United States Rocket Research and Development During World War II Unidentified U.S. Navy LSM(R) (Landing Ship Medium (Rocket)) launching barrage rockets during a drill late in the Second World War. Image courtesy of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. and jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) units for piston-pow- Over the course of the Second World War, rockets ered attack fighters and bombers. Wartime American evolved from scientific and technical curiosities into rocket research evolved along a number of similar and practical weapons with specific battlefield applications. overlapping research trajectories. Both the U.S. Navy The Allied and Axis powers both pursued rocket re- and Army (which included the Army Air Forces) devel- search and development programs during the war. Brit- oped rockets for ground bombardment purposes. The ish and American rocket scientists and engineers (and services also fielded aerial rockets for use by attack their Japanese adversaries) mainly focused their efforts aircraft. The Navy worked on rocket-powered bombs on tactical applications using solid-propellant rockets, for antisubmarine warfare, while the Army developed while the Germans pursued a variety of strategic and the handheld bazooka antitank rocket system. Lastly, tactical development programs primarily centered on both the Army and Navy conducted research into JATO liquid-propellant rockets. German Army researchers units for use with bombers and seaplanes. Throughout led by Wernher von Braun spent much of the war de- the war, however, limited coordination between the veloping the A-4 (more popularly known as the V-2), armed services and federal wartime planning bodies a sophisticated long-range, liquid-fueled rocket that hampered American rocket development efforts and led was employed to bombard London and Rotterdam late to duplicated research and competition amongst pro- in the war. German Air Force investigators developed duction facilities for scarce manpower and resources. short-range rocket-powered bomber interceptor aircraft Consequently, the war revealed the significant poten- AI R FO Y R M C R E A JANNAF INTERAGENCY Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited. AFRL-2021-1697. PROPULSION N COMMITTEE A A V S Y A N tial of rockets as a revolutionary military technology research and development work during the war. Ralph but also the shortcomings of the decentralized research E. Gibson of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and development efforts conducted by the armed ser- served as Hickman’s vice chair.4 Once the NDRC fell vices and the federal government during the conflict. under OSRD oversight in mid-1941, some of the rocket work was subsumed under Division B, Section B-I-d The Roots of American Wartime Rocket Research, (Unrotated Projectile Propellants).5 A third reorganiza- 1940‒1941 tion of the NDRC research divisions took place in late American military rocket research in the World War 1942. Under this new arrangement, which remained in II era began under the auspices of the National Defense place until the end of the war, rocket ordnance fell un- Research Committee (NDRC), which was established der Division 3 (Special Projectiles, later Rocket Ord- by the Council of National Defense (a body consist- nance), Section H, with Hickman as chief and Gibson ing of the secretaries of war, navy, interior, agriculture, briefly serving as his deputy during 1943.6 commerce, and labor) with presidential approval on NDRC division and section chiefs enjoyed statuto- June 27, 1940.1 NDRC leadership consisted of eight ry authority to draw up research contracts with univer- members, six civilian researchers, all of whom held sities, research institutes, and industrial laboratories senior posts in various government agencies and edu- based on suggestions or recommendations primarily cational institutions, and two senior officers from the originating from the Army Ordnance Department and Army and Navy. Vannevar Bush, an electrical engineer Navy Bureau of Ordnance. Initially, these contracts and president of the Carnegie Institution of Washing- were intended purely to advance scientific knowledge ton, was selected as committee chair. Bush was an ex- regarding specific subject areas. Following Ameri- tremely capable administrator and served as chair for can entry into the war in December of 1941, however, approximately a year until he was elevated to director NDRC/OSRD became involved with industrial pro- of the newly created Office of Scientific Research and curement of specific advanced weapons and weapons Development (OSRD) within the Office for Emergen- components, though this was typically an outgrowth cy Management. The NDRC became an advisory com- of existing research projects and treated as “crash pro- mittee under the OSRD with primary responsibility for curement” by the armed services. In practice, NDRC mobilizing “the scientific personnel and resources of was “highly decentralized” and the various division the Nation” through collaboration with “universities, and section chiefs had great leeway with respect to con- research institutes, and industrial laboratories for re- tracting. Little effort was made to spread out research search and development on instrumentalities of warfare among the many colleges, universities, and public and to supplement such research and development activities private research facilities across the nation. Instead, a of the Departments of War and Navy.”2 small number of elite East Coast and West Coast uni- Prior to the formation of the OSRD in June of 1941, versities and research institutions received the bulk of the NDRC oversaw research into a variety of advanced the research work. This led to shortages of scientific weapons technologies, including rocket propulsion. labor at these institutions and concerns that too few Rocket work initially fell under Division A (Armor and researchers had too many critical research projects in Ordnance), Section H (Investigation on Propulsion) of their portfolios. Formal information sharing was also the NDRC, which was chaired by Clarence N. Hick- lacking, which led to duplication of research efforts and man. Hickman was a physicist at Bell Telephone Labo- wasted time, energy, and money. While efforts were ratories who, as a graduate student, had worked briefly made throughout the war to address these issues, they with Robert H. Goddard on solid-fuel rockets for the were never completely resolved.7 Army Signal Corps in World War I. Shortly after the In the case of rockets and rocket propulsion, initial creation of the NDRC, Hickman, with Goddard’s ap- work at the behest of the NDRC began in the early fall proval, had written a letter to the head of Bell Labs, of 1940. Hickman’s advocacy for new research on rock- Frank B. Jewett, discussing the various military appli- ets as military weapons attracted little interest within cations of rockets.3 Jewett was also president of the Na- the Army Ordnance Department and Navy Bureau of tional Academy of Sciences and a founding member of Ordnance with one exception: rocket-accelerated ar- the NDRC. Hickman’s advocacy helped to secure him a mor-piercing bombs. The Navy Bureau of Ordnance position as chairman for the NDRC’s rocket propulsion viewed rocket acceleration as a means for imparting ae- section, which offered him great influence over rocket rial bombs with greater accuracy and penetration power. Page 2 Energetics Research Group, Spring 2021 Unidentified U.S. Navy LSM(R) launching barrage rockets at the shore near Pokishi Shima, near Okinawa, prior to American invasion in May of 1945. Image courtesy of the Library of Congress. Naval staff believed that this would enhance the effec- through dies. The ensuing grains had to be small or thin tiveness of land- and carrier-based aircraft. The Bureau in order for the solvent to evaporate completely, which of Ordnance offered Hickman’s NDRC-sponsored team made them unsuitable for rockets that needed thicker research space at the Naval Proving Ground at Dahl- and wider propellant grains. The British, on the other gren, Va., along the bank of the Potomac River. The fa- hand, employed dry extrusion of double-base propel- cilities at Dahlgren eventually proved insufficient, and lants through rolling and pressure to produce larger in early 1941 the Navy moved the researchers to the powder grains much more suitable for rocket motors. Naval Powder Factory at Indian Head, Md., where they Hickman’s team encouraged Hercules to pursue the continued their solid-propellant research under the title dry extrusion method in consultation with British pow- of the Jet Propulsion Research Committee.8 der manufacturers, but the American firm was hesitant Hickman’s research team struggled to find a work- to introduce the unfamiliar and potentially hazardous able solid propellant for rocket testing. Double-base manufacturing practice to its existing powder mills.9 propellants, which contained both nitroglycerin and ni- At the same time that the NDRC research team was trocellulose, were deemed by the researchers to be the beginning its investigations into rocket propulsion, a only propellants suitable for rockets. Hickman’s team British delegation led by Sir Henry Tizard visited the focused on ballistite, manufactured by the Hercules U.S. to enlist the help of American researchers with a Powder Company, but at the time Hercules only pro- number of secret military technology development pro- duced ballistite in sheets for larger weapons and small grams that the British had begun to pursue prior to the grains for small arms, such as rifles. Neither suited outbreak of war in Europe. While the U.S. was official- the needs of the rocket researchers and they began to ly neutral at the time, the Roosevelt Administration and investigate purpose-made, double-base rocket propel- the armed services jumped at the opportunity to acquire lants. The American process for extruding double-base information about British technical advances in ex- propellants into grains involved suspending the powder change for American financial and research support.