed on 23 Octo- ships from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to England, the U.S. destroyer Reuben ber 1944 with Kinkaid that Nashville James (DD 245) was torpedoed and should take part in the coming battle sunk by the German submarine U-562, and that he intended to go along, but becoming the first American naval ves- Kinkaid would not hear of it. “All my sel lost to action in World War II. life I had been reading and studying At daybreak on 31 October 1944, naval combat,” MacArthur wrote, “and Reuben James was on the port beam of the glamour of sea battle had always MacArthur and Coney on Nashville’s bridge. “fast” convoy HX-156, making about excited my imagination.” nine knots 600 miles west of Ireland transfer his staff in order that we might Kinkaid would not employ Nashville and had just begun turning to investi- with MacArthur aboard. “It was to be participate.” gate a direction-finder bearing when his fight,” MacArthur said, adding he “No, I do not desire to leave your she was struck on her port quarter by a subsequently moved his headquarters ship, Captain,” the general smiled, “I torpedo which ignited the forward ashore “and the Nashville moved out to have never been able to witness a naval magazine. Of her complement of 160, take its [ sic ] honored position in the engagement and this is the opportunity only 45 enlisted men were rescued. battle line.” of a lifetime. Proceed to the battle area William Manchester, in his soundly when you wish.” Coney asked Kinkaid researched biography of MacArthur, for instructions and was told to suggest American Caesar, reports the ex- that MacArthur join the admiral on change essentially as MacArthur re- Wasatch , quite the opposite of what membered it. Geoffrey Perret in his Admiral Houser tells us. Naval History Old Soldiers Never Die , another biog- would have us believe that MacArthur raphy, says that the general told “stated he would join Kinkaid on board Kinkaid “There is every reason why I the Wasatch. ” should be present during such a crucial What MacArthur said about that engagement,” adding, “Besides, I have invitation, according to both Battle 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 13

Bomb Wrecks Ship Bakery One 250 Kilogram Bomb Well Placed Causes But Fires Spread to Explosives Loss of Princeton , Carnage on BirminghamBirmingha mmm Shortly after 0800 on 24 October 1944, the Japs mounted their only suc- cessful air attack of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Three separate raids of around 50 aircraft concentrated on Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman’s Group 3, one of three fast carrier groups. The enemy planes were met by swarms of Hellcats and the American pilots had a field day. Cdr. David McCampbell shot down nine Nips. At 0938, a single Yokosuka D4Y slipped through and planted a single 250-kilogram (550 pounds) bomb on the flight deck of Princeton (CVL 23). The bomb penetrated three decks and exploded in the ship’s bakery, starting fires that invaded the hangar deck and exploded torpedoes in airplanes, blow- ing the elevators up and out. Capt. W. H. Buracker ordered all but a 240-man THE LIGHT CRUISER Birmingham rigs lines and fire hoses to the stricken light carrier Princeton and firefighting crew to abandon ship. sends a party of firefighters on board at shortly after 1000. Princeton had been hit by a single 550- pound bomb that started internal fires. On the hangar deck, exploding torpedoes blew both fore Destroyers were first ordered to aid and aft elevators out of their holes. Flames threatened both torpedo and gasoline stowage. the stricken carrier, but could not get close. At 1004, the light cruiser Bir- mingham (CL 62) was ordered to assist Princeton and pulled alongside. Lines and hoses were passed to the carrier and a party of firefighters went on board to help Princeton’s crew. At 1330, Birmingham cast off because of a submarine report that turned out to be a false alarm. She returned to the carrier, her topsides crowded with sailors waiting to help Princeton. At 1523, the flames reached Princeton’s torpedo stowage. The explosion killed 229 and injured 420 on Birmingham .

WHEN THE FLAMES REACHED her torpedo stowage, Princeton exploded. Alongside, rendering assistance to the carrier, light cruiser Birmingham was ripped by pieces of carrier, large and small. The photo at left shows the damage to the cruiser, which was light, but 229 of her sailors died in the blast and another 420 were injured. Page 14 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Sibuyan Sea a Victory, But Not the End of Kurita Main Japanese Battle Force Hesitates, But Keeps Coming (Continued from page 7) A second attack hit the Japs shortly after noon, concentrating on Musashi , which was hit by three more torpedoes. A third wave also focused on Musashi , hitting her with several bombs and a fifth torpedo. One of these torpedoes was a seeing-eye torpedo, and found a hole in the ship’s protective bulge left by a previous torpedo. It penetrated her No. 4 engine room, flooding it and reducing her speed. A fourth attack found Musashi listing and went in for the kill. Holes in her deck vented smoke from fires below and her list increased. A fifth wave put five more torpedoes in the ship and Kurita ordered her to Brunei, with two destroyers and a cruiser. Then he turned his whole fleet around and headed back across the Sibuyan Sea, passing Musa- shi which was slowly steaming in cir- cles without steering. At 1714, he decided to once more make for San Bernardino Strait. As Kurita once more passed Musa- shi , he recalled the cruiser escort, leaving only the two destroyers at her bed- side. Shortly after Kurita passed, Musa- shi , the invincible 68,000 ton super battleship, rolled over and sank. It had taken 10 bomb hits and an astonishing 19 torpedo hits to sink her. Only 18 planes were lost but, by concentrating on Musashi, they had left the remainder of the force undamaged. Halsey knew that Kurita had turned away the first time, but not that he had resumed his approach to San Bernardino Strait. From his pilots’ reports, he believed Kurita’s force was finished. Be- cause Sherman’s task group had been attacked by navy type planes, he believed carriers were nearby. Thus, when air searches late in the day found the Jap decoy force of Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa off the northeast tip of Luzon, he HARRIED BY THIRD FLEET dive bombers and torpedo planes, Musashi takes violent evasive action took the bait. That part is understandable. in the top photo. At least two torpedo tracks are visible. In the second picture, the super battleship What has never been answered is why he receives a bomb hit forward of the number one turret. Finally, low in the water, Musashi is shown took his entire force with him. being hit by at least three of the astonishing number of 19 torpedoes it took to sink her. 4 October 1999 Mission: History Page 15

“WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK-FORCE groups and Task Force 34 south. Mitscher, meanwhile, decided to use THIRTY-FOUR — THE WORLD WONDERS” his cruisers to finish off the Japanese cripples. Rear Admiral L. T. DuBose (Continued from page 3) San Bernardino Strait while Halsey took the heavy cruisers Wichita (CA One can say Halsey was only fol- went after Ozawa with three carrier lowing orders, and be correct. In his groups. 45) and New Orleans (CA 32), the light 1994 book on the Battle of Leyte Gulf, At 0710 on the 25th, search planes cruisers Santa Fe (CL 60) and Mobile Thomas J. Cutler presents a clear pic- from the carriers — Task Force 38 (CL 63) and a dozen destroyers and ture of the unclear orders laid down by under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher went Jap hunting. Directed by a strike Nimitz: — spotted Ozawa’s force and the first control airplane, a division of destroy- • Cover and support forces of attack of 180 planes was launched. At ers was sent to torpedo the stricken Southwest Pacific in order to 0800, the air attacks on the Japs began, Choyoda , but before they could pull the assist the seizure and occupa- meeting little opposition from Ozawa trigger, she rolled over and sank. tion of objectives in the Central who had only 108 airplanes on his four DuBose then went after three de- Philippines. carriers, and no experienced pilots. stroyers, one of them the 2,400-ton At 0822, Halsey received a plain • Destroy enemy naval and air Hatsutsuki , which aircraft had reported language call for help from Kinkaid forces in or threatening the Phil- as a cruiser. At 1823, Mobile and Wich- saying that his escort carriers were un- ippine Area. ita began firing as the two smaller de- der attack by a force of battleships and • In case opportunity for destruc- stroyers fled. When one of the latter cruisers and that the Third Fleet’s as- tion of major portion of the en- joined the remnants of Ozawa’s force, sistance was desperately needed. The emy fleet offer [ sic ] or can be she reported that Hatsutsuki was en- message was ignored, as were subse- created, such destruction be- gaging a surface force of two battle- quent calls for help, including one that comes the primary task. ships, two large cruisers and a de- told him that Seventh Fleet battleships That last clause was the loophole stroyer squadron. Ozawa did not inter- were low on ammunition and would Philadelphia lawyers look for, and has vene and, at 2100, Hatsutsuki went not be able to contend with the Jap been used for more than 50 years to down by the bow, the last Jap ship sunk justify Halsey’s chase after Vice Admi- force if it reached the landing beaches. in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. ral Jisaburo Ozawa’s decoy. The first wave of American planes Halsey had, at last, his “battle” with were having a field day with the Japs. Halsey thought there was no danger a carrier force. Against no American from Kurita. His pilots had, in the Bat- After disposing of the 18 fighters that losses, the Japanese lost one large car- tle of Sibuyan Sea, sunk the super bat- arose to meet them, the planes had the rier, three light carriers, one light tleship Musashi , had forced the heavy sky to themselves. The large carrier cruiser and two destroyers. Halsey had cruiser Myoko to retire and caused Ku- Zuikaku was hit with a torpedo that his victory over a Jap carrier force, but rita to turn around. To hear Halsey’s disrupted her steering gear. Chitose , a one thing still rankled. pilots tell it, Kurita was finished. But light carrier was bombed to death and the Jap admiral had resumed his ap- sank. The light cruiser Tama was torpe- “WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS proach to San Bernardino Strait. What- doed and slowed to 13 knots. Light TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR -- ever the rationale, Halsey went after Ozawa with everything he had, and the carriers Zuiho and Choyoda received THE WORLD WONDERS.” ensuing action, a one-sided fight on 25 bomb hits, forcing Choyoda out of line. October 1944, is called the Battle of At 1000, Halsey received the mes- 1891: Bar Brawl in Chile Cape Engaño. sage he couldn’t ignore, from Nimitz. Strains International AmitAmityyyy Halsey had brought his three sec- “WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS tions close together off San Bernardino TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR -- Two U.S. Sailors are Slain Strait the previous day. On the night of THE WORLD WONDERS” In Fight at True Blue Saloon the 24th, as they headed north off the When Halsey saw that message he east coast of Luzon, he formed Task was livid and threw his hat on the deck Two American sailors were killed Force 34, of six fast battleships, two in anger. As he considered what to do, and 16 injured in a Friday night bar heavy cruisers, five light cruisers and Mitscher’s planes pressed home the brawl at the True Blue Saloon in Val- 18 destroyers, with Vice Admiral paraiso, Chile, on 16 October 1891. attack on the hapless Ozawa. Zuikaku Willis A. Lee Jr. in tactical command. Intemperate remarks by the Chilean and the light carrier Zuiho were trying The instructions issued were inter- foreign minister brought Chile and the cepted by the Seventh Fleet and it was to escape north so the pilots concen- U.S. to the brink of war. assumed by Seventh Fleet commander trated on them, sinking both. At 1115, Cooler heads prevailed when U.S. Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid that Halsey decided to send help to Navy officials discerned that the Chil- Task Force 34 would be left guarding Kinkaid. He ordered one of the carrier ean navy was superior to their own. Page 16 Mission: History 4 October 1999 Breach the Enemy Line, Destroy Him Piecemeal, That’s the Nelson Touch (Continued from page 5) Trafalgar, Mahan says, because “Nelson’s intuitions and activity kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and brought it up in time at the decisive moment.” Mahan pays tribute to “the great lessons of efficiency in prepa- ration, of activity and energy in execu- tion, and of thought and insight on the part of the English leader during the previous months.” Mahan is cited here because, to many, what is called “The Nelson Touch” con- sists only of tactics of the moment. Not so. Nelson worked at his trade full time. The Nelson Society, which was of significant help in providing material including the chart showing disposition of the forces, notes that before Trafalgar as before the Battle of the Nile, Nelson “had briefed his Captains in fine detail” and had them drill their crews accord- ingly. Still, Nelson was the first to sail, in line, at a fortified fleet arranged in line of battle. By doing so, he was able to break the enemy line into manageable segments. Enemy ships away from Nel- son’s points of contact were out of the battle and no danger. They could be rounded up in due course. The Nelson Society DISPOSITION OF FORCES at noon on 21 October 1805. To sail at an enemy head-on, breaking Mission: History owes thanks to The his line at two or more places, and then destroying him piecemeal became known as “the Nelson Nelson Society for permission to use its Touch,” but it relied on superior ships, sailors, seamanship, gunnery and command. material, including the chart on this page Nelson Society showing disposition of the opposing How to Get in Touch Mission: History has been asked to provide forces at Trafalgar. Had we used it all, Because he was too young to have an address for reader communications. E-mail the publication would be twice as thick, figured in the American Revolution and may be sent to this address: for the Society is a treasure house de- died before the War of 1812, Lord Nel- [email protected] voted to Horatio Nelson. son is possibly the only notable English Mail may be sent by conventional post to: Based in England, the Society pub- military commander of his period im- Ric Teague lishes a quarterly journal, of about 50 mune from disapprobation in the 2239 Wellesley Street Palo Alto, CA 94306 pages, with the stated objective of pro- United States. Submissions are not encouraged because of moting “public education and apprecia- Membership or other inquiries can constraints on the time available for editing. If tion of the character and life of Admiral be directed to the Society in care of such are sent, they should be sent as e-mail Lord Nelson.” Tony Dickinson, Prospect House, attachments in Microsoft Word 6.0 or as type- written copy, double-spaced, accompanied by a In England, even after two centuries, Reedness, Goole, Yorkshire DN 14 3½-inch diskette containing the submission in new material keeps coming to light, in 8HG. The Society’s Website is a valu- Microsoft Word 6.0 for Windows. the form of old letters found in musty able resource, at http://www.rjt.co.uk/ Quite welcome, however, are suggestions of attics, church records and the like. Nelson/html events for coverage. Please offer suggestions two months ahead of the anniversary of an event.